THE CHALLENGES OF CHANGE:
IN THE 21ST CENTURY AND CONTINUING NEED FOR REFORM

International Ankara Seminar of the Project on Challenges of Peace Operations: Into the 21st Century

18 - 20 November 2003
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IN THE 21ST CENTURY AND 
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18-20 November 2003

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Center for Strategic Research
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The challenges of peace operations facing the international community are comprehensive and significant, and continue to evolve. The launch in 2002 of the report by the Panel on UN Peace Operations, the so called Brahimi Report, provided an invaluable catalyst for reform of the way in which UN peace operations are being conducted. It was an important vehicle for change, in the United Nations system, and specifically, in the UN Secretariat. Implementation activities of various kinds have been carried out. However, much work still remains to be done, by the UN, but also and primarily by the Member States.

Bearing in mind the ongoing need for reform, and as part of the project “Challenges of Peace Operations: Into the 21st Century”, the so called “Challenges Project”, the Center for Strategic Research of Turkey in cooperation with the University of Bilkent, the Turkish National Police, and the Swedish Folke Bernadotte Academy co-hosted an international Challenges Seminar in Ankara in November 2003.

The continually changing nature of UN-mandated peace operations has been illustrated in a variety of conflict areas over the last few years. Acknowledging that each conflict requires a tailor-made response, best practices can nevertheless be identified; both in operations that have rendered wide appraise, and have yet to achieve major results. Useful lessons have been identified and learned from experiences of mission failures. The Ankara Seminar covered a broad range of issues and perspectives; policy, academic, diplomatic, military, police, humanitarian and legal, as well as mission case studies; Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Afghanistan and Iraq. Representatives of the UN, AU, NATO, EU, OSCE, and the IAPTC shared their perspectives on the topics. The international experts and seminar participants shed important light on many of the major challenges facing the international community today.

The findings generated in Ankara, in addition to their presentation in this Ankara Challenges Seminar Report, will provide an important substantive input to the conception and development of the Challenges Project Phase II Concluding Report to be finalized in 2005. The Partner Organizations have decided the overall focus of Phase II to be on “Meeting the Challenges of Peace Operations: Cooperation and Coordination”. The Concluding Report of Phase II will address issues of cooperation and coordination on multinational and multifunctional peace operations at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. The Report will emphasize a limited number of functional areas and provide practical recommendations for enhanced effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy of multinational peace operations. The primary target audience of the project will continue to be the Member States of the United Nations.

Moreover, the tragic terrorist attacks taking place in Istanbul at the time of the Ankara Seminar brought home the importance of cross national and cross-professional cooperation and coordination on means and methods of responding to emerging challenges.

On behalf of the extended family of Challenges Partner Organizations, I would like to extend a note of appreciation and gratitude to our Turkish colleagues. Their professionalism displayed in the preparations and conduct of the Seminar, and making it a successful step in the Challenges Project process, serves as a reminder of Turkey’s long-standing and outstanding contributions to a significant number of peace operations over the years.

Michael Sahlin, Ambassador
Director - General of the Folke Bernadotte Academy
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank all the contributors of this compiled book of texts, mainly composed of statements made during the Ankara Seminar titled “Challenges of Change: The Nature of Peace Operations in the 21st Century and the Continuing Need for Reform” held within the framework of Challenges Project.

I am particularly grateful to Folke Bernadotte Academy of Sweden led by Ambassador Michael Sahlin and his able staff; Mr. Jonas Alberoth, Ms. Annika Hilding-Norberg and Ms. Charlotte Svensson, and other Swedish Partners who have made the Ankara Seminar not only possible, but also contributed to its success.

Having shared our efforts in organising and hosting the Seminar, I am pleased to extend my sincere thanks to the Administration of the Promotion Fund of the Prime Ministry, the Bilkent University and Bilkent Hotel, the National Police Department, and the other Turkish authorities for their active participation, generous contributions, and facility and staff allocations.

I would like to add to my list of gratitude Jacques Paul Klein, UN Under Secretary General; Adam Kobieracki, Assistant Secretary General for Operations, NATO; Ambassador Lamberto Zannier, Director of OSCE Conflict Prevention Center; Ambassador Ki Doulaye Corentin, Head of the Conflict Management Center, AU; Hans Bernhard Weisserth, Head of ESDP Task Force Policy Unit, EU. I am also grateful to all the distinguished guests, civilian and military personalities who have contributed with their experiences and presentations to the Seminar.

I would like to express my special appreciation and thanks to Mr. Derek Boothby who has selflessly assisted us in compiling and editing of the whole text in cooperation with Mr. İhsan Yücel, Head of Department, SAM.

Finally, my special thanks go to all personnel of the Center for Strategic Research (SAM) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, who has dedicated themselves to the success of the Ankara Seminar. In this context, I would like to commend especially the efforts of Mr. İhsan Yücel and Ms. Emel Derinöz-Tekin and thank them for their contributions in all the stages of the Seminar.

Last but not least, I rightfully acknowledge with thanks the good work done by the assisting staff in various administrative, travel and accommodation arrangements, social programmes and Cappadocia excursion, involving the memorable balloon trip.

The Ankara Seminar has constituted a first in the Project in so far as it provided the participation of an additional number of international organizations involved in peacekeeping. Accordingly, it has enabled us to draw the road map of Phase II of the Project in a broader conceptual basis. Turkey, having taken part in almost all peace operations since the foundation of the UN, has found the opportunity of exchanging valuable experience. I feel privileged to represent the Turkish share in this timely and justifiable Project.

Murat Bilhan, Ambassador
Chairman of the Center for Strategic Research
OPENING SESSION
MESSAGE BY H.E. AHMET NECDET SEZER
President of the Republic of Turkey

I warmly welcome all participants to the seminar on peace operations. I am confident that this seminar will contribute to a better understanding of the problems encountered in conducting peacekeeping operations and to the international efforts aimed at finding a solution to these problems.

In the changing geostrategic environment of our era, we must be ready to face new risks and challenges. Following the end of the Cold War, uncertainties surfaced in the sphere of security, especially ethnic and religious conflicts, that threaten global peace and stability and underscore how cautious we ought to be in maintaining peace.

The escalation of regional conflicts poses a threat to world peace. In order to cope with the new risks and challenges of the 21st century, prudent nations have acknowledged the need for peacekeeping operations and that new military capabilities are required to conduct these operations successfully.

Finding solutions to problems threatening peace, conflict prevention and establishing, quickly and efficiently, a durable and just peace are of utmost importance. In close cooperation with the United Nations, Turkey takes part in various activities aimed at preventing conflict and securing peace.

In order to establish peace and stability in its region and beyond, Turkey has actively participated in peacekeeping operations led by the United Nations, NATO and the OSCE and will continue to provide concrete contributions to ongoing efforts in that direction.

I believe that this seminar will offer a good opportunity for a productive exchange of views on the problems of peacekeeping operations. I congratulate the distinguished organizers and executive officials of the Center for Strategic Research, Bilkent University and the Folke Bernadotte Academy of Sweden. I wish success and health to all those who will contribute to this useful seminar.
MESSAGE BY H.E. RECEP TAYYİP ERDOĞAN

Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey

I am truly pleased that the 13th International Seminar on the Challenges of Peace Operations into the 21st century is being held in Ankara at a time when international developments mandate a thorough assessment of the topic. I commend the Centre of Strategic Research of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Folke Bernadotte Academy of Sweden, the Turkish National Police Force and Bilkent University for this timely initiative.

At the outset, I wish to pay tribute to the memories of the late Sergio Vieira de Mello, Under Secretary General and UN Special Representative for Iraq and his colleagues as well as the late Anna Lindh, Foreign Minister of Sweden. This seminar regrettably coincides with the tragic loss of our innocent citizens during the heinous terrorist attacks in Istanbul on 15 November 2003. This criminal act has once again proved that no nation or region is immune from terrorism, which requires international solidarity and joint action. We are determined to continue our fight against this global scourge in every possible way.

The contemporary security risks and threats can no longer be defined in conventional terms. Conflicts are increasingly occurring not between but within nations. Terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, human and drug trafficking, organized crime and corruption, racism, xenophobia, fundamentalism and environmental degradation among others are multidimensional threats to international peace and security. These challenges do not threaten only specific nations or interests; instead they challenge humanity as a whole and therefore need to be addressed through international solidarity. The need for effective international organizations is more pronounced than ever.

The United Nations was indeed created in response to the security threats of a former era. However, it still has a central role to play in confronting contemporary challenges. In this context, the ongoing process of adapting the United Nations to the swiftly changing realities of our world is a high priority for the international community. Today, dedicated UN officials serve on the front lines in new risk regions of the world with a whole range of tasks from peacekeeping to humanitarian assistance. Within the framework of the ongoing reform process, increasing the security and ameliorating the working conditions of the United Nations personnel is a crucial task. With this understanding, Turkey has recently taken the necessary steps to become a party to the 1994 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel. Furthermore, a UN Standby Arrangement System is being established in order to provide the UN with instant peacekeeper deployment capability in case of a threat to international peace and security. Turkey has announced that it is prepared to provide a contingent of 100 personnel from the Ministry of Interior, in addition to a battalion already pledged since 1997.

In the volatile geography that Turkey finds herself, we seek to actively contribute to peace and stability. This active endeavour is a result of a growing demand in Turkey, as well as in the world, for the realization of a peace dividend. I believe that our highest priority should be directed towards preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention. However, effective peacekeeping capabilities are also essential. My country, in close cooperation with
the United Nations, has accumulated over the years a vast experience in regional cooperation, conflict prevention and peacekeeping and has participated in a wide range of United Nations peace operations. We maintain that peacekeeping missions should be conducted in accordance with clearly defined mandates. Appropriate training is vital for the success of peacekeeping forces. We also believe that the UN must be endowed with the necessary resources to fulfil peacekeeping tasks.

Turkey is determined to remain a major contributor to peace, security and stability in her region and beyond. My government pursues a multidimensional and balanced foreign policy that is active in various geographies and continues to believe in the fundamental role of the United Nations in the current international environment. Against this background, in a bid to serve international peace and stability, Turkey has decided to present its candidature for a non-permanent seat in the Security Council for the term 2009 – 2010. I am confident that the deliberations at this seminar will help improve UN peacekeeping in accordance with the needs of our time.
SPEECH BY GUEST OF HONOUR

H.E. Abdullah Gül
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey

I would like to begin my remarks by warmly welcoming you all to the 13th International Seminar on the Challenges of Peace operations into the 21st century. I am confident that this seminar will provide opportunity for a most fruitful discussion on a highly pertinent and important subject matter for the entire international community. I hope that all attending will benefit from this initiative of the Centre for Strategic Research of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, organized in cooperation with Turkish National Police Force, Bilkent University and the Folke Bernadotte Academy of Sweden.

We also pay tribute today to the memory of those who have lost their lives in the service of peace. We remember the late Sergio Vieira de Mello, Under Secretary General of the United Nations and his colleagues, who fell victim to terrorism during their mission to Iraq. Similarly, we honour the memory of the late Anna Lindh, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden, who was tragically slain less than three months ago. This meeting is taking place as we in Turkey also mourn the tragic loss of innocent civilians at the hands of terrorists in Istanbul last Saturday. This horrendous act of terror has unfortunately claimed many lives and left hundreds of citizens wounded. Terrorism committed in any part of the world is in fact an act directed at humanity as a whole. We condemn this hateful crime in strongest terms. We must fight against it as a united front, if we are to eradicate this scourge from face of the earth.

Ladies and gentlemen, during the course of the next three days, this seminar will address the issue of the changing nature of peace operations especially in the phase of new threats and challenges to international peace and security in this new century. These discussions will cover just about every aspect of peace operations, the need for constant reform in international policy, police, military, civil rights as well as academic, legal human rights and coordination perspectives. Lessons drawn for a wide range of operations in the Balkans, Africa, the Gulf, near and far Asia will shed light on the problems encountered and solutions that need to be found.

The world has undergone fundamental transformation in the post-Cold War period. The potential today for large-scale warfare has been greatly minimized. However, our search for peace persists as many regions of the world continue to suffer from tensions and conflicts. Moreover, just as the world has changed, so has the nature of threats to global security and stability. Yet, despite all these changes, the United Nations remains central to our efforts in the maintenance of international peace and security. Peacekeeping is an invention of the UN that has brought stability to many areas of tension around the globe. Today, peace operations continue to serve as an important tool for the organization in fulfilling its mandate to preserve peace and security.

The new threats and challenges that we face in the 21st century require a renewed commitment to peacemaking and enforcement efforts. In the same way we need innovative thinking and solutions for the challenges confronted in the area of peace operations.
Certainly conflict prevention should be at the top of our agenda. The best contribution of the international community to peace and security is still avoiding the outbreak of hostilities by means of preventive diplomacy. Prevention is always better than a cure, but it is equally important to improve our peacekeeping capacity to save more lives when preventive diplomacy fails and conflict proves inevitable.

In times of crisis, speed is of essence. Experience has taught us that delayed action is costly both in terms of human suffering and resources. The ability to act quickly often makes the difference between life and death, failure and success. An important aspect of modern peacekeeping is better planning, preparation, coordination and maintaining capabilities for rapid deployment of both military and police. Additional steps need to be taken to increase the United Nations’ capacity for, and speed of, intervention. In the framework of the efforts to enhance the UN’s rapid deployment capacity, Turkey joined the UN Standby Arrangement System and the military “on-call list”. We indicated our intention to provide a battalion to this system in 1997 and also informed the UN that the Ministry of Interior would assign an additional contingent of 100 personnel. The Declaration of Mutual Intent regarding our participation in this system was signed in June 2000.

Another important issue associated with peace operations is providing safety and security for the forces and personnel serving in Blue Helmets, who place their lives at risk and in harm’s way for the noble cause of peace and security. Regrettably, many who are in conflict zones to save the peace and provide humanitarian assistance often become the targets of aggression themselves. More than 1500 admirable men and women have lost their lives in such missions under the UN flag. Turkey has therefore recently taken steps to become a party to the 1994 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel.

Training of peacekeeping personnel is also a vital component of successful operations of this nature. Turkey established a Partnership for Peace Training Centre in Ankara in 1998. We are at the disposal of the UN to enhance its training capacity for peacekeeping with the centre.

We should also not forget that no nation can be fully at peace when its neighbour is not, nor can conflicts be contained to one region as they have spill-over effects that affect a much larger geography. More countries must therefore be prepared to contribute their fair share to the maintenance of international peace and stability by participating in peace operations. Turkey has always been aware of this responsibility and its forces, both military and police, have served to secure peace and stability worldwide within the UN and NATO. We have placed our resources at the disposal of peace operations in a wide geography ranging from the Balkans to Africa and Asia. Our commitment to peacekeeping efforts dates back to the Korean War where the heroic service of Turkish troops is remembered to this day. Turkey currently takes part in several UN peacekeeping operations around the world. Turkey’s active policy in this field has been demonstrated in its involvement in various operations and missions in Somali, the former Yugoslavia, Bosnia – Herzegovina, Kosovo, Georgia, East Timor, North Korea, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Turkey’s command of ISAF-II in Afghanistan is one more recent example.

Turkey is therefore in a position to make substantive contributions to the discussion on the need for continuing reform and the future course of peace operations with the vast experience gained from these missions. Some of the conclusions we have drawn are the
need for a clearly defined mandate, the consent of the parties to the conflict, transparency, limited duration of mission, impartiality and credibility. These are factors that make for successful peacekeeping operations.

The United Nations and its Security Council are the key actors in the peace effort when international stability is at stake. For example, evolving conditions in neighbouring Iraq point to the need for greater involvement of the United Nations in the reconstruction of Iraq and humanitarian assistance as well as in the restoration of security and stability.

We believe that the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations can be greatly increased. This can be done through a more transparent functioning of the United Nations Security Council. An efficient consultation mechanism with troop-contributing countries can be instrumental in this regard. Close consultation and coordination among countries participating in these operations is also of importance. The new procedures adopted by the Security Council that expand the range of its consultation mechanism have been useful. We hope that further steps to this end will follow.

It takes just one glance at the world map to see that Turkey is in close proximity with many of the current conflict spots and potential new threats that are high on the international community’s agenda. This has placed a special responsibility on Turkey. As one of the founding member of the United Nations, Turkey has always been committed to upholding the noble goals and principles enshrined in the UN Charter. Its record in actively contributing to the preservation of regional and global peace and stability speaks for itself.

Yet, Turkey has not been represented on the Security Council for almost half a century. Turkey believes that it will be better equipped to bring further contributions to international peace and security as a member of Security Council. This is precisely why it has announced its candidacy for election to a non-permanent seat of this important body for the term 2009 – 2010.

On this note, I complete my comments and wish the seminar every success in elaborating on the ways and means of reform required so that the international community maybe better equipped to meet the peace operations challenges of our century.
This morning I have the pleasure of welcoming and co-hosting the participants in an International Seminar on Peace Operations. This is one in a series of seminars within the framework of a project with the title ‘Challenges of Peace Operations: Into the 21st Century’ that is being conducted by a number of partner organizations from several countries and originally and continuously coordinated by Swedish partners. The first phase of this project, from 1997 to 2002, was carried out by institutions from a variety of countries from all continents, not necessarily sharing membership in the same blocks or alliances, but sharing the same peace-loving values, the only common denominator probably being that they are from among the ones who have contributed substantially to peace operations in the world, by contributing troops, financial support, humanitarian assistance, or in some other way. These institutions have been assisted by international organizations and primarily by the United Nations.

The second phase of this valuable project is expected to be completed in 2005, when a final report will be submitted to the Secretary General of the United Nations.

We all know that there are many similar initiatives and continuing processes to improve peacekeeping, peacemaking, conflict management, and crisis prevention, and studying norms setting, legitimacy, legal aspects, operational problems and many other facets of peace operations. Probably, like my country, the countries and organizations represented here are participating in other similar events. All these activities are encouraged and sometimes supported by the UN Fourth Committee. These ongoing meetings, conferences and seminars all share the same purposes, perhaps with some different participants. I hope our project will be one of the outstanding success stories in this field.

Turkey, as your host country on this occasion, has an extensive and comprehensive experience to share with you in the field of peace operations. I believe that we have participated in some way in most, if not exactly all, peace operations since the foundation of the United Nations organization. In many of these cases, Turkey has sent troops to keep peace, and occasionally to make peace. In some of them she has sent observers, experts, international judges; in others she has contributed humanitarian assistance in kind, by sending aid materials, medical staff, food or other support. Turkey has always tried to fulfill the obligations and responsibilities normally expected from her by the international community.

Turkey is one of the very few countries in the world, in that it has not taken part in any war for the last 80 years, including the Second World War. This is the longest period of peace in Turkish history, and it is also despite our extremely difficult geography. We have managed to get through without involving ourselves in the tragedy of war for all those years, thanks to our policy of peace.

Now, I give the floor to Ambassador Michael Sahlin of the Folke Bernadotte Academy to present the project to you.
I see in front of me a huge crowd of experience in peacekeeping and peace operations and it is going to be a very interesting event for the next few days. So, on behalf of the wider Challenges Partnership, we wish to thank our Turkish friends for hosting this Seminar, the 13th of its kind. The number 13 normally means bad luck, at least in Sweden it does, but in this case it does not, I am sure.

We appreciate the importance of a seminar on peace operations being hosted in Ankara, given the experience of Turkish peacekeepers - military, police and civilian - in UN peace operations. We heard the Minister and now you, Ambassador, outline some of the highlights of this impressive record. Frankly, I did not know that Turkey has been in all or almost all UN sponsored peace operations. The Folke Bernadotte Academy is very proud to have worked with you on organizing this conference and I am sure that we are going to have some very interesting days. You have been able, as host, to give this topic a very high political profile here in Turkey and the attendance here is something that leads us to look forward to the next few days with much anticipation.

There was a moment of silence for Anna Lindh and for Sergio Vieira De Mello. Their tragic deaths are constant reminders that the force of terrorism strikes not only at foreign minister or high representative level, but strikes everywhere, including the other day at the level of ordinary people in Istanbul. We regret that event very much and share the feeling of sadness and outrage at what has happened and what continues to happen. In mentioning the topic of terrorism, I recall that the last time that the Challenge’s Partners convened for a session was in Stockholm in May, where you, Ambassador, were visiting for the first time. There, apart from the discussions concerning the Project, a seminar on the theme of peace operations and counter-terrorism was held. The results of those deliberations are published in a book and now available, as from today, and I think you will find it interesting reading.

As Foreign Minister Gül and you have already pointed out, this seminar carrying the title of “Challenges of Change in the Nature of Peace Operations and the Continuing Need for Reform” is very timely.

This month the Project Director of the Brahimi Report has issued a study of the implementation of recommendations made by the highly useful and highly praised Brahimi Report. A brief look at that most recent text shows that whereas the UN is doing reasonable work by way of implementing the recommendations of the Brahimi Report, there are still problems. I am sure that Mr. Klein will later outline to us some of the problems concerning Member States and their willingness really to contribute to the extent that most of us believe is objectively needed. I am sure that this will be a theme throughout the three days of the Seminar. The momentum for reform of peace operations to make them more robust, more complex, more multidimensional is something that needs to be continuously nourished and I am sure that such a nourishment will flow from this Seminar. So, we look forward to having very open, frank, non-rhetorical exchanges during this week, which will allow us to put forward concrete recommendations and proposals.
Such recommendations and proposals will have different functions, and the host country will be able to use them in different ways: for example, by presenting them to the UN Special Committee for Peacekeeping Operations and in other forums where there is a need constantly for inputs from inside and outside. There are also different ways in which a host country of a Challenges Seminar may disseminate information. The results of this Seminar will also be an important step in the framework of the Challenges Project. It has already been mentioned that this project aims at a concluding event in 2005, and who knows what we shall decide to do after 2005. We shall have deliberations here in Ankara on how to conceive and develop this process. As steps towards this, we shall have other seminars following this one in Ankara, and I am happy to say that just before this session General Agwai has allowed me to announce that the Nigerian Government has declared its willingness to host our next seminar. Subsequently, there will be another seminar in China later in 2004. So ladies and gentlemen, distinguished participants, we are very happy to take part in this conference. It is very timely and will be remembered as an important stepping stone in the Challenges process.

I will now ask my colleague Annika Hilding-Norberg, who has been in this project ever since its inception, to describe the Challenges Project and its objectives more fully so that you all may understand the larger framework.
I join Ambassador Sahlin in expressing our deep gratitude to our Turkish colleagues and generous hosts who have organized it in a very professional, hospitable and generous way. The seminar promises to be both thought-provoking and fruitful.

This is the 13th seminar in the framework of the Challenges Project. The first phase of the project was brought to a close by the presentation of a Concluding Report by the Foreign Minister of Sweden, the late Anna Lindh, on behalf of all the Partners of the Project, to Secretary-General Kofi A. Annan at UN Headquarters, New York, on 25 April 2002. The report made recommendations to troop contributing countries, informed Member States on current peace operations developments and contributed to the process of reform of UN peace operations. The report was a product of a series of seminars held during the previous five years in nine countries around the world and attended by a wide range of highly experienced civilian and military peacekeepers and academics from some 230 organizations and 50 countries. Subsequently, Partners agreed to a second phase of the Challenges Project, addressing some of the specific challenges identified in the Phase I Concluding Report, and to report again in 2005.

As recognized in the background paper for this seminar; it is clear that the implementation and practice of peace does not stand still: in a world that is constantly subject to change, reform has to be a continuing activity. The project, beginning with a first seminar in Stockholm in 1997, is a living and evolving process.

The objective of the project is to foster and encourage a culture of cross-professional cooperation and partnership with the primary objective of making practical recommendations that will benefit the effectiveness and legitimacy of multinational and multidisciplinary peace operations.

The Challenges Project is a joint effort by a multiplicity of Partner Organizations around the world. The following organizations form the steering group of the project:

- Folke Bernadotte Academy of Sweden (in cooperation with the Swedish Armed Forces, National Defence College, and the National Police Board),
- Russian Public Policy Centre,
- Jordan Institute of Diplomacy,
- Institute for Security Studies in Pretoria,
- United States Institute of Peace,
- United Services Institution of India,
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan,
- Pearson Peacekeeping Centre of Canada,
- Argentine Armed Forces Joint Staff (in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs),
- Asia Pacific Centre for Military Law (in cooperation with the Australian Defence Force),
- Turkish Centre for Strategic Research of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (in cooperation with the National Police Directorate and the University of Bilkent),
China Institute for International Strategic Studies.

The overall project is coordinated by the Folke Bernadotte Academy in cooperation with the Swedish Armed Forces, National Police Board and National Defence College.

Discussions on the practice and theory of peace operations are combined with issues of education and training. Additional organizations that have contributed to the project effort with their perspectives on the issues are the following:

- CENCAMEX Gendarmerie Peacekeeping Training Centre, Argentina
- Commonwealth of Independent States HQ for Military Cooperation & Coordination
- Partnership for Peace Training Centre of Turkey
- Royal Police Academy of Jordan
- South African Army War College
- Swedish International Centre
- United Service Institution of India Centre for UN Peacekeeping
- UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations Training and Evaluation Service
- UN Institute for Training and Research Programme of Correspondence
- United States Army Peacekeeping Institute
- Vystrel Peacekeeping Academy, Russian Federation
- Zarqa Peacekeeping Centre, Jordan

The multitude of financial contributors and sponsors of the overall project illustrate the truly multinational character of the effort, and include the governments, armed forces and/or police of:

- Argentina
- Australia
- Canada
- China
- India
- Japan
- Jordan
- Nigeria
- Norway
- Russian Federation
- South Africa
- Sweden
- Turkey
- United States

Moreover, important contributions have been made by the following organizations:

- AusAID of Australia
- Defence Corporate Services & Infrastructure, Australia
- Hanns Seidel Foundation
- Jordan Radio & Television Corporation
- Kluwer Law International
- London School of Economics
- Jordan Ministry of Tourism & Antiquities
- NATO Information & Liaison Office
- Royal Court of Jordan
- Susan & Elihu Rose Foundation
- UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
University of Melbourne, Australia
University of Bilkent, Turkey

Finally, the project coordination is financed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Armed Forces and National Police Force of Sweden.

So, what are we going to do in the second phase of the project, between now and 2005?

A review of the conclusions and recommendations of the Concluding Report of Phase I of the Challenges Project in April 2002, the Secretary-General’s Report to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations¹, the report of that committee’s March 2003 meeting², recent statements by the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, and the Partner Organizations’ discussions in Sweden in May 2003, provides a list of topics, sub-topics and questions that seem worthy of study:

a. what should be the respective roles of the United Nations and regional organizations?
b. what are the ways and means of strengthening regional capacities, particularly in Africa?
c. how do we most effectively
   - further improve multinational, multicultural and multidisciplinary cooperation and coordination?
   - explore more deeply complexities related to the rule of law, preventive action and peace-building
   - strengthen training and education
   - integrate lessons learned and best practices into operational planning,
   - enhance rapid deployment
   - minimize disciplinary problems
d. what are the approaches and methods of achieving good media relations
e. what types of expertise should the UN be preparing to potentially include in future operations, in order to ensure that such involvement is well informed?
f. how involved should DPKO or a UN peace operation be in security sector reform?

The evolving nature of these challenges points to issues relevant for our discussion here in Ankara:
g. what are the important implications of change for Member States?
h. how can governments, with differing resources and capabilities, best respond?
i. what might be some of the most helpful ways in which Member States could support UN peace operations?

The primary target of the Challenges Project continues to be the Member States, rather than the UN Secretariat and its agencies and programmes. An appropriate aim for the event concluding the second phase could be the sharing of findings and recommendations with policy makers to influence policy at the national level and stimulate follow-up action at regional, national and sub-national levels and in multinational fora.

The Challenges 2005 concluding event will take place some eleven months after the presentation of the report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change.

¹ UN document A/57/711 of 16 January 2003
² UN document A/57/767 of 28 March 2003
appointed by the Secretary-General on 4 November, 2003. If that report contains issues relating to peace operations, it would prove fruitful and opportune for the Member States and the Project to take them into account for the 2005 report.

Leading up to the 2005 event, in general terms the Project Partners are looking to do the following:

- Conduct four international seminars: building on the seminar findings here in Turkey, colleagues in Nigeria and China will host the next two seminars. A fourth seminar is tentatively planned in a country yet to be determined.
- The project partners will intensify research, with a view to developing practical recommendations and strategies for their implementation to enhance the international capacity to conduct multinational peace operations.

  This is suggested to be done by way of:

- Continue to publish Challenges Seminar Reports (nos. 13, 14, 15, and 16)
- Encourage Partners, based on the findings of the seminars, to develop and provide input to the United Nations.
- Encourage Partners to continue contributing seminar findings to journals, as has been done for the International Peacekeeping Yearbook, the International Peacekeeping Journal, the Diplomatic Journal of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and now Perceptions.
- Seek to continue increase the available literature on peace operations in the official languages of the UN: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Spanish, as we did by publishing the Executive Summary of the Phase I Concluding Report in all six languages.

The development of useful findings and practical recommendations is essential to our effort in the next few days. In addition, the activities in the margins of the seminars are aimed at encouraging informal contacts and new cooperative ventures to flourish. For example, to date, spin-offs from the Challenges process have included training and education exchanges, cooperation between partner organizations and countries, a contribution towards the establishment of an Early Warning Centre for Africa, and cooperation on book and journal projects.

Finally, the Challenges Project web-site (www.peacechallenges.net) has been updated thanks to our very hard-working and professional colleague, Charlotte Svensson.

We all look forward to this seminar. We welcome your contributions to and participation in the evolving Challenges Project.
There is an old maxim in peacekeeping – before you ask a wise man, ask someone who has done it. I am pleased to see here this morning so many people who have done it.

It is a great pleasure to address this important conference. I would like to thank the organizers for giving me the opportunity to discuss my views of the challenges and future of United Nations peacekeeping. My basic standpoint may be simply stated. UN peacekeeping, which was out of fashion for a period, is now back. The UN has a unique legal and moral authority as well as valuable operational experience in international peacekeeping. While the increasing calls for peacekeeping missions make cooperation and burden sharing essential, the UN is—and should remain—the nucleus of activity.

I speak as a practitioner with eight years experience in both UN and non-UN operations. I deliver my remarks today in my capacity as the SRSG to Liberia but I will also draw on my experience from the Balkans—heading UNMIBH and UNTAES.

I will divide my comments into two parts. First, an overview of the important qualities and strengths of UN peacekeeping. Secondly, I will outline what I have come to recognize as five prerequisites for success once the decision has been made to engage. They are: a clear mandate; a solid organizational structure; strategic planning; strength in leadership and support; and finally, an organized closure of the mission.

The UN Contribution to Peacekeeping

I am often asked “what is the unique contribution of the UN as a peacekeeping organization?” To my mind the UN has five important qualities.

First is the unique legal and moral authority of the UN Charter. Even amidst all the horrors of the Bosnian war, it remained the only document that was never rejected by any party. Perhaps more than any other document, it represents the common understanding of mankind of the principles that should govern international relations in support of human dignity.

Second, the administrative experience of the UN in fielding peacekeeping missions is unparalleled. In the past 50 years, over 750,000 personnel have been deployed. The professional infrastructure for peacekeeping is well established and accomplished. As the US government has discovered in Iraq, successful peacekeeping requires a different skill set from warfare.

Third, the United Nations brings a legitimacy that other organizations do not necessarily have. While regional organizations bring important qualities to the table, such as
in-depth knowledge of the conflict, experience, and diplomatic resolve, they are sometimes charged with acting in the self-interest of leading member states. The UN is by definition representative of the whole international community and cannot as easily be accused of partiality.

Fourth, in Africa in particular, we all too often see how the willing are not able and the able are not willing. In spite of chronic under-funding, the UN has significantly more resources than other likely peacekeeping candidates. In both Liberia and Sierra Leone, ECOWAS has shown great commitment and timely action. But it has not always been able to provide the essential logistical support, equipment, and training to carry out large-scale peacekeeping tasks. Therefore the UN partnership with regional and sub-regional organizations such as the African Union and ECOWAS is absolutely essential.

The UN can also assist ECOWAS in addressing the regional dimension of conflicts in West Africa, much of which stems from Liberia. With the resources and knowledge accumulated in the region—we have UN missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone and potentially in Cote d’Ivoire and we have a UN Office for West Africa in Senegal—the need for a regional approach can and should be easily met.

Fifth, the multiethnic and multinational nature of UN peacekeeping is itself an asset. In UNMIBH (the UN Mission in Bosnia & Herzegovina), 43 nations contributed police contingents. Between military and police, the numbers for UNMIL will likely be similar. Many of these nations have themselves suffered ethnic conflict and have found the path to reconciliation and democracy. Their positive example sends a powerful message that local problems are not unsolvable, that there is always a way forward and that, with perseverance, peace can be self-sustaining.

Five Fundamentals for Success

In the second part of my address today, I would like to outline five fundamentals I have identified for a peacekeeping operation to be successful.

1. A Clear, Credible, and Achievable Mandate

A clear, credible, and achievable mandate sets the pace for all that follows: the appropriate force size and composition, rules of engagement, and resource intensity. It stands to reason that a confusing mandate will only lead to confusion on the ground.

UNPROFOR had some 70 Security Council resolutions and dozens of Presidential statements. Political negotiating authority was split between the UN, the EU, and the Contact Group. The biggest challenge for any peacekeeper was to understand what he/she was supposed to do before actually taking any action.

The Dayton Peace Accords contain no less than 150 pages divided into eleven Annexes, some 40 pages of Peace Implementation Council Declarations, 92 post-accession criteria for membership in the Council of Europe, and a plethora of further agreements, particularly with the EU and the IFIs. Many of these decisions were never fulfilled. Others never got off the ground and now languish in cyberspace on a series of web-sites.
In contrast, the mandate of UNTAES (the UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slovenia, Croatia) contained just 13 sentences that could be distilled into six quantifiable objectives. And UNMIBH, which successfully completed its mandate before its termination on 31 December 2002, did so under the authority of 7 resolutions that were further operationalised through its Mandate Implementation Plan. Comprising 6 practical core goals and corresponding programmes, that plan was both our guide and exit strategy.

My point here is twofold: if you start out and you don’t know where you are going, you will probably end up somewhere else. And secondly, the mandate is the floor (but not the ceiling) for everything the Mission does. If the mandate is vague for whatever reason—including the inability of Security Council members to agree on a political end state—dysfunction will plague the lifespan of the mission.

2. A Clear Organizational Structure

This brings me to the second prerequisite for success—a clear organizational structure. Here, let me be rather controversial about the relationship between the military and civilian components of a Mission. The failure of the dual key system in UNPROFOR does not justify the division of a Mission into separate and parallel military and civilian chains of command.

As the Transitional Administrator of UNTAES, I had command and control of both the civilian part of the mission and the military force in an integrated organizational concept. I delegated operational control to my Force Commander. He and I worked in tandem, but the political direction of all Mission components was always in my hands. It worked exceptionally well by making the military force an integral part of the civilian and political process. We are now working with the same structure in UNMIL, which already is making our tasks easier. In UNMIL, as was done in UNAMSIL, we are also integrating our work with the UN agencies by the appointment of the Humanitarian Coordinator as Deputy SRSG for Rehabilitation, Recovery, and Reconstruction.

By contrast, in BiH the military dimension overwhelmed the civilian peace-building aspects. And IFOR was able to limit and circumscribe its own role to such an extent that civilian implementation arguably became exceedingly difficult. We are all aware of the failure to capture notorious war criminals such as Karadzic and Mladic whose continued liberty is a sign of the impotence of the West in the face of evil. If you cannot punish the guilty, you cannot absolve the innocent.

The other point I would make about organizational structure is to question the effectiveness of multiple organizations working in a “Pillar” structure. The UNTAES Mission was fully integrated—we sequentially brought in specialist organizations (the EC, the Council of Europe, UN Volunteers, bilateral donors) for specific tasks according to our overall plan and timetable.

In contrast, the Dayton Accords mandated an unprecedented number of organizations to work under the weak overall coordinating authority of the High Representative. By ignoring the tenet of “unity of command” each of the five principal organizations had its own mandate, budget, and governing body. The result was niche mandate implementation, duplication, and lack of strategic planning.
3. Clear Strategic Planning and Prioritizing

My third prerequisite for success is strategic planning and prioritization, including in resource allocation. We need to ask ourselves why BiH has received more per capita assistance than Western Europe under the whole Marshall Plan, but still remains weak and unsustainable requiring several more years of intensive international attention.

One reason is that we failed to prioritize the priorities, particularly with respect to rule of law. I have no doubt that rule of law must be placed at the centre piece of practically every peacekeeping mission. Without it, a credible exit strategy is inconceivable—international military forces cannot leave, the economy cannot recover, democracy remains a façade, and corruption and criminalization become entrenched. That is why in UNMIL we will have a solid focus on rule of law with four mission components (CIVPOL, Judicial, Corrections, and Human Rights) integrating their joint activities.

4. Leadership, Personnel, and Support

My fourth prerequisite for success is strength—strength in leadership, support, and personnel.

Leadership and support from the Security Council and key players in a “Contact Group” format is critical. As James Gow has phrased it, the debacle of UNPROFOR as a peacekeeping mission was the “Triumph of a Lack of Political Will”. In UNTAES, we enjoyed the fullest support of the Council to the extent that, when President Tudjman threatened to terminate the Mission prematurely, the Council sent him a strong message by renewing our mandate two months before it was due to expire. In UNMIBH, I enjoyed the consistent support of the Council throughout my tenure.

On the issue of personnel: it is imperative to have a critical mass of trained peacekeepers. In UNTAES, the ratio of international personnel to the local population was 1 to 15. In UNMIBH, we had one international police monitor to every 10 local police officers. Eventually, we will have sufficient strength in UNMIL as well but even as I speak, we are seeing before our eyes in places like Nimba County and other parts of rural Liberia what lack of personnel means in terms of human suffering and the loss of human life.

5. Closure and Departure

Finally, a few words about a Mission’s closure and departure. I have always maintained that the success of a mission is judged not only by what it achieves but also by how it leaves. Following the completion of the UNTAES mandate, long-term monitoring was undertaken by the OSCE to ensure local compliance with ironclad agreements brokered by the Mission. UNMIBH’s success is being sustained by the European Union Police Mission. A seamless transition occurred serving as an excellent example of the regional cooperation called for in the Brahimi Report.
Conclusion

Let me conclude by saying that there is no single answer on how to ensure a successful peacekeeping operation. But I do believe that the United Nations has the legal and moral authority and the experience and knowledge to get it right.

While there can never be a definitive operations manual, there are core lessons and best practices to be considered. Get them right, and an operation has a real chance of success. Get them wrong, and the Mission will collapse or at best flounder on indefinitely, trapping us into long-term, expensive, and seemingly endless engagements that degrade over time as political fatigue, donor fatigue, and compassion fatigue set in.

A mission stands and falls on the basis of its mandate; its organization; its strategic planning; its leadership and political support; and how it leaves.

In closing, I would like to recognize the thousands of United Nations peacekeepers—civilians, police, and military—for their determination and dedication in the service of peace. A service in which, as you know, many of them made the ultimate sacrifice. For over half a century, they have lived up to the Biblical admonition "when the question was asked whom shall we send, they stepped forward and said “send us, we will go in your name.”"

Thank you very much for your attention and my best wishes for a successful conference.

As for our perennial critics, the nay Sayers and to those who will never wish us well – there is an old Balkan proverb, the dogs may bark – but the caravan moves on.
A FIRST IN NATO

PEACE OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN

Major General Hilmi Akın Zorlu
Former Commander International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF-II)

It is an honour for me to address you, today, about the activities of ISAF and, tomorrow, about the lessons learned from the ISAF mission. My presentation will cover the following topics: ISAF-II, the security situation in Kabul, and the restructuring process in Afghanistan.

Before describing ISAF-II, I would like to say a few words in general concerning the global security situation and peace support operations. As is well-known, nowadays radical changes are taking place in both diplomatic and military terms. Following the end of the Cold War, the conventional military threat was replaced by multidirectional threats such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional uncertainties and instabilities, organized crime and drug trafficking. As Turkey is a country located in the middle of current and potential conflicts, unfortunately we already have been familiar with many kinds of these threats especially in the context of terrorism for many years. I believe that international cooperation is the only way to cope with these threats. Therefore, there is a requirement for a comprehensive approach to the concept of security. In this context, all nations should consider basing their foreign policy on the famous saying of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Turkish Republic, "Peace at home, peace in the world." Taking this saying as guidance, Turkey has been taking part in many multinational operations since the Korean War, in order to contribute regional and global peace. It is an undeniable fact that the United Nations has always played an important role in establishing regional and global peace. Today many peace support operations in different parts of the world are going on under UN mandates.

In this context, the United Nations authorized the International Security Assistance Force, known as ISAF, by UN Security Council Resolution 1386 of 20 December 2001. ISAF was tasked to assist the Afghan interim authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas. As you know, Turkey has been participating in ISAF from the beginning and I wish to take you over to Kabul, during the period of Turkish leadership of ISAF. Following the initial phase, Turkey took over the second term of command of ISAF from the United Kingdom on 20 June 2002, as authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 1413 of 23 May 2002. Normally, we should have handed over command of ISAF on 20 December 2002, but no other country was ready to take this commitment. So, the UN Security Council extended Turkish leadership until 10 February 2003. At the end of this extension, we handed over command to Germany and the Netherlands, in other words, to a German-Dutch corps. Following ISAF-III, NATO took over the responsibility of ISAF as of 11 August 2003. Turkey is still continuing to contribute to ISAF with troops and staff officers.

As to the mission of ISAF at that time, during the Turkish leadership the core mission was to assist the Afghan interim authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas. The responsibility for providing security and law and order rests with the Afghan authorities as defined in the Bonn Agreement of 5 December 2001 and also
related UN Security Council resolutions. The main threat to the security and stability of Kabul is posed by the remnants of Taliban and Al-Qaeda, as well as by various groups opposed to the existence of the transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan. Taliban and Al-Qaeda remnants are able to carry out isolated attacks and rarely disrupt daily life in the city.

During the Turkish leadership, the ISAF Headquarters was under the command and control of the Turkish General Staff. Operations were executed in coordination with US Central Command based in Tampa, Florida. At that time ISAF's area of responsibility was 50 km in the north-south direction and 45 km in the east-west direction. The total covered area was 2250 km². ISAF has authorized personnel strength of roughly 4800 from 22 countries. The ISAF leadership was able to establish excellent relations with the Afghan authorities and also worked in close coordination with the United Nations representatives. ISAF expended great efforts on initiating a comprehensive security coordination and intelligence sharing system, both among the Afghan security forces and between those forces and ISAF. ISAF conducted a strong public information campaign using all available means to describe the role and tasks of the ISAF forces. For instance, ISAF published newssheets every two weeks, giving ISAF news in English, Pushtu and Dari languages and distributed 50,000 copies throughout the city free of charge. In addition, more than 150,000 leaflets were printed and distributed during our term. ISAF also ran two radio stations, “Radio Türkiyem” and “Voice of Freedom”, broadcasting all over the area of Kabul.

I believe in that establishing and maintaining relations with a variety of civilian authorities and organizations is a very important activity in any peace support operation. Therefore, Civil-Military Cooperation Operations, known in brief as CMIC, was an essential part of ISAF activities. CMIC always played an important role, not only in the ongoing reconstruction and rehabilitation process of Kabul and its surrounding areas, but also in establishing good relations with the Afghan people. In this context, education and healthcare took priority in CMIC activities. During Turkish leadership 176 projects mainly related with education and healthcare were completed.

During ISAF-II, the security situation in Kabul was calm and quiet, and according to many surveys the crime rate was really lower than in many Western cities. That is why, after consulting with the Ministry of the Interior, the night curfew was lifted for the first time in 23 years. No major incidents occurred after the night curfew was lifted. Naturally this greatly boosted the morale of the local population and also encouraged foreign businessmen and investments to come to Kabul and to invest in some essential institutions and facilities. ISAF also tried to meet the equipment requirements of the Kabul police and security personnel serving at the entry-exit points of Kabul. It is ironic that in a country with many regional armies and a heavily armed population, only the police lacked weapons and ammunition in their hands and in their police stations.

As I mentioned earlier, the Bonn Agreement had initiated the process of restructuring in Afghanistan. The first step in this respect was the establishment of a transitional authority in Afghanistan under the leadership of President Karzai. A constitutional commission was set up under the supervision of the former King in order to adopt a new constitution by the end of 2003. The constitutional Loya Jirga will convene at the beginning of December 2003 in order to discuss and adopt a new constitution for the country. The establishment of a national army, which is very important for the security of the whole of Afghanistan, has been continuing under the leadership of the USA.
In conclusion, the progress achieved so far in the implementation of the Bonn process has been satisfactory. But, there is a lot of work to do and be achieved. In my opinion, ISAF should continue until the successful completion of the Bonn process and I believe that international efforts should continue until the ongoing process achieves success. As a final word, the international community should not repeat its mistake of earlier years of leaving Afghanistan to its own fate.
PANEL I

DISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES
AN INTERNATIONAL POLICY APPROACH

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No prevention strategy can be conceived and executed successfully without the full participation of willing and committed Member States. Much of the emphasis of, first, the Brahimi Report and, later, of the Challenges of Peace Operations, focuses on the UN, regional organizations and the peace operations themselves.

The risk of this approach is that while states are mentioned as central there is not enough focus on them, their roles and responsibilities. It is a mistake to reduce prevention and peace operations to only crisis management. It is a mistake to look at states only in their relation to one another.

The 191 Member States of the UN are the political structures of representation of the interests and needs of the world population. The ability of each of Member State to resolve its internal conflicts politically varies, greatly affecting the implementation of prevention and peace operations.

Governments, taken individually, have a much better grasp of prevention as a necessary strategy to retain power and reduce human suffering. Strengthening a state’s capacity to represent interests and needs properly, at all level of the political process (locally, nationally, regionally and internationally), should be a high priority.

In addressing the possibilities of the ‘third wave’ of prevention in a world that is structurally very different, the key actors are the Member States.

What are the new dynamics and challenges?

- Increased complexity
- Reduction in state-to-state tensions
- Greater fluidity
- Larger role of non-state actors
- New shared experiences

There are also old dynamics and challenges:

- Historical rivalries
- State formation processes
- Economic interests
- Inadequate UN system
- Burdensome cooperation

Enmity is distributed along new lines: it is frequently transnational and has powerful destabilizing effects in some states. Member States need to cooperate more and to become more ‘preventive’. No prevention strategy can be conceived and executed successfully without the full participation of willing and committed Member States.
Yet, much of the emphasis of, first, the Brahimi Report and, later, of the Challenges of Peace Operations, focuses on the UN, regional organizations and the peace operations themselves. As Secretary General Kofi Annan has repeatedly stressed “None of the critical issues we are dealing with can be resolved within a solely national framework. All of them require cooperation, partnership, and burden sharing among governments, UN, regional organizations, NGOs, private sector and civil society.”

The risk of this approach is that while states are mentioned as central there is not enough focus on them, their roles and their responsibilities. It is a mistake to reduce prevention and peace operations to only crisis management. It is a mistake to look at states only in their relation to one another. The 191 Member States of the UN are the political structures of representation of the interests and needs of the world population. The ability of each of the 191 Member States to resolve its internal conflicts politically (without violence) varies (greatly affecting the implementation of prevention and peace operations).

A sound strategy must focus on states and avoid the trap of negativity. Some of the 191 Member States have perceived ‘prevention’ as ‘interference’.
Is that fair?
Is that understandable?
Yes.

The international community is at the same time lethargic and hyperactive, depending on dynamics that are marginally influenced by less powerful Member States. However, governments, taken individually, have a much better grasp of prevention as a necessary strategy to retain power and reduce human suffering. Strengthening a state’s capacity to represent interests and needs properly, at all level of the political process (locally, nationally, regionally and internationally), should be a high priority. All cases presented in this seminar were ‘in-the-making’ for decades.

Think of Sierra Leone. The results of the war in Sierra Leone were horrific - 11 years of war, 3,000 villages and towns destroyed, half of the population displaced, agriculture and mining were disrupted. Sierra Leone was the last of 147 countries in the Human Development Index in 2002. This was not a surprise. UNDP spoke of “bad governance, denial of rights, economic mismanagement, and social exclusion”.

Violent conflict is a failure of politics and once the failure emerges it must be responded to constructively, using the opportunity created by the moment of discontinuity. The peace process in Sierra Leone produced a formal declaration of the end of war in January 2000 and a new political landscape. The peace process was predicated on the ability to transform the RUF into a political party, with 72,000 combatants disarmed. The government is controlling the territory - even if in a fragile manner - with the help of the international community. Elections were held successfully and the level of violence in the country is minimal in comparison with the war period. Yet, no one would define Sierra Leone as a ‘concluded’ case. It was possible because of the decisive political will of the Security Council and the UK. A solution was found when an appropriate political and military response was executed and made possible a political experimentation.

Success is achieved by responding properly to unique challenges. What makes a solution emerge? Sustained interaction among relevant actors, bound together in an epistemic community. Because each case is unique, unique responses must be found.
Success is determined by the ability to correctly identify and execute positive constructive responses to particular situations. We must accept that the same desire to minimize loss of lives can lead to very different actions taken by political, military, humanitarian, development or human rights actors. Moreover, while disagreements can lead to lack of cohesion, a stable communication system thrives on sustained contradictions. What we need is a proper division of labour, respectful of differences and open to collective learning. There is no alternative to dialogue, debate, and demonstration of the reasonableness of a particular position, policy, and process in a given situation. For this reason the “Challenges” initiative and this particular seminar in Ankara are so important.

Cooperation emerges out of sustained communication, personal connection and shared analysis. States should cooperate more bilaterally to improve their multilateral involvement. Bilaterally, states may find easier to value what is there and improve it.

“Always make sure that those who should pay taxes have a job and a decent salary.”

Anonymous

States should enter into more cooperation by trying ‘easier’ issues first and focusing on collective responses to their interests and needs. States are part of webs and clusters. Affinities should not be perceived negatively. The fluidity requires sustained communication, open cooperation, and effective coordination. States will not cooperate against their interests and needs. However, proper interaction will increase the chances of responding positively to their interests and needs. States - as any human organization - cooperate more and better when the engagement is voluntary, respectful, mutually binding, transparent, consistent with shared values, explicit. States must cooperate more, bilaterally, regionally, globally, in the area of policy analysis. Can the Challenges Project facilitate this through an in-between-seminar programme of visits and internships?

Turkey could welcome representatives from Nigeria and China to thoroughly share with them (and other participants who are willing to engage) its policy analysis processes. States perceive, understand and respond to threats very differently. Only sustained communication patterns can develop a shared understanding. The possibility of solutions emerging at a time of crisis will increase substantially if the network of communication is in place and effective. The fact that the war is frequently fought by non-state actors increases the need for state-to-state communication. There is no escape from the grip of politics and the 21st century must respectfully include all Member States, allowing for actual political development and fair representation of interests and needs.

There is no escape from the possibilities of politics. The new frontier is our collective understanding and practice of relational responsibility. Violent conflicts are a chaotic moment. We must capture the possibilities that they create.

States are human constructs. They are learning agents. We must make sure that all states learn interactively. For this reason, the importance of clusters, bilateral communications, and special affinities, should not be underestimated. Imagine independent units seeking positive response to their interests, needs and experiences. Facilitate sustained communication. Sharing policy analysis should be a very high priority. Favour direct working relations not only at the diplomatic level. The constant interaction will make the continuing reform that the fluidity requires, and possibly Sierra Leone will be considered a
success story. There was coordination and integration but not always, not in every sector, and not necessarily as planned.

Coordination emerged as a consequence of sufficient political will and availability to invest in the crisis. Coordination is a requirement for success. Any ‘peace-builder’ creates coordination. But does coordination, per se, create peace?

There is great ambivalence about coordination (e.g. that it is burdensome, useless, stiffening…) but it is frequently practiced when it is presented and practiced in a meaningful way. Coordination is an orientation not an approach, not an office, not a procedure. It is an essential function of any effective organization. The key question is: how can states promote patterns of communication that will facilitate the emergence of coordination at national, regional, international levels of policy? Coordination thrives on distinctions. Respect for different roles and responsibilities is a key to successful peace operations. Previously established reliable patterns of communication are also a key to successful peace operations. We need everyone. Especially states able to represent interests and needs of their population properly. Effective states are born out of appropriate ways to represent interests, memories and needs. They must be consistent and able to uphold the standards set through treaties. We need to make sure that the state emerging out of violent, deadly conflict is worthy of this name, serves the citizens and is able to play a constructive role regionally and internationally.
Peace operations have routinely been plagued by deployment, enforcement, and institutional sustainability gaps observed in public security. To deal with these gaps, robust police units which can carry out specialized missions requiring disciplined group action, and equipped with a military structure are needed. When deployed internationally, these units can be described as “International Stability Police Units (ISPU)s”.

To increase international capacity to provide constabulary units existing initiatives within the EU must be supported. Interoperability among the EU, UN and NATO must be promoted. A Centre for Doctrine and Training of ISPUs should be established. A coordinated effort to promote common doctrine and prepare such police units for international service ought to be placed at the top of the international agenda.

Even though security is the foundation upon which all other aspects of a peace mission must build, peace operations have routinely been plagued by serious gaps in public security. There are three distinct aspects to this public security challenge:

- A Deployment Gap
- An Enforcement Gap, and
- An Institutional Sustainability Gap

To address these gaps requires robust policing organizations that are able to perform specialized missions involving disciplined group action. These capabilities are found in police units with a military structure such as the Italian Carabinieri or French Gendarmerie. Owing to the nature of the missions they perform when deployed internationally, these forces could be described as “International Stability Police Units” or ISPUs.

There are a number of hurdles to be overcome before the use of International Stability Police Units to address the public security challenges of peace operations can reach its potential. Chief among these are the need for interoperability and the limited availability of such units from countries with solid democratic orientations.

Accordingly this essay will address:

- The nature of the public security challenges to peace operations and the relevance of International Stability Police Units for coping with them, and
- Thoughts on how to develop greater international capacity to provide ISPUs.
The Nature of the Challenges and the Relevance of International Stability Police Units

• The Deployment Gap

At the inception of most peace enforcement and stability operations, there is likely to be an immediate need to combat rampant lawlessness, revenge killings, and major civil disturbances that are aimed at thwarting the peace process.

In the early days of a mission, the military is often the only source of order due to the inherent delay involved in mobilizing and deploying international civilian police, or CIVPOL. Mobilizing a CIVPOL contingent is time-consuming because, unlike the military, most domestic police forces do not have a significant surge capability or preparation to operate beyond national borders. The lag time between the arrival of the military contingent and the fielding of operational police contingents creates a deployment gap. This gap is temporal in nature—and it has profound consequences that can severely weaken a mission.

During the deployment phase, a peace mission is apt to be tested, and a void in public security creates a crucial vulnerability. If a single soldier errs by using excessive force, the entire mission can be placed in jeopardy because local consent may be squandered. Inaction, on the other hand, risks the loss of credibility and can give the impression that the mission is incompetent and failing. In either case, the peace operation may confront a “defining moment” before it is well postured to respond. The media spotlight will be unavoidable, moreover, invariably producing dramatic TV news clippings. The impact on public opinion and the credibility of the peace mission can be destructive and enduring.

What is required to address the Deployment Gap? The capacity to deploy rapidly in unit strength is the answer. Military forces possess this capacity; most police organizations do not--unless they are police units organized along military lines. The European Union has recognized this and developed the capacity to deploy 1,000 police on 30 days notice, the majority of which are from police units with a military status.

• The Enforcement Gap

Whereas the deployment gap is about timing, the gap in enforcement is about capabilities. An enforcement gap arises when there is a need to perform functions that fall between the lethal force at the disposal of combat units and the minimal level of force available to the individual policeman.

As the US has again demonstrated in Iraq, the military is a blunt and unsatisfactory instrument when used alone to meet the challenge of public disorder and lawlessness. Military combat units possessing overwhelming force are not maximized for deterring and limiting loss of life or destruction of property. Military forces are ill-suited to engage in confrontations with civilians because, with the exception of constabulary or military police units, they are generally not trained in the measured use of force, control of riots, negotiating techniques, or de-escalation of conflict. Individual CIVPOL are not capable of handling such large-scale, strategic challenges, either.
Just as vital is a continuing need throughout the mission to defeat vicious threats to a sustainable peace in the form of political-criminal power structures, rogue intelligence organizations, warlords, fanatical religious groups, global terrorists, or some combination of the above. Orchestrated civil disturbances or “rent-a-mobs” are really a symptom of this underlying source of resistance to the peace process. Such obstructionism has repeatedly plagued peace enforcement missions in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Africa, and now Iraq.

To confront these challenges effectively requires more than the presence of combat units. Organized police units with a military structure, such as the Carabinieri and Gendarmerie, armed with non-lethal weapons and a robust law enforcement capacity are essential to fill this crucial aspect of the security gap. In addition, to cope with political violence and extremism, a sophisticated criminal intelligence, surveillance, evidence gathering, border patrol, close protection, and high-risk arrest capacity must be mobilized.

- The Institutional Sustainability Gap

The two gaps discussed above pertain to the relationship between the military and civilian police components of a peace operation. The institutional sustainability gap, in contrast, refers to the incapacity of the host government to establish and sustain the rule of law. To close this gap, the local justice system must develop the ability to afford equal access to justice to politically disadvantaged groups and overcome the impunity that is associated with the use of politically motivated violence.

Rather than becoming a surrogate for malfunctioning institutions of law, order, and justice, the international community aspires to foster their progressive development. Domestic institutions, however, are often ill trained, inadequately equipped, and lacking in discipline. They usually do not command the trust or respect of the citizenry and are often themselves among the more notorious criminal offenders. In addition, ex-combatants may be tempted to join the criminal underworld, and international criminal syndicates may have exploited the conflict to insinuate themselves into the structures of power. The justice system must be transformed from an instrument of state repression into a servant of the people. Such a role reversal will profoundly affect the domestic distribution of power. Unless this becomes irreversible, however, the stage will be set for another cycle of institutional decay, disorder, and collapse.

Closing this gap in a sustainable manner will require more than reconstituting the local police force and judiciary and heading for the nearest exit. If we are honest with ourselves, we will acknowledge that these fragile institutions will not be capable of resisting efforts by former criminalized power structures or divisive political factions to capture them. To sustain the rule of law over the medium term while these nascent institutions mature requires continuous international safeguards to provide oversight, assistance and an ample degree of conditionality. One way to accomplish this could entail a transition from the initial, large-scale military presence to a more modest presence involving International Stability Police Units. Their role ought to continue until the rule of law is fully self-sustaining, with an emphasis on converting criminal intelligence into evidence and solidifying international regimes of cooperation to sustain a permanent effort against transnational crime and global terrorism.
Developing International Capacity to Meet the Public Security Challenge

International Stability Police Units are uniquely suited for the anarchic environment of societies struggling to emerge from conflict since they possess a hybrid of police and military attributes. Not all nations maintain such forces, however. As a result there is an acute shortage of this vital international capacity, especially from countries with solid democratic traditions.

Even when they have been available and the mandate has permitted involvement in law enforcement, there has sometimes been reluctance to use stability police units. The failure to develop a proper international understanding about how to employ ISPUs and integrate their efforts with those of military contingents also debilitates the international capacity to stabilize these situations successfully.

What can be done to increase international capacity to provide constabulary police units?

• Support Existing Initiatives

Within the European Union, France has proposed the expansion of the existing capability. Currently the EU has 1,000 personnel in what they refer to as “Integrated Police Units”. They are available for international duty on 30-day notice. This number could be doubled as the EU incorporates new members, many of which have substantial numbers of police units with military status.

• Promote Interoperability among the EU, NATO, and the UN

To date, doctrinal development in NATO and the EU for use of police units with a military structure has progressed along the same path because the same individual from the Italian Carabinieri has been responsible in both cases. To preserve this doctrinal convergence and promote interoperability, both among the countries that provide stability police and among the international organizations that use them, a Center for Doctrine and Training of International Stability Police Units should be established. The European Union, NATO, and the United Nations should be regarded as the Center’s leading customers. The Center should perform the following functions:

1. Serve as the recognized international depository for doctrine, tactics, and procedures for the use of ISPUs in peace support and stability operations (i.e., changes to existing doctrine could only be accomplished by the Center).
2. Develop courses designed to convey the concepts derived from doctrine.
3. Conduct training programs that prepare trainers from around the world to conduct these courses.
4. Establish specifications for items of equipment that must be common among all ISPUs to achieve interoperability.
5. Develop and provide pre-deployment courses and exercises for the leadership cadres of ISPUs.
6. Coordinate and cooperate with national doctrine centers, training facilities, and headquarters located in countries that provide ISPUs.

The Center would ensure that training is grounded in accumulated field experience and that lessons learned in the field are incorporated into international practice.
• Expand International Capacity

The Center could also facilitate national, regional, and international efforts to expand the capacity to provide ISPUs for peace and stability operations by engaging in the following activities:

1. Offering on-site assistance to countries seeking to establish their own ISPU training programs.
2. Establishing guidelines for assessing the level of readiness of ISPUs to serve internationally.
3. Providing technical assistance and advice to countries seeking to prepare ISPUs for international deployment.

The area of greatest potential contribution for the United States would be to provide essential items of equipment. By helping to equip stability police from other countries, with items such as communications gear, four-wheel drive vehicles, armoured vehicles, crowd-control equipment, and technical devices for surveillance and evidence-gathering, the US could play a useful role in expanding international capacity.

• Promote Interoperability between Military Combat Units and International Stability Police

It will also be crucial to prepare military combat units that are assigned to peace enforcement missions to integrate their efforts effectively with stability police units. This will require pre-deployment training and exercises, and the Centre for Doctrine and Training should assist in the development and conduct of military exercises designed to achieve interoperability between international military forces and ISPUs.

In sum, bridging the gaps in public security that have repeatedly confounded peace and stability operations requires the capacity to mobilize and effectively employ International Stability Police Units. A coordinated effort to promote common doctrine and prepare such police units for international service ought to be placed at the top of the international agenda.
CHALLENGES OF CHANGE
HOW CAN THE MILITARY CONTRIBUTE TO A “CULTURE OF PROTECTION” IN PEACE OPERATIONS?

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"The humanitarian impact of the armed conflict for the 4.6 million inhabitants of Ituri has been catastrophic. According to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, between 500,000 and 600,000 internally displaced persons - many of who remain in hiding and cannot be accounted for - in addition to nearly 100,000 refugees from Uganda and the Sudan, are dispersed throughout the area. Since the first major onslaught of violence in June 1999, the death toll has been estimated at more than 60,000, and countless others have been left maimed or severely mutilated." (United Nations, Second Special Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 27 May 2003.)

Introduction

Along with that of the United Nations, the Hague and Geneva bodies of law make up a complex and very complete system for the protection of civilians during conflict. In Africa, however, military and militia groups routinely massacre and torture civilians as part of their normal operational technique. Globally, civilians are believed to constitute some 75% of war casualties, an alarming trend that has moved the UN Secretary-General to call for the creation of a “culture of protection” in dealing with situations of armed conflict. 3

Following up on his September 1999 report to the Security Council on the protection of civilians in armed conflict 4, Annan announced on 7 March 2000 that he was appointing an international panel to look at every aspect of United Nations peacekeeping, and to make recommendations on how missions can be more effective. At the news conference where the appointment of the panel was announced, the Secretary-General outlined its brief as follows:

"Partly it is a question of being clearer about what we are trying to do, and partly it is a question of getting the nuts and bolts right. … I hope that in the next six months or a year we would have enough ideas on when and how we intervene. Under our charter, we are allowed to use force in the common interest. But there are questions that we will have to answer. What is the common interest? Who defines it? Who defends it? And under what authority and under what circumstances?" 5

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The Report of the UN Panel on Peace Operations, or the ‘Brahimi Report’, released on 23 August 2000, contained a comprehensive set of recommendations based on a blend of principle and pragmatism, which deserved the widespread support received at the UN Millennium Summit. However, they are aimed mainly at the organisation and mechanics of UN peacekeeping, and do little to address some of the more fundamental questions posed by Annan. The single recommendation on “Peacekeeping doctrine and strategy” states simply that:

“Once deployed, United Nations peacekeepers must be able to carry out their mandates professionally and successfully and be capable of defending themselves, other mission components and the mission’s mandate, with robust rules of engagement, against those who renege on their commitments to a peace accord or otherwise seek to undermine it by violence”.

Canada was quick to respond to the higher-order deficit. During his address to the United Nations General Assembly on 7 September 2000, Prime Minister Chrétien announced that he would establish an independent International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). The mandate of the ICISS was to promote a comprehensive debate and forge consensus around the vexing issues surrounding intervention and state sovereignty.

The ICISS was challenged to address the concerns of developing countries, which had strong reservations (along with countries such as China and Russia) about the legitimacy of the concept of humanitarian intervention. Ultimately, the Commission concluded that exceptions to the principle of non-intervention should be limited, and that: “Military Intervention for humanitarian protection purposes must be regarded as an exceptional and extraordinary measure, and for it to be warranted, there must be serious and irreparable harm occurring to human beings, or immediately likely to occur”.

The aim of this paper is not to dwell on the need for reform of multifunctional peace operations “in all their aspects”. The Brahimi Report has already done justice to this enterprise. The idea is rather to look at what has not been adequately addressed by Brahimi or the ICISS: What to do when peace operations are already deployed, or about to be deployed, and there is “serious and irreparable harm occurring to human beings, or immediately likely to occur”? This is an aspect of peace operations that requires not only continuing reform, but a substantive and urgent (r)evolution in doctrinal thinking, if 21st Century peace operations are to enjoy legitimacy and credibility.

While the challenge is a global one, it is addressed from an African perspective, with particular reference to some pertinent lessons that are emerging from the complex UN operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

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Political and humanitarian motives for peace operations

The hosts of any of any peace operation are likely to shape, if not articulate, the vision and objectives of the intervening authority – either before or during the intervention itself. Most of the UN’s post-Cold War peace operations have been in response to requests to verify and monitor the political vision of previously belligerent parties – as expressed in a mutual cease-fire or more comprehensive peace agreement, and/or adapted in a succession of subsequent negotiated agreements. However, parties involved have rarely arrived at such agreements without external interlocutors, and the UN Secretary-General has warned that “the failure of the major external actors to maintain a common political approach to an erupting or ongoing crisis is one of the principal impediments to progress towards a solution … it is critically important that international actors avoid the temptation to undertake rival or competing efforts.”\(^8\)

In most peacemaking processes, there has been a general tendency of political negotiators to introduce a self-defeating dynamic by ignoring the finer details of peace implementation. In negotiations aimed at terminating complex emergencies, the major concern has been to address and contain a proliferation of interests. This, it is believed, can only be achieved when regional consensus is high and belligerent parties put under pressure. The opportunity for action is therefore perceived as short and the need for impetus as all-important. Under such circumstances, negotiators do not wish to wrangle over details, but prefer an approach that minimizes problems.\(^9\) Ultimately, justice loses and the war-affected civilian population suffer most from such oversight.

Ideally, the decision to intervene should be based on a set of realistic objectives to be achieved in pursuit of an envisaged end-state – however well or poorly the latter is defined. In reality, however, such decisions have often been precipitated more by the willingness or imperative to “do something” than by a clear notion of the objectives and expected long-term outcomes of an operation. This imperative is, in turn, more the result of public opinion generated by the media among the political constituencies of the intervening authority/agents, than it is of an objective appraisal of the needs of the hosts or presumed direct beneficiaries of the intervention. Public opinion in support of peace operations has been based on abhorrence for human suffering – hence the strong humanitarian component of many mission mandates.

On the other hand, the Western media do not like to depict misery without also showing that someone is doing something about it. The presence of aid workers in conflict zones mitigates the horror by suggesting that help is at hand and allows Western powers the illusion that they are doing something. In this way, television coverage can also become an alternative to more serious political and military engagement, and is thus a great contributor to the humanitarian “fig leaf” response.\(^10\)

Nevertheless, the notion of humanitarianism has underpinned, either explicitly or implicitly, the perceived right of forceful intervention into essentially domestic conflict


\(^10\) Ibid, p. 298.
situations. By the end of 2001, the ICISS had shifted the debate from the “right to intervene” towards the “responsibility to protect”. According to the Commission, the decision to intervene need not be based on any grand vision, but should be taken according to six broad criteria that qualify the notion of a responsibility to protect. These are listed as right authority, just cause, right intention, last resort, proportional means and reasonable prospects. It is the last of these that is most relevant to the civilian protection challenges within ongoing and future peace operations. The ICISS found that: “Military action can only be justified if it stands a reasonable chance of success, that is, halting or averting the atrocities and suffering that triggered the intervention in the first place”.

While the work of the Commission focused on military intervention, rather than what we know as peace operations, both are predicated on impartiality and the practice of separating the two modes of action needs to be questioned, as the distinction is becoming increasingly blurred at the strategic and operational levels. Recent events in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) illustrate that military intervention can be triggered amidst an ongoing consensual peace operation, and indeed, that UN peacekeepers can be expected to continue the protection tasks of the intervention force.

Case study: Ituri

Despite the establishment of the United Nations Mission in the DRC (MONUC) in late 1999, the north-eastern district of Ituri continued to suffer from scores of village massacres, most prominently in and around the provincial capital of Bunia. Although Bunia is only a small town in a very large and unstable province, it was at the epicentre of intensified violence involving rival Hema and Lendu militia when Ugandan forces began their withdrawal from Ituri on 7 May 2003. By the end of the month, the local Red Cross had recovered 429 bodies, and 74,000 people had been displaced from Bunia. MONUC continued to receive reports of rape, kidnapping and extortion in and around Bunia, and of massacres at villages a little farther away.

On 30 May 2003, the UN Security Council made a unanimous decision to authorise the deployment of an Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF) to help stabilise the situation. The relevant parts of Resolution 1484 (2003) read as follows:

“[The Security Council] Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, authorises the deployment until 1 September 2003 of an Interim Emergency Multinational Force in Bunia … to ensure protection of the airport, the internally displaced persons in the camps in Bunia and, if the situation requires it, to contribute to the safety of the civilian population, United Nations personnel and the humanitarian presence in the town. … [The Security Council] authorises the Member States participating in the Interim Emergency Multinational Force in Bunia to take all necessary means to fulfill its mandate.”

The 1,400-strong IEMF, deployed under the auspices of the European Union (but composed mainly of French combat soldiers) was a remarkably positive experiment in co-

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11 The Responsibility to Protect, op cit.
12 Ibid, p.37, par. 4.41.
operation between the UN and a regional organization. The IEMF provided a stopgap for the UN, limited in time and space, which allowed it to better prepare to transit from passive to active operations. The IEMF re-established security in Bunia, effectively responded to UPC provocations, and weakened the militia’s military capabilities. It managed to cut off military supplies from abroad, through air monitoring of secondary and field airstrips.

Thanks to the IEMF’s stabilization action, the leadership of rival armed groups were allowed to relocate in Bunia, and to open up political offices there. IEMF actions also facilitated the return to Bunia of thousands of IDPs, as well as the resumption of economic and social activities (albeit at a modest scale).

Many commentators erroneously ascribed this success to the Chapter VII ‘shoot to kill’ mandate of the IEMF. In reality, MONUC had a similar mandate. What was different was the force posture and credibility of the IEMF. As EU special envoy Aldo Ajello and the force commander noted in a joint media statement: "The determined attitude of the multinational force enabled a rapid elimination of the threat posed by aggressive armed groups in Bunia, as well as in the surrounding area".

Although the Force was not able to extend its action beyond Bunia (apart from *ad hoc* pre-emptive raids aimed at preventing attacks on the town), it allowed the UN Security Council, troop contributing countries, and MONUC to prepare for the deployment of a significant UN force to the district. The MONUC Ituri Brigade is composed of almost 4,800 troops, and endowed with some heavy armament and combat helicopters, which makes it a formidable force, by UN standards. By mid-September 2003, it had completed its deployment in Bunia and was carrying out *ad hoc* multi-purpose assessment missions, to stop or prevent killings and other major violations of the law. The Brigade has been entrusted by the Security Council with a similar mandate to the IEMF. This considerably extends the action range of MONUC troops, and empowers them to suppress and prevent any violation of the cessation of hostilities agreements. According to the Ituri Brigade commander:

“We are now acting under a Chapter VII mandate authorised by the UN Security Council. This means the brigade is now enforcing peace, as opposed to keeping peace. Since the brigade's deployment began in mid-August, we haven't had reports where the troops have killed any combatant but we have used force a couple of times … the brigade's capacity is enormous. We have all the necessary means - we have helicopters, APCs and the weapons each soldier has. We are capable of countering any attack. … we must act according to our new mandate of Chapter VII immediately and without hesitation, to be ready to use force when the situation dictates ….”

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15 Congolese Patriotic Union (Union des Patriotes Congolais).
18 On 28 July 2003, the Security Council adopted resolution 1493 which, inter alia, extended the mandate of MONUC until 30 July 2004, increased the military strength to 10,800 and (acting under Chapter VII) authorized MONUC to use all necessary means to fulfil its mandate in Ituri and North and South Kivu. It may be argued that MONUC already had a Chapter VII mandate (see reference to Resolution 1291 (2000) below). Although the previous Rules of Engagement did not need a major change with the new mandate, their interpretation and application on the ground needed to be adjusted very quickly.
19 IRIN, DRC: Interview with Brig-Gen Jern Isberg, acting Ituri Brigade commander, Bunia, 3 September 2003.
With a death toll estimated at over 60,000 since mid-1999, and ten times that number of people displaced, there can be no doubt that, whatever forceful actions may be taken by MONUC, the ICISS’ threshold criterion of *just cause* will be met. It is the Commission’s view that military intervention for humanitarian protection purposes is justified in order to halt or avert:

- **Large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is the product of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to a act, or a failed state situation; or**

- **Large scale “ethnic cleansing”, actual or apprehended, whether carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape.**\(^{20}\)

Time will tell if the Ituri brigade lives up to its commander’s robust statement of intent. But according to what doctrine and training will it use force to protect civilians? The stakes are very high, as are the expectations of the civilians themselves – a factor confirmed by the MONUC Sector 5 commander: “MONUC received its Chapter VII mandate a month and a half ago. The immediate effect was a range of expectations from a variety of role players. In essence the population, that has been on the receiving end of human rights violations and numerous abuses, now has the expectation that MONUC will use its military force to protect them.”\(^{21}\)

**Civilian protection mandates**

During the peace operations of the 1990s, the security and the protection of civilians was dealt with implicitly in mandate provisions for the disarmament and demobilization of combatants. In the ritual calendar of events, as reflected in Council resolutions and mission mandates, the key to stabilization has always been seen as the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants. The unstated purpose of stabilization measures has been to wrest power and the means of violence from local militias and warlords and to recentralize it at a much higher level. In other words, security and therefore the success of the whole operation has hinged on the degree to which warring factions can be effectively disarmed.

All disarmament commitments in peace processes have tended, at least at the outset, to be based on consent – regardless of whether the external forces deploy under a Chapter VI or VII mandate. However, the idea of voluntary disarmament has soon been challenged by issues such as the security concerns of disarming combatants and the deficient troops-to-task structure of peace support forces. Faced with non-compliance with the disarmament provisions of the mandate, peacekeeping forces have exhibited two basic reactions. The first is acquiescence in the face of recalcitrance, combined with a shift in the mandate that allows the “peace process” to proceed regardless. The second approach has been to apply limited coercion to recalcitrant parties, while attempting to preserve the consensual nature of the intervention at the strategic level. Both approaches have been problematic, in terms creating a truly secure environment.


\(^{21}\) Colonel Lawrence Smith, MONUC Sector 5 Commander, speaking at an ISS workshop on MONUC and peace implementation in the DRC, Pretoria, 17-19 September 2003.
Beyond disarmament, mandates also began to include the safety and security dimensions of the peace-building enterprise. This was manifested in efforts to assist in the (re)construction of the coercive functions of states in transition. The focus of such tasks has been to assist local power-holders in their own process of security sector transformation. Bilateral and multilateral donors alike have sought to influence the direction of change, to establish good practices, and to transfer knowledge and insights to the new authorities. Until recently, however, the “international community” has not seen fit to take upon itself the responsibilities of providing law enforcement as such.

A departure from this trend emerged at the end of the 90s, with the interventions in Kosovo and East Timor. In both cases, the UN assumed responsibility for executive authority policing as an integral part of its peace-building efforts. In both cases, the previous governments (Yugoslavia and Indonesia) had withdrawn their security forces and no longer exercised sovereign authority over the provinces in question, and new local governments had yet to be established.

This was a new experiment, where international transitional administrations were set up to run the provinces for an interim period. The UN missions were not only tasked with reconstructing law and order, but also with a whole range of issues from day-to-day policing tasks to the long-term establishment of the criminal justice triad of police, judiciaries and penal systems, as well as the development of new legal codes. However, engagement in such a comprehensive peace-building agenda was predicated on the assumption that military enforcement action had created a sufficiently secure macro-security environment for such projects to succeed.

In other peace operations, where military (rather than criminal) threats to personal security have remained prevalent, some attention has also been paid to the military protection of civilians caught in the midst of ongoing conflict – most notably through resolutions mandating the creation of “security zones”, or “protected areas”. The latter concepts emerged during the 18-month period following the initiation of full-scale hostilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina on 6 April 1992. The safe haven idea soon proved to be “flawed in concept”, with tragic results in Srebrenica and other “safe areas”.

It was not until the end of the century that explicit reference to the protection of civilians again emerged in Security Council resolutions – in security environments that were arguably more challenging than those confronted by the UN protection Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The first such resolution was adopted with reference to Sierra Leone, when the Council voted unanimously, on 7 February 2000, to approve the Secretary-General’s plans for strengthening UNAMSIL. This not only raised the maximum authorized strength from 6,000 to 11,000, but also granted the mission an expanded mandate under Chapter VII of the Charter. In particular, resolution 1289 (2000):

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22 There is a substantial difference, however, between the two cases: In the case of East Timor, a final status is envisaged (full independence). In the case of Kosovo, no such final status had yet been agreed upon, and in principle, the suspension of Yugoslav sovereignty over the province as specified in Resolution 1244 (1999) was a temporal measure.

23 The idea, as introduced by the president of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in August 1992, was to protect threatened communities in their place of residence in order to prevent armed attacks, forced population movements, harassment, arbitrary arrests and killings. See United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 53/35: The Fall of Srebrenica, A/54/549, 15 November 1999, pp. 17-18.
“… authorizes UNAMSIL to take the necessary action to fulfill …[its] tasks … and affirms that, in the discharge of its mandate, UNAMSIL may take the necessary action to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel and … to afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence …”

Similarly, in the midst of a shaky cease-fire and highly volatile security environment in the DRC, the Council tasked (what was then) an observer mission to protect civilians. On 25 February, the Security Council adopted resolution 1291 (2000), which states, among other matters, that:

“Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, [the Security Council] decides that MONUC may take the necessary action, in the areas of deployment of its infantry battalions and as it deems fit within its capabilities, to protect United nations … personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel, and protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.”

The Security Council has thus arrived at a point where it is prepared to invoke Chapter VII powers in authorizing forces to protect civilians at risk in armed conflict. However, the phrase “may take the necessary action” (used in both resolutions 1289 and 1291) implies that intervening forces have the right to use force to protect civilians, but also that they are under no obligation or duty to do so. Indeed, the record of implementation reveals that force and contingent commanders have felt duty bound mainly to protect their own forces, often at the expense of the broader mission mandate and to the detriment of the safety of the civilian populace.

The ability of past missions to provide a secure environment has been less dependent on military prowess than it has upon the degree of legitimacy that the warring parties and the population award to the force through the peace agreement, the mandate, and trust on the part of the population. The latter is, however, directly related to the degree to which the intervening force can provide protection and dramatically improve the pre-intervention security situation. Moreover, subsequent to the providing an initial protection mandate, UN Security Council resolutions have been strong on condemnation of belligerent actions, but weak in terms of positive guidelines and resources for intervening forces to deal with non-compliance.

Protection and the use of force

Through its unanimous adoption of resolution 1296 on 19 April 2000, the UN Security Council placed the protection of civilians in armed conflict at the heart of the UN’s future peacekeeping agenda. In paragraph 13 of the resolution, the Council states its intention to ensure that:

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25 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1291, S/RES/1291 (2000) 25 February 2000, par. 8. The fact that this mandate was never implemented was vividly demonstrated to the world via the brutal massacres of civilians in and around the town of Bunia during May 2003. The 400-strong Uruguayan contingent of UN soldiers could do nothing but protect their compound. The militiamen showed complete contempt for the UN soldiers, and what remained of the civilian population also had little regard for the peacekeepers.
"… peacekeeping missions are given suitable mandates and adequate resources to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical danger, including by strengthening the ability of the United Nations to plan and rapidly deploy peacekeeping personnel, civilian police, civilian administrators and humanitarian personnel."

While reiterating the importance of compliance with international humanitarian and human rights law, resolution 1296 is predictably silent on the issue of enforcement action in the face of non-compliance.

In his 29 March 2001 report to the Security Council, the UN Secretary-General reiterated a range of measures to enhance the protection of civilians in armed conflict. These ranged from the prosecution of violators of international criminal law, to separating armed elements from concentrations of refugees and displaced people, and countering hate media. He also dealt with “entities providing protection”, in terms of governments and armed groups involved in armed conflict bearing primary responsibility, and referred to the positive role to be played by such amorphous entities as “civil society” and regional organizations. Notably absent from Annan’s report was any clear reference to a decisive role for military forces in the protection of civilians. In the annex to his report, however, the Secretary-General did highlight progress made in implementing nine key recommendations of his September 1999 report on protecting civilians (S/1999/957). Among these were the UN’s capacity to plan and deploy rapidly (addressed primarily through the Brahimi Report), and the imposition of appropriate enforcement action in the face of massive and ongoing abuses.

In reality, what constitutes “appropriate enforcement action” has been determined more by military expediency than by any sense of moral obligation to protect. In Bosnia, for example, those advocating the use of force typically used its feasibility - meaning air strikes without casualties - as their prime argument, not moral or legal obligation. They were usually not honest enough to admit that there were considerable risks associated with effective and effectual intervention, and they were not arguing that these risks may be worthwhile. The real question, ultimately, was whether the West was willing to risk the lives of probably many of its soldiers in order to stop genocide.

Where the answer to the above is negative, the revered peacekeeping principles of impartiality (narrowly interpreted as neutrality), consent and the non-use of force have provided a ready excuse for military inaction. However, these principles were robustly challenged in the report of the independent inquiry into the actions of the UN during the genocide in Rwanda, and in the UN Secretary-General’s report on the fall of Srebrenica. Introducing the latter report, a senior UN official admitted that the UN’s failure was “in part rooted in a philosophy of neutrality and nonviolence wholly unsuited to the conflict in Bosnia.” While blame for the massacres is obviously more widely distributed, the report

29 A/54/549, 15 November 1999, op cit.
“breaks new ground by effectively damning the diplomatic nicety of trying to remain neutral and above the fray in civil conflict.”\textsuperscript{31}

The Brahimi Report also challenges narrow conceptions of impartiality, confirming that “impartiality is not the same as neutrality or equal treatment of all parties in all cases for all time, which can amount to a policy of appeasement. In some cases, local parties consist not of moral equals but of obvious aggressors and victims, and peacekeepers may not only be operationally justified in using force but morally compelled to do so.”\textsuperscript{32}

However, the Brahimi panel does not suggest any new doctrine or concept of operations, and the validity of ‘classic’ peacekeeping principles was subsequently confirmed by Kofi Annan, as follows:

“The Panel’s recommendations regarding the use of force apply only to those operations in which armed United Nations peacekeepers have deployed with the consent of the parties concerned. I therefore do not interpret any portions of the Panel’s report as a recommendation to turn the United Nations into a war-fighting machine or to fundamentally change the principles according to which peacekeepers use force.”\textsuperscript{33}

With such lack of innovation at the higher strategic level, it is hardly surprising that doctrinal thinkers within the military have failed to create a conceptual framework for peace operations that offers more potential for the protection of civilian populations than the existing paradigm of incrementalism. There is still no clear concept for legitimate multinational operations aimed at preventing or ending gross abuses of human rights by governments and non-governmental actors that cannot be controlled by governments.

In particular, there has been no move to change the focus of peace operations from reducing the level of violence between armed factions, to reducing the level (and threat) of factional violence against one another’s and own civilian populations. Such a shift would have significant implications for the tasks of intervening forces, as it would require a move away from the principle of consent, towards a form of policing that has hitherto been strongly resisted in military doctrine for peace operations.

\textbf{From consent to legitimacy}

Legitimacy has always been considered a key prerequisite for the success of peace operations. As Deutch notes: “When legitimacy is lost, agreements break down or are reduced to matters of expediency and can be disregarded when convenient”.\textsuperscript{34} However, the concept of legitimacy has been obscured in the peacekeeping debate by what was considered its constituent elements – impartiality, non-use of force, and, above all consent. Legitimacy can also be obtained through results, which is a far more substantive than legitimacy that is acquired through procedure or representation, because it deals with the substance of what

\textsuperscript{31} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{32} Brahimi Report, par. 50.
\textsuperscript{33} United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the report of the Panel on United Nations peace operations, A/55/502, 20 October 2000, par. 7. (e).
exists and what is done by an actor. But few have had the courage to contest the primacy of consent as the fundamental principle of peace operations.

Ironically, Kofi Annan did so seven years ago, in an unpublished paper. With reference to intervention in internal conflicts in a “failed state” environment, Annan concluded that “the old dictum of ‘consent of the parties’ will be neither right [nor] wrong; it will be, quite simply, irrelevant.” In 1995, Gow and Dandeker had similarly rejected the concept of consent as the foundation of peace operations, and replaced it with the broader concept of legitimization which, in their view, provides a viable doctrinal basis for interventions where neither the conditions for enforcement nor for peacekeeping have been met - a situation which can best be addressed through “strategic peacekeeping”.

Strategic peacekeeping allows for the use of enforcement measures to ensure compliance with terms initially derived from a broadly consensual environment. However, since force will be used against one of the originally consenting parties, it cannot be legitimized through the principle of consent, but rather by maintaining a complex civil-military equilibrium, in which the various civilian and military groupings with a stake in the resolution of the conflict accept enforcement measures as necessary and appropriate. The failure of those in authority to enforce compliance will lead to a decline in support due to poor performance (results) in upholding the values and principles of the initial social contract.

Also Berdal recognizes that consent can no longer be postulated and adhered to in practice as an absolute requirement for peace operations, he has suggested that the issue of consent should be resolved on a situation-specific basis. For example, if the military threat posed by the non-cooperation of parties is limited to small-scale resistance, banditry and looting, and the principal parties to a conflict remain committed to an agreement, a peacekeeping force may be empowered to confront it. This, he notes, implies a type of “policing function”, and should be clearly distinguished from an enforcement action that does not rest on the strategic level consent of key parties, and which involves military operations aimed at forcibly imposing a solution.

If consent is indeed no longer viable or valid as an absolute and definitive feature of peace operations, then the present doctrinal approach is clearly flawed and in need of urgent revision. Berdal’s notion of a “policing function” is clearer than the concept of “strategic peacekeeping”, and it suggests a new point of departure for conceptualizing and legitimizing peace operations – a “law”-based approach that is appropriate to both the security and safety challenges presented by 21st Century peace operations.

While civil wars are devastating for the majority, they also create a breeding ground for certain types of criminal economic activity that prove particularly effective in the absence of order. The people who benefit from such activities see few reasons to support

the re-establishment of effective public control. Past warlords, therefore, frequently become the *spoilers* of peace processes.\(^{39}\)

Past experience demonstrates that, if the internal security challenge is not handled robustly at an early stage of intervention, these “old” habits and structures will prevail for a long time, undermining other efforts aimed at enhancing post-conflict settlement and promoting justice and the rule of law. The immediate aftermath of any civil war spawns organized crime, revenge attacks, arms proliferation, looting and theft. UN civilian police officers deployed alongside peacekeepers, in order to assist in the resuscitation of national law enforcement agencies, have not been equipped to address the issue of law enforcement in a “not crime-not war” environment, and the military has remained the only viable, but grossly neglected, enforcement agency.

The fact is that military organizations remain extremely reluctant to engage in anything akin to policing functions, and crime remains a virtually overlooked issue in military doctrinal thinking – despite the continuing criminal challenges confronted by peacekeepers in the field.\(^{40}\)

**Case study: Ituri**

Recent UN operations in Ituri again provide a ready example of the doctrinal lacunae. According to the head of the UN office in Bunia, the insecurity caused by the Ituri civil war is progressively transforming into insecurity caused by widespread criminality. He comments further that:

> “The militaries will soon be expected to hand over more and more of their powers of control to judicial and police institutions. MONUC’s Ituri Brigade, a military body, has no specific mandate to carry out policing activities. On the other hand, national judicial, correctional, and police structures have been very seriously damaged by the war.”\(^{41}\)

During an interview with IRIN\(^{42}\), on 3 September 2003, the Ituri Brigade commander was asked: “How will the brigade tackle roving bands of armed men that are responsible for continued insecurity around Bunia”? Brigadier General Jern Isberg replied as follows:

> “First of all, we must identify and define what a band is and what a militia group is. Militias are the armed groups controlled by political parties or groups, and then we have the bands that are not under the control of any political umbrella, these we consider to be criminal gangs. … Those not controlled will be considered as criminal gangs and we will deal with them appropriately …”\(^{43}\)

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\(^{41}\) Alpha Sow, op cit.

\(^{42}\) (UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs) Integrated Regional Information Network.

\(^{43}\) IRIN, DRC: Interview with Brig-Gen Jern Isberg, op cit.
Here it is evident that the military is aware of the challenge posed by criminal gangs, and that there is a desire to “deal with them appropriately”, but according to which doctrine and training, and with what criminal justice infrastructure? During the month of September, for example, over 100 militia members were arrested by MONUC forces for being in illegal possession of firearms and ammunition – only to be released within a few days. This is not surprising, given the lack of any functioning prosecution system or adequate incarceration facilities.

It is also clear that the UN civilian police component of MONUC cannot provide a ready answer to the pervasive lawlessness in Bunia and Ituri. When asked by IRIN whether the Ituri Brigade has a civil police element to take care of police duties, General Isberg answered:

“There is a civilian police component in Bunia, which will be deployed soon. This will be a great asset to the brigade. But may I hasten to add that it is the responsibility of the government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to provide the men who will be posted to various parts of the town. MONUC’s civilian police unit will only advise and facilitate this deployment in conjunction with the Congolese government.”

While UN police, with no executive authority, cannot be expected to deal with armed militia and criminal gangs, it should also be clear that the Congolese police are not exactly an effective law enforcement agency. The Kinshasa government had sent 700 special police to Bunia when the Ugandan army started its pullout in early May, but less than half were armed, and they were totally ineffective. By 13 May 2003, only 100 government police remained in the town - the rest had all fled, or been killed.

In the DRC, the police officer is still regarded as the ‘l’enfant pauvre’, forced to make a living by partaking in corruption, instead of being paid a decent salary in order to serve the citizenry. The population has little trust in the police after 40 years of neglect under Mobutu’s rule, and there is virtually no infrastructure or equipment for police officers to do their job. The head of the UN office in Bunia, Alpha Sow, summarises the situation and suggests the way forward as follows:

“In cooperation with the transitional authorities of the DRC, MONUC has a daunting task of peace enforcement, peace-building, and also longer-term conflict resolution in Ituri. The approach to be adopted must be multi-layered - the best strategy should include coherent political, military, judicial, information, humanitarian and development interventions. In brief, MONUC has to use both the stick and the carrot to induce compliance. The carrot, in fact, isolates the extremists, while the stick weakens them. Once the extremists are “neutralized”, the more moderate citizens will be able to occupy the public space and start again dreaming about a prosperous and peaceful Ituri.

The best strategy is an integrated one. MONUC’s intervention should be multi-layered and homogeneous, in the sense that all components are targeting the same objectives.”

44 IRIN, DRC: Protection, water and food are priorities in Bunia, Goma, 13 May 2003.
45 “Poor child”.
46 Alpha Sow, op cit.
To “serve and protect”

The singular strand that would pull together various mission components dealing with protection, human rights, justice and security issues - and lend some credence to the notion of “unity of effort” - is a conception of Chapter VII peace operations in “failed states” as international law enforcement operations. Where a national legal order has lost its efficacy, to the extent that it no longer protects the citizenry from the grossest of human rights abuses, a higher body of law must be invoked - at least until a new legitimacy has been established at the national level.

However, it is evident that international humanitarian and human rights law, as an effective regulator of behaviour, requires not merely the existence of legal instruments, but also the willingness of governments and non-state actors to implement them. As Olara Otunnu has noted:

“Over the past 50 years, the countries of the world have developed an impressive body of international human rights and humanitarian instruments … The impact of these instruments remains woefully thin on the ground, however. Words on paper cannot save children and women in peril. The Special Representative believes that the time has come for the international community to redirect its energies from the juridical task of the elaboration of norms to the political project of ensuring their application and respect on the ground.”

Non-compliance with international law is a function of several factors, but the most pertinent is the ability of actors to violate the law without serious threat of sanctions. The primary objective of the military in Chapter VII peace operations, therefore, should simply be to enforce international humanitarian and human rights law as a precursor, or an adjunct to broader peace-building processes that include the [re-]establishment of the rule of law at the national level.

If interventions are viewed primarily as an exercise in international law enforcement, then the principles and practices for the conduct of military operations become much clearer and logically more consistent. While it has been extremely difficult to bend the principles of war to fit in with the conduct of peace operations, this is not the case with the principles of law enforcement. According to this conception, the “grey area” between peacekeeping and war fighting becomes more focused - not on the issue of consent, but on the key issue of compliance.

Reduced to its simplest terms, the law to be enforced during a Chapter VII operation is that which is circumscribed in the mandate and framed in a resolution of the UN Security Council. If this is the elementary law that peacekeepers are tasked to uphold, then it should be codified in terms that are as clear and unambiguous as possible, and clearly reflected in the force’s concept of operations. This demands more than an elaboration of appropriate rules of engagement, for the appropriate and legitimate use of


force and firearms is an important but limited aspect of the international criminal justice standards that are taught to UN civilian police. Of course, there are training implications for the military, but a standard UN Civilian Police Officers’ Course can be presented in two weeks.

The notion of a law enforcement role for military peacekeepers also needs to be linked to the efforts of contemporary UN operations to contribute to the restoration of the rule of law through the efforts of other mission components. In this context, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations recently observed that:

“Our peacekeeping operations continue to expend effort and resources on restoration of the rule of law, but these activities are not yet a central part of peacekeeping mandates … rather than taking a backseat to our political, humanitarian and reconstruction objectives, restoration of the rule of law must be seen as an essential activity that can determine the success or failure of our peacekeeping operations.”

49 Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Remarks to the Fourth Committee, 15 October 2003.
With regard to mandates under Chapters VI and VII a familiar distinction has been blurred in recent state practice, the distinction between consensual and non-consensual operations between peacekeeping and peace enforcement.

With regard to Chapter VIII, we may have a somewhat similar development. The clear wording of Article 53 on authorization by the Security Council when crossing the borderline between peacekeeping and peace enforcement seems to be softened up in practice.

If this showing of confidence in regional bodies continues, and ex post facto mandates result, it becomes an interesting development. It is positive to a certain extent in that regional preventive deployment and other early action are facilitated.

Regional Action

One trend in current peace operations is the increased relevance of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. In discussing mandates we continuously refer to chapters VI, VI 1/2 and VIII, but not so often to the role of regional organizations and arrangements under Chapter VIII. Still, our project is very much linked to Chapter VII and regional capacity building. Our meetings in South Africa, India, Australia, now Turkey, and next time Nigeria attend to that fact. Regional consensual peacekeeping operations only need consent within the region, but if an enforcement mandate is added Article 53 of the UN Charter comes into the picture. As a consequence, authorization by the Security Council is necessary in situations where it is a matter of using “all necessary means”.

With regard to mandates under Chapters VI and VII a familiar distinction has been blurred in recent state practice, the distinction between consensual and non-consensual operations between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Security Council Resolution 1264 of 1999 on East Timor and INTERFET (with Australia as a lead nation) was a Chapter VII resolution, with a mandate of “all necessary measures”, but it was also an operation with the consent of Indonesia. Rather than being a mandate of Chapter VI plus (something) it was a mandate of Chapter VII minus (something). The INTERFET operation also had a regional Chapter VIII dimension.

With regard to Chapter VIII, we may have a somewhat similar development. The clear wording of Article 53 on authorization by the Security Council when crossing the borderline between peacekeeping and peace enforcement seems to be softened up in practice. The ECOWAS intervention in Liberia in 1990, an action with an enforcement dimension, was accepted ex post facto by the Security Council (in December 1990).

In 1997, ECOWAS had a military (ECOMOG) presence in Sierra Leone and used it stop the local insurgents, and obviously, prevented crimes against humanity in the process. Consequently, the tacit consent of the Security Council was forthcoming. If this showing of
confidence in regional bodies continues, and ex post facto mandates result, it becomes an interesting development. It is positive to a certain extent in that regional preventive deployment and other early action are facilitated.

**Rule of Law (ROL)**

Peacekeepers and peace-enforcers must act in accordance with applicable human rights law (HRL) and international humanitarian law (IHL). The legal norms in question need to be disseminated and implemented, both on a national and international level.

The UN Secretariat has produced a Secretary-General’s Bulletin on observance of IHL in peace operations. It has been suggested that the UN should also produce a SG Bulletin on human rights, amounting to a Code of Conduct for peace operations personnel. This is a good idea. Whatever national legal input there is, it needs to be supported on the international level.

On the other hand, a UN Criminal Code listing crimes and penalties for peacekeepers is not a project that needs to be undertaken. The idea with a UN Criminal Code as reported in Melbourne is that “all participants in peacekeeping are held accountable to the same standard for any criminal actions they commit when serving in a host country”.

National jurisdictions are expected to handle both HR and IHL violations. If they do not do that, serious violations could be taken up by the new International Criminal Court (ICC).

Human rights norms express a common standard within the framework of international law and we do not have to duplicate them in a UN Criminal Code. With regard to counter-measures and penalties we also have to accept that different countries, due to cultural differences, vary in their reactions. National court procedures should be accepted, unless the ICC claims jurisdiction. This national approach to disciplinary problems and serious violations will, in general, not create any problems. Most countries recognize the active personality principle of jurisdiction. This principle admits extra-territorial jurisdiction of sending states when their citizens have been acting in violation of national law abroad. Troop Contributing Countries (TCC) could be recommended to ensure that their national legislation has this extra-territorial reach, at least with regard to peace operations personnel.

In order to be effective in peace operations, HRL and IHL need to be living parts of the law of sending states. Dissemination is a must in national societies, especially in relation to the armed forces and peacekeeping training centres. Otherwise, bad things could happen, as they did in Somalia, where young boys were tortured by UN peacekeeping personnel. So, preparations on a national level need to be improved.

Many suggestions for the future were discussed at our conference in Melbourne. A syndicate of which I was a member produced a number of recommendations of which I will mention three:

- Syndicate 9 recommended that the UN early assessment team in prospective peace operation areas should take into account the applicable laws of that area, including its
criminal code, so as to be able to use that legal order as much as possible. Also in this context a UN Criminal Code has been suggested. However, a general Code for all countries of operation is not a good idea, since legal and cultural traditions should be respected, as I indicated earlier.

- With regard to the peace v. justice dilemma, Syndicate 9 recommended that the UN should look further into the issue of amnesty as an alternative to prosecution. Every one in the group recognized that reconciliation is fundamental in a conflict-ridden society, but from a rule of law perspective it is troublesome if reconciliation excludes accountability of criminals. Granting amnesties may be necessary in certain situations, but it should not be the rule.

- The syndicate also recommended that a special seminar (not necessarily a UN seminar) should be held concerning key mission experiences in East Timor, Sierra Leone, Kosovo and Afghanistan, so as to be able to feed in lessons learned into the UN induction programs and the ROL training.

### Security of UN and Other Personnel

I am not here referring to “safety” of personnel, since that concept is limited to protection against internal threats, i.e. dangers within the mission, like accidents. These risks will have to be dealt with also, but the focus here is on external threats, terrorism and other attacks against mission facilities and personnel.

The 1994 UN Convention on Safety and Security of UN and Associated Personnel has not been a success. The intended protection of this convention does not amount to physical security. Relevant protection is of a legal nature and limited to norms and procedures, the indirect effect of which may prevent or deter from attacks against personnel. A main feature is the obligation of states to prosecute or extradite offenders. It is desirable to revise and improve upon the convention and negotiations to this effect are in fact going on in New York. The Convention’s scope of application is complicated and burdensome and can be simplified. The obligation to prosecute or extradite is not very useful if there has been no arrest. There is a clear need for a mechanism of intelligence gathering, both in order to prevent terrorist acts and in order to react upon them.

The 4th Committee of the GA discussed this in October 2003 and one idea is to create a UN intelligence gathering body to protect mission personnel. In addition, as it was pointed out in Melbourne, a mission should be equipped so as to obtain information and cooperation from local security institutions. At the same time, close and friendly relations with the local population are a necessary part of any defence against terrorist attacks.

### National Legal Framework in Peace Operations (“The Stockholm Project”)

In September 1998 the Swedish National Defence College (SNDC) organized the seminar “Peace support operations: the legal framework” in Stockholm. A Russian proposal to study the national constitutional framework of TCCs was accepted by the SNDC as joint (Swedish-Russian) project. National constitutional provisions lay down the conditions for national peace support contributions in accordance with the UN Charter and regional initiatives.
In the UN, Russia recently pointed out (in the 4th Committee of the GA) that there was a need to strengthen and reaffirm the legal framework of PSOs.

At the Stockholm seminar it was argued that consistency between different national legislations could produce bonus effects as to the efficiency of PSOs. It was also argued that “Consistency already at the different national levels is one way of achieving unity of command at the multinational operational level.”

The idea behind the Stockholm project is thus to make a comparative overview of the PSO related legislation of some important TCCs. A harmonization of law and ordinances would be the ultimate goal.

Moreover, there is an IHL dimension. Sending states have an obligation under the humanitarian law of armed conflict, to ensure that their personnel know about and respect the norms. The obligation of dissemination needs legislative support to function in practice. One idea to extend the Stockholm project would be to include, in the questionnaires to TCCs, the question what kind of IHL education is legally prescribed in that country. The aim would be to achieve a common standard of IHL and HR dissemination in TCCs. However, so far there is no agreement on this among the partners of the Stockholm project.

Final Remarks

Two international law theses are to be finalized in Stockholm during 2004 with regard to the mentioned topics and problems. One deals with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and the other with protection of personnel on dangerous missions. The latter will be presented at Stockholm University on 17 September 2004, the anniversary of the day when Count Folke Bernadotte was murdered on a peace mission in Jerusalem, and also the day when Dag Hammarskjold lost his life in the service of the United Nations.
A PERSPECTIVE OF COORDINATION BETWEEN THE UN AND REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN PEACE OPERATIONS

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The ever-changing international political and economic situations in the post-Cold War period have offered great opportunities, as well as unprecedented challenges to the UN in the field of peace operations.

The interaction and cooperation between the UN and regional organizations, to a certain extent, are significant parts of peacekeeping practice. Some peace operations demonstrate the fact that both the UN and regional organizations have their respective advantages, in addition to inevitable limitations. Hence, for the maintenance of world peace and security, the UN, as the supervisor, on the one hand is supposed to bring regional organizations into peace operations and promote cooperation, and on the other hand, restrict the functions and powers of regional organizations lest they exceed the UN authority to take actions to their own advantage.

Based on a pros and cons analysis of regional organizations in peace operations, this seminar paper concludes that regional organizations will play an ever-increasingly important role in peace operations. They should respect the UN authority in all cases, while the UN should encourage regional organizations’ participation in more peace operations under its authorisation.

Entering the 21st century, UN peace operations have stepped into a new phase. While their mechanisms have arrived at a time of perfection and deliberation, it is to be expected that the operational capabilities will be further improved and the coordination between the UN and regional organizations will also be enhanced. These advances are not only the expectations of the UN and the international community, but also are necessary for the maintenance of world as well as regional peace and security.

The advantages of regional organizations in peace operations

In playing a much greater role than used to be the case, in recent years regional organizations have developed closer connections with UN peace operations. According to UN publications, up to now, nearly 20 regional, subregional organizations or national organizations have actively participated in UN peace operations to one extent or another. With the participation of regional organizations, the UN is able to share the responsibility and burden and thus counteract its weaknesses, and the cooperation between the countries of a region and the UN on world peace and security matters is also improved, thus contributing to security and stability in the regions concerned.
Generally speaking, regional organizations have the following advantages in safeguarding regional peace and security:

1. Due to their proximity in the neighbourhood of conflict areas, regional organizations are extremely concerned at the conflict situation and not willing to turn a blind eye to the spread of conflict that might endanger the whole region. They are eager to put an end to the conflict as early as possible and so their enthusiasm to respond to UN peace operations is quite apparent.

2. As they possess certain resources and military capabilities, regional organizations can take effective and timely measures and can cooperate with UN peace operations in preventing the occurrence and escalation of armed conflicts. During the peace operations in Sierra Leone, the Economic Community for West African States (ECOWAS) carried out effective peace operations before UN involvement. The peace operations in Georgia and Liberia are two other cases, in which the UN and regional organizations work hand in hand to share the responsibility of peace missions: the UN Security Council authorized regional organizations to establish multinational forces which conduct military operations, while the UN peacekeeping forces are responsible for other duties. In this way, peace operations are carried out by both the UN and regional organizations in the conflict area.

3. Regional countries share much of their culture, traditions and geography, and sometimes, they have the same history, the same religion, and similar military training or weaponry. The proximity of regional organizations to the conflict area gives them incisive knowledge into the root causes of the conflicts. All these factors should not be overlooked if we are to resolve a conflict and restore peace.

4. Throughout a peace mission, the situations in the conflict region are constantly in a state of flux. At some critical points, if regional organizations are authorized and encouraged by the UN to react swiftly and flexibly instead of consulting UN headquarters, which may not be within easy reach, then possible delay or interruption of the peace efforts will be avoided.

The contribution of regional organizations to peace operations

Thanks to the advantages of regional organizations in conducting peace operations (to be specific, their advantages in resolving regional conflicts), the UN has cooperated for years with them in maintaining regional peace and security. It is common knowledge that the UN is an international organization that has no armed forces and compulsory executive power, rather than an international government. One cannot depend on the UN for everything. Therefore the success of the peace operations lies in the political willingness of the Member States and parties to the conflict. For many years, the UN has often faced a dilemma in implementing its peace operations. Of course, we cannot conclude that it is the failure of the UN, because the UN has lacked the unanimous support of the international community on many occasions. Only with the affirmative political assurance of the UN Member States and regional organizations, and provided with sufficient resources, will a peace mission be able to fulfil its mandate.
The UN Charter endows the Security Council with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of world peace and security, and it recognizes “the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action” (Chapter VIII, Article 52.1). In Part VII of An Agenda for Peace, the former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali emphasized the importance of UN cooperation with regional organizations in peace operations. In the Supplement to an Agenda for Peace issued in 1995, he explored further fields of cooperation, including consultation, diplomatic support, operational support, co-deployment and joint operations. On 18 September 1998, the Security Council adopted resolution 1197(1998) which, while focusing on the situation in Africa, contained elements of general application to all regional organizations. The Council recognized the need for strengthening coordination between the United Nations and regional and sub-regional organizations in the area of conflict prevention and the maintenance of peace. The Council also encouraged the Secretary-General to facilitate efforts to establish partnerships between States and regional and sub-regional organizations involved in peacekeeping operations and requested him to consider developing a framework to coordinate such partnerships. Hence, by their active participation in these and similar arrangements, regional organizations are able to provide support to UN peace operations.

Nowadays, regional organizations are making the following three main contributions to UN peace operations:

1. Diplomatic negotiations by regional organizations pave the way for UN peace operations. As have mentioned above, regional organizations often have various close relations with the disputing parties, so their proposals are more practical and acceptable. In the past several decades, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) has made great efforts to resolve conflicts in that war-torn continent. To resolve the armed conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the OAU played a mediating role, thus enabling the situation to take a favourable turn and providing the UN with a political basis for the establishment of peace efforts. For this reason, in his report to the Security Council, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan especially praised the OAU efforts, saying that the cease-fire agreement was an important step toward peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea.

2. To ensure the successful enforcement of UN peace operations, regional organizations provide support in the following two aspects. First, regional organizations do the first-stage work for the UN. The peace mission in East Timor is an example: with the authorization of the UN, the Association of the South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Australia took active peace initiatives. Owing to their work, the establishment of the UN peace mission in East Timor went smoothly. Secondly, regional organizations also provide logistic support and guarantee the safety of the UN peace mission. This is the case in Georgia where Russian peace-keeping forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States have supported the UN observer force.

3. Regional organizations and the UN carry out joint peace operations. The UN mission in Haiti was conducted by the UN together with the regional
countries and organizations in North and South America. The two sides developed a joint command system and shared the financial costs. Besides, during the establishment of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), both the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Union (EU) dispatched personnel to the posts of the Special Deputy Representatives of the UN Secretary-General.

The negative impact of regional organizations on peace operations

As can be seen, the co-operation between the UN and regional organizations in peace operations has had significant effects. The UN is not the only mediator in the world. Effective cooperation from regional organizations will still be requested in the peace missions to come, especially in missions of larger scale. However, there should be no denying that regional organizations do have their limitations in this regard. First, the cooperation lacks unity of command and clear division of their respective responsibilities. The problem becomes all the more obvious when joint actions are taken by both the UN forces and the regional multinational forces. Second, the lack of essential working personnel, equipment and funds exposes the fact that their ability is unequal to their goodwill or ambition in resolving regional conflicts, therefore they have to fall back on the UN for assistance.

Due to these limitations, regional organizations might have brought about the following negative influences:

1. Some regional organizations are inclined to take advantage of the UN-authorized power for their own political ends. Under the guise of “human rights” or humanitarian aid, certain countries of some regional organizations even ignore UN authority and pursue unilateralism or power politics in the name of UN peace operations.

2. In some cases, the involvement of regional organizations makes their impartiality and neutrality questionable because of their close connections with sovereign states in the conflict area. Some regional organizations or neighbouring countries may have common interests with some parties to the conflict, so their participation in peace efforts is not so welcome and lacks impartiality. Worst of all, they themselves may become involved in the conflict and instead of resolving the disputes; they may play a role in escalating the conflict.

3. The involvement of some regional organizations could possibly undermine the authority of the UN so that the UN loses control over the peace operations under its name. Besides, too much emphasis on the role of regional organizations might give an impression that peace operations are no longer within the UN scope and that regional organizations may seem to be replacing the UN in peace operations. This kind of regionalization of peace operations is not what the international community needs and can tolerate.
Considering the above-mentioned negative impacts, some countries have proposed to amend the UN Charter so as to enhance the role of regional organizations in peace operations. Their real intention is to have the same authority as the UN. After the outbreak of the Kosovo crisis, some western countries even proposed that the UN should immediately establish a system which enables regional organizations, such as NATO, ASEAN and OAU, to take on the responsibilities of dealing with the crisis. They also claimed that as long as some regional organizations, especially NATO, are allowed to play a global role, they would do everything on behalf of the UN, with or without the UN authorization. These arguments not only tend to marginalize the UN role in peace operations and infringe upon the reputation and credibility of the UN, but also harm the further healthy development of UN peace operations as a whole.

Proper handling of the relationship between the UN and regional organizations

The possible negative impact of regional organizations in peace operations is no excuse to deny their active participation and positive role. Both the UN and regional organizations have their advantages and disadvantages. Hence, on the one hand, the UN should welcome and encourage the participation and cooperation of regional organizations in peace missions; on the other hand, there should be some necessary restrictions so that they would not circumvent the UN in a roundabout way, get out of control and do harm to the peace efforts. As Secretary-General Kofi Annan put it in his report to the Security Council, on the premise that the UN has the primary responsibility for world peace and security, the support from regional organizations is both necessary and expected.

Therefore, to properly deal with the relationship between the UN and regional organizations in peace operations, the following principles should be complied with in accordance with the UN Charter:

1. Through many years, UN peace missions have been creative and relatively successful actions, and UN peace operations should continue to play an active role. At the same time, it should not be permissible for some countries to ignore UN authority and the Security Council, or even intervene into the internal affairs of other countries on behalf of the UN.

2. The UN is the only international organization bestowed with the trust and duties of maintaining world peace and security, therefore it should not offload its responsibilities for preventing armed conflicts from happening, eradicating the roots of disputes and promoting international political, economic and social development. The leading role of the UN in this regard is so great that no other organization is able to replace it. All coordination between the UN and regional organizations must not go beyond the framework of the UN Charter.

3. Before the regional organizations participate, they must first obtain the Security Council’s authorization, and they should also deliver timely reports to the UN throughout the operations. In his report to the General Assembly, the UN Secretary-General pointed out that, to maintain the legal basis of international security system, regional security operations must be carried out in accordance with the Security Council’s authorization. The Secretary-General also stated that there is no need for the UN and regional organizations to compete with
each other in peace and security matters. I believe that this is an important principle that all should adhere to.

4. To strengthen coordination, a liaison mechanism between the UN and regional organizations is badly needed. While the UN is encouraging the active participation of regional organizations, the organizations concerned should also respond accordingly with immediate support and cooperation, thus ensuring the smooth execution of the peace mission.

Conclusion

The UN peace operations will continue to play an important role in safeguarding world peace and security in the days to come in the 21st century. I believe that both challenges and opportunities lie ahead of us in this new century. As we strive to move forward, coordination and cooperation between the UN and regional organizations in peace operations have become an essential part of the UN peace and security mechanism. Therefore, proper handling of the coordination of this kind becomes an important issue.

I believe the key to the coordination issue rests mainly on the following two points:

_Regional organizations should and can play an increasingly important role in peace operations, but without sacrificing the dignity and authority of the UN._

_The UN should do much more to encourage the participation of regional organizations in peace missions, but should not let them do whatever they want without UN control and supervision._

To ensure the success of UN peace operations, a command and supervisory system must be set up and constantly improved. The UN Member States and the relevant regional organizations must have more say and more supervisory power, so that peace operations can represent the will of the world community. In addition, the mandate of every peace mission should be clearly defined and feasible; the rights and obligations of the Security Council, the Secretary-General and all those involved in must be specifically defined, so that all may adhere to the principles of UN peace operations.

In sum, the UN is the most authoritative international organization that shoulders the primary responsibility of safeguarding world peace and security. Any regional organization, before initiating action in a peace operation, must first inform and consult the UN and obtain its authorisation.
HUMANITARIAN DIMENSION IN CIVIL AFFAIRS
JORDAN'S EXPERIENCE IN AN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

Major General Mohammed Al-Allaf
Commandant of the Royal Jordanian National Defense College

In the last decade, the world has witnessed a huge number of conflicts with stunning strategic, political, economic and humanitarian results that have shaped the future of millions of people. Political solutions to crisis are to be sought while military and peacekeeping operations will take place. In this context, the need for civil affairs will drastically increase in size and volume in future conflicts. That's why the function of civil affairs is also expected to grow more and more salient. Human rights issue will continue to be at the heart of this function.

It gives me a great pleasure to participate in the “Challenges of Change” conference. I would like to take this opportunity to express my deep attitude to the Center for Strategic Research of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, Bilkent University, and the Folke Bernadotte Academy of Sweden for inviting me to take part in such an important event.

As we approach the middle of the first decade of this century, the world faces a dynamic and uncertain security environment. The world has become a highly uncertain place, with increasingly unpredictable, complex and dangerous threats to internal security of nation states and to regional and international peace, security and stability. The world continues to face a wide range of grave threats in different regions, most of which are concentrated and developed in the Middle East, threatening to create instability, internal conflicts, and humanitarian crises. In the last decade, the world has witnessed a huge number of conflicts all over the world with stunning strategic, political, economic and humanitarian results that have shaped the future of millions of people around the globe. In the last two years, we have observed in the Middle East two major wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and one major conflict in Palestine with the potential to cross the borders turning, therefore, into a regional armed conflict. The continuous humanitarian crisis in the occupied territories of the West Bank underscores the state of insecurity, instability and the political unrest currently prevailing in the Middle East threatening to transfer the humanitarian crisis into the neighbouring countries. In many of these cases the existing political authorities either lost their capacity to function as a government, or lost their power to maintain public order and internal security, or failed to provide for the basic needs of their people creating, therefore, conditions for civil unrest, famine, massive flow of migrants across international borders.

It is within this environment that political solutions of crisis will be sought. It is under these conditions that military and peacekeeping operations will take place. In this context, the function of civil affairs is expected to grow more and more salient. The need
for civil affairs would drastically increase in size and volume in future conflicts. In addition, human rights will continue to fall at the heart of this function.

Traditionally, civil-military affairs are conducted to expand the horizons of military forces in combat by employing civilian potential existing in the theatre for operational purposes. This is no longer the case. Military operations, today, are no longer planned and executed in isolation of the civil dimensions. Military planners and staff officers are required, more than ever, to get more involved in planning the civil dimensions of their operations to mitigate unnecessary suffering of civilians in future conflicts. The civil affairs planning cells and the civil affairs forces are expected to anticipate a variety of humanitarian conditions that might develop during a military operation or even a peacekeeping mission, providing for rapid response options to urgent conditions occurring in a crisis environment.

* U.S. Civil affairs units were critical during the post-conflict stage of Operation Desert Storm in assisting the Kuwaiti government to restore essential services and re-establish its authority and subsequently responded to humanitarian crisis in northern Iraq by assisting the resettlement of the Kurds.

* In Bosnia–Herzegovina the British corps civil affairs personnel coordinated the reconstruction of civil infrastructure and provision of relief efforts of hundreds of governments and NGOs.

These conditions are related to the needs and rights of civilians during the conflict. Civil affairs planners and forces should be prepared to carry out a wide variety of CA missions like:

- Providing immediate security and public safety for population, installations and property.
- Provide protection and facilitating the return of refugees or displaced persons without which any political solution of the conflict becomes impractical.
- Preserving law, order, and restoration of the normal life.
- Ensuring basic human rights in a crisis environment.
- Providing the basic humanitarian needs of security, food, water supplies, shelters, medical services and evacuation work.
- Facilitating future political efforts by stabilizing the security environment.

In the recent years, many countries have experienced the value of the civil affairs function and are incorporating these types of missions into their own militaries. The U.S civil affairs structure and doctrine offers a well-established model for this purpose. The Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) recognized the significance of the civil affairs function in a combat/peacekeeping environment. Inspired by the U.S civil affairs model, the Jordanian doctrine calls for two senior joint staff officers to carry out civil affairs planning in a PKO environment, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence and Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations. They are required to examine the situations, review conditions that might lead to humanitarian consequences in a combat/peacekeeping environment and coordinate joint solutions. Their function is not how best to make use of civilian resources and
infrastructure for operational purposes, but to ensure the safety and security of civilians and to restore the normal daily life as soon as possible.

While JAF has not created its own specialized civil affairs units like SFOR's civil–military taskforce which was the primary civil affairs tool, the function itself has not been dismissed. The Jordanian Special Operation Command (SOC), a highly professional force, is trained, equipped and organized to carry out a wide range of civil affairs tasks and is perceived as a central military tool for this purpose. The Jordanian SOC has performed its professional civil affairs tasks entrusted to it by dispatching several contingents in a number of peacekeeping operations like NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) and the subsequent Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Kosovo.

The biggest challenge of our civil affairs capacity is to be prepared to work from a multinational perspective to bring about political solutions to regional conflicts. The Jordanian Armed Forces currently deploys five field hospitals in conflict theaters, in Eritrea, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan and Iraq and preparing to deploy the fifth field hospital in Liberia in the near future in addition to two surgical stations deployed in the occupied West Bank. It is the purpose of the Jordanian leadership to be engaged in regional conflicts through constructive initiatives. The biggest challenge facing the international community is to make the best use of regional initiatives to achieve the desired political results.

Our recent experience in Afghanistan and currently in Iraq and the West Bank indicates that more Jordanian military forces will be called upon to perform civil affairs functions in more complex, nontraditional, and politically sensitive operations that involve close interaction with other friendly forces and international non-governmental organizations.

JAF will continue to be prepared to get more engaged in tense and unstable security environments to perform a variety of civil affair tasks. A comprehensive human–oriented training programme may be required more than ever to include humanitarian demining operations where the JAF engineering corps enjoys an international name.

The anti–personnel landmine crisis has taken an enormous toll on populations and governments around the world. Minefields drive whole societies into helpless poverty and severely damage the national economy of affected countries. Jordan's humanitarian demining efforts stand as a prominent example of the significant contribution made by JAF in the area of civil affairs. Humanitarian demining has been perceived as one of the most fundamental humanitarian missions carried out by JAF's Engineering Corps. In this regard, Jordan has expressed a decisive political will to address the issue. JAF has demonstrated a great deal of determination to eliminate personal suffering, to restore the agricultural use of land, to stop injuries inflicted by landmines, and reduce medical expenses incurred. In the aftermath of the Jordanian–Israeli peace treaty, JAF launched a major anti-personnel landmine demining programme in which 100,000 land mines were removed and a strict timetable calls for a total removal by the year 2009. Additionally, and in compliance with Ottawa Convention on landmines, the JAF's Engineering Corps has totally disposed of its landmine stockpile. In this context, the Jordanian demining expertise has been a landmark
of the JAF's effectiveness in this area and has been put into practice at the international level where nations are striving to heal the wounds of war. JAF's Engineering Corps has contributed to demining efforts in a number of cases in Eritrea, Ethiopia and most notably in Afghanistan where our engineering contingent carries out demining operations in Mazar Al-Shareef, Qandahar airport, and Baghram base.

The most impotent dimension of civil affairs is the political portion of its function. Offering medical assistance to populations, providing basic needs of food, water supplies, shelters and communication services only mitigates the suffering of civilians in a crisis situation. It does not, by itself, achieve much towards putting an end to a conflict or concluding a viable political solution. Unless fully integrated in an overall international master scheme, aimed at achieving political settlement, civil affairs will remain an operational function with limited political outcome. The biggest challenge of the civil affair function is to actively contribute to a permanent political settlement. Civil affairs staff, planners, forces and specialized services have a lot to offer. They assisted plans for elections in Bosnia, coordinated flow of humanitarian assistance into Cambodia assisting, therefore, the government to reestablish infrastructure capable of providing necessary governmental services to people; they promoted regional stability and reduced conflicts and threats; they anticipated potential crises and helped local policy makers to consider or wide range of political options.

WITHOUT SUCH A DIMENSION, CIVIL AFFAIRS WILL FALL WITHIN THE REALM OF TACTICS RATHER THAN STRATEGY.

Conclusion

Faced with today's unconventional threats of violence, terrorism, drug trafficking, organized crime, smuggling, illegal crossing of international borders, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the work of international civil affairs forces becomes even more important.

Civil affairs structures, doctrines, staff function, and field operations have to adjust to the changing nature of security environment and to the ever-growing demands of civil rights in a conflict situation.

As we look to the future, we have to be convinced that the notion of civil-military affairs as a function of utilizing civilian resources and infrastructure for operational purposes does not exist. On the contrary, CA today is the art of mobilizing military potential to mitigate the civilian suffering in a combat environment, to serve as a stepping stone in transition from war–like conditions to a peace situation, and to facilitate the achievement of peaceful settlements of future conflicts.

Jordan is determined to exercise effective civil affairs engagement in the regional community using its resources, regional influence, and goodwill to respond to human needs in affected countries for the cause of peace and security.
CHARACTERISTICS AND PRINCIPLES
OF PEACE INTERVENTION
THE SOMALIA EXPERIENCE

General (R) Çevik Bir
Former Commander of United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM)

Peacemaking operations are conducted within the framework of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter which also refers to use of force. In order to command and control an operation under war conditions, there are certain requirements such as having appropriate force multipliers, necessary organizations, combat ready forces and standard procedures, which were all absent in Somalia.

The UN commanded and controlled Somalia operation by itself at a time when it was not ready and experienced to conduct such an operation under war conditions. In the history of the UN, Somalia intervention was the first ‘Peace Making/Enforcement operation’ under direct UN command and control, and consequently many lessons were drawn for future operations.

We, the peoples of the world, have the legitimate right and responsibility to intervene when conditions require us to preserve peace. Intervention by today’s definition means to intervene in an internal crisis of a country in military, political, social fields for humanitarian purposes. Accordingly, it could take various forms to achieve some political, military or politico-military objectives even to restructure some institutions of the state.

So, the characteristics and different principles of peace intervention operations are different from those of ordinary military operations.

Characteristics and Principles

First, the characteristics
• The nature of intervention operations is multidimensional (political/diplomatic, military/security, humanitarian/economic, social) and dictates planned coordination.
• The environment of the countries in crisis and the actors of the crises are different.
• NGO, International Organizations, PVO and media, even non-state actors (like militia chiefs, elders, etc.) may invariably be partners, and can play key roles in such operations.
• Understanding the complexities of the operational environment is the key to developing the mission statement, concept of operations, end state, and tasks to forces.
• Requirements of the mission are urgent and complex resources are often limited and not always efficiently applied.
• There are always shortfalls between requirements and resources.
• In many aspects, mutual understanding is essential between the military and civil parties of the operation and among the partners.

Now let me go over some important principles, about intervention operations. And I will examine all of these in the framework of the UNOSOM II operation in Somalia, as a means of supporting my presentation.

a. Political objectives

Every multinational intervention operation, like all military operations, needs a clearly defined and attainable political objective. The military and political leaders in the field must easily understand the strategic aim, and set appropriate objectives. While developing a political objective; the complexities of the crisis should always be recognized. Long-term rather than short-term solutions to the problems of a country in crisis should be ruled by all components of the decision-makers. All should be reflected in the political guidance.

b. Unity of effort

Unity of command is one of the components of unity of effort. Unity of effort is an atmosphere of cooperation and actions in harmony, which are essential to ensuring that all the intervention powers are working in a collective and not conflicting manner. Achieving this target requires complex operations and may require signing an agreement. Because participating nations do not always share exactly the same reasons for entering multinational intervention operations, maintaining cohesion and unity of effort requires the same understanding and perception by the member nations, and adjustment of the requirements of the forces.

c. Legitimacy

Legitimacy depends on the acceptance of the mission by parties, or local groups and the international community to carry out the decision. The main problem confronting leaders of intervention operations is the issue of identifying “legitimate” authority in the failed state.

An intervention operation may be strongly supported if it is perceived as legitimate. If not, the action may not be supported and may be resisted. For that reason, legitimacy frequently is a decisive element for intervention operations.

d. Perseverance

Perseverance means patient and persistent pursuit of goals and objectives. The underlying causes of the crisis may be elusive, making it difficult to achieve decisive resolution.

Assessing possible reactions of various groups in the crisis is essential for the operation to achieve its long-term political objective.
e. Restraint

Restraint requires the careful balancing of requirements for security, conduct of operations, and political objectives. Except for the right of self-defence, Rules of Engagement (ROE) in intervention operations are generally more restrictive, detailed and sensitive to political concerns than in war. A single act could cause significant military and political consequences; therefore the proper use of force is essential. That is why ROE should be issued at the beginning of an operation to address most anticipated situations that may arise.

ROE should be accepted and understood by all troop contributors.

f. Security

General security (including protection of civilians and participating agencies) is an integral part of the operation because of the uncertain nature of the situation. Security of the troops and personnel is one of the major issues which directly affect the decision of the nations to participate in this kind of operation and to maintain their contribution throughout the operation.

Interoperability

Now let me speak about interoperability. It is common understanding that interoperability exists only where forces can provide or accept services from other services or within the nations of a coalition. Efforts to achieve interoperability focus on making all functional areas of combat interoperable, and they indicate a need for common standards and procedures across the board.

Interoperability can be considered in different phases of intervention operations: The pre-operation, planning, and execution phases.

Pre-operation phase

There should be a “common doctrine” to support multinational coalition efforts, because support of such of such operations is a national level task but the objective is common. However, the UN also can play a key role in developing and incorporating intervention operations doctrine. Military cooperation missions, training, and civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) can enhance interoperability in pre-intervention functions and activities.

Bilateral agreements also create cooperation, which regional peace and interoperability. Coalition interoperabilities may combine human and technology. The technological gap between developed and developing countries may cause some obstacles to interoperability among coalition forces.

The international planning phase

There is no international standard mechanism for coordination of policy issued by the UN, other than the principle of impartiality. Mutual understanding in many respects is
essential for success. Harmonizing the UN’s strategic objectives with the interests of the countries and also synchronizing civil-military plans and policies are absolutely necessary.

**The execution phase (in the theatre)**

The command and control system and force structure are at the core of achieving interoperability during the operation. A C4I system includes not only command and control facilities, communications, and intelligence systems, but also elements such as common understanding, leadership, staffing procedures, training ROE, teamwork and others. Cooperation, prioritization, teamwork, using resources, and reducing the inevitable friction in implementation are important to enhance interoperability.

All member nations should be involved in the decision-making process, especially during development of the concept of the operations and rules of engagement.

**The Somalia Experience**

I would like to analyze each single principle taking the experience in Somalia, an “ex-post facto” case with which I am naturally most familiar. My comments will be mostly on peace enforcement, because, as you know, the Somalia operation was a peace operation based on chapter VII of the UN Charter.

**a. Political directive/objectives**

The UN’s decision was to deploy troops as a humanitarian mission, in spite of the fact that the core problem in Somalia was political. Because of the collapse of state and the armed anarchy which followed, the political, humanitarian and military strategy were not harmonized.

I had difficulties by not having an open and clear mandate from the beginning. There must be clear and agreed military objectives, supported by all the contributing nations, from the outset based on a clear political directive. Therefore, the mandate should have complied with the political decision.

**b. Unity of effort**

I had also difficulties with unity of effort toward a common goal.

As a commander in the field I had a great problem at the beginning of the operation, because there was not an established operation cell, operating 24 hours, in the UN HQ, New York, although UNOSOM II had one in the field. In addition, national interests and national intervention to the mission played important roles in implementation. Nations wanted to dictate where their contingents would serve and what duties they would perform. Also, we lost too much time and too many opportunities while waiting for contingents, and equipment, and re-assigning or re-adjusting the forces.

We were not able to develop an integrated common strategy to address coherently national reconciliation and the reconstruction of Somalia.
c. Legitimacy

The biggest problem, in Somalia, was to identify “legitimate” authority in the absence of state institutions. Although the majority of parties in Somalia called for and expected the UN forces, General Aideed and his clan strongly opposed any kind of UN intervention in Somalia’s “sovereignty”, and vowed to conduct guerrilla war against any such administration organized by the UN. Somalia proved how a loss of legitimacy can change a successful mission into a failed intervention.

d. Perseverance

Solving long term problems required long term commitments which were absent in Somalia. Troop contributors rotated their units for short periods and withdrew them at very short notice. You cannot always determine how long the forces will be deployed.

e. Restraint

The understanding of ROE was different among troop contributors. The less the principle of restraint was observed the more opposition was encountered from fighting factions.

f. Security

The forces committed to the city of Mogadishu, where heavily armed militia were operating, were not sufficient as most of the troop contributors were avoiding deploying their troops into the city. This forced my HQ to concentrate our efforts to take more measures with our own security instead of stabilizing the city.

g. Interoperability

I had great difficulties, even with basic areas of interoperability, as I mentioned earlier. Logistics, including health services, was one of the greatest problems in interoperability. All the necessary force multipliers and most of the needs were provided by the United States. Keeping the operation interoperable in a military respect was very difficult without common interests and understanding. So, lack of interoperability in every phase of the Somali operation was one of the major problems that negatively affected the whole Somali operation.

I also had problems related to a common understanding of procedures and standards to the command and control of the operations. INE, used the standards and procedures of NATO, but non-NATO nations had problems. So, there is a need for the UN to write down common standards and procedures for a UN operation.

Essential points for future intervention operations

Having made comments on characteristics and principles and my experiences of Somali operation, I believe that the points that I would like to stress are essential for future intervention operations:
There should be an integrated and an interoperable theatre strategy, which harmonizes political, military and humanitarian elements of force into a coherent approach that establishes unity of efforts.

The UN HQ must be developed and operated in an efficient manner to command and control intervention operations in the military aspect.

All necessary force multipliers, such as C4I, EW and transportation should be provided by the UN.

The intentions of troop contributors should be directed toward the same goal and separate national interests and activities should be avoided.

The force commander should have full command and control authority of the forces. This prevents conflicts between national interests and the international goal.

The Force Commander’s authority should be clearly identified and adequately defined in the documents. It should be unquestionable and accepted by the troop contributors.

The structure of the force should be appropriate for the operation.

The operational forces require more engineer, transportation and logistic support, especially for the forces of developing countries.

Intelligence is vital for the success of intervention operations, just as it is for other military activities.

The dissemination of intelligence to the partners should be clarified at the beginning of the operation.

Logistics (including health services) should be handled through central arrangements.

There should be a plan to supplement logistical shortages without jealousy.

Special forces always have a significant role in such operations. Many missions carried out by special forces cannot be conducted by regular forces.

Also, psychological operations and the media are integral parts for the success of the operation.

Conclusion

I would like to summarize by saying that

- Somalia highlighted many aspects of adequacy of command and control arrangements and the organization from the United Nations to the theatre.
- Political guidance should be clear and comprise all the aspects of the operation. Considering the nature and especially the principles of intervention operations and the current structure of the UN Organization, I clearly say that the UN, with its current structure, cannot lead a peace enforcement operation.
- Intervention operations in the near future should be led by NATO or a capable single nation, under the political authorization of the United Nations.
- In the near and long terms, the UN should have a military structure - including rapid reaction forces - to be able to conduct peace operations.
• Establishing multinational peacekeeping units may enhance the ability for intervention, and solve the problems of interoperability.

• Force multipliers should be organized at enough levels to successfully conduct the operation.

• It is impossible to achieve the objectives with insufficient forces. For this reason the commitment of nations, including the duration of troop service, should be clearly defined at the beginning of the operation, and important changes should not be made during the operation.

• At the beginning, the views of the force committed nations should be taken into account to define the main concept of the operation in order to avoid national interventions during the operation. This means that an appropriate mechanism for the decision makers should be established.

• The task organization should sufficiently meet theatre requirements.

Lastly I would like to remind you of the statement made by the UN Secretary General in 1995, that the UN was not the proper organization for managing large, complex, and ambitious military operations, and did not have the capacity to deploy, direct, or command and control peace enforcement operations.

I take this opportunity to salute the troop contributors and those who lost their lives for a free world order.
PANEL II

CASE STUDIES WITH PROJECTIONS INTO THE 21ST CENTURY
As the first comprehensive models of transitional administrations under a certain mandate, Bosnia and Kosovo constitute the turning points in the evolution process of multidimensional peace operations.

The overarching challenge in both territories is to build confidence in the hearts and minds of the people and it can only be done by restoring faith in justice, a “sine qua non” for reaching reconciliation in a post-conflict environment.

Upholding human rights and establishing the rule of law, in order to provide justice to all members of the society, can only be achieved by developing peace-building strategies and implementing programmes in support of those strategies. Despite the significant progress made in Bosnia and Kosovo operations, a doctrinal development of the justice issue is yet to be realized. A mechanism within the UN that can make a system-wide analysis and reflect theoretical discussions concerning justice issues in the field is needed. This mechanism will be a vital tool in matching theoretical and practical issues related with complex peace operations.

Marx expected the communist revolution to take place in Germany, but it happened in Russia. Similarly, after the end of the Cold War and the leadership change in the Yugoslav State, the international community expected a deadly conflict in Kosovo, but the third Balkan war started in Bosnia.

It is a matter of discussion how can Germany and Russia be related in the matter of regime change, but I can easily tell you that the Bosnia and Kosovo issues have been the part and parcel of the same regional armed conflict. These two territories have stayed on the fault line of European politics and history, from the times of division of the Roman Empire. If we do not take into account several centuries of Pax Ottomana, this part of the world has had no rest in most of its history. Since the last quarter of the 19th century Bosnia and Kosovo have not witnessed peace and prosperity, and this trend has not changed in the post-Cold War era.

The people living there consider this fact as a bad joke of their destiny and they believe that life has not treated them justly. However, if you get to know them better, you realize that although they complain a lot about their current conditions, they hold a strong hope deep in their hearts, that divine justice will be achieved in their region and, even if they do not benefit, their future generations will live in a better environment, where they can get their share of happiness, wealth and justice in this world.
Following this prelude, based on the thirst of the people of the region for justice, I would like to compare the peace operations in Bosnia and Kosovo. Then, I would like to comment on whether these operations would succeed in bringing sustainable peace and prosperity to these two regions.

Following the end of the Cold War, the world witnessed violent conflicts that resulted in appalling humanitarian catastrophes. Two of them occurred in the heart of Europe: in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in Kosovo, and with the intention of restoring peace in these two territories, the international community had to apply certain enforcement methods. In order to maintain peace and security, the international community established multidimensional peace operations in Bosnia and Kosovo.

Without elaborating the conditions that paved way for the signing of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, I would like to overview the nature of this agreement, which is known as the Dayton Peace Accords or Agreement. In conformity with its full name, it is a framework agreement. It has two main pillars: civilian and military ones.  

Immediately after the signing of the agreement for Bosnia, the UN Security Council established a United Nations Civilian Police Force (IPTF) and a United Nations civilian office to shoulder the civilian pillar, especially in entrenching the rule of law. The OSCE accepted the task of arranging elections and fostering the democratization process in Bosnia. The World Bank and the EU initiated comprehensive projects for the economic reconstruction of the country.

Looking at the overall assessment of the peace operation in Bosnia, we realize that its framework, together with the support of international organizations including the UN, is quite different than the peacekeeping operations of the Cold War period, which mostly had traditional monitoring mandates and no direct peace building responsibilities. This framework incorporates many elements, military and civilian, working together to build peace in the dangerous aftermath of war in Bosnia. These elements include: military aspects of the peace settlement, arrangements for regional stabilization, establishing state institutions, electoral assistance, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants into civilian society, entrenching the rule of law, upholding the human rights, and providing technical assistance for democratic development.

1 Office of the High Representative, Bosnia and Herzegovina: Essential Texts, 1996, 4-5.
2 Ibid, 124-128.
With these elements, I argue that the peace operation in Bosnia, being close to the first comprehensive model of transitional administration under a certain mandate, may be regarded as the turning point in the evolution of multidimensional peace operations.

Let me turn to the immediate aftermath of the Kosovo war, in 1999. Four years after the Dayton, we witnessed the establishment of another peace operation in the Balkans region: UNMIK, the UN mission in Kosovo.

All the elements of the Dayton framework found their reflection in the UN Security Council Resolution 1244, in conformity with the *sui generis* political status of Kosovo.\(^7\) This time we see a transitional administration in the Balkans, led by the UN. The civilian aspects of the operation are run by the UN mission headed by the SRSG, while its military aspect is run by KFOR, a multinational force.

The picture becomes more complete when there is a UN mandate that sets out detailed aspects of a complex peace operation and the case that followed Kosovo was the East Timor conflict. The UN involvement in the conflict resulted in the establishment of another complex peacekeeping operation in the form of a transitional administration: UNTAET. It would not be wrong to say that, while subsequent complex missions after UNMIK all have their own unique aspects, several have at least followed the tracks of UNSC 1244.

In sum, in my personal view, the mandate of the Bosnia mission constituted a blueprint for UNMIK, and UN Security Council Resolution 1244, which established UNMIK and authorized the KFOR as the multinational force in Kosovo, formed a base for future UN resolutions on complex peace missions.

The evolution of the multidimensional peace operations required a comprehensive assessment of all the aspects of these operations. The timely work of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations chaired by Mr. Brahimi produced a fundamental framework for peace operations.\(^8\) The panel inspired mainly by the Bosnia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and East Timor cases put forward recommendations on how to run complex peace operations successfully and end them with a sound exit strategy.

But what do we see 8 years after Dayton and 4 years after UNSC 1244? There is no clear exit strategy for either Bosnia or Kosovo. So what has gone wrong or is still going wrong?

Of course, one can cite several political reasons as excuses however, before looking at excuses, we should consider to what extent the international community is able to play its part within the context of peacekeeping. How flawless are our peace operations? Are there aspects that jeopardize the effectiveness of the peace operations carried out by the international community?

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\(^7\) United Nations, Security Council Resolution 1244, S/RES/1244(1999). All the references that are made in this study on the interim administration in Kosovo are cited in the UNSC Resolution 1244(1999) and its annexes.

For the Bosnia and Kosovo cases my answer is in the affirmative. I will dwell on two main aspects of the Bosnian and Kosovo cases, which support my contention: the issues of the rule of law and human rights under the common denominator of justice.

All armed conflicts have victims. Briefly speaking, victims are people subjected to injustice with their rights grossly violated, including the most sacred one – the right to live. Wherever violators of rights escape unpunished, it means there is no justice.

Whether from the perspective of Hobbes or of Rousseau, man wants to feel secure in his society. He may obtain this security either by deterrence through strength, or by guarantees of a social contract. The only way to feel secure is to have faith that the justice system of the society will protect its members from victimization. From this we come to reconciliation. In a post-conflict society without confidence and without justice, there cannot be a climate of reconciliation. Without reconciliation, it is almost impossible to convince former enemies to set their differences aside and work together in politics or economy.

Unfortunately, in Bosnia and Kosovo, the rule of law has not been sufficiently strengthened to provide trust and confidence to all segments of society. This does not mean that there have been no positive developments achieved in the rule of law and related aspects of these peace operations. The maintenance of peace after two deadly conflicts is certainly a considerable achievement. However, a lot still needs to be done. This observation is also shared by the relevant authorities in charge of Bosnia and Kosovo.

Let me read from a report given by the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Peace Implementation Council Steering Board in September 2002: “This country has many laws and many judges, but it does not have the rule of law. Every citizen in this country knows that our laws are too often flouted or ignored, and that when prosecutions do occur, justice is rarely served…”

It should not be surprising to hear these words from the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the international community has to date failed to bring to justice Karadzic and Mladic, the main architects of the massacres in Bosnia. As Ambassador Klein put it yesterday very eloquently, “if you cannot punish the guilty, you cannot absolve the innocent”.

The record on the rule of law in Kosovo is also not very promising. The parallel structures from both the Albanian and Serbian sides continue to paralyze the legal system. The ambiguous political language of Security Council resolution 1244 is far from discouraging the extremists from doing anything they want in order to fulfil their aspirations. According to the latest report of the UN Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, the period since July 2003 has been characterized by a number of violent attacks, including shootings, in which the victims have been members of the Kosovo Serb community, as well as UNMIK law enforcement authorities. UNMIK has been criticized for being reluctant to pursue suspected war

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crimes in case such actions inflame local tensions and lead to public unrest. Critics have noted, however, that recently there have been clear indications that this apparent policy is changing. Let us hope that this is so, but we should not forget that if you cannot rule the streets, the streets rule you.

I shall now briefly comment on the policy of UNMIK on human rights in Kosovo. According to this policy the promotion of human rights has been to subsume the problem of national minorities under the broader topic of ensuring basic individual rights to all human beings, without particular reference to membership in any specific group. This approach is in conformity with liberal thinking, which advocates the universality of individual rights as a basis for justice in society, rather than focusing on the collective rights of certain groups of people. I have three comments on such an approach.

First of all, this might be valid for a country with democratic traditions, but not for the transitional administration of a community that has experienced ethnic cleansing.

Secondly, this approach was popular during the great euphoria that prevailed in the aftermath of the Cold War. The events in the Balkans, however, served as a wake up call for advocates of human rights, by showing that the rights of groups caught up in intra-state conflicts could not be protected by a policy that focuses on individual rights.

Thirdly and most saliently, after witnessing intra-state conflicts such as Bosnia and Kosovo, the scholars of the political thought have begun to argue that “a comprehensive theory of justice in a multicultural state should in addition to universal rights, assigned to individuals regardless of group membership, include certain group-differentiated rights or ‘special status’ for minority cultures”.

Regarding the dynamics and tensions of the Balkan region, it is not easy to understand the contradictory approaches adopted by the international community in Bosnia and in Kosovo. In the former, the Bosnian vase has been broken into two entities and three constituent peoples, whereas in the latter the international community tries to glue the two pieces together as a patchwork.

These suggest that, in the area of justice, an important set of recommendations included in the Brahimi report and later in the Challenges Report, namely strategic thinking and doctrinal guidance, were largely ignored in the cases of Bosnia and Kosovo.

Upholding human rights and establishing the rule of law, in order to provide justice to all

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12 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, New York, Oxford University Press ,1999, p. 3. Kymlicka refers to Inis Claude for this definition (Inis Claude,National Minorities:An International Problem,(Cambridge, Mass, Harvard University Press, 1955), 211.) Kymlicka and Iris Marion Young discuss the issue of “subsuming the problem of national minorities under the broader topic of ensuring basic individual rights to all human beings, without particular reference to membership in any groups” in depth in their books cited in the Bibliography.

13 Ibid., 6.

members of society in a post-conflict area, can be achieved only by developing peace building strategies and implementing programmes in support of those strategies.

Although many advances have been made in Bosnia and Kosovo in the area of justice, a doctrinal development of the justice issue has yet to be achieved. In my opinion, what is needed is a mechanism in the UN system able to make system-wide analysis and able to apply theoretical discussions on justice to field practices. The unit of best practices and lessons in the UN DPKO can surely provide very useful insights on the operational aspects of peace operations. However, there is a vital need to establish a strategic planning centre at UN Headquarters, although I recognize that there may be practical and political objections. The centre should have the means and the capacity to make system-wide analysis in order to recommend strategies and doctrines, and most importantly, it should be transparent, impartial, and immune to political influences.

The paragraphs in the reports of the Special Committee for Peacekeeping Operations in the past four years recognize the need for establishing such a unit but without a serious suggestion for implementation.\textsuperscript{15} The Committee should seriously concentrate on establishing such a centre in the Secretariat as recommended in the Brahimi Report.\textsuperscript{16} The Secretariat should be cooperative and the competition between DPA and DPKO on the location of this unit should be overcome. The Secretary-General himself should get involved to solve this problem.

Otherwise, the lack of determining strategies and doctrines on issues such as justice which are credible in the field, at headquarters and in the policies of states will constitute an acute challenge for peace operations.

As Dr. Andrea Bartoli emphasized yesterday, Member States are the key actors in conflict prevention, so their commitment and willingness will be crucial elements in establishing such a mechanism which is vital to the marriage of theory and practice in all aspects of a complex peace operation.

I believe that Member States should consider the realization of this mechanism as an important step in the interests of improving the access to justice of all victims of conflicts.

\textsuperscript{15} United Nations, Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, A/57/6, 28 March 2003, 11.
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THE NATO OPERATION IN MACEDONIA

Brigadier Jan Harm de Jonge
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For many years, the ethnic Albanians and the Slavic Macedonians had lived together, respecting each other’s religions and cultures. What played an important role in the dispute, of course, was the enormous unemployment. An unemployment rate of more than 80% in some areas is the best guarantee for destabilising any nation or society.

Under Operation Essential Harvest a NATO force entered Macedonia, in order to support the first steps of a normalisation process and was followed by Operation Amber Fox with its military component Task Force Fox, which were both completely successful.

Keys for these successes were: a rapid deployment of credible forces; a serious commitment of major nations of NATO; the used system of a “lead nation concept”; extremely good cooperation between the various Heads of Mission in theatre. It ends with the plea to give a Force Commander the necessary “freedom of movement”.

I would like to share my experiences with you over this NATO mission in Macedonia. I shall not take a ‘behind the desk approach’ nor a philosophical one; but I shall share my personal accounts and experiences as a Force-Commander in the field. Listening to yesterday’s briefings was very useful. It gave me a better idea of what I should focus on, namely the key to success or the potential for failure. Furthermore, I will address some specific characteristics that could be interesting for this symposium to reflect upon. Let me start with a quick refresher on Macedonia itself.

Firstly, we saw in Macedonia the UN mission, the preventive deployment of troops, starting in 1992. Why was it important? It was not a very strong force; it was a force deployed in the former crisis area against the border-areas of northern Macedonia and in the west near Albania. In my opinion, the most important signal that was given was that it showed to the local authorities and population that the international community was watching the situation and was committed to giving some kind of support to keep Macedonia stable and prevent it from being affected by the unrest and the crisis of the war in Yugoslavia. Macedonia, until 1992 a part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, has always been a relatively poor country and depended on selling their agricultural products on the Yugoslavian markets. After the collapse of the Republic, the export of these products decreased dramatically. The result was a collapse of the economy and an increase in unemployment rates. The population is mainly Slavic Macedonian, with a minority of ethnic Albanians. However, we must be aware that the ethnic Albanians, despite being a minority, were represented in the government and in Parliament. The ethnic Albanians had long-standing demands and wishes, for example to be allowed to use their own language as an official language in their part of the country and to have the possibility to have their own university.
UNPREDEP, the preventive UN deployment, was unfortunately terminated on 28 February 1999. Additionally, we saw the unexpected exodus of Kosovo-Albanians from Kosovo into Macedonia. This immediately started to destabilize the delicate balance in the northern part of Macedonia. The unrest and the later uncertainty in Macedonia as we saw it in 2001 was a spill over consequence of the NATO operations and the NATO intervention in Kosovo. I should like to bring this to your attention as the first point for further reflection.

Once an international institution such as the UN or NATO decides to intervene, a campaign plan is developed. The campaign plan itself, in order to intervene in this case in Kosovo, is relatively easy to produce. It focuses mainly on operations, logistics, and information operations. In my opinion what should be taken into account is an analysis of the possible spill over effects and ways to prevent the spill over consequences of such an intervention. This analysis should not act as a show-stopper for the intervention itself, but to enable the planners to be aware of these side-effects and to have contingencies available in order to react in a preventive way when necessary.

From January until June 2001, we experienced the insurgency crisis of the UCK-M, the National Liberation Army. In fact, the ethnic Albanians guerrillas were not a large force. But the Macedonian Army responsible for law and order in that area, reacted in a very unfortunate way. As we all know, trying to track down small groups of guerrillas with mechanized forces and targeting whole villages with artillery in the hope of catching one of the guerrillas is definitely not a solution. In fact, it resulted in a very sharp increase in support by the Albanian population for the UCK-M. The police in the area where the UCK-M won ground were quickly evicted and of course, emotions ran high.

In my opinion, the dispute between the Albanians and the Macedonians basically had no religious grounds. For many years, the ethnic Albanians and the Slavic Macedonians had lived together, respecting each other’s religions and cultures. What played a role of course was the enormous unemployment. An unemployment rate of more than 80% in some areas is the best guarantee for destabilising any nation or society. If fathers and mothers do not have the means to buy food for their children, they become desperate and unpredictable and resort to any means possible to provide food for their children. As I have already mentioned, Macedonia has always been a relatively poor country. It was not only the collapse of Yugoslavia, but also the economic sanctions against Serbia that brought the export of goods to other countries more or less to a standstill. Again, we see here an example of the side effects brought about by the actions of the international community. Although the economic sanctions against Serbia may have been wise in order to force Serbia to change its policy, they resulted at the same time in a collapse of the Macedonian economy and, by doing so, in a destabilizing process.

In order to stop the fighting, the international community forced both parties, the Macedonian authorities and the ethnic Albanian guerrillas, to negotiate and accept a peace agreement. The Agreement of Ohrid was accepted on 13 August 2001. It should have resulted in more rights for the Albanians, new fair and democratic elections, and a census. This census was very crucial as it was supposed to answer the question of the size of the Albanian minority. A clear outcome of this census was supposed to end the hopeless time-consuming debate on this topic. It was also agreed to restore public law and order, which meant that in the former crisis area where the UCK-M ruled and where the police had been evicted, the Albanians had to accept that a new police force would take over. However, this
time it was a more balanced force with Macedonians and Albanians and of course most important was the dismantling of the UCK-M as a military force.

In the first week of September 2001, two weeks after the signing of the peace-agreement, a NATO force of approximately 4,000 soldiers entered Macedonia, for a specific period, in order to support the first steps of a normalisation process. This Force was deployed at the request of the Macedonian government. Its specific mission was to assist in the collection of arms. During yesterday’s question and answer period the collection of arms was an issue. In fact, you see here two examples that give us the “key to success”; first a rapid deployment of a credible force - using a window of opportunity - and secondly the collection of arms soon after the end of the conflict in order to move towards a normal stable situation. A total of 3,300 weapons were collected and destroyed. It seems to be quite a lot of weapons, but on the other hand it is not many because in these countries there are many more weapons concealed in houses and among the people, and above all the borders are open and free of border controls. It was possible to smuggle weapons from one country to another in the space of two or three months. In fact, it was again more of a political signal to the Macedonians and to the ethnic Albanians that NATO was serious and meant business and that the international community was committed to ensuring stability and would support the people in trying to achieve it.

Operation Essential Harvest lasted approximately one and a half months. Then the troops were withdrawn and there was a follow up, Operation Amber Fox with its military component NATO Task Force Fox. This mission, approximately 700 soldiers strong, lasted from October 2001 to December 2002. Looking at their mandate, which yesterday was also an issue, - was it under Chapter VI and a half or VII, VIII? I have no idea; I have never had an idea and in fact, I was never interested. It was clearly defined what I had to do as a Force Commander and what I was allowed to do, and it was not very much. My main task was to guarantee the safety of the international observers. We had approximately 200 observers who were to observe the accomplishment of the Ohrid Agreement and these men had to be extracted in case they were taken hostage or were targeted or threatened in any way whatsoever. That was my main task. So, I was not allowed to interpose in case of a clash between two groups. I was not allowed to check or to close the border between Kosovo and Macedonia, etc., etc. In fact, I was not an occupation force. The position of my Force and me was absolutely different in comparison with the situation that we saw with NATO in Bosnia and we still see nowadays in Kosovo.

Having said that, the problem of course is that, once you arrive, you find out very quickly that people on the ground expect you to do much more. Especially in those places where we had no police forces - because the internal police did not dare to go into the former crises area- where in fact the Albanians were the rulers, criminality was high, and we could not exclude that criminality was linked to politics. There were still many weapons and there was a lot of border-crossing, illegal border-crossing. I was not allowed to act, to do something against that. However, the normal people on the street expected me, because NATO was there, to counter those illegal, destabilising activities. Therefore, that always remains a dilemma which starts in fact on the very first day of such a mission.

After the successful completion of elections and the census, tension in the area began to decrease. Therefore, Operation Amber Fox, with its military component Task Force Fox, was completed and the Force deactivated. It was also an important and clear political signal to the Macedonians. One point to mention is that NATO, and later on the
EU, understood that you cannot fully withdraw all your attention, commitment and all your troops out of a mission, where you have supported a government or its people. Yesterday it was stressed during the discussions that there should always be a kind of follow-up. In this case, the NATO commitment continues, under a new name and with a much reduced force made up of more observers than any proper troops. This continues today where the European Union has taken over the responsibility of the international community in Macedonia.

Let me focus a little on the area where Task Force Fox was deployed in my time. It consisted of one fifth of the whole territory of the Republic of Macedonia. It was the former crisis area where in 2001 the fighting had started. However, in September 2002 during my time as Force Commander, elections were to take place, which gave the potential for skirmishes, for disruption and probably for sabotage. In addition, the census had to take place and these two events were taking place throughout the whole country.

Focusing on Task Force Fox, what was it exactly? We had three infantry teams and some support and headquarters troops. The main task of these infantry teams was, as mentioned, to act in case the observers or a group of observers had to be extracted because they were taken hostage or otherwise threatened. That could have led to a situation where they were left sitting in their camps or in their small barracks waiting for such an action. Instead, I ordered these infantry teams to carry out patrols and to prepare themselves for extraction tasks. Once these preparations were completed, the teams continued to patrol. This led to the secondary effect that was to show the flag and to be visible. Was I allowed to order my troops to act in this way? Probably not. However, by showing the flag and by driving around through the villages where the Macedonian police were not yet present, we made the international community visible to the population, saying: “We are here to help you to go towards a more stable situation.” In fact, at this point I was already broadening the scope of my mission, my mandate, and it certainly calmed down the tense situation, which was not only in line with the long-term goals of NATO, but also facilitated the force protection of my soldiers.

Furthermore, we deployed the so-called Field Liaison Teams; small teams of four soldiers, and NCOs who were deployed throughout the country, concentrating on the former crisis area, in the north. It is important to note that they lived with and among the population. They rented in a village a small house or an apartment and were very soon accepted and trusted by the villagers. You should try to be one with the population. You should try to understand them. You should do the same things such as celebrating their marriages and religious gatherings with them. In this way, they gained the trust of the population. The population saw that the international community was committed and so the people complied with the aspects as stated in the Ohrid Agreement. Furthermore, those teams were my main source of information and very soon after the start of the mission; I had a complete situational awareness of what had happened, what were the trends and what were the thoughts and fears in the former crises area between the population and the Macedonian authorities. This of course put me in a position where my advice to the ambassadors and to the Macedonian authorities was always well argued and convincing.

Yesterday the topic of lead nation was covered very briefly. I should like to elaborate a little further on this subject. According to my experience, there is not always a common understanding of what the consequences are of being a lead nation. What are the responsibilities? Is it only to provide the bulk of the troops or the logistics? Does it bring
to this nation a position of priority in the political aspects of how to deal with a mission? The four major participating countries that provided troops were Germany, Italy, France and the Netherlands. In total, my taskforce consisted of eleven nations. The elections and the census both had the potential to increase tension and to cause disruptions, but they were very important steps towards the end-state that we wanted to reach. At the end of July 2002, it was made clear that the elections were going to take place after having been already postponed for some time. It meant that we were going to have five times as many observers. One thousand observers and election monitors, instead of two hundred, and I was made responsible to guarantee the safety of these one thousand observers as well. Furthermore, my area of operation in order to guarantee the safety was now not only confined to the former crisis area, which was only a small part, but was covering the whole area, which suddenly became an interesting challenge. Very soon, the Heads of Mission of the EU, the OSCE who provided the main bulk of the observers, and the Macedonian authorities, requested NATO to enlarge the mandate, to enlarge the mission and to send if necessary more troops. It took NATO some time, more than a month, to come up with a decision and then it was only four weeks before the elections, and I still had no additional troops. A Force Generation Conference, hosted by NATO, failed. No country was willing to provide any additional troops and then you see the advantage of having a lead nation. This lead nation, in this case the Netherlands, realised that it had to act and take responsibility. Eight days after this non-productive Force Generation Conference, I started to receive my additional troops in theatre. I am talking about additional soldiers, Field Liaison teams, helicopters and signal troops in order to cover the whole area. Again, you see one of the advantages of the concept of a lead nation. You do not want to lose too much time in asking various countries for support. In a pressing situation, only one country should be in the position to take the decision.

Another item I would like to bring to your attention is co-operation in theatre. Talking to the Macedonian authorities in Macedonia, we had at least four institutions. We had the European Union represented at ambassador level, as the Head of Mission. The OSCE was also represented at ambassador level. There was NATO with its Civilian Representative on behalf of Secretary-General Lord Robertson at ambassador level and we saw the ambassador of the United States of America who played a vital role in Macedonia. Normally, you would say, this is the best recipe for creating chaos. How can you speak with one voice? How can you have one voice representing the international community? In fact, from the first day on it worked and we saw that there was absolutely 100% co-operation and understanding between these four or five gentlemen called the Principals. They met twice a week and as a Force Commander, I was also involved in these talks. They policies how to act, how to handle a crises, how to do more in order to stabilise and to calm down the people, until we had the census and the elections were discussed there. I sat many times around the table, and was surprised about the way in which these gentlemen listened to each other, advised each other and in the end, came up with a result. This result was then presented with one voice, one statement and one policy towards the ethnic Albanian leaders or towards the Macedonian government authorities. This was one of the best ways of co-operation that I have seen in such a mission.

Operation Amber Fox and Task Force Fox were deactivated in December 2002. As I mentioned, again a very important political signal. Major steps forward had been made. The elections and the census had taken place in a relatively fair and democratic manner, without major problems. From the beginning, NATO made clear that it was willing to support the Macedonians, but only for a fixed period of time. It was important that
Macedonia should be in a position to continue its way towards stability and prosperity on its own, without the help of an institution like NATO. It was well understood, however, that a kind of follow-up should remain. So the lesson previously learned, that is, it’s unwise to end a mission suddenly and completely, was then put into practice. This follow-up mission was later to be taken over by the EU and it would consist mainly of observers.

Now some more words on the mandate business. I can tell you that when I left my country in order to prepare myself for taking over command, I received some guidance from the Dutch MOD. It was made clear that it was of utmost importance that I should stay completely within my mandate. That sounds logical and understandable, but it means that you may run into problems and dilemmas. The situation on the ground is always different, or may develop in a different way than can be foreseen. Just one example to make this clear: the elections. I knew from my intelligence gathering, through my Field Liaison Teams, specific spots during election day where polling stations were going to be put out of business by certain groups, especially in the Albanian area. So, I decided to deploy all the troops that were available in the field, focusing of course on the specific spots as mentioned. The effect had to be that the population noticed that the international community was in the area and observing. The result of this support was a high percentage of people showing up at the polling stations. Was it in the mandate? Absolutely not, but sometimes you have to act.

The second example is a very interesting one, it happened after the elections. It was clear that one of the winners was the socialist Macedonian party, the other winner on the side of the Albanian party was the former leader of the UCK-M. He was at that moment, a man that you could not bypass. He would remain an important figure for the rest of the political process in which the Albanian and Macedonian parties would come together in order to achieve a clear policy on how to govern within a new government, including of course who should be given the most important posts. What is interesting to note is that this former leader of the UCK-M was still on the wanted list. The police wanted to arrest him because of his involvement in the UCK-M and had every intention of doing so. As long as he stayed in his own area, where at that moment the Macedonian police were not in power there was no problem, but as soon as he would show up in Skopje the police would go after him. So at the request of one of the ambassadors, I provided my camp as a place where both parties were able to meet with each other and start up the necessary negotiations and talks. Why? Because I felt that it was important in regard to the political intent. We wanted it to lead to a new stable government and it is then necessary to support them every step of the way in order to ensure that such a situation was made possible. Of course, I also had to make some arrangements that this man was able to reach the camp.

In the end, it resulted in a situation where there were fair talks that resulted in a good and stable government as we have since witnessed. I would say that sometimes you have to step on the other side of the line. Some of the pre-conditions, of course the collection of arms, the co-operation at a local level and at a higher level are very important. What I mentioned earlier, one team, one mission is illustrated through those four or five ambassadors who came together to form one policy. For NATO, it was important as well to do this with a relatively small force with limited resources and in a limited time frame.

To finish with one last word on the mandate, my plea has always been and will remain that a Force Commander should be given freedom of movement. After all, once a
Force Commander has been appointed one should of course assume that he has the necessary credentials to fulfil his mission and is aware of the international political intentions. Therefore, he should be given the freedom and leeway to achieve his mission and reach the end-state in the best possible way. Otherwise, he should not have been appointed in the first place.
In trying to analyse how crises in Africa could be managed, it is necessary to understand the causes of such problems. Africa is peculiar in that whereas the nation state is acknowledged as the primary actor in international politics, states as such do not exist in Africa and had not been consciously constructed in the post independence era.

There are two main viewpoints as to what should be done in the management of African crisis. One viewpoint advocates that the developed world must come to Africa’s rescue for anything tangible to be achieved. The second viewpoint believes that Africa must rediscover itself as the problems were created by the developed world that imposed un-African solutions on Africa’s problems.

The solution to Africa’s problems lies in a combination of these two extreme points. It is not possible for Africa to develop on its own without support from the industrialised world, just as it not possible for the industrialised world to start anything without Africans taking the initiative for others to assist.

‘Conflicts continue to prevail in many parts of the continent causing considerable human suffering and destruction of property and infrastructure…they are generating millions of refugees and displaced persons in Africa. They are subjecting generations of young Africans to violence, hatred and destruction…Conflicts are also depriving our continent of the use of its immense resources, both human and material, at a time when Africa badly needs the energies of all its people to forge ahead with its development’.  

Dr Salim A. Salim (October 1996)

Introduction

Two issues are paramount to the changes taking place in the world and these are the end of the Cold War and globalisation. The euphoria heralding the end of the cold war has been replaced by fear on the level of violence unleashed on Africa. From the Maghreb to the sub-Sahara, the continent is engulfed in various forms of crises, bordering on economic, ethnic, political or religious in nature. Algeria to the North is in serious political crisis with religious connotations. East and Central Africa are grappling with problems of

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political power sharing, as the case in Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) portend. The south is gripped with the self-inflicted problem of famine in Zimbabwe for economic and political reasons. The West is dealing with political instability from civil war ravaged Liberia and Sierra Leone to the threat to the nascent democracy in Nigeria. Even Ivory Coast once the sub-region economic miracle country is dealing with rebellion, which might require military intervention.  

Crisis is not new in Africa as old empires and kingdoms before the partitioning of the continent in 1858 were based on conflicts and conquering of one ethnic group or tribe by another. The partitioning of these communities into what later metamorphosed into nation states, did not take the differences of those lumped together into consideration. As Richard Brown said ‘colonisation formed boundaries which grouped rival ethnic groups together and separated others’.  

During the Cold War, now tagged the ‘Third World War’, Africa was an ideological battlefield for the super powers. ‘Some of the most devastated battlefields of that war are found in sub Sahara Africa, with 931,500 military and civilian casualties in the 1990’s alone’. The super powers wooed African countries by buoying their economies and propping up regimes, which were known to be oppressive and autocratic, as was the case with Mobutu Sese Seko and Menghistu Haile Mariam of DRC and Ethiopia respectively.  

The end of the Cold War saw Africa being embroiled in many conflicts, more than any other continent in the world. ‘Of the 15 complex emergencies declared by the United Nations (UN) Department of Humanitarian Affairs, 8 were in Africa’. These conflicts were mostly intra rather than inter-state conflicts, as ‘of the 17 wars in Africa only one of them the Ethiopian- Eritrea war is classified as interstate’. The death toll in all these crises over the last 10 years is about 4.1million.  

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2 Guardian Nigerian Newspaper of Friday 27 Sep 02.
7 West Africa Magazine Issue 453 25 Nov- 01 Dec 02(London, England ) p.4
8 Sola Akimimade and Ahmadu Sessay; Africa in Post cold war international system (London, Pinter) 1998, p. 46
11 Olu Adedeji ‘Essays on Nigerian Foreign Policy p162-163.
12 Maj Gen Chris A Garuba ‘Capacity Building………p. 9
13 Okwudibia Nnoli ‘Ethnic Politics in Nigeria; (Enugu, 1980) Charpter 5 p. 141
14 Stephen Wright ‘Economist Intelligence Unit: A Political Risk Analysis; Nigeria- The Dilemmas Ahead Special Report/No. 1072 1986.
15 Nigeria’s Current Crisis RISCT Conflict Studies 283/284 p. 3
The new world order in its wake has brought a great deal of disorder in Africa. For Africa it is synonymous with breakdown of nation states, pitching minority against majority. The advent of globalisation and its economic, cultural and political implications has serious repercussion for Africa, if the myriads of crises are not managed effectively. While the core states of the world are stressing international cooperation and unity, African countries are busy contemplating break up and fragmentation. The atmosphere is tense with minimal level of investments in human and infrastructures. This has resulted in misplaced priorities and, as Barry Buzan opined, African countries as part of the third world lay emphasis on military and political security, which in essence is regime security as against economic, social and environmental security by the core states. The interest of the developed countries of the world in Africa is now on core national issues of; ‘exploiting the vast resources and untapped market potential, reduction of seed bed for diseases including HIV/AIDS, for terrorism, illegal drugs and fraud’. There is also the issue of migration from Africa and its attendant problems for the home country.

Nigeria with her vast human and material resources has epitomised the African crisis problem. Despite the emplacement of a democratic government in May 1999, the situation is so critical that some parts of the country are agitating for a sovereign conference to determine if the present system should continue or break into its constituent parts. The country has been under military rule for 28 of 42 years of independence, with at least 5 successful coup d’etats and more than 10 failed attempts to overthrow the various governments. At present the problems of ethnic and religious crisis, which have serious political implications, are threatening the corporate existence of the country. All these could be blamed on the poor economic situation in which the nation has found itself due to corruption, poor fiscal policies and poor management of the resources, by the political leadership.

The rampant ethnic and religious clashes are a reflection of the divide between the 3 major tribes; Hausa-Fulani’s to the north, Yoruba’s to the southwest and Igbo’s to the south east of the country. The north is predominantly Muslim, the west mixed and the east Christian. Of the 12 different governments in Nigeria from 1960 to date, the North has provided the head 8 times, the West 3 times, the East once. The issue is viewed virtually on a zero sum basis of whichever tribe is at the helm of affairs gets the best appointments and determines the distribution of the national wealth. The problem is not insurmountable given the fact that the people have existed as a nation for this long. The post Cold War situation has placed the onus of resolving African crisis on Africans themselves. African fatigue has set in and no core state will donate or even send in troops to resolve any crisis in Africa, if the people of the continent are not willing to solve their problems themselves.

This paper will use Nigeria as a vehicle for highlighting the types of crisis in Africa and examine what needs to be done. There is the argument that Africans need to evolve their own antidote for these crises. If the problems cannot be stopped completely, they should be managed effectively to prevent system collapse. Crisis management refers to “the attempt to control events to prevent significant and systemic violence from occurring.”

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11 Olu Adedeji ‘Essays on Nigerian Foreign Policy’ p162-163
12 Maj Gen Chris A Garuba ‘Capacity Building’ p. 9
This paper will be restricted to civil matters affecting development, good governance and security. Furthermore emphasis is placed on intra rather than inter-state conflicts.

**Types of Crisis**

The typology of crises in Nigeria and indeed Africa could be in many forms. However this paper is concentrating on ethnic, religious and economic crisis, which have invariably impacted on the political situation.

**Ethnic Crisis**

Ethnicity is not a new phenomenon in Nigeria. It was the basis of the old kingdoms before colonialism. It was further reinforced by the colonial masters who used the divide and rule system by separating the ethnic groups and setting up regional governments. The negative consequences of the growing power of ethnic groups for the development of a nation state were recognised as far back as 1945 when Eyo Ita warned ‘that the greatest need of Nigerians is to become a community and evolve a national selfhood’.\textsuperscript{13} Ethnic sympathies and inter-ethnic rivalries are an important issue in Nigerian politics, even though various governments tried to alleviate the tensions by dividing the country first to 12 in 1967 and currently to 36 including the capital city Abuja. The Economist recognised the impact of ethnicity on the polity when it stated that ‘It remains an important filter through which Nigerians perceive the political system, which is normally blunt, stereotyped and unfavourable towards that of differing background’.\textsuperscript{14} This argument sums up the situation during the First and Second Republics between 1960-1966 and 1979-1983 respectively. The same situation is becoming visible with the Presidential elections in April 2003.\textsuperscript{15} The genesis of the Nigerian civil war of 1967-1970 has been traced in some quarters to ethnicity, as there was mistrust in the military, the only bastion of the nation’s unity.

The Cold War acted as a structural control on pre-existing ethnic and sub-national aspirations and these, no longer suppressed, have now burst to the foreground. Cumulatively, observers felt that since the ‘Cold War was a stable system, they could envision only instability resulting from its end’.\textsuperscript{16} However, the revival of ethnic problems in Nigeria cannot be explained away on past events. The leaders of the ethnic groups worked together for political independence from the British, by presenting a common front. People from the various ethnic groups have married into, traded with and worked in other areas, which should have further strengthened the unity of the country. It could be argued that those complaining are doing so because they are not at the centre to disburse resources and line their pockets given the level of corruption in the country. The same politicians were in the same organisation in opposition to military governments, especially from 1992 till 1999. Some of the complaints are genuine and the government could reduce the tension and agitation by being accountable and addressing complaints of the various communities without politicising the issue. An example is the onshore-offshore issue of the oil producing areas. The areas have been seriously devastated with oil exploration activities, thereby

\textsuperscript{13} Okwudiba Nnoli ‘Ethnic Politics in Nigeria (Enugu, 1980) Chapter 5 p. 141
\textsuperscript{14} Stephen Wright ‘Economist Intelligence Unit: A Political Risk Analysis; Nigeria- The Dillemas Ahead Special Report’ No. 1072 1986.
affecting the communities’ ability to farm and fish. It could be argued that Nigerians irrespective of their tribes are simply interested in eking out means of livelihood. It is the leaders or elites who take advantage of bad situations to fan the ember of ethnicity for their selfish interest, thereby amplifying the argument of Mueller in his banality of ethnic wars.\textsuperscript{17}

### Religious Crisis

Religious conflict has lately been fanned by the upsurge in fundamentalism both in Islam and Christianity.\textsuperscript{18} The upsurge could be traced to 1986, when the then government of General Ibrahim Babangida attempted taking Nigeria into the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC), which provoked serious rioting by Christians and showed how easy it is to arouse religious passions. Religious tensions were further heightened by the introduction of Sharia, the Islamic law by 12 states in Northern Nigeria, from May 1999. This has sparked bloody riots between Muslims and Christians in states like Kaduna, Kano, Bauchi and Plateau all in the north.\textsuperscript{19} More than 7000 deaths have occurred in over 3 years of these clashes.\textsuperscript{20} The latest of these started on Wednesday 20 November 2002 in Kaduna central Nigeria, when Muslims in the town were said to have protested a report in This Day newspaper linking the beauty of the Miss World contestants to Prophet Mohammed. This protest left over 100 dead and several hundred injured.\textsuperscript{21} President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria indicated that Sharia is not a problem when practised by genuine Islamic adherents. It becomes worrisome when it is political.\textsuperscript{22}

Although much of the crisis could be said to be from religious fervour, three issues have contributed to the present situation. The first is the dire economic situation, which has created a large residue of disillusioned people in urban areas. Secondly, there are a substantial number of unemployed youths who are ready made tools for these conflicts. The third issue is those who use these two problems to foment trouble and seek political relevance, as they believe that with political power comes wealth.

### Economic Crisis

The economic crisis in Nigeria is multidimensional, as it has to do with government policies, distribution of wealth, poverty, fraud and corruption. Nigeria’s economy like most other African countries used to be based on agriculture. Exploration of oil and the OPEC induced prices of the 1970s led to an economic boom and neglect of agriculture.\textsuperscript{23} Nigeria should have developed with the excess funds available to her but lack of long term planning, unsustainable ventures, massive fraud and corruption by government officials led to massive debts, which is a carry over till today.

Different reasons have been adduced for the endemic corrupt practices, which has had a devastating effect on the economy. This might have influenced the present government of President Obasanjo in instituting Justice Mustapha Akanbi’s Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC). The family of late

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\textsuperscript{17} Mueller, J. ‘The Banality of Ethnic War’ International Security, Vol 25, No 1, 2000
\textsuperscript{18} Nigeria’s Current Crisis RISCT Conflict Studies 283/284 p. 3
\textsuperscript{19} The Independent 21 May 2002 p. 13.
\textsuperscript{20} West Africa Issue 4553
\textsuperscript{21} Daily Mail Sat 23 Nov 02 p. 17
\textsuperscript{22} Independent 21 May 02 p. 13
\textsuperscript{23} Risk Analysis by Stephen Wright p. 4
General Sani Abacha, former military ruler between 1992 and 1998 were made to return US $1billion of embezzled funds in various banks all over the world to the government. Another $1billion is to be returned from some Switzerland banks in 2003. These had reinforced the belief that 39% of Africa’s money is held outside the continent.

While few individuals are extremely rich, the majority of the populace in Nigeria are living below the poverty line. This has led to various forms of economic malpractices, fraud and corruption. The Central Bank had to shut down the Savannah Bank and sanction 21 other banks for what was referred to officially as sharp economic practices. Furthermore, Peak Merchant Bank was liquidated by the Central Bank of Nigeria in March 2003 for its inability to fulfil the cash reserve requirement for September 2001. This brings to 34 the number of banks closed since 1994 in the wake of distress in the financial sector. Coupled with Nigeria’s external debt of about $28.4 billion, the result is disenchantment and lack of trust in the economy. The IMF has been involved in the fiscal policies of the country since 1986, when the usual pill of structural adjustment programme of the institution was introduced. The 2002 budget was only approved midway into the year with lots of confusion over the details, which definitely is one of the lapses that allow for corruption. The country also pulled out of the IMF programme to pursue a home grown policy, while the privatisation programme of the government has not been all that successful. What is required is dedication and achievable long-term projections and plans to increase populace confidence in the economic policies.

Causes of Crisis in Nigeria

In trying to analyse how crises in Africa could be managed, it is necessary to understand the causes of such problems. Africa is peculiar in that ‘whereas the nation state is acknowledged as the primary actor in international politics, states as such do not exist in Africa and had not been consciously constructed in the post independence era. The closest to the state idea is what is euphemistically referred to as tribes (ethnic groups), which colonialism ensured were lumped together in some places and sliced apart in others to form modern states in Africa’. Thus problems in one country have serious effects in a neighbouring state. This is why the Efiks in Nigeria are vehement in their opposition to Cameroun’s claim to the Bakassi peninsular as their kinsmen are the occupants of the disputed territory. The crises were so rampant that in 1992, Africa was declared as the most violent continent. In 1993 it accounted for 11 of the 26 major conflicts in the world.

Political Causes

Africa and indeed Nigeria have political problems, which were part of the colonial legacy, but frozen by the Cold War. The main problems politically are issues of legitimacy, integration and limited democratic cultures. Nigeria is a society with diverse languages, ethnic groups, religions and cultures. These differences have been further exacerbated by

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24 Economic Intelligence Unit May 2002 p. 17
25 Africa Security Review Vol 9 No 3
26 Economic Intelligence Unit p 4
27 Guardian Nigeria Newspaper 7 Nov 2002
28 Economic Intelligence Unit p 4
29 Chris Garuba Capacity Building p. 106
30 Zartman I.W. Collapsed states parts I- 3
social cleavages, colonialism and impact of market economy and globalisation. Nigerian leaders have been unwilling and unable to create durable bonds of unity that supersede ethnic loyalties. This has been attributed as the cause of the secession attempt in 1967 and the subsequent civil war, which lasted till 1970. Dr. Dipo Fashina the National President of the Academic Staff Union of Nigerian universities accused the political leadership in Nigeria of self seeking attitude and trying to disintegrate the country.

The political crisis has led to complaints of marginalisation in both the Northern and Eastern parts of Nigeria as the President is from the West. All parts of the country are insisting on producing the next president. The democratisation process in Nigeria is so fragile and not nationalistic that by 17 December 2002, the Independent National Electoral Commission has registered 30 political parties to contest the April 2003 general elections. This marked an astronomical increase of 27 parties from the 3 that contested the election in 1999.

It could be argued that the political problems cannot be blamed on colonialism as according to Dr. Fashina ‘the very first generation of African nationalists in what became Nigeria in 1914, worked and struggled on behalf of all people in Sokoto, Bonny, Enugu, Iseyin, Jos. Furthermore many viable countries of the world including the United States of America are colonies contraptions’. The leadership alone cannot be blamed for the problems, as the followers have failed to imbibe the attitude of making the political leaders accountable for their actions. The leaders as such have come to regard the country as an extension of their personal estate, and will get into office and blatantly refuse to leave. This situation is true of many African countries. Dr. Fashina believed that in Nigeria ‘a new constitution is required, with the civil society organising itself for critical intervention in the political and policy space locally and internationally.’

Economic Mismanagement

The economy is in a very poor state, as the vast majority of the populace are living below the poverty line. The nation’s resources and wealth are viewed as national cake, with every one trying to cut their own share without recourse to national development. Despite an increase in revenue from oil, corruption, fraud and inconsistent governmental policies have led to serious debt and intervention of the IMF. Unfortunately some Nigerians have huge foreign deposits, which could have assisted in turning the situation round. A World Bank official Gerald Meyerman called on Nigerians to repatriate their funds from other places. According to him ‘50% of Nigeria’s wealth is held outside the country’. He also warned against state monopoly turning into private monopoly in the current privatisation drive. With all these and activities of fraudsters in the country, it will be difficult to attract foreign investments unless the government act decisively. Even the privatisation programme has not been open to the average Nigerian as those with political connections are the benefactors.

31 Sola Akin and Ahmadr Sessay Africa in the post cold war p.4
32 Guardian Newspaper Fri 18 Oct 2002
33 Sunday Punch 15 Dec 2002 p.3
34 Guardian Newspaper 19 Dec 02
35 Guardian Newspaper 18 Oct 02
36 Ibid
37 Guardian 18 Dec 2002
The level of corruption is very high, involving top government officials. The Governor of Kaduna State Alhaji Mohammad Makarfi was taken before the ICPC on grounds of fraud. He was accused of acquiring choice properties in USA and Britain. One such property in Miami USA was valued at $1.5million; another in North West London valued at £0.5million and 3 others in Nigeria at N650million (Nigeria Naira). Corruption has led to a high poverty level, which is widespread, multi-faceted and multi-dimensional. Governments at both Federal and states levels have tried various attempts at poverty alleviation, with little or no success, due to fraud. This has added to the level of financial crimes and money laundering in the country. Nigeria is noted worldwide for financial crimes, which has been dubbed ‘419’ after a section of the penal code of the country. The president in an attempt to reduce public anxiety and meet international deadline on the issue of money laundering, signed into laws 3 bills against financial crimes on 14 December 2002.

Oil accounts for more than 77% of the nation’s income. The awareness of the huge receipts from oil has led to a series of clashes on the revenue sharing formula. The Supreme Court in April 2002 quashed deductions on first line charges for foreign debts by the Federal Government. The oil producing areas have been clamouring for increased in their revenue allocation, apart from the 13% derivation formula for the communities. Among other steps taken by the government to reduce agitations and clashes on revenue in these areas was the establishment of the Niger Delta Development Commission. Unfortunately instead of these steps reducing the problems it has increased agitation by some other states claiming special funds for their states for providing one form of resources or services or the other to the nation. An example is the request for special funds by the states around the North Western part of the country, where the River Niger flows through and is used for the generation of hydroelectric power in the country. There was a call to the Federal Government by John Udeh a member of the Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission ‘to raise a new revenue sharing formula to reduce the violence on revenue sharing’.

Despite the societal effects of globalisation in Africa, the greatest economic problem in the continent is corruption and fraud by government officials. In Nigeria both the Federal and state governments keep on borrowing money from within and externally, yet the economy is in the doldrums. The external debts keep on increasing, despite huge earnings from oil. Each of the 36 states collects their revenue allocation from the Federal account, yet fails to pay workers salaries, cannot provide basic infrastructures required by the citizens and still need to borrow money both from within and externally. This practice has therefore increased the nation’s debt. The Central Bank has had to warn banks that ‘the huge public lending portfolio of banks, which occasioned the crisis in the sector in mid 1990s, is gradually making a return with its dangerous consequences’. The warning became necessary as the internal lending to the 3 tiers of government jumped from N11bn in June 2000 to N46bn in May 2001. Yet the Federal Government and the Central Bank are not doing much to correct the anomaly.

38 Sunday Punch 15 Dec 02
39 Guardian 31 Oct 02
40 Punch 25 Dec 02
41 Guardian 7 Nov 02
42 Guardian 14 Oct 02
43 Ibid
Social Injustice

Nigeria is a country of diverse cultures, with 3 major and more than 200 minority tribes. The Hausa/Fulani is the largest ethnic group accounting for 40-45% of the population and dominates the North. The Yorubas are to the Southwest and account for 20-25%, while the Igbo to the Southeast are 10-15% of the population. The government realising the issues involved introduced the ‘Federal Character’. This is an attempt to ensure that at least the major tribes are represented in all spheres of the country’s affairs. This in itself is an admission of mistrust and tribal inclination on national issues. However, this has failed to douse complaints by the minority tribes who are more in number and widespread. Attempts by the government to reduce social tensions are not achieving the desired results due to economic and political crises. Globalisation has further exposed the populace to external events and cultures. It has increased their awareness to the rights of individuals and groups. The minority tribes, especially those in whose areas the oil and other resources are being squandered by those in power, are now clamouring for better treatment, which at times has bordered on violence. Those in power have tended to protect the influence of their ethnic groups, thus encouraging tribalism and nepotism. These have further compounded the level of social intolerance.

All these have increased the level of disorder and insecurity, which had reached an intolerable point. Few notable Nigerians have expressed their concern and anxiety for the safety of the citizenry. One of such is General Muhammadu Buhari, a one time Head of State between December 1983 and August 1985, who was also a Presidential candidate of the All Nigeria Peoples Party, for the 15 April 2003 general election. These are caused by the disenchantment with the political and economic situation. The helplessness of ordinary Nigerians as to the social malaise had been heightened by a spate of tragedies, including the assassination of a former Minister for Justice, Bola Ige in December 2001 and the deaths of more than 1,000 people due to an ammunition explosion in Lagos in January 2002. Coupled to these are religious riots, ethnic clashes, armed robbery and the incessant power struggle of the 3 major tribal groups. The latest of these calamities were the Miss World religious riot and another explosion in central Lagos, on 2 February 2003, which left more than 30 people dead and over 100 injured. Added to these is the increase in political assassination, the latest being that of Marshall Harry in Rivers State in March 2003. In all these cases the police has neither identified nor prosecuted those involved.

However, it is noteworthy that most of these problems are self-inflicted and resultant effects of the poor economy and the machination of the political elites. The vast majority of the people are living below poverty line and are witnessing the unbelievable wealth of a few who seem to be above the law. Cases before the civil police and even the courts are mostly handled in ways that usually favour the rich, which breeds lack of trust in the system. The aggrieved thus resort to violence. The Economist in its political analysis puts it succinctly that ‘the sheer size of the economic prize, which is on a zero sum basis, whetted the appetite of the greedy to the extent that ethnic competition was equally if not more intense’. Once the national wealth or perceived cake start decreasing, the

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44 EIC Country Report, p. 13
46 Ibid
47 Economist political Risk Analysis, p. 4
competition became fiercer, with those involved invoking tribal sentiments and resorting to unwholesome practices.

Border and Land Disputes

Until early 1960s, Nigeria’s economy was based on agriculture and from then on till now it has been dominated by oil. Despite this change and the revenue available to the Federal Government, the majority of Nigerians are still living in the rural areas and are basically subsistence farmers, with a few rich ones producing cash or export crops. Land is therefore important to their survival, the importance of which cannot be over emphasised. This has increased communal clashes among communities in the rural areas. Unfortunately due to the minimal development and industrialisation in the country, this has become seriously pronounced.

The list of communal clashes in Nigeria is as long as those based on religious intolerance. In the North, there is a standing communal clash between the Tivs and Jukuns, which has become an annual ritual with unwarranted loss of lives. This is because of land dispute between the two tribes, which has spanned decades. The current crisis is in Taraba State and has spread to their kith and kin in Benue, Nasarawa and Plateau States. The Federal Government was forced into setting up a commission of inquiry on the latest of such fracas in June 2002. This was all the more necessary as the Nigerian Army was getting pulled into the crisis, due to the killing of 19 soldiers including an officer on patrol mission in Zaki Biam a Tiv village in February 2002. This led to a reprisal in which the Army was accused of taking sides with a party to the crisis and wiping out a whole village. It should be noted that at the time of the crisis the Chief of Army Staff was a Tiv man, while the Minister of Defence was a Jukun. There were allegations and counter allegations of both men supporting their kith and kin in the crisis.

There had been many commissions of inquiry on land-based communal clashes in Nigeria and none had produced a white paper which could be used subsequently in resolving all these crises. One of the issues contributing to the un-ending clashes is that revenue allocation takes the land mass and derivatives into consideration. It could be argued that even if members of these communities are ready for peace, the political leadership might not be. This is due to the unguarded utterances attributed to such leaders, which are in times of tension bound to lead to violence. Unfortunately due to lack of development and that the communities depend on their land for survival, they will be ready and willing to fight to retain their means of livelihood. The land use decree introduced by the Federal Government in the 1970’s and the abstract way creation of states was done without taking the peculiarities of communities lumped together had further increased the tension.

While accusing the colonialists of creating Africa’s problems in not taking cognisance of the tribal lineage of people merged together in the same country, various Nigerian Governments did the same thing in Taraba State by cutting the Tiv people away from their kith and kin in Benue State. To abate the land clashes, it is necessary for the Government to re-examine the composition of states and conduct proper alignment of the various tribes. This in itself is not a foolproof antidote for the land clashes, as what is required is sustainable growth and development, which will impact on the lives of all Nigerians. This will provide employment opportunities for the masses and reduce the

number of those available to the machinations of the rich, again confirming Mueller’s banality of ethnic crisis.

What Needs to be Done

There are two main viewpoints as to what should be done in the management of African crisis. One viewpoint advocates that the developed world must come to Africa’s rescue for anything tangible to be achieved. This point is supported by Calvocorresi, who opined that ‘any belief that Africa can pull itself up by its own bootstraps is, however morally admirable, an arithmetic absurdity’.\(^49\) The second viewpoint believes that Africa must rediscover itself as the problems were created by the developed world that imposed un-African solutions on Africa’s problems. According to Adeleji Adebayo ‘a society which neglects the instructive value of its past for its present and future cannot be self-confident and self-reliant and will therefore lack internally generated dynamism and stability’.\(^50\)

Simply put it is a disagreement about the objectives of post-Cold War African society. A cross between integration within the global economy aided by IMF/World Bank structural adjustment programmes (SAP), or self-reliance and a de-linking from the global economy.\(^51\)

The solution to Africa’s problems lies in a combination of these two extreme points. It is not possible for Africa to develop on its own without support from the industrialised world, just as it not possible for the industrialised world to start anything without Africans taking the initiative for others to assist.

The end of the Cold War has exposed Africa’s vulnerability and weakness. In a world where economic issues are taking centre stage with an increasingly integrated world of regionalisation and globalisation and where high levels of technology are paramount, Africa is lagging behind on all accounts.\(^52\) Globalisation is a hierarchical issue and Akinrinade and Sessay capture the issue vividly when they said that ‘globalisation is the hierarchisation of the world - economically, politically and culturally - and the crystallisation of a domination. It is a domination constituted essentially by economic power.’\(^53\)

Given the backwardness of Nigeria and indeed the African economy, the enormity of the situation is better imagined. Africa’s apparently endemic economic problems and increasing international debt have contributed to a lowly status in the structure of power. The points of interest include information, good governance, sustainable economic development, regional cooperation and security and social justice.

Information

Underdevelopment has robbed Nigeria and the continent the capacity to monitor and evaluate events within its environment. Unfortunately in a period referred to as the information age, the entire continent is far behind. Information is essential in crisis management especially in this post Cold War era, yet it is lacking. The Federal Government needs to do more in its awareness drive to encourage the citizens to be interested in basic education and global events. Drezner listed technology as one of the

\(^49\) Capacity p.47
\(^50\) Ibid p.48
\(^51\) Africa in post Cold War Akinrinade and Sessay p.135
\(^52\) Ibid p.134
\(^53\) Ibid p.134
elements involved in globalisation.\textsuperscript{54} In essence this is information as the driving force of globalisation is technology. The Government might have to overhaul even its daily chore of information gathering, as without this it will only be grappling about and be reacting to issues. The security organs are not effective nor the economic sector responsive to developments elsewhere due to lack of information to base decisions on. The civil police, State Security Services and a host of these civil organisations required for crisis management are constantly blamed for inefficiency. However, it is not really their fault but that of the entire society.

In this regard, it is not only the national governments that required to act, but even the newly constituted AU. This is because as Enahoro puts it ‘people have more affinity to their tribes rather than nations coupled with the issue of non-recognition of phase lines in crisis situation.\textsuperscript{55} Enahoro went further to advocate four phase lines, which include development, crisis assessment, decision and execution.\textsuperscript{56} This could be likened to the ability to stay ahead as postulated in the Boyd cycle or the observation, orientation, decision and action (OODA) cycle.\textsuperscript{57} With information, the situation could be monitored, evaluated, options assessed and a workable solution proffered in a timely manner. Unfortunately, there are problems with technology, its availability, provision and development in Nigeria.

However, it is possible to overcome or at worst reduce this problem by the Nigerian Government forging closer ties with other African countries especially South Africa and Egypt. This is one of the areas where the AU has to play a more positive role than its predecessor OAU. The AU needs to lead the drive for more and better integration of the information systems in Africa rather than be a mere change of name. The idea is already evident in Nigeria’s telecommunication sector, where South African companies like the MTN and DSTV are involved. These companies have assisted in bringing Nigeria closer to the fringes of activities in the globalised world. More could still be done to ensure that the citizens are involved in global activities and could communicate and monitor whatever is happening in any part of the country and the world in general.

**Economic Development**

Africa’s economy is in shambles both internally and on external debt. Africa’s external debt is put at between US$250-300 billion, which cannot be paid. Adedeji talked of an estimated total debt of US$255 billion in 1992, while Sadiq Rasheed puts it without quoting any year at US$300 billion.\textsuperscript{58} Africa is indeed marginalized in the globalised economy, as the debt burden is a veritable weapon used by the developed world. Nigeria has a high debt profile in the world estimated in the region of US$28.4 billion. This is rather unfortunate for a country with revenue of about US$19.13 billion.\textsuperscript{59} The revenue could even be the highest in the continent possibly with the exception of South Africa and Egypt. Mary Chinery-Hesse summed up the situation while comparing Africa with other developing zones of the south that ‘sub-Saharan African countries, as their increasing poor populations prove, appear the most vulnerable players or the greatest casualties of the

\textsuperscript{54}Drezner p.\ldots (Theme 1)  
\textsuperscript{55}Capacity p.124.  
\textsuperscript{56}Ibid pp123-127  
\textsuperscript{57}Lind Manoeuvre p.5  
\textsuperscript{58}Capacity p.40  
\textsuperscript{59}EIU May 2002 p. 5
globalised world economy.” In a similar review, Sadiq Rasheed lamented that ‘while the developed countries are racing and being hotly pursued by a number of developing countries, Africa has been sliding backwards into a fourth world of its own.’

To compound the issue, various tiers of governments in Nigeria are the major employers of labour. The Federal Government in line with the recommendations of the international financial institutions has embarked upon privatisation of some social services to allow individual participation. A lot needs to be done in this regard to assure the entire citizenry of the sincerity of the government on the issue. The activities should be open to scrutiny and to all Nigerians and not just to the political elites. Unfortunately this is not so as the Bureau of Public Enterprises was accused of negligence in its activities in the handling of the African Petroleum case, where it was discovered that the oil company was into debt of about N25 billion only after being privatised. This case had to be referred to a tribunal of inquiry, which is an indictment of the exercise. The ICPC mentioned earlier require a lot of attention. The idea was a laudable one but the recent amendment of the commissions law by the Senate in February 2003 by reducing its powers and placing it under the control of another body was viewed in many quarters within Nigeria as a confirmation of the lack of commitment of the elites in wiping out corruption in the society. This had elicited serious responses from various segments of the society, as it does not portray the nation as being serious in her moves to curb financial crimes. The bad image issue is a serious one for investors and the legislators will do the country a lot of good in allowing the ICPC to function without any hindrance.

Economic development is the key issue to Nigeria’s and indeed Africa’s crisis, as those struggling for political control are doing so for economic reasons. Despite the fluctuating prices of agricultural produce, the main and key way out for Africa right now is through agriculture. Cash crops production needs to be pursued vigorously, as it will enhance foreign earnings, assist in the establishment of industries for processing of such crops and in manufacturing. The resultant effect will be creation of employment opportunities for the teeming unemployed youths and university graduates.

Nigeria could participate in globalisation with a revived agricultural sector, exportation of cash crops, oil and other mineral resources that abound in the nation. Although some form or aspect of globalisation will not be favourable, the only way out is to be fully involved and make the best use of the opportunities of the international system. The Government needs to undertake sustainable growth for its industrialisation and be careful in the type of investments it is making. For example the 1975 establishment of the Volkswagen Assembly Plant in Lagos based on the supply of knocked down parts (CKD) and spare parts from Germany was a failed venture. The Germans had stopped production of the Volkswagen Beetle due to standards and as such the spares were available till 1985. This has shown that the plant was a mere monument and conduit for siphoning money out of Nigeria.

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60 Capacity p.41
61 Ibid p.42
62 Guardian 5 Mar 03
63 Ibid
64 Capacity p.36
Cooperation between Nigeria and other African nations is one of the possible solutions. Although there is no complete agreement on the extreme viewpoints of how to move forward, one of the basics for development in the post Cold War era is an increase in regional cooperation, without regional autonomy. As Akinrinade and Sessay put it, while unofficial trade remains buoyant, official regional organisations, such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), COMESA and SADC have not seen performances match expectations. Greater regional cooperation could improve intra-regional trade and also pave the way for new security arrangements. The possibility of comparative advantage might be considered, where countries concentrate on areas they best suited to them. This might be necessary, as no one will transfer technology to another country after spending so much money on research and development. Globalisation is the embodiment of capitalism, which in turn is about resource control. Not much assistance should be expected from the globalised world as it will be against their interest, unless Africans show signs of seriousness and ability to change.

In line with this objective according to Akinrinade and Sessay ‘is the desire to move towards a new continentalism, heralded by the pursuit of an African Economic Community (AEC) to be completed in 2025. The need for Africa to organise continentally to be even remotely competitive in the global economy is widely recognised. This would parallel trends in the EU, the Asia Pacific region, North and Central America. There appears to be increasing support in the continent for the spirit of Kwame Nkrumah’s dictum that Africa must unite’. The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), is in line with cooperation within Africa and possibly with the developed world, which Sonala Olumhense referred to ‘as the new elixir for African development’. He went further to enjoin African leaders to make NEPAD work and not allow it to follow the parts of earlier organisations like the UN Agenda for Development of Africa in the 1990’s which dipped from 43% to its current 3% activities in the continent. This is a homegrown economic plan that could salvage the situation. NEPAD is now under the auspices of the AU and hopefully African leaders should be willing to change the deplorable condition.

A recent development which Nigeria and indeed Africa need to seize upon is the gradual shift by the USA in her oil activities from the Middle East to the Coast of Guinea from Nigeria in the north to Angola in the South. This necessitated the meeting of the USA President with leaders of 11 African nations including the oil-producing states of West Africa in late 2002. This move was enhanced by the volatile nature of the Middle East in comparison to the ‘relative peace’ in West Africa. Nigeria’s domestic turmoil is considered as a child’s play in comparison with the events in the Middle East with a likelihood of war in Iraq looming in the horizon. It is left for African governments to capitalise on this.

**Good Governance**

It is of utmost importance for the populace to be mobilised for participation in governance, which is possible in a democracy. This is one of the points being emphasised.
by the core states for any nation to be part of the globalised world. Julius Ihonvbere noted that ‘it is difficult to see how the continent can recover and become relevant in the geostrategic and economic calculations of other nations without serious, viable and sustainable reforms. And it is difficult to see how the critical questions and challenges concerning Africa’s future can be tackled without the active participation of all its citizens. When all is said and done, without democracy, African states cannot expect to fare better in the new millennium than in the last decade.’ In showing the importance of democracy to Africa, Adedeji observed that during the past 40 post independence years in Africa, there have been some 80 violent changes of governments with more than two dozens heads of state and government losing their lives. The way out is for democratic tenets to be entrenched in Africa.

The post Cold War sweep of democratisation is still finding it tough going in Africa. Democracy, embracing respect for human rights, a free press, academic freedom and accountable government are the key factors in creating a new range of prospects for African states. The current democratic dispensation in Nigeria should be total and accommodate all views within the polity to reduce mistrust and disenchantment of the various tribal groups. There should be a guarantee for change of leadership via open ballot elections, as perpetuation in power will only breed more crises and endanger peace in the country.

The agitation for a national sovereignty conference to determine if the country should still continue to exist, as it is presently constituted, is because people felt they are being left out and marginalized. If Nigeria should break, the effect and consequences may be disastrous for West and indeed the whole of Africa. Furthermore it may lead to failed states as at least one or two of the break away components may eventually fail. Although Mazrui has suggested that failed states be put under regional organisations or trusteeship, this also depends on strong regional settings, which is not the situation in Africa. This will also depend on regionally powerful individual countries like South Africa, Egypt, and Kenya and in the case of the problem emanating from elsewhere Nigeria, being able to play the pivotal role. As Mazrui further suggested these states may make up the newly constituted AU Security Council capable of decisive intervention in a crisis.

The three tiers of government in Nigeria need to be accountable and answerable to the electorates. In being so, public offices will only be attractive to those who are ready to make sacrifices and serve the nation. The belief in Nigeria that wealth brings power and power breeds more wealth will be seriously reduced, if not completely eradicated. There should be dialogue, which is tied to the information indices examined earlier. Dialogue will douse tension, entrench peaceful co-existence and reduce violence. This in turn will provide a conducive atmosphere for investment and allow Nigeria to take part in the activities of the globalised world.

The AU needs to be involved in ensuring peaceful co-existence of not only Nigerians but also all Africans. The petty squabbles or jealousy surrounding its

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70 Africa in post Cold War p.144
71 Capacity p.149
72 Africa post Cold War p.143
73 Capacity p.145
74 Guardian 10 Mar 03
75 Capacity p.82

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establishment which afflicted the OAU need to be forgotten. Irrespective of whose brainchild it was, what should be ensured is its success. African leaders should be able and willing to make a success of this organisation, otherwise the continent will continue to be the laughing stock of the international system. There are marked areas of problems already for an organisation that came on stream in May 2002, which if not resolved immediately will lead to failure like its predecessor. One such area is on the way: the Zimbabwe issue is being handled by African leaders. According to the West Africa Magazine, “the verdict was that African leaders would rather have Zimbabwe explode than solve the problem”. It is time for all Africans to allow democracy flourish rather than demagoguery. This will be difficult given the diverse situation both in Nigeria in particular and Africa in general, but this is the time to act as there is no Cold War again and as such no buffer from the developed countries. The solutions lie with Africans and there must be concerted efforts to join the train of globalisation.

**Security and Sub Regional Cooperation**

“The independence of African states and the link between their security, stability and development demands a common African agenda based on a unity of purpose and a collective political consensus derived from a firm conviction that Africa cannot make any significant progress on any other front without creating collectively a lasting solution to its problems of security and instability.”

The security situation in Africa generally requires sub and regional cooperation. The leaders should realise that the developed world’s emphasis on security has changed and despite recognising the problems of internal legitimacy, it is their responsibility to ensure that the continent is secured to encourage foreign investments. The post Cold War environment in Africa has witnessed diminished ties between African states and the USA and Europe but an increase in the intrusion of the international financial institutions into all the decision-making processes of African states. There is the need to learn from Europe on the establishment of organisations, which could monitor events and recommend courses of action to the AU, just like the EU and the OSCE.

Unfortunately, the AU is already entangling itself with legal and legitimacy issue from its acts. Areas of interest are the ambivalent acts, for example Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act allows for intervention in Member States on grounds of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, on the other hand Article 4(g) affirmed non-interference by any Member State in the affairs of another. The AU has taken over NEPAD and with its numerous agencies could ensure integration both economic and political in Africa. There are sub-regional organisations that could play important roles in the integration. The ECOWAS has strived to achieve some semblance of peace in the West Africa sub-region and even raised a military organ ECOMOG to intervene in Liberia and Sierra Leone, yet economically and socially the same body has achieved little. The Southern Africa Development Commission (SADC) and the yet to be revived East African

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76West Africa Issue 4348 21-27 Oct 02
77Hart Keith and Lewis Joanna Why Angola Matters p. 32
78Thomas Caroline
79Africa in post Cold War p.142

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Council with ECOWAS need to be integrated in ensuring political, economic and social integration of their areas. A serious problem with sub-regional bodies in Africa is with the North, where the Arab countries view themselves first as Arabs, Mediterranean, North Africans and Africans in that order. However if the integration of Africa works and there is development with less security problems, the North Africans will definitely join the fold.

The lesson is that even in Europe, the EU still has its problems with membership despite the level of development. The recent antagonism of the French and German governments against USA and Britain on the war against Iraq is another example of how nations within the same organisation could be pursuing different approaches to an issue, which is the beauty of democracy. This should be a good lesson for Africans that fear of domination is everywhere and not limited to the continent. The West is in control due to the level of cooperation among its members, which has provided adequate security to all involved. The military resources of the leading members of the sub-regions might be handy in ensuring the security and peaceful co-existence in the continent. As Ali Mazrui stated ‘without a minimum of peace, development is impossible; and without development peace is not durable’. President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria reiterating the importance of security declared in his re-election campaign that ‘no stone will be left unturned to ensure that the electioneering process in Nigeria remains peaceful, fair and free devoid of coercion, corruption and all forms of violent behaviour. The language, tone and tenor of our campaign shall be devoid of mudslinging, ethnicity, religion and such mundane and pedestrian context’.

**Social Justice and Equality**

There is a need for an open government in Nigeria, and in all African countries, for trust to develop within the polity. Observers and critics have attributed the high incidence of intra-state conflicts to marginalisation, injustice, religious and socio-cultural diversities and clashes among many other reasons. Those struggling for power are doing so without any plans to adjust the geographical settings, which they blame for their agitation. As Asiwaju opined that ‘For the most part, African crises do not question the territorial structures and boundaries of states. By governments or rebels, the struggle most of the time is for the exercise of control over the same particular territories as defined by the so-called inherited borders. Even in cases of secession as the cases of Eritrea and Somalia had shown, the territorial frameworks still remain those as arranged by the erstwhile colonial authorities’.

One of the effects of globalisation is that people are now aware of their rights and what is happening elsewhere and how to exploit technology in seeking their rights. It is therefore important for the government to ensure that all citizens are equal before the law. The government from the information indices needs to be ahead of issues and address them on time. If the consensus is that un-African solutions are being applied to African problems, it might be necessary to revisit Nigeria’s old method of conflict resolution, which created social harmony and peace in the past. As Chris Garuba advocated: ‘Nigerians have a lot to learn from our traditional methods of conflict resolution as practised in our various

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82 Guardian 14 Feb 03.
83 Capacity p.150
communities. These methods put in place by our ancestors but disrupted by colonialism, have been greatly found to be effectively reconciliatory and consensual. We need to look at these methods again, and amend those that need amendment, and adopt them to our present circumstances for settling disputes and promoting social harmony. We must be honest enough to admit that government laws and our legal system have not taken care of our grassroots realities.84

The problem of persistent religious crisis has shown that Nigeria cannot adopt any state religion to put to rest the issue of the country taking up a particular religion. Furthermore laws that are at variance with the socio-cultural set up of the communities must be expunged from the penal code. The importance of social education in letting the citizens know their rights and civic duties needs to be vigorously embarked upon. This will develop a system where the followers will make their leaders accountable for their actions.

Conclusion

Solana Olumhese said that ‘African leaders have a lot of work to do. They must genuinely accept responsibility and understand that their people now see through their weakness, personal and political. They do not have to profess Pan African movement and know that it is not how well they can count what is in the pockets of donor nations, a concept that every African should hate passionately. They should invest their money in Africa, send their children to African schools and use Africa as a hospital to restore some confidence’.85

The types and causes of conflicts as well as what should be done to move ahead is applicable not only to Nigeria but Africa as a whole. Africa was declared a violent continent in 1992, but the problems started far earlier. The economic crisis in Nigeria, which has political connotations and is compounded by the socio-cultural diversity of the country is worsening. The suppressed ethnic tensions during the Cold War era have been released and further heightened by the effects of globalisation. The incessant tribal and religious crises are for political power, the bottom line of which is control of economic resources, to ensure survival. As McNamara noted ‘there is a direct and constant relationship between the incidence of violence and the economic status of the countries affected without internal development of at least a minimal degree, order and stability are impossible’.86 The requirements are information, good government, sustainable development, regional cooperation and security and social justice.

The persistent blaming of colonialists for the present problems is losing its appeal and relevance, as Africans have been at the helms of their affairs for the past 40 years. The reasons identified for the crises include the self-seeking nature and non-accountability of the political leaders for their actions. The non-responsiveness of governments to pressing issues has developed disenchanted and tribal loyalists. What is required is education of the populace as to their rights to make the leadership accountable. Government should be open without a state religion.

84 Ibid p.152
85 Guardian 22 Sep 03
86 Capacity p.85

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Africans need to revisit agriculture for sustainable economic growth and seek sub-regional cooperation. The AU needs to be more than a mere change of name, as much is expected from it. NEPAD and its organs must seek Africa’s participation in globalisation on terms favourable to it, although this will be difficult especially with the external debt and very low literacy and computer level. The way out is by promoting popular and democratic government, which will not only assist in providing a sane internal environment, but as former USA President Bill Clinton said in 1994, while echoing Luttwaks’ assertion that ‘no two liberal democracies fight one another’, there will provide for a secure Africa. In the same vein Claude Ake noted ‘Democracy is not merely desirable it is necessary. It will not solve all the problems of Africa, but none of her major problems can be solved without it’. There were old African ways of conflict resolution which had produced social harmony and peace in the past. Those compatible with modern ways of life should be adopted, while the archaic and bad ones discarded. This way, even those clamouring for break up on tribal inclinations would have no basis for complaining.

Nigeria has already squandered the 1970’s petrol-dollars-naira windfall through the leaders’ indulgence and corruption. If it fails to revive agriculture, diversify and join the world of globalisation to achieve self reliance before the next decade, then it will be condemned to the throes of the fourth world

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87 Luttwaks
88 Capacity p.91
REVIEW OF THE SITUATION IN LIBERIA*

Jacques Paul Klein
Special Representative of the Secretary-General and
Coordinator of UN Operations in Liberia

As I said yesterday, the best writing and peacekeeping I have seen in peace enforcement is by people who have actually been in missions. People who understand how different each mission is, how different each mandate is, and whether they have authority or don’t.

The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) is surprisingly broad and powerful. It will be the largest UN current mission in the world and has achieved a lot. However, there are still things to be done in Liberia, demobilisation and demilitarization of all thugs, responsibility of carrying out a census, providing more funding for reconstruction and development.

Historical background

First, a brief history of Liberia. Liberia is Africa, and somehow not Africa. As you know, Liberia was basically created by a group of Americans as a country for the voluntary return of former slaves and church groups funded their return from the United States. The country declared its independence in 1847 and its flag has one star, after the American flag; the capital, Monrovia, is named after U.S. President James Monroe. The port of Buchanan is named after U.S. President Buchanan, and Bushrod Island is named after George Washington’s nephew, Justice Bushrod Washington.

Although Liberia’s population was never more than six or seven percent liberated Americans, they dominated the coastline. They became the educated elite but they never built a country. They never integrated with the other ethnic groups, and in fact they treated the other ethnic groups as badly as they had been treated in South Carolina. As one American wrote in his book, “I was ashamed to see my people treating the local population as badly as they had been treated at home.”

Liberia has sixteen basically ethnic groups among approximately 3.7 million people, divided into 40% Christian, 40% animist and native religions and 20% Muslim.

Descent into chaos 1980-1999

Chaos began basically some twenty-four years ago in 1980. The Liberian Americans never built a Liberia where they integrated the rural tribes. The old elite still ruled at that time when President Tolbert was assassinated in a coup d’etat by a group led

* SRSG Klein’s comments accompanied his presentation of a series of photoslides and video footage. This account has been prepared by the Editor from the transcript of his remarks and his speaking notes.
by an army master sergeant. After killing the President in his bed, they took the senior ministers down to the beach across the room where we have lunch every day and shot them all. Then the chaos began and tribal rivalry is still going on today.

The coup d’etat of April 1980 heralded a sudden shift of power from Americo-Liberians to the indigenous population. A slide in the quality of governance resulted in a rebellion led by Charles Taylor on 24 December 1989 with incursion into Nimba County through the Ivorian border. The ensuing civil war lasted for seven years until the Abuja Accord under which multi-party elections were held in July 1997. Taylor’s emergence with a solid electoral victory raised high expectations for peace in Liberia.

But, instead of peace, there were problems. President Taylor refused to allow ECOMOG to undertake the restructuring of the army, raising deep suspicion that Taylor was determined to set up a partisan army with strict loyalty to himself. Equally discernible early in the Taylor administration were the policy of repression, human rights abuses, and the systematic erosion of the freedom of speech and freedom of the press as evident in the closure of Star Radio. All these led to international development assistance being cut off. Even the money pledged at the Paris Pledging Conference in 1998 was not redeemed by donors. Consequently, Liberia’s deficient infrastructure degenerated further and the nation’s economy, which had been seriously weakened by a protracted war, became progressively worse. Liberia’s external indebtedness of $3 billion was not serviced. The IMF and the World Bank suspended any interactions with Liberia, scaring off any new development assistance. These problems set the stage for renewed rebellion in 1999 against the Taylor government, already cast in bad light due to its involvement with the RUF in Sierra Leone and support for dissidents trying to unseat President Conte in Guinea.

Renewed conflict 1999-2003 and Taylor’s departure

In 1999, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) started an incursion into Lofa County from its base in Guinea. The rebellion gradually gained ground mainly because the Taylor forces, unpaid for months, began to lose morale while assistance for the rebels increased. By May 2003, LURD and another splinter rebel group, Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) between them had occupied two-thirds of Liberia’s land space and by June 2003, rebels had entered the capital, Monrovia. In June ECOWAS arranged a peace conference in Ghana involving all stakeholders.

A cease-fire agreement was signed on 17 June 2003, and on 4 August the first ECOMIL troop contingent comprised of 2 Nigerian battalions started entering Monrovia. On 11 August 2003, Taylor bowed to international pressure and left for exile in Nigeria.

Comprehensive Peace Agreement - August 2003

On 18 August a Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed in Accra. Its main points included; a National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) including all stakeholders; a 76-member National Transitional Legislative Assembly (NTLA); disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration and repatriation programme to cover ex-combatants, including child soldiers; a Joint Monitoring Commission (JMC) to oversee compliance with the cease-fire agreement; and an Implementation Monitoring Committee (IMC) to monitor progress in the peace process.
UNMIL Mandate from the Security Council

On 19 September 2003, by resolution 1509(2003), the UN Security Council authorized a UN peace-keeping force with a robust mandate for Liberia including 15,000 troops and 1,115 civilian police. Included in the mandate were the following tasks:

- Observe and monitor the implementation of the ceasefire agreement and investigate violations of the ceasefire.
- Carry out voluntary disarmament and collect and destroy weapons and ammunition as part of an organized DDRR programme.
- Facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance.
- Establish the necessary security conditions.
- Contribute towards international efforts to protect and promote human rights in Liberia.
- Assist the transitional government of Liberia in monitoring and restructuring the police force of Liberia.
- Assist the transitional government in the formation of a new and restructured Liberian military in cooperation with ECOWAS, international organizations and interested States.
- Assist the transitional government in the reestablishment of national authority throughout the country.
- Assist the transitional government in preparing for national elections.

On 1 October 2003, ECOMIL forces were rehatted to form the nucleus of the UNMIL vanguard stabilization force. As of late November 2003, there are 4,500 UN troops in Liberia.

The present situation and challenges ahead

On the arrival of the first troops, they were universally welcomed. With our change of command on 1 October, the first UN forces were in place and more have been slowly coming in. But the country is an ecological disaster. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Justice and all the ministries have been gutted: archives gone, furniture gone, vehicles gone. No civil servant, soldier or policeman has been paid in over three years.

Mr. Taylor basically courted his own society. Because he paid no one, people had to live off bribes whether to obtain a high school certificate, open a license to do business, or do anything. And that is going to be the hardest thing to do - to restructure a society, where we have to basically build a whole nation, a conscience and a psyche.

As a result of the peace conference orchestrated by ECOWAS, we have a government with a chairman, Chairman Charles Gyude Bryant, and a vice-chairman for two years, and a legislative assembly of about 76 members. There the dilemma begins because the 76 members of the assembly come from the three warring sides, who now believe that it is their role to take bureaucratically what they could not take militarily.
Liberia is bankrupt. Taylor took everything with him: furniture, presidential vehicles, archives - everything. The only sources of income are the maritime register ($22 million a year) but there is enormous wealth in eight and a half million-rubber trees. A tree in Liberia takes about 12 years to grow into a 15 cm tree for harvesting. In Europe that same tree takes 70 years. I have been told that 10 million board feet of lumber can be taken out of Liberia without doing ecological damage. There is also iron ore and potentially the gold field is richer than the gold fields in Ghana. Only 15% of the land is utilized, which means that 85% of the land needs to be developed. A country that used to export rice now imports rice. What it needs is management, it needs government, it needs integrity, it needs honesty. Before the Accra Agreement there was no lead nation, no UN mandate, people were being murdered, and the streets were full of thousands of people suffering from malnutrition, claustrophobia, and anxiety. And half the population is under the age of fifteen.

There is glaring instability in Liberia’s rural areas with reports of continuing violence, pillaging and harassment targeted at civilians by rebel, former government and militia groups. There are continuing skirmishes between government and LURD elements on the one hand or between government and MODEL combatants on the other, resulting in further displacement of civilian populations. In Monrovia, the incidence of armed robberies is on the increase.

Both LURD and MODEL have lodged complaints against the NTGL over nominations for positions in the NTGL. One source of disagreement hovers around the appointment of assistant ministers in the Ministries allotted to the various warring factions. LURD contends that it should decide on the nominees for such posts as they fall within the orbit of the Ministries allocated to it under the peace accord. Mr. Bryant, on the other hand, argues that the Peace Agreement is silent on the mode of selection to such posts and that selection should be based on civil service procedures. There is also palpable struggle over posts in the yet to be restructured Liberian army. LURD insists on having the post of Chief of Staff while MODEL is claiming the post of Army Commander.

UNMIL’s prescription in dousing tension in this area is to read out to the leaders of the warring factions the fine print of the Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement as elaborated in Part 4, Article 7 under Security Sector Reform. This calls for the total disbandment of all irregular forces, and a restructuring of the armed forces followed by the creation of a new command structure. It is therefore pointless to struggle for posts in a yet-to-be created army. UNMIL also suggested the establishment of a Military Advisory Committee with representation from all warring factions which could examine complaints in the security sector and proffer mutually acceptable solutions.

Impact of UNMIL’s presence

The UNMIL mandate is surprisingly broad and powerful. The United States introduced the draft resolution into the Security Council, with British support based on their experience in Sierra Leone, and French support based on their experience in the Cote d’Ivoire. The Chinese and Russians have always been friends in any mission that I have had, and so the resolution just went through and gave us things that we didn’t even ask for.

The dilemma one always has at the start of a mission is the slowness of the troops’ arrival. All we had in country were two Nigerian battalions and some small units from
Togo, Senegal, Mali and Guinea. At present we have 4,500 on the ground right now and we are authorized to build up to 15,000. So, with up to 15,000 troops, 250 military observers, 1,115 civilian police and about 600 civilians, and a budget of something like $560 million, UNMIL will be the largest UN current mission in the world."

To date, the international community’s achievements have included:

- Enhanced security in Monrovia and environs.
- With WFP’s assistance, food distribution assured for over 400,000 displaced persons in the capital.
- Improvement in accessibility to potable water and 5,000 wells routinely chlorinated by UNICEF.
- Other UN agencies and NGOs have been helping in upgrading medical and other services including efforts at re-uniting families.
- The NTGL under Chairman Bryant became operational effective from 14 October.
- Cease-fire violations being adequately addressed by the JMC.
- Excellent cooperation with ECOWAS, especially in resolving grey areas of the Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
- Gradual restoration of normalcy in Monrovia - street trading expanding - greater freedom of movement.
- Back to school launched with robust assistance from UNICEF early in November.
- Great strides made in the identification of cantonment sites for ex-combatants in preparation for the launching of the DDRR Programme.
- Reconnaissance patrols undertaken into the interior – Zwedru, Buchanan and Tubmanburg among others.
- Humanitarian assessment mission dispatched as far north as Voinjama in Lofa County.

Now what do we need to do? We need to demobilize and demilitarize all these thugs and we don’t know how many there are. There could be as low as 35,000 or as high as 60,000. That means building three camps, one in each area. We shall start with a thousand in each camp; come in, give up your weapon, have your picture taken, have a physical, get a little bit of money and some training of some sort, including improving literacy because so many of these people are under the age of 18 and are children by UN definition, and 20% are women. So we have to disaggregate the children, disaggregate the women and then work with the others. Due to the high illiteracy rate, that is going to take quite a bit of time. Obviously we would like to get out these people of these areas, but we don’t yet have sufficient troops to project the force needed to actually even secure the areas where we are putting up the camps. But, still, we shall start doing that by mid December.

The transitional government or new government will be in power for two years. We are responsible for a census, which we need to organize and carry out. As there has been no census for 30 years, we don’t know how many people there are in Liberia. We have 500,000 Liberians across the border in Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea who we have to get back to register for the election. We also have to help develop political parties that are not personality-driven and we touched on some of that yesterday. And at the end of that, in 2005, I have to do a free, fair and honest election.

As at 31 January 2004, UNMIL deployed strength was 11,453 total uniformed personnel, including 10,903 troops and 108 military observers; 443 civilian police supported by 198 international civilian personnel and 10 local staff.

I think that all this is doable, although my anxiety three weeks ago was lack of money for reconstruction and development. Then suddenly the US Congress came through with $435 million, which is larger than the State Department budget for the rest of Africa. Of that sum, $200 million goes to the United States Ambassador, Ambassador John Blaney, who has done a very good job and has been extremely courageous. He refused to leave Monrovia when ordered to do so by his government. He said “I have faith in this, I have faith in these people. I will stay with them”, and that certainly helped in terms of public opinion in the United States.

I think this will take us about two years but if you talk about long term, you are talking 10 or 15 years. So I think it’s doable, I have very good people and there are 30 or 40% of the UN here who are incredibly professional civil servants. My Deputy has served in seven missions including Angola, Mozambique, Croatia, and Sarajevo. My other Deputy is from Chad with a long and extensive history. My force commander is Lieutenant-General Opande from Kenya, and the Deputy Force Commander is from Nigeria.

What we need right now is firepower; at the moment I do not have any helicopter gun ships and so I cannot project power of force. I can’t intimidate people to do what I want them to do. But I am relatively optimistic that we can do this mission. I would also say that we have depended heavily on our colleagues in UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone: to have a UN mission next door that is phasing out that has built bridges, that has equipment, that has personnel who are willing to transfer from one mission to another is very, very important.

So I invite any of you to visit, don’t hesitate to come. I have often welcomed scholars in the past; we had them in Sarajevo and in Croatia and I give them an office and a desk and let them do research for a month or two. As I said yesterday, the best writing and peacekeeping I have seen in peace enforcement is by people who have actually been in missions. People who understand how different each mission is, how different each mandate is, and whether they have authority or don’t.
The crisis in Congo was and still is one of the world’s most complex regional conflicts. The UN played a central role in ending the war through its peacekeeping operation in Congo named “UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)”. The MONUC’s involvement in the Congo was not an easy task. Its success was dependent on certain factors. One was the willingness of all political forces in Congo to talk and negotiate. Second was that all state and non-state parties to the Lusaka Agreement and the non-armed opposition in Congo willingly or reluctantly negotiated and cooperated with MONUC. Despite slowly, unwillingly, and being under massive diplomatic and economic pressure, all parties to the Agreement complied with Security Council Resolutions in the end.

A continental war was fought in Central Africa that went on for almost seven years, in two phases and was characterized by mass violence and disastrous humanitarian crises. The war, fought in central Democratic Republic of Congo is now over. A series of agreements were signed in 2002 and 2003, which should end military conflict. After years of fighting, there is now a chance to follow the path to peace and reconciliation.

The crisis in Congo was and still is one of the world’s most complex regional conflicts. It was the outcome of separate civil wars in Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and Congo. During the conflict, armed forces of three countries, Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi, entered Congolese territory. To counter this offensive, armed forces of four countries, Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia and Chad, came and fought alongside Congolese Armed Forces. In the initial stages of the war, armies of eight African countries were involved. The regional war also aggravated various local mini-conflicts, most of them in Eastern Congo, leading to destruction, pillage and interethnic killings.

Parties to the second phase of the conflict that started in 1998 signed reluctantly a ceasefire agreement in July 1999, and asked United Nations assistance to ensure the implementation of the agreement. The UN, through its peacekeeping operation in Congo, played a central role in ending the war.

I will make my presentation on the UN peacekeeping operation in two sections. The first section will provide an overview of developments in the region and Congo before the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement was signed. The second section will be an overview of the Lusaka Agreement and the UN peace operation in Congo. Finally, I will make a short analysis of the ways in which the UN peacekeeping operation achieved success.
Overview of Developments in the Region and Congo before the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement was signed

The war in Central Africa began when Rwandan and Ugandan Armed Forces together with Congolese Tutsi militia invaded Zaire (now Congo), in October 1996. The attackers had two declared goals:

- The first goal was to destroy the refugee camps in Kivu close to the Congo-Rwandan border and dismantle the Hutu armed groups in these camps.
- The second goal was to provide security to Tutsis living in Congo.

The campaign immediately exposed the weakness of the Mobutu regime in Congo, and it became apparent that the entire country was ripe for the taking. In 9 months Kinshasa was captured by the “Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo”, a rebel group that was created just before the offensive began. After capturing Kinshasa, the self-elected leader of the rebel movement, Laurent Desire Kabila, declared himself President.

President Kabila gave his allies, Uganda and Rwanda, a free hand in the Eastern provinces of Congo as he had agreed to do before the hostilities in Congo had started. But relations between Kabila and his allies rapidly cooled in early 1998. President Kabila dismissed his Rwandan Chief of Staff in July 1998. He also asked all foreign troops to leave Congo within a week.

Rwanda immediately created a new Congolese rebel movement, named “Rally for Congolese Democracy”, seized control in the Eastern provinces of Congo and moved against Kinshasa by an airborne attack hoping for a quick and easy victory. This proved to be a mistake. Immediate military help from Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia and Chad stopped the Rwandan advance on Kinshasa and a regional conflict flared up on Congolese soil. Rapidly the Ugandan-Rwandan alliance crumbled and the armed forces of the two countries started fighting over Kisangani in a struggle for the control of Congo’s rich natural resources.

There were various attempts to find a negotiated settlement to the conflict by African countries. Following a series of summits under the auspices of the Southern African Development Community chaired by President Chiluba of Zambia, a cease-fire agreement was signed in July 1999 in Lusaka.

Overview of the Lusaka Agreement and the UN peace operation in the Congo

On 10 July 1999, Congo, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe and Angola signed an agreement for cessation of hostilities in the Congo. After the Lusaka Agreement, the conflict in Congo slowed down but never ended. Soon it became obvious that the main belligerents had no intention of adhering to the provisions of the Agreement.

Then, why did they sign? The answer is simple. Congo signed because she was suffering heavy losses on the battlefield and needed time to recover. Rwanda and Uganda signed partly due to relentless international pressure and partly with the belief that the provisions of the Lusaka Agreement would not be applied.
African countries were disturbed by this new regional conflict in the continent that had drawn in armies of eight countries. Furthermore, countries in the region perceived the invasion of Congolese territory as an attempt by Rwanda and Uganda to emerge as regional powers.

Western countries were obviously relieved that a ceasefire agreement was signed. They knew the complexities of the crisis and also knew that it had no easy solutions. Furthermore, following the ill-fated UN operation in Somalia and the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, they were not enthusiastic about engaging in a difficult peace operation in Africa.

The UN Secretariat was extremely careful about a major operation in the Congo. The previous peace operation in Congo in the early 1960s had been traumatic for the organization. The operation had lasted for four years and had become embroiled by the force of circumstances in a chaotic internal situation of extreme complexity. In the course of the operation a total of 250 peacekeepers had died. UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld had also lost his life on 17 September 1961 in an airplane crash on the way to a meeting in Zambia, where talks were to be held for the cessation of hostilities in the Congo.

The planners in the UN Secretariat knew that an operation in the Congo would be long. It would require possibly up to 40,000 military personnel, and still could not succeed if the parties to the conflict and the Congolese people did not support the operation.

After this brief review of the attitudes regarding the agreement, it would be useful to review its main provisions. The agreement is similar to other ceasefire agreements. It invites the belligerents to undertake the following steps:

- cessation of hostilities; the release of hostages and exchange of prisoners,
- disengagement and redeployment of forces of the parties to defensive positions,
- an open national dialogue between the Government and the armed and unarmed opposition,
- disarmament of armed groups identified in the annex to the Agreement,
- withdrawal of all foreign forces from Congo
- formation of a national army,

The agreement also contained proposals for an “appropriate force” to be constituted and deployed by the UN, in collaboration with Organization of African Unity, to ensure the implementation of the agreement.

In examining the Lusaka Process and the UN peacekeeping operation in Congo, I would like to divide the developments into two phases. First, I would like to review the Developments from the signature of the Lusaka Agreement to the assassination of President Kabila. After the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in July 1999, the UN went into action. The Security Council authorized deployment of up to 90 UN military personnel to the sub-region, mainly to serve as liaison officers. Subsequently, the Security Council authorized the expansion of the UN peacekeeping force up to 5,537 military personnel. The Council
named the peace operation “MONUC”, (the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo). The Mandate of MONUC was to monitor and assist in the implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement.

The year 2000 was difficult for MONUC. The main belligerents, Congo, Rwanda and Uganda, believed that they could still win the war. Military operations continued. Furthermore, Ugandan and Rwandan troops fought furious battles among themselves in the Congolese city of Kisangani for the spoils of war. All state and non-state actors in the conflict mostly ignored various calls by the UN Security Council to end hostilities. There were massive human rights violations in all areas of conflict but especially in Eastern Congo. The natural resources of Congo were being illegally exploited.

In this period, the inter-Congolese dialogue envisaged in the Lusaka Agreement fared no better. The Facilitator, Sir Ketumile Masire nominated with the consent of all parties, encountered serious difficulties. His office in Kinshasa was searched and ransacked. The President of Congo, Laurent Desire Kabila stated that he did not trust the Facilitator. Most serious of all, the government of Congo was not cooperating with MONUC. MONUC’s deployment and operations were being carried out under most difficult conditions. The Status of Forces Agreement was signed after months of delay. MONUC planes had difficulties in receiving flight clearance and there were officially orchestrated demonstrations in front of MONUC offices in Kinshasa.

Despite difficulties, MONUC continued its deployment in Congo. The numbers of its military personnel slowly increased and efforts were deployed to verify claims of ceasefire violations.

In the second phase of the Lusaka Process, I would like to review the developments from the assassination of President Kabila to the signature of the Final Act of the inter-Congolese Dialogue

President Kabila was assassinated on 16 January 2001 and 11 days later his son Joseph Kabila became President. The new President informed the Special Representative of the Secretary General in the Congo that his government wanted to cooperate with the UN and counted upon MONUC to continue fulfilling its mandate. The Facilitator of the inter-Congolese dialogue was also invited to continue his activities. This change of attitude in Kinshasa was of utmost importance. But there were other developments. Slowly, Lusaka Process started coming back to life.

What had changed? Very briefly, the developments that brought about positive changes in the Lusaka Process were the following:

- After the failure of a military offensive in December 2000, the government of Congo realized that it could not win the war.
- Human rights violations in Eastern Congo were becoming intolerable. International pressure increased on Rwanda and Uganda to abide by the Lusaka Agreement.
- Report after report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources of the Congo indicated that all parties in the conflict but especially Rwanda and Uganda were illegally exploiting Congo’s natural resources. This increased international pressure on Rwanda and Uganda.
- With the election of President G.W. Bush, the US administration’s pro-Rwandan stance started to change.
As a result of these and other developments, state and non-state parties to the conflict started reluctantly to comply with the Lusaka Agreement. A ceasefire was declared in January 2001. This time it was respected.

The disengagement and redeployment of forces to defensive positions was the next step, and it was completed by October 2001. The inter-Congolese dialogue envisaged by the Lusaka Agreement was held successfully on 15 December 2001. In 2002, a more assertive South African government started assisting and prodding the parties and hosted talks between Congolese factions from February to April 2002. During the talks, consensus was reached on a number of important issues between the government and non-armed opposition representatives. Following the talks in South Africa, the Congolese government was viewed as making a reasonable effort to comply with the Lusaka Agreement. This led to increased pressure on Rwanda and Uganda to withdraw their forces from Congo.

Finally, both countries bowed to pressure. In June 2002, the Pretoria Agreement between Congo and Rwanda was signed. It was followed by the Luanda Agreement signed on 6 September 2002 between Congo and Uganda. Early in September 2002, Rwanda suddenly withdrew more that 23,000 troops from Eastern Congo. The majority of Ugandan troops left Congo in March 2003 and by mid May, no foreign troops remained in Congo.

On 2 April, the Final Act of the inter-Congolese Dialogue was signed. With the signature of the Final Act, the Lusaka Process in the Congo was completed and the search for peace moved beyond the Lusaka framework. Rapid political developments followed the signing of the Final Act. On 4 April a Transitional Constitution was promulgated, and three days later Joseph Kabila was sworn-in as President. This was followed by the promulgation of a decree granting amnesty for “acts of war” and “political and opinion offences”. The Transitional Government was announced on 30 June.

Probably, there will be various problems to overcome during the transition period, which is expected to last two years, but, Congo with assistance from the UN is at present in a much better position to look for a peaceful solution to its problems than it has ever been since 1996. With the signing of the Final Act, a milestone had been reached in the conflict. What appeared to be extremely difficult if not impossible was achieved.

The main provisions of the 1999 Lusaka Agreement such as, ceasefire; disengagement; relocation of fighting forces; withdrawal of foreign armies; inter-Congolese dialogue and initial progress in the disarmament of armed groups, have all been fulfilled. MONUC had a part in all these positive developments, assisting, advising and when necessary prodding the parties to the conflict and the unarmed opposition in the Congo to move forward. But challenges and problems remain. Congo is still a divided and poverty stricken country and military hostilities continue in the east. MONUC continues to be well-placed to play a central catalytic role in assisting the parties through the transition period that is expected to last two years.

**Assessing MONUC’s Role in the Resolution of the Crisis in Congo**

In assessing MONUC’s role in the Congo, emphasizing especially the ways in which it achieved success, is not an easy task. I would like to base my views on the ways
in which MONUC’s success was achieved on how skilfully the political and military tools the Mission had at its disposal were used.

First, let us remember MONUC’s mandate. In essence, the mission’s mandate was to assist the signatories in the implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. To realize its mandate, MONUC first needed a sound peace-building strategy. Did MONUC have a sound peace-building strategy?

Developments following the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in Congo show that the UN as an organization and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in particular proved over and over again that they could develop a sound peace-building strategy and then adapt it to meet changing circumstances. Once the parties started to cooperate with MONUC, the mission had the capacity and the technical know-how to put a very complex operation, based on a sound strategy, into application in a vast country with practically no infrastructure. Secondly, to achieve its mandate, MONUC had to project credible political and military force in the application of its peace-building strategy. So the question is - “was MONUC successful in projecting a credible political and military force”? The number of military personnel at MONUC’s disposal was rather limited, when compared to the magnitude and difficulties of its tasks. The mission’s military personnel were mainly used for verification purposes, for the projection of credible military force against armed groups in the country and for the protection of UN staff.

MONUC’s most important asset was not its military strength but its success in projecting credible political power. All the parties to the Lusaka Agreement knew that it was MONUC’s advice that guided Security Council resolutions regarding the situation in Congo. The political power which was a direct result of MONUC’s ability to guide Security Council resolutions, combined with the military personnel and material means it had at its disposal gave MONUC the means to project credible force in the application of its peace-building strategy.

Finally to carry out its mandate, MONUC needed the support of the parties to the Lusaka Agreement and of the members of the Security Council. Did MONUC receive the support it needed to carry out its mandate?

The political will and support for MONUC operations was limited until the end of the year 2000. Following the assassination of President Kabila in January 2001, political will for a solution in the Security Council, as well as in the government of Congo, began to strengthen.

MONUC could not have been successful in its operation without the interest shown by Security Council to find a peaceful solution to the crisis in Congo. In four years, besides holding a special meeting on the situation in the Congo, with the participation of the Heads of State of the signatories of the Lusaka Agreement, the Security Council sent three Security Council missions to the region. At the time the first mission visited Congo, it was extremely rare for Security Council members to go on missions.

Political support for MONUC by the Security Council was not limited to the resolutions adopted by the Council, Permanent Members of the Council as individual states also applied pressure on all signatories of the Lusaka Agreement, either for cooperation with MONUC activities or for the rapid application of the provisions of the Lusaka Agreement.
The political will that existed in the Security Council to find a solution to the crisis was much more important for MONUC than the number military personnel it had at its disposal.

There was one other important factor that assisted MONUC. That factor was the willingness of all political forces in Congo to talk and negotiate. Furthermore, all state and non-state parties to the Lusaka Agreement and the non-armed opposition in Congo willingly or reluctantly negotiated and cooperated with MONUC. Finally, all parties to the Agreement complied with Security Council Resolutions. Perhaps slowly, unwillingly, half-hearted, grudgingly and under great diplomatic and economic pressure, but in the end they complied.
ETIOPIA AND ERITREA

THE CHALLENGE OF RECONCILIATION AND PEACE-BUILDING

Abdul Mohammed

Addis Ababa

The Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict has dramatically demonstrated. That is, Africa needs no more wars. In the last three decades, brutal and protracted wars have destroyed millions of lives and livelihoods or physically and mentally maimed several more millions. Ethiopia and Eritrea, the parties to the conflict and the international community have the responsibility of restoring normal, peaceful relations. They have to take to heart the lessons of this tragic conflict. They should in particular use those lessons to avoid repeating the mistakes they have made as well to inform their future course of action. By themselves the parties may not be able to start a process of reconciliation. They need the international community’s assistance and cooperation.

I would like to thank the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs for this opportunity to share my views on peacekeeping and peace-building in the context of the Ethio-Eritrean conflict and on how to restore Ethiopian-Eritrean relations to a peaceful avenue. I am flattered by the invitation because I have no claim to a special expertise on the subject except that I am a citizen of one of the two countries who has followed closely developments in Ethiopian-Eritrean relations with great hope and recently with disappointment and concern. My views are therefore personal and they should be taken as such. They are also expressed here on a non-attributable basis.

This consultation organized by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs is an important expression of Turkey’s commitment to assisting parties to the conflict to find solutions to their problems.

Fifty years ago, when the United Nations accepted responsibility for determining Eritrea’s future status along with other ex-Italian colonies, the UN Commission, on the strength of the view of the majority of the population, recommended the reunification of Eritrea with Ethiopia.

I. Lessons Learned

My comments today will focus on what should be done to initiate and nurture a process of reconciliation and peaceful cooperation between Ethiopia and Eritrea in the wake of their still unresolved conflict. To that end, I propose to address what the parties and the

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international community should do urgently and in the long run. My specific recommendations in this regard stem from what I believe to be instructive lessons the parties and the international community ought to draw from the conflict as well as what a restoration of a peaceful, cooperative co-existence would require.

I will begin my comments on the lessons that both parties to the conflict should draw and then proceed to what each should specifically learn.

**Joint lessons.** On both sides, until the outbreak of hostilities, the ruling political parties handled Ethiopian-Eritrean relations. Government-to-government contacts were limited, and when they occurred occasionally, they were mostly to confirm or to operationalise agreements reached at the party level. The way such relations were conducted lacked transparency and did not allow the participation of non-party and non-governmental actors, such as private businessmen, religious leaders and civil society organizations.

Both sides postponed addressing the issue of citizenship of their nationals living in the other’s territory—the right to work in their administration and participate in their political process, to own property and conduct businesses, and to use their passport and local identity cards and residence permits. The failure to determine urgently these and other related issues gave rise to speculation and devious practices.

Another issue that was not adequately discussed was the consequences of Eritrea’s adoption of a new currency. Before Eritrea adopted its currency, both sides should have anticipated and resolved through discussion how the exchange rate between the two currencies should be fixed, what currencies should be used for what amount of their border trade, as well as whether or not their bilateral trade should be transacted in hard currency. As it turned out, discussion on such issues was delayed until after Eritrea had introduced its currency. By that time however, the discussion that followed could not avoid mutual suspicion of undue advantage,

On both sides, there was also a lack of appreciation of each other’s decision-making process. On the Ethiopian side, decision-making was a slow collective process, which allowed little room for any prompt decision on a pressing issue. On the Eritrean side, there was no parallel deliberative process, and one person, who according to people who know him well has a tendency to react impulsively, made all the important decisions. This was the president of the country.

**Lessons for Ethiopia.** On the Ethiopian leadership’s side, there was a strong inclination to accommodate Eritrean interests and views without asking for reciprocity. This tendency was predicated on a belief—which turned out to be wishful in light of subsequent events—that if the Eritrean side began to see their interests in terms of mutually beneficial economic relations with Ethiopia, it would pave the way for close political interdependence that would gradually necessitate joint political institutions.

Shortly after coming to power the Ethiopian People’s Democratic Revolutionary Front (EPDRF) government demobilized more than half of its troops and cut down military expenditure by 60 percent. Eritrea, on the other hand, increased both its troop level and military expenditure on the ground that it felt threatened by Sudanese fundamentalism and Yemeni irredentism. The Ethiopian leadership acquiesced in this judgment without suspecting that this military build up could be turned against their country.
Lessons for Eritrea. On the Eritrean leadership’s side, there was an unrealistic ambition to become another “Singapore” or “Hong Kong” and to regard their economic link with Ethiopia as a prop for the achievement of this larger ambition. In some measure Eritrean expatriate professionals fuelled and rationalised this ambition. It was also born out of a mistaken common belief that if the Derg’s massive war machine could be defeated, no challenge could be so formidable as to be insurmountable. The Eritrean leadership’s overestimation of their capacity often led them to making arrogant statements and to seeking a military solution to problems that could be better solved through patient discussion and negotiation.

Lessons for the international community. The international community cannot be blamed for not foreseeing the conflict and not taking preventive measures. No one, even the leaderships of both sides, could have suspected that the two countries would engage in such a devastating war six months before its outbreak. The war caught every one by surprise.

One is justified however in questioning the actions the international community took or failed to take once the seriousness of the conflict became apparent. Were they sufficiently resolute and unambiguous in their objective to prevent the latter large-scale fighting, in which several thousand lives were lost and the livelihoods of several thousand more were destroyed? After all, after the initial armed clashes on the border, there was time for diplomacy to prevent the latter escalation. Why did diplomacy then fail?

Rwanda and the United States offered their good offices to help the parties to resolve their dispute peacefully. They presented a plan that had four elements: (1) The withdrawal of Eritrean forces to the positions they held before 6 May 1998, i.e., to positions they were at before the outbreak of hostilities; (2) the restoration of Ethiopian civil administration to Badme; (3) the demarcation of the border on the basis of existing international treaties; (4) until that occurs, the demilitarization of the border supervised by third-party observers.

Ethiopia readily accepted the Rwandan-US peace plan. However, Eritrea rejected it out of hand. The OAU then took up the peace-making challenge. Its Summit Conference in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, called on both parties to cease hostilities and to solve their dispute peacefully. It also mandated three heads of state and the organization’s Secretary-General, to find a peaceful solution. All four leaders discharged this responsibility conscientiously with tact and patience. They visited the capitals of the parties and talked to their leaders. Over six months, through their ambassadors and foreign ministers, they continued discussions with the parties and sought to ascertain independently both sides’ claims and counter-claims. Undeterred by the Eritrean rejection of the plan it jointly sponsored with Rwanda, the United States continued its peace facilitation effort.

In the meantime, the OAU high-level initiative reached a conclusion. In November 1998, the mandated heads of state called the leaders of the two parties to a meeting in Ouagadougou and presented to them what they called a Framework Proposal. The proposal was predicated first on two factual determinations: (a) their claim notwithstanding, Eritrean forces had occupied since 6 May, 1998, the previously Ethiopian-administered territory of Badme; (b) pending a legal settlement of both parties’ territorial claims and, in particular, without prejudice to Eritrea’s legal right, its forces should withdraw from the territories administered by Ethiopia prior to 6 May 1998. The other elements of the Framework Proposal were restatements of the previous Rwanda/US proposals already on the table.
Ethiopia immediately accepted the Proposal. Again, Eritrea was in no mood to accept, delaying its response with repeated frivolous requests for further clarification. In the meantime, however, the Framework Proposal enjoyed widespread endorsement. The OAU Central Organ and Summit, the EU, the UN Security Council and several governments endorsed it as a balanced solution.

While continuing its non-acceptance stance, in the hope of deflecting attention from the Framework Proposal, the Eritrean government resumed hostile actions, intermittently firing artillery at Ethiopian troops across the border. Ethiopia’s incremental self-defence response to those actions led to the first large-scale fighting and the eviction of Eritrean forces from Badme and the surrounding area. Faced with a military defeat and the recapture of Badme, the Eritrean leader announced that he had now accepted the OAU Framework proposal.

It was obvious that what changed the Eritrean leader’s mind was the military defeat and not because he saw the Framework Proposal as offering a balanced and just basis for a peaceful solution of the conflict. The continuing diplomatic process did not however draw the correct lesson from the situation. Instead of pressing the Eritrean leader to withdraw his forces from other areas that had been administered by Ethiopia prior to 6 May, it allowed him to resume his intransigence.

The Eritrean leader began to insist that his acceptance of the OAU Framework Proposal, which by that time had become an Agreement, did not, apart from Badme, oblige him to withdraw from other formerly Ethiopian administered territories that his troops had occupied—a stand that obviously amounted to rejecting it. It took six months of negotiation with the Eritrean leader before the OAU, through its then current Chairman, made it clear in no uncertain terms that the Framework Agreement had indeed imposed on Eritrea an obligation to withdraw from all the Ethiopian administered territories that its forces had occupied since 6 May, 1998.

The OAU’s firm and unambiguous injunction forced the Eritrean leader to change his tactic. While preparing for another round of fighting aimed at retaking Badme, the Eritrean leader began going through the motions of appearing open to entertaining further OAU suggestions aimed at implementing the Framework Agreement. Two weeks before the Algiers Summit, he launched a large-scale offensive. However, the offensive was crushed with a great loss of lives and military equipment. At the Algiers Summit, the Eritrean leader had no choice but to accept the OAU proposals for implementing the Framework Agreement, the so-called Modalities. This and the long time it took to complete negotiations on the Technical Arrangements aimed at operationalising the Modalities gave the Eritrean leader breathing space after which he once again began stonewalling the diplomatic process. He refused to instruct his foreign minister to sign the proposed Ceasefire and Peace Agreement. It took another round of fighting, this time initiated by Ethiopia, which administered a devastating defeat on Eritrean forces and which, in turn, permitted Ethiopian troops to advance deep into Eritrean territory, to persuade the Eritrean leader to accept the Peace and Ceasefire Agreement.

This account of the twists and turns of the diplomatic process is instructive. With the exception of the OAU, the larger international community failed to correctly read and draw the necessary conclusion from the diplomatic process. It regarded the conflict as one of territorial dispute and repeatedly stated that it was unacceptable and immoral for two
impoverished nations to fight for a small and poor swath of territory. They totally ignored the fact that an important principle of legality and regional order was involved. While insisting at the same time that this principle should be upheld in Balkans, the Security Council, the custodian of peace and security, refused to affirm the same principle in the context of the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict. A clear case of a double standard was visible. The party that violated the sovereignty of a neighbour and initiated the conflict interpreted the reluctance of the Security Council, and of the major powers, as countenancing its behaviour. This encouraged it to persist in the belief that no sanction would be imposed against it and that it would perhaps be permitted to reap the fruits of its aggression.

The diplomatic process also misread the unfolding outcome of the conflict. It read the Eritrean leader’s often delayed qualified acceptances of agreements as an outcome of its persistence rather than as the result of the victory of Ethiopian arms.

The Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict provides a case study of how a small local conflict can develop into a large-scale conflict, with tragic consequences, if the major powers in the Security Council fail to attend to it with a sense of commitment to the principles of the UN Charter.

II. What needs to be done?

The parties to the conflict and the international community have the responsibility of restoring normal, peaceful relations. They have to take to heart the lessons of this tragic conflict. They should in particular use those lessons to avoid repeating the mistakes they have made as well to inform their future course of action. By themselves the parties may not be able to start a process of reconciliation. They need the international community’s assistance and cooperation. On the other hand, the international community cannot help the parties if they do not see a common interest in a peaceful, cooperative co-existence and take the necessary steps toward that end. The parties and the international community should therefore work in tandem and in a mutually supportive way.

What steps should the parties take to initiate a process of reconciliation?

There are a number of things they can and should do—immediately and incrementally.

--The Boundary Arbitration Commission's decision was bound to please or displease one of the parties. It was therefore of the utmost importance that it should be fair and impartial and seen to be so. Although both parties committed themselves a priori to accepting the arbitral decision, it is a different proposition for either party to accept an unfavourable decision, particularly where it believes that there has been some deviation from the expected criteria. Moreover, both sides strongly believe in the righteousness of their case, and know that an unfavourable decision might not be well received by the majority of their publics.

--The first stage of the arbitral decision was on the delimitation of the boundary. It was then to be followed by a demarcation exercise of the delimited boundary, i.e., to put up physical markers on the ground. In view of the time gap between the two processes there was a need for the two parties to exercise the utmost prudence, so as not to allow an unfavourable arbitral award to negatively affect the cease-fire and the peacekeeping arrangement.
With regard to both aspects, the international community could have been more helpful. It needed to closely follow developments and the Security Council, in particular, should have held early consultations with a view to preparing itself to cope with any untoward consequences.

In this respect the international community should have been guided by the lesson it should have learned from its failure to act resolutely at the early stage of the conflict, when it showed a tendency to indulge the violator of international legality. Even after the OAU had determined that the conflict began as a result of Eritrean military occupation of previously Ethiopian administered territory, the UN Security Council failed to take note of that and call on the violator to withdraw its troops pending a legal determination of both parties’ territorial claims. As I have observed, this failure to lay down the law encouraged the violator to believe that if he persisted he could manage to keep the fruits of his aggression.

Even today the Security Council does not seem to have fully appreciated the consequence of its earlier failure. It still continues the tendency of indulging the violator of international legality. The Eritrean government has clearly failed to live up to all the obligations it has entered into under the Peace and Ceasefire Agreement that provided for the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force. It has restricted the movement of UN peacekeepers within the Temporary Security Zone. It has also reintroduced armed military personnel into the Zone under the guise of civilian militia and has refused to give information to the UN on their numbers as well as on the types of weapons they are carrying or on the general military activities they may be engaged in. Even more serious, instead of demobilizing, Eritrea is increasing its force level. There is also credible evidence that Eritrea has acquired high performance military aircraft, while Ethiopia has been demobilizing. The Security Council seems to ignore the implications of all such evidence. Its regular reports exhibit a tendency to equate Ethiopian and Eritrean behaviour with respect to fulfilling their obligations under the ceasefire agreement. At no time has it underscored the seriousness of Eritrea’s violations of its obligations, which suggests that either the UN peacekeeping force (UNMEE) is not reporting all that it knows or that the Security Council is not prepared to act resolutely on the basis of the information it receives from its field observation. This must be a matter of great concern as it has implications for the continuation of the ceasefire and the peace-building process.

What has been said so far concerns potential difficulties that may arise. Beyond this however, there is a need for positive steps to initiate reconciliation and a restoration of peaceful and mutually beneficial relations. To that end, the parties to the conflict should take the following immediate and successive steps:

--The two parties need to discuss perceived anomalies in the Boundary Commission’s decision and modalities for its implementation.

--They should commit themselves to cease hostile propaganda directed against each other.

--They should likewise commit themselves to cease encouraging, arming, and infiltrating political dissidents to destabilize the constitutional order of the other country.

--They should immediately demobilize and reduce the level of their armed forces and military expenditure to a level that can be justified by their legitimate defence needs.
The international community should encourage the parties to take all the above steps. The international community should recognize such steps as they are taken and encourage further steps by providing assistance especially to the parties’ demobilization programmes. Those steps are envisaged to create a climate that would pave the way for agreements on the following steps:

--The parties should hold discussions to agree on legal principles that could help determine the citizenship status of their nationals residing in each other’s country.
--They should agree on guidelines regarding family reunion.
--They should ensure respect of human rights of citizens residing in each other’s country.
--They should commit themselves to implement the decisions of the Claims Commission.
--They should ease and eventually remove travel restrictions between them.
--They should ease and also eventually remove trade restrictions between them.

All the above need the international community’s support, financial and technical assistance where and when required.

In order to bring about a durable and lasting peace, all the above measures need to be consolidated in a final peace settlement. One cannot put a timeline on the achievement of this goal. But once most of those measures are agreed on and implemented, the need for such a settlement that is linked with a regional security order will become obvious. The security needs of the regional countries are so interdependent that they are likely to agree on a regional security order that is based on shared security interests. The InterGovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) can provide a forum for discussion on issues related to such an enterprise. Through the Friends of IGAD group, the international community is well positioned to follow, encourage, and assist in the evolution of a regional security order. Among others, the following measures should be included in any framework of a regional security order:

--Developing a common understanding of regional security needs.
--Developing a larger concept and vision of regional security in which economic development, poverty reduction, joint efforts to combat the HIV/AIDS pandemic, regulating refugee flows, and environmental protection will be vital parts.
--The utilization of trans-boundary rivers for multi-purpose regional development—irrigation, energy, and for other regional developmental needs.
--Cooperation in developing standards of good governance and ensuring the protection of human rights.
--Agreeing on the force levels of the regional countries as well as on their composition, their equipment, and disposition.
--Agreeing on guidelines and measures to prevent surprise attacks.
--Cooperation on regional control of the proliferation of small arms.
--Agreement on regional utilization of seaports, and providing to landlocked countries internationally guaranteed access to an outlet to the sea.
Consolidating agreements on all the above measures should be envisaged as a long-term undertaking. They should be studied, and their implementation should be carefully sequenced.

In conclusion I would like to underscore what the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict has dramatically demonstrated. That is, Africa needs no more wars. In the last three decades, brutal and protracted wars have destroyed millions of lives and livelihoods or physically and mentally maimed several more millions. But Africa also needs an end to lawlessness because it is lawlessness that fuels the cycle of violence.

I regret to have taxed your patience by burdening you with details, but you will agree with me that without those details my remarks would have become too abstract and unfocused to stimulate discussion.

Thank you for your attention.
In a peace support operation, peacekeepers may be easily regarded as invaders by the local people. The main operational principles that helped ISAF lead nation, Turkey, to win the full confidence of Afghan Authorities and Afghan people are as follows:

- Showing polite behaviour to the local people; taking great care to set an equal approach to all ethnic groups forming the population of the country; avoiding any interference with the internal political affairs of the country; respecting the country's traditions and cultural values; working in very close consultation and coordination with the local authorities, and international organizations.

Yesterday I presented a summary of ISAF activities under Turkish leadership, and today I would like to touch upon some important lessons learned during ISAF II operations.

Introduction

As you know, the core mission of ISAF is to help the Afghan people, not to govern them. So the primary role of ISAF II was to assist the Afghan Transitional Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas. In addition to its core mission, the Military Technical Agreement stipulated the following tasks for ISAF:

- To aid the Interim Government in developing a national security structure,
- To assist the country’s reconstruction,
- To assist in developing and training future Afghan Security Forces.

Operational principles

I would like to touch upon the fundamental operational principles of the Turkish leadership of ISAF:

a. I think that the most important thing we did was to issue strict orders to all ISAF personnel to be polite and kind to Afghan citizens at all times.
b. At the same time, we took great care to remain equally distant to all ethnic groups of the Afghan people.
c. Furthermore, we were very careful not to involve in Afghan domestic politics.
d. In addition, we, as the Turkish ISAF leadership and all ISAF personnel, fully respected Afghan customs and cultural values.
e. Finally, we worked in very close consultation and coordination with the local authorities, the representatives of the United Nations and Non-Governmental Organizations.
These guiding principles helped us to win the full confidence of Afghan Authorities and Afghan people.

Lessons learned from Afghanistan

Regarding the lessons learned from Afghanistan during our leadership, I may say that mutual trust and respect between the people and the peacekeepers must be the most critical aspect of any peace support operation. So, in my opinion, the main lesson in a Peace Support Operation should be “to show polite behaviour to the local people”.

For this reason, Troop Contributing Nations should train their troops on the delicate nature of Peace Support Operations, which requires politeness towards the local population.

Another important lesson that should be taken into account is to maintain equal distance with all ethnic groups. Moreover, all personnel should respect the country’s customs and cultural values. If you do not respect these values, or if you make discrimination among the ethnic groups and treat the people impolitely, people may easily see you as invaders of their country.

Working in close consultation and coordination with the local authorities, the UN representatives and non-governmental organizations was another key issue.

A detailed reconnaissance with the specialists was very important to clarify the real requirements. On the operational side, joint patrols with the Afghan Security Forces were very important to train them and to show mutual support between ISAF and the Afghan Security Forces. For example, all patrols were conducted jointly during the ISAF-II.

For the restructuring process of the Afghan national army and the police, providing equipment and training was another important contribution. As lead nation, Turkey donated many items and equipment for security and we trained bodyguards and the 1st Battalion of Afghan National Guard.

In peace support operations, the ratio of combat troops to support troops should be determined carefully. For example, ISAF had roughly 4,800 personnel, but only 850 of them could be used as infantry role. The rest were staff and support personnel. The main reason for this was the preference of most countries to assign support troops, instead of combat troops.

Correct and timely reporting is a must to react against incidents properly. For this purpose we mainly organized seminars to train the staff officers and the commanders of the sub-units.

Force protection of all the units is also an important issue in a Peace Support Operation. Security equipment, such as detectors, x-ray devices, armoured vehicles and narcotic-trained dogs are some of the essential equipment and assets to ensure the security and force protection of the units.
Of course, logistics is often one of the main problems, especially in a country where there is no host nation support. However, because of the perfect planning, there was no problem with the logistic support. Almost all logistic support was provided abroad.

The UN Security Council resolutions on ISAF called for a trust fund to be established for common expenses. But, no contribution was made to this fund. The lead nation, therefore, had to meet the most of ISAF's substantial costs.

Well-established communication and information systems had an important role and assisted in the success of ISAF. Selecting the specialist personnel for the operation was another key issue of ISAF's success. Information Operations and Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Operations are the main operations for the success of a Peace Support Operation. On the Civil Military Cooperation issues, working in coordination with the U.N. Agencies, Non-Governmental Organizations, other international organizations, and local authorities was also important. In this context, ISAF conducted an extensive CIMIC programme, designed to provide assistance to the local community through carefully selected quick-impact projects.

Public relations and the media played an important role in achieving our goals. Timely and accurate information to the local and international communities about ISAF activities and incidents prevented incorrect news production. For this reason, a press briefing was held everyday to inform the press and the public. Additionally, my monthly press briefings provided a suitable atmosphere for the media to get first-hand information.

Conclusion

In assuming command of ISAF, Turkey demonstrated its determination to fight against terrorism. Because of the deep-rooted friendship between Afghanistan and Turkey, the Afghan people felt secure with ISAF forces under Turkish leadership. During our mandate, stability and security in Kabul improved gradually and, according to the surveys, the people of Kabul were very happy with ISAF’s activities. Finally, ISAF became one large family, with all its members supporting one another and joining hands to help the people of Kabul.

I think this harmony was the reason behind ISAF’s success.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank all Troop Contributing Nations once again for their participation in ISAF II and their valuable support.
THE INGREDIENTS OF SUCCESS IN AFGHANISTAN

Arthur E. Dewey
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The reconstruction and, indeed, reconstitution of Afghanistan is a success story, though it is a story still being written. The elements of the success are strong leadership by the United Nations and Afghan government; the vital and creative role played by the UN, the massive return of refugees thanks, in part, to support from the international donor community and effective humanitarian action; and integrated security efforts involving the Afghan army and civil-military initiatives. Progress is threatened by recalcitrant elements, but continuing to follow a strategy containing relevant elements will win the day.

I am honoured to have a part in the remarkable series on the Challenges of Peace Operations. It is a particular privilege to join Major General Zorlu, who commanded the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul, in presenting our perspective on the Afghan success story. General Zorlu would probably agree with me that it is a story still being written. But even today in the middle of the story, I believe that we have adequate confidence in a successful conclusion.

I will discuss what I see as the ingredients of success in Afghanistan. These ingredients include:

1. Leadership arising from the international community and the Afghan people;
2. The proper and vital role of the United Nations;
3. The essential contribution of humanitarian action, including return of refugees and displaced people, to rebuilding a failed state; and,

We can draw enormous encouragement from the first three. The jury is still out on the all-important number four.

Leadership

In both the United Nations, and in the Afghan Government, we have witnessed an extraordinary constellation of effective leaders. In the Afghan Government, it is President Karzai with his able Minister of Finance Ashraf Ghani. Included are emerging
ministerial leaders in Rural Reconstruction and Development; Urban Development; and Refugees and Repatriation – as well as several others. Then, of course, we have had the wide experience of Ambassador Brahimi as Special Representative of the Secretary-General. The United Nations Relief and Reconstruction effort was led with special distinction by Nigel Fisher (seconded to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) from UNICEF). And the remarkable return and repatriation of over 2.5 million refugees was led by the seasoned UNHCR field operator – Filippo Grande with his talented backup in both Kabul and Geneva. And I would like to pay special tribute today to the distinguished leadership of Major General Zorlu as Commander of the International Security Assistance Force. Rarely have we witnessed such a combination of host government, multinational, and UN leadership in both civilian and military fields. Nowhere has leadership been more needed. And nowhere has it paid greater dividends than in the case of Afghanistan.

The vital role of the United Nations

The Afghan government and people are now involved in the reconstruction and, indeed, the reconstitution of their country. But their ability to take such initiative so early in the metamorphosis from a failed state to an emerging civil society has depended in large measure on United Nations agencies playing a vital role. How did this happen? It happened largely through the genius of Nigel Fisher in devising a model called the Programme Secretariat.

What was the Programme Secretariat mechanism?

The Programme Secretariat structure and process provided a way for the United Nations to start transferring planning and programming – and eventually budgeting – of essential public services to indigenous Afghan ministries. The United States, along with some other serious members of the United Nations, recognized early on the genius of using the United Nations in such a halfway house role to transfer responsibility and power to the leadership of the host government authority.

To be fair, the Afghan leadership, good as it was, did not immediately warm to this transitional role for the United Nations. The top leadership initially thought UN overhead was too high, and donor contributions to the UN were competing with resources that Afghan leaders wanted to go directly to their own ministries. They initially balked at international funding of high cost emergency humanitarian assistance – monies they would rather see applied to road construction and high value infrastructure projects. U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, however, recognized early on the wisdom of this approach. He sent me to Kabul for an extended period a year ago to help work through this difficult transition period between provision of public services by the United Nations and assumptions of these services by the relevant Afghan ministries. We came to an understanding that significant donor funding would eventually come directly to the Afghan Trust Fund and to Afghan ministries. But while Afghan capacities and donor confidence were being built up, it was essential to use and support the vital work of such UN agencies as UNHCR, UNICEF, the World Food Programme, the UN Development Programme, plus the World Bank.

The work of the Programme Secretariat, and the follow-on sectoral consultative groups, produced both one of the finest hours of the United Nations, and one of the finest examples of the vital role of the UN in transferring public service responsibilities from the
international community to the appropriate ministries of a new host government. I will be so bold to say that this ringing support of multilateralism also represented one of the finest hours of the United States. It is a lesson that could have had applications in other situations. It is a lesson that we can ignore only at our peril in similar nation-building operations both in the present and in the future.

**The Relationship of Humanitarian Action and Reconstruction**

Now, we are witness to one of the largest repatriation operations in history, with over two and a half million Afghan refugees, as well as 450,000 internally displaced persons, who have returned home since the fall of the Taliban. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that it will facilitate the return and reintegration of an additional one million Afghan refugees in 2004.

Afghanistan’s Foreign Minister Abdullah reminds us that refugee>IDP returns are not distractions on the way to reconstruction. He tells us: “Refugee returns are reconstruction.”

This massive return of refugees and internally displaced persons occurred because the Afghan diaspora saw a new future free of the Taliban and Al Qaeda barbarians, led by an enlightened breed of Afghan statesmen, and supported by the financial and political commitment of the international donor community. The decision of Afghan refugees to vote with their feet and go back home from Pakistan and Iran had much to do with these two realities: Afghan refugees heard and trusted that the international emergency relief and reconstruction effort was being ably administered by UN agencies and other parts of the international humanitarian community; and they trusted that donor states would stay the course, and continue to pay the high costs of both emergency relief and reconstruction.

So far, so good; but it has not been easy. It has required intensive management on an almost daily basis – for the key national and international players to hold in their hands every day what could be a fragile and loosening commitment without such intensive engagement, and given the costly humanitarian requirements in Africa and Iraq.

Even with this extraordinary combination of positive ingredients and sustained support for this vital contribution to rebuilding Afghan society – through the last two hard winters, with fragile safety nets, and dicey security conditions in many parts of the country – making such refugee and IDP returns sustainable has been a near-run thing. It was clear from the beginning of such returns that the returnees needed employment that would provide cash for them to access the local markets. To provide such employment, our Bureau at the U.S. Department of State took a page from former U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt. Roosevelt devised an employment solution for a similar perilous time in our own country’s history. This scheme put millions of people to work, and on the way to economic recovery during the great American Depression of the 1930s. He set up the Civilian Conservation Corps – an employment-generating scheme that put people to work and contributed substantially to improving the U.S. environment and infrastructure. The United States and the Afghan Government have recently launched a similar initiative in Afghanistan called the Afghan Conservation Corps (ACC).

The ACC employs refugee returnees, IDPs and other vulnerable groups to work on reforestation and soil conservation projects. A significant proportion of participants will be women. This initiative will help restore forests and other aspects of Afghanistan’s ravaged
environment. And it will provide jobs for thousands – ultimately hundreds of thousands – of persons who need employment and are eager to help rebuild their country. Demobilized militia members are also ideal candidates for these jobs. Donors and the Afghan Government are working to coordinate the ACC with the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) initiative. President Karzai is personally committed to the success of the ACC. We expect he will plant the first tree for the Kabul Green Belt reforestation project in early December 2003.

The ACC, along with the National Emergency Employment Program (NEEP) are concrete examples of donor countries giving Afghans a “hand-up”, rather than a “hand-out.” And these initiatives will be the key to refugee returnees being able to support themselves back in their homes, to pick up their lives again, after decades of exile from their former oppressors in Afghanistan.

The Interrelationship of Security, Human Rights, and the Rule of Law

While progress on relief and reconstruction has been fast, it is threatened by a resurgence of elements in parts of the country that seek to slow and block this forward movement. These elements are trying to plunge Afghanistan once again into violence and oppression. It is now a top priority to devise and implement a comprehensive security strategy. Such a strategy is vital to the continuation of nation-building in Afghanistan.

The overarching formula for success has been the dependence on multinationalism and multilateralism. It has been smart to use the proven UN and other international response mechanisms for as many sectors as possible. Frankly, we have run into some difficulties when we have tried to substitute unilateral donor country responsibility for multilateral competencies, in such key sectors as poppy production, police, justice, and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. Especially for security-related sectors such as justice, police, and human rights - where close integration of effort is required – the unilateral donor service package approach has predictably been slow to produce results.

The multilateral community has had to be creative in dealing with some of these shortcomings. For example, ethnic persecution, human rights violations and oppressive taxation by warlords and commanders forced Pashtuns from their homes in Northern Afghanistan and made it impossible for Pashtun refugees to return to their homes in the North. There were no human rights monitors, no real capacity in the fledgling Afghan Human Rights Commission. There was, and still is, no reliable police or justice system to help. So the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in Kabul called on President Karzai to help. Karzai sent a team to investigate, found the charges were true, and began to work with UNHCR to set up a Northern Return Commission that engaged all of the both positive and negative players to deal with this root cause of refugee movements, and threat to refugee returns.

The International Committee of the Red Cross has done its part to deal with the vacuum in the practice of international humanitarian law. The ICRC has conducted seminars and workshops with warlords and commanders that are at the root of these violations.

Other individual security efforts are beginning to show results. The United States strongly supports efforts by Germany as the lead nation in developing a competent Afghan
National Police force. Germany has renovated and reopened the police academy in Kabul, and approximately 1,500 students have enrolled in officer and non-commissioned officer programs. About 1,000 police have been trained so far, with a goal of 20,000 by June 2004 (including highway patrol and border police). This effort must be accelerated.

A central element of our strategy to meet the security needs of Afghanistan is to develop a nationally-acceptable Afghan National Army (ANA). This force must be multi-ethnic, disciplined, and subordinate to civilian authority, adequately armed and equipped, and sustainable. France and the United States are leading the effort to train the ANA, and eleven battalions of 4,400 troops out of a planned eighteen battalions with 10,000 troops by June 2004 have been trained so far.

It is important that the ANA not be perceived by other ethnic groups as an instrument of the Panjshiri Tajiks. The recent appointment of 22 ethnically balanced leaders in the Afghan Ministry of Defence is a positive sign that President Karzai’s government is serious on this point. The multilateral commitment to the ANA is demonstrated by the contributions of many donors besides the US and France, including NCO training by the British and pledges of over $40 million in equipment from many east European countries.

While it would be very appropriate for the ANA to develop a civil affairs component, the reality now is that the first priority must be to build an effective fighting and security force. Once this is in place, the ANA should give serious thought to the inclusion of a civil affairs component, including an engineering battalion. In this way, the ANA would win hearts and minds for the central government by identifying the government authority with projects that improve people’s lives.

Among the most promising of recent security developments are the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT). These are civil-military teams that include diplomatic and reconstruction aid persons on the civilian side, together with national military contingents working with ANA units on the military side. PRTs have been established in Gardez, Mazar-e-Sharif, Bamian, and Kunduz. Germany, New Zealand, the United States, and the United Kingdom are sponsors of one of these teams.

The PRTs have three purposes: first, to assess local needs and facilitate the exchange of information of all players in the field to ensure that aid is well coordinated and reaches the most vulnerable; second, to foster a security environment that makes it possible for aid to reach the needy beyond Kabul; third, to help align the central authority with local authorities, thereby raising the central government’s profile throughout the country.

While the PRTs are in close communication with humanitarian workers, they do not work side by side on projects, nor do the PRTs attempt to direct humanitarian workers on the ground. The military personnel respect the humanitarian workers’ need for absolute neutrality. PRT military personnel are in uniform at all times, and do not try to “pass” as humanitarian workers.

It is important for the military and civil components of this joint humanitarian reconstruction effort to be part of a comprehensive campaign plan for rebuilding Afghan society. In Afghanistan today the Afghan Government, UN agencies and the Coalition are already working closely on the PRTs’ mission goals and objectives. In fact, it was President
Karzai who came up with the name for the teams; because he wanted to emphasize that the focus of the PRTs’ mission includes reconstruction, on an equal footing with providing security.

The PRTs are embodying this civil-military coordination in many ways. For example, to ensure that PRTs enhance the influence of the central government and its representatives in the provinces, PRTs approve reconstruction projects only with approval of provincial authorities. To cite another example, if village elders approach a PRT with a request for a small irrigation project, the PRT will consult with the local agricultural official and will conduct a tripartite assessment of the proposed project - PRT expert, provincial official, village representative – before deciding whether or not to nominate the project.

The PRTs have potential to do even more: they can facilitate the sharing of unclassified information with aid organizations. This was one of the roles of the civil affairs teams in the Balkans, and it was effective in keeping aid providers in the loop on security issues. UNAMA would be the proper vehicle for the dissemination of unclassified information from the PRTs to the aid community. This has not been utilized fully in Afghanistan, and it is not too late to correct this missing element in the PRT arsenal.

Another important initiative to increase security is the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programme. DDR, with Japan in the lead, took a big step forward on 24 October 2003 with the inauguration of its first initiative in Kunduz, with a pilot project to disarm 1,000 militia members. Other DDR programmes will start soon in Gardez and Mazar-e-Sharif. DDR is an excellent opportunity to showcase civil – military coordination. The demobilized militia is offered opportunities to join cash-for-work programmes in the provinces, such as the National Solidarity Programme, and the National Emergency Employment Programme.

How did so much happen in Afghanistan in so short a time? Let us recall the four essential ingredients:

Leadership; a vital UN role; the essential contribution of humanitarian action to rebuilding a failed state; and operationalising the synergy among security, human rights and the rule of law.

I do not use the term lessons learned, as our record of learning is not very good. I do see these four elements as vital lessons identified – lessons that we have ignored at times in the past, and will in the future ignore – only at our own peril.
WINNING PEACE IN IRAQ
PLANNING AND THE INITIAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF
ORHA AND CPA

George F. Oliver
Colonel, U.S. Army

The Iraq War lasted 21 days; yet “winning the peace” will take much longer. With the United States taking the lead in the war, it also took the lead in reconstruction efforts and the forming of a new Iraqi government. Early successes of the coalition included reforming the Iraqi Ministries, working with the United Nations and the World Food Program to get the Public Distribution System working, attending to humanitarian issues, getting children back to school, getting public utilities functioning, and forming an Interim Iraq Authority.

It must be noted that there are lessons learned from past operations and challenges still facing the international community in peace operations.

Many of my colleagues and I who worked rebuilding Iraq were amazed that the situation portrayed by the newspapers and news commentators was not at all like the country we just left. The reporters were reporting the truth as they perceived it, but the overall impression is that the winning of the peace in Iraq was going all wrong. They depicted one negative situation after another, yet there was much going right. Like two opinions regarding a glass of water: is it half full or half empty? Winning the peace in Iraq is half full.

The purpose of this article is to provide one person’s views on the planning for reconstruction and humanitarian assistance and the initial few months of executing the plan for rebuilding Iraq. I was fortunate to be asked to be the Deputy Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance for the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), which then transitioned to the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). Since I worked humanitarian issues, the emphasis will be on the Humanitarian Assistance (HA) pillar. This article will also cover several other critical areas: security, governance, and reconstruction. In the end, I hope to demonstrate that the dedicated and fearless individuals who first went into Iraq to “win the peace” did far more than most people realized.

Iraq, before the war in 2003, was a country slightly larger in size then the U.S. state of California and slightly smaller in population. The 24 million Iraqi people, however, were more urban than rural, and concentrated around the cities of Baghdad (5.6 million), Mosul (1.7 million), Basrah (1.3 million), Irbil, Kirkuk, As Sulaymaniyyah, An Najaf, and Karbala. Iraq also has a complete make up of ethnic and religious groups that comprise its
population. Ethnically there are Arabs, Kurds, Turkomen, and Assyrians and two prominent religious groups, Shi’a and Sunni.

Historically, Iraq is the cradle of civilization. Unfortunately, during the last two decades of the 20th Century the people of Iraq were isolated from the rest of the world. The Ba’ath party first came to power in 1963, and by 1979 Saddam Hussein was president, replacing the ailing Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr.

For over 30 years Saddam controlled everything in Iraq through the Ba’ath Party. The preponderance of party members came from the Sunni religious sect, while the majority of the population (60%) is Shi’a. In an attempt to further his power base and increase the wealth of the Ba’ath party, in 1980 Saddam initiated a long devastating war with Iran, its neighbour to the east. The war lasted until 1988 with no victory for either side. Even Iraq’s development and use of weapons of mass destruction were unable to secure a marginal victory for Iraq.

Suffering from immense debt as a result of the 8-year war with Iran, Saddam, claiming an old tribal inheritance, sent two of his most modern and trained divisions against the Kingdom of Kuwait in August 1990. His intent was to reclaim the Rumaila oil fields and reap their benefits. Saddam misgauged the impact of this strategic blunder and the response by the rest of the international community. By February 1991, under the leadership of the United States, 620,000 soldiers from 37 nations massed to counter Saddam’s 500,000 troops. In 100 hours of combat this coalition reduced the world’s fourth largest military force by half and returned Kuwait back to the Emir and his people.

The attack and brutality of Saddam’s regime against the people of Kuwait left an indelible impression on the world community. Immediately following the invasion the UN Security Council passed resolution 660 condemning the invasion then followed it up with a resolution imposing sanctions. From 1991 through to the final days of the Ba’ath Party, the noose of sanctions gradually tightened around the Iraqi people. Saddam’s cat and mouse game with the UN inspectors and his ultimate expulsion of all inspectors in 1998 resulted in the country’s almost complete isolation from the rest of the world.

The world according to Saddam was much different. He allowed his people to suffer while he became richer and more brutal in maintaining his power base. Programmes such as Oil for Food were aimed at the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people. Ba’athists, however, were able to infiltrate and scavenge from these programmes to line their own pockets.

In the end, 20 years of almost continuous war and 12 years of international sanctions made their mark on the Iraqi people and its infrastructure. Water, electrical, telecommunications, health systems, computer systems, and almost everything that makes a country function were 20 if not 30 years behind the rest of the world. Literacy rates stood at 58%. The child mortality rate (the probability that a child would die by the age of 5) stood at 10%, one of the highest in the world. In short, the country was in dire straits. While

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2 CIA Fact Book on Iraq.

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the Iraqi people suffered, Saddam continued to surround himself in a lavish lifestyle by building over 50 presidential palaces costing well in excess of $2 billion.  

To hold onto his power base, Saddam resorted to increasingly violent tactics. Especially following the first Gulf War in 1991, human rights abuses increased year to year. Estimates of missing Iraqi people were in the hundreds of thousands.  

In the aftermath of the horrendous terrorist attacks of the World Trade Center in September 2001, President George W. Bush and the American people became more concerned with global terrorism, especially if terrorists were able to get their hands on weapons of mass destruction. In his State of the Union Speech in January 2002, President Bush labelled three countries the “axis of evil”. Iraq was one of these countries. With Saddam’s past use of weapons of mass destruction, his links to terrorist organizations, and his transgressions against the international community by evicting the UN’s weapons inspectors, the stage was set for the elimination of the Ba’ath Party and the rule of Saddam Hussein.

On 19 March 2003, a coalition of 35 nations, primarily led by the United States, attacked from Kuwait “to disarm Iraq, to free its people and to defend the world from grave danger,” and ultimately remove Saddam and the Ba’ath Party from power. The war lasted 21 days. With 143,000 total troops, the Coalition swept through Iraq with unprecedented speed and accuracy. By 20 April the entire country was occupied and there was only limited damage to the already fragile infrastructure.

Planning for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance

In military circles and other parts of America’s national security architecture, nation-building was something the United States was reluctant to do. Experiences in nation-building following World War II, the Korean War, and more recently in Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo, were time-consuming and expensive. Yet occupying powers under the Fourth Geneva Convention would be required to protect the local people, restore law and order, maintain local hospitals and health services, facilitate the education of children, and ensure availability of food supplies. In short, rebuild the nation.

To manage post-conflict humanitarian assistance and reconstruction, phase IV, of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the President of the United States established the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) on 22 January 2003. This office was headed by retired General Jay Garner whose work in Northern Iraq with the Kurds in 1991 gave him an understanding of the Iraqi people that few had. The organization was formed in Washington DC and worked through the U.S. Secretary of Defense. According to the NSPD, ORHA would have the following tasks to accomplish:

- Assist in humanitarian relief,
- Dismantle weapons of mass destruction,

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Defeat and exploit terrorist networks,
- Protect natural resources and infrastructure,
- Facilitate reconstruction; protecting infrastructure and economy,
- Assist in the reestablishment of key civilian services,
- Reshape and reform Iraqi military with civilian control,
- Support transition to Iraqi authority,
- Build links to UN agencies and NGOs,
- Build links to planning counterparts in coalition governments.

Initially, there were only a few members of ORHA, but staffing the organization began in February 2003. By the time the organization left for Kuwait in March 2003 to link up with the United States Central Command planners, the organization was approximately 200 people. Many of the original ORHA staff were experts. Some brought experiences from Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and other failed states. Additionally, they came from all over the U.S. Government and many spent the previous months working on post-conflict plans.

The month of planning in Washington was time well spent, but the bulk of the planning occurred after deployment to Kuwait and establishing a working relationship with the U.S. Central Command. ORHA’s staff made good use of the many studies and plans prepared by think tanks and government institutions. During the 21 days, combat planning continued. The end result was a draft strategic plan.

Also incorporated in the plan were final visions of post-conflict Iraq developed by key coalition members, United Kingdom and Australia (see figure 1). The plan called for the following end state: “A stable Iraq, with its territorial integrity intact, and a broad-based government that renounces WMD development and use and no longer supports terrorism or threatens its neighbours.”

Those who were part of the team knew that there had not been enough information to complete the detailed planning necessary to undertake the enormous task of rebuilding this country. There were many gaps about the status of facilities and infrastructure in Iraq prior to the war. Added to this were limited amounts of information regarding what was destroyed as the war unfolded. When the port town of Umm Qasr fell into Coalition hands in mid-March 2003, members of ORHA went forward to get a glimpse of what they were to face when the whole country fell. The infrastructure in this part of the town had received

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7 Ibid, I-6
virtually no combat damage, yet was in poor condition. This visit only emphasized that more information and planning was needed.

On reflection, members of ORHA knew that the planning time was short, especially since planning for World War II reconstruction in Germany began a full two years before the D-Day landing in Normandy. As a result, there was no strategic overall plan for the occupation of Iraq. Many of the ideas were conceptual only, and resources needed to be applied to those concepts. Lastly, we knew that, in the information age, managing information would be a key to success. In the course of the last ten years of post-conflict actions, a new concept regarding information operations had emerged. Planning and organization of information operations was behind schedule.

All of those working on various aspects of the plan knew security was the key to success. Concepts such as creating an international police force to guide the local Iraqi police and reforming the Iraq Armed Forces into security and reconstruction forces were all developed, yet not resourced with money or people.

To manage rebuilding Iraq, Jay Garner created three teams to manage three regions. Later the Danes offered to take the lead in a fourth region, thus allowing one team to focus on the most critical region, Baghdad. The Northern Region placed its headquarters in Mosul, the South Central in al Hillah, and the Southern Region in Basrah. (See figure 2). Each of these regions had a small staff to facilitate the reconstruction efforts and their organizations paralleled many of the functions of the ORHA staff. One of their major roles was to link up with coalition military forces and synchronize efforts.
As ORHA moved into its assigned sectors in April, the military was already shifting to phase IV tasks. They were making contact with local officials, tribal leaders (mukhtars) and religious leaders (Imams). There were over 1200 civil affairs soldiers spread throughout the various military units. Their mission was to assess the status of the local infrastructure, make contact with local officials, and begin creating local government institutions.

Military combat units were also involved. For the Commander of the 101st Airborne Division, Major General Dave Petraeus, issues like countering Saddam’s arabisation program, finding equitable solutions to ethnic rivalries, security, and establishing local governments became the focus for the division which occupied the northern region. Lieutenant Colonel Steve Bruch, an infantry commander in the 101st correctly assessed the situation: “the key to transition from the use of brute force and violence was to now undertake a more softer and convincing approach [toward the people of Iraq].”

Military units all over Iraq were using their civil affairs and combat units to begin the tasks of reconstructing the country. Meanwhile on 22 April, the ORHA staff moved into one of Saddam’s palaces and began establishing itself as the organization that would manage the reconstruction. During the week of April 20-27, Jay Garner made a sweep around the country talking to local Iraqi leaders and Coalition military commanders—essentially conducting his own assessment.

By only 30 days following the war, the combined efforts of the military and ORHA were beginning to have an impact. There was no humanitarian crisis because the military’s surgical campaign minimized collateral damage. Although the electrical and water distribution systems sustained some damage and most of the government ministry buildings were destroyed and looted, the Iraqi people had access to food and water, hospitals were functioning, and electrical power was restored, albeit in limited amounts. Additionally some members of the Iraqi Governing Council were identified, and all 23 Iraqi Ministries were contacted and many of them began to function.

In mid May 2003, Ambassador L. Paul Bremer arrived in Baghdad to assume the reigns of managing the reconstruction efforts for the coalition. Jay Garner knew that

Jay Garner’s tasks to staff late May 2003
- Improve security situation
- Government salaries to be paid nation-wide
- Begin returning police to work which included a training programme
- Return ministries to a functional level
- Restore basis services to Baghdad
- Prevent a fuel crisis (both gasoline and liquid petroleum gas)
- Purchase winter crops
- Solve food distribution challenges
- Install town councils nation wide
- Integrate government support teams (military) with local government teams (civilian)
- Prevent cholera and dysentery

8 Interviews with Major General Petraeus, Commander of the 101st Airborne Division in Mosul on 11-13 July 2003.
9 Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Steve Bruch, Commander 2nd Battalion 502nd Infantry, in Mosul on 11 July 2003.
eventually a civilian administrator would replace him, but not quite so soon. Being the professional he was, he called the staff together and issued instructions, so there would be a smooth transition to the new civilian administrator (see figure 3). Every staff member responsible for these tasks felt confident that they could be accomplished by 15 June.

Upon assuming control at the end of May as the Coalition Provisional Administrator, Ambassador Bremer wasted no time in taking action. Within days he issued two regulations, four orders, two memoranda, and five public notices. The orders to the Iraqi people were the most sweeping and included the De-Baathification of Iraqi society, the dissolution of entities, a weapons control policy, and the management of property and assets of the Iraqi Ba'ath Party. ¹⁰

As military planners know, no plan survives the first shots of battle, and rebuilding the country was no different. Ambassador Patrick Kennedy, Chief of Staff for the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), took a hard look at the organizational structure. The number of staff members for the CPA continued to grow and it was time to shift away from the three pillars envisioned by Garner. The new structure developed by Ambassador Kennedy in mid July focused more on the Iraqi Ministries and Governance, both of which sprang to life much faster than anticipated. The staff also reflected a growing number of staff from other Coalition members, and as such, they were entitled to key positions (see figure 4 - last page).

The command relationship between Ambassador Bremer and the senior coalition military commander was an issue of much debate. Ambassador Bremer worked directly for the U.S. Secretary of Defense and the senior military commander, Lieutenant General Richard Sanchez, Commander of Joint Task Force 7 worked for U.S. Central Command, who in turn answered to the Secretary of Defense. Ambassador Bremer had no direct authority over General Sanchez, but since both assumed their duties at roughly the same time, they developed a good working relationship.

**Humanitarian Assistance**

During the planning phase of the operation, the Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance (HA), Ambassador George Ward, established a strong relationship with many non-governmental organizations that were also assembling in Kuwait, awaiting the end of the war. Based on his previous experience in Namibia and the Balkans, Ambassador Ward knew that much of the humanitarian assistance to the people of Iraq would not come from ORHA or the military, but from the many dedicated and professional people who work with international organizations (IO) and non-governmental organizations (NGO). Therefore he set out to establish good working relationships.

ORHA recognized that cooperation with agencies of the United Nations would be essential in meeting Iraq's humanitarian needs. UN agencies had a great deal of experience in Iraq, especially through the Oil for Food Programme. Specialized agencies such as the World Food Programme established effective working relationships with CENTCOM and ORHA, and were ready to provide assistance by the time hostilities commenced. Working relations with the UN Secretariat developed less rapidly, in large part due to the UN's

reluctance to accept security protection from coalition forces and its reservations about the war. Following a trip by Ambassador War and Henrik Oleson, a Danish ORHA staff member who had two decades of experience with the UN, to Cyprus to meet the UN’s humanitarian coordinator for Iraq, the UN moved to establish a presence in Baghdad and agreed to exchange liaison officers with ORHA. Joint ORHA-UN working groups were set up to work on problems in areas such as food, health, and refugees.

Assessments for determining priorities of effort were critical to the overall success of the humanitarian situation. To help in this assessment, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) assembled the largest and most qualified Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) in its history. Fifty-six DART personnel were organized into small teams and equipped with armour-plated all-terrain vehicles and state-of-the-art communications equipment. Staging out of Northern Iraq (Kurdish controlled areas), Jordan and Kuwait, these teams were ready to begin assessments as soon as the security was established. USAID also positioned around the region stockpiles of emergency supplies and commodities upon which the DART could draw to head off any humanitarian crisis. Their purpose was to “save lives, alleviate suffering, and mitigate the impact of emergency situations”. With experts in health, water and sanitation, food and nutrition, internally displaced persons, and infrastructure, the DART complemented the HA staff in ORHA.

By the time the HA staff left for Iraq, they had a common purpose, “relieve human suffering by establishing a responsive humanitarian assistance organization that facilitates the delivery of relief and emergency humanitarian assistance”. To accomplish these tasks, Ambassador Ward broke the staff down into sectors, matching those used by the relief community - water and sanitation, health, food, shelter, refugees and internally displaced personnel, demining, and human rights.

As the HA staff moved into Iraq, it was becoming obvious that the war had averted a major humanitarian crisis. With most hospitals still functioning, food distributed to the local people, some water still flowing in major population centres and the rest provided by the military and NGOs, and only a marginal increase in internally displaced people, there was no immediate emergency, yet there was a whole host of humanitarian issues.

Human Rights

History will reflect that the United States initiated the war with Saddam’s regime based on the Iraqi development of weapons of mass destruction and links to terrorist organizations, but the more compelling reason for the war was to free the people of Iraq from the oppressive Ba’ath regime. Those outside Iraq knew the atrocities faced by the Iraqi people, but the full impact on the Iraqi people could only be known by seeing it first hand. Human rights groups knew of the mass killings, rape, torture, mutilation, detention and seizure of property inflicted by the Ba’ath regime on the Iraqi people. Anticipating a wealth of information, the HA staff created a Human Rights Archive Unit to collect and document these atrocities, help the Iraqi people overcome these terrors, as well as develop policies for the CPA regarding human rights issues.

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12 ORHA Humanitarian Assistance briefing developed while planning in Kuwait, April 2003.
Shortly after the war, the Iraqi people began expounding on the horrific incidents of abuse. A visit to the notorious Abu Ghraib prison on the outskirts of Baghdad revealed torture tools, execution chambers, and prison records. The Human Rights Archive Unit set up operations in the Baghdad convention centre and publicly announced that the CPA wanted to gather evidence on crimes against humanity. Initially only a few people came forward to recount their experiences, but as it became clear the Ba’ath regime would never surface again, the numbers increased. Each new person recounted an incident more horrific than the last, often proving his or her story with missing limbs or scars.

Murdered people could not speak, but their relatives did in a manner that was anticipated but difficult to manage. The Iraqi people knew the location of many mass graves, but feared going near them. Once fear of reprisal by the regime was removed, the Iraqi people began digging up known sites. It was the CPA’s intent, however, to identify possible sites, confirm they were mass gravesites, conduct a forensic investigation to determine what happened for use in possible criminal proceedings, and finally return the remains to the family. Iraqi culture is strong on family ties, so there was a pressing desire to find their missing relatives. By mid-May, nineteen possible mass gravesites were identified. (A mass gravesite was defined as an unmarked site that contained five or more bodies.)

The most horrific site was just north of the town of al Hillah, about 50 kilometres south of Baghdad. In putting down the Shi’a uprising in 1991 just after the first Gulf War, Saddam and his henchmen had rounded up Shi’as all over southern Iraq, murdered them and buried them in a mass grave. The farmer who owned the field feared to go near the site until the Ba’ath Party was gone. After Iraq fell under Coalition control, the local community organized the exhumation. Digging with first heavy equipment and then by hand, the remains were searched for documentation and attempts were made to identify the victims. People came from all over the region came in search of missing family. Initial estimates were that this grave contained 3,000 bodies, but later estimates go as high as 15,000.

It took some careful negotiations to convince the Iraqi people of the reasons for documenting these atrocities. Eventually local leaders understood and digging stopped. The discovery of mass graves continues. The Chicago Tribune in January 2004 recounted that so far 282 mass graves have been reported, 55 have been confirmed, yet only 20 have been explored. The number of missing Iraqis continues to climb as more reports of atrocities come to light. It will take years to fully understand what the Ba’ath Regime did to its own people.

**Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons**

With the atrocities committed by the regime and almost twelve years of continuous wars, there were over 500,000 Iraqis refugees in countries all over the world. The largest number (202,000) was in Iran, with smaller numbers in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, other Middle Eastern countries and Europe. The challenge for the CPA was the desire by the

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refugees and the governments in which they resided to return immediately. Ambassador Bremer met with the UN High Commissioner of Refugees Special Representative (UNHCR), Dennis MacNamara, in late June to discuss the return of these refugees. Both agreed that the return of refugees should start soon, but only when the people of Iraq were ready to receive them. Also for the CPA, there was concern that terrorists or Ba’ath party sympathizers might return with the refugees, a tactic that was used in other conflicts. Still there were spontaneous returns, but for the most part the UNHCR and NGOs helped organize an orderly return.

There were also refugees in Iraq - 80,000 Palestinians and 23,000 Iranians. Saddam took some pity on the Palestinians and provided many with homes. When the regime fell, Iraqis evicted the Palestinians. Some found refuge in a sports camp in Baghdad while others were caught in a no-man’s land between Iraq and Jordan. The Iranians met a similar fate, but most were in camps in the Kurdish section of Iraq. Again UNHCR and NGOs came to the rescue and helped these unfortunate people.

The precision and accuracy of the war conducted by the coalition prevented an increase in internally displaced people (IDP). Saddam, however, created his own IDP problem. Under his arabisation programme, Saddam forced many Kurds off their land and gave the land to Arabs. His intent was to increase Arab populations in the Kurdish dominated agricultural region and the northern oil fields. When the war ended, the Kurds returned and demanded their land back, which then in turn displaced the Arabs. This created some unique challenges for the CPA. First, they had to resolve who in fact owned the land, and secondly in the agriculturally rich northern regions, who owned the harvest.

Food

As mentioned earlier, approximately 60% of the Iraqi people were dependent on the United Nations Oil for Food Programme for their subsistence and approximately 60 days worth of food was distributed before the war. There were approximately 55,000 distribution sites all over the country in which the Ministry of Trade (MOT) used to distribute food provided by the World Food Programme. One of the challenges facing the ORHA was to restart the Public Distribution System before the food ran out on 1 June. In working with the UN before the war, no one outside Iraq had a good list of these distribution sites.

Upon ORHA’s arrival in Baghdad, contact was immediately established with the MOT. Ambassador Robin Raphael was the ORHA and then CPA advisor to the ministry. Working with Ambassador Raphael was Nick Harvey, an HA staff member and former member of the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development. They were able to quickly locate members of the Iraqi Ministry of Trade who worked with the World Food Programme. To their surprise, these Iraqi officials took their records home, as they feared that the Iraqi Ministry of Trade would be destroyed, which it was.

The World Food Programme positioned new stocks of food in neighbouring countries before the war and many of the warehouses within Iraq were also full. One of the challenges was to prevent looting of these warehouses. Again, getting the military to secure these sites was problematic, but after a few were looted, the military provided the much needed protection. By 1 June the Public Distribution System was functioning, and for the first time, many Iraqis received their full food basket rather than only a portion.
Additionally, the port of Umm Qasr was dredged and cleared of sunken ships in early May and opened in time to support larger deliveries of food stocks.

Fortunately 2003 was a good agricultural year for the Iraqi people. A large percentage of the population depended on food purchased at the local markets or to supplement their food baskets from Oil for Food. It was amazing how fast the markets sprang to life after the war, but to fill the gap the World Food Programme and other IOs and NGOs distributed rations. Food was not a major issue.

One issue faced by the Coalition was regarding the harvests. Who owned them? Could they be purchased so currency could get back in the hands of the Iraqi people? Jay Garner identified this early on as one of his priorities. The grain and other products produced in Iraq were poorer quality than what was purchased in other countries, yet the World Food Programme agreed to purchase the crops. In the northern sector of Iraq, Saddam’s arabisation programme created the problem of who benefited from that year’s bountiful harvest, the Arab who worked the harvest or the Kurd who was thrown off the land? The military unit in that sector was the American 101st Airborne Division. Their commander came up with a unique solution. He used military units to prevent the harvest from entering the grain processing centres until ownership could be verified. If in question, an agreement was reached between the Arab farmer and the Kurd landowner. In most cases the Arabs and the Kurds split the profits of the harvest.15

Water and Sanitation

In the arid region of Iraq, water is life. Fortunately in the Fertile Crescent where the bulk of the population resides, wells can be easily dug, as the water table is relatively shallow, but this water is often brackish. Shortages of water cause a variety of diseases and are particularly hard on children.

Immediately preceding and following the war, there was acute concern among many relief agencies that the war would create a shortage of potable water and disease and death would ensue.16 In Basrah where outbreaks of cholera occur every year, the World Health Organization in May 2003 confirmed 73 cases and over 1500 cases of acute diarrhea.17 Fortunately, organizations like the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the World Health Organization, and many NGOs, responded quickly and incident rates for these maladies never exceeded rates of previous years. To fill the void until the local water systems were functioning at pre-war levels, IOs, NGOs, and the military provided drinking water.

The water and sanitation system was one of the poorest maintained utilities. Added to this problem was the inconsistency of power by which all these systems operated. Bombs and heavy equipment (tanks and armoured personnel carriers) did some damage to the already fragile system. In the early days of April and May, it was not uncommon to see water flowing through the streets from a broken water main. Sewage systems ran untreated into the Tigress and Euphrates river systems, and often through the streets itself. Where

15 Petraeus interview.
water did flow, people tapped straight into the underground pipes to get at the water, thus reducing the pressure and increasing unwanted leakage. To manage this huge undertaking, before the war US Agency for International Development (USAID) provided UNICEF with an $8 million grant to meet immediate needs in Iraq and build upon the organization’s work there since 1997.

In addition to grants to IOs and NGOs, Bechtel Corporation under a contract by USAID was tasked to repair hundreds of critical breaks in the water system. They were also responsible for long-term restoration, which included construction on three major water treatment plants and forty-eight compact water treatment plants, installation of thirty-seven back up generators at water treatment facilities, and the rehabilitation of the Sweet Water Canal, to help bring drinking water to Basrah. As of December 2003, the water distribution was operating at 65% of the pre-war level. By spring 2004, USAID expects that water and sanitation projects underway will eventually benefit over 14.5 million people or over half of the Iraqi population.18

Health

Health and medical treatment for Iraqis was one of Jay Garner’s earliest priorities. For this reason medical facilities were on his list of things to see when he first entered Iraq. Most hospitals were functioning, albeit at reduced capacity due to the war, but organizations like the International Committee of Red Cross and Red Crescent (ICRC) continued to operate in Iraq before and during the war. The heroic efforts of these dedicated international civil servants and the Iraqi medical staffs that remained in the hospitals were incredible.

Hospitals, like so much of the infrastructure, were in bad shape even before the war, but well educated medical staffs were on hand. Iraq witnessed a new phenomenon for hospitals, especially in Baghdad. Control of hospitals became a political issue. On 2 May, fundamentalist political groups controlled 11 of the 30 hospitals in Baghdad. The Ministry of Health (MOH) advisor, Steve Browning, was the person eventually responsible for finding a solution to these takeovers, and the hospitals and the MOH began functioning effectively in late May 2003.

During the first few months of occupation, many countries made offers of assistance of which many were in the medical arena. The most common offer was to send a complete hospital. With an already sufficient number of functioning hospitals, Steve Browning and the MOH attempted to get countries to sponsor existing hospitals. This policy worked, but more importantly these decisions were a result of a well-organized process to handle all medical issues. Browning in working with the MOH created the International Medical Aid Committee made up of the MOH, ORHA, ICRC, the World Health Organization, and some selected NGOs. This committee approved every health-related issue from taking an injured child out of the country for medical treatment to reviewing requests from the international community of offers of medical assistance.

Other challenges faced by the Ministry of Health and the ORHA advisor were security of hospitals, reliable power supplies, availability of potable water, and distribution of medical supplies. Coalition military forces secured only some hospitals. Those that were not secured were generally looted. In one hospital in downtown Baghdad, the ICRC


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provided much needed equipment, but on the night it was installed, looters came in through the back of the hospital and stole the equipment while soldiers protected the front of the building. As for power, it was sporadic, but quickly generators were found to provide backup power. As for water, much was delivered by relief agencies. The end result was that hospitals continued to function.

Hospitals cannot be fully effective unless they have adequate medical supplies and medications. Kamadia, the Iraqi government’s organization responsible for distributing medical supplies throughout Iraq, was ineffective and corrupt. The Oil for Food Programme provided funds for medical supplies, yet Kamadia employees were adept at siphoning drugs and supplies to the black market. After many Kamadia employees refused to work, Steve Browning and others working with the MOH removed them and installed new managers. By May 2003 Kamadia was functioning and supplies were getting to the hospitals on a regular schedule.

By October 2003, public spending on health was 26 times more than that provided by Saddam’s regime. Two hundred and forty hospitals and 1200 clinics were operational all over the country, and pharmaceutical distribution went from 700 tons in May to 12,000 tons in October. One huge success story rarely recounted was a children’s vaccination programme sponsored by MOH, various relief agencies, and the military. In four months 22 million vaccinations were administered. The hard work of Skip Burkle, Steve Browning, Dr. Bob Mott, and many dedicated U.S. Army Civil Affairs officers, all of whom worked for ORHA and then CPA in the first few months put medical services far ahead of any other service to the Iraqi people.

Mine Action

Twenty years of almost continuous war were responsible for Iraq being the most mine-affected nation in the world. Estimates were that between 10 and 15 million mines were scattered across the country with the most along the Iran-Iraq border. Throughout the 1990s the United Nations and other NGOs worked through the bureaucratic stalling tactics of the Ba’ath Regime to clear some mines in the Kurdish areas of Iraq, and the ICRC conducted extensive mine awareness training. Still much needed to be done even before Operation Iraqi Freedom.

As part of ORHA’s planning staff, the US State Department organized a Mine Action team. Led by Dan Layton, this group of experienced deminers helped devise a strategy for managing the huge land mine and unexploded ordnance problem in Iraq. Unexploded ordnance is a problem in most modern wars. Many small projectiles used during the conduct of the war fail to explode in the designed time limit. Their small size and location in unexpected areas make them more dangerous than land mines. Layton and company set up a Mine Action Centre, and set to work within the Iraqi government in establishing a national mine action programme. This programme would educate the Iraqi people on mine awareness and train Iraqis on clearing mines and unexploded ordinance.

In early May the State Department arranged for the deployment of a Quick Reaction Demining Force with 50 specially trained personnel, most from Mozambique.

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20 U.S. State Department website: [http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/fs/22184.htm](http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/fs/22184.htm), accessed 1 November 2003.
Immediately they began to work on clearing unexploded ordnance in populated areas. In December 2003, on a Relief Web posting USAID announced the formation of Iraq’s first national mine action programme. Under the direction of the Ministry of Interior with aid from other nations and NGOs and IOs, Iraq was ready to tackle the huge task of clearing Iraq of the millions of land mines. This task will take many years to complete.\(^21\)

**Civil-Military Relations**

As mentioned earlier civilian agencies, IOs, NGOs, and other nations, were prepared for the fall of the Ba’ath Regime. Organizations like the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, UN Children’s Fund, World Food Programme, World Health Organization, International Committee of Red Cross, International Rescue Committee, Refugees International and Save the Children were positioning people and supplies around the region in March and April 2003. Within weeks after the war, the security situation was improving and these agencies moved in to help the Iraqi people.

Ambassador George Ward, a seasoned veteran of many conflicts and the overall coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance, correctly assessed that he could not control or even provide useful advice to these organizations. They all have their own goals, missions, and constituents. Ambassador Ward’s approach was to establish a good working relationship with these various groups, and keep them informed on both ORHA and military activities.

Since 1991, the military too had experienced the challenges of working with NGOs and IOs. To ease their understanding of these organizations and facilitate their work, the military created humanitarian operations centres where these civilian organizations could go to get information about the crisis and if possible find help from the military. Civilian and military organizations over time developed an uneasy alliance built not upon common ideologies but upon a common purpose.

Under ORHA’s and the military’s reconstruction plans there would be many centres run by Army civil affairs personnel all over Iraq. Their purpose was to provide information to the relief community, and in exchange some synergy of effort might be achieved. ORHA and the CPA would lead this effort by establishing a national level Humanitarian Operations Centre (HOC). The Army’s V Corps and the Marine Expeditionary Force organized a Humanitarian Assistance and Coordination Centre (HACC), and below that smaller units, usually at division level, established Civil-Military Operations Centres (CMOC). Civil Affairs soldiers were responsible for establishing and managing these centres.

While still in Kuwait, the first of these centres was established, thanks to the Kuwaiti Government and the professional efforts of US Army Civil Affairs officers like Major J.B. Brown. As Operation Iraqi Freedom got underway, the Humanitarian Operations Centre in Kuwait conducted daily briefings to the relief agencies. Information from the many civil affairs soldiers embedded in the various combat units funnelled back to a central location and was consolidated. As the war unfolded morning briefings held at the HOC in Kuwait were regularly attended by over 40 organizations.

In planning for humanitarian assistance once in Iraq, a nationally focused HOC was envisioned. Key to selecting the HOC was that it needed to be close to the ORHA Headquarters, yet on the edge of the security zone so civilian agencies could have easy access. In reviewing photographs of downtown Baghdad, the likely location for the HOC was a convention centre in which Saddam and his regime used to hold ministerial meetings. The Baghdad Conference Palace, as the Iraqis called it, was located across the street from the Al Rashid Hotel and on the edge of the security zone for ORHA and the CPA. The building was large, and after one short visit, it became clear that this conference centre could become the public face of ORHA and then the CPA. Within three weeks of ORHA’s arrival in Baghdad, the convention centre became a bustling hub of activity. Besides holding daily briefing to IOs and NGOs, USAID coordinated its reconstruction with Iraqi businesses, ministries conducted daily business, the Iraqi Governing Council held regular meetings, and the Coalition Press Information Centre used a large conference room to keep the world abreast of actions in Iraq.

The 352nd Civil Affairs Command was responsible for establishing the HOC, and in mid-May the first HOC briefing was provided to IOs and NGOs. Initially briefings were given daily, and as the relief agencies working in Baghdad grew, attendance at these briefings increased. During the briefings, Lieutenant Colonel Gordon Stewart, a civil affairs officer from the United Kingdom, provided current information on military activities and Colonel George Oliver provided an overview of ORHA or CPA policies and activities. From time to time, many of the ministerial advisors spoke and explained their actions and future plans. In addition to these national level meetings, civil affairs personnel in other units provided IOs and NGOs information at the HACCs and CMOCs.

Since there was no humanitarian crisis and the Iraqi Ministries began functioning, many of the humanitarian issues were managed by Iraqi Ministries. This was particularly true for the Ministries of Health and Trade, and the Water Commission (later to become part of the Ministry of Water Resources). In addition to updates during the daily briefing by these ministries, there were regular meetings in the Convention Centre where representatives from both IOs and NGOs could meet with the Iraqi Ministry and discuss national level solutions to humanitarian issues. In the other coordination centres across the country similar meetings were held with local officials.

As effective as the civil-military coordination was, there was still a host of challenges. Key among them was the sharing of information and security. Sharing of information has always been a problem during crises. To facilitate the sharing of information, the United Nations created Relief Web, a virtual information-sharing web site. With civil affairs officers embedded in many of the military units across Iraq, many good assessments and a great deal of information were gathered on almost every town and village in Iraq. Unfortunately, the civil affairs information could not be posted on the web site because, according to the military, the information came from a classified database and needed to be purged of classified information before release. Consequently, only the information presented by the civil affairs officers at the daily briefings could be released. A real opportunity to move civil-military coordination to a new level was lost. Still relations between the military and the civilian relief agencies were generally good.
Security

Security was clearly the biggest issue with regards to providing aid to the Iraqi people. As the country fell into Coalition hands the Iraqi military dissolved. Few soldiers were captured. Most ran from any fight or deserted before engaging with coalition forces. During the planning, it was anticipated that Iraqi captured forces would be purged of senior leaders, and then reformed to aid in reconstruction efforts. Eventually they would be reorganized into the new Iraqi Army. Since there was no army to disarm or reorganize, this plan was never executed.

Shortly after the Ba’ath Regime fell, looters all over the country lashed out at the regime. Initially looting was focused on government-owned facilities, but quickly shifted to almost anything not protected by guards. The military commanders thought that the looting was a backlash against the regime, but as the looting continued, military forces were faced with a dilemma of how to protect facilities. Should they shoot looters? The overall Coalition ground commander, Lieutenant General David McKiernan, was reluctant to put looters in the same category as Saddam’s loyalists. Although Saddam’s regime was gone, the Coalition was still very much at war. Several weeks of looting were disastrous until the military shifted from combat actions to post conflict tasks. One element that continued to cause problems for the Coalition’s military after the fall of the regime was the Fedayeen Saddam (Saddam’s ‘Men of Sacrifice’). These guerrilla fighters in later months gained the support of other Saddam loyalists and other terrorists whose aim was to destabilize Iraq. Initially their attacks were only against the military, but gradually shifted toward civilian targets. The bombing of the UN Headquarters on 19 August 2003 was a major blow to the entire civilian relief community. Prior to this incident many relief agencies were operating all over the country. After it, many relief agencies re-evaluated their status in Iraq. Many stayed, but then the ICRC Headquarters met the same fate in October 2003. Guerrillas struck “soft” targets so they could demonstrate that the coalition was not providing the necessary security for relief agencies. By January 2004, it seems clear they are shifting their attacks once again toward Iraqis working with the Coalition.

To aid in the security mission the Coalition began programmes to train security forces. Military units all over Iraq quickly began training local security forces hired by the CPA. Rudimentary training in fixed site protection provided a quick supply of security forces to protect facilities all over Iraq. By December 2003 there were 60,000 Iraqis in the Iraqi Facilities Protection Service. By the summer of 2004 this number will reduce to 50,000, but added to it will be 1100 members of the New Iraqi Army, 40,000 Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, 75,000 police and 27,500 border police and immigration and customs officials. Security continues to be the biggest challenge in establishing a new functioning government for Iraq, but daily the security situation has improved.

Another challenge was to quickly restart the Iraqi police forces. Under the old regime the police did little to maintain law and order. Their standards toward policing did not match the rest of the world, and often they were used as instruments of oppression. In previous crises (Bosnia, Kosovo and other failed states), one of the first actions taken was to organize international police whose job was to work with the local police. Although planned, this programme was slow to get started. On 2 February 2003, a Wall Street Journal article clearly outlined some of the problems with organizing international civilian

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22 Briefing by Mr. Peter Velez, Coalition Provisional Authority on 21 January 2004 in Washington DC.
police.\textsuperscript{23} Despite efforts by Ambassador Ward (who is quoted in the article) and Bill Lentz and Dick Mayer, both from the Justice Department, to get this programme started, it did not become operational until the fall of 2003. Military police units were called in to fill the security vacuum and they established programmes to train local police. By October 2003, there were 60,000 Iraqi police on duty all over the country with over 40 courts to prosecute cases against offenders.\textsuperscript{24}

\textbf{Governance}

General Jay Garner recognized during the planning process that key to success in Iraq was to establish a new Iraqi Government as quickly as possible. One of his pillars for organizing ORHA was Civil Administration. His vision was to bring in experienced diplomats from all over the Coalition to be advisors to the various Iraqi Ministries. He also set in motion the process of finding key Iraqi leaders to be on the Governing Council. The Council would provide advice to the Interim Iraqi Administrator and eventually form a committee for a new Iraqi constitution that would elect an Iraqi leader. Lessons from past nation-building experiences were to build a government from the ground up, rather than from the top down.

While planning in Kuwait, advisors for the various Iraqi ministries began to join the ORHA team and helped prepare for the eventual move to Baghdad and the managing of the vast Iraqi government. Upon ORHA’s arrival in Iraq, most ministries had advisors, and as already mentioned it was amazing how fast the ministries began functioning, albeit in a limited capacity since most of the government buildings were destroyed. By mid-May, many of the more important ministries were holding regular meetings in the Convention Centre, and many developed councils to help guide ORHA and the CPA.

While the ministries were getting organized so were local officials. Military civil affairs personnel quickly located the local leaders. All over the country local government institution began to form. Mayors were elected and city officials went back to work. In his travels around Iraq, Jay Garner met key national leaders and began the process of selecting members for the Interim Iraqi Governing Council. Informal meeting were held, so when Ambassador Bremer took over as the Coalition Provisional Administrator, the groundwork was already started for the formal announcement on 13 July 2003 of the 25-member Governing Council.

Immediately the ministries began the process of developing an Iraq national budget. This was no small task. Saddam financially rewarded those loyal to his cause. Added to this were a number of perks and benefits or better called “skimming” from the national budget. For the first time, ministries were asked to develop working budgets. Initially a basic budget was created to finance the government through 2003 and by October 2003 a budget for 2004 was proposed. Looking toward 2006, Iraq will run a deficit even after factoring in monies from the Oil for Food Programme, seized Iraqi assets, and oil revenue.


Consequently, Iraq hoped to receive donations from other nations.\footnote{CPA website: \url{http://cpa-iraq.org/budget/NIDmergedfinal-11Oct.pdf}, accessed 26 January 2004.} The budget was at least a start, something that was not done under Saddam.

One of the early tasks facing both ORHA and the CPA was to get government workers back to work and paid. Developing a working pay system was difficult since under the old regime most government employees received free housing, free utilities, free medical, and often free gas and use of a government vehicle. An initial four level pay system was developed and then later adjusted as some of the old regime’s perks began to fade away. In June the CPA supervised an emergency payment of $20.00 to two million Government workers and then followed through with salary payments from April to June.

To complicate and add work to the already busy CPA, there was a desperate need to replace the old Iraqi currency where every bill prominently displayed a picture of Saddam. The picture was not the biggest issue, bill denominations were. There was abundant supply of 10,000 dinar ($6.60 US) notes in the central bank, but the next lower denomination was 250 dinars ($0.16 US). With the going salary for unskilled workers at roughly $2.00 per day, the 10,000-dinar note was useless in daily transactions. It was often traded away at a reduced value. Fortunately the plates for the Iraqi dinar were held in the United Kingdom, so in mid-October 2003 new Iraqi money began arriving. By a currency exchange from 15 October 2003 to 15 January 2004, the old Iraqi dinar was replaced by the new dinar,\footnote{CPA website: \url{http://www.cpa-iraq.org/pressreleases/20040115_exchange_end.htm}, accessed 26 January 2004.} which now depicts ancient sites across Iraq.

Other Issues – Power, Fuel, and Education

Electrical power was essential to the reconstruction of Iraq. Like any modern society everything depends on a reliable source of power. Although, as at early 2004, there are still areas of Iraq that did not and do not rely on power for daily activities, they are few and far between. With power being so important, CPA faced many challenges as it worked to rebuild an antiquated system while terrorists and looters caused destruction.

Prior to the war, the electrical grid in Iraq operated at less than half its capacity, and later analysis revealed its peak before the war was 4,400 megawatts. Power interruptions were normal, and many parts of the country received power only for a few hours each day. Although there was surplus power in the north, that power was funnelled to Baghdad to service those facilities that the regime felt important. Like so many other utilities, the power system suffered from years of neglect. Power became an important target for the attacking coalition forces in March and April 2003, because shutting off the power meant shutting off Saddam’s ability to communicate with his military units. As ORHA arrived in Baghdad, people like Pete Gibson, ORHA’s advisor to the Electric Commission, had an awesome and thankless job – to get the power back on all over Iraq.

By mid-May 2003 power was operating at 2,100 megawatts with several power plants still out of service. Added to this, the line that connected the northern power stations to Baghdad electrical grid was damaged. Still, places like Basrah, Iraq’s second largest city, experienced 24 hours of power, something they had not seen for over 12 years.\footnote{ORHA Daily reconstruction report of 12 May 2003.}
Bechtel Corporation and the many Iraqi electrical engineers worked tirelessly to get power back to at least pre-war levels, but security presented unique challenges. Often power vehicles were hijacked and the vehicles stolen. Power lines were susceptible to terrorist attacks. To disable a power line was easy. All an insurgent needed to do was use an AK 47 and shoot through the support cables that held up a transmission tower, and the tower toppled. Over 1,000 towers were brought down after the war, and once down, looters stole the wire and burned it to extract the copper inside. Added to this was the limited availability of parts for the outdated electrical system. Power was also dependent on oil as the power stations relied on a steady flow of fuel to keep up operations. Fuel was in short supply immediately following the war, as the refineries were not operating at peak capacity due to the lack of reliable power. There was some good news. There were generators all over Iraq, as Saddam invested in them to provide backup power when the effects of war interrupted his electrical system. Those generators that worked (and many suffered from neglect as well) were put to good use in hospitals and key facilities.

By early July 2003 the generation of electrical power improved, but many challenges still faced the CPA. One of the warehouses containing over $100 million of spare parts to the electrical system was burned, and an increase in sabotage hampered efforts to open the electrical grid linking power in the north to the rest of the country. Still countrywide people enjoyed more reliable power than they did before the war. July power levels reached only approximately 3,236 megawatts. By mid-October that level was 3,948 megawatts; by December it fell to 3,452. Power is expected to reach 6,000 megawatts by the summer of 2004.28

Closely related to power generation is oil and gas. Critical immediately following the war was the availability of liquid petroleum gas (LPG). LPG came in containers similar to those used to fuel backyard barbeque grills. It was important because this was the method by which the Iraqi people cook the food provided under the UN’s Oil for Food Programme. Iraq generated its own LPG through its refineries, but since the refineries were not operating, LPG quickly became a critical issue. Similar to shortages of LPG were shortages of gasoline. Iraqis faced daylong waits in mile-long lines, but the price of a litre of gas was only a few cents. (When an unskilled worker makes $2.00 a day, Iraq must keep its gas prices low.) Fortunately neighbouring countries came to the aid of the Iraqi people and both gasoline and LPG were imported from Turkey, Syria and Kuwait to meet the demands of the people until local refineries were functioning. Sabotage also affected the oil industry and slowed the process of getting refineries fully operational, however organizations like the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Task Force Restore Iraqi Oil (TF RIO) worked to get production levels back on line. Again problems with obtaining a reliable source of electrical power hampered the opening of many refineries.

TF RIO, a composite group of military and civilian engineers, was established well before the war and was responsible for extinguishing oil fires, safely shut down oil-producing facilities during the war, repair and restore facilities after the war, and assist the Ministry of Oil in the management of the oil industry. With Iraq harbouring the second largest oil reserves in the world, getting this system functioning was critical to the economy. Fortunately there was very little damage to the oil infrastructure during the war, so the Corps of Engineers set out to repair and restore the existing system.

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Prior to the war, Iraq produced approximately 3 million barrels of crude oil a day. During the months of March and April 2003, production fell to nearly zero. TF RIO’s goal was to get to 1.1 million barrels per day by the 1 June, but it took them until mid-July to reach that level. Production improved every month and by the end of December 2003, Iraq was producing 2.4 million barrels per day.  

Lastly, it is important to mention the education system - one of the largest successes of the reconstruction effort. Iraqi schools and universities, like much of the rest of its infrastructure, were in a poor state even before the war, yet the Iraqi people are very well educated and place a high priority on educating their children. At the outbreak of the war, the school year was suspended, but the Iraqi people focused on getting the children back to school. Schools reopened on 4 May 2003.

The coordination and efforts of a whole range of organizations were the key to this success. The CPA, coalition military units, United Nations (UNICEF), and NGOs worked together to improve the Iraqi education system. Textbooks had to be reprinted as every book harboured elaborate pictures of and accolades to Saddam Hussein. Schools needed the basic necessities for teaching and some required ammunition cleared which retreating Iraqi forces had left. After six months, 22 universities and 43 institutes and colleges and nearly all primary and secondary schools were open. By 1 October 2003, 1500 schools were refurbished by USAID contracts, 50% more than what was planned by the CPA. Teachers, one of the lowest paying jobs under the old regime, received salaries 12 to 25 times higher. By the end of this school year (May 2004), 75 million new textbooks are expected to be distributed all across Iraq.

Conclusion

Many journalists and political figures criticize the planning and preparation for reconstruction of Iraq following the war-fighting phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Articles like the one in the New York Times on November 2, 2003 entitled: “Blueprint for a Mess,” by David Rieff and the January/February 2004 Atlantic magazine article entitled: “Blind into Baghdad” by James Fallows. Many other press clippings and news casts depict the efforts of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs and the Coalition Provisional Authority as a failure or leaning toward failure. Few really understood the full impact of what the United States and its coalition partners undertook when they decided to “take down” Saddam and his regime. It was an enormous task. More planning certainly could have been done. Planning is not the be all and end all of success. As General George S. Patton said, “A good plan executed today is better than a perfect plan executed at some indefinite point in the future.” ORHA and then the CPA had a good plan, but not a perfect plan. The problem was in resources. Thanks to Saddam and his henchmen, over $750

million was found in Iraq, another $1 billion in contracts were awarded before the war, and
seized assets were in the billions of dollars. The donor conference in October 2003 in
Madrid netted another $18 billion and the United States’ commitment of $20.3 billion will
go a long way to bringing Iraq back into the world.

ORHA, the CPA, and the current U.S. Administration received much criticism for
not having anticipated the challenges the coalition would face as it attempted to rebuild the
Iraqi society. As I mentioned before we would have liked more time to plan, but because of
the professional and dedicated efforts of many experienced people, a draft plan was quickly
put together, and then those who developed the plan set forth to carry it out. The coalition
military forces, ORHA and the CPA, and the many international and non-governmental
organizations were well organized, structured and ready to take on this awesome task.
There were many challenges and bumps in the road, but that is expected in an undertaking
as large as this one. Still there were many successes.

The information about the good stories about rebuilding Iraq is out there. Some of
the information for this article came from personal experience, but a lot came from web
sites, news articles and other people’s personal accounts. Good news is hard to find, but
web sites managed by the CPA, State Department, military units, USAID, the UN, and
many international organizations and non-governmental organizations portray the great work
that is happening in Iraq. I challenge everyone to seek out this information and not just rely
on newspapers and news commentators.

Also this article does not cover all that was done in Iraq. There are hundreds of
other accomplishments that could be added, but in the interest of space, I have excluded
discussions on the distribution of thousands of cell phones to establish communications with
Iraqi ministries, the 10,000 soccer balls and numerous soccer fields created by military units
that got kids and young adults off the streets, the concerts done by the Iraqi National
Symphony Orchestra, the creation of a postal system, the reopening of the banks, the
recovery of much of the cultural items stolen from the Iraqi National Museum, and most
importantly, the indomitable spirit of the Iraqi people. I left these out in the interest of
length.

I hope one can see that the glass is half full, not half empty. Many great things
have happened in Iraq, but good news does not sell papers or magazines. Bad news is more
appealing. Someone has to tell the good news story and I hope I have done that. There are
many courageous people who volunteered their time and risked their lives for the Iraqi
people. Lastly I hope that history is kind to General Jay Garner. He did a tremendous job
pulling together a diverse group of experts, moulded them into a team, and then set into
action the “mother of all” reconstruction projects.
The problem of military advice or the quality from military point of view of Security Council decisions in peacekeeping sphere has two sides: the advice to the Council from Secretariat and the military expertise inside the Security Council. Both can be improved provided that some bureaucratic obstacles are overcome and there is political will.

The problem has two sides: military advice to the Security Council from the Secretariat and military expertise inside the Council. Let us consider the first one. The Brahimi report dwelt quite substantially on the subject and as a result of its implementation the quality of military advice from the Secretariat has improved significantly. But there are some obstacles that are difficult to overcome.

Until quite recently the system of strategic planning was very vague and ambiguous in the Secretariat where many departments, not just DPKO, were involved in the process of development of the strategic concept of peacekeeping operations without taking responsibility for its implementation. Even in DPKO itself it was sometimes difficult to determine who was in charge of military planning: the Military Division, the Office of Mission Support or the Office of Operations.

Recently there has been a steady trend to establish a more or less simple and understandable procedure of military planning inside DPKO – the so-called system of
integrated mission planning. And with the introduction of a new post of Director Change Management, headed by a two star general, there is hope that the situation can be improved.

Another problem is more political than managerial: military planning in any joint or general staff starts from threat assessment and the assessment of one's own resources. Neither can be done in DPKO. First, because there is no intelligence division and no intelligence mechanism at all in the UNHQ and, secondly, no one in the Secretariat is aware how many and what kind of troops Member States are going to provide for any particular mission. How have these obstacles been overcome up to date? The best answer is -- by muddling through. Information is provided by Member States that have intelligence resources in the area of a future peacekeeping mission and, of course, there is a risk of a biased approach. Can this risk be minimized? It can, through organizing an information (the word "intelligence" is not acceptable in the UNHQ) service for the purpose of planning and running peacekeeping operations. There are timid voices from Secretariat officials in favour of such an initiative, at least on the tactical level, but many Member States still have reservations. No doubt, sooner or later such kind of service will be established and it will have the most positive effect on the whole process of conducting peacekeeping operations. The problem of resources availability is very close to the question of Stand-by Arrangement System modernization and beyond the framework of this topic.

There is another question concerning DPKO that should be mentioned. Three divisions of DPKO are directly involved in the process of strategic planning; two of them – the Office of Mission Support and the Office of Operations - are headed by officials in the rank of Assistant Secretary General, while the chief of the Military Division is only a D2 position. By making him "equal among equals" and upgrading his/her post to the level of Military Adviser to the Secretary General (at the rank of ASG), this would normalize their relations and smooth the process of military planning. There is of course another option - to downgrade the position of two ASGs to D2 level.

Another side of the quality of military advice depends on the efficiency of the personnel who are working in DPKO, especially in its Military Division. As a result of Brahimi report implementation practically everything has been done in this sphere and we can hardly expect further improvements. It is obvious that Member States send their best officers to the UN, but they all have different experience and educational backgrounds, belong to different military cultures, speak different native languages and as a result it takes time to make them into a team, especially in military planning. The system of the selection of candidates - secondment officers - for working in DPKO has improved, but like any bureaucratic system it has its drawbacks and the major one is that it is not a competition of skills and experience but of papers. When we take into consideration other requirements imposed on the selection process - like geographical and gender representation and others, what Americans call "affirmative action" - then it is unlikely that the quality of personnel selected for DPKO can be improved further. But there is one chance - to change the system of selection for one or two sections of DPKO, most crucial for the military planning service, and to appoint people there not after their arrival to the UNHQ, but to pick them up from other units after several months of practical work.

We have just considered different ways of improving the military advice from the Secretariat. There is another side to this subject - advice from inside the Security Council. This problem was discussed during several meetings of its Working Group for peacekeeping last year. Two main proposals were presented by the British and Russian delegations. The
The substance of the British proposal was to make better use of available military expertise of Member States and for this purpose all parties participating in meetings of the Security Council, when peacekeeping questions are discussed, would be encouraged to include their Military Advisers in their representation. The Russian proposal went even further - to make better use of the expertise of not just military advisors available in New York, but the general (joint, defence) staffs they represent, and for this purpose activate the Military Staff Committee of the UN which has been in service since 1946, but has not produced much because it has not been given any serious mission from the Security Council for obvious political reasons. After long discussions neither proposal was recommended by the Working Group.

Summing up I would like to say the following: there are a number of ways to improve military advice to the Security Council. A lot has been done by the Secretariat under the guidance of the Council. The question now is whether further improvements are necessary or whether the Security Council is happy with the level of military advice that has been achieved. Or in other words, perhaps advice that is "too good" would limit the space for political and diplomatic manoeuvre and compromise that are a substantial part of Security Council activities.
PANEL III

IMPLICATIONS FOR PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE OPERATIONS
THE CHALLENGE OF ENHANCING LOCAL PARTICIPATION IN PEACE OPERATIONS

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Peace operations have expanded substantially in scope to now include Western-style state-building activities, often in conjunction with the authorization of an international transitional administration. This has plunged the UN into areas formerly the preserve of sovereign governments and has created causes tensions with the local population which the mission is designed to assist. The challenge now is to move a step beyond rhetoric regarding local participation and to develop realistic, sustainable strategies that incorporate the local population, in a meaningful way, into the peace process. This will enable the emergence of truly robust indigenous structures capable of dealing with future conflicts in a non-violent manner. In the words of the Brahimi Report: “We see… ending a mission well accomplished, having given the people of a country the opportunity to do for themselves what they could not do before: to build and hold onto peace, to find reconciliation, to strengthen democracy, to secure human rights.”

Introduction

“Better to let them do it imperfectly, than to do it perfectly yourself, for it is their country, their war, and your time is short”

Lawrence of Arabia

The role of the United Nations and the international community in the governance of societies affected by conflict has substantially expanded. This expansion has assumed particular significance since 1999 with the establishment of the United Nations involvement in Kosovo, UNMIK, and East Timor, UNTAET, where, for the first time, it has assumed responsibilities as a ‘transitional authority’, exercising legislative and executive powers and administration of the judiciary. The effects of conflict, including physical, economic and social destruction have led to the view that these territories are 'blank-slates' requiring the complete (re-)construction of governments, economies and social systems. These areas have traditionally been understood as being within the purview of sovereign governments alone, and are based on very complex relationships between state and population, known as the ‘social contract’. The intervention of the international community may be necessary to avoid a serious resumption or spread of conflict, and has evolved to take the form of an interim administration designed to last until the peace is securely restored and the future of these territories could be determined through other political processes. This has plunged the UN into areas formerly the preserve of sovereign governments and has created tensions with

the local population who the mission is designed to assist. Paradoxically, the consultation, inclusion and participation of the local population remains the rhetoric of the security and development community, despite the fact that the fundamental task of an transitional administration is to govern effectively and to prepare for a smooth transition to a sustainable nationally elected government.

The local population, those who have grown tired of waiting for peace, good governance and a normal life, have expressed frustrations with the efforts of operations that exercise any degree of political authority. These have been echoed by the now familiar criticisms from academics and practitioners alike, of neo-colonialism and of the “UN’s Kingdom”. International policy makers are increasingly recognizing that creating and sustaining credible institutions and practices in post conflict contexts requires close collaboration between local and international actors. Michael G. Smith suggests that “the UN’s intervention in East Timor reflected one of partnership with the East Timorese and overall cooperation by Indonesia.” The challenge therefore is to balance international responsibilities and local demands for self-rule. This will depend “on the extent of convergence of interests between local and international parties,” so essential for successful intervention, but rare in post conflict situations.

Early peacekeeping efforts evolved as a purely military endeavour. It was a form of outside assistance to facilitate the implementation of a peace agreement by stabilizing a military situation in the interests of supporting political efforts to reach a long-term solution and was guided by the interwoven principles of consent, minimum use of force and impartiality. Recent multidimensional interventions have been based on attempts to deal with the root causes of conflicts which get directly at the heart of state and its functions where authorities are often seen as either unable or unwilling to deal with the crisis. Thus, the international community has taken a growing interest in matters that previously would have been deemed to fall essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of states. The trend is reflected in the recent Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, as well as the increasing stress on good governance, human rights and democratization. These pressures have challenged long-held assumptions about sovereignty as enshrined in the United Nations Charter.

Ralph Wilde suggests that these latter interventions have been framed in response to two problems to do with administration in the territory concerned. First, a perceived sovereignty problem regarding the identity of those local actors exercising administrative control or, secondly, attempts to address a perceived governance problem regarding the conduct of governance by local actors. Thus, Mats Berdal suggests that “the key question

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involves two choices: whether interventions are deployed to assist others in resolving conflict or whether they themselves are there to enforce a particular outcome on disputants. The choice dictates radically different requirements and missions."

We can now distinguish the various types of operations that have evolved to deal with these perceived sovereignty and governance problems, through the level of authority mandated by the Security Council Resolution. At one end of the spectrum are the ‘advise and assist’ models, where territory under consideration retains ‘ownership’ of the peace process and in which the United Nations and international community plays a supporting role to the government. These operations include the ‘light-foot print’ approach adopted by SRSG Brahimi in Afghanistan. With an increasing amount of authority is the ‘supervisory’ model, such as in Bosnia, where the international community and the local population share responsibility for the implementation of the peace process as ‘partners’. Finally, as we have seen in Kosovo and East Timor, the United Nations and the international community are designated as ‘interim administrations’ and are mandated full executive and legislative authority. Former Principal Deputy SRSG in UNMIK, Jock Covey refers to this type of operation as ‘Custodianship’.

The three categories of operation mentioned above have had an end state towards which to strive, the ultimate transfer of power and authority to the host population. “One of the primary objectives of a transitional regime regardless of what type, independence, autonomy or to be determined, must be to empower the local population to manage its own affairs. They are, by their nature, interim arrangements that envisage the eventual transfer of full responsibility for government to local authority.” Even with the ambiguous status of Kosovo, UNMIK is mandated to promote substantial autonomy and meaningful self-administration and to facilitate a political process to determine Kosovo’s future status.

Richard Caplan suggests that “we imagine these operations as lying along a continuum”. The ultimate aim is therefore, to transition from the ‘custodianship’ model at the far end, through the ‘partnership’ model to ‘ownership’ at the far end. This implies that at the beginning of each mission and at each transition point the international authority must consider a strategy to work with the locals through these phases.

We all acknowledge and espouse the virtue of greater partnership, ownership and capacity building and the UN recognizes the need to work better with the locals. These virtues are recognized as being indisputable and uncontroversial, but we also acknowledge that it is hard to achieve this in practice. The challenge now is to move a step

10 This is the subject of the author's PhD research. For additional information see Jarat Chopra, The Politics of Peace Maintenance, Richard Caplan A New Trusteeship? and Simon Chesterman, You – the People.
beyond rhetoric regarding local participation and to develop realistic, sustainable strategies that incorporate the local population, in a meaningful way, into the peace process. This will enable the emergence of truly robust indigenous structures capable of dealing with future conflicts in a non-violent manner.

The rest of this presentation will be in two sections. It will review the practical challenges of enhancing local partnership in implementation and attempt to move beyond the rhetoric and suggest some guiding principles to help develop realistic, sustainable strategies that incorporate the local population in a meaningful way into the peace process, to enable the emergence of truly robust indigenous structures capable of dealing with future conflicts in a non-violent manner.

**Challenges of Enhancing Local Partnership**

In the name of brevity, I would like to focus on three areas which appear to me to be interconnected as to why we may choose to ‘go it alone’. First, the demands of the relief effort as an obstacle to the inclusion of locals when lives are at stake, which leads, secondly, to an over-reliance on international experts, and thirdly, the clash of paradigms and the imposition of western-style state-building models.

During the emergency phase, *relief efforts demand an efficient response* in order to save lives. Beneficiaries are seen as victims in need of aid which must be disbursed swiftly and competently. This attitude and time dimension blocks the inclusion of locals in participating in the delivery of aid as emergencies are not opportune moments for capacity building or for overcoming any stereotypes of capability or corruption. The temptation – especially in the early days of an operation, when emergency conditions prevail – for international authorities to rely principally if not entirely on international agencies and personnel for the implementation of the mandate. The danger is that authorities will be so concerned about adequate and efficient implementation, or constituencies back home concerned with past failure that they will prefer to take matters into their own hands and that they will be impervious to recipient input or will favour their own agencies and services – to the detriment of developing local capacity. This sets them up for tension and even confrontation with those they are supposedly there to support.

Two additional factors complicate matters. First, the need to disburse funding by deadlines and spend within fixed periods weakens or kills participation, ownership and local self-reliance, undermining social networks. Secondly, the belief, real or perceived, that locals are corrupt, incompetent or that there are not enough qualified technicians, bureaucrats and administrators. This is compounded by a further belief that no formal structures exist or international authorities may consider existing structures inadequate – notably because they may be undemocratic, unrepresentative, incapable or unwilling to implement international obligations. This leads to an *over-reliance on internationals*.

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15 For an excellent discussion of this see Chopra, Jarat and Tonja Hohe, “Participatory Intervention”, in Global Governance forthcoming 2004.
16 Carothers p 101
Some of the problems arising from insufficient consultation are compounded by the tendency of international staff, in large missions, to detach themselves from the local population and from the realities of everyday life. They may not live among the locals, cannot speak the language, and enjoy amenities not generally available to the locals – fosters mutual alienation and even resentment by the indigenous community. Therefore, too often the reform efforts are self contained – disconnected from the society in which the institutions are rooted – and the structures of power, authority, interests, hierarchies, loyalties and traditions that make up the dense weave of socio-political life, such as patronage networks which emerge in response to the destruction of civic institutions during authoritarian rule and because they provided a degree of social solidity in an otherwise brutalized set of social relations. Comparisons with colonial administration may be unfair but they are easily called to mind in such circumstances.¹⁷

“The western-style paradigm of state-building based on the Westphalian model which developed as a result of European history is preoccupied with forming a national executive, legislative and judiciary. This comes into confrontation with resilient traditional structures, socially legitimate power holders; abusive warlords out to win or community coping mechanisms relied on under conflict conditions. The options for establishing or restructuring governing institutions seem stark: either reinforce the status quo and build on it, further empowering the already strong; or replacing altogether what exists with a new administrative order.”¹⁸ This tabula rosa approach involves wiping the slate clean through the destruction of existing institutions. “However, the democracy template is too simplistic, more based on hope than reality and too well suited to mechanical application,”¹⁹ and the implementation of this approach relies on a highly visible military presence, which may be viewed by the host population as an army of occupation.²⁰

That was a fast gallop over three possible barriers to international and local partnership in post-conflict reconstruction. “The go it alone model is short-sighted and counter-productive for a number of reasons, first it provides international action with a fragile local base. Second, it is often short-term pragmatically based which may undermine longer-term development initiatives and will ultimately nurture resentment among locals.”²¹ This approach destroys but it does not create – it exacerbates the sense of a broken society and compounds humiliation and lack of dignity.

Ideas of participation and partnership have emerged yet the key decisions that affect peoples lives continue to be made without sufficient attention to their socio-political realities. Planning continues as if it were free of the chaotic interactions among stakeholders while the rhetoric remains²². So, we must get over the technical fix, understand

complex political and social complexes which motivate the population and move from *patronage towards partnership*.23

The dilemma becomes how to work with domestic colleagues? Who do international officials choose as their interlocutors among the competing demands for power? How do preconceived images of domestic officials and the operational environment hinder the selection of official interlocutors? How can labour be divided among international and host country civil servants at the different stages of development? And, finally, why are we not responding to the rhetoric of local participation and engagement? I am pleased to say that General Zorlu has beaten me to the punch and has already provided some guiding principles to help win the confidence of the Afghan authorities and people. General – thank you. I will use these extensively! And I hope that the Challenges Project will recommend them to the Member States.

**Guiding Principles for a Strategy of Engagement**

I would like to propose some guiding principles to shape a debate on how we can go forward on this issue. These few offerings, of which I know there are more, are offered to help us, the external actors.

**Who to Engage? Who do you bring into the tent?**

Let’s start with the politicians, those in authority. This is a double edged sword – and will require well thought out strategies and trade-offs ie on working with spoilers or war criminals ie milosovic. A real difficulty arises when the strategic aims of the external actors are not shared by the local parties – who for instance may want to continue to pursue war aims by other means. What happens when there is no Karzai, Mandela or Havel who has moral and practical sway?

Bureaucrats: they are often forgotten but they need to be part of any local engagement strategy. We are all familiar with how difficult reform of our own bureaucracies can be! I would like to offer a word of caution of who we work with in the various departments and ministries – bearing in mind earlier criticisms of ineptitude and corruption: moderates or good people in government are marked out as points of entry. By selecting which ones to work with to the exclusion of others, external actors send message about power relations. While this is defended in the name of expediency, however the local perspective is that internationals call the shots.

Finally, all stakeholders: we need to build a broad base of support which will have the spin-off effect of reducing the power of potential spoilers to the peace process. Ownership means involving significant groups of leaders from each party so as to reach out to as many of their members as possible. This approach has major advantages: it helps to democratize them or at least open them up for further dialogue, and increases the magnitude of political transparency within the society.

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Thus we must “choose carefully but also widely!”

**When to Engage?**

We must engage early and meaningfully, as this will help to ensure consent and buy-in from the population. Additionally, this will set the tone for the rest of the mission given the rapid turn over of mission staff. Furthermore, Richard Caplan suggests that “early engagement and or devolution allows the population to learn from their experiences under the watchful eye of international specialists who given the vagaries of international assistance may not be able to remain very long in a territory.”

Finally, an enduring policy constructive engagement must be the stated goal of the organizations involved and their structures and programmes must reflect this if we are to move beyond the rhetoric of partnership.

**How to Engage the Local Population?**

Nobel prize winner Joseph Stiglitz reminds us that the degree of ownership is likely to be much greater if those who must carry out the policies are actively involved in the process of shaping and adopting.

Again, for the sake of brevity, I would like to offer a few thoughts, in no particular order:

- If we are serious about truly leaving on a note of success, one in which peace is sustainable, I believe that we need to place participation and inclusion at the centre of our approach. We must develop a strategy based on a culture of engagement, or a partnership-centric approach, from the beginning, otherwise we will face adversarial and antagonistic relationships with those we are meant to assist in their transformation to non-violent politics.
- Too often, we tend to forget that the locals are part of the equation. This is patronage not partnership. We need to develop a deep understanding of how political legitimacy and authority is understood locally and how survival strategies have evolved and what remain in place particularly the nexus of politics, crime and corruption as many of these parallel institutions have proved resilient to attempts at reform and transformation. Returning back to the stark choices I outlined earlier of whether to empower the already strong or replace altogether what exists with new structures. “There is never a vacuum of power on the ground – even in the complete absence of governing institutions. People continue to survive and local structures adapt and evolve.”

Furthermore, we need to start with an evaluation of perception. As Mr. Klein said yesterday, Liberia is not Somalia – he was welcomed on the streets. As we were in Kosovo and East Timor. The question then is how to retain that welcome and not allow it to disintegrate into disillusion when high expectations are not managed or achieved. This happened in Kosovo when the issue of power became a political issue which still haunts that mission.

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But it is also how we view the locals: during intervention individuals are labelled as victims and programmes are designed with that in mind. However, they view themselves as survivors or as victors with skills and capacity to dedicate to progressing towards a normal life. We need to develop a culture of understanding and engagement that places the locals at the centre of all efforts. Unfortunately, valuable sources of knowledge and expertise that is rarely drawn upon for planning purposes are the residents themselves as in the case of East Timor which involved no meaningful participation to the extent that proposals submitted by them were ignored. “The structures of the Balkan operations were also designed with little participation with the local parties, although an earlier draft peace settlement negotiated with the partners did inform certain features of the international administration in Bosnia and Kosovo.”

Thus, there is a necessity to choose local partners carefully and broadly, and involve them early and widely in all aspects of policy making. What I am suggesting is a better understanding of the interests of the stakeholders and analysis of where power lies and how that is legitimized in the eyes of the polity and to ensure that the UN and international community should see its commitment as a facilitator as an ongoing one.

Conclusion

This presentation has illustrated the complexity and challenge of enhancing local cooperation in peace operations. A challenge that I believe is not only worthwhile but essential to long-term success. But the challenge remains: how to assist indigenously based change. External agencies can force reforms but the outcomes are just as likely to be negative as positive. The societies of war torn countries have grown out of deep roots and have legacies of various eras embedded in them. They may be hybrids but they are distinctive with their own rationalities, operating structures and values. New grafts may be rejected especially when imposed on an unwilling host. Effective reforms must be indigenously owned if they are to be successful. Transformation to durable peace is a multifaceted phenomena and ownership itself does not guarantee favourable outcomes. It could however give the participants a good start.

In the words of the Brahimi Report: “We see... ending a mission well accomplished, having given the people of a country the opportunity to do for themselves what they could not do before: to build and hold onto peace, to find reconciliation, to strengthen democracy, to secure human rights.” In the end of course, it is the local authorities who bear primary responsibility for the policies that prevail. Where these authorities are determined to pursue divisive and even fratricidal policies, international and regional organizations may need to contemplate indefinite occupation to contain these tendencies, bearing in mind that ultimately there may be limits on what outsiders can do to promote the values that underpin a democratic and tolerant society. Domestic peace and sustainable development can only be achieved by the local population itself. “The role of

28 Caplan or Baskin
the UN is merely to facilitate the process that seeks to dismantle the structures of violence and create the conditions conducive to durable peace and sustainable development.”

The social, human and economic cost of conflicts is visible in Africa and, unless we can put a definite end to conflicts, Africa will continue to be mired in confusion and its people condemned to misery and suffering.

To fulfil its responsibilities in conflict prevention, management and resolution, the African Union will need more than goodwill and ideas. It will need the human and financial resources required for such expensive operations. More than ever, the assistance of partners in and outside Africa will be needed. Already, the African Union has strong cooperation with the UN, the EU, many individual European countries and countries throughout the world, institutions like SHIRBRIG. OSCE, ACOTA (former ACRI), French RECAMP, BMATT (British Military and Advisory Training Teams) etc.. However, it has become imperative for the African Union to take steps to improve its financial capacity by organizing better its resource mobilization strategies.

Introduction

The issue of conflict is the most pressing of all challenges facing Africa today. Conflicts have cast a dark shadow over the prospects for a united, secure and prosperous Africa, which the Africans seek to create. Conflicts have cost the continent enormously in terms of resources and destruction to property and infrastructure but above all in terms of human suffering. Indeed, conflicts have caused immense suffering to the people of Africa. Men, women and children have been uprooted, dispossessed, deprived of their means of livelihood and thrown into exile as refugees or displaced into their own countries. Conflicts have engendered hate and divisions among African peoples and undermined the prospects of the long term stability and unity of our countries and Africa as a whole. Links between peace, security, stability and development are now well known. The social, human and economic cost of conflicts is visible in Africa and, unless we can put a definite end to conflicts, Africa will continue to be mired in confusion and its people condemned to misery and suffering.

It is roughly by these words that the former Secretary General of the OAU, Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim began his address to the 28th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Head of State and government which took place in Dakar, Senegal in July 1992.

It should be remembered that it was during that summit that the Heads of State and governments adopted in principle, the establishment, within the framework of the OAU, a mechanism for preventing, managing and resolving conflicts in Africa. As you are aware, the OAU Mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution was formally adopted by the 29th Assembly of Heads of State and government in Cairo, Egypt in June 1993.
As we will see, contrary to the instrument created at the establishment of the OAU, which was dealing only with interstate conflicts, the new mechanism allowed the OAU to deal with internal conflict. However, the Cairo Declaration had its own limitation, particularly regarding the problem of peacekeeping and peace enforcement as stated in the Constitutive Act of the African Union. Therefore, it became necessary to work out a new mechanism able to face the new challenges before Africa in the field of conflict management. The adoption, by the African Heads of State and Government of the Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council reflects that preoccupation.

The adoption of the Cairo mechanism and the Protocol does not mean that the OAU was not previously interested in conflict prevention, management and resolution; on the contrary, the problem of conflict resolution has always been at the centre of the preoccupations of the OAU Founding Fathers even if one cannot find these words in the OAU Charter. Allow me therefore, to give an overview of the OAU efforts for the prevention and resolution of conflicts in Africa until the new mechanism was adopted before describing the specificities of this new mechanism.

The Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration

The Founding Fathers of the OAU were so preoccupied by the problem of conflicts, particularly the inter-state conflicts and border disputes that they made provision in the Charter for a Commission of mediation, conciliation and arbitration composed of 21 members elected for 5 years by the Assembly of Heads of State and government. A dispute may be referred to the Commission jointly by the Parties concerned, by a party to the dispute, by the Council of Ministers or by the Assembly of Heads of State and government. It should be noticed that Article 12 of the Protocol establishing the Commission states that “the Commission shall have jurisdiction over disputes between States only”. Consequently internal disputes were not part of its mandate.

In spite of this precaution, the Commission waited in vain to have a job to do. In fact it has been purely and merely abandoned and the work that it should have been doing was being given to various ad hoc Commissions and Committees. The main reasons for this disaffection relied on the fact that, finally, the method of functioning of the Commission and mainly arbitration were not matching with the African methods of conflict resolution and the Heads of State were not ready to hand over their problem to technicians whose decision were not controlled by them.

Finally, all the conflicts at that time were managed by ad hoc commissions or directly by the Council of Ministers and the Assembly of Heads of State and government.

By and large, the disputes that were submitted to these ad hoc commissions and committees were over border and territorial claims and allegations of subversions by some of the OAU Member States against other Member States. The problem of boundaries was so sensitive that the “respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its inalienable right to independent existence” became one of the cardinal principles of the Charter in Paragraph 3 of Article III. In spite of this provision however, the Heads of State and government were obliged to take another decision one year later in Cairo by adopting Resolutions AHG/16/1 on territorial integrity and the inviolability of national boundaries as inherited at independence. Indeed the Organisation was facing at the time many border disputes: Algeria-Morocco, Ethiopia-Somalia, Somalia-Kenya, Rwanda-
Burundi, Ghana-Upper –Volta (Burkina Faso), Burkina Faso-Mali, Niger-Benin, Uganda-Tanzania, Gabon-Equatorial Guinea, Chad-Libya etc.

In spite of the provisions both of the Charter and the Commission, the Organisation also dealt with some cases of civil wars: the problem of the Congo was handed over to an ad hoc Commission under the personal chairmanship of Prime Minister (later President) Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya; the civil war in Nigeria on which the Assembly of Heads of State and government (Kinshasa, September 1967) set up a consultative Committee of six Heads of States with Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia as its Chairman; the dispute between Sudan and Ethiopia over the problem of the secession of Eritrea on which the Libreville Summit (July 1977) decided to set up a nine nations ad hoc mediation Committee with Sierra Leone as Chairman and finally the Chad civil war where the Assembly appointed an ad hoc Committee with Gabon as Chairman and later a standing Committee led by Nigeria following the Kano and Lagos Accords between the warring factions in Chad. The example of Chad was also one of the rare real peacekeeping operations under the direct auspices of the OAU. This operation has failed for numerous reasons including financing, command and control and mandate.

The Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution

The OAU efforts to address the scourge of conflicts in the continent reached a landmark step in June 1993, when the 29th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, held in Cairo, Egypt, adopted a declaration establishing, within the OAU, a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. The decision to establish the Mechanism was reached against the background that there was no way Africa could improve its socio-economic performance in the years following the end of the Cold War in an environment of wars, conflict and domestic tension. In this respect, it is worth recalling that, three years earlier, in July 1990, the 26th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, that took place in Addis Ababa, adopted the “Declaration on the Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and the Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World”. In that declaration, the Heads of State and Government noted, that:

“No single internal factor has contributed more to the present socio-economic problems in the Continent than the scourge of conflicts within and between our countries. They have brought about death and human suffering, engendered hate and divided nations and families. Conflicts have forced millions of our people into a drifting life as refugees and internally displaced persons, deprived of their means of livelihood, human dignity and hope. Conflicts have gobbled-up scarce resources, and undermined the ability of our countries to address the many compelling needs of our people.”

In establishing the Mechanism, the Heads of State and Government clearly wanted to bring a new institutional dynamism to the process of dealing with conflicts on the African Continent, by enabling speedy action to prevent and, if necessary, manage and ultimately resolve conflicts when and where they occur.

According to the Cairo Declaration, the Mechanism has, as its primary objective, the anticipation and prevention of conflicts. In circumstances where conflicts have occurred, it will be its responsibility to undertake peacemaking and peace-building functions in order to facilitate the resolution of these conflicts. In this respect, civilian and military missions
of observation and monitoring of limited scope and duration may be deployed. In so
deciding, the Assembly was of the view that the emphasis of the OAU Mechanism on
anticipatory and preventive measures and concerted action on peacemaking and peace-
building would obviate the need to resort to complex and resource-demanding peacekeeping
operations, which African countries could find difficult to finance and carry out.

In the event that conflicts would degenerate to the extent of requiring collective
international intervention and policing, the assistance or, where appropriate, the services of
the United Nations will be sought. In this case, African countries will examine ways and
modalities through which they can make practical contribution to such a United Nations
undertaking and participate effectively to peacekeeping operations in Africa.

The OAU Mechanism is guided by the objectives and principles of the OAU
Charter, in particular the sovereign equality of Member States, non interference in the
internal affairs of Member States, the respect of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
Member States, their inalienable right to independent existence, the peaceful settlement of
disputes as well as the inviolability of borders inherited from colonialism. The Mechanism
functions on the basis of the consent and the cooperation of the parties to a conflict.

The OAU Mechanism is built around a Central Organ, with the Secretary-General
and the Secretariat as its operational arm. There is also, established within the framework
of the Mechanism, a Special Peace Fund to finance its operational activities.

The Central Organ assumes the overall direction and coordination of the activities
of the Mechanism between ordinary sessions of the Assembly of Heads of State and
Government. It is composed of the Bureau of the Assembly of Heads of State and
Government, elected annually (in keeping with the principles of equitable regional
representation and rotation). For the sake of continuity, States of the outgoing Chairman
and incoming Chairman are also members.

The Central Organ functions at the level of Heads of State, Ministers and
Ambassadors accredited to the OAU. Where necessary, the participation of other OAU
member States, particularly the countries neighbouring to a conflict area, is sought. The
Central Organ may also seek from within the continent such military, legal and other forms
of expertise as it may require in the performance of its functions. The proceedings of the
Central Organ are governed by the pertinent rules of procedures of the Assembly of Heads
of State and Government.

The Central Organ can be convened at the request of the Secretary-General or any
Member State. It meets, in principle, once a year at the level of Heads of State and
Government, twice a year at Ministerial level and once a month at Ambassadorial level. In
deciding on its recommendations, the Central Organ is generally guided by the principle of
consensus.

The Secretary-General, under the authority of the Central Organ and in
consultation with the parties involved in the conflict, deploys efforts and takes all
appropriate initiatives to prevent, manage and resolve conflict. To this end, the Secretary-
General relies upon the human and material resources available at the General Secretariat.
In his action, the Secretary-General may resort to eminent African personalities in
consultation with their countries of origin. Where necessary, the Secretary-General makes
use of other relevant expertise, sends Special Envoys or Special Representatives and dispatches fact-finding missions to conflict areas.

The Special Fund, known as the “OAU Peace Fund”, was also established for the purpose of providing financial resources to exclusively support OAU operational activities relating to conflict prevention, management and resolution. The Peace Fund is made up of financial appropriations of 6 percent of the regular budget of the OAU, voluntary contributions from OAU Member States, as well as from other sources within Africa. The Secretary General may, also accept voluntary contributions from sources outside Africa. For the period from June 1993 to September 2003, more than US$ 60 million have been mobilized for the Peace Fund: 70 per cent of this amount is coming from OAU external partners.

Within the context of the Mechanism, the OAU is trying to coordinates its activities with African Regional and sub-Regional Organizations and cooperate, as appropriate, with the neighbouring countries with respect to conflicts which may arise in the different sub-Regions of the Continent. The OAU also cooperates and works closely with the United Nations, not only with regard to issues relating to peacemaking but, and especially, on those relating to peacekeeping. When necessary, recourse is made to the United Nations to provide the necessary financial, logistical, military and political support for OAU’s activities. Similarly, the Secretary-General of the OAU maintains close cooperation with other international organizations.

Undoubtedly, the Mechanism has brought a new impetus to OAU’s efforts aimed at bringing about peace, security and stability in the continent. Over the past eight years, the OAU has been involved in the management of nearly all the conflicts facing the Continent. As a result, the Organization has increased both its credibility and visibility. One of the most far-reaching developments resides in the fact that the OAU has now much latitude to deal with issues that were previously considered as purely internal matters. In this respect, the principles articulated by the Organization on the question of unconstitutional changes of Governments and the practical steps taken to this end (in Sierra Leone, following the coup d’état of May 1997, in the Comoros after the coup d’etat of April 1999, in Côte d’Ivoire after the coup d’etat of December 1999, in Madagascar after the unconstitutional change from the December 2001 elections, in the Central African Republic after the coup d’etat of General François Bozize) are cases in point. The new dynamism demonstrated by the Organization applies to the entire spectrum of conflict management, i.e. from early warning and prevention to conflict resolution and peace-building.

PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY

Over the past years, the OAU has taken a number of initiatives aimed at preventing conflicts, through the deployment of Eminent Personalities or Special Envoys or preventive deployment for purposes of containing a situation and averting its escalation. In this regard, a case in point is the decision taken at the OAU Summit in Lomé, in July 2000, to dispatch a Committee of ten Heads of State to Côte d’Ivoire to help defusing the tension prevailing in the country at the time and assist the Ivorian political leaders in ensuring a smooth transition. The decision taken by the OAU Central Organ to deploy an OAU Observer Mission in the Comoros, in September 1997, constitutes another illustration of this proactive approach to conflict prevention by the OAU Mechanism. The objective was then to contain
the mounting tension in the archipelago, resulting from the secessionist attempt in Anjouan, and to avert further negative developments in the rest of the country.

At the end of October 2001, following reports on the deterioration of the relations between Uganda and Rwanda, the then OAU Secretary-General travelled to both countries to meet with their leaders and urge them to exercise restraint and work towards the peaceful settlement of their differences. Following the crisis that erupted in the Central African Republic, in November 2001 and the Secretary-General dispatched a team led by an Assistant Secretary General to meet with the parties and help them contain the situation. Finally, in reaction to the developments that took place in Madagascar, following the first round of the presidential elections, held on 16 December 2001, the Central Organ called on all the parties to exercise maximum restraint. Significantly, in deciding to remain seized with the matter, the Central Organ indicated that it was acting within the purview of its preventive mandate.

As part of its preventive efforts, the Central Organ has also been involved in structural prevention. The objective is to create conditions in which the naturally occurring competition for power, resources and prestige within and between States can be managed peacefully and prevented from plunging into a spiral of violence. In this respect the efforts made by the OAU within the framework of the Mechanism are worth mentioning. Following the Summit's decision adopted in Algiers in 1999 on the unconstitutional changes of Government, the Central Organ established a sub-Committee that elaborated a Framework for an OAU response to unconstitutional changes, which was adopted by the OAU Summit in Lomé, in July 2000. Basically, the Framework provides for a set of common values and principles of democratic governance, a definition of what constitutes an unconstitutional change, the measures and actions that the OAU would progressively take to respond to unconstitutional changes and an implementation mechanism. It should, in particular, be noted that the Central Organ emphasized the need for Member States to comply with the set of common values and principles for democratic governance, stressing that some of the unconstitutional changes of Government arise from the non-compliance with those principles.

Conflict Management and Resolution

The OAU has been equally active in the resolution of numerous conflicts facing the continent. Rather than providing an assessment of the role of the OAU in all the conflicts that broke out after the establishment of the Mechanism, the following paragraphs will highlight a few cases that illustrate both the variety of conflicts the Organization is grappling with and the range of tools and resources used by the OAU.

Rwanda: The OAU Mechanism was established three years after the beginning of the Rwandan conflict, in October 1990. By 1993, the conflict in Rwanda had reached a critical phase. Nevertheless, the Mechanism played an active role in the subsequent - and unsuccessful - attempts aimed at bringing about a negotiated solution and stopping the genocide that took place in 1994. It should be recalled that, between 1990 and 1992, the OAU launched a mediation effort that resulted in a Ceasefire Agreement, under which the Organization deployed a 55-man Neutral Military Observers Group (NMOG) to monitor compliance with the Agreement. Subsequently, the efforts deployed by the countries of the Region and the OAU led to the signing of the Arusha Accords, in August 1993. The
NMOG was then subsumed into the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), which was deployed in October 1993 and was 2,500 men strong.

In April 1994, the situation in the country exploded into a widespread violence, with a genocide, during which close to one million people were killed. The OAU deployed sustained efforts to help stop the genocide. In this respect, the OAU appealed urgently to the UN to intervene and ensure the protection of the civilians, but to no avail as the UN decided to scale down the strength of the Mission. Subsequently, and in response to the pressure for action, the UN Security Council agreed to deploy an expanded peacekeeping mission (UNAMIR II), with a mandate that included the protection of the civilians. The OAU made firm offers of African troops. UNAMIR II was eventually deployed, but after the genocide was over, thus making it irrelevant.

Having failed to prevent the genocide, the OAU attempted to understand what went wrong with a clear preventive purpose aimed at averting the repetition of the genocide in the Great Lakes Region and wide scale conflicts. In November 1997, the OAU Central Organ, meeting at Ministerial level in Addis Ababa, decided to establish a Panel of Eminent Personalities to investigate the Rwandan Genocide and Surrounding Events. The Panel, which was chaired by former President Sir Ketumile Masire, submitted its report in July 2000. The report has been distributed and appreciated worldwide.

**Burundi:** The OAU got involved in the conflict in Burundi, following the assassination, in September 1993, of the first democratically elected President of the country and other high ranking officials and the massacres that followed in the aftermath of that assassination. More specifically, and in addition to several visits undertaken by the Secretary-General and other officials of the Organization, the OAU deployed an Observer Mission in Burundi (OMIB), headed by a Special Representative of the Secretary-General and initially comprising military and civilian elements. However, after the coup d’état of 25 July 1996, the OAU withdrew the military component of the Mission. It also called on Member States and the international community as a whole to isolate the new regime. Subsequently, and short of a military intervention, the countries of the Region imposed sanctions to ensure the return to constitutional normalcy and the commencement of immediate and unconditional negotiations with all the parties. These sanctions were endorsed by the Central Organ and monitored by the Secretariat. They were suspended in June 1998.

The OAU was closely involved in the Arusha negotiation process, which started in March 1996 and led to the signing, on 28 August 2000, of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement. The OAU is signatory and moral guarantor of the Agreement. In particular, the OAU has been entrusted with specific responsibilities both at the level of the Implementation Monitoring Committee (IMC) and the Sectorial Commissions provided for by the Arusha Agreement. The OAU has actively participated in the efforts to implement the Arusha Agreement.

The 15th Regional Summit, held in Arusha in July 2001, marked a turning point. Indeed, it was that meeting which endorsed the decision to appoint Major Pierre Buyoya as President of the first phase of the transition. This led to the establishment, on 1 November 2001, of the Transitional Government. In view of the progress made in the implementation of the Arusha Agreement, the 75th Ordinary Session of the Central Organ at Ambassadorial level held in Addis Ababa in August 2001, requested the Secretary-General to take the
appropriate steps to ensure that the OAU further contributes to the peace process. In this respect, steps were taken to strengthen the OAU Mission in Burundi so it can assist the region in dealing with the peace process. The negotiations led to the signing, by the Transitional Government of Burundi and some rebel groups to sign a ceasefire agreement which led to the deployment of African Union military observers and an African mission of 3,500 troops in the country.

Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC): The OAU played an active role in the efforts to bring about peace and stability in the DRC. Soon after the outbreak of the second conflict in that country, in August 1998, with the attack launched by a rebel movement backed by Rwanda and Uganda in the eastern part of the country, the OAU Secretary-General expressed his concerns and appealed to the countries of the Region to work towards a peaceful solution. A few days later, he dispatched a fact-finding mission to the DRC and the countries of the Region. On its part, the Central Organ, issued a communiqué requesting the OAU Secretary-General to enter into urgent consultations with all concerned and closely coordinate OAU’s efforts with those of the Region and the UN, with the view to seeking a speedy and peaceful end to the conflict.

As the conflict escalated, OAU’s efforts aimed at harmonizing the diverging peace initiatives launched by SADC countries. In this respect, and at the initiatives of the OAU and UN Secretaries-General, a summit was convened in Victoria Falls in September 1998. The Summit was followed by a meeting of the Ministers of Defence and other officials in Addis Ababa which adopted two technical documents: “The Ceasefire Agreement and the Mechanism for setting-up an OAU Observer Mission or a UN Peacekeeping Operation”. However, the Ceasefire Agreement was not enforced.

In the following period, the OAU worked closely with the Regional Peace Initiative under the leadership of the then Zambian President, F. Chiluba, to secure an end to the hostilities. In July 1999, the parties to the conflict signed the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, to which the OAU is both a signatory and moral guarantor. As part of the responsibilities entrusted to it by the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, the OAU:

- assisted the Congolese parties in the choice of the Neutral Facilitator, Sir Ketumile Masire;
- appointed the Chairman of the Joint Military Commission, one of the key organs for the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement, and facilitated its establishment, including through the mobilisation of the resources required from within and outside the continent;
- deployed, between November 1999 and November 2000, 30 Neutral observers/verifiers, in three locations inside the DRC, to assist in the monitoring of the ceasefire, pending the deployment of MONUC; and
- participated in all the meetings of the Political Committee, the principal organ of the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement.

The OAU was involved in the preparation and convening of the Meeting of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue that took place in Addis Ababa from 15 to 22 October 2001, providing, on that occasion, financial and logistical assistance to the Office of the Facilitator. This involvement derived both from the responsibilities assigned to the Organization by the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, as well as from the request by the Central
Organ meeting of 20 September 2001 that the Secretary-General provide assistance to the Facilitator.

In pursuance of Central Organ relevant decisions, the OAU has just opened an Office in Kinshasa to provide further support to the peace process in that country. The Office is headed by a Special Representative who participated in all the subsequent negotiations between the Congolese parties in Sun City (National dialogue) or in Pretoria under the auspices of President Thabo Mbeki as the then acting chairman of the OAU and which led to the establishment of the Transitional Institutions.

**Conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea:** The OAU played a key role in the efforts that brought to an end the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Following the outbreak of the conflict, in May 1998, the Secretary-General met with the leaders of both parties, encouraging them to exercise restraint and cooperate with the then facilitators, namely USA and Rwanda. However, in view of the escalation of the situation on the ground, the OAU had to be involved more directly. The conflict was one of the major preoccupations of the OAU session in Ouagadougou, in June 1998. Following the resolution adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government and the decision taken at the extraordinary session of the Central Organ that took place thereafter, a high level delegation led by the then Chairman of the OAU, Blaise Compaoré, visited Ethiopia and Eritrea in June 1998.

As a follow-up to that visit, the high level delegation undertook intense efforts at ambassadorial and ministerial levels. These efforts resulted in the submission to the parties of a Framework Agreement in November 1998. In spite of the acceptance by the two parties of the Framework Agreement, the diplomatic impasse remained, especially after the fighting of February 1999. Subsequently, diplomatic efforts failed to overcome the impasse. In May 2000, a new round of fighting took place.

In June 2000, following sustained efforts by the OAU and its partners, the parties signed a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement. On December 2000, they signed a comprehensive Peace Agreement. Under the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, the UN has deployed a peacekeeping mission (under the auspices of the OAU). On its part, the OAU has deployed a limited Observer Liaison Mission (OLMEE), which works closely with the UN in the monitoring of the compliance with the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement. As part the comprehensive Peace Agreement of December 2000, the OAU Secretary-General is to appoint a Neutral Body that will investigate the origins of the conflict.

**Comoros:** Since the inception of the separatist crisis in that country, in August 1997, the OAU, working closely with the countries of the Region, under the leadership of South Africa, in its capacity as Regional Coordinator, has been spearheading the efforts aimed at finding a lasting solution that takes into account the legitimate aspirations of the Islands and their inhabitants and respects the unity and territorial integrity of the Archipelago. As part of these efforts, the OAU dispatched several missions to the Comoros led by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General; organized reconciliation Conferences bringing all the parties together; and deployed, between September 1997 and April 1999, an Observer Mission (OMIC), with a view to restoring confidence and facilitating dialogue.

The coup d’état of April 1999, a week after the conclusion of the Antananarivo Agreement following the Comorian Inter-Island Conference, introduced a new element.
Indeed, the OAU had not only to deal with the separatist crisis, but also to work towards the restoration of constitutional legality in the country. In this respect, and in pursuance of the Algiers Decision on unconstitutional changes of Governments, the Comoros was barred from participating in the deliberations of the OAU Policy Organs. In December 2000, and in face of the continued intransigence of the Anjouanese party, the OAU imposed a set of gradual measures on the separatists. These measures were monitored by the Secretariat.

The OAU efforts eventually resulted, in February 2001, in the signing by all the parties of a Framework Agreement for Reconciliation that provides for the establishment of a new Comorian Ensemble, the return to constitutional rule and for a number of confidence building measures. As part of the implementation of this Agreement, a New Constitution has been adopted in December 2001, and a Transitional Government has been established.

Furthermore, the OAU has deployed an observer Mission in Anjouan to supervise the arms collection exercise, which constitutes a key component of the confidence-building measures. In addition to the political efforts, the OAU is also involved in the mobilisation of the resources required for the socio-economic development of the Archipelago, as well as in the provision of humanitarian assistance to the needy population in the Archipelago. The OAU is planning to organize a donor round table in Mauritius.

In addition to these conflicts, the OAU has been involved in several other conflicts, including to list but a few, the crisis in the Central African Republic between 1996 and 1998 and since November 2001, and in Guinea Bissau, following the crisis that erupted in June 1998.

This overview clearly demonstrates the new dynamism brought to OAU’s efforts in conflict prevention and resolution by the establishment of the Mechanism. Equally significant is the wide range of tools used by the Organization. The OAU has not only undertaken political mediation, using to that end, Special Envoys, but it has also deployed observer missions in Rwanda, Burundi, Comoros, Ethiopia/Eritrea and DRC (the role of these missions have ranged from that of observing to a more operational role that included arms collection), applied sanctions (in Burundi and Comoros), sent fact-finding missions, established a Panel to investigate the genocide in Rwanda, and issued regular statements to express concern at specific developments and to urge the parties concerned to seek negotiated solutions to their differences.

Peace-building

As indicated above, peace-building functions have been formally included in the mandate of the Mechanism. However, the Cairo Declaration did not provide for a specific definition of the peace-building functions to be undertaken by the Mechanism. It was the Joint OAU/IPA Task Force, established in August 1995 to assist the OAU to operationalise its Mechanism, which, building on UN reports, described peace-building as a continuous process that involves a broad range of activities aimed at consolidating peace, and seeks to address both the root causes of conflict and measures for bolstering peace agreement in the aftermath of conflicts.

It is against this background that, in dealing with specific conflicts, the OAU has endeavoured to integrate a peace-building component in its efforts. For instance, the Addis Ababa Agreement of December 1997 on the Comoros provided for the organization of a
Donors-Round Table to mobilize additional resources for the socio-economic development of the Comoros. Indeed, the separatist crisis facing the Comoros since August 1997 is largely tied to the extremely difficult economic and social situation obtaining in the country and in Anjouan in particular. It was in consideration of this situation that the OAU, as soon as it got involved in the Comorian crisis, adopted the principle of the organization of a Donors Round Table, the objective being to consolidate any political settlement by addressing the root causes of the conflict and avoid its recurrence.

The OAU has also taken initiatives aimed at sustaining the peace process in Sierra Leone. In May 1998, following the signing, in 1996, of the Abidjan Accord, the OAU and the ECA undertook a needs assessment mission to Sierra Leone to determine how best the two institutions could support the country in the post-conflict period. Subsequently, in October 1999, and bearing in mind the regional dimension of the conflicts in the region, the ECA, in cooperation with the OAU and other UN Agencies, launched a Peace Programme in the Mano River Basin countries. The objective is, inter-alia, to develop a programme to address the sub-regional dimension of post-conflict in Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone, support these countries in designing and implementing programmes for post-conflict economic reconstruction and to develop programmes and projects to involve civil society in reconciliation and peace consolidation.

Regarding the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and in order to consolidate the Peace Agreement signed between the two countries in Algiers in December 2000, the OAU and the UN, working closely with the international community, are to mobilize resources for the resettlement of displaced persons, as well as for rehabilitation and peace-building activities in both countries.

The OAU involvement in electoral processes in the aftermath of a conflict also forms an integral part of the Organization peace-building activities. In this regard, it is worth recalling that the OAU, which played a key role in the negotiation of the 1995 Abuja Agreement, which brought to an end the civil war in Liberia, seconded an electoral expert to the Independent Electoral Commission in Liberia. That body, in which both the UN and ECOWAS were represented, played an important role in the successful holding of the elections. The OAU also sponsored African women observers for the Liberian elections.

Although the Mechanism has made remarkable achievements over the past years, it is faced with very serious constraints which limit its capacity to perform its mandate. These constraints fringe on the mode of operation of the Mechanism, the membership of the Central Organ, its methods of work and decision making process, on the lack of a clear framework governing the relations with the sub-regional and regional groupings, on the inadequacy of the Mechanism mandate in the present circumstances, etc.

Thus, the new dynamism of the OAU in conflict prevention and management has not resulted into a more peaceful continent. Since 1993, new conflicts have occurred, e.g., the war in the DRC, the crisis in the Mano River Union and in Cote d’Ivoire. In addition, breakthroughs in long standing conflicts, such as the ones in the Sudan and Somalia, are yet awaited. In fact, the role of the OAU remains peripheral if not non-existent in a number of major conflicts, including in particular the conflicts in the Sudan and Somalia even if we can say that this role has significantly improved with the ongoing negotiations on the two countries. In addition, the capacity of the Mechanism to react in face of an impending crisis
has been rather weak, leading to the escalation of these situations, which could have been contained had the required action been taken at the right time.

It should, however, be noted that these weaknesses have been acknowledged. Right after the establishment of the Mechanism, efforts were made to address them. These efforts have concentrated both on the issue of peacekeeping and on other aspects of the Mechanism.

At the 68th Ordinary Session of Council held in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, from 1 to 6 June 1998, the Secretary General submitted a report on the Enhancement of the Effectiveness of the Central Organ [CM/2064 (LXVIII)] that captured the essence of the discussions at the Central Organ level. Essentially, it was recommended to amend paragraph 20 of the Cairo Declaration to enhance role and functions of the Central Organ at Ambassadorial level; enhance funding of the Mechanism; build suitable representation in Addis Ababa of Members of the Central Organ; review the Central Organ’s working methods and rules of procedure and work for a suitable and sufficient staffing in the Conflict Management Center. All these are being pursued diligently.

The Protocol on the establishment of the Peace and Security Council

The decision of the African leaders to establish an African Union to replace the OAU and the entering into force of the Constitutive Act of the Union on 26 May 2001 has accelerated the desire of transforming the Central Organ of the OAU into a more dynamic instrument. Pursuant to the decision of the Lusaka Summit of the OAU in 2001, the General Secretariat has initiated an extensive review of the Structure, working methods and procedures of the Central Organ of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution.

In particular, the review seeks to identify and address the political, institutional, financial and structural constraints that have undermined the effectiveness of the mechanism, including the following:

- The problem of entry points, which often makes it difficult for the organization to secure the time and the space needed to engage in productive interventions that could avert conflicts in Africa and thereby save lives.
- Institutional competition and rivalries within and between organizations that stifle initiatives, erode political responsibility and accountability and ultimately thwart action or send conflicting signals to protagonists in conflict.
- Consultation processes that stymie rather than lead to early political action and which erode political authority and prevent a clear delegation of responsibility action.
- Lack of institutional capacity, trained personnel and resource constraints in the OAU/AU to engage in peace-making and peace-building initiatives.
- Lack of proper coordinating mechanisms and designation of institutional responsibilities once entry into a conflict has been achieved.
- Ineffectiveness of human rights mechanisms in the OAU/AU as a result of inadequate resources and insufficient personnel.
- Distance between the OAU/AU from local human rights groups and non-governmental organizations in spite of recent efforts to build partnership with and strengthen the African civil society.
The General Secretariat therefore prepared a comprehensive report on the review and submitted it to the 38th Summit of the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government in Durban, South Africa in July 2002, along with a draft protocol on the African Union Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution as well as the Rules of Procedure and Regulations of the proposed Peace and Security Council of the African Union which will succeed the Central Organ as the primary organ for maintaining peace and security in Africa.

The new Protocol, which was adopted by the Assembly of the African Union in Durban on 9 July 2002 established the Peace and Security Council as a collective security and early-warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa. The Peace and Security Council is composed of 15 members and will be supported by the Commission of the African Union, a Panel of the Wise, a Continental Early Warning System, an African Standby Force and a Special Fund.

The objectives of the PSC are to promote peace, security and stability in Africa; anticipate and prevent conflicts; promote and implement peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction activities; co-ordinate and harmonize continental efforts in the prevention and combating of international terrorism in all its aspects; develop a common defence policy for the Union, in accordance with article 4(d) of the Constitutive Act; promote and encourage democratic practices, good governance and the rule of law; protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, promote respect for the sanctity of human life and international humanitarian law, as part of efforts for preventing conflicts.

The Peace and Security Council is guided by the principles enshrined in the Constitutive Act, the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It is, in particular, guided by the following principles: peaceful settlement of disputes and conflicts; early responses to contain crisis situations so as to prevent them from developing into full-blown conflicts; respect for the rule of law, fundamental human rights and freedom, the sanctity of human life and international humanitarian law; interdependence between socio-economic development and the security of peoples and States; respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Member States; non interference by any Member State in the internal affairs of another; sovereign equality and interdependence of Member States; inalienable right to independent existence; respect of borders inherited on achievement of independence; the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, in accordance with Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act; the right of a Member State to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security, in accordance with Article 4(j) of the Constitutive Act.

OAU and the issue of peacekeeping in Africa

One of the most challenging aspects of the work of the new Peace and Security Council to be established is the issue of peacekeeping and even peace enforcement. Indeed, the provisions of Article 4(h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union suppose a military intervention in Member States. It should be recalled that an important part of the Secretary-General's initial proposals on the establishment of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution was the issue of the Organization’s involvement in peacekeeping. The proposal was subjected to a lengthy debate in Dakar, in 1992, and Addis
Ababa, in early 1993, following which a consensus emerged regarding the non-involvement of the OAU in peacekeeping. Hence, the 1993 Mechanism's emphasis is on the anticipation and prevention of conflicts.

However, the thinking of the OAU not playing a more active role with respect to peacekeeping activities that dominated the discourse in 1992 and 1993, started to shift following the experiences in Rwanda and Burundi, where the Organization had deployed Military Observer Groups which, subsequently, found themselves assuming peacekeeping responsibilities by force of circumstances. Furthermore, in Tunis, in 1994, and having expressed the view, before the Council and Summit, that Africa cannot continue to remain indifferent to African conflicts, the Secretary-General emphasized the need for earmarking ready contingents within African national armies and security structures for deployment in peacekeeping operations whenever the need arises, first by the UN and, in exceptional cases, by the OAU, through deployment of observer missions of limited scope and duration. This proposal was subsequently endorsed by the OAU Summit in Addis Ababa, in 1995, which also approved the convening of a meeting of Chiefs of Staff of Member States of the Central Organ to look into the technical aspects of peacekeeping with a view to enhancing Africa’s capacity for peacekeeping.

The first meeting of the African Chiefs of Defence Staff (ACDS) took place in Addis Ababa, from 3 to 6 June 1996. The meeting recalled the principle that the primary responsibility of the OAU should lie with the anticipation and prevention of conflicts, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the 1993 Cairo Declaration. It also recognized that the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, particularly in the area of peacekeeping, rests with the United Nations Security Council. At the same time, the meeting recognized that certain exceptional circumstances can arise which may lead to the deployment of limited peacekeeping or observation missions by the OAU.

In order to equip the OAU to better undertake peace support missions, the meeting saw the need to strengthen the military unit of the General Secretariat. It also recommended that the OAU should continue to co-ordinate closely with sub-regional organizations in its peace support operations, taking advantage of existing arrangements within the sub-regions. The meeting accepted the principle of standby arrangements and earmarked contingents on a voluntary basis, which could serve either under the aegis of the United Nations or the OAU or under sub-regional arrangements. In this regard, the Meeting recognised the need for proper preparation and the standardisation of training.

In order to provide further clarity and to come out with practical and realistic recommendations on the technical issues raised during the meeting, it was recommended that a working group of military experts from Member States of the Central Organ be set up. The Meeting also recognized the need for further clarity with regard to the guidelines, which apply to possible OAU peacekeeping operations. The meeting, therefore, requested the General Secretariat of the OAU to undertake a study on “African Training Capacities in Peacekeeping Operations” and called upon the OAU Secretary General to take the necessary action.

The 2nd ACDS Meeting in Harare, from 24 to 25 October 1997, was convened to consider the recommendations, observations and proposals of the Group of Military Experts. The discussions allowed the ACDS to make substantive recommendations covering the
modalities of the concepts, training and liaison; command, control and communications; and budget and logistics, of OAU’s 500-men standby observer force, as contained in the Report of the Secretary General submitted to the 7th Ordinary Session of the Central Organ [Organ/MEC/MIN/7 (VII), 20-21 November 1997]. On the Concept, the Meeting recommended, among other things, that all Peace Support Operations in Africa should be conducted in a manner consistent with both the UN and the OAU Charters and the Cairo Declaration; and that the concept should be firmly linked to the operationalisation of its Early Warning System, including a network linking each of the Early Warning cells of the various sub-regional organizations in Africa.

In respect of procedures for the conduct of peace support operations, the meeting recommended, among other things, that the OAU should use existing UN references and adapt them to specific continental and organizational factors, and must also develop its own standard operating procedures, for use by Member States in training and preparation for peace operations. In addition, it recommended that OAU Member States, individually or as part of sub-regional organizations, should supply the Conflict Management Division with the same data on strengths, tables of equipment, etc. In addition, it recommended that the OAU should identify about 500 trained military and civilian observers (100 from each sub-region) as an appropriate starting point for a standby capacity.

The meeting recommended that training should be conducted in accordance with UN doctrine and standards. The ACDS recommended that centres of expertise for peace support operations training should be established. The OAU was also to conduct simulation exercises at the organizational level and joint exercises at the sub-regional level under its auspices. The meeting also recommended a command, control and communications framework for OAU peace support operations, taking into consideration the OAU Charter and the Cairo Declaration. The proposed framework excluded peace enforcement operations.

The 67th Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers held in Addis Ababa, in February 1998, took note of these recommendations and requested the Secretary General to undertake consultations with the sub-regions on their implementation [CM/DEC.378 (LXVII)]. Pursuant to this decision, the General Secretariat communicated with the chief executives of the various regional Economic Communities and informed them of its intention to dispatch delegations to their headquarters to discuss, inter-alia, the recommendations of the 2nd Meeting of Chiefs of Defence Staff. These missions were undertaken by the Staff of the Field Operations Unit and African Defence Attachés accredited to Addis Ababa, to all sub-regions, except IGAD. Within the General Secretariat, the Military Staff of the Field Operations Unit also held extensive deliberations with the African Defence Attachés and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). These efforts resulted in the drafting of a document titled “Draft Plan for Implementing the Recommendations of the Second Meeting of Chiefs of Defence Staff”, which was prepared pursuant to the decision of the 68th Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers held in Ouagadougou, from 4 to 7 June 1998 [CM/DEC.410 (LXVIII)].

It is in light of the new responsibilities invested in the African Union that the Protocol on the Peace and Security Council made provision, not only for a Continental Early Warning System, but also for an African Standby Force composed of standby multidisciplinary contingents, with civilian and military components in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice. The third meeting of the
African Chief of Defence staff held in Addis Ababa from 15 to 16 May 2003 was in line with the two other meetings. It adopted a Policy Framework for the establishment of the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee. This document will be submitted to a meeting of Ministers of Defence and security in January 2004 along with a Framework document on the Common African Defence and Security Policy. Subsequently, a fourth meeting of the African Chiefs of Defence Staff will be convened in April 2004 to operationalise the overall structure of the African Standby Force.

It is expected that the new Protocol will enter into force by the beginning of the year 2004, after the 27th ratification by a Member State. This will allow the next Executive Council to take the necessary steps to put in place the structures of the PSC.

To fulfil its responsibilities in conflict prevention, management and resolution, the African Union will need more than goodwill and ideas. It will need the human and financial resources required for such expensive operations. More than ever, the assistance of partners in and outside Africa will be needed. Already, the African Union has strong cooperation with the UN, the EU, many individual European countries and countries throughout the world, institutions like SHIRBRIG, OSCE, ACOTA (former ACRI), French RECAMP, BMATT (British Military and Advisory Training Teams) etc.. However, it has become imperative for the African Union to take steps to improve its financial capacity by organizing better its resource mobilization strategies.
NATO AND PEACE OPERATIONS

Ambassador Adam Kobieracki
Assistant Secretary General for Operations
NATO

The growing NATO operational involvement or operational evolution has coincided, to a certain extent, with the true process of NATO enlargement. At the beginning, the expectations that new members brought to the Alliance were very much in terms of security guarantees rather than peace support operations. But enlargement has not made a NATO operational role more difficult; on the contrary, all recognize the absolute need for the Alliance to be involved in peace support operations.

After becoming operational in Europe, NATO, recently, in a dramatic evolution, took over the strategic coordination of the peace support operation in far-away Afghanistan.

The current and future role of the EU in peacekeeping is clearly something that we have to consider as well, as it does and will affect the way that NATO will prepare itself for peace support operations.

NATO has crossed three bridges in the past few years in its dealing with peace operations. Ten years ago, before NATO ever dreamed of being “operational” in the best sense of the word - that is, getting involved in actual operations - and definitely before my country was invited to join the Alliance, the then 16 NATO nations had serious discussions and policy differences over whether NATO should intervene in the Balkans. We know the eventual outcome of that discussion: the first bridge crossed was NATO involvement in the Balkans - a shock for the Alliance and a proof of its ongoing transformation.

Since that first NATO operational involvement, there has been a quite dramatic evolution in how and where NATO does its business. This has been more than the Alliance’s choice; it has been driven by events. Becoming involved in peace support operations or peacekeeping operations was something new for the Alliance and NATO’s member governments have taken countless crucial decisions in support of the wider goals of restoring stability. This growing NATO operational involvement or operational evolution has coincided to a certain extent with the true process of NATO enlargement. At the beginning, the expectations that new members brought to the Alliance were very much in terms of security guarantees rather than peace support operations. But enlargement has not made a NATO operational role more difficult; on the contrary, all recognize the absolute need for the Alliance to be involved in peace support operations. Our presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia are examples of NATO operations close to home, and with its involvement “throughout” the Balkans NATO crossed its second bridge. It became fully operational, although confined to Europe.

Recently, NATO has taken over the strategic coordination of the peace support operation in far-away Afghanistan. This has been a dramatic evolution for us and is a sign of not just NATO’s adaptation. In taking over the lead of ISAF, NATO has moved beyond Europe in operational terms and in so doing has crossed its third bridge.
What are the limits now? I would say that there are no geographical limits. The only possible limits are the need for political consensus among NATO nations, and operational readiness once the tough decision is made to provide troops for any peacekeeping operation. We must of course keep in mind that peacekeeping itself has evolved and become an extremely complex business involving a number of state actors, different international organizations and other players.

Military operations themselves are very different from what they were in the past. In the past, military operations traditionally meant conflicts between states, and between militaries. Armed forces were given certain goals by politicians, and when those goals were met, the military went home and civilians took over. Today, as many theatres have shown, a specific challenge for our armed forces is to help in the effort of reconstructing shattered societies. The aftermath of the conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo are telling examples, as is Afghanistan. The aim is not just establishing the status quo ante, but in order to settle a crisis one has to address its root causes.

In that context, let me revert to the issue of civil-military cooperation in peacekeeping for which there is an absolute need. As I announced yesterday, a distinguished Turkish official, Minister Hikmet Çetin, has just been appointed as NATO’s Senior Civilian Representative in Kabul. His function has been modeled on the functions of the Senior Civilian Representatives of the NATO Secretary General in Kosovo and in Macedonia. Of course, the specific tasks assigned to these high level officials are linked to the specific situations on the ground. Nevertheless, this serves as the mechanism within NATO to ensure that there is as close a cooperation as possible between civilian and military in the theatre.

We have learned many lessons over the last few years including in the area of preparing for peace support operations. In my view there are four considerations that are most important. First, there is the need for close co-ordination with other international actors at an early stage. The advantages are obvious. It allows for unity of purpose in the development and better co-ordination of the military-civilian interface prior to deployment to a specific theatre. At the same time, persistent follow-up and tenacity in post-conflict management remain equally important. As we have seen in the Balkans, the job of peace-building is a long-term investment whereby the international community and local institutions must remain engaged. One cannot substitute for the other in the longer run.

Secondly, close co-ordination requires interoperability in crisis management. This is not just a technical issue: it affects communication and information sharing, and it is something that we have to keep in mind while preparing for the next generation of peacekeeping and peace support operations.

Thirdly, good and specific training for peacekeeping troops is important. As we have learned from the Balkans, we have been consolidating peace by providing selective support to civil implementation organizations. Peacekeeping tasks are far different from traditional combat operations. Developing certain common training requirements against the background of the evolving peacekeeping environment is the key. It is not easy to harmonize national training concepts but at the national level there are many examples of close coordination in the field of training among military and civilians who are assigned to certain peace support!operations. An emphasis on training and increased coordination among civilians and the military is particularly important if we are to strengthen and
harmonize the roles of the international organizations involved in peacemaking and peace-building, leveraging the relative strengths of each in a mutually supportive way.

Fourthly, we must focus on usability of our forces. As you may have heard this was the main topic at the recent meeting of NATO Defence Ministers in Colorado Springs, USA, and Secretary General Robertson said clearly that we need real deployable soldiers. Crisis Response Operations (CROs) and all peacekeeping operations are not being conducted by declared forces, but by those available in real life and in the real world. The Alliance itself faces two usability challenges at the same time. On the one hand it needs high readiness, rapid deployable forces able to conduct combat operations at short notice to prevent a crisis from escalating into a wider conflict; the NATO Response Force was activated in October 2003 with an initial capacity of 9,000. On the other hand, it needs forces at lower readiness that can be rotated to sustain crisis operations for extended periods of time.

Learning lessons from the Balkans, in my view one may pose the question - is NATO overall prepared for peace support operations? From my 2.5 months of experience of working at NATO and for NATO, I would say it is getting ready for that. We have to remember that historically NATO was prepared to deal with some different threats to security and it needs time and effort to change this kind of attitude. Politically speaking, all the important decisions have been taken and declarations have been adopted, but now we have to move into the implementation phase. Once more, this is not just establishing a specific capability. It is the entire thinking about force planning, force generation process which needs to be linked to operational requirements and not just to defence needs in the wider, more generic, meaning of the term. Political decisions on a given operation must be followed up by meeting the requirements of a given operation with appropriate forces. We are facing this challenge now in Afghanistan with ISAF expansion. Proper running of an operation depends on having adequate forces and back up to do the job.

In Afghanistan, we have already decided that the ISAF operation would move beyond Kabul. The decision was taken by NATO after authorization by the Security Council, so that we have the proper of the order of events. The questions that might be asked are - what will be the future of ISAF's involvement or NATO's involvement in Afghanistan? Does the current situation in Afghanistan set a kind of precedent for future operations of that nature?

The picture in Afghanistan is somewhat complex, if not confused. We have Operation Enduring Freedom going on parallel with ISAF. The picture is that we have a UN mandate, a US military operation, the political involvement of nations in establishing Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and NATO in its ISAF role providing a security and stability framework. Of course, this scene is not complete as in this specific case the EU is somewhat missing. Nevertheless, I would argue that, at some point in future, we will probably benefit from trying to establish a form of a unity of command in Afghanistan.

One more comment about Afghanistan is that there are very high political expectations towards NATO doing a proper job in that country. I am mentioning this to stress my response whenever I am asked whether NATO is still a living organization or whether we still need this Alliance. The current and future role of the European Union in peacekeeping is clearly something that we have to consider as well, as it does and will affect the way that NATO will prepare itself for peace support operations. I shall not go
into any details but just mention that for the time being we have the ‘Berlin plus’ arrangement (a comprehensive package of agreements between NATO and the EU established in March 2003). This arrangement has worked in Macedonia and we shall rely on it in the discussions that will take place shortly on the future of both EU and NATO operational involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina. There must be clarity as to whether EU and NATO operational capabilities will be compatible or competitive, and the answer is obvious.

Finally, we must show flexibility in our decision-making and be ready to adapt to specific circumstances in a given crisis. Different peace support operations might have many similarities but, in the end, each must be adapted to its specific political and security environment. For the decision-makers, this means keeping options open and providing clear political guidance to the military. I have learned already that whenever an operation is being prepared, one is faced by the military insisting on political guidance, but of course keeping flexibility of action for their troops in the field. On the other hand, politicians and diplomats always insist on having an exit strategy even before troops are deployed. And both military and politicians always insist on the absolute need to recognize the specificity of a given operation. However, they have different objectives in their minds when they insist on recognizing specificity.

To sum up, NATO has moved a long way in a few short years in its willingness to take on peace support operations, and in harnessing its capabilities to implement such operations successfully. Subject, of course, to the political decisions of its members, I am confident that NATO will continue to develop its capacity in this area and will play a valuable role in peace support operations of the future.
THE EUROPEAN UNION PERSPECTIVE

Hans-Bernhard Weisserth
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An overarching and guiding document, the strategy paper, European Security Strategy (ESS), gives an indication of how the Union will prepare itself and act in crisis management, including potential peace operations.

For ensuring overall coherence in the EU’s response to a crisis, at the top of the list of fundamentals, lies the need for a culture of co-ordination. In this framework, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) emphasizes the EU’s potential in the development of a comprehensive outline for coherent co-ordination of its civilian and military instruments. In addition, the established EU-UN co-operation in civilian and military crisis management will provide the parties with reliable and sustainable mechanisms in the areas of planning, training and communication.

Some months ago the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Dr. Solana, presented to the European Council in Thessalonica a European Security Strategy (ESS), entitled "A Secure Europe in a Better World". On the basis of national comments and discussions in several workshops, we are currently finalising this strategy paper with a view to endorsement at the European Council in Rome in December 2003. The Security Strategy will then be an overarching and guiding document for further action and activities for the European Union in various fields. This document includes a common analysis of the risks and threats we are faced with, elaborates the strategic objectives, how to address the threats and identifies the relevant policy implications for the European Union. The Security Strategy also covers a number of aspects related to the subject of this seminar. Let me highlight some of these aspects.

The European Security Strategy states on the threat assessment:

"None of the new threats is purely military, nor can any be tackled by purely military means. Each requires a mixture of instruments. Proliferation may be contained through export controls and attacked through political, economic and other pressures. Dealing with terrorism may require a mixture of intelligence, police, and judicial, military and other means. In failed states, military instruments may be needed to restore order and humanitarian instruments to tackle the immediate crisis. Regional conflicts need political solutions but military assets and effective policing may be needed in the post conflict phase. Economic instruments serve reconstruction and civilian crisis management helps restore civil government. The European Union is particularly well equipped to respond to such multi-faceted situations"

One of the policy implications identified in the ESS is that we need to be more active in pursuing our strategic objectives. This implies using the full spectrum of instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention at our disposal, including political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and development activities. We think that we should be able to sustain several operations and that we could add particular value by
developing operations involving both military and civilian capabilities. We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention. Preventive engagement can avoid more serious problems in the future. We need to be able to act before countries around us deteriorate and before humanitarian emergencies arise.

According to the ESS we should be more capable. We have to transform our militaries into more flexible, mobile forces to enable them to address the threats and to be interoperable with our potential partners. In almost every major intervention, military efficiency has been followed by civilian chaos. So, we need greater capacity to bring all necessary civilian resources to bear in crisis and post crisis situations. Dealing with problems that are more distant and more foreign requires better understanding and communication.

These are some of the relevant aspects of the European Security Strategy giving an indication of how the Union wants to prepare for itself and act in crisis management, including potential peace operations. And, as I have already said, this Security Strategy will function as guidance for our activities and the development of capabilities in the coming years. Decisions taken, particularly during the last four years, in the military and civilian fields already move us in the right direction, notably the implementation of the Helsinki Headline (military) goals and the goals in the four civilian priority areas - police, the rule of law, civil administration and civil protection.

Let me now come to some basic considerations on peace operations from a European Union perspective.

Crises and conflicts facing the international community are increasingly of a complex nature. Peace operations extend beyond the separation of warring parties and are often multifunctional and carried out alongside a wide range of civilian actions. In some cases peace operations include the management of international administrations. In such situations, overall coherence and effectiveness is essential for the credibility of the international community. Furthermore, military resources are used more often in support of purely civilian operations, e.g., in the field of humanitarian support, emergency relief and search and rescue. Hence, civil-military co-ordination is necessary and increasingly important in actual crisis situations. Recent experiences have highlighted the need and the opportunities for close and effective co-ordination between civilian and military actors and instruments - but have also highlighted the absence of an overall framework.

What are the conclusions that the European Union has drawn?

Within the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), the European Union has a great potential in the development of a comprehensive framework for coherent co-ordination of its civilian and military instruments, irrespective of whether the Union cooperates with other organizations or in autonomous operation - and we are developing these opportunities.

For the Union, Civil-Military Co-ordination (CMCO) addresses the need for effective co-ordination of the actions of all relevant EU actors involved in the planning and subsequent implementation of the EU’s response to the crisis. It encompasses the following functional areas:
Early warning and situation assessment: this is the area where CMCO must start. All relevant actors should share situation analysis in an appropriate way. The establishment of a Joint Situation Centre in the EU, where civil, military and police personnel are working close together, is part of this approach.

Co-ordinated planning: this needs to encompass the strategic level, subsequent operational planning and the tactical planning by the relevant military and civilian actors in theatre.

Decision-making and implementation/conduct of the operation are areas where structures and procedures must ensure effective co-ordination of all instruments.

However, at the top of the list of fundamentals lies the need for a culture of co-ordination, rather than seeking to put too much emphasis on detailed structures or procedures. We consider CMCO as a culture of co-ordination as an essential element in ensuring overall coherence in the EU's response to a crisis. The aim must be to encourage and to ensure the co-ordination in the actions of relevant EU actors in all phases of an operation. CMCO culture needs to be "built into" the crisis response at the earliest possible stage and for the whole duration of the operation, rather than being "bolted on" at a later stage. And, it goes without saying, working closely together is an essential element also during the "routine" phase of crisis management.

While CMCO is primarily concerned with how the EU ensures internal co-ordination in crisis management, there is also a need to ensure co-operation and to establish co-ordination modalities with other actors external to the EU involved in theatre. Effective CMCO within the EU is a pre-requisite to reach this goal.

In addition to the EU internal co-ordination, there is the need for consultative meetings with other international organizations that are engaged. To this end, the EU agreed with the United Nations to establish a joint consultative mechanism at the working level to examine ways and means to enhance mutual co-ordination and compatibility in the areas of planning, training, communication and best practices.

To conclude let me remind you that the European Union is already actively supporting and participating in peacekeeping operations from the Balkans to Africa. More than 40,000 men and women of the European Union are currently deployed on UN-led or UN-authorised peace operations in the world.

The past year saw great progress in co-operation between the EU and the UN and NATO in crisis management. This includes specifically

- the hand-over of responsibilities from the IPTF to the EUPM in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
- the conduct of operation CONCORDIA with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities under the "Berlin Plus" arrangements,
- the rapid deployment of the military operation ARTEMIS in the Democratic Republic of Congo and
- the active consideration by the EU of ways to assist in the establishment of an Integrated Police Unit in Kinshasa to provide security to the transitional government and institutions.
We are determined to further develop and strengthen co-operation between the UN and the EU and its Member States in the field of peacekeeping. The Joint Declaration on EU-UN co-operation in civilian and military crisis management, recently signed, is intended as a further tool at the UN's disposal to achieve its goals. It will contribute to deepening EU-UN co-operation and provide it with reliable, sustainable mechanisms in the areas of planning, training and communication.
OSCE’S CONTRIBUTION TO PEACE OPERATIONS

Ambassador Lamberto Zannier
Director, OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre

The OSCE “philosophy” is based upon a comprehensive approach to the three dimensions of security, namely politico-military issues, the economic and environmental area and the human dimension. The Organization has a co-operative approach to security, based on the premise that security is indivisible, that there is equal status for all States, and decisions are made by consensus. OSCE’s broad approach, based on the comprehensive concept of security, and of its inherent operational flexibility, has demonstrated a high degree of effectiveness in developing multidimensional activities.

I welcome this timely opportunity to address you on the nature of possible future peace operations and the continuing need for change. Events in Iraq, Afghanistan and in other regions of the world graphically illustrate the nature of the threats faced today by international organizations. In the search to promote peace, and to assist countries bring stability and economic and social development, international organizations have had to adapt rapidly to ensure their continuing effectiveness. I hope today to be able to address some of the most important aspects of this reform process, building on the valuable and often challenging experience of learning lessons. Let me start also by pointing to the fact that these challenges require, more than ever, a concerted effort to improve co-operation in preventing conflicts before they evolve, a philosophy much integrated in the way OSCE works.

The OSCE “philosophy” is based upon a comprehensive approach to the three dimensions of security, namely politico-military issues, the economic and environmental area and the human dimension. Furthermore, the Organization has a co-operative approach to security, based on the premise that security is indivisible, that there is equal status for all States, and decisions are made by consensus. This can sometimes be a slow process, but it underpins the concerted commitment to action by all member states.

When considering our Organization’s role in peacekeeping we need to take into account the fact that the past ten years have seen peace operations becoming increasingly complex, involving military, police and civilian personnel addressing a wider range of tasks and responsibilities. This has dramatically broadened the very definition of peacekeeping and profoundly changed its nature.

In this broad sense, the OSCE has played a very active role in conflict prevention, peace-making, peacekeeping and post-conflict rehabilitation. Indeed, our present 18 OSCE field presences are involved in a number of activities falling into this broad category of peace operations, and these activities have contributed significantly to dealing with different levels of crisis/conflict situations in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia. In fact, our Missions themselves have demonstrated to serve a much appreciated early warning/conflict prevention role.
Additionally, some of our current and ongoing operations, such as the Border Monitoring Operation in Georgia and our activities in the area of policing (in particular, in the area of community policing, ethnic policing and police training), have many elements in common with activities that, from a UN perspective, would be considered an integral part of peace operations.

As a relatively young organization, the OSCE is no stranger to change. Following a profound restructuring and the institutionalisation of the Organization in the nineties, the Istanbul Summit 1999, by adopting the Charter for European Security, promoted new instruments to improve the efficiency of the Organisation in recognition of lessons learnt and the new challenges ahead. The main decisions included the promotion of a more regional approach to issues, the strengthening of cooperation with other IOs and NGOs and the establishment of the Platform for Co-operative Security. The adoption of this in particular greatly improved the OSCE’s capacity to co-operate with other organizations, including those involved in broader forms of peacekeeping operations.

This Platform also called for a number of further initiatives to enable the OSCE Secretariat to better facilitate such activities. Specific efforts to enhance the Organization’s capability to plan, deploy and manage field operations included the setting up of a small Operations Planning Unit within the Conflict Prevention Centre, the adoption of the Rapid Expert Assistance and Co-operation Teams (REACT) initiative as a means to rapidly recruit the experts needed for fast deployments to new or enhanced missions, and more recently, the commitment to adopt an Integrated Resource Management Agenda (IRMA) system. These are all signs of strong political will on the part of participating States.

Additionally, there are political discussions ongoing in OSCE bodies on possible amendments to the 1992 Helsinki Document where it sets out the framework for any future OSCE peacekeeping operations that might be called for.

I started by saying that today's peace operations have become increasingly multi-facetted and multi-dimensional, with solutions being sought by deploying together military, police and civilian components. Current crises have illustrated clearly the need for a benign environment in order that civilian components of such operations, which in turn makes rapid security sector reform a major priority. Experiences from Afghanistan and Iraq show the need to provide a strategic plan for the co-operation and co-ordination of international organizations and other supporting institutions before deploying people and supporters to the respective theatre. This strategic planning should be tailored to the situation on the ground, and has to include the political and operational exit strategy, and further measures as basis for the whole mission circle. These well-timed activities should enable the development of the Host Nation’s capabilities to take over its own responsibility of the country supported by diminishing foreign institutions and the international organizations.

As a result of our experiences, the OSCE has activated an intensive dialogue with other international actors involved in our mission areas. This includes more and more structured exchanges at the HQ level, aimed at encouraging exchanges of visions and fine-tuning of strategies. This dialogue, however, complements - but cannot in any way replace - the vitally important mechanisms for co-ordination and co-operation on the terrain both at the political and the operational level.
In this connection, I would like to put forward some suggestions to further improve IC co-operation in the following areas, all of which are areas that will benefit from reform:

- Information sharing, especially in early warning;
- Enhancing co-operation in fact-finding and monitoring missions, including possible set-up of joint “country co-ordination teams;”
- Developing joint training programs for field officers prior to their deployment in the field; and
- Harmonisation of our working procedures.

• First, where necessary, partner organizations should introduce new modalities and establish new mechanisms for co-operation. But we also need to build more efficiently on the initiatives already launched and take more active advantage of each other’s existing tools. For example, better use could be made of cross-conditionality: non-compliance with international obligations (ICTY or OSCE or Dayton) could be linked to progress in the relations with other organizations (e.g. SAP or PfP co-operation). We must see where and how we can complement each other, using experience gained, resources and mechanisms available. And we should respect the principle of inclusiveness and involve all relevant players.

• Secondly, despite recent progress achieved, information-sharing among partner organizations, especially in early warning, definitely needs to be improved. Early warning is one of the main functions of the OSCE institutions and field offices. Regular reports and evaluations of the situation in a variety of locations and on a variety of issues are provided to the participating States, who themselves regularly share information in the Permanent Council. Better information-sharing among partner organizations can be achieved through joint working level meetings directly in the field and between headquarters. The OSCE-NATO working level consultations between headquarters have become good examples of such information-sharing, and we are at present discussing ways to make even it more systematic and operational.

• Thirdly, there is much room for improving co-operation in fact-finding and monitoring missions. One possible solution might be to set up, when needed, joint “country co-ordination teams”, for example drawing on OSCE’s permanent field presences.

• Fourthly, as we are doing today, we should as well in future continue our exchanges on lessons learned and evaluation, since this is an essential component of successful conflict prevention. Within the OSCE the Conflict Prevention Centre is, among others, responsible for developing an OSCE lessons learned process. An OSCE strategy in this area of activity, as well as a database, will be produced. It would be interesting to formulate truly inclusive common evaluations of joint operations with a view to developing common lessons learned.

• Fifthly, as proved by earlier practice, very often a major obstacle to smooth co-operation between partners in the field is the lack of reciprocal knowledge of goals, mandates, procedures, etc. One way to tackle this issue would be to provide each other with training modules on respective organizations, or to develop joint training programmes on relevant issues for field officers prior to their deployment in the field. Joint training should be a general aim, not least because common standards are already current practice in many areas. Joint exercises can also play a very important role in this process of getting to know each other’s procedures better – but only if partner organizations are treated as real partners, and can participate rather than observe, and have access to relevant information.

It should be added here that while OSCE Permanent Council decisions can be fast, and subsequent deployment swift, there are instances when rapid deployment is not
essential. Such scenarios present opportunities to conduct thorough needs assessments in
order to ensure best possible complementarities between both government agencies and other
international organizations.

OSCE’s broad approach, based on the comprehensive concept of security, and of its
inherent operational flexibility, has demonstrated a high degree of effectiveness in
developing multidimensional activities. This has come about not least because it has built on
the strengths of its “soft security approach”, embracing as it does all of its three dimensions.
Thus it has proved to be, along with all else, a successful partner for organizations involved
in peacekeeping and crisis management operations. The need for coherent action by the
international community in this respect does certainly make a difference. And the OSCE
stands ready to continue to play its part in the 21st century.
Not having enough proficiency and human resources for PKO is one of the problems of international organizations. Solution to this problem can be to work closer with national human research centres, including these centres to the planning activities of PKO, so that both sides can understand each other’s needs and abilities. This also helps the planning activities of national human resource centres.

Present peacekeeping operations (PKOs) are mainly carried out in violent and volatile environments. The nature of these operations has been changing from observation and advice to implementation. The level of violence in the society is beyond the capacities of a mission police component comprised of different nationalities, different standards, and with different rules for using police powers. The military and police component should also work very closely together to be successful in providing public order, at least at the start of the mission, until the police component is ready to handle the violent crimes.

The paper also comprises the results of a survey reflecting opinions of police officers in the field concerning management problems in the missions.

I would like to share my experience and opinions on three topics:

- The difficulties we face in meeting the different standards of different international organizations,
- The need for better cooperation between military and civilian police components in future missions,
- The results of a survey carried out among Turkish police who have served in certain missions.

A. My first topic is the difficulties we are facing in meeting the different human resources management standards, requirements or policies of various international organizations. To meet the quantity and quality requirements of international organizations entails preparing more foreign language and relevant courses. I am not going to talk about problems we have at home but on our expectations from international organizations.

Turkey has so far contributed four different international organizations, the United Nations, OSCE, Western European Union, and European Union, with police officers, as follows:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INTERNATIONAL DEPLOYMENT</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>European Union Police Mission</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia Herzegovina</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>United Nations / UN</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo UNMIK (United Nations Mission in Kosovo)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIVPOL</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correction Officer</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo MONUC (United Nations Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo)</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Timor UNMISET (United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone UNAMSIL (United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia UNMIL (United Nations Mission in Liberia)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York UN / DPKO Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe / OSCE</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE Macedonia Mission</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE Kosovo Mission</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE Serbia &amp; Montenegro Mission</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE Georgia Mission</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These organizations have different standards, and different recruitment systems.

First, the UN system is the most transparent and easiest one to work with. Cooperation starts from the very early stage of planning. It gives the power and responsibility to national organizations to nominate and select their candidates with the help of UN DPKO. It is then possible for national organizations to plan their human resources.
UN policy on planning, selection and sharing of the high level post is as transparent as possible, although in practice some managers may not fully comply with this policy.

Second, the OSCE’s e-mail application and recruitment system for seconded posts makes planning very hard, if not impossible, for national institutions. Vacancy information is easy to access and all can apply, but the selection process is not open. Who or how many of our candidates will be selected, and when, is not clear.

Additionally, OSCE does not have a clear national balanced policy for sharing the senior positions. The selection process is again not transparent, and who has been selected for the post and for what qualification is not clear. I recognize that the quality of personnel is more important than observing national balance, but I have met some officers in the missions who do not speak enough English and do not have the qualities and experience necessary for holding such posts, except that they come from certain nationalities. As far as I know, 8 staff officers are working in the Strategic Police Matter Units in Vienna, OSCE headquarters: 2 from UK, 2 from Russia, 2 from USA, 1 from Sweden and 1 from France. I do not understand why OSCE has to select two persons from the same country.

Thirdly, working with the European Union is easy. The posts that member states and non-member states can fill are separated and the contributing countries know which posts they can choose for their candidates. But, the problem here is that all decisions are taken by EU beforehand, leaving not much room. For example, the EU Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina: at the planning stage, the EU mission planning team shared the high level posts among member states and announced to non-EU member states that they could apply for the remaining posts not taken by member states.

As OSCE and EU claim to be very strong champions of transparency, good governance and democracy, they should utilize better human research management policies for the peace operation missions.

In this context, the human research management policy of the international organizations should have at least the following rules:

1. There should be transparency and a participatory policy starting from the planning stage - contributing countries should be included in the planning and recruitment stages.
2. The appointment of candidates to senior positions in field and at headquarters should reflect the respective level of contributions of the countries involved.
3. Human Resources Management Sections should work closely with national institutions for nomination and selection of personnel.
4. There should be a time limit given for term of service in the posts - international posts, especially seconded posts, which are not career-building posts.

B. The second topic on which I like to share my opinion is the need for cooperation between military and CivPol components for future missions. My starting point is cooperation in the home countries. The classic view is that military organizations are set up to fight against the enemy. No matter how big or sophisticated, they are organized, trained and equipped to operate against armies, but not for civil disorders and crimes.
Police departments, on the other hand, are organized, trained and equipped to operate against crimes that endanger civil life and order. Police forces are expected to have very light weapons, and if possible no firearms at all.

Recent changes in society and criminality, especially in the last two decades, have required police departments to establish some units to deal with extremely violent cases. So, most of the police departments today have SWAT teams or special forces and explosive units capable of bomb disposal and conducting post-blast investigations and handling very violent cases. The tactics they are using in such operations can be considered as military commando techniques or tactics.

In Turkey, we have had help from the armed forces to train and equip special police forces and explosive experts. We have also observed some changes in the doctrine and tactics, after which training on army organization and equipment is given. Terrorist actions are considered as crimes and normally the responsibility of the police departments, but sometimes the power used by terrorist organizations goes beyond the fire power capacities of the police. Nowadays in military doctrine, dealing with terrorism, in the sense of using extreme violence, not only against military targets, but also and mainly against civilian targets, is considered within the duties of the armed forces.

Military and police forces, having complementary skills, have had to cooperate more closely in their home countries to meet such actions. Very good teams have been formed of military forces capable of dealing with heavy armed conflicts (rifles, explosives, rockets etc.) and police forces capable of gathering intelligence, investigating cases, proving links between incidents and individuals, preparing cases for court hearings and assisting in immobilisation of terrorist organizations.

In some missions, police and military components have executive tasks and power. In the mission areas, we need such teamwork more than we need it in the home countries. Let us remember the working environment in the mission area. Crime is endemic, disarmament and demobilization have not been completed, ex-combatants, still having their arms and organizational structure and not wishing to lose their power, are already organized in criminal gangs or going to be so organized if there is no reintegration process. In sum, the level of violence in the society is beyond the capacities of a mission police component comprised of different nationalities, different standards, and with different rules for using police powers.

Military components are often ready and trained and equipped to face such a level of force, but they do not have the skills or personnel for investigations and preparation of cases for court. The military and police component should also work very closely together to be successful in providing public order, at least at the start of the mission, until the police component is ready to handle the violent crimes.

C. Finally, the third topic I wish to talk about is the results of a short survey carried out by Turkish police in missions they serve. The main purposes of the survey were:

1. To take opinions of police officers working in the field about subjects covered in various UN documents and in the Concluding Report of the Challenges Project Seminars between 1997-2002, regarding the CivPol component, such as training, equipment, realistic mandate, management problems, etc.,
2. To learn the opinions of police officers about local peoples’ will and cooperation into the mission objectives and mission personnel. In addition, to find out the officers’ evaluation on local human recourses and capacity of local institutions to reach the mission objectives.

In UNMIK the total number of personnel is 3765 and the survey paper was returned from 70 in 10 different contingents. In MONUC the total number of personnel is 182 and the survey paper was returned from 11 in 9 different contingents.

The survey contains 15 questions. The questions and answer percentages from the survey are shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>UNMIK (KOSOVA)</th>
<th>MONUC (KONGO)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Do you have previous mission experience?</td>
<td>YES 28/NO 42</td>
<td>YES 9/NO 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Did you take part in any training program geared into the mission in your country before you joined mission?</td>
<td>YES 41/NO 29</td>
<td>YES 7/NO 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>If yes, please tell us the subject and duration of the programs and evaluate each program separately.</td>
<td>Very Satisfied 53/ Satisfied 33/ No Idea 2/ Poor 0/ Very Poor 0</td>
<td>Very Satisfied 11/Satisfied 31/ No Idea 4/ Poor 0/ Very Poor 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Did you participate at any training program as in the mission?</td>
<td>YES 26/NO 41</td>
<td>YES 9/NO 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>If yes, tell us the subject and duration of the programs and evaluate each program separately.</td>
<td>Very Satisfied 8/ Satisfied 31/ No Idea 4/ Poor 0/ Very Poor 0</td>
<td>Very Satisfied 7/Satisfied 4/ No Idea 1/ Poor 1/ Very Poor 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>How would you evaluate the followings provided to you by your government?</td>
<td>Very Satisfied 19/ Satisfied 28/ No Idea 4/ Poor 8/ Very Poor 2</td>
<td>Very Satisfied 5/Satisfied 2/ No Idea 1/ Poor 0/ Very Poor 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>How would you evaluate the personnel and Office equipment provided by the United Nations?</td>
<td>Very Satisfied 11/ Satisfied 31/ No Idea 9/ Poor 8/ Very Poor 3</td>
<td>Very Satisfied 1/Satisfied 3/ No Idea 2/ Poor 1/ Very Poor 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Question 8
In general, how do you evaluate individual performance of the CIVPOL, OSCE, EU officers in the mission?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very Good</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Idea</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Poor</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Question 9
Please mark four most important reasons that you consider effecting individual’s performance in negative ways:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poor Training</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of Motivation</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor Management</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of Language Skills</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inability to Work in multicultural Environment</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of Adaptation to Living Conditions</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of Leadership</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unclear and unrealistic Standard Operation Producers</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resentment to unfair promotion and awarding systems</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others (please explain)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Question 10
How would you evaluate success of the CIVPOL, OSCE, EU program in general?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very Successful</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Successful</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Idea</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsuccessful</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Successful at all</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Question 11
If your answer is 4 or 5, please mark four of the following reasons behind your decision:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Too broad and unclear mandate</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unrealistic objectives</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unclear and unrealistic standard operation procedures</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of personnel is not enough</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skills of personnel is not enough</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor equipment</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor management</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of coordination</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of existence of relevant local institution</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lack of belief and trust of local authorities to UN mission mandate and UN Institutions and uncooperation,</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lack of local skilled personnel,</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Others (please explain)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 How would you evaluate overall success of CIVPOL, OSCE, and EU management?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Very Good</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No Idea</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Very Poor</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 If your answer is 4 or 5, please mark four of the following reasons that you consider most important for your decision:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Managers don’t have skilled man power,</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Managers don’t have enough men power,</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lack of office equipment,</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lack of communication equipment,</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lack of personnel equipment,</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unclear mandate and objectives,</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unskilled managers,</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lack of relevant rules and procedures,</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Others (please explain)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 How would you evaluate local human recourses and capacity of local institutions to reach the mission objectives?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Very Satisfied</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Satisfied</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No Idea</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Very Poor</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 How would you evaluate local peoples’ will and cooperation into the mission objectives and mission personnel?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Very Satisfied</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Satisfied</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No Idea</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Very Poor</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
EDUCATION AND TRAINING IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF PEACEKEEPING TRAINING CENTRES (IAPTC)

David Lightburn
International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres, Canada

International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres, the IAPTC, founded 8 years ago, is a gathering of military, civilian and police institutions and open to other interested parties. It provides a venue for an informal exchange of views on current education and training issues related to peace operations.

Its annual meeting was held in Wertheim, Germany in 2003, with the participation of 40 countries, 95 participants and 45 different institutions addressing the theme of “Enhancing the effectiveness of peace operations through Education and Training”.

As the last official speaker I wish to talk about the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres, the IAPTC, in the broad context of education and training and the preparation of peacekeepers - military, civilian and police. I will talk about the IAPTC because it is connected and linked in several ways to the work of the Challenges project, so I will first provide some factual information on the Association and its link to Challenges. I, then, wish to return to the main purpose of this conference; that is, to continue to identify change, challenges and, in particular in this case, education and training challenges for member states.

The IAPTC itself is only 8 years old. There were only some 14 or 15 people gathered around the table at its first meeting in Canada in 1995, and Dr. Stephanie Blair, who of course spoke earlier, was one of the people who helped to found the organization. The IAPTC is a gathering of military, civilian and police institutions but also those others who are interested in the topic of peacekeeping education and training. Quite often, for example, government organizations, particularly from defence and foreign ministries, also participate, as well as a number of interested academics. The whole purpose of such a group of like-minded centres and individuals coming together once a year is to provide a venue for an informal exchange of views on current education and training issues related to peace operations. I would stress that during the deliberations it is not government positions being on tabled nor is it any kind of official policy; rather, it is an exchange of views on best practices, lessons-learned and new developments in peacekeeping education and training. More than 90 different institutions have participated over the 9 years of this organization. The last annual meeting took place just four short weeks ago, at a police academy in Wertheim, Germany, and next year we will gather in Ghana at the new Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre. For the following year, in 2005, we have taken a decision to hold our meeting in India.
Earlier, I mentioned a linkage to the Challenges project, also a group of institutions and individuals who are networking internationally. Both IAPTC and Challenges have a common interest in education and training as a principal issue. Both are also multidisciplinary in nature. Both have representation from all corners of the world. Both are voluntary and informal, and most importantly both work closely in support of, and with, the United Nations.

At the annual meetings of the IAPTC a principal event is a two-day topical seminar dealing with current education and training issues and I will elaborate on the Wertheim seminar in a moment. During the gathering, in addition to a seminar, we also provide a day for functional meetings where, for example, the military institutions and individuals in attendance can sit down together, as can the civilian institutions, the police institutions and so on, and work through a functional agenda on information on education and training. The IAPTC also organizes a day of information where we learn about current education and training developments in the OSCE, the EU and the United Nations, and where speakers also inform on other national and international initiatives in the peace operations education and training field. During the course of some five days we also devote a period to certain “housekeeping businesses” at an annual meeting of interested members. Information on all of this can be found on an IAPTC web site.

During the most recent meeting, seminar participants addressed the theme of “Enhancing the effectiveness of peace operations through Education and Training”, and we examined three distinct areas. The matter of creating a common ground and working with training standards was the first theme. The second one was, and we've heard a reference to this already this morning, building partnerships, i.e. working together; and, thirdly, the very difficult area of evaluating success, for which I am not happy to note, provided a considerable challenge. We were, despite considerable discussion, unable to come to any great conclusions in this area; there is a lot of work to be done here.

This year’s IAPTC had more than 40 countries, 95 participants and some 45 different institutions, and it was a particularly good balance between civilian, police and military institutions and individuals. Next year (2004) the annual meeting will take place in Ghana from 17 until 21 October. For anybody who would be interested in participating the general theme for 2004 will be capacity building, as we attempt to work closely with a number of African centres in this regard.

The issues that were discussed in Wertheim related to the main themes. The first on “Individual Training” addressed standardization in general, and then we considered it in the context of United Nations Standardized Generic Training Modules – SGTMs. We also looked at the EU effort to standardize training and to have a foundation course for training civilians prior to their joining peace operations. Under the second main theme “Collective Training”, we talked about the very difficult challenge of bringing different cultures and disciplines together in multidisciplinary training, and trying to improve upon the normal way of doing this, a military exercise where the civilians are at best role players. As I have already mentioned with respect to the third main theme “Evaluation” we arrived at no particular conclusions.

A further issue that we considered was that of "capacity building", which was raised in part in relation to next year's IAPTC theme, but also in the sense that capacity building is out there in name at the moment, but it is not being well done. If one examines
the agendas of some of the Centres that are being supported at the moment, one might see a program with a course by country X, another by country Y, and another by country Z, with very little coordination of the issue or overall capacity building concept. Nor is there a methodology for building real capacity. This discussion will continue on next year.

One of the most important things that we identified, and I am particularly aware of this from my Canadian experience, is that there is a need for national systems that will link the capability requirements in peace operations in the field. For example, what does the UN need, what does the OSCE need, and what are the requirements in a particular mission; linking these needs and requirements with the resources that are available in the country, - here we are talking about the people that are ready to be deployed, the organizations and so on- with the funding available, the training capabilities, a deployment mechanism, and then of course, the difficult issue of evaluation. There are such systems of course that link requirements with training, with funding and with deployment for military officials, and to some degree for police, but beyond that, for most civilians being sent to peace missions, only Germany, Sweden, to some degree Finland have got reasonable systems either in place or being contemplated.

Another main issue that was raised in the seminar was the whole business of the impact of technology. Here we are talking about distance-learning and about adult training techniques and so on. Whatever the technique, there is a clear need for education and training in peace operations for everybody at different levels. There are, for example, a lot of senior officials going abroad at the moment, taking control of peace operations missions, yet with no understanding of the bits and pieces of a mission, no understanding of the environment. There are also people at the middle management level being sent abroad from Foreign Ministries who are very good at what they do in their Foreign Ministry, but believe they don't need to know any more before they're deployed. So, there is a lot of work to be done on, at several levels. In particular, we need to provide an overview of a mission for everybody, foundation training. The EU has developed a very good course in this. I believe some 14 nations have worked on the program. It, in fact, is modelled on an OSCE course. We, in Canada, have aligned our course in this area with both the EU and the OSCE models. There is of course a further need for specialized training, people who understand the processes of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration – DDR – and Security Sector Reform – SSR. You have also heard this morning the emphasis on the need for cooperation and coordination, a concept and approach that needs to be instilled in junior management, middle management and senior management; embedded in operations; and a feature of whatever policy of governance is being applied.

Let me conclude with two thoughts unrelated to the IAPTC, but are worthy of mention based on things that I have heard here at this important Challenges seminar.

I've been involved in this Challenges project since 2000. I have participated in many seminars, not only in this series, but of course, as many of us have over the years, in other contexts - in my case NATO, and there are many recurring themes. One of them is that there is a tendency on the part of many of us, particularly those of us who live within a professional culture and don't look outside the windows too many times, that the world is black and white, that there must be a way to do this, there must be a template for that, there must be a case study to follow etcetera. The peace operations business is not that way. It's dynamic, it evolves every day. It is grey, it is complex. If you take any day in the history of Bosnia, particularly in the first two years, at any one time one had conflict prevention
activities, classic peacekeeping activities, NATO enforcement actions, the seeds of development efforts, peace building activities, and so on. There is no clear delineation of operations; no clear ‘categorization’ of what is going on. It is confusion and complexity. Also, there is no clear delineation of lead responsibility and so on. So, it's a very complex area. Forget about common notions that we have to change the military culture that civilians can change the military culture in order to really make things work. Forget also the simplistic idea that the military can direct and coordinate NGOs or that there needs to be an absolutely clear chain of command or nothing else will work. We have to replace all of these ideas, not force change on things that are realities and, instead, work with a better understanding of the other components of a peace operation. We need to work in the context of partnerships, and as we said this morning, these partnerships begin prior to a mission and at all levels, especially the strategic and operational levels.

Finally, the other thing that keeps recurring is the criticism of past missions. If I just focus on Bosnia for a moment, I've heard several statements this week about “why this wasn't done”, “why that wasn't done”. In the US, this is called “the monday morning quarterback”. Bosnia was a huge experiment for the international community. It was the mission that is still, in my view, one of the most complexes, simply because of the number of actors. But, for NATO, as our NATO colleague said this morning, it was a first deployment of ground forces, and especially on the scale achieved; for the European Union it was the EU’s very first experiment in such a mission; there was, also, an Office of the High Representative – something unique to Bosnia and is an international experiment that is still going on; and for the OSCE, it was their first mission on such a scale. There is no one template; learn lessons from the past, but in the right context; understand principles; and, most of all, work together across organizational, national, cultural and professional boundaries to achieve a common goal.
CONCLUSION
We have had three days of deliberations on the nature and practice of peacekeeping efforts in the world. I think that many beneficial results came out of these discussions. I believe that we now have an even better understanding of what efforts are being made around the world and of the long road ahead of us in order to achieve the common goal: making the world a safer place for ourselves and our children.

Peacekeeping involves sacrificing resources in terms of money and materials, as well as that most precious of assets, human lives. I ask myself: why do this? Why do countries put their soldiers in harm’s way for others?

I want to suggest two answers to this question:

The first answer is hidden in a familiar quotation from the 17th century British metaphysical poet and philosopher John Donne. In 1624, exactly 379 years ago he wrote:

“No man is an island entire of itself; everyman is a piece of the continent, a part of the main….Any man’s death diminishes me because I am involved in Mankind; and therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls, it tolls for thee.”

Yes, indeed no man or nation is an island unto itself and, yes; they are parts of the main. We must, and do care about what happens to our neighbour. This is why we as members of the world community want to stop hostilities and bring about peace. But ironically, it is the very countries that sometimes try to forge truces and write peace accords that cause the conflicts. This is why an international body such as the United Nations, and not any one nation, needs to take charge and try to restore tranquillity.

The second reason why peacekeeping and peacemaking efforts are expended is that we all believe in the goodness of human nature and also believe that the lot of human beings and their political behaviour is improvable. We hopefully learn from our mistakes and do not repeat them if we want to retain membership in a world community. In fact, the very preamble to the Charter of the United Nations plainly tells us why world nations, after one of the most horrible of human conflicts costing millions of lives and untold destruction, got together and decided to form an organization for perpetuating peace:

“...to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and

To reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and
To establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained…”

If we are all members in this organization with such lofty aims, you will ask, have we failed? Well, if the Utopian and the Idealist answer this question, the answer will have to be in the affirmative.

However, for us the teachers and practitioners of international politics, all is not lost. We need not despair. The very fact that we have meetings such as this one on the intellectual level, and efforts as outlined by our colleagues on the practical level, being made from Africa to the depths of Central Asia, then we have hope that things will get better in the future.

Ambassador Klein eloquently told us two days ago why the United Nations was uniquely qualified to take on the various mandates of peacekeeping:

It has the moral authority and the experience to perform this task.

Jean-Marie Guehenno, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, in a statement distributed to the Fourth Committee on October 15, 2003 only about five weeks ago, states that

“Contrary to misperceptions in some quarters suggesting that an increase in United Nations peacekeeping activity that had begun in 1999 would be short lived; a period of significant expansion and change is afoot.”

It is clear from all of the examples provided to us that the United Nations is the right body to be given the task of peacekeeping. Its success depends, however, on the level of commitment of its member nations.

I am happy to note that Turkey, our host country for this conference, is an active participant in peacekeeping efforts. One document distributed here shows that Turkey has made significant contributions to all the efforts when asked. This country’s value as peacekeepers in Afghanistan was amply demonstrated in the two presentations of General Hilmi Akin Zorlu, the ISAF commander, during the last two days.

Ladies and gentlemen, I too am an optimist like our colleague yesterday, when he pointed to the half full glass.

I think the peacekeeping efforts are priceless. Ask the mother whose child can now live a full life and the Rwandan girl who does not need to fear loss of limbs or life to the machetes of the terrorist because of the peacekeepers if you don’t believe me.

I thank you all for joining us in these very important deliberations. My gratitude also goes to the Folke Bernadotte Academy, the Center for Strategic Research of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the General Directorate of the Turkish Police and to Bilkent University for their support and hospitality.

Thank you very much.
CONCLUDING REMARKS

Ambassador Michael Sahlin
Director-General, Folke Bernadotte Academy

Ambassador Bilhan, Distinguished Guests,
Friends and Colleagues,

First and foremost, I know that I speak on behalf of the Partners of the Challenges Project and all present when I express our warmest appreciation for the very handsome organization and generous hospitality extended to us this week. It has been a stimulating, thoughtful – and indeed, challenging – seminar. But it could not have been so without the magnificent efforts that you and your colleagues from the Center for Strategic Research of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Gökhan Aydner, Governor and General Director of the Turkish National Police, and Professor Dr. İhsan Doğramaci, President of the Board of Trustees, Bilkent University. I would also like to recognize and thank all those members of the seminar secretariat and many others behind the scenes who have met every request so efficiently and whose support has made the seminar proceed so smoothly.

Our point of departure on Tuesday morning was to consider the nature of peace operations in the 21st century in order to address the Challenges of Change. The world continues to experience the shifting sands of crisis and violent conflict. The capacities and attitudes of governments to respond to these situations are undergoing constant change, and peace operations themselves have to change to keep up with the times.

Our discussions have covered a wide range of subjects and we have tried to ask ourselves “What are the implications of these changes for Member States, and how best can they support UN peace operations?” As Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül reminded us on Tuesday, “…no nation can be fully at peace when its neighbour is not. Nor can conflicts be contained in one region as they have spill-over effects that affect a much larger geography. More countries must therefore be prepared to contribute their fair share to the maintenance of international peace and stability by participating in peace operations”.

We have had the privilege of hearing from many of those who have had leadership responsibilities in the field. They have shared with us their experiences, their problems, and their achievements. While Mr. Klein was with us, he received a telephone call from the Secretary-General who, when he heard what Mr. Klein was doing at this seminar, said how valuable such exchanges are and he expressed his strong support for our efforts at this seminar.

For all that every peace operation is different, there have been several common themes: the importance of clear and unambiguous mandates; the value of unity of command; the need for good planning; the essential nature of coordination and cooperation among military, police and civilian elements; the significance of proper training and preparation; the vital contribution of good leadership, the importance of the rule of law, the complexities of implementing multinational, multidisciplinary peace operations; the nuances of the provisions of Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the UN Charter; the dilemmas of our humanitarian colleagues in their relationships with the military.
We have been given some excellent presentations on case studies of specific peace operations, and we have recognized that the UN does not have a monopoly in these activities. Valuable roles can and are played by regional organizations, which often have perspectives of their own as we heard this morning.

All these contributions have added to the richness of Phase II of the Challenges Project. From Ankara, the Partners look forward to our seminars in 2004, in Nigeria and later in China, and in 2005 we provisionally hope to hold a seminar in U.K. We have yet to decide on the form and content of our final product but in essence it will be a focused distillation of some of the major issues raised at these seminars together with some pertinent recommendations for action by Member States. Our aim is to produce a final document in the summer of 2005 for presentation at an appropriate concluding event.

Our primary, but not our only, audience continues to be Member States. In that context, allow me to recall the remark by Mr. Klein that “some States are willing but not able, while others are able but not willing.” If our efforts succeed in making more States both able and willing, then I believe that the Challenges Project will have made a valuable contribution for the benefit of all. But as was pointed out by General Agwai of Nigeria, “The UN, or any other organization, can only be as strong as its members want it to be.”

The purposes of the Challenges Project are worth repeating. They are to bring to bear, in a collegial and informal setting, the collective knowledge and views of participants on the challenges of peace operations as we enter the 21st century, and to foster and encourage a culture of cross-professional cooperation and partnership between organizations and individuals from a wide variety of nations and cultures. I am strongly of the view that the Ankara seminar has generously reflected those purposes, and once again I wish to express to our Turkish hosts our deep appreciation for making this seminar possible.

Thank you all, very much indeed.
CONCLUSION
THE ANKARA SEMINAR AND BEYOND

Professor Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu
Chairman of Department of International Relations,
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A pragmatic device for regulating conflicts, the idea of peacekeeping evolved out of necessity through the practice of the United Nations after the paralysis of its collective security system under Cold War conditions. The major concern was then to localize conflicts and tensions and prevent them from escalating to a super power confrontation. According to Inis L. Claude “the greatest potential contribution” of peacekeeping lay “in helping to improve and stabilize the working of the balance of power system”.¹

Since the end of the Cold War, however, the international system and the characteristics of conflict situations have been changing. Intra-state conflicts involving humanitarian disasters and large-scale genocidal acts have become widespread. Non-state actors such as criminal organisations and local warlords have exploited ethnic and other socio-political tensions for their own ends. Weak state structures, socio-economic inequalities and violations of human rights have aggravated intra-state and international tensions. Moreover, as underlined at the previous Challenges Project Seminar of May 2003 in Krusenberg, international terrorism has “created new forms of security threat, new forms of conflict and new forms of response”.

The continuing transformation of the international system and its consequences pose a formidable challenge to Member States, as well as the United Nations. All these developments have required the UN to adapt to change. This is however a dynamic process. The ongoing change implies that the UN has to take the necessary measures keep up with the new socio-political developments and, if necessary, at the expense of its existing priorities. This was indeed how peacekeeping had developed pragmatically during the Cold War. This is indeed what the UN is doing at present and should continue to do.

Over the last decade, the UN has made significant efforts to respond to change. Peace operations have evolved from traditional peacekeeping, usually limited to interposition and ceasefire monitoring, to multi-dimensional operations involving a much wider range of objectives and responsibilities such as protecting civilians in “safe areas”, demilitarization of conflicting parties, assuring the delivery of humanitarian aid, and state-building.

In March 2000, the Secretary-General of the UN convened a high-level Panel to undertake a comprehensive review of United Nations peace and security activities. The Secretary-General presented the report of the Panel to the General Assembly and the Security Council in August 2000. The approach adopted and the reforms recommended by that Report (usually called “the Brahimi Report”) constituted the intellectual basis of the ensuing work of the UN.

The Challenges Project has been an extremely useful contribution to the interdisciplinary aspect of multi-dimensional peace operations by bringing together military, police and civilian experts, including academics. It has greatly contributed to informal, open and academic debate on almost all aspects of peace operations. Since 1997, it has formulated recommendations with a view to increasing the effectiveness and legitimacy of multi-dimensional peace operations.

The Ankara Seminar, in November 2003, accomplished very useful work in the development of an agenda for the Second Phase (2002-2005) of the Challenges Project. It highlighted the following critical issues:

- The necessity of developing a clear concept for peace operations aimed at preventing or ending flagrant violations of human rights (in the form of mass killings and genocidal acts).
- The increased relevance of doctrinal development and strategic planning. In this context, the creation of a Strategic Planning Centre.
- Peace operations require effective coordination and cooperation at all levels.
- Cooperation with regional organizations.
- Cooperation with local administration and civil society, including NGOs, is essential to adjust to local needs and realities.
- The civilian-military cooperation and development of a CMCO culture.
- The four civilian priority areas: police, rule of law, civil administration, and protection of civilians.
- The growing significance and utility of the civilian police.
- For the long-lasting stability and peace, the improvement of economic situation in the intervened country and international assistance given to the devastated populations are of utmost importance. A peace operation should contribute to the self-development of an intervened country.
- The Ankara Seminar also highlighted various recent peace operations particularly held in the Balkans, Africa, the Middle East and Afghanistan.

Reform projects have so far remained within the framework of the Brahimi Report. As is widely acknowledged, the Brahimi Report’s recommendations have already led to significant reforms in the structure, staffing, and implementation of peace operations. The Report, however, neither addressed what should peace operations do when genocidal acts are occurring or likely to occur, nor adequately considered strategic planning and doctrinal issues regarding protection of civilian populations. As a matter of fact, the Report stated that its recommendations were “the minimum threshold of change needed to give the UN system the opportunity to be an effective, operational, Twenty-First century institution”.

One of the most formidable challenges the UN and Member States have had to face since the early 1990s has been the prevention of mass killings of civilians. Successful reforms on this issue would enhance the credibility and legitimacy of peace operations. In the Second Phase, the work of the Challenges Project should go beyond the Brahimi Report and give priority to doctrine development, planning, and effective cooperation at different levels from the perspective of enforcement of humanitarian norms. In other words, it would be most timely and appropriate to address the question of improving the UN and regional

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2 UN Doc. A/55/305 or S/2000/809 of 21 August 2000, par. 7. The word “minimum” is underlined by the author of this paper.
capabilities for the purpose of better protecting civilians and preventing genocidal acts. In this context, the Project should also include in its agenda the post-conflict role of the United Nations and the non-coercive aspects of humanitarian relief operations. Although there has been and continues to be extensive discussion of these issues, there are still differences of view and gaps in doctrine. Therefore they require further elaboration, conceptualization and clarity.

Another topic worth considering should be terrorism. Since September 11, 2001 terrorism and counter-terrorism have come to the forefront on the agenda of international security affairs. In the activities of the UN and regional organizations this issue occupies an important place. The Challenges Project also treated the issue and, in May 2003, prepared a report on “Peace Operations and Counter-Terrorism”. However, overall interest of the Challenges Project participants in the topic has remained minimal. Although the Ankara Seminar of November 2003 was held under the shadow of wide scale terrorist attacks taking place in Istanbul, it was not an exception. The difficulty in reaching a unanimously accepted definition of terrorism should not prevent the international community from struggling against any kind of international and ideologically, ethnically or religiously motivated political violence. It would be a mistake to overlook the fact that such violence often involves mass killings of civilians and creates a very serious obstacle to the success of peace operations, including peace-building.

The following sections will briefly underline a number of problematic issues without proposing solutions. The list of the problems taken up in this paper is by no means exhaustive.

**Legal Authority and the Problem of Clear Mandate**

Coercion through the use of military force has, on various occasions, been a key element in peace operations. The UN peacekeeping practice had deviated from the traditional model based on the three pillars (consent, impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-defence) on the occasion of the Congo operation (ONUC) 1960-1964. The most significant departures, however, took place in the post-Cold War era. The requirement of assuming humanitarian tasks in Somalia and ex-Yugoslavia and the multidimensional character of the missions induced the UN to introduce a certain element of enforcement beyond self-defence in peace operations. There is a wide and common understanding among the Member States that the Security Council, under Chapter VII, has the competence to authorize any peacekeeping force to take enforcement action. Moreover, in terms of article 53, the Security Council can utilize regional organizations for enforcement action. There is also a broad consensus among the members that the Security Council has the authority to authorize individual states or coalitions of states to use force. Member States should work to create a new concept for dealing with conflicts involving humanitarian issues. The objective of enforcement action should be the implementation of international humanitarian norms and facilitation of peace building process.

Although there is considerable clarity about the overall powers of the Security Council, many things become problematic when it comes to the question of mandate. In peace operations, mandates (political objectives) are often ambiguous, if not unattainable.\(^3\)

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Imprecise mandates are often the result of Security Council politics. They are vaguely formulated in order to facilitate consensus among the members of the Security Council. Ambiguity also arises from mixing chapter VI and VII mandates in the Security Council resolutions. Ambiguity may be politically necessary for the initiation of an operation but, on the other hand, it usually creates serious problems in the formulation of military objectives and implementation of the mission. It is to be noted that it may be relatively easier to achieve far less ambiguous mandates concerning long-term objectives such as post-conflict missions.

**Doctrine and Planning**

Although direct and tangible interests of states are low in humanitarian intervention they are increasingly feeling the pressure of a moral and political, if not legal, obligation to intervene for the purpose of preventing and stopping mass killings of civilians and other genocidal acts. Humanitarian intervention, however, poses daunting problems to interveners, international organizations as well as individual states, ranging from casualty sensitivity to strategic and operational constraints affecting the credibility of the operation.

Effective coercion depends on the ability of controlling escalation of violence in complex conflict situations. Military planners and force commanders face narrow limits on the use of force in humanitarian intervention. These constraints make escalation control extremely difficult. They are, among others, vague mandates, excessively rigid rules of engagement, resource limits, lack of a unified command, the fragility of support given by participating states, and the target discrimination problem. They all make it hard to “credibly threaten the adversary with higher levels of military force”.

Is a deterrence strategy possible in peace operations? There are radical differences between the Cold War context in which the deterrence theory became functional and the complex intra-state conflict situations of our time. The above-mentioned complexities will certainly impede a satisfactory operationalisation of the concepts of the deterrence theory. The development of a general and “consistently effective deterrence strategy” seems to be impossible for peace operations. However, this is not to say that deterrence can never work. The success of deterrence would rather depend on the specific conditions of each conflict situation.

For example, after the first Gulf war in 1991, the Saddam regime was successfully deterred from attempting mass killings similar to Halepçe in northern Iraq. Concerned with the recurrence of the tragedies and massive flow of the people across the border, Turkey requested its NATO allies to launch a joint humanitarian operation to protect civilians in northern Iraq. This resulted in Operation Provide Comfort which successfully continued until the US-led military intervention by the Coalition in 2003. In Bosnia, the Serbs could not be effectively deterred until 1995. Eventually, a joint UN-NATO enforcement action was successfully launched against various Serb targets in August 1995 in response to the Bosnian Serb Army’s shelling of Sarajevo. That operation was so successful that it paved the way to the Dayton Peace Agreement. Operation Turquoise, with its mandate to use force beyond self-defence saved thousands of lives though the overall performance of the

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UN in Rwanda was dismal. These operations indicate that there are also lessons to be learned from their partial success with a view to contribute to the doctrine and planning development.

Rules of Engagement

“Rules of engagement are designed to prevent the use of excessive force while minimizing unnecessary passivity... Rules of engagement seek to authorize sufficient force so that commanders can respond to threats without appearing weak and thus inviting further attack. They also seek to prevent commanders from using excessive force, escalating beyond political objectives”.

It is difficult to keep this balance in peace operations. UNPROFOR’s rules of engagement were extremely rigid. They prohibited retaliation, instructed special approval for offensive actions, and required ceasing fire when an opponent ceased fire. Similar inflexibilities existed in the rules governing close air support and protection of safe areas. NATO learned from the UNPROFOR experience and designed more flexible rules of engagement for IFOR, SFOR and KFOR operations. Looking at the recent UN reports on peace operations, we can state that there is an increasing recognition of the importance of rules of engagement. This will hopefully lead to more robust rules of engagement in future UN or UN-authorized operations. DPKO has already done much work on the Rules of Engagement.

Command and Control

In UN peace operations, command and control are shared in many respects and at various levels. Troop contributing states usually seek same sort of control over strategic, operational, and even tactical decisions. Command structure of national contingents remains purely national. Although the commanders of national contingents are usually subordinated to the UN commander who is in turn subordinated to the Secretary-General. Contributing states show a strong tendency to issue instructions directly to their units in the field. Contributing states have on occasions refrained from placing their units under UN command. For example, this was the way how the United States acted in Somalia and the Anglo-French Rapid Reaction Force in Bosnia. Command and control are also shared between the UN Force Commander and the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General who is a civilian. Military actions even at the lowest (tactical) level are taken by their unanimous decisions. Lack of a civilian-military common culture, lack of joint operational experience, differences in national cultures, political and organizational rivalries all offset the creation and operation of an effective command and control structure in peace operations. In the field UN commanders have to communicate and cooperate with UN specialized agencies and non-governmental local or transnational civilian organizations. Cultural organizational differences militate against effective coordination and cooperation at this level too. It may be impossible to solve those of the above-mentioned problems which touch upon the vital or major interests of Member States. Nevertheless, it would be much easier to get over organizational and bureaucratic inhibitions to effective coordination and

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6 D. Byman and M. Waxman, op.cit., 166.
7 Ibid., 166-167.
8 Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, UN Doc. A/57/767, 28 March 2003, par. 188.
9 J. Baylis et alia, op.cit., 300-301.
cooperation. It is also relatively easier to seek the ways of facilitating intercultural communication and coordination leading to more effective cooperation.

**Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration**

The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations “acknowledges the need for additional research and analysis on the interrelated areas of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), security sector reform and the strengthening of the rule of law in post-conflict environments…”

This is one of the formidable challenges faced by complex multidimensional peace operations in our time. Today’s complex intra-state conflict environments are mostly characterized by war-making non-state entities such as ethnic groups, terrorist and criminal organizations. They are “constructed on charismatic lines rather than institutional ones, and to be motivated less by ‘professionalism’ than by fanatical, ideologically-based loyalties”.

War-making non-state entities are dispersed and have a completely decentralized decision-making. Their cells usually decide and act on their own. It is therefore hard for the UN to effectively communicate with them, let alone persuade them to disarm.

**Counter-terrorism**

Terrorism is not only a global threat to international peace and security. It is also a specific threat to peace operations and peace-building in intra-state conflicts. Despite the lack of a consensus on the nature and definition of the terrorist threat, the UN has so far made significant contributions to the struggle against international terrorism. The measures taken by the UN range from financial and political sanctions to the legitimisation of unilateral use of military force against terrorist attacks. The UN, however, has not so far studied terrorism as a threat to peace operations. It has neither looked at it as a challenge complicating peace-building activities in post-conflict situations.

**Cooperation with Regional Organizations**

The UN has always recognized the importance of regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security. Since the early 1990s it has taken steps to strengthen cooperation with regional organizations in multidimensional peace operations. On the occasion of the Bosnian crisis, the UN set up mechanisms of cooperation between

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10 UN Doc. A/55/305 or S/2000/809, par. 125.
UNPROFOR and NATO. The purpose was to enhance the UN’s capacity of enforcement and to effectively protect the civilian population against genocidal acts of the Serbs. This cooperation between the two organizations of different cultures raised many political, military and administrative problems. Eventually, in the summer of 1995, the cooperation worked and NATO’s enforcement action put an end to the killing of civilians and other genocidal acts. Despite the final success, however, the preceding problems discouraged both the UN and NATO from repeating cooperation in similar cases. Today, learning from previous experience, the UN is again developing closer links with the EU and NATO. There are exchange of visits and discussions between staffs in New York and Brussels.

If the UN wants to enhance its capacity for coercive action for the purpose of effectively protecting civilians against mass killings and other genocidal acts, it should reconsider cooperation with regional organizations having that capacity. In the future not only NATO but also the EU may be an appropriate organization for cooperation. The EU has already contributed to peace operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan. It is preparing for the tasks such as peacekeeping, peacemaking, and “crisis management with combat forces” as stated in the WEU’s Petersberg Declaration of June 1992. Moreover, the EU is making serious efforts to combine its civilian culture with a newly developed “strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention”. This strong trend is clearly reflected in the document entitled “European Security Strategy” adopted by the Heads of State and Government at the European Council on 12 December 2003. This new trend in the EU may facilitate a productive but less problematic cooperation between the UN and the EU. But there continue to be sensitivities among countries that do not belong to either NATO or the EU. The UN, therefore, should be careful not to give the impression that it is acting as an agent of Euro-Atlantic policies. Another problem is that certain regional organizations expect financial assistance from the UN which itself need resources to improve its own capabilities.

Final Remarks

The Ankara Seminar, after examining the most critical issues, affecting one way or another, contemporary peace operations, reflected a growing consensus on “The importance of cooperation and coordination to the success of peace operations” as a possible central theme for Phase II. Complex multi-dimensional peace operations of our time require “cooperation at strategic, operational and tactical levels during all phases of peace operations, from the planning stage, through the many transitions during the implementation phase, and on to the achievement of lasting peace and stability”. While cooperation is necessary at all levels to enhance capabilities, it is hard to achieve effective cooperation because of multinational and multicultural differences. Cooperation and coordination issues have preoccupied the UN since the early 1990s. Although the World Organization has made meaningful progress in cooperation at all levels with various actors ranging from regional organizations to NGOs and local administrations, effective cooperation has remained a serious challenge not only to the UN but also to Member States, regional and non-governmental organizations, local administrations, and professionals of different cultural and organizational environments.

The Ankara Seminar also underlined a number of other critical issues some of which are referred to in this concluding paper. One of them is probably the most pressing: increasing the UN’s capacity to cope with mass killings and other genocidal acts. Improvement of UN and regional capabilities in this field will respond to a widespread
expectation in the international community and enhance the legitimacy of peace operations. Rwanda and other recent experiences in Africa made clear that there are great inefficiencies in the mechanisms necessary to prevent humanitarian disasters.

International terrorism is the other significant topic that deserves more and continual attention. Although the UN, particularly since September 11 2001, has considerably contributed to the counter-terrorist struggle, it has not yet examined implications of the international terrorism for peace operations.

As a central theme for Phase II, “cooperation and coordination” is broad and flexible enough to be examined from the perspective of all the critical issues underlined in the Ankara and Krussenberg meetings. Since the general objective is to increase the effectiveness of peace operations by enhancing UN potential and abilities, “cooperation and coordination” appears to be a very significant method of easing or solving the problems that the UN is facing in a complex and changing international system. In this sense, “cooperation and coordination” crosscuts all the critical issues previously underlined.
RAPPORTEUR REPORTS
Panel 1 – Disciplinary perspectives

Under this heading, speakers addressed a number of issues in response to such questions as: What are the new dynamics and challenges of the changing face of peace operations? What lessons can be drawn from recent experiences? What are the implications for Member States? How can Member States most effectively respond to these challenges?

Andrea Bartoli explored the possibilities of the ‘third wave’ of prevention, namely following the work some years ago of the Carnegie Commission and the consideration within the UN, the capability of Member States to implement conflict prevention in practice. He identified the new dynamics and challenges as: increased complexity, the state formation process, economic interests, an inadequate UN system; and the burdens of cooperation. He stressed that no prevention strategy can be successful without the full participation of Member States but as yet there has been insufficient focus on their roles and responsibilities.

It should be recognized that prevention is more than crisis management. Member States have individual and differing capacities to take action, but it is essential to avoid a mood of negativity and a high priority should be given to achieving cooperation through sustained communication among States, both bilaterally and multilaterally.

What is needed, therefore, is a much higher level of cooperation on issues requiring preventive action, recognizing that States have different capabilities and interests and that States tend to understand the issues of prevention better when they consider internal threats to stability. Only through sustained communications patterns could a shared understanding of policy analysis be properly developed. A way of promoting such communications could be for the Challenges project to facilitate a programme of exchanges, either by visits or by internet, among those persons and authorities interested in prevention.

Michael Dziedzic addressed the challenge of filling the void in public security and focused on two aspects: the nature of the public security challenge and the relevance of ‘Formed Police Units’, and thoughts on how to develop greater international capacity to use such units.

There are three distinct gaps in the public security challenge: the deployment gap, the enforcement gap, and the institutional or sustainability gap. The first is temporal in nature, in that in the early days of a mission, unlike the military, the police do not have a surge capability and therefore are not present to relieve the soldiers from law and order responsibilities. Formed police units organized along military lines to deploy rapidly in unit strength are the answer, and the European Union has now developed a capacity to deploy 1000 police at 30 days notice, most of whom are in formed police units.

The enforcement gap is about capabilities and arises when there is a need to perform functions between the lethal force of military combat units and the normal level of force available to the individual policeman. Organized police units, with non-lethal weapons
and a robust law enforcement capacity, such as the Carabinieri and the Gendarmerie, can fill this gap, supplemented by sophisticated criminal intelligence and high-risk arrest capacities.

The institutional gap refers to the incapability of the host government to establish and maintain the rule of law. This requires the development of the local justice system’s ability to afford equal access to justice to all to transform it from an instrument of state repression into a servant of the people. In turn, this transformation requires time with continuous international safeguards to provide oversight, assistance and an ample degree of conditionality, and a continued presence involving formed police units until the rule of law is fully self-sustaining.

The international capacity to provide constabulary police units, Dziedzic suggested, could be increased in four ways: by supporting existing initiatives, such as the current EU approach; by ensuring operability between NATO, the EU and the UN, with the establishment of a Center of Excellence for designing doctrine and training, as proposed by the Italian Government; by supporting the equipping of units in those countries now joining NATO and the EU; and by promoting interoperability between military combat units and constabulary police units.

Mark Malan considered the issue of how the military could contribute to a ‘culture of protection’ in peace operations. He noted that neither the Brahimi Report nor the Independent International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) established by Canada had addressed what should be done in peace operations when “serious and irreparable harm” was occurring, or likely to occur, to human beings. This aspect needed reform if 21st century peace operations were to enjoy legitimacy and credibility.

The ICISS debate had shifted the debate from the “right to intervene” towards “the responsibility to protect”. While the ICISS focused on military intervention rather than peace operations, he suggested that the practice of separating the two needed to be questioned as the distinction between them was becoming increasingly blurred at the strategic and operational levels. He illustrated his views by describing the case of action by the Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF) in the Ituri district of the Congo in late 1999. The IEMF, authorized by the Security Council and deployed under the auspices of the EU, had a similar mandate as MONUC but the difference was the former’s force posture and credibility.

Until recently, the international community has not accepted the responsibility to provide law enforcement but this began to change at the end of the 1990s with the interventions in Kosovo and East Timor where the UN assumed responsibility for executive policing. In later operations in Africa, the Security Council demonstrated its readiness to invoke the powers of Chapter VII in authorizing forces to protect civilians at risk in armed conflict. In reality, however, what constituted appropriate enforcement action had been determined more by military expediency than any sense of moral obligation to protect. Despite the tragedies of Srebenica and Rwanda, there was still no clear concept for legitimate peace operations aimed at preventing or ending gross abuses of human rights by governments or those persons who cannot be controlled by governments. There had been no move to change the focus of peace operations from the principle of consent towards a form of policing that would reduce the level of factional violence.
Malan argued that the singular strand that would pull together various mission components dealing with protection, human rights, justice and security issues would be a concept of Chapter VII peace operations in failed states as international law enforcement operations. The primary objective of the military in such operations should be to enforce international humanitarian and human rights law to support the broader peace-building processes. In that context, he noted the recent observation by the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations that “restoration of the rule of law must be seen as an essential activity that can determine the success or failure of our peacekeeping operations”.

Ove Bring reviewed some of the legal aspects and challenges and focused his remarks on mandates, the rule of law, security of mission personnel and national legal frameworks for peace operations. The increased relevance of Chapter VIII in mandates authorized by the Security Council implied a heavy responsibility and also possibilities for early regional action that would go further than peacekeeping and extend to enforcement. Moreover, there was a certain blurring of distinctions between mandates under Chapters VI, VII and VIII in the matter of consensual and non-consensual operations.

He believed that peacekeepers should know more about international humanitarian law and human rights law, and there should be a Secretary-General’s Bulletin on human rights in peace operations to supplement the one already issued on observance of international humanitarian law. On the other hand, he did not see a need for a UN Criminal Code listing crimes and penalties for peacekeepers as national jurisdictions were expected to deal with such violations by their national personnel serving in peace operations. He noted that some of these and related issues had been discussed at the seminar held in Melbourne in late 2001 and a number of recommendations had been put forward.

Regarding the security of mission personnel, he focused his comments on the threats of terrorism and other attacks on mission personnel and facilities. In his view, the 1994 UN Convention on Safety and Security of UN and Associated Personnel had not been a success in that the protection intended to be provided by that Convention did not amount to physical security. An urgent revision of the Convention was necessary. In addition, there was a clear need for peace operations to have a mechanism for intelligence gathering, both in order to prevent terrorist acts and to react to them.

Drawing attention to a joint Swedish-Russian project on the subject of national legal frameworks, he suggested that there should be a comparative overview to promote consistency between them. Consistency and harmony at different national levels was one way of achieving unity of command at the multinational operational level. Such actions would also contribute to raising the awareness of international humanitarian law in peace operations and the establishment of common standards.

In the discussion that followed the first group of speakers, several points were raised. One commentator, referring to Ove Bring’s intervention, felt that if the military and police components of a peace operation were going to be more robust, it would be good to have some kind of interim criminal code in order to provide a legal framework for their actions, particularly in the first months of an operation. Another person suggested that in the light of mandates established in the past, the common points should be brought together to construct a peacekeeping, peacemaking convention to provide guidance for future operations, and that there should also be a field manual for peacekeepers to use. Ove Bring responded that he was not in favour of a convention based on mandates, as mandates had to
be unique and designed for each situation. Jacques Klein added that, as mandates dealt with politically sensitive questions regarding the use of force and individual national security concerns, there was no political will to produce international documents such as a convention on mandates.

Another comment from the floor referred specifically to Africa and Andreas Bartoli’s presentation. The speaker, from an NGO working on peace and development issues in the Horn of Africa, strongly supported Bartoli’s thesis. Stating that the major problem of Africa was that it was littered with weak states, he expressed his view that the greatest challenge was the building of legitimate, inclusive and stable states capable of establishing and keeping the peace.

Du Nongyi presented a perspective of coordination between the UN and regional organizations in peace operations. Regional organizations had certain advantages, such as eagerness to put an end to conflicts in their regions as early as possible, their possession of resources and military power to cooperate with the UN, their understanding of the cultures and traditions of their respective regions that gave them an incisive knowledge of the root causes of the conflicts, and their ability in some cases to react swiftly and flexibly thereby avoiding possible delay by having to wait for action at UN headquarters.

The success of UN peace operations lay with the political willingness of its Member States and the parties in the conflict. Regional organizations were able to make three main contributions: by diplomatic negotiations at the regional level to pave the way for UN peace operations; by carrying out first-stage work and the provision of logistic and other support, such as guaranteeing the safety of mission personnel; and by implementing joint actions.

However, it should also be recognized that regional organizations had limitations in the lack of unified command, a clear division of responsibilities, and a lack of essential expert personnel, equipment and financial resources. These limitations resulted in some negative influences. Some regional organizations were inclined to take advantage of UN authority to advance their own political goals. Separately, involvement of regional organizations raised questions regarding impartiality and neutrality because of their close connections with states in the conflict area. Moreover, the involvement of some regional organizations could lead to a loss of UN control over peace operations being carried out in the UN’s name. He noted that some western countries had proposed that regional organizations, such as NATO, ASEAN and the African Union, should deal with crises and in some instances, especially NATO, play a global role with or without UN authorization. In his view, such arguments tended to marginalize the UN role in peace operations and harmed the further healthy development of UN Peace operations as a whole.

Arising from these considerations, Du Nongyi urged that some countries should not step over UN authority or intervene in the internal affairs of other countries on behalf of the UN, that coordination between the UN and regional organizations should not go beyond the framework of the UN Charter, that the UN and regional organizations should not compete with each other in peace and security matters, and that a liaison mechanism between the UN and regional organizations was badly needed.

In sum he believed that the key to the coordination issue rested mainly on two points: regional organizations should and could play an increasingly important role in peace
Muhammed Al-Allaf gave an account of Jordan’s experience of civil affairs in an international peace operation context. Traditionally, civil-military affairs were aimed at expanding the horizons of military forces in combat by using civilians present in the theatre of operation. This was no longer true. Military planners and staff officers are now required to get more involved in planning the civilian dimensions of their operations. The civil affairs planning cells are expected to anticipate a variety of humanitarian conditions that might develop during a military operation or a peacekeeping mission, providing options for rapid response to urgent conditions occurring in a crisis environment.

In recent years, many countries have experienced the value of the civil affairs function and are incorporating such activities into their militaries. The Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) recognized the significance of the civil affairs function in a combat or peacekeeping environment and JAF doctrine calls for two senior joint staff officers to carry out civil affairs planning in a PKO environment, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence and Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations. They are required to examine situations, review conditions in a combat or peacekeeping environment that might lead to humanitarian consequences, and coordinate joint solutions. Their function is not how best to make use of civilian resources and infrastructure, but to ensure the safety and security of civilians and to restore normal daily life as soon as possible.

The most important dimension of civil affairs is the political aspect of the function. Providing medical assistance and meeting the basic needs of the local population can mitigate the suffering of civilians, but such services will not achieve a viable political solution. The biggest challenge of the civil affairs function is to contribute actively to finding a permanent political settlement and in these civil affairs staff, planners, forces and specialized services have a lot to offer. Without such a dimension, civil affairs will fall within the realm of tactics rather than strategy.

In sum, therefore, military civil affairs structures, doctrines, staff functions and field operations have to adjust to the changing nature of the security environment and to the ever-growing demands of civil rights in conflict situations.

Gesche Karrenbrock offered her remarks from a UNHCR perspective on changes in peace operations and their impact on displacement and sustainable solutions. Since the 1990s the increased incidence of the implosion of states had produced new and difficult challenges. There had been a shift from refugees to a much larger number of internally and externally displaced persons. At the same time, the perception that humanitarian actors were assisting one side or another rather than being neutral and non-political, together with the logistic and security needs that made it necessary and useful to make use of military assets, all had contributed to the reduction of neutral humanitarian space. All these had added to a vicious cycle of misunderstanding.

From the reception of refugees, the matter of return and reintegration had become a major area of activity for UNHCR, but this had raised the challenge of whether UNHCR was still implementing the principle of voluntary return.
Peace operations and peace-making have changed the relationship between humanitarian actors and the military. There has been a blurring of the emergency humanitarian assistance period with the confidence-building phase. In addition the use of military logistics and intelligence support in situations of mass displacement or extensive civilian hardship have meant that humanitarian actors need to cooperate with the military, but at the same time keep a visible distance to preserve their basic mandates and goals. The humanitarian community has struggled to respond to this dilemma.

In post-conflict situations the population needs signs of rapid improvement in the sectors of life that previously caused displacement and hardship, and this has given an added importance to the promotion of development assistance and institution-building. There has to be a rapid move from military to civilian engagement and this has given yet greater impetus to the four Rs – repatriation, reintegration, rehabilitation and reconstruction, to which might be added a fifth R – reconciliation.

The return and repatriation of displaced persons brings with it several problems: who should judge conditions of safety and dignity? Who should have the responsibility to provide objective information so that people can make informed decisions on whether or not to return? Premature returns raise the risks of renewed destabilization through secondary displacement.

Finally, in recent years there have been new origins and actors in conflict, and new threats to the security of humanitarian personnel. The Secretary-General has stressed that we must never be reckless with our staff. At the same time, however, UN humanitarian and operational agencies cannot operate from within a fortress and this dilemma itself creates new challenges.

In the ensuing discussion, the first speaker took up some of the points made by Du Nongyi and commented from the floor that the problem for Africa was how to fashion a strategically credible cooperation arrangement to ensure that the Security Council and the UN would actually respond to Africa’s crises in a predictable and meaningful way. The speaker also made the point that we should be mindful of how post-conflict political order was established and made sustainable, and if the conflict ended through international intervention and peace negotiations then a very credible third party interaction was essential to achieve sustainability. Gesche Karrenbock responded that for UNHCR it was necessary for the neutral humanitarian partner to work with a political actor to develop political solutions to the conflict, and in the context of Africa that third party had often and quite successfully been the OAU, now the AU.

A counter view was given from the floor by a seminar participant who had had direct experience of difficulties in Africa. Referring to the extensive killings in Liberia, he said that it had been very difficult to find any organization willing to stop them. Neither the UN nor the United States had moved militarily to offer protection to the people. A similar situation had now arisen in Burundi, where the UN had needed a comprehensive peace agreement before it would deploy a peacekeeping operation: as such a comprehensive agreement would never be possible in African situations; this inaction by the UN was a thinking that was not for the 21st century.

This comment caused another speaker to refer to the Bosnia situation, when there was good will on the humanitarian side but no political will to take action. He gave as his
example the case of the ‘safe haven’ in Srebrenica decided by the Security Council that was followed by the failure of UN peacekeepers to protect the residents from Serb killings. In turn, this drew a rebuttal from another participant who pointed out that the term ‘safe haven’ had never been formally adopted, and that even ‘safe area’ had been strongly resisted by Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali as the UN knew that the Dutch troops would not have the military strength to protect the civilian population against determined attack. Unfortunately, the Council had passed the resolution and given the UN peacekeepers an impossible task. Thus, if Member States wanted the UN and regional organizations to be effective, they needed to provide not only the political will but also the tools to do the job.

The final question posed from the floor, addressed to Gesche Karrenbock, asked why the UN’s humanitarian work in Iraq lacked credibility among Iraqis even though the UN was not a party to the Iraq war. She responded that many of the UN agencies were seen by Iraqis as being involved in the Oil-for-Food Programme established by the Security Council, and therefore not perceived as necessarily as a humanitarian input but as a visible sign of the sanctions regime. In addition, as a personal view, she wondered whether it had been wise for the humanitarian agencies to enter Iraq almost simultaneously with the military actions, as perhaps they had then been perceived as being too close to the military effort.
In presenting the different case studies the speakers focused on the way in which, in a given situation, a peace operation resulted in success or failure. The issues for discussion were the identification of unique characteristics of a case that may have led to a particular outcome and the lessons that could be drawn from these successes and / or failures.

The three groups of speakers addressed case studies from specific geographical areas, namely: the Balkans, Africa and the Middle East. It is worth mentioning that, in analysing peace operations that took place over a period of time, the seminar participants benefited from a temporal or longitudinal approach which made it possible to compare the evolution of peace operations phenomena. This view was convergent with the central topic of the seminar: “The Challenges of Change: The Nature of Peace Operations in the 21st Century and Continuing Need for Reform”. As Michael Sahlin stated ‘…it is a long time study, from Somalia to what we have heard today. We can infer we are doing things in a better way.’

The Balkans

Mehmet Kemal Bozay addressed the Balkan experience (specifically in Bosnia and Kosovo, as part of the same regional armed conflict) in the development and implementation of comprehensive strategies for multidimensional peace operations. He described a model of transitional administration that differed from the peacekeeping operations of the Cold War period, constituting a turning point in the evolution of peace operations. In view of the humanitarian catastrophes that had occurred, the international community had to apply certain enforcement methods. In order to maintain peace and security, the international community established a transitional administration, with the High Representative and his office as the civilian pillar, IFOR (later SFOR) as the military component, while the UN Security Council established the Civpol Force (IPTF). The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) focused on the election process, while the World Bank and the European Union (EU) started comprehensive projects for economic reconstruction. The maintenance of peace for years following the two deadly conflicts has been an immense achievement. Moreover, the experience in Bosnia had led to a different arrangement for Kosovo, and it could be said that Security Council resolution 1244 that set up the peace operation in Kosovo had become the mother of UN resolutions for subsequent complex peace operations.

But although much has been achieved in both cases, there is still no exit strategy, mainly in Bozay’s view because the justice issue – the common dominator for the rule of law and human rights - including specific doctrinal developments, has yet to be dealt with effectively. Bozay recommended that the UN system should move from a theoretical discussion on justice to field practice. The rule of law has not been strengthened sufficiently to provide the necessary confidence to achieve reconciliation. Moreover, the
promotion of human rights has overshadowed the minority issues. Advocating the universality of individual rights without focusing on the collective rights of certain groups may not be a valid approach for the transitional administration of a community that has suffered ethnic cleansing. Some argue that ‘a comprehensive theory of justice in a multicultural state should include both universal individual rights and certain group-differentiated rights or special status for minority cultures’. Bozay believed that there is also a vital need to establish a Strategic Planning Centre at UN Headquarters in New York that should be transparent, impartial and immune to political influences, in order to recommend strategies and doctrines for each particular mission. The establishment of such a centre is a pending issue that has not been seriously addressed by the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations.

Harm de Jonge addressed the Macedonia case, which clearly reflected the danger of how a certain conflict can spill over regional-wide, thereby provoking insurgency crises in countries that were not previously affected by severe conflict. Such was the case in Macedonia, where the mandate of the UN Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) – probably the only military preventive deployment - was not extended but the situation evolved and called for more complex peace operation tasks involving regional organizations with the ultimate responsibility given to a lead country. Those tasks included tackling the provision of Albanian rights; participating in disarmament, census and election processes; and even policing tasks for the restoration of public law and order, at the request of the Macedonian Government. Many straightforward observations or recommendations could be identified. It is counterproductive to redeploy all the mission personnel at once, leaving the indigenous people by themselves. The peacekeepers’ presence should be seen so it is important to move around and show the flag. Procedures that foster success were clearly stated. It is important to get close to the local population and listen to their fears and expectations. A way of fostering synergy is through close cooperation and coordination with governmental organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). It is of the utmost importance to promote initiative and flexibility, recognizing that sometimes the commander must go beyond the ‘cold letter’ of the mandate in certain situations.

In the ensuing question and answer session, one participant with experience of the Macedonian issue wondered whether actions taken to stabilize the situation might lead, a few years later, to a resumption of tensions and problems, and therefore peacekeepers would have to remain for a long time in order to maintain stability. Another participant enquired whether the Macedonian mandate should have been broader. A third participant asked whether the political sensitivities of handling the Macedonian situation, and the arms traffic across the border with Kosovo, would have an effect on Kosovo.

Responding to these comments, Harm de Jonge agreed that long-lasting stability in Macedonia had not yet been achieved. In his view, the only answer was to improve the economic situation and for that soldiers were not needed. What was necessary was economic and other support from the European Union to give the Macedonians the possibility of self-development. Regarding his mandate, it would have been good to be able to support the internal police in their fight against criminality, and to monitor or close the border between Kosovo and Macedonia. But Macedonia was an independent and proud country and so from a political perspective he understood why the mandate could not be broader. Harm de Jonge saw the situations in Macedonia and Kosovo as being closely linked; the Kosovo issue was not likely to be resolved for some years and until that
happened there would continue to be spill-over between the Albanians in Kosovo and the Albanians and the whole population of Macedonia.

Another participant saw the absence of an exit strategy in Bosnia somewhat differently from Bozay: rather than the matter of dealing with the justice issue effectively, he believed that more important was the risk of resumption of conflict around the Breko Gap if international peacekeepers were withdrawn. In such circumstances there might be panic among the Serbs living to the west, leading to another ethnic evacuation to Serbia. As to Security Council resolution 1244, he doubted if that resolution could be even reaffirmed, as it had created a complicated arrangement in which there was no unity of command and it did not provide for a final status of Kosovo.

Bozay responded that by his comment about resolution 1244 he had meant that in future complex peace operations there might be, as in Kosovo, an SRSG responsible for a transitional administration but the military aspect would be handled by a multinational force rather than a UN force of ‘Blue Helmets’.

Africa

The case study of Sierra Leona, presented by Martin Agwai focused on the role of leadership in a multifunctional peace operation such as the UN Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). After enumerating a series of problems that had to be dealt with, such as lack of cohesion and direction, varying capacities and the high rate of rotation of contingents, the speaker addressed several key issues that led to UNAMSIL success. The primary aim of the mission was to create the security conditions required for peaceful elections. For that, it was necessary to demonstrate UNAMSIL credibility and capability to ensure freedom of movement and establish new areas of direct influence for UNAMSIL. It was also essential to avoid cross border movement that would spill the conflict over to the region, and to restore government authority. Contact with the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) leadership led to consensus as regards disarmament. The RUF were concerned over their safety after disarmament, a concern which was counterbalanced by a disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) sensitisation process which even took child soldiers into account. The immediate destruction of weapons was an imperative. There were also proactive media activities (information operations) that should not be seen as psychological warfare, but rather as a way of avoiding misinformation. Agwai recommended that peacekeepers should be mentally and psychologically prepared and militarily well-equipped to send a clear message that they can defend themselves and the mandate. In-mission training for election monitoring was crucial for the Sierra Leone electoral process. Furthermore, he stressed the importance of educating all the native population in international law, so that they understand the implications of what they are doing. Finally the speaker focused attention on the importance of leadership in a peace operation. Leadership – especially at strategic management level - involves a sound professionalism with a deep understanding of the local culture and the people’s traditions. This helps to gain the respect and support of the community and promotes confidence-building with the local political leaders. The following characteristics of leadership were highlighted: ‘bold and flexible...ready to take a calculated risk and remain impartial’; able to differentiate between reality and ideal in order to bring reality as close as possible to the ideal; acceptance that occasionally he will have to work under conditions that cannot be changed but cannot be ignored either. A force commander should ideally be a leader with experience, dedication and knowledge of his subordinates, a facilitator who should
encourage shared vision, mutual appreciation of appropriate value and clear definitions of roles, promoting creative and critical thinking.

Jacques Paul Klein reviewed the situation in Liberia. After presenting the general background of the crisis in that country, he analysed the renewed conflict (1999 – 2003), highlighting the arrangement by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) of a peace conference which resulted in the implementation of the Accra Peace Accord, designating a National Transitional Government for Liberia (NTGL); and the UN Security Council authorization for the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) with a robust mandate. Both the ECOWAS military mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) and the UNMIL operation were welcomed by the Liberian people. The impact of the UNMIL presence in a failed state has resulted in the enhancement of security in Monrovia, humanitarian assistance in the form of food, potable water, medical and schooling services, greater freedom of movement and the launching of a DDR programme. Moreover, the excellent cooperation between ECOWAS and UNMIL has helped in resolving the grey areas of the Accra Peace Accord. Unfortunately UNMIL still encounters certain constraints and difficulties: for example, armed robberies in Monrovia and instability in rural areas with reports of continuing violence targeted at civilians by rebel groups; skirmishes between opposing militia forces provoking severe problems of internally displaced persons (IDPs); palpable struggles over posts in the yet to be reconstructed Liberian army; and the slow pace in the arrival of troops which is hampering UNMIL deployment to the entire country. One of the issues yet to be solved is the provision of financial resources to help rebuild Liberia. In addition to a pledging conference to be co-chaired by USA and the UN Secretary General, UNMIL has already hosted a meeting of ambassadors from major donor countries.

Other issues that need to be tackled, following both a national and integrated sub-regional approach, are: the proliferation of small arms, and the question of mercenaries and child soldiers. As regards the DDR programme, it is essential that both UNMIL and UNAMSIL, together with neighbouring countries, coordinate and complement efforts. Klein concluded by stating that, in spite of persistent violence in the rural areas, the peace process seems to be on course, counting on solid international support for the DDR programme, and improvement of security in the capital as a result of combining army and police patrols. However, UNMIL still has to face serious challenges, such as the insufficient deployment of troops which hampers aid workers in their efforts to do their job properly in an insecure and volatile environment.

Can Altan developed his case study on the Democratic Republic of Congo, defining the conflict as a continental war that involved armies from eight African countries. This regional war aggravated several local conflicts in the eastern part of the country characterized by interethnic killings. The first section of his presentation provided an overview of developments in the region and Congo before the signing of Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. The second section was devoted to the Lusaka Agreement and the establishment of the Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies en République démocratique du Congo (MONUC). This was followed by an analysis of the way in which the mission achieved success. The Lusaka Agreement was signed with the aid of several African countries. Even though the conflict in Congo slowed down it never ended. The parties had signed the accord for different reasons: gaining time for recovery, international pressure or the idea that it would never be applied. Following the ill-fated UN operations in Somalia and Rwanda, the Western countries were not enthusiastic about engaging in Africa. The UN Secretariat itself was extremely cautious about a major operation in Congo. It was
known that the operation in Congo would take long and would require a robust military force, together with the support of the parties to the conflict and the Congolese people themselves. The UN started working in collaboration with the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to ensure the implementation of the agreement. Thus, the UN established MONUC, whose mandate was to monitor and assist in the implementation of the Lusaka Agreement. It was difficult for MONUC because military operations continued. There were massive human rights violations in all areas, while natural resources were illegally exploited. Moreover, the government of Congo was not cooperating with MONUC. The assassination of President Kabila became a turning point. The new government wanted MONUC to continue fulfilling its mandate. Consensus was reached on a number of important issues during the Inter-Congolese dialogue. Owing to international pressure, no foreign troops remained in Congo by the beginning of 2003. This marked the beginning of a transitional period. The main provisions of the Lusaka Agreement such as ceasefire, disengagement, relocation of fighting forces, and withdrawal of foreign armies, inter-Congolese dialogue and initial progress in the disarmament of armed groups have been achieved. MONUC had a part in all those positive developments. Still Congo is a divided and poverty-stricken country and military hostilities continue in the east. The two main key factors for MONUC success are having a sound peace-building strategy adaptable to the changing circumstances, and success in projecting credible political and military force. It is important to highlight that MONUC’s most important asset was not its military strength but its success in projecting credible political power, stemming from its ability to guide Security Council resolutions. What is clear is that MONUC could not have succeeded without the interest shown by the Security Council which even sent three Security Council missions to the region, and with the political support of Security Council Permanent Members as individual states. The other vital factor that fostered success was the willingness of all political forces in Congo to talk and negotiate.

In his presentation Abdul Muhammed explained how the Ethiopian-Eritrean unresolved conflict provides a case study of the way in which a small local conflict developed into a large-scale conflict when the major powers in the Security Council failed to attend to it. The speaker described certain factors which fostered mutual suspicion between the two parties, namely: the lack of transparency in their relationship, the postponement of addressing the issue of citizenship of nationals living in the other country and the late arrangement of the exchange rate. The decision-making processes were completely different, with the Ethiopian side undergoing a slow collective process while Eritrea moved more quickly. The outbreak of war caught every one by surprise, so the international community could not be blamed for not taking preventive measures, but it failed to take unambiguous actions once the seriousness of the conflict became evident. The wider international community regarded a fight between two impoverished countries over a poor strip of territory as unacceptable. Even the Security Council did not uphold the same principles in Ethiopia-Eritrea as it defended in the Balkans. Only Rwanda and the USA presented a peace plan that became the basis for the Framework Proposal issued by the OAU. The proposal encompassed four main points: the withdrawal of Eritrean forces to the positions they were at before the outbreak of hostilities; the restoration of Ethiopian civil administration to Badme; the border demarcation based on existing international treaties; and the demilitarisation of the border, supervised by a third-party observer. Ethiopia readily accepted the plan but Eritrea rejected it until its troops suffered a military defeat. Only when the Ethiopian troops advanced deep into Eritrean territory did the diplomatic process make progress.
According to Muhammed, the parties need the international community’s assistance and cooperation, working in a mutually supportive way, fostering the DDR process and sharing information with the UN. As for the parties in conflict, he stressed that they should demonstrate a great sense of responsibility and prudence to accept the Boundary Arbitration Commission’s decision. He bitterly criticized the Security Council for underscoring Eritrea’s violation of its obligations. Having stated the potential difficulties that may arise, Muhammed recognized the need for taking positive steps towards reconciliation and restoration of peace, as for example ceasing the hostile propaganda directed against each other, reducing the level of military expenditure, and ensuring respect of human rights of citizens residing in each others’ country. Finally, Muhammed stressed that Africa needs no more wars and he emphasized that regional security order should be fostered with the development of a larger concept and vision of regional security in which economic development, poverty and epidemic reduction, protection of human rights, control of small arms proliferation, regulation of refugee flows and environmental protection become of the utmost importance. This would be the only way in which Africa may eradicate the lawlessness that fuels cycles of violence.

Several seminar participants had experience of peace operations in Africa. In response to one participant who asked what possibility there was of forming an African Rapid Response Force on behalf of the African Union, Agwai drew attention to ECOWAS which had served in that role on three occasions in West Africa and which, in conjunction with the stand-by force arrangement of the European Union, is now trying to improve its capability. Klein agreed that this is a major challenge and pointed out that what is needed is standardized training and standardized equipment with the EU or USA covering the costs.

Commenting on the presentation regarding UNMIL in Liberia, another participant underlined the importance of quick impact projects, funds for rebuilding and the crucial need for employment opportunities for former combatants. Klein agreed with these points and stressed that quick important projects were perhaps the most important tasks to be done.

A third participant, drawing on his own experience of military service in UNAMSIL, asked whether ECOMOG should have continued for longer and UNAMSIL should have been launched at a later date. He also pointed to the difficulties of maintaining impartiality, particularly in situations such as Sierra Leone where British troops were training government forces while the UN was trying to mediate impartially between all the various factions. Thirdly, he drew attention to the challenges of peacekeepers raising expectations among the indigenous people and then the problem of meeting those expectations over time. On the first point, Agwai responded that it was necessary that peacekeepers should show that they had military capability and the readiness to use it to achieve their mandate. In his view, ECOMOG had been a success despite a lack of resources and capability. On the issue of raising expectations, Klein agreed and said that the leaders of peace operations had to be very careful.

An African participant observed that most African countries see involvement in peacekeeping, especially in their sub-region, not as a national interest but as a duty to assist neighbours. In the end, it does not matter who really does it but what is most important is that it is done in order to bring peace and tranquillity to a country or sub-region.
Hilmi Akin Zorlu presented Lessons Learned from Afghanistan. The primary role of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF II) was to assist the Afghan Transitional Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, as well as in developing a national security structure (training future Afghan Security Forces) and assisting in the country’s reconstruction. The fundamental operational principles of the Turkish leadership of ISAF included respect for Afghan citizens, their customs and cultural values – something that was easily achieved owing to the deep-rooted friendship between Afghanistan and Turkey; equal treatment of all ethnic groups; non-intervention in Afghan domestic politics; and close coordination with the local authorities, representatives of UN and NGOs. Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) should train their troops in these attitudinal aspects because mutual trust between the local population and the peacekeepers (confidence-building) is of the utmost importance. For instance, joint patrols were very important to train the Afghan Security Forces (ASF) and to show mutual support between ISAF and the ASF. The role of the lead nation (Turkey in this case) was particularly important as a main donor of items for security and provider of training. Because of the tendency of most TCCs to assign support personnel, the imbalance between combat troops and support or staff personnel is an issue that needs to be carefully determined. In-mission training for rapid reaction and Force protection becomes an important factor in any peace operation. One of the main aspects that calls for effective planning is logistics. The same can be said regarding communication and information systems. In order to keep the local and international communities timely and accurately informed, a press briefing was held daily. In conclusion, Zorlu highlighted that the strong bonds and harmony among all members were one of the reasons underlying ISAF success.

Arthur Dewey also addressed the situation in Afghanistan, stressing the fact that it is a story still being written but with adequate confidence in a successful conclusion, owing mainly to four factors. In the first place, civilian or military leadership both in the UN and in the Afghan Government have proved to be very effective and have paid great dividends. Secondly, the Afghan Government and people are now involved in the reconstruction and reconstitution of their country with UN agencies playing a vital role through the implementation of a model called ‘Programme Secretariat’, described as a way for the UN to start transferring planning and programming, and eventually budgeting, of essential public services to local Afghan ministries. Dewey considered the model applicable to other situations in similar nation-building operations in the future. Thirdly, the relationship between Humanitarian Action and Reconstruction has been so positive that it led to one of the largest repatriation operations in history. Refugee returns are seen as part of the reconstruction process. A problem that has yet to be faced is employment for the returnees and demobilized militias that would provide cash for them to access the local markets. President F. Roosevelt’s economic recovery programme served as a model for launching a similar initiative in Afghanistan, called the Afghan Conservation Corps (ACC), which will provide, for instance, reforestation jobs especially for women and demobilized militia. In this respect, it is of vital importance to coordinate the ACC with the DDR initiative. However, the relief and reconstruction process is threatened by a resurgence of spoiling elements. So much so that it has become a top priority to implement a comprehensive security strategy to deal with ethnic persecutions and human rights violations by warlords. There is still no reliable police or justice system to help, even though there has been improvement with the renovation and reopening of the Police Academy in Kabul. Afghanistan has yet to develop a nationally-acceptable organisation and structure for a
military force that should be multi-ethnic, disciplined and subordinate to the civilian authority and capable of building an effective fighting and security force. Among the most recent security developments are the civil-military Provincial Reconstruction Teams whose duties are to assess local needs and facilitate the exchange of information of all players in order to foster a security environment beyond Kabul, while helping align the central authority with local ones. Thus, the fourth factor towards success is operationalising the synergy among security, human rights and the rule of law.

George Oliver presented a case study on Iraq. The Iraq War of March/April 2003 lasted 21 days, yet “winning the peace” will take much longer. The presentation covered the initial work of reconstruction, humanitarian assistance and governance of the Coalition Provisional Authority, and the significant challenges it had to face. A group of skilled professionals learnt the lessons of past mission and undertook in Iraq a task that some thought impossible. Under the previous regime, the Iraqi people had suffered in almost every manner possible human rights abuses. The infrastructure was thirty to forty years behind the rest of the world, and over ten years of international sanctions had put Iraq in dire straits. The skill with which the Coalition carried out the war was unprecedented. When reconstruction began there was no humanitarian crisis, but the long road to reconstruction was just beginning. With the USA as lead nation in the war, it also took the lead in reconstruction efforts and the forming of a new Iraqi government, aiming at security and self-governance. Thus, the USA formed the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), focusing on meeting basic human needs such as food and water; respect for human rights; the issue of refugees and IDPs; the restoration of public services such as sanitation and health; and the implementation of mine action programmes. Initially there were three countries in the coalition to rebuild Iraq and they began an intense period of planning, but two months were not enough before they began their activities in Baghdad on 20 April. Two months later a new organization, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was formed around the nucleus of ORHA. Early successes of the Coalition included reforming the Iraqi Ministries, working with the UN and specific UN agencies, such as the World Food Programme (WFP) to get the public distribution system working, attending to humanitarian issues, getting children back to school and public utilities functioning, and forming an Interim Iraq Authority.

In the discussion that followed the three presentations, there was wide agreement that the nature of peace operations has changed over time and is continuing to change. In earlier years there was little attention paid to such issues as reconstruction and rebuilding, whereas in modern peace operations these consume much attention and resources. It was also recognized that in some situations a UN military force might be more appropriate, whereas in others in which more robust action is needed a multinational force, involving either NATO or some other coalition of willing states, is more suitable.

A view expressed in various ways by a number of participants was that the military operation in Iraq is not a peace operation, and that as an occupying power the United States had certain responsibilities according to international humanitarian law. Oliver responded that although the peace enforcement operation in Iraq is on the high end of the spectrum it is an operation to establish security that has the support of most Iraqis, notwithstanding the efforts of a few who act as peace spoilers, and is therefore a peace operation. On the matter of international humanitarian law, the United States complied with the requirements of the Geneva Convention and to the extent practicable sought to treat people with dignity and respect. Replying to another participant who asked why the planning for the post-conflict
situation in Iraq had not been better planned, Oliver explained that pulling together all the different agencies within the US government had itself been a challenge and that there continue to be lessons to be learned in this respect. Dewey added that even now in USA there is still insufficient realization of what the civilian components of nation-building require, and in turn it has to be a total force approach involving the military and all aspects of civilian expertise.

The exchange gave rise to another comment from the floor by a participant who drew a distinction between a government as an authority, and a state as an identity of the people. Destroying a government to replace it with another was understandable, but in Iraq why destroy the state? Why disband the army? Why disband the civil servants? Oliver replied that in Iraq the army and the police force had dissolved themselves, and the aim was now to help the Iraqi people rebuild a state that was familiar to them. Dewey observed that the questioner raised points that deserved more consideration, namely that perhaps more research should be applied to civilian targeting as well as military targeting.

A further comment from the floor drew attention to differences between the way in which the US army conducts peace operations and the practice of the UN, giving as an example the fact that in US practice ‘civil affairs officers’ are military and in uniform, whereas in UN practice such persons are always civilians. It was generally accepted that both functions have considerable value but the usage of the same term for different functions can create certain confusion. There continues to be a need for problems of interagency coordination and civil-military cooperation to be overcome by better understanding and better training.

Conclusions of Panel 2

While recognizing that each mission is unique, most case studies highlighted certain common points:

▫ For the achievement of long-lasting stability aiming at durable peace, it is essential to improve the economic situation in the affected area. To this end, the international community must support the devastated population in its effort towards self-development.
▫ The restoration of durable peace and stability in a country requires a regional approach involving regional organizations. However, while sometimes these organizations may have the will, they may not have adequate resources.
▫ In order to gain respect it is necessary for peacekeepers to show that they possess the capability and the leadership to act robustly when necessary. However, overacting can be counterproductive, and provoke a violent reaction to the peacekeepers’ presence.
▫ Some key factors of success are: clear mandates; sound leadership; unity of command; the important role of a lead nation; keeping the local and international communities well informed; respect for local culture, values and traditions; the establishment of security, law and order; respect for justice, human rights and the rule of law; effective civil-military coordination; successful confidence-building; and well-planned and implemented DDR processes.
Panel 3 - Implications for preparations of peace operations

Under this heading, speakers addressed a number of issues in response to such questions as: What is the role that the multinational peacekeeping forces need to play in establishing sustainable peace as opposed to locals? In such operations how can the question of sovereignty be dealt with? What is the role of international organizations like the UN, the OSCE and the EU in peace operations? How can the peace operation instruments of these organizations be reformed to acquire better transparency in establishing the necessary criteria for the selection process of certain positions? How can civilian-military, military-police, and international cooperation be promoted?

Stephanie Blair explored the complexity and challenge of enhancing local cooperation in peace operations. Peace operations are carried out to ‘help people on the ground’ and with the evolving face of peace operations, the aim of the international arena has become to help achieve sustainable peace. Blair declared that this aim entails going deep into the roots of the conflict and that this requires good governance, promotion of human rights, and a democratisation process. As international forces push for these concepts, the question of sovereignty, an issue that has recently become problematic, arises. For Blair, the problem of sovereignty becomes deeper depending on whether the intervention at hand is deployed to resolve a conflict, or whether the international community would like to enforce an outcome on the disputants.

Whatever the reason for intervention, local cooperation is vital. Blair emphasized that the peacekeeping forces are in the region for the benefit of the local people, and hence they should try to maintain a relationship of partnership rather than patronage. Especially in the transformation stage, external actors need to be extremely cautious, as this is the time to maintain a good balance. On one side, as the internationals are the ones bringing peace, especially when emergency conditions prevail, they might rely on the international personnel, rather than the local people for the implementation of their mandate. This might be controversial, as the population might prefer to be the ones performing the necessary reforms. There might also be the contrary case where the local authorities are perceived as corrupt or incompetent and there might be over-reliance on internationals.

Another problem that might arise, according to Blair, is that the multinational peacekeepers might want to promote state-building based on the Westphalian model, preoccupied with forming a national executive, legislative and judiciary, which might be contradictory to the traditional norms of the society. Implementation of such policies might need a highly visible military presence and international personnel.

The important point for achieving successful peacekeeping operations is to retain and preserve a welcome from the local population, while at the same time maintaining a balance between self-rule by the locals and international responsibility. Trying to preserve this balance might raise the question of sovereignty, as has happened recently, with the
increasing number of peacekeeping operations involving nation-building. Blair stressed that in the end however, domestic peace and sustainable development can only be achieved by the domestic population itself, and the UN can merely facilitate its accomplishment.

Corentin Ki-Doulaye addressed the African Union perspective on peace operations. His expose touched upon the issues of the framework, objectives, and contents of African peace operations.

The African Union had taken Chapter VIII of the UN Charter (entitled ‘Regional Arrangements’) as its framework for peace operations. These operations are undertaken with the objective of securing peace, which is an essential condition for economic development on the continent. The content of the African Union’s peace operations has evolved over time since 1993. The founding fathers of the Union had focused on inter-state conflicts. However, since the end of the Cold War, there has been a turn towards intra-state conflicts in Africa. As the continent started to face internal/domestic conflicts, a new mechanism was adopted, namely conflict prevention among warring parties and ethnic groups.

The African Union usually takes the initiative in managing the conflicts before the UN moves in. The Union’s most important limitation in these efforts is funding, followed by the lack of equipment and logistical infrastructure. It also needs a conflict management centre.

Ki-Doulaye concluded with a statement on what needs to be done in the future to further promote conflict prevention in Africa. While the Union ought to keep up its work towards promoting democracy and human rights, it must also play a greater role and cooperate with others in post-conflict reconstruction, fighting against international terrorism, and founding of a Pan-African Parliament.

Adam Kobieracki focused on NATO specific issues of conflict management. It had not been intended for NATO to get involved in peacekeeping operations and 10 years ago, there had been much debate on whether the Alliance should intervene in peace operations at all. The first bridge in answering this debate had been crossed with its involvement in peace operations in the Balkans. Since then, NATO has been involved in other operations, the most recent being in Afghanistan. Moving from whether to intervene in a situation to intervening in a non-European country – Afghanistan – had been a dramatic evolution for NATO.

Kobieracki reiterated the point made by other speakers that peacekeeping has become more complicated, and is in practice CRO (Crisis Response Operations). Peacekeeping is not limited to keeping peace between nations, but entails establishing peace within states. Military operations are different from what they were in the past, in that they help to reconstruct the state concerned. The aim is not to restore the status quo, but to go beyond to address the root causes of the problem.

Kobieracki contended that there are various areas of consideration in preparing for peacekeeping operations. There should be close cooperation between international actors and between military and civilians. This is important in post-conflict management, as peace-building is a long-term investment. Another important area of consideration is the training of peacekeeping forces. As peacekeeping operations are very different from combat
training, certain training requirements need to be established in order to overcome the differentiations among national training concepts.

Kobieracki added that EU involvement in peacekeeping operations is essential for NATO, as it will affect the future role of the Alliance.

Hans-Bernhard Weisserth considered peace operations from a European Union perspective. He informed participants that the EU is finalizing a Strategy Paper on European Security Strategy titled “A Secure Europe in a Better World”. The Security Strategy will involve certain aspects related to peace operations, underlining the importance of preventive engagement and being efficient in avoiding more serious problems in the future. Improvement of capabilities, implying the transformation of militaries into more mobile and flexible forces capable of addressing new threats, is another notion which the Strategy will emphasize. The Strategy Paper will serve as guidance for activities and improvement of capabilities relating to peace operations. The four civilian priority areas: police, rule of law, civil administration and civil protection are important in preserving the sustainability of peace.

Weisserth stated that the EU recognizes that peace operations require coherent coordination and cooperation. Civil-Military Coordination (CMCO) addresses the need for coordination, as all relevant EU actors are involved in planning and implementation of the EU’s response to a crisis. The CMCO culture needs to be ‘built into’ the crisis response at an early stage, lasting the whole duration of the operation, rather than ‘bolted on’ at a later stage. To establish cooperation, Weisserth believed in the need for consultative meetings with other international organizations. To this end, the EU had agreed to establish a joint consultative mechanism with the UN at the working level.

There have been further steps taken to develop cooperation between the EU and the UN such as the assumption by EU forces of certain peace operations from the UN forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the Joint Declaration on EU-UN cooperation. As sustainable mechanisms are established between the EU and the UN in the areas of planning, training and communication of peace operations, there will be further cooperation between the two organizations, strengthening the success of the operations.

Lamberto Zannier gave information about the peace operations of the OSCE. He emphasized that the inclusion of local governments and civil society including NGOs is crucial to adjust to local needs and realities. He especially touched upon the issue of inclusion of national minorities to promote cooperation. His suggestions included more coordination among organizations on planning before deploying forces for peace operations; cooperation on timing of the missions; and joint training and exercise by participating organizations.

Alaettin Cangöz stressed two crucial points for the success of peace operations. The first point involved the interaction between the international organizations and the national governments. He underlined the difficulties faced in meeting the different standards, requirements, and policies of different international organizations in human resources management. Cangöz demonstrated how the three main international organizations, the UN, OSCE, and the EU, have different standards and selection systems.
The UN system, according to Cangöz, was the most transparent and the easiest to work with. Co-operation starts from the early stage, and national organizations have the power to nominate and select their candidates with the help of UN DPKO. In such ways it is possible for national governments to plan their human resources. The OSCE e-mail application system for seconded posts makes planning very hard for the national institutions. Moreover, the OSCE does not have a clear policy for the national balance of senior posts. Cangöz contended that the selection process is not transparent, and the qualifications required are not clear.

In the EU system the personnel from member and non-member states are assigned to different posts. The problem with this system, however, is that all the decisions are taken by the EU. Moreover, usually the EU mission planning team shares high level posts, and then announces the rest of the posts for non-member states.

Cangöz suggested that organizations like OSCE and the EU that are strong supporters of transparency, good governance, and democracy should have better transparency and participation policies, allowing the contributing countries to be included into planning and staffing. The contribution of respective countries should determine the appointments of senior positions. Human resources management should work closely with national institutions. Such reforms are needed to achieve efficient peace operations.

The second point Cangöz emphasized was the need for cooperation between military and CivPol missions in the future operations. Military personnel are trained for combat, and not for maintaining law and order and fighting against crime. Most police forces nowadays have SWAT teams to fight against organized crime. Hence, Cangöz suggested that better cooperation between military forces, able to deal with heavy arms, and police forces capable of gathering intelligence, investigating cases, and preparing cases for the court hearings will be successful in maintaining public order.

David Lightburn emphasized that nations need to commit resources to education and training. He presented brief facts on the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres with special emphasis on education and training as the IAPTC’s theme for 2003 was “Enhancing the effectiveness of peace operations through education and training.” He also introduced the theme for 2004: “How training affects the overall building of capacity, and its relevance to preparing for peace operations.”

Lightburn informed the seminar that the IAPTC 2003 meeting had covered the following issues: the need for standardization between countries, cultures, professions, organizations, etc., and the means of doing so through the Standardized Generic Training Modules of the UN, and networking with the EU, OSCE, and other organizations; the challenges of joint (multi-disciplinary) education and training; the difficult challenge of evaluating training and its relevance in the field; the requirement for more attention to ‘real’ capacity-building in nations willing to contribute to peace operations; the need for national systems to be developed to link field requirements, with the identification of personnel, with funding and other resources necessary for preparation, with the ways and means of informing, training and educating peacekeepers, with deployment mechanisms and ultimately with effective evaluation techniques; and the need to take advantage of changes such as the methods of distance-learning, adult learning techniques, and computer technology.
The first speaker in the ensuing discussion warmly supported Stephanie Blair’s contention that the policy of the leadership of a peace operation should be one of partnership with the local population rather than patronage. In her response, Blair added that an SRSG needed to be more political than humanitarian and that some of the current SRSGs were insufficiently political.

The issue of conflict prevention raised several comments. Referring to the presentation on the arrangements within the African Union, one participant asked whether the single mechanism embracing conflict prevention, negotiation and peacekeeping would remain complementary to UN efforts, and whether linkages had been established with similar processes being carried out within the UN Secretariat in New York. Ki-Doulaye replied that the AU mechanism was evolving in phases and it was being developed in very good cooperation with DPKO as well as with the multinational Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) in Copenhagen with a view to creating an African standby force for rapid deployment in a conflict situation.

Another participant commented that that in the whole question of how to gather information on potential conflicts and then take action to prevent them it was difficult to develop the right tools. Zannier responded that in his view money invested in conflict prevention was money well spent: what needed were good early warning sensors, but prevention was often not very tangible and action frequently involved many broader issues. Weisserth said that conflict prevention was becoming an increasing priority for the European Union. The gathering of information was a day-to-day business of evaluation, analysis and presentation of policy option papers to the political and security unit within the EU. The most essential thing was the political will to act, and in that regard there had recently been some good examples notably the visit by three EU foreign ministers to Iran. Lightburn pointed out that conflict prevention was also involved in avoiding the recurrence of conflict, and therefore peace operation processes such as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, security sector reform and good governance were all part of conflict prevention.

A question from the floor asked whether the Brahimi Report provided the guiding principles for current peace operations and whether it was being used in training centres or by regional organizations in their planning for peacekeeping. Lightburn confirmed that the contents of the Brahimi Report were well to the fore in the training institutions with which he was associated. In concluding the panel’s discussions and closing the seminar, Ersin Onulduran and Michael Sahlin commented on the contributions of earlier speakers and emphasized the important role of such conferences in understanding and overcoming the challenges in conducting and contributing to peace operations. This was the 13th seminar in the framework of the Challenges Project to promote further cooperation between the Member States and International Organizations in their peacekeeping efforts. The seminars have emphasized the need for the continuation of such projects to contribute more effectively to peace in the world. They expressed their wishes to meet again in the conferences in 2004 in Nigeria, and the following one in China.