

The Art of the Possible: Peace Operations Under New Conditions

Executive Summary

The workshop took place against the backdrop of a new and potentially significant shift in the mandating of UN peace operations. In early 2013, the UN Security Council assigned ambitious new roles to several UN-led missions, which will be operating in extremely trying conditions. Defying projections that the Security Council might rely less on such UN missions in future, the first four months of 2013 has seen three ambitious new peace operations mandates for UN missions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Mali and a large UN integrated special political mission in Somalia.

Many workshop participants felt strongly that these new mandates signified a substantial shift that is already underway in the Security Council's approach to UN mission mandates. It was noted that the conceptual, operational and bureaucratic modus operandi developed for UN peacekeeping models of the last two decades will need to be re-visited for the new types of missions in Mali and the DRC, and to ensure the mandates are matched by the necessary concepts, capacities and resources to enable success, and prevent the over-reach and ultimately the failures of UN peacekeeping in the early 1990s. In Somalia, a new integrated and multidimensional special political mission also represents a major new development and will pose new challenges for the UN Department of Political Affairs.

Against this backdrop of evolving mandates, the Entebbe workshop ranged across key issues facing peace operations, including several topics already being addressed by the Challenges Forum partners such as command and control. In addition, new discussions were launched on issues of emerging interest in UN peace operations,

The workshop

The Art of the Possible: Peace Operations Under New Conditions: A Dialogue with the Field Community was held at the United Nations Regional Service Centre in Entebbe, Uganda on 29–30 April 2013. It was hosted by the Swedish Armed Forces and the United Service Institute of India.

The workshop provided an opportunity to test and calibrate on-going Challenges Forum work streams with a group of field practitioners in UN and AU missions in eastern and central Africa.

This policy brief reflects the rapporteur's interpretation of the meeting and not necessarily the views of the Challenges Forum nor of all of the participants.



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and were discussed extensively among Challenges Forum partners and field representatives from MONUSCO, UNMISS, UNAMID, UNOWA, UNPOS and AMISOM:

- **UN and regional linkages:** The linkages between regional and international capacities in the field, including an assessment of current efforts to provide support between UN and AU missions on the ground.
- **Field support innovations:** New developments in field support, in particular the advances being made under the Global Field Support Strategy of the UN Department of Field Support, and the UN Regional Service Centre in Entebbe.
- **New threats:** The challenges of dealing with unconventional threats in peacekeeping environment, in particular terrorism and organized crime, and the approaches international missions might adopt in addressing these threats.
- **Strategic communication and new media:** An overview of new techniques in strategic communication and interaction, as well as an introduction to social media tools.
- **New developments in command, control and information gathering:** An assessment of the viability of using new tools, such as unmanned surveillance platforms; and updates on UN Joint Operations Centres (JOC) and Joint Mission Analysis Centres (JMAC) structures.

Introduction

The workshop objectives were identified by the speakers in the opening session as:

- An exchange on the key issues and recommendations emerging from the Berlin workshop¹.
- An opportunity for ‘ground-truthing’ the Challenges Forum’s dialogue with field practitioners and to focus on practical solutions.
- Closer on-the-ground cooperation between the UN and regional organizations can influence the need for a strengthened cooperation at the policy level.

Following an initial discussion on the current conditions facing peace operations, the workshop agenda focused in detail on important and

¹ The Challenges Forum held a research workshop ‘The Future is now: Putting Scenarios for Peace Operations in 2005 in Today’s Context’ in Berlin, 15-16 October 2012. It was hosted by the Center for International Peace Operations, ZIF.

emerging themes for peace operations, many of which built directly upon the Berlin workshop recommendations:

- Building blocks for mission success: Linking capacities of UN, regional and bilateral actors, and new approaches to field support: the Global Field Support Strategy.
- New threats and actors.
- Modernizing peacekeeping information gathering.
- Strategic communications and the use of new media.
- Authority, command and control.

This report summarizes the main lines of discussion from each of the workshop sessions.

Opening Session: Peace operations under new conditions

The workshop opened with a brief review of the four scenarios and the recommendations that had emerged from the Berlin Challenges Forum workshop as well as an overview of the conditions currently affecting international peace operations, including changing political interests, economic realities and new threats and persistent conflict drivers.

The following Berlin recommendations were highlighted in particular for their relevance to the Entebbe workshop agenda:

- The importance of developing minimum consensus on peacekeeping.
- The need to strengthen cooperation between the UN and regional organisations.
- The importance of identifying and understanding how to respond to vulnerabilities of and threats to peace operations.
- The need for strategies for adopting new tools and technologies.
- The importance of developing a better understanding of new media.

Workshop participants were exhorted to remember that even as we discuss the leading edge issues in peace operations, it is as important to ensure we get the basics right: organization, cooperation and common sense.

It was suggested that while new technologies are needed, peace operations are and should remain people-centric, in that peace operations are about working within the populace, that the people in the missions are critical and that political but also individual will are essential to success.

Participants were encouraged to ensure that discussions be pragmatic and that recommendations not be overly 'utopic'. It was noted that there



should be a balance between the art and the science of peacekeeping to ensure some predictability while also allowing for innovation.

It was further noted that too often there is not enough consolidation in peacekeeping, and that the ‘new’ is always being introduced while much of what has gone before was not properly consolidated.

Workshop participants noted the importance of recognizing that not only are the external conditions facing international peace operations changing rapidly and significantly, but also that in the first four months of 2013, a significant shift appears to have already occurred in the way that the UN Security Council has mandated a robust role for UN peace operations in the challenging contexts of eastern DRC and Mali. The new resolutions of 2013, it was felt, may have far-reaching implications for UN peacekeeping.

Discussion focused around whether the new mandates represent a significant shift from the so-called ‘Brahimi principles’ as laid out in the landmark Report of the Panel on United Nations Peacekeeping (2000) and further codified by DPKO in the UN peacekeeping ‘Capstone Doctrine’ (2008). Some felt the new mandates represented a major new ‘evolution’ of the peacekeeping concept. Others felt that these missions should instead be conceptualized as a distinct new type of UN peace operation among other extant types. It was further noted that the Security Council has experimented with other terminologies such as ‘stabilization missions’ although it is not clear if there are conceptual or doctrinal underpinnings within the UN for these terms. More broadly, some felt that there should be a review of the various typologies of peace operations, which might be more productively discussed outside the institutional silos of the UN machinery given that such efforts have stalled in the UN legislative committees in the past.

Participants also noted some of the persistent structural flaws in UN peacekeeping, in particular that it is seen by member states as peace operations on the cheap. It was further noted that peacekeeping is often overloaded with expectations that it cannot deliver.

In the opening session it was also stressed that the wider community — including the Challenges Forum — that supports peace operations needs to strengthen the information and advocacy around the ‘good news’ stories from peacekeeping. There was a sense among participants that the value of UN peacekeeping and its many successes in the past decades has proven difficult to communicate effectively, and there may be a role for the Challenges Forum to support this.

Authority, Command and control

The command and control (C2) session opened with a briefing on the work of the Challenges Partners leading on the C2 theme. The discussion continued on a more general analysis of the state of C2 arrangements


in UN peacekeeping. From the field perspective, it was felt that it was important for there to be much clearer communication to TCCs about what is expected under the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). Greater homogeneity of formations from the brigade level down as brigade commanders sometimes struggle to bring together diverse nationalities and standards, was raised as a point of concern but was not a view shared by all participants. There was broad agreement however that field commanders needed better access to information resources.

Concern was expressed that the views of field level commanders are at times not sufficiently considered at mission headquarters levels. There was a suggestion of the need for more control to be devolved to the contingent levels with more logistical and other support devolved to that level, while primacy of command through plans, assigning tasks and setting parameters should remain at Force headquarters. Some speakers noted that improvements have come about in integration of missions when there has been co-location of different staff types or joint activities such as the civilian-military joint protection teams in MONUSCO.

For one speaker, the command and control challenges in peacekeeping can stem from the attributes of senior leaders being willing and able to lead effectively and collaboratively. It was suggested that it is the responsibility of senior managers to work as a team to: define the problem; elaborate the strategy; identify and assign resources; enable the work of their subordinates; embrace risk-taking and risk accountability; and to build shared values.

Other participants felt that a major lacuna in command and control stemmed from the silo component planning that continues in headquarters and in the missions despite clear integrated planning guidance. The 'integrated plans', it was suggested, are often simply a collection of parallel plans. Others felt that some problems of integrated command and control among components might be solved by co-location and through measures to enforce joint planning and collaboration. Some suggested that there are significant gaps in what the decision-making bodies in New York decided and what could be done in the field. It was noted that there is significant variance between mandates and mission benchmarks and that the Security Council and DPKO do not appear to apply the good examples and benchmarks consistently. Some participants queried whether the Security Council gets sufficient technical advice on what is feasible when launching a mission, and when to adjust the mandate.

It was suggested that accountability for implementing clear guidance on all of these substantive issues is lacking. Several participants echoed this view noting that the accountability system must be improved from the Security Council down, to the planners and decision makers in UN headquarters who lay out the proposals for mandates and the plans to implement them, and then down to managers in the field for



implementation. One participant noted that lessons could be learned from the UN Security Management System's accountability structure, which was introduced after the 2003 bombing of the UN headquarters in Baghdad. It was noted that accountability for substantive planning and implementation lags far behind financial and security accountabilities in the UN although it was noted that some accountability systems can lead to high levels of risk aversion.

Open discussion largely centered on the new mission mandates for Mali and the DRC, and the challenges these could pose to command and control under existing UN rules and policies. A number of participants felt the Force Intervention Brigade for MONUSCO and the new MINUSMA mission in Mali were extremely ambitious, and the challenges they will face might outstrip existing UN C2 and mission support capacities. Concerns were raised that some of the more 'kinetic' aspects of these missions could undermine other mandate objectives, such as the rule of law, making achievement of multidimensional mandate objectives quite difficult.

It was suggested that some of the tension around the new missions' mandates revolved around differing views on the utility of military force by UN peace operations, and whether the existing peacekeeping framework is capable of supporting and enabling such high-tempo operations. The creation of operational HQs to support these more ambitious operations was discussed as a potential way forward. Some felt that if TCCs were to be asked to take on higher risks and new enforcement tasks, they will need to be well-versed in the UN's C2 arrangements. The danger of the 'on-paper' C2 arrangements diverging from the 'in-reality' arrangements was highlighted, particularly in recognition of the reality of field commanders 'linking back' to national decision-makers when use of force is required.

Building blocks for mission success

This session examined two related areas:

- (i) opportunities for linking the capacities of different actors (UN, regional and bilateral); and
- (ii) new approaches to UN field support, and in particular the Global Field Support Strategy (GFSS).

The GFSS was introduced as a major transformation exercise spearheaded by the UN Department of Field Support that is taking place alongside the introduction of the UN's enterprise management platform, 'Umoja'. One of the key tenets of the GFSS is an understanding that effective global, regional and local supply chain management — of personnel and materiel — underpins and enables UN peacekeeping.

It was explained that the GFSS has *inter alia* sought to realign support responsibilities within the peacekeeping system with clear responsibilities

at the global, regional and mission levels. The Regional Service Centre in Entebbe is an example of this realignment in practice, where the regional level focuses on transactional support to regional missions and the standardization and efficiency optimization of these transactions. In the field of aviation, for example, UN Headquarters maintains responsibility for global procurement and standards, the Brindisi Global Support Centre undertakes global aviation tracking for UN peacekeeping, while the Regional Service Centre manages regional air movements to support optimal use of the air fleets of the regional missions. It was estimated that already, some \$100 million was being saved in more efficient air operations management at the regional level.

It was also noted that there are real challenges in rolling out a major change management exercise as operations continue to evolve rapidly. The GFSS implementation has necessarily required that the early GFSS concepts be worked through using a rolling ‘design and implement’ model, and will no doubt need to continue to evolve to meet new demands in the field and new mandates from the Security Council.

The session turned to a discussion about linking UN and regional capabilities, with a focus on the experience of UN support to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). It was noted that AMISOM has provided the Security Council with a very cheap option for dealing with a very difficult peace and security dilemma. The AU mission relies on EU funds for its personnel costs, while the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) has provided good logistical support and now funding for contingent-owned equipment. Although the AU-UN collaboration has been good at the working level, there have been frustrations. It was noted in particular that UN rules and policies for administration and logistics have at times constrained UNSOA’s capacity to support AMISOM operations at the tempo required for a mission engaged in highly robust operations.

In considering alternative field support solutions for the AU, it was suggested that the African Standby Force logistics base concept could be revitalized. Several participants noted however that political will and resources were a constraint to this at the present time. Although the AU has provided some seed money for the AFISMA mission in Mali, AU member states have not yet been willing or able to financially support AU operations through an assessment mechanism along the lines of the United Nations assessed budget. In a wider discussion on the challenges of linkages between UN and regional organisations, prior experiences have always revealed the structural tensions of parallel reporting lines and differing political objectives and resources.

New threats and challenges

It was noted from the outset that the threats and challenges being focused on in this session could not be considered ‘new’ *per se*, and that a number



of UN missions have tracked issues such as organized crime and terrorism over a long period. What is potentially more novel about these dynamics however is the rapid rate at which these dynamics have grown globally and in mission areas.


It was suggested that the very ‘fragile’ contexts in which peace operations are deployed are extremely good targets for transnational organized crime networks. It was noted that according to recent research, organized crime vectors thrive best when there is a modicum of state structure and stability and that states in transition are the most vulnerable to these dynamics. The corruption of the state officials, the buying of elections, trafficking of arms and people, counterfeit medicines and goods, illegal resource extraction, linkages to piracy and terrorism are all issues on the rise and can undermine efforts to support state stability and long term peace, which are at the heart of many international peace operations’ mandates.

Some key questions were posed to participants: Should peace operations engage with these complicated dynamics? If so, how? With whom should they cooperate? It was suggested that organized crime is only effectively dealt with when the solutions are locally owned and regionally coordinated. Several key lessons were identified: Solutions cannot be imposed, and the timelines will be long. Those solutions are not even primarily law enforcement centric — they are political, socio-economic as well as rule of law based. It was suggested that only long-term, locally driven capacity building could be truly effective. Engagement by peace operations should not be driven by technicians but should be led at the high political level, and led through locally-driven by good information gathering and analysis. Intrusive international efforts can undermine local efforts and motivation. It was suggested that UN peace operations’ comparative advantage would lie at the strategic/political level, not at the technical level.

The DPKO initiative for a serious crime specialized unit was discussed and it was suggested that its strength could be in bringing a long term bilateral partner into play, in helping mobilize resources and in providing some mentoring etc. support for locally led operations. Linkages with the UN Country Team would be critical to any mission engagement on these issues, along with long-term bilateral partners supporting national capacity building. With respect to terrorism, there was general agreement that the UN was an ill-suited entity for dealing with terrorism issues at the field level.

Modernizing Information Gathering

Speakers described the recent experiences of several United Nations missions in strengthening information gathering and analysis. It was suggested that the challenge for information gathering often begins with flaws in planning and priority setting for missions. The information



gathering cycle should be driven through targeted priority information requirements (PIR) and yet this is not necessarily a tool understood or used by many senior leaders. In many missions, personnel working in Joint Mission Analysis Centres (JMACs) or Joint Operations Centres (JOCs) have had to work extremely hard with senior managers to elicit actionable PIRs (or ‘what you need to know?’) from the mission leadership to target their information gathering effort.


With respect to the mission machinery for information gathering, it was noted that the JMAC institution is now beginning to evolve into a more standardized and reliable entity within missions. JMACs have worked at their best when working a collaborative tool in a mission drawing on wider working groups and expertise. The experiences of the MINUSTAH JMAC and MONUSCO JMAC and the UNMISS JOC and early warning system were discussed in detail, and innovations were discussed such as the UNMISS early warning matrix, the MONUSCO JMAC’s use of technology tools, as well as MINUSTAH’s experiences of intelligence driven operations in 2007–2008 for disrupting gang networks.

There was discussion concerning the new unmanned aerial surveillance systems authorized for MONUSCO under Resolution 2098 (2013) in support of protection of civilians and the arms embargo. It was noted that MONUSCO already uses technology tools such as radar to monitor the airspace and waterways of eastern DRC. Other missions, it was noted, have also used technologies such as forward-looking infrared cameras on aircraft although these often encounter host state restrictions and challenges in timely mission analysis of the raw information gathered.

The need for a further dialogue with member states on this issue was discussed in order to explain and review the true benefits from a more integrated information gathering capacity.

Strategic communications and the use of new media

Speakers introduced the efforts in a few missions to engage with a strategic communications approach as well as the use of new approaches and new media to support this. The case of Somalia was highlighted as an example of the UN and AU shifting from crisis communications and more classic public information approach to a ‘StratComms’ approach. Under the strategic communications concept, the mission’s communications effort is seen as a mission enabler and can support force protection, and is not just for information provision. The approach recognizes that UN operations often succeed not through military power but through soft power, political influence and momentum-building. It was also noted that in taking a more strategic approach it is possible to become more evidence-based in determining what actions to take but also in measuring how well the mission is doing by using tools such as popular surveys.



The activities of the UNPOS/UNSOA StratComms teams in Somalia were defined along three main axes: promotion, production and messaging. Production activities are driven by what the public wants. They are diverse, ranging from plays and soap operas to live debates, posters and billboards. By defining key strategic communications messages in Somalia, it has proven possible to better harmonize the overall international communications effort along key themes. Much of the work produced has been ‘unbranded’, meaning that it was not exclusively UN or AU content but rather open for all partners, particularly Somali partners, to draw upon. The efforts of the Somalia missions to draw on digital platforms were also outlined, including a Blog, Twitter and digital imaging. The key point with respect to new media was the ability for a mission to engage in two-way dialogue through these media platforms, rather than simply being on ‘send’.

In DRC, it was explained that MONUSCO was also engaging in a new two-way communications tool but with lower technology — VHF radios and mobile phones. These tools are at the centre of the mission’s Community Alert Networks (CANs) to support early warning and protection of civilians. 25 such networks have been established in North Kivu, South Kivu and Orientale provinces supported by 202 MONUSCO Community Liaison Assistants who work with local communities. A speaker noted also that the opponents of missions are becoming very sophisticated. The M23 Movement in DRC has used, among other things, Twitter, Blogs, and disinformation, to undermine MONUSCO. In addition to new tools however, the power of traditional media forms was also highlighted. It was recalled for example that while twitter accounts may have hundreds or even thousands of ‘followers’, MONUSCO’s Radio Okapi had an estimated 15 million listeners.

Finally, a briefing was received on the Ushahidi ‘crowd-sourcing’ tool, which was developed in Kenya and has been deployed in a number of relevant settings to peace operations including in Syria, Haiti and Libya. The tool relies on open-source reporting of events and incidents which can be instantaneously plotted on a digital map. While this tool is being experimented with by humanitarian and development communities, it has not yet featured in UN peace operations. Some discussion focused on information security and the security of users in these contexts, as well as whether UN mission data bandwidth could be sufficient.

Final session

In the closing session, speakers returned workshop participants to some of the major themes of the earlier discussion and sought to identify some key observations that had emerged from the meeting. It was noted that in current UN operations the classic flow from theory to doctrine to capacity appears to be out of alignment, and that mandates are driving new requirements quite distinct from the premises of earlier peacekeeping

missions. It was further noted that to meet these new challenges, there will need to be sustained support from member states for resourcing the missions and for embracing new ways of doing business. One speaker noted that the new demands of these missions cannot be met 'on the cheap'.

The risk to troops and the political will required for robust operations was again raised. For the troop contributors, it was suggested there would need to be real political commitment when they volunteer for these new missions and there must be explicit dialogue between the UN Secretariat and the TCCs about expectations regarding the use of force and on the likelihood of receiving and inflicting casualties. Unless TCCs come prepared to stay the course, the impact of robust mandates will be quickly undermined. Several speakers noted with satisfaction that the workshop had revealed a great deal of innovation in missions, and that this needs to be transferred between the missions, and needs to be better known by member states.

Some speakers felt that UN concepts and doctrine was now lagging the changes in the mandates and needed to be updated, whereas others firmly felt that peacekeeping doctrine should not 'lurch' towards these new missions but rather that these missions may well represent a departure from the tried and tested models and that separate thinking and doctrine should emerge from these rather than straining existing doctrine to cover all mission variations. Other speakers strongly felt that there needed to be an effort to better categorize the different types of missions and understand them better.

With respect to mandates and benchmarks, it was suggested that these need to be applied with greater consistency and should be taken more seriously. There is often a real divergence between the benchmarks, an honest assessment of progress, and the behaviour of the Security Council in responding to progress against benchmarks. It was felt that setting and monitoring benchmarks is critical in that it can provide a more objective and transparent basis for common assessment of the situation and progress against mandated activities.

On command and control issues, several speakers felt much of the debate around UN command and control has proven to be a stagnant and divisive dialogue, which focuses too much on control issues. It was suggested that the discussion of command and control could be more productive if it was broadened to reflect the realities of information systems, coordination (not least the integration and coordination between political, military, police and civilian components) and communications as in a 'C4' type concept. This could help change the terms of an overall sterile debate that has not shifted in years, and does not reflect the real complexity. It was also noted that discussion on command and control needed to better include systems for accountability – from the headquarters to the field levels.

Key Observations

While this report and its preceding discussions cover a broad range of issues and put forward various suggestions for further inquiry, some recommendations are highlighted here.

1. Workshop participants confirmed that the recommendations from the Berlin workshop provided an accurate reflection of current challenges and a useful framework for advancing the work of Challenges Forum. The field dialogue underscored their relevance and explored a number of the recommendations in greater detail.
2. Observations on command and control had pointed towards the need for a more expansive dialogue on C2 that: addresses the complexity of modern operations; that embraces the need to include coordination, information and communication concepts; and that looks at practical ways to better empower commanders in the field (for example by looking at the composition of formations below brigade level, better communications and information tools, more decentralization to the sector levels).
3. The new mandates authorized in 2013 for UN operations in the DRC, Mali and Somalia represent a significant—although potentially risky—shift from the earlier UN peacekeeping principles and practices. Some participants felt it important to ensure that these new robust operations be better understood as a distinct type of operation, requiring a quite different approach from earlier UN peacekeeping operations.
4. It was suggested that the Challenges Forum could be an appropriate forum for examining some of these issues as it looks across the spectrum of peace operations. It was suggested that useful work could be done in exploring the broader peace operations typologies and what these new 2013 mission types might require, including an examination of what concepts, tools, rules and cultural/institutional changes might be needed to deliver on the new mandates and how these differ to the existing UN peacekeeping paradigms.
5. Participants noted with interest a range of improvements in the conduct of UN peace operations. For example, the encouraging advances in missions support under the Global Field Support Strategy (GFSS), continued progress with JOC and JMAC implementation in missions, and important new developments in information gathering techniques, as well as in a strategic communications approach to support mission campaigns, as well as recent efforts to engage with new media in missions.
6. There was a suggestion that the Challenges Forum could play a greater role in helping the UN and others to communicate more effectively about the value of international peace operations, and their successes over the past decades. Workshop participants confirmed that the recommendations from the Berlin workshop provided an accurate reflection of current challenges and a useful framework for advancing the work of Challenges Forum. The field dialogue underscored their relevance and explored a number of the recommendations in greater detail.



THE INTERNATIONAL FORUM FOR THE CHALLENGES OF PEACE OPERATIONS

The Challenges Forum is a strategic and dynamic platform for constructive dialogue among policymakers, practitioners and academics on key issues and developments in peace operations. The aim is to shape the debate by promoting awareness of emerging issues and identifying key challenges facing military, police and civilian peace operations. It is a global network of partner organizations from all continents of the world.

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