CHALLENGES
OF PEACEKEEPING

"THE DOCTRINAL DIMENSION"
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CHALLENGES OF PEACEKEEPING AND PEACE SUPPORT INTO THE 21ST CENTURY

“The Doctrinal Dimension”
(Report of the Conference held at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, USA; May 22-26, 2000)

Project Coordinator: Ms. Annika Hilding-Norberg, National Defence College of Sweden

Edited by: Lieutenat Colonel Michael Esper and Lieutenat Colonel Daniel Miltenberger, US Army Peacekeeping Institute
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**Introduction**  
1

**Day 1 - Doctrinal Reviews**  
5  
- Project Report  
  Ms. Annika Hilding-Norberg  
  7  
- NATO  
  LTC Chris Nunn  
  11  
- Sweden  
  MG Karlis Neretniecks  
  23  
- Russia  
  MG Andrey Marshankin  
  31  
- Jordan  
  Dr. Kamel Abu-Jabar  
  39  
- South Africa  
  Mr. Mark Malan  
  47  
- India  
  BG Susheel Gupta  
  67  
- USA  
  Mr. William Flavin  
  75  
- Summary  
  COL George Oliver  
  85

**Day 2 – Panel Discussions**  
87  
- Risks to Peacekeepers  
  LTG (ret) Satish Nambiar  
  89
- Disarmament, Demobilization, & Reintegration  
  AMB Peggy Mason  
  111

**Day 3 – Panel Discussions & Working Group Reports**  
125  
- Public Security Doctrine  
  Mr. Halvor Hartz  
  127
- Training Doctrine  
  AMB George Ward  
  141
- Working Group Reports  
  COL Walthall  
  157  
  MG Neretniecks  
  161  
  LTG (ret) Nambiar  
  165

Annex A – Attendance Roster  
167  
Annex B – Introductory Brief  
179  
Annex C – Discussion Groups  
187  
Annex D – Conference Break Out  
191
The views expressed are those of the participants and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Army, the U.S. Army War College, the Department of Defense, the U.S. Government, or the governments of the other participating nations.
Introduction

The International Comparative Peacekeeping Seminar: Challenges of Peace Support into the 21st Century, The Doctrinal Dimension was conducted at Carlisle Barracks May 23-25, 2000. It was the fifth in a series of conferences addressing various aspects of peacekeeping and peace support. The series is based on a partnership of nations consisting of representatives from six nations, Sweden, Jordan, South Africa, Russia, India and the United States. Similar seminars have been held in five of the partner nations, with India hosting the next conference in September 2000. The seventh and eighth seminars are planned in the year 2001 for Japan and Argentina as these two countries are in the process of joining the partnership.

The Swedish National Defence College initiated the Challenges series in 1997 as part of a study that the Strategic Studies Department of the college was conducting. The focus of the study was initially centered on Russia, and a conference was held to explore Russian views on peacekeeping. Realizing that the nature of peace operations is multinational, several nations were invited to attend the conference. These nations became the partners that have continued the project. Other nations have also indicated an interest in joining this partnership, most notably, Australia. The potential growth of this partnership and the global complexion of its membership underscore the universal significance of peace operations and enhance multinational cooperation and understanding.

The objective of the project series is twofold. Primarily, it is designed to promote and facilitate increased cooperation and coordination between the partner nations and various influential institutions seeking to address the complex issues associated with peacekeeping and peace support. Secondly, the project provides a forum for exploring concepts and ideas that specifically address issues involving regional conflicts. The project combines theoretical concepts with practical lessons learned in addressing the complexities of multinational peace support.

The United States Army Peacekeeping Institute is responsible, in part, for developing and promulgating peacekeeping doctrine for the Army. The prospect of hosting this conference presented PKI with a unique opportunity to vet emerging doctrinal concepts in an international forum attended by academics, politicians, soldiers and humanitarians. In this way, the intent was to ensure that our thinking was compatible with that of our partner nations with whom the United States Army has a high probability of serving in a multinational peace operation. Thus, the theme of the conference was determined to be doctrine and the impact of doctrine on peace operations.

Specific conference objectives were:

- Familiarize the participants with US doctrine, both established and emerging.

- Familiarize the participants with the partners' views concerning doctrine and how it impacts the conduct of peace operations in which they have been involved.
- Incorporate discussion generated ideas and concepts into doctrinal revisions as appropriate.

- Develop contacts within the partnership to promote international understanding and enhance interoperability among partner nations and beyond.

The overall topic was sub-divided into specific areas for discussion. Sub-topic areas included: risks to peacekeepers; disarmament, demobilization and re-integration; public security doctrine; and training doctrine. The sub-topics represented the most challenging areas in doctrinal development emerging from lessons learned and experiences in the Balkans, East Timor and elsewhere.

Participants were asked to consider six questions addressing issues requiring the development of doctrinal guidance:

- Support to elections by peacekeeping forces.
- Determining success in peace operations.
- Peacekeeper’s responsibilities in the return of refugees.
- Peacekeeper’s role in restoring basic infrastructure.
- Restoration of law and order in peace operations.

These questions were discussed in small groups. The goal of their deliberations was to suggest additional research topics that could be used later in research projects generated by emerging doctrinal concepts.

Seminar participants (listed in Annex A) included representatives from 13 countries, governmental and non-governmental organizations, academia and the United Nations. Guest speakers included HRH Prince Zeid Ra'ad Hussein, the Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN from Jordan; LTG (ret) Satish Nambiar, formerly of the Indian Army and currently the President of the United Service Institute of India; Halvor Hartz, the Chief of UN CIVPOL; Ambassador Peggy Mason of the Canadian Council for International Peace and Security; Dr. Johanna Mendelson-Forman, Senior Advisor on Democracy and Governance, United States Agency for International Development (USAID); and Ambassador George Ward, Director of Training for the United States Institute of Peace (USIP). The speakers set the tone and the stage for in-depth discussions on the subtopics by distinguished panelists who elaborated on the topics in even greater detail.

This report is a summary of the key points generated by the seminar. Each nation was asked to present their national view on peace operations doctrine. Additionally, the NATO view was presented. The seminar agenda (Enclosure 2) lists the speakers from each partner, and subsequent chapters of this report detail their comments and presentations. The intent of this presentation was to offer the view of a regional security organization (particularly one that is
deeply involved in on-going peace operations in Kosovo) so that the view of this organization could be compared/contrasted with that of the individual partners. All presentations included a question and answer period, generating excellent exchanges between participants, which are documented throughout this report.

The fundamental philosophy of the seminar was to assess the various aspects of doctrine i.e., lessons learned, standard operating procedures, guidelines and academic theory. By evaluating these aspects of peace operations through discussion and debate, we can focus on the best of what this partnership has to offer. This evaluation process would enhance mutual understanding among the partners and between the civilian and military communities in their entirety.

The United States Army Peacekeeping Institute and the partnership of nations participating in this seminar is indebted to the Susan and Elihu Rose Foundation for their belief and commitment to global peace and security. It was through their generous support that this seminar was possible.
DAY 1 - DOCTRINAL REVIEW
Ms. Annika Hilding-Norberg opened the seminar with a report on this project, which has come to be known as the "Challenges Project". It was Ms. Hilding-Norberg's study on Russian peacekeeping that inspired the original seminar in Stockholm in 1997. Since then she has served as the coordinator for the series, traveling to each venue, assisting the host nation with invitations, agendas and overall coordination with specific participants. It is through her diligence and commitment that these vital forums have continued despite the enormous coordination and funding challenges that are inherent in any international effort of this magnitude. The original text of her presentation is located at Annex A.

Contemporary conflict is "multiple" in nature, scope and persistence requiring a multiplicity of responses. The multiple nature of conflict requires multinational response since each member of the international community has an abundance of talent and, thus, much to share. This series is an attempt to explore ways in which the world community can deal with conflict on a regional or international scale. This is the fundamental purpose of the series. (The goals of the series are outlined above in the introduction.)

The concluding report will capture the most cogent aspects of each of the seminars conducted in the series. It is tentatively scheduled for presentation to the United Nations Secretary General and the General Assembly in the Fall of 2001. Additionally, there is a specific end state generating: (1) an increased understanding of the challenges of peacekeeping, and (2) strengthening and widening the international network begun with this partnership.

The organizations representing the partner nations include the Swedish National Defence College led by Major General Karlis Neretnieks, who serves as the primary series coordinator. The National Defence College held the first seminar in the series and continues to provide assistance to other partner nations and their organizations. The second seminar held in 1998 was sponsored by Professor Alexi Salmin's Centre for Public Policy in Moscow, Russia. This seminar primarily covered coalitions of the willing and the evolving role of regional organizations such as NATO and the Commonwealth on Independent States. The Jordanian Institute of Diplomacy led by Dr. Kamel Abu-Jaber sponsored the third seminar held in Amman, Jordan in October 1998. The seminar addressed several major issues including the changing concept of security based on experiences within the Middle East region. Other topics discussed included preventive diplomacy, post-conflict peace building, civil-military relations, mine action, and training and education for military and CIVPOL peacekeepers. The fourth seminar was held in Pretoria, South Africa, in November 1999, sponsored by the Institute for Security Studies and led by Dr. Jakkis Cilliers. This seminar focused on the many and varied problems confronting the leaders of the nations on the African continent. Discussions centered on the growing challenges of dealing with failed societies, warlords, war economies, development issues, and reform and outsourcing of the security sector.

The sixth seminar will be held in New Delhi, India sponsored by the United Services Institute of India and led by Lieutenant General (retired) Satish Nambiar. A seventh seminar is being positively considered by the Japanese with details on sponsorship to follow. The tentative theme for this conference, scheduled for Tokyo in March 2001, will be the challenges to safety.
and security of peacekeepers in the context of recent events in West Africa. (It was noted that
this schedule is tentative and pending approval of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs).
Argentina has also expressed interest in hosting a conference in September 2001.

Funding continues to be a challenge. To date, the series has realized great success
because of the efforts of the following organizations: Susan and Elihu Rose Foundation; the
United States Army; the Swedish, Norwegian and Jordanian governments; the Pearson
Peacekeeping Training Center; the NATO Information and Liaison Office; the CS Headquarters
for Military Cooperation and Coordination; and the Jordanian Television Corporation.

There have been positive "spin-offs" from this series of seminars. Several tangible and
substantive exchanges have occurred as a direct result of participation in this series. These
include exchanges between peacekeeping training centers and academies. The most notable has
been between Sweden and the Russian Federation and the Pearson Centre and the Jordanian
Centre. Other cooperative efforts have resulted from the seminar series including the further
development of a multidisciplinary regional training center in Jordan. Additionally, an early
warning program has been established in South Africa financially supported by the Swedish
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Also, contacts were established between British, Russian,
Zimbabwean and Indian scholars to conduct research concerning warlords and wartime
economies. All of these activities support the goals of the series and have contributed to its
growth.
DAY 1 - Doctrinal Overviews

This section contains the presentations given by the representatives from the partner nations concerning their views on peacekeeping doctrine. Most presented papers are included in their entirety. Others presented briefings that required more extensive transcription. In the former case only the question and answer sessions are included. In the latter a comprehensive transcription has been rendered to capture the presentation in the same detail as available from the prepared papers.
This briefing is a military perspective on how NATO's thinking is evolving with respect to Non-Article 5 crisis response operations. Since 1989, NATO has been trying to determine proper guidance to provide to alliance members and others for the future; so far they have failed to hit this "moving target". Since 1995, SFOR has had up to 23,000 troops from 33 nations in Bosnia, and KFOR has 46,000 troops deployed from 39 nations. To date, SFOR has lost 120 personnel killed and 655 injured. KFOR has lost 28 killed since they went into Kosovo. These are costly, but necessary operations.

We are trying to capitalize on “lessons learned”. Often times the “lessons learned” are documented but not implemented. Rather, they become lessons that have been identified and then forgotten. Despite the need to hit the "moving target" of establishing doctrinal guidance for future missions, the leadership is often consumed with the urgency of doing something, rather than reading something, about the recent experience of those performing current missions. This presentation shows that NATO has moved from a traditional view of peacekeeping to a focus on crisis response operations conducted in support of conflict prevention in the context of the alliance's contribution to international crisis management.

Both NATO and the UN are in transition as to how missions are performed and how doctrine...
is established chiefly because of the increased complexity of the crises facing Europe and the alliance. The challenges will continue to be great on the members of both security organizations requiring adaptation and flexibility, but particularly great on NATO. The challenges center on the dichotomy of the perceived "peace dividend" manifested in the national desire to cash in on this perception and strategic reality. This dividend demands military forces be reduced, great sums of money saved, and readiness criteria abridged while simultaneously maintaining a modicum of readiness to counter threats to the borders of alliance members. In order to balance these competing demands resulting from the peace dividend, NATO has created structures that lend themselves to achieving the original goals of the alliance within the parameters created by this dividend. These measures include the development of a new command structure with the development of a combined joint task force concept. This provides for suitable, deployable command and control of the Non-Article 5 operations, but not the forces. Force contributions are requested from the member nations based on a consensus to act and a willingness of the individual members to participate. However, the need to assign forces for reaction to fast developing situations has been accepted by the members.

In order to assist with the balance and reasonably assure security, NATO has established an intricate framework of consultative mechanisms including the Joint NATO-Russian Permanent Joint Council; the NATO-Ukraine Commission; the Mediterranean Dialogue; and support to the WEU and when appropriate EU.

While the strategic purpose of the NATO alliance was articulated in the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, periodically the alliance revises its collective strategic thinking in the form of the Strategic Concept. It was last revised at the 50th anniversary of NATO in Washington in April 1999. This document outlines NATO's purpose that in part states "to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means...The
Alliance therefore not only ensures the defense of its members but contributes to peace and security in this region." The document includes a list of new and complex risks to peace and security including oppression, ethnic conflict, economic distress, the collapse of political order and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

In Washington, the Alliance reaffirmed an offer made in 1994 to "support on a case-by-case basis... peacekeeping and other operations under authority of the UN Council or the responsibility of the OSCE, including making available Alliance resources and expertise."

This offer was based on the division between Article 5 (of the North Atlantic Treaty) and Non-Article 5 operations. Article 5 stipulates that the parties agree to collective defense. Non-Article 5 operations include those that preserve peace and enhance security and stability throughout the region. This part of the reaffirmation in 1999 is listed above.

An important addition was made to the Alliance's Strategic Concept in 1999. For the first time the Alliance introduced the terms "Crisis Response Operations" (peace support operations, interestingly is cited only once in the entire document) adding this form of conflict prevention to the precepts of Article 7 of the original charter, signaling a change in NATO's approach to Non-Article 5 operations. This also caused the NATO planners and operators to analyze this concept and address it in specific terms that could be understood by all members.
Essential to this analysis is an understanding of the three military missions set forth in the Strategic Concept outlined in Washington in April, 1999: Article 5 Defence, Non-Article 5 Crisis Response, and Consultation and Co-operation. Where is NATO now? The Strategic Concept acknowledges multi-dimensional risks and challenges resulting in the addition of the crisis response operations as a mission for the Alliance. The range of activities encapsulated in the crisis response mission is being identified to counter the continually emerging risks that were covered previously. The dynamic nature of these risks dictate that the inventory of options NATO has are equally dynamic and requires that NATO's flexibility of response extend to all spheres of Alliance influence not to just those of the military.

NATO has no specific definition of a crisis upon which to base the activation or deployment of reaction forces in accordance with this new concept. However, the following broad statement serves as a definition from which to work: “National or International situations where there is a threat to priority values interests or goals.” While the definition of a crisis is fairly broad, the Alliance does have a fairly well developed crisis management system with five well-defined objectives:

- Reduce tensions to prevent crisis
- Manage crisis effectively to avoid conflict
- Ensure timely civil and military preparedness
- If hostilities occur, control, prevent escalation and persuade aggressor to cease attack and to withdraw from Allied territory.
- When escalation and hostilities stopped, to de-escalate.

The Alliance’s Military Missions

- Article 5 Collective Defence.
- Non-Article 5 Crisis Response.
- Consultation and Co-operation.

missions, but particularly to the two relevant to this seminar: consultation and cooperation, and crisis response. There are several mechanisms designed to enhance and support the consultation and cooperation mission that have been mentioned previously. The military contribution to day-to-day Alliance business in support of the consultation and cooperation mission is primarily conducted through the various elements of the Partnership for Peace program (PfP). Since 1994 this program has
been the principle mechanism for forging practical security links between the Alliance and its partners.

Initially, the military objectives were limited to strengthening the ability of partner nations to conduct peacekeeping, search and rescue, and humanitarian operations. However, these objectives have been expanded to include much more.

The planning and review process provides a basis for reviewing and evaluating forces and capabilities. It provided a political military framework for NATO-led Partner for Peace operations. This framework affords the Alliance and its partners guidelines within which political and military parameters can be established to balance the commitment among members and partners so that no one segment of the framework contributes more than another. This framework also establishes guidance for command and control.

The Operational Capabilities Concept is designed to identify a number of things: a pool of forces and capabilities, establish multinational formations, peacetime working relationships, operational assessment and feedback mechanisms, as well as the enabling mechanisms which improve the integration of partner contributions into any future NATO-led Non-Article 5 operations.

The Training and Education Enhancement Program provides a structured approach to optimizing and improving training and education for each of the partners engaged in PfP framework.

There are many initiatives being taken to enhance cooperation among the partner nations. As an example, staff elements from partner nations have been established in several NATO headquarters to facilitate military cooperation, liaison and pave the way for operational integration.

Addressing doctrinal terminology, NATO has made some important changes that may influence the development of other doctrinal products particularly within NATO and PfP member states. Up until April 1999, Non-Article 5 operations were generically termed "peace support operations" or PSO. Military Operations Other Than War or MOOTW is not used in NATO. The existing doctrine still addresses "PSO", but with the addition of crisis response emphasizing crisis management, signals a change in the direction of future doctrinal products. Generally speaking, there is a movement away from rote categorization and a move toward more flexibility in terms of response to crisis within the NATO sphere of influence. This approach explores a range of options including military contributions in order to provide appropriate, composite, multifunctional, multi-institutional responses. These responses are not pre-ordained nor do they fit the categories of operations that
These operations can range from assistance to disaster relief, to humanitarian operations, to support, to diplomacy, to implementation operations where some form of agreement exits, to operations that are designed to coerce support in achieving an agreement. These operations may take place in a permissive environment, in an environment that is semi-permissive or in one that is even blatantly hostile. While these operations are not particular to NATO, there are key factors that effect Alliance thinking in consideration of these kinds of operations.

Fundamentally it takes the full consensus of 19 member states for NATO to make a decision on any situation brought before it as a political and security entity. In the case of Article 5 operations, agreement obliges every member to participate in some way. Non-Article 5 operations are different in that there is no obligation for the member states to participate, although the hope is that all members would participate in some way. Consensus also implies that all doctrine, policies and concepts would be agreed upon by all of the member states generating debate and compromise within the North Atlantic Council and the Military Committee to ensure that all members of the Alliance can support these policies. This is a time consuming process.

NATO military authorities recognize political control will be more intrusive than in more traditional military operations given the sensitivity attendant with crisis response operations. This extends to the development of the operational plan, to the approval of the OPLAN, to the development of the rules of engagement and probably to the subordination of military advise to over-riding political considerations. This detailed interest compresses the chain of command since the actions of commanders and even individual soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines can have far-reaching political repercussions. Casualties and collateral damage understandably generate huge political and media interest. Experience has demonstrated the essential need to plan, train, exercise and execute as fully combined and joint operations. Military planners must come to expect and accept that decision-making will be slower than usual and subject to more serious constraints and restraints given the intensive and highly politicized environment in which these operations take place.

NATO places collective defense above all else and expects to counter all other risks from the force structure required to guarantee Non-Article 5 operations. It is now fully
appreciated that within that framework, the techniques needed in crisis response operations can be different from, but just as demanding as, Article 5 operations. It has taken some time for everyone to understand this aspect of crisis response. The operational conditions differ considerably from conventional war fighting and require specific and, in some cases, unique operational procedures and techniques that allow the military to operate among the civil population and in concert with the numerous non-governmental, international and private voluntary organizations that are necessarily involved in crisis response. It is for this reason that the principal of unity of effort replaces the principal of unity of command as the foundation for effective civil-military coordination.

Since it is often impossible or inappropriate to identify an "enemy," it is prudent, indeed essential, to identify the local center of gravity, not to neutralize or to destroy it as might be the case in conventional warfare, but to protect it from factional or clan violence. For the foreseeable future NATO and the entire international community will continue to be challenged by the lack of timely and effective mechanisms to provide law enforcement to the local populations. While the military cannot provide the full spectrum of public security (such as the judiciary and penal aspects of the criminal justice system), it is the only means by which the stability and security of a region can be maintained. At the same time, in several nations, the military is constitutionally prohibited from conducting such public security functions that are lacking, and this, in part, may be the cause for the military intervention in the first place. Multinational specialized units are now deployed by the Alliance, and the experience gained by doing so will be reflected in future NATO policy for crisis response operations.

The effect of the media on crisis response operations is profound, particularly with regard to reporting casualties, but the overall effect and influence of the media is much more pervasive. NATO continues to learn the hard way the importance of conducting effective and timely information operations. In any crisis the manipulation of the facts to raise or lower the stakes is a technique which the likes of Saddam Hussein and Milosevic have demonstrated, very ably, over and over again. Out-thinking and countering this manipulation is less easy in any coalition that requires the consensus of all members. Timeliness of reaction is the key. Modern media reporting brings horror and criticism into millions of homes instantly, thus, while support or neutrality does not guarantee success in crisis response operations, continuing media criticism can contribute to its failure.

Multinationality is also fundamental to all Alliance military activity. The PfP program achieves this in the context of consultation and cooperation, but, multi-nationality, while it demonstrates political resolve and cohesion, also brings challenges. Unity of command is not negotiable, but the way national caveats are taken into account may be. The effect can be that, on occasion, a commander may direct what is to be done, but he may not be able to say how it will be
achieved. This is compatible with the normal principals of decentralization of mission command. However, within a multinational environment this requires a great deal of work and time. Commanders will conduct their normal assessments of the situation as they have been universally trained to do. However, risk and cost will have a greater effect upon the balance of forces than in conventional warfare and may ultimately impact on the ability of the force to accomplish its mission efficiently. Force troops will probably be required to often operate outside the national area of responsibility to counter a deteriorating situation, which increases the potential for casualties and is a risk that may make offering nations reluctant to participate. This may lead to under-resourcing that may in turn lead to operational flexibility. Within NATO the practice of grouping forces into formations under a lead framework nation is becoming a preferred option. It is preferred since it overcomes some of the limitations of under-resourcing and adds flexibility to key areas such as logistical support and other interoperability problems associated with multinational operations. Even with these benefits there are still issues of unity of command, which will have to accommodate a range of national caveats, which may be the preconditions for nations to offer forces in the first place.

Campaign planning also represents a challenge to the Alliance and to its participation in multinational crisis response operations. In fact, the international community has yet to demonstrate the importance of conducting effective strategic planning that brings together all the lines of activity; political, civil, military and commercial as a coherent, long-term plan. This is the single most important lesson to be learned in crisis response operations. Crisis must be tackled early with the complete range of resources, commitment and determination. An operation can be judged effectively only if there is a coherent and comprehensive plan against which it can be judged.

Sir John Harvey-Jones said, "Planning is an unnatural process: It is much more fun to do something. The nicest thing about not planning is that failure comes as a complete surprise rather than being preceded by a period of worry and depression." While humorous, this statement captures the necessity for planning and carries a very important message. NATO does continue to adapt to the requirements placed upon it and will continue to do so.
Questions and Answers

1. Now that EURO Corps has taken over as KFOR, what is its relationship to NATO in as much as, it is not part of NATO and does not employ the framework nation concept that was outlined? How is it working, and what is the relationship with NATO?

There is a certain amount of "smoke and mirrors" in this, and this is a personal opinion. One of the problems of NATO is that it only has the ARRC and nothing else. The ARRC return from a mission and then, after a short period, reconstitutes and goes again. This represents a capabilities gap that has not been addressed. One of the fallacies of the Dayton Accords is that in Annex 1a the intervention would only be 365 days. But, as the situation unfolded, it became apparent that the ARRC would have to be replaced. The EURO Corps was that replacement, and, to answer the question, it does not look like it did fours years ago. It has had to adapt to the changing situation and has been redesigned accordingly and is now under NATO command. This is a good thing because it represented a first step in recognizing the lack of capability in depth that is required for the long-term commitment that the Balkans has become. It was a smooth transition and is working very well as a NATO command headquarters.

2. Is there a conflict of interest between national interests and Alliance requirements? If so, how can these be overcome?

There are conflicts of interest and this goes back to the national caveats addressed earlier in the presentation. National caveats are overriding. They must be accommodated. As the operational requirement is developed, member states offer forces to address the crisis. Decisions have to be made regarding how these forces will be organized and grouped; what they can do and what they cannot do has to be addressed and documented. This takes a great deal of work, as the force generation process is extremely complicated. The good news is that a nation can offer these forces; the bad news is that by national law, or caveat, they can only participate in these types of missions or do only these things. The lower in command structure the more is shared. An example is MG Nash releasing Apache attack helicopters at the request of, and for use by, the British to take out buildings that were identified as having snipers in them. Nash knew that this was in contravention of a congressional mandate, but did it anyway in the name of unity of effort. He was chastised for this, but this underscores the problem with multinational operations and the challenges of making these operations successful. There is a great deal of "baggage" that comes with providing troops to any multinational operation even within NATO. In the end everything works.

3. Earlier it was said that NATO would only intervene under the authority of the UN or the OSCE, later political primacy was addressed. Kosovo is a situation in which NATO operated without UN authority. What is the position now as to when, and under what authority, NATO will intervene?

NATO wishes to act with the greatest international support that is obtainable. However, when NATO, as a body, recognizes that delay and procrastination may lead to undue suffering, then there is a feeling that something needs to be done.
Is there a recommendation as to how the tensions and clash between UN authority and the need to act on NATO's part can be reconciled?

This is difficult because it speaks to the challenges of multi-nationality. There is no such thing as a "free lunch". Everyone comes to a multinational operation with a national agenda and national interests. Each situation must be addressed by itself simply because each is different. At the risk of being jingoistic, judging success should be getting the images off the television screen. Just because there are no longer any pictures on the screen to inflame public opinion doesn't mean that the situation has gone away; it has not.

4. How serious is the impact of force protection requirements imposed on US commanders on NATO’s overall mission?

While it is entirely understandable, it does hamper the way US forces are allowed to operate. In all honesty US soldiers find the force protection situation embarrassing. But, if there is a legacy to Northern Ireland, it is that to be effective soldiers must go into the community and be visible. How can the local population be convinced that things are getting better when you are dressed as if they are not? Again, at the risk of sounding jingoistic, there is no such thing as a "no debt" operation. US soldiers on the ground want to get in and "do it", but are continually hampered, and indeed embarrassed, about the need for the force protection measures now imposed. Force protection is a huge burden on all commanders. This requirement is illustrative of the compression of the chain of command and was particularly true during the early IFOR days. In the case of a single road accident, extremely detailed questions were put from the highest levels to the lowest - such as which nationality was involved, who was hurt or killed and, most importantly, who was at fault. Soldiers and those operating at the lowest level must be trusted to obey the rules of engagement and trusted, and trained, to do the right thing in terms of protecting themselves and their people. They should not have to think twice about everything they do.

5. Regarding the last point, on campaign planning from a NATO perspective, why is this capability so slow in developing?

This is not a NATO problem, and it is not a military problem, but there is another dynamic at work that is stifling the development of the campaign planning. In the military when we say, “It will be done.”, it will be done. But, there are others who do not want their feet held to the fire. There has to be someone who will say the mission will be completed by a certain time. There are those with great ideas who can articulate them, but who are not able to put together the plan that will make the ideas work.

6. Is it useful during the course of the seminar to identify consistent definitions for such terms as peace operations, peace support operations and peacekeeping operations so that there is a common frame of reference while we conduct this seminar?

Within NATO this is still being explored and is often overshadowed by the necessities of ongoing operations, e.g. what does it matter what the operation is called as long as there is an identified goal. However, that said, given the political nature of these operations, it is necessary to discuss. The politics suggest that these operations be compartmentalized into neat boxes so
that a response would be consistent in every case. This is dangerous because it gives the politicians the opportunity to under-resource and be lulled into a false sense of security, e.g. we are doing something consistent with other operations we have participated in. These situations and missions are not the same. This underscores the need to conduct the analysis that accompanies campaign planning. Each operation is addressed on its own merit and resourced accordingly, if possible. If there is a plan it can be made flexible to allow for the worse case.

7. Crisis response operations as a term seems to be in response to a situation like Kosovo, but has many pitfalls particularly that it is too open-ended. For example, the First World War could be termed a crisis response operation. From a narrowly military point of view it provides a focal point for military planning. There are two questions associated with this comment. The doctrinal spectrum of peace operations assumes that we are trying to achieve peace. What is the aim of a crisis response operation? What is the doctrinal principal underlying the response to Sierra Leone?

From a military perspective we are still wrestling with what crisis response operations means. It was included in the Strategic Concept, but the military was unclear as to what it really meant. The military is but one element of a larger response by the Alliance. The military preference would be crisis response options vice operations since this would suggest a range of activities that could be undertaken to address a crisis. Operation clearly suggests a military response. Agree that politics may have played a part in the open-ended nature of the term, but disagree that it was in response to the situation in Kosovo. The open-ended nature of the term may suggest the required flexibility, but that is speculation and not necessarily doctrine. This is why doctrine was not addressed at the outset of this presentation. The situation in terms of doctrine is so fluid within NATO that much more must be done before a coherent doctrinal base can be developed. And then it must be decided upon by 19 member nations, each having its own reason or reasons for any involvement in crisis response operations, however they may be categorized.

With respect to Sierra Leone, this question is directly linked to the answer above. The fact that the term is so open-ended that it allowed for the deployment of NATO troops, and specifically Royal Marines, illustrates the reorientation of NATO to crisis response, however defined, and is entirely relevant to the international situation that exists at the moment. The influence of this capability over the past ten days is extraordinary. It is at least worth exploring.
The Swedish Approach to Peace Support Operations

Background

The Swedish Defence Bill of 1996 and a "follow up bill" from this spring puts forward Peace Support Operations as one of the four main tasks of the Swedish armed forces. The others are: defence of the realm, to protect Swedish territorial integrity and to support society in case of disasters or other emergencies.

One could argue that this emphasis on Peace Support Operations is nothing new as we have participated in such operations since 1948, when we sent our first military observers to take part in UNTSO in the Middle East. From that year up till now some 80,000 Swedish officers and soldiers have taken part in approximately 50 different Peace Support Operations. These operations have included outright war fighting as in Congo in the early sixties, classical Peace Keeping as on Cyprus, impossible protection duties as a part of UNPROFOR in Bosnia, as well as typical observer missions as UNMOGIP in Kashmir or UNPF in Croatia.

But today there is a new element in how we look at Peace Support Operations, especially when it comes to preparations.

During the Cold War and the early nineties we followed the very clear principle that our participation in Peace Support Operations should just be a spin off effect of our capability to defend Sweden. No parts of the defense budget were allocated for special equipment or directed to units earmarked for Peace Support Operations. Every unit that we sent abroad consisted of material and personnel belonging to our wartime organization. From now on, however we will allocate quite large resources to form and equip units especially tailored for Peace Support Operations. In the training and education of our officers, at all levels, we have already changed the curricula and put more emphasis on these types of operations.

How We Look at Peace Support Operations

Peace Support Operations can be sorted into two main categories: Peace Keeping and Peace Enforcement. Of course, there can be no clear and absolute borderline between these two types of operations and variants such as protecting humanitarian aid actions in a hostile environment (UNPROFOR in Bosnia 92-95) and others. The following diagram can nevertheless be quite helpful when trying to sort out the difference between different types of Peace Support Operations. It could also be to some help when considering if you should engage yourself in an
operation or not. The trick of course is to place the conflict correctly in the diagram and also make the right predictions about how the conflict will develop during the time you are involved.

What can be achieved by use of military forces in a Peace Support Operations? That of course depends on what you see as a desirable end state. If we go back not so far in history, perhaps only some 60 or 70 years, it was in many cases enough to just recreate order to make a society function reasonably well again. This could perhaps be called the colonial approach to Peace Support Operations.

Today that way of thinking would lead to quite limited results in most cases. If you want a lasting success you will normally have to consider a much more complex problem than just a military operation.

People expect more from their rulers than just peace. Therefore factors as: the creation of democratic institutions, rebuilding of a working infrastructure, support of the judicial system and other components that form a working modern society are probably more important in the long run than just putting an end to the fighting.

This of course does not diminish the importance of the use of (or the threat of using) military force in international conflict solving in situations when all other means have failed. But we, the military, have to see ourselves as just one, often indispensable, but nevertheless only one of many tools in conflict prevention and conflict solving.
A way to present our approach in a graphic form is shown below.

Of course this picture does not cover all possibilities, but far too often we see situations resembling what the curves illustrate, especially in the beginning of a conflict.

The first ones to react when something goes wrong are very often different humanitarian aid organizations. Only when they start having problems the political level wakes up. Then it takes some time before military resources are available and the situation often deteriorates even more before action can be taken.

When it comes to the later parts of the conflict the curves illustrate an ideal situation where the need of military forces is reduced as a result of the activities of different civilian components.

Although there are many more factors that have to be taken into account the principles behind the graph have influenced Swedish thinking quite a lot. We are convinced that we must be able to react factor to different contingencies in the future and that CIMIC (Civilian Military Cooperation) is not just an important but a decisive part of any Peace Support Operation.

Although most Peace Support Operations, in which we have participated so far, have been managed by the UN and despite that Sweden is a nonaligned country, this does not mean that we will abstain from participating in NATO-led operations. IFOR, SFOR and the current operations in Kosovo being examples of that. The only prerequisite is that the operation is authorized by the UN or OSCE.
Some Factors Influencing Our Way to Run Operations.

The above-mentioned principles can probably be accepted by most military organizations when conducting different Peace Support Operations. In that respect they are not specifically Swedish. But there are other factors that influence our way to handle these types of missions and that are a product of the Swedish military system. I would like to elaborate on two of them: conscription and our trust in "Auftragstaktik," or mission-oriented tactics.

The fact that we rely on conscription means that we have no standing units in Sweden. Every time when we want to send a unit abroad we have to recruit it, train it and then deploy it. Although we only recruit fully trained soldiers who have finished their basic training (8-15 months) this takes time. Normally it is a process that takes approximately 3 months. That is not acceptable.

Another drawback relying on conscripts (and reserve officers) is that they have to consider what consequences it might have for their civilian jobs if they chose to go abroad for 6-12 months. This makes the pool of potential recruits quite small. Experience has shown that we are able to recruit approximately two battalions at any given time and the rotate them every 6 months for almost indefinite periods (we have done it since 1956).

Having said this I would like to stress the great advantage in almost every member of a military unit having a civilian profession apart from being a soldier. A Swedish battalion-size unit represents the mix of the capabilities that you would find among 1000 randomly chosen well-trained civilian professionals. That means among other things that a Swedish unit to a very large extent has a built in capacity to do its own building, plumbing, repairing, etc. We also only accept the best 40 percent of the trained conscripts as potential recruits for operations abroad.

The inability to keep larger forces, than approximately two battalions, abroad at the same time also means that we more or less always have to work together with other nations at brigade and divisional level. This very much influences our training and selection of personnel. Proficiency in English and NATO (UN) staff procedures are important criteria.

Another effect of the limitations in unit size is that we have to organize our logistics in such a way that we do not get too much tail at the expense of the teeth. We have come quite far when it comes to "just in time" deliveries directly from Sweden to different mission areas. That being one method to keep the tail small. Of course there is a limit to this approach, as every unit has to have enough built in capacity and reserves to handle an emergency.

Another method to reduce the demands on the logistic system and also enhance efficiency is to cooperate with other nations that use similar equipment and methods. You may even borrow equipment from each other to promote interoperability and make the logistics less complicated. In our case we have cooperated with the other Nordic countries for the last 30 years. The latest example being the Nordic (and Polish) brigade in Bosnia.

The other Swedish trademark that I would like to comment on is our nearly fanatical belief in "Auftragstaktik" as our main guiding tactical principle for warfighting. It means that all officers
and soldiers are trained to solve their tasks according to their own heads, or to put it in other words, "I tell you what to do, how you do it is your own problem." This combined with the fact that approximately 90 percent of any Swedish (army) unit consists of reserve officers and soldiers who are used to making decisions in different civilian capacities creates a willingness and ability to solve problems at very low levels. This of course is also reflected in how we run Peace Support Operations.

Without doubt there is a risk in giving junior officers and ordinary soldiers the responsibility to handle complex situations but to our experience this has been a remarkably successful way to avoid small incidents escalating into use of massive force or becoming matters of prestige.

The argument that most small incidents in Peace Support Operations may have a great political significance and therefore have to be handled at very high levels still has to be proven. I would say that on very many occasions it is the other way around. Because trivial matters are handled at high levels they become politically important.

The Future

Our perhaps greatest problem at the moment is that it takes some 3 months to deploy a Swedish unit abroad. Very often this means that the situation has deteriorated still more before measures can be taken to restore the situation in a conflict area. Therefore we will take steps to make it possible to deploy a battalion-sized unit within a month. It will not be a standing unit. Probably we will refine the concept with high readiness reserve units by developing a contract system for the personnel and by storing complete units earmarked for Peace Support Operations.

Another problem that occurs quite often is that some capabilities are very hard to find when a new operation is launched. We will therefore offer the international community a menu including a mechanized battalion, an amphibious battalion, a fighter squadron, transport aircraft, corvettes, mine hunters, submarines, staff units, different logistical units, individuals with special skills, etc. All these different capabilities will be deployable within a month. This system will be operational from 2003. These units will also constitute our contribution to the 60,000 strong European crisis management force.

To summarize, there are very few differences between the general principles that govern Swedish Peace Support Operations and those of most other countries. But there is nevertheless a Swedish touch:

- Our reliance on conscription with its drawbacks and advantages,
- Our love for mission-oriented tactics and the type of officers and soldiers it creates.

The single most important thing for us in the near future is to develop methods that will enable us to react faster when there is a contingency and the international community asks us to participate.

Questions and Answers
1. What venue do you use for teaching peace support operations at the senior and junior command and staff level? Do you make use of the draft NATO manual? Do you have a national Swedish manual which is akin to the NATO manual?

We do have a manual that was written in 1997. It is very similar to the NATO manual.

2. Are the battalions Sweden deploys to peace support operations from the standing army of Sweden or are they specifically designed and manned for that operation?

The Swedish army does not have any standing units at all. There are numerous reserve units that are called up in case of war. This represents approximately thirteen brigades, some 50 battalions. When the opportunity to deploy forces to an operation such as Bosnia arises, the Swedish government looks out over this reserve manpower pool and asks for volunteers. Usually there are up to 5,000 volunteers to fill out the battalion. Of these 1,000 are selected for deployment. They are then processed, trained for two months and then deployed over a month long period. After three months of deployment the selection and training process begins using the pool of volunteers that are available. Thus every six months a new battalion is ready to deploy if required. Approximately 90% of the personnel in the battalion are reserve personnel including officers. 10% are active duty officers. Thus the majority of the senior level officers are reserve officers with a small cadre of active duty officers to provide continuity. There are no problems recruiting people to fill the requirements within any given battalion to be deployed. The sense of adventure and the generous pay are enticements to the younger segments of society to participate in these deployments. The numbers of volunteers have been consistent over the past four or five years.

3. One of the critical aspects of defining peace support operations versus peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations is that of consent. This aspect was missing from the chart you presented with your paper. Have the Swedes done any thinking on how to evaluate consent? The issue in Sierra Leone may involve a misjudgment on the issue of consent and how that has contributed to the definition of the response to the situation in this country.

Sierra Leone is an excellent example of how what you thought was consent in the beginning deteriorated after a time to where it is unclear as to whether or not consent was given in the first place. In the beginning, there seemed to be consent, which would support a peacekeeping mission. But later, the consent disappears, and the mission became impossible. The trick is to predict how the conflict will develop and then to predict how many more resources will be needed to accomplish the mission.

4. When the soldiers are trained in peacekeeping skills, have you noticed degradation in military skills? Does the training erode their warfighting skills?

Sweden does not have the same problem the US has in this regard. The US has standing forces that are required to not only train for war, but also for all other missions that might be given them. A battalion or brigade is given the mission to go to Bosnia, for example, and they are trained in peacekeeping skills. They are deployed, but after they return their warfighting capability must be evaluated. There must be some sort of re-training or reindoctrination so that
their combat skills can be reviewed. In the case of Sweden, since the units deployed to a peace operation are ad hoc units and trained to accomplish the peace support mission, they come from all of the brigades as volunteers. The unit and the soldiers in it exist for a specific task, in this case the peace operation. After they return, they go back to their wartime reserve units. The individual soldiers go with the ad hoc unit to the peace operation, do the jobs they are trained to do, then return to the unit from which they came. The Swedish army does not re-train the soldiers after they return. Standing units, such as those in the US, must be ready to react faster than those in Sweden.

5. You had mentioned the increasing costs of developing rapid reaction peacekeeping battalions. Will this increased cost be part of your defense budget or will it be above your defense budget? This is an issue in the US since most of the leadership does not want to take away from the warfighting capability in any way.

It is an issue in Sweden, too. There are two parts to the answer. First, who will pay for the preparations as the units are formed to conduct the peace operation; and, secondly, who will pay for the operation in the mission area. The preparation cost including equipment and specialized training comes out of the defense budget. Paying for the mission itself is more a question of debate. Previously, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs resourced the costs in the mission area. This debate continues between the MFA and the defense ministry, who sees the participation of Swedish forces as foreign policy and not a defense matter. The MFA contends that participation in any mission abroad is an extension of Swedish security policy, and thus should be included as a defense expenditure. However, if the defense establishment is made to pay the entire cost of training for the operation and also to pay for the operation in the mission area, then other programs, such as procurement of updated systems, will not be funded or will be funded at a lower level.

6. Could you expand on whether there is any particular training that’s given in relation to peace operations? Are the soldiers given specific training to solve problems within the mission area, or is there confidence in the skills that they have acquired in their civilian lives?

It is the other way around. Mission tactics are part of the fundamental training all Swedish soldiers are given. The philosophy in Sweden is to create individuals capable of making their own decisions. From the very first day of training, once an individual joins the armed forces or is conscripted, they are taught to take the initiative and think for themselves. In fact, we often have to restrain them from taking too much initiative or doing so in a reckless manner, particularly when the forces are abroad. The idea is to use individual resources in an optimal way. We build on the natural sense of initiative and the initiative that is used in their civilian jobs then, with proper restraint, capitalize on it.

7. Please clarify what you meant by "peace support operations". What kind of operations actually falls into this category?

In Swedish terminology, peace support operations are categorized as peacekeeping and peace enforcement.
8. Has the initiative taken by the Swedish government to include peace support operations as a "pillar" of your defense policy been mirrored on the civilian side? If so, has this caused an institutional links during training or the development of joint doctrine between the military and civilian agencies involved in these operations?

There is a third aspect of peace support operations that has not been mentioned. Since the end of the Second World War, Sweden has embraced a philosophy known as the Total Defense Concept. Sweden is organized into three military districts, each run by a three-star general or an admiral. On the staff of each of the military districts is the head of police, the county governors, and people responsible for health and security. For the last fifty years we have lived in a CIMIC environment. This philosophy has transferred into our participation in peace support operations, since we have been cooperating with the police and other civilian agencies for many years. It is part of our national culture. We have trained and operated together so there is no difficulty as we deploy and participate in these kinds of operations.
Russian View

Major General Andrey Marshankin, Defense Attaché, Embassy of the Russian Federation Washington, DC.

Recommend that everyone read the article by Michael Yermaliv, director of the Center for International Studies in Moscow, entitled, "Russia's International Peacekeeping and Conflict Management in the Post-Soviet Environment". This article is a very comprehensive review of Russian peacekeeping over the past ten years.

Text of the article follows:

Peacekeeping from the Russian Perspective

Russian experts still consider the international peacekeeping activity to be a creative instrument of settling down regional and local conflicts and support the idea of enhancing its legal basis in strict accordance with the basic principles of the UN Charter. While supporting the measures to increase and update the potential of the UN anti-crisis rapid reaction, the Russian Federation should at the same time go on with its active participation in peace support operations carried out both by this Organization and in particular cases by regional and sub-regional organizations. The necessity and the degree of the participation will be co-related with the national interests and international obligations of the country.

Unfortunately the preceding experience has not resulted in working out efficient means of resolving regional and local conflicts and other crises situations. It looks like this is going to become the goal of the future system of collective security.

The experience shows that the international community finds itself unprepared for every new conflict what makes it – as a result – unable to settle it down on the earlier stage, avoiding serious human and material losses. The recent events – the Gulf War and the Iraqi war, Yugoslavia – are good illustrations for the above mentioned. The same can be said about the indirect participation of some states in the Dagestan and Chechen conflicts. The international community is still less prepared for the crisis where the parties could use missiles or mass destruction weapons.

Speaking about the peacekeeping actions of any structures and organizations some people first of all mean use of face for the achievement of the goal.

Reputable international experts when assessing the latest events state, that we are facing the tradition of extrapolation of American power in any international aspect, including, naturally, the most complicated mechanisms of peace-keeping using the potential of the UN, NATO, and other reputable organizations subordinated to the US authority.

"The Kosovo syndrome" of the US global diplomacy on the modern stage can lead to an impasse the United States, NATO and the West in general.

The traditions of using power in peacekeeping must give way to the new approaches based on wisdom, common sense and good will. Any situation should first of all be assessed from the point of view of the rule of law, international legal norms. The main legal norms of peacekeeping are defined by the UN Charter, where many clauses need to be clarified, supplemented and defined more concretely. It is especially important considering the ever-growing problems of international terrorism, religious and ethnic contradictions.

It is only the comprehensive approach and analysis of the situation that had resulted in the transformation of the former world order that can lead to proper decisions and define the means and devices of its restoration. It is obvious that it is worthwhile to have scientific and analytical centers within the composition of various international
and regional structures; the centers for to be able to give an objective assessment of the situation within the limited period of time.

The decisions taken and approved can be successfully implemented if there are managerial organs and the potential for the implementation of these tasks. It is essential that there must be controlling organs with the greatest possible framework of responsibility to the international community.

Let us briefly formulate our point of view on those issues.

**Managerial bodies**

Our experts believe that a permanent structural managerial group is a must. It must be directly subordinated to the head of the international organization. The group will embrace professional lawyers, scientists, politicians, the military, policemen, and international representatives of human rights organizations. It can be responsible for:

- Working out international norms of the world order and interaction.
- Comprehensive assessment of the situation, especially in the crises areas.
- Working out common international programs for training military and civilian peacekeepers.
- The analysis of the peacekeeping operations; conclusions and recommendations on that basis.

The managerial group can also be entrusted with controlling the readiness of the forces and means of peacekeeping operations, reconnaissance of the ground, conducting the negotiations, etc.

**Means and forces of the peace-keeping operations**

By now there already were cases of voluntary contribution of means and forces for the peacekeeping operations by some countries, the model is checked by practice and has right for existence.

The practice and experience prompt that it is necessary to have permanent forces and means for reconnaissance provide communication, establish mobile groups of influence and protection.

The professional training of the peacekeepers, especially the commanding officers for the military and police forces, in our view, must be very thoroughly analyzed, prepared and offered to all countries participating in the peacekeeping operations.

It is necessary to define one's attitude to specialized training for different arms in various countries and international centers for peacekeepers.

The above-mentioned managerial bodies must have a database showing the readiness of the means and forces for the peacekeeping operations. Some forces should be in the red alert readiness; the others – the majority of the peacekeeping forces – may be restored to the second degree of combat readiness. All peacekeepers must go through some special training program common for all of them.

We should not forget about training the professionals providing material support to the crises regions and responsible for organizing the everyday routine life after the military or special type operations are over.

And the essential thing is – to provide the interaction of all means and forces in the crises areas on all stages of preparation and conduct of peacekeeping operations.

**A Few Words about the Controlling Organs**

Our experts believe that the controlling organs must be formed and appointed only by the supreme organs of international organizations, and should remain subordinate to them.

Having rights and authority those organs must be responsible to the world community. Prominent state leaders, politicians, scientists, reputable public figures should be members of those bodies. Ex-heads of the states and governments who have sufficient experience in international affairs and enjoy high moral authority can be their active members.
This organ must be able to give as objective an assessment of the situation as possible and come out with recommendations.

We can go on with this discussion and expect positive results only if we can come to understanding about the strategy of international peacekeeping. The representatives of Russia had already mentioned it at previous conferences.

First – the UNO and the OSCE have unquestionable rights to take decisions about the resolution of any conflicts and it is only the decisions of those organizations that can be obligatory for the regional structures when conducting the peacekeeping operations. Hence the necessity to have permanent organs responsible for peacekeeping operations in the UN structures.

Second – common documents on international law regulating coordinated actions in analysis, planning, preparation and conduct of peacekeeping operations must be prepared.

Third – it is not worthwhile to organize and use strategic groups or task forces using modern systems of armaments in peacekeeping operations.

Fourth – the events in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo give another proof to our view and our warnings that the use of peace-keeping operations so as to reconsider ethnic and state borders, to solve ecological or economic problems can only result in broadening the conflict and its escalation.

Fifth – practice and experience show that it is necessary to have well prepared permanent units for peace-keeping operations and not only national military units, that are often used to solve the problems of their respective states. They have to be trained in specialized training centers on common programs controlled by permanent UN organs.

Those proposals in our view today are quite topical and must be reflected in the documents that lay the basis for the peacekeeping doctrines.

The text was prepared by experts of the Foundation "Russian Public Policy Center."

We do not have any written document called Russian military doctrine. We have a system of views or a concept of Russian military doctrine. This doctrine is composed of political, military and military tactical issues put together and observed as an ideology for Russian involvement in peacekeeping activities. We are still having difficulties defining types of operations within the sphere of peacekeeping, and, in part because of these difficulties, we are having difficulties adjusting this ideology to the doctrine of the rest of the world. The slides will be used as an illustration, but I will explain in detail that which is not depicted on the slides.
Over the past two or three months the Russian military has adopted two documents that form the basis for operations including those within the realm of peacekeeping. They are the National Strategy Concept and the Russian Military Doctrine. These documents show the political assessment of Russian participation in peacekeeping operations.

The Russian security concept outlines the external destabilizing factors, which are the basis for our assessment of our peacekeeping efforts. At least three of these destabilizing factors can be a trigger or a source for the Russian government to consider participation in peacekeeping operations.

The National Security Concept defines the range of threats that are viewed as most serious to the Russian Federation. They are broken down into two groups: external and internal. It is relevant to say that either group might cause the government to become involved in peace operations. One of the most controversial points for us is the range of peace operations conducted in the territory formerly known as the Soviet Union and now known as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Observers may question whether or not Russian operations in Tajikistan, Abkasia, Moldova, or elsewhere, are traditional peacekeeping operations, and this is a valid question. We believe that the ultimate purpose of any peace operation, regardless of what it is called, is to establish peace, and this is our goal in these operations.
The Russian National Strategy Concept provides for three principles for the Russian international policy. The importance of the UN Security Council role was stressed as were the standards established for peacekeeping by the UN.

President Putin has just recently signed the Russian military doctrine. It provides the Russian armed forces would be responsible for peace operations and be responsible for the tasks listed on the slide.

The main preconditions for Russian participation in peacekeeping operations are listed here. One of the major issues here is to continually evaluate how on-going peace operations correspond to Russian national interests, particularly for those that are close to the Russian borders and elsewhere. We have to evaluate the danger of political, economic and humanitarian consequences caused by inaction on the part of the UN or other international entities. We also must obtain clear-cut political goals, a clear mandate, and constantly review the time limits for the operations and the end-state. The preconditions are somewhat idealistic since very rarely would a situation meeting most of these criteria exist, but this how we evaluate situations of this kind.
Russia has been participating in a number of peace operations within the CIS. However, we see a philosophical conflict while participating in these peace operations. This conflict revolves around legal issues centering on the rights of sovereign states competing with Russian national interests.

This slide is very simple and self-explanatory as it illustrates that which is required to bring peace to a region or area anywhere in the world. This slide addresses traditional peacekeeping operations.

This slide lists missions that the Russian military would undertake to support a negotiated peace, or a peace agreement, between belligerent parties.
Within the traditional peacekeeping operations we define three types of Russian participation. The first is Russian military observers. Their mission would be to observe the stabilizing measures in the zone of conflict: the separation of forces, the cease-fire, the exchange of prisoners of war and assist the humanitarian effort in a particular mission. We may also include here inspections of demilitarization of weapons, depots and other related activities, investigation of cease-fire violations, monitoring of negotiation sites and monitoring the situation along lines of separation along the demilitarized zone.

We continue to receive tasks from the current, on-going, peacekeeping operations that are consuming time and resources. These tasks are largely humanitarian in nature and revolve around assisting local governments to provide the local populations, including assistance to the local police agencies, and many other tasks that are associated with internal assistance. These are new challenges for Russian peacekeepers.

Questions and Answers

1. Does the Russian military work with EVERCOM, the civilian emergency management organization or does the military have its own assets that provide this type of assistance?

We do not work with the international humanitarian organizations. We do however cooperate with the Russian organization analogous to FEMA. It is through them that we cooperate with international organizations worldwide. We offer transportation and logistics infrastructure to the Russian interagency organization, which is an intermediary for the Russian military to the international relief community. However, in the long term, the Russian military will have to address this question as it is very relevant. The intermediate arrangement tends to cause delays in getting required assistance to those who need it.

2. Where does the concept of consent fit into your approach to peacekeeping? One of the slides talked about establishing the basis for a political settlement, but a couple of other slides talked about pre-conditions for Russian involvement.

Ideally we would like to have consent. Obtaining consent can do nothing but help in resolving the situation at hand. There are examples where consent is very difficult to achieve because of the absence of political will or other physical requirements necessary for consent to be realized. For peace operations within the CIS, a request from one of the entities for assistance from the Russian military can be viewed as a legal issue by the rest of the CIS community and serve as a prelude to peacekeeping operations by the Russian military.

3. Building on that point, the slides suggest that a UN mandate is necessary as a precondition for Russian military participation in a peace operation. Are you suggesting that there are circumstances in which regionally based peacekeeping could be viewed as legal if it did not go through the UN, such as a CIS request or ECOWAS; after Kosovo that is a very difficult issue.

We feel that a regional mandate or regional decision could be enough to start a peacekeeping operation at least for the CIS community. The legal basis we have created within the CIS community is enough and is recognized internationally to start a peacekeeping operation within
the territory of the former Soviet Union. Ideally, the UN mandate, or that of the OSCE, would be the best situation. But, if these two organizations fail to issue such a mandate, the highest criteria for Russian military involvement is the maintaining of peace and security.

Would you say that there is a basis for applying this standard to other regionally sponsored peacekeeping operations?

I don't think so, but ultimately it is up to the lawyers in a global context. My reference here is to the CIS community only.

4. Not everyone recognizes this standard within the CIS. Ukraine for example does not recognize CIS peacekeeping outside of a UN or OSCE mandate.

The closer a conflict is to a nation's borders, the less confident that nation is in the criteria and standards applied by the UN or the OSCE that govern military involvement.
Dr. Kamel Abu-Jaber, President of the Jordanian Institute of Diplomacy

Before I get into my paper, I have three remarks I would like to make:

1. I am intrigued with the word "doctrine". This is the military's business, indoctrinating and creating doctrine. Situations are always different; no two conflicts are the same.

2. Who is the "international community"? It changes from time-to-time, as do coalitions from situation to situation. This is mainly because interests change over time.

3. We are in a transition period as illustrated by the changing political climate in the world and among the "international community". Our collective mode of thinking is changing. Aristotle said that there are two constants in life. One is that there is always time and, two, that there is always change. We are passing through a period where state sovereignty is being called into question. When does the international community have a right to intervene in the affairs of another state? Does it have a right to intervene? What are the limits of state sovereignty?

Support of Peace Keeping Operations
A Jordanian View

Presentation by
Professor Kamel S. Abu Jaber
Seminar on
"Doctrinal Development and the Impact of doctrine on Peace Operations"

United States Army War College

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In historical terms it is only very recently that the nations of the world began thinking in terms of peacekeeping operations. In fact, not until the end of World War II and the adoption of the United Nations Charter was there any serious attempt in that direction. Also, such attempts succeeded only when the then two super powers agreed on a particular situation. Peacekeeping then, an aspect of the concept of peace preparedness and the attempts at the creation of a worldwide culture of peace, is only a recent development in the context of international relations.

For Jordan, a small country surrounded by all sides by powerful states, and situated in one of the most difficult neighborhoods in the world, peace within, social peace, as well as peace in the
region and the world remains a strategic goal. Surely it is obvious that the smaller the country, the greater is its need for peace and stability. The multiplier effect of violence, even in remote situations, can and often has made its ripples, even waves reaching Jordan itself.

The war in Afghanistan, and its aftermath, the terrible and tragic events in the Balkans, Chechnya, indeed the super power Cold War itself had their immediate impact on the politics and the society of Jordan. When the conflict is nearer to home, like the Arab-Israeli, or the Iran-Iraq, or indeed the present Iraqi situation, the impact is indeed more immediate and is swiftly reflected in the country's politics, and economy.

Since its establishment in 1921, the moderate leadership of the country had the vision as well as the political acumen to assess the proper place and the role of their small country. Their pragmatic and rational calculations made it evident that peace is the best guarantee not only for survival but also for the development of the country. This explains why Jordan in the 1940s advised the then Arab leadership to accept the Palestine Partition Plan of 1947 and since then, and especially since 1967, has been in the forefront of all the efforts to bring about a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

And while Jordan was always a pro-Western country: first closely associated with Britain and since the mid-fifties with the United States, at the same time, it also maintained relations with the other major powers. Always in the back of its mind was the idea that a peaceful world is the kind of healthy environment allowing smaller nations to develop. This explains why Jordan now is one of six Mediterranean countries affiliated with NATO. Simply stated, peace serves the national interests and allows the country to cooperate with the international community to develop the socio-economic plans designed for the welfare of its people.

Peace, however, necessitates the rule of law. Domestically this translates into an attempt to build a civil society based on participatory institutions and respect for human rights and a government responsive, within available means, to the socio-economic needs of its people. Internationally, Jordan continues to insist that no state give itself the right to be exempted from the provisions of international law and United Nations Security Council Resolutions. That is why Jordan continues to insist that for the Arab-Israeli peace process to be permanent, it must be just and comprehensive and based on UN resolutions 242, 338, and 425. Otherwise, it may yet prove to be no more than another truce.

While force may at times bring a certain level of stability, such, as history tells us, is only a short-lived stability that is the breeding ground for greater violence and extremism. The great British Philosopher Thomas Hobbes placed stability above all other political values. In its absence, he correctly pointed that life would be "nasty" "brutish" and brief. Again it is obvious that the smaller the nation, the closer is the link of its stability to the region around the world beyond. Jordan's quest for socio-economic development is closely linked to its other two strategic goals, stability and peace.

Jordan's participation in peacekeeping operations is made in light of these considerations, as well as the realization that such peacekeeping operations help in the creation of the climate necessary for encouraging the nascent idea of an international culture of peace.
By its very size, definition, and its moderate and rational leadership Jordan recognizes, indeed has always lived with the reality that state sovereignty is not limitless. That is why it readily adheres to, and respects the boundaries of international law and indeed has been in the forefront of countries to expand its dimensions. In 1981, Jordan proposed to the United Nations General Assembly the establishment of a New Humanitarian Order and in 1988 Jordan played a major role in the establishment of the International Criminal Court. It was also with this in mind that Jordan viewed NATO's intervention against Serbia, which though unsanctioned by a United Nations Security Council resolution, remains ethically and morally sanctioned. The idea remains that nation-states and certain of their leaders must realize that state sovereignty must no longer be an automatic blanket against reprehensible actions of a state against even its own citizens.

Of course Jordan prefers, indeed insists, that such interventionism must be sanctioned by the UN Charter. This not only for technical legal niceties but for historical precedence too.

Because of the diverse conditions and circumstances of every conflict, Jordan realizes there needs to be greater flexibility in handling each, as the situation demands. The intensity, indeed the ferocity of a conflict, is a factor in the way it should be dealt with. Surely no two crises, and thus no two peacekeeping operations can be duplicates of each other.

General Mohammed Shiyyab, Director of the Jordan Department for Security Studies emphasizes that "...there can be no standard form of fixed rules...Each operation required to be planned and mounted in order to meet the circumstances of the dispute and the nature of the environment in which the force will be operating. Therefore, UN peacekeeping operations have been most successful in cases of interstate hostilities, where belligerents have consented to the deployment of international forces..." General Shiyyab in addressing the question in cases of civil conflict which are more problematic and difficult, states, "...it becomes very difficult to adhere to norms of neutrality and restrictive rules of engagement..."

Looking into the future and the fact that conflicts will remain a fact of life, original and innovative thinking is needed in anticipation. Such creative thinking needs to address, why, when and how peacekeeping operations are to be conducted. No ironclad fixed rules can apply uniformly to every situation, though certain guidelines can be of help.

First, that such operations must attempt to receive United Nations sanctions. Second, an attempt should be made to secure the consent of the parties to the conflict. Third, that such operations should not reflect negatively or harm the interests of neighboring countries, and than an attempt should be made to secure their consent and cooperation. Fourth, that there be a serious attempt not only to contain and manage the conflict but also be attempt a resolution. And finally, that such peacekeeping operations be clearly conducted with the understanding that they are conducted without "...prejudice to the rights, claims, or positions of the parties concerned."

Related to this last point is the emphasis that the peacekeepers remain neutral in any given situation regardless of their personal feelings on the matter or the fact that they are an instrument of the Security Council or the international community.

Because they are a new introduction into the international relations between states, Jordan realizes that each situation must be met on an ad hoc basis. They must not be ideologized or
made to appear that they are conducted to serve the interests of one party. And it is for this reason that Jordan also has been attempting, for the past two decades, to enlarge the concept of security from its traditional military and police dimensions to include "soft" security: the humanitarian, socio-economic and cultural dimensions too. This realization emanates from the increasing villigization of the world and the increased and continuous process of interdependency in terms of security, politics, economics and culture.


Jordan is located in a most difficult neighborhood, Israel on one side and oil on the other. Security is foremost in the minds of all states within the Middle Eastern community. The oil represents something that everyone needs and wants. There is also Saddam Hussein. Trying to make sense of the situation in the Middle East is always a challenge.

For the first time smaller states can feel some small sense of security in that there are political agreements in place that allow these smaller states in Africa, Latin America and elsewhere to feel that they can exist. Why does Jordan participate in peace operations? The answer is that Jordan wants to assist in creating an environment of peace. Peace is in Jordan's national interest; it guarantees our survivability.

Jordan has been fortunate to have leaders who are intelligent and are visionaries. As a political scientist I often ponder which is more important, the people or the leadership. I always conclude that it is the leadership that makes the difference. Not that the people are not important, but the leaders are the ones who create the conditions for success and are ultimately responsible for the success or failure of the nation. The leaders of Jordan have been able to see beyond the horizon and see what the long-term interests of the country are and the direction the country needs to go to satisfy those interests. This is the fundamental basis for Jordan's peacekeeping doctrine. Why does Jordan participate in peacekeeping operations given our meager resources? Simply, because it helps to create conditions of stability and peace which in turn guarantees our socio-economic and political development.

The creation of cultural peace is the bedrock of Jordan's peacekeeping doctrine. Certain factors lie behind Jordan's doctrine. Peacekeeping and Jordan's participation in peace operations is an instrument of Jordan's foreign policy. This is the most important outreach of Jordanian foreign policy.

The smaller the country, the greater the need for inclusion on the international scene and involvement in international affairs. Smaller countries can be forgotten easily, overshadowed by the larger, more powerful countries. This is a reality of foreign affairs and an underlying factor behind Jordan's participation in peace operations.

Ideology is also a factor that underpins Jordanian peacekeeping doctrine. Jordan has always been pro-West and pragmatic in its approach to foreign affairs. That we are surrounded by these powerful states requires Jordan to look beyond its frontiers to determine ways to co-
exist with these powers and still be a player in the international community. This ideology is important for Jordan to contain the great powers that surround it and still be capable of participating in international affairs.

The ideology cannot be mentioned without addressing the peace process. Israel is a highly ideological country, which impacts on our relations. The other countries in the region also have strong ideological concepts many of which compete with not only our own, but with those of the other nations in the region. This is something with which Jordan must deal not only ideologically, but also practically. For some ideology is a curiosity, something to be studied within the context of international politics. But in the Middle East ideology is a defining aspect of the culture; it is embedded in the fiber of each individual country and is based upon ancient ideas to which many still cling. The hatreds and prejudices are deep seated and based, in part, upon this ancient ideology. To counter this, Jordan has tried to introduce a sense of rationality and pragmatism to moderate the problems. As the leader of the Jordanian delegation to the peace process I was criticized for even talking to the Israelis. But the conflict was eating us alive and had to be stopped. The forces of rejection are still strong in the region, but we continue to inject a sense of rationality and peace. We need your support (American, Russian and all others) to bring the forces of rejection under control.

However, we are not getting the support we need to bring the situation to a satisfactory conclusion. This is not money or assistance, but the kind of effort that will bring the situation under control. Security is necessarily paramount to the Israelis, but this must be moderated in order for real peace to be achieved. Like other nations, Jordan is a traumatized nation in need of input and interest from the larger international community. We cannot solve all of these problems alone, much less regionally.

Jordan is still involved in the great experiment with democracy. It is not perfect, but nevertheless in place. This is being done without a great deal of help from the so-called international community. Jordan's peacekeeping doctrine, and the peacekeeping doctrine of many smaller nations, is survivability through the rule of law generated by the United Nations
Questions and Answers

1. Comment on two issues from the paper. On the issue of the "international community", Islamic thought suggests the unity of humanity, that humanity is one. While there are shifting political alliances, there is an international community not necessarily composed of states, but of individual, ordinary people who want the rest of the world to see their plight and respond to help them when in need. On the issue concerning the limits of state sovereignty, the state has a duty and an obligation to protect its citizens against armed attack and in some cases the state fails to do so. Sierra Leone is an excellent example of this. When the state fails in this duty there is a legal and moral basis for military intervention by outside actors or the "international community".

I agree with both points. The international community changes from crisis to crisis, depending on the impact on any one nation's national interests. This is what I meant when I said there is no one international community. A tyrant attacking his people must be stopped, but how can we do this without violating national sovereignty? We are beginning to devise ways to help people in this situation, but there is resistance. This resistance does not come from the larger powers. The Russians and Americans no doubt will agree that there are situations that require intervention depending on where they occur. It may take many years before we reach the stage of accepting intervention as a way of rectifying desperate situations. But, for the first time in history on the international scene, there is a chance for the establishment of the rule of law as the basis for intervention.

2. Does the general population of Jordan accept the far-sighted role of Jordanian troops in Sierra Leone to the extent that there may be casualties in this peace enforcement operation?

Yes. We have had casualties since we have been involved in peace operations longer than many other countries. The leadership of Jordan has conditioned the population to accept that the larger role in peace operations comes with the potential for casualties. The leaders are approachable and are willing to explain the situation so that the population will understand.

3. If Jordan is threatened, do you think that the international community would come to your assistance just as you go abroad to assist others in a similar situation?

One of the lessons learned from the Gulf War was that international borders are sacrosanct. This is a lesson that many Arabs resent. The Jordanian army is capable of defending our borders. Jordan has always tried to maintain good relations with all nations, but has always been pro-Western in its outlook.

4. Russia is facing a real threat at its southern border from Islamic extremists, could you elaborate on how the international community can help in stopping the expansion of this extremist movement, or do you see this extremism as a threat to the international community?

The Islamic sentiment is very strong throughout the world. I do not think that the international community will be able to assist. The Russians will vanquish the Chechyns, but I think it is time for a dialog to be opened. In Jordan, there is an open dialog with the Islamic groups in
Parliament by the rulers of Jordan. Thus we have had very few problems in this regard. Time was always made to listen to the Islamic members of parliament. Communication is key. There is a large Chechen population in Jordan, in fact, the leading Chechen leader was asked at one point to be the president of Chechnya, and he was Jordanian.

5. Jordan is contributing forces to the peace enforcement mission in Sierra Leone, but did not participate with the allies in the Gulf War, was this because of the Jordanian survivability doctrine?

Jordan did not participate in the action against Iraq. We wanted to solve the problem with Iraq from within the Arab world. We still believe that had we been given the chance to work within the Arab sphere the consequences still being suffered because of the conflict might not now be a continuing problem.
South African View

Mark Malan, Chief of Mission Programs, South African Institute of Strategic Studies.

I have no mandate from the South African government to address national policy, but I will allude to it because I have been involved in the capacity building effort in southern Africa for the past five years.

Thus far, South Africa has a very little practical experience with peacekeeping; although we have been active in planning and have dedicated some time to training and becoming slowly involved with peace operations to the extent that we hosted a regional peacekeeping exercise known as "Blue Crane" recently. We also have participated in a response to a "crisis" situation in Lethoso. But we realize that we will become involved whether we like it or not in any operation that will be undertaken in response to the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo. One thing we have found is that we cannot develop doctrine in isolation.

PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS IN AFRICA:
ADDRESSING THE DOCTRINAL DEFICIT

Mark Malan, Institute for Security Studies

Prepared for the International Comparative Peacekeeping Seminar with the theme
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INTRODUCTION

African countries have historically played an important role in international peacekeeping. Like other poor nations, they have been willing and able to provide sizeable contingents for United Nations peacekeeping operations, thus increasing the geographical spread of troop contributors and enhancing the representative nature, perceived impartially, and legitimacy of such missions. However, African states are now more likely to be called upon to organize and sustain their own peace support operations for dealing with regional conflicts in Africa, or to contribute the bulk of formed military units where the UN launches such missions. The fact that the ability of African countries to meet the demands of contemporary peace support is severely limited seems to be ignored by an increasingly vocal chorus of "African solutions to African problems". Such solutions, in the realm of peace support, amount to what Hutchful has described as 'lean peacekeeping' – missions that operate under sub-optimal conditions that would not normally support military operations.1

The advent of lean peacekeeping in Africa is often ascribed to the 'Somalia' effect, or Western disenchantment with the failure of new generation peace operations in Africa. However, it began under regional auspices with the ECOMOG intervention in Liberia in 1990. The 'Africanization' of peacekeeping continued under UN auspices in Angola, where the UNAVEM III mission (February 1995 – June 1997) was comprised mainly of troops from African and other developing countries. However, the precedent for stretching Chapter VIII of the UN Charter to its limits was firmly set in Central African Republic, when on 6 August 1997, the Security Council retrospectively authorized the 800-member Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements (MISAB) under a Chapter VII mandate.

The results of these operations vary from fairly successful (in CAR), to inconclusive (Liberia), and outright failure (Angola). However, it is the regional and international peace support process in Sierra Leone, as pursued from 1996 to present, that illustrates the full absurdity of applying the lean peacekeeping recipe to ruinous civil wars in Africa. Much has been said and written on the dramatic events in that country since the first UN peacekeepers were taken hostage on 1 May 2000. The 'I-told-you-so' brigade has included both interventionists and non-interventionists. But beyond all the hype (which includes suggestions of sending in mercenaries to fix the mess), the UN debacle provides an opportunity for some serious reflection on some key unresolved doctrinal issues of peace support in Africa.

The aim of this paper is to briefly sketch some of the key doctrinal challenges emerging from the UN mission in Sierra Leone, before outlining the progress (or lack thereof) in addressing such challenges at the international and African levels.

**THE FAILURE OF UN PEACE SUPPORT IN SIERRA LEONE**

Sierra Leone's 8-year civil war supposedly ended with a peace agreement signed in Lome on 7 July 1999. After a decade of providing the backbone of ECOMOG forces in Liberia and then Sierra Leone, the democratically elected government of Nigeria could no longer sustain its ECOMOG commitments, and informed the world that it would be pulling its troops out of Sierra Leone. Although Foday Sankoh's Revolutionary United Front (RUF) had been driven out of Freetown, they still controlled the countryside and the diamond-mining areas that create most of

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3 The force, which had been operating without international approval since early 1997, consisted of voluntary troop contributions by Burkina Faso, Chad, Gabon, Kenya, Senegal, and Togo. Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, MISAB was entitled to use force in order to implement its mandate, which included the disarmament of rebellious factions of the CAR military. UN member states were not assessed for any portion of the mission costs, which had to be borne by participating countries. In effect, France carried much of the burden of sustaining the African contingents in the field. The Security Council finally succumbed to French pressure for the UN to take over responsibility for the CAR peace process from the hard-pressed MISAB contributors with effect from 15 April 1998. The role of the UN Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA) was to provide security long enough for the Government of the CAR to undertake the reforms it had promised and to provide for its own security.
the country's wealth. No peace deal was possible without Sankoh and the RUF. Corporal Sankoh was in jail, awaiting execution for terrible crimes of which he is unquestionably guilty.

The tense security environment and impending Nigerian withdrawal led to a frantic scramble among West African states, as well as Britain and the United States, to broker a peace agreement. The UN Special Representative initiated a series of diplomatic efforts aimed at opening up dialogue with the rebels. Negotiations between the Government and the rebels began in May 1999. With coaxing from the UK and USA, a controversial peace agreement was signed by President Kabbah and Corporal Sankoh in Lome, Togo on 7 July 1999. The Lome accord granted total amnesty to Foday Sankoh and members of the RUF, promised reintegration of the RUF into the Sierra Leonean Army, assured the RUF several cabinet seats in the transitional government, left the RUF in control of the diamond mines and invited Sankoh to participate in UN-sponsored elections.

In exchange for senior government positions for its commanders and a blanket amnesty for atrocities committed during the war, the RUF pledged to disarm, along with pro-government civil defense forces and other paramilitary units. Despite its obvious flaws, the UN was obliged to back the agreement with a peacekeeping mission. The Lome accord requires that:

"A neutral peacekeeping force comprising UNOMSIL⁴ and ECOMOG shall disarm all combatants of the RUF/SL, CDF, SLA and paramilitary groups. The encampment disarmament and demobilization process shall commence within six weeks of signing of the present Agreement in line with the deployment of the neutral peacekeeping force."⁵

This process was to be completed within 60 days, according to the draft implementation schedule.⁶ The Lome signatories specifically requested the UN Security Council to urgently:

"…amend the mandate of UNOMSIL to enable it to undertake the tasks provided for it in the present Agreement; (and) to authorize the deployment of a peace-keeping force in Sierra Leone."⁷

On 22 October 1999, Council authorized the establishment of the UN Assistance Mission to Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), with a maximum authorized strength of 6,000 military personnel, including 260 military observers, to assist the Government and the parties in carrying out

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⁴ In June 1998, the UN Security Council decided to establish the United Nations Observer Mission to Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) for an initial period of 6 months. By the end of August 1998, UNOMSIL had completed the first phase of the deployment of its military component, consisting of 40 military observers, a Chief Military Observer and a medical team of 15 personnel. The mission was supposed to help with national reconciliation and with the demobilization of former soldiers. However, it was never more than a ‘lame duck’ UN presence, of minor significance next to the regional ECOMOG force, whose total strength that varied between 12,000 and 15,000 men. Nigeria was providing between 10,000 and 11,000 of these troops.

⁵ Peace Agreement between the government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, Lome, 7 July 1999.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.
provisions of the Lome peace agreement. At the same time, the Council decided to terminate UNOMSIL.

According to Security Council resolution 1270, UNAMSIL had the mandate to *inter alia*:

- assist the Government of Sierra Leone in the implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan,
- that end, to establish a presence at key locations throughout the territory of Sierra Leone, including at disarmament/reception centers and demobilization centers,
- ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel,
- monitor adherence to the cease-fire in accordance with the cease-fire agreement of 18 May 1999 (S/1999/585, annex) through the structures provided for therein; and
- provide support, to the elections, which are to be held in accordance with the present constitution of Sierra Leone (early 2001).

In early December 1999, the first company of 133 Kenyan soldiers flew into Lungi International Airport as the advance unit of the first new UNAMSIL battalion to join some 223 UN military observers from 30 countries, already on the ground. Four ECOMOG battalions already in Sierra Leone (composed of troops from Ghana, Guinea and Nigeria) were 're-hatted' as UN peacekeepers. In the tradition of lean peacekeeping in Africa, the rest of the formed units were to come from India, Jordan, Bangladesh and Zambia – with only a few military observers being volunteered by the developed world.

Deployment of the remaining units, as is customary for UN operations, was painfully slow. At the beginning of April 2000 (more than 5 months after Resolution 1270), UNAMSIL force commander Major General Vijay Jetley complained that he did not have sufficient troops to deploy into the diamond-rich Kono district, because he was still waiting for the Jordanian and Zambian peacekeeping contingents to arrive.8

Although the Lome agreement guaranteed the UN unhindered and safe access to all areas of the country, the UN peacekeepers were often denied freedom of movement, amidst frequent cease-fire violations that included ambushes against civilians and UN personnel, the maintenance of illegal roadblocks, and RUF troop movements.9 It was also not entirely clear who was doing the disarming – UNAMSIL or the belligerents. In January, peacekeepers from Kenya and Guinea surrendered at least 100 assault rifles, several rocket-propelled grenade launchers, 4 armored personnel carriers, communications equipment and other military gear in at least three ambushes by elements of the RUF. In each incident, the troops put up no resistance.

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8 Interview with Reuters, 7 April 2000.

The peacekeepers' failure to respond with force caused U.S., British and some UN officials to worry that the rebels would step up their armed challenges to the UN forces as they assumed greater responsibility for security from the departing Nigerian-led West African force. On 3 February, CIA Director George Tenet told Congress the rebels were "poised to break a tenuous cease-fire and resume a campaign of terror."\textsuperscript{10}

In response to the above and other incidents and concerns, Council voted unanimously, on 7 February 2000, to approve the Secretary-General's plans for strengthening the UNAMSIL mission in Sierra Leone. This not only raised the maximum authorized strength from 6,000 to 11,000, but also granted the mission an expanded mandate under Chapter VII of the Charter.\textsuperscript{11} In particular, Council:

"... authorizes UNAMSIL to take the necessary action to fulfil ... (its) tasks ... and affirms that, in the discharge of its mandate, UNAMSIL may take the necessary action to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel and ... to afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence ...".\textsuperscript{12}

Resolution 1289 thus provides the legal framework for coercive action by UNAMSIL in pursuit of its disarmament mandate, but this could not be translated into assertive and credible action on the ground. Despite the more robust mandate, General Jetley continued to defend the peacekeepers' 'soft' approach, saying that while the RUF is "not as fully committed to disarmament as it would like people to believe," patience is necessary. Jetley stressed that "(UNAMSIL is) a peacekeeping force, not a combat force," and that "peace is already here; we don't want to shred it...a peacekeeper's role is very delicate...restraint and neutrality are the watch words."\textsuperscript{13}

The RUF did not appear to be impressed by the concepts of restraint and neutrality. Human Rights Watch reported in March 2000 that the RUF was regularly committing atrocities, including rapes, abductions and looting near where UN forces were stationed in Port Loko. Intelligence sources also warned that, despite Sankoh's public pledges to disarm, he had told his commanders that there will be no disarmament until after the election is held and the RUF wins.\textsuperscript{14}

Although the total number of disarmed combatants passing through five UNAMSIL-supervised camps stood at around 23,000 by mid-April 2000, the UN was concerned over the low quality of


\textsuperscript{11} Reuters, 7 February 2000.


\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.
surrendered weapons and the ratio of collected arms to the number of ex-combatants. Many fighters reported for demobilization only with ammunition or hand grenades.\textsuperscript{15} As of April 15, according to the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration, only some 5,000 weapons had been handed in by Sierra Leonean belligerents, who reportedly number about 45,000.\textsuperscript{16} Most of these weapons appear to have been surrendered by former members of the Sierra Leone army, rather than by RUF fighters.

Sankoh was obviously playing a double game: participating in the transitional government, while keeping his war options open. The cash from illegal diamond sales would clearly enable him, if he saw his ambitions for power frustrated, to go back to the bush. The UN therefore came under increasing pressure (\textit{inter alia} from the UK and USA) to end the RUF game. On 17 April 2000, the United Nations attempted to correct matters by opening four new camps – two of which were in the central RUF-held towns of Makeni and Magburaka. On 29 April, General Jetley declared that his forces expected to take over all diamond areas under RUF control by the end of June, and he informed reporters in Freetown that a Zambian contingent would deploy to Koidu (the seat of the RUF diamond-mining center in the Kono district).\textsuperscript{17}

This obviously amounted to a direct challenge to Foday Sankoh. On several occasions before the announcement, rebels had prevented UN troops from conducting reconnaissance missions to Koidu. Moreover, as the UN presence intensified in rebel territory, the newly-established demobilization camps in Makeni and Magburaka became the flashpoint for the present emergency, with the first RUF abductions happening here on 1 and 2 May 2000 respectively. Significantly, these incidents coincided with final departure of the last of four battalions of Nigerian ECOMOG troops.

With the Lome accord in tatters, there are numerous lessons for the international community and Africans to learn from the recent UN experience in Sierra Leone – from the political issue of striking Faustian bargains with the likes of Sankoh and the RUF; to the operational problems of cobbling together a 'Third World' UN force to implement the deal. Such lessons are often noted, but seldom learned. A 1996 UNIDIR study warned, for example, that any sources of UN leverage amount to naught, unless the peacekeepers are adequately supported and the mission properly executed. This implies that the following four basic rules must be applied:

- Peacekeepers must have the resources and determination to do the job and must ensure that the parties understand this;
- UN forces should absolutely minimize the amount of time it takes to deploy an effective monitoring and reporting capability;


\textsuperscript{16} According to the Draft Military Reintegration Plan (Iteration dated 31 January 2000), the 45,000 'ex'-combatants are from the following groupings: CDF – 15,000; RUF – 15,000; 'paramilitaries'/mercenaries – 2,000; SLA – 6,000; ex-SLA/AFRC – 7,000.

• Peacekeepers must act decisively immediately upon arrival and respond firmly to challenges; and

• Peacekeepers must act uniformly and respond uniformly to challenges.18

UNAMSIL missed the boat on all four of these points. Moreover, the notion of UN peacekeepers providing security through coercive disarmament and mandate enforcement defies the lessons of historical experience. For example, the UN seminar on lessons learned from the operations in Somalia concluded inter alia that a UN force is unsuited for non-voluntary disarmament and demobilization.19

The United Nations' approach of minimizing risks through incremental military deployment also flies in the face of just about every recommendation of a series of 'lessons learned' seminars that were conducted in the wake of the failed UN missions in Somalia and Rwanda. The most fundamental lesson to emerge from these endeavors is that there must be a clear and achievable mandate backed by sufficient means for its execution. If a peace operation is to be effective, it must be credible and perceived as such. The credibility of the operation is, in turn, a reflection of the parties' assessment of the force's capability to accomplish the mission.20

Yet the Security Council is increasingly invoking Chapter VII powers for the protection of civilians and the disarmament of combatants, without a clear notion of how this is to be done in practice.21 As David Cox has noted:

"Until the UN finds a way between the hollow invocations of Chapter VII to which the Security Council is now prone, and acceptance that any recalcitrant party can sabotage a mission by


20 Examining several peace support operations over the past nine years that 'exemplify success', Daniel and Hayes conclude that: “the common thread throughout these examples is the quick deployment of robust forces which, possibly through shock effect, implicitly if not explicitly deliver the message that they mean business”. D.C.F. Daniel and B.C. Hayes, Securing Observance of UN Mandates Through the Employment of Military Forces, US Naval War College, Newport, RI, 1995. UNITAF, Operation Turquoise, Provide Comfort and Uphold Democracy are cited as operations that succeeded in successfully inducing co-operation from belligerents.

21 For example, operative paragraph 8 of Resolution 1291 (25 February 2000), authorizing the expanded MONUC mission to the DRC, states that the Council:

"Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, decides that MONUC may take the necessary action, in the areas of deployment of its infantry battalions and as it deems it within its capabilities, to protect United Nations and co-located JMC personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel, and protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence".
withdrawing its consent, the frustration of complex UN peacekeeping operations, especially in regard to disarmament, is likely to continue."  

INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO REVISE PEACE SUPPORT DOCTRINE

The immediate response of the UN Security Council to the hostage-taking and RUF aggression was one of shock and outrage, even though they had had ample warning that things were going very wrong with the UNAMSIL mission. As David Rieff puts it: "Only in the Alice-in-Wonderland atmosphere of the UN, where officials can simply deny realities everyone else sees plainly, could the RUF's defiance and the deaths of the peacekeepers have come as a surprise."  

Concerned about the safety of the UN hostages, the only plan that UNHQ has come up with is to speed up the deployment of the outstanding national contingents earmarked for UNAMSIL. The idea is to increase the number of peacekeepers from 8,700 to the full authorized strength of over 11,000 as soon as possible. Bemoaning the poor state of training and equipment of the existing UNAMSIL force, Kofi Annan was also quick to call for a 'rapid-reaction force' to be deployed immediately, to stabilize the precarious situation and bolster the UNAMSIL forces.

To be fair, the UN Secretary-General has been pushing harder than any of his predecessors for doctrinal clarity on what can and can't be done within the broad rubric of peace support. Following up on his September 1999 report to Council on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, Annan announced on 7 March 2000 that he was appointing an international panel to look at every aspect of United Nations peacekeeping, and to make recommendations on how missions can be more effective. The latter will be contained in a report of the panel that is due by July 2000. 

As the new conference where the appointment of the panel was announced, the Secretary-General outlined its brief as follows:


25 The panel is to be led by Lakhdar Brahimi, a former Algerian foreign minister and UN 'troubleshooter'. Other panel members include J. Brian Atwood, former administrator of the United States Agency for International Development; Dame Ann Hercus of New Zealand, a former representative of the secretary general in Cyprus; Richard Monk of Britain, a member of the police task force in Bosnia; General Klaus Naumann, former chief of the German defense staff and chairman of the military committee of NATO; Hisako Shimura, president of Tsuda College in Japan and a former peace negotiator for the United nations; General Philip Sibanda of Zimbabwe, a former peacekeeping force commander in Angola; and Cornelius Sommaruga of Switzerland, who recently retired as president of the International Committee of the Red Cross. The report is to be written by William Durch of the Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington.
"Partly it is a question of being clearer about what we are trying to do, and partly it is a question of getting the nuts and bolts right. ...I hope that in the next six months or a year we would have enough ideas on when and how we intervene. Under our charter, we are allowed to use force in the common interest. But there are questions that we will have to answer. What is the common interest? Who defines it? Who defends it? And under what authority and under what circumstances?" \(^{26}\)

This panel will be hard pressed to come up with viable answers to the 'million dollar' questions posed by Annan – questions that have defied the best efforts of the peace research community for the past decade. Moreover, whatever the answers that emerge, they will still have to face the test of consensus and political will for implementation. Hopefully, the abysmal record of international involvement in the Sierra Leone peace process will feature prominently in their deliberations, and will give them the courage to come up with something more credible than incremental adaptations of the lean peacekeeping formula that has been prescribed for Africa's most debilitating illnesses.

**CONTINENTAL EFFORTS TO DEVELOP AFRICAN PSO DOCTRINE**

Given the trend towards regional coalition operations, and the fact that Africa is once again host to the vast majority of UN peacekeepers, Africans themselves also have a responsibility to contribute to the evolution of a viable doctrine for peace support.

The first real African attempt to address the doctrinal deficit for the conduct of PSO was made at the Second Meeting of the Chiefs of Defence Staff of Member States of the OAU Central Organ, which was held in Harare from 24-25 October 1997. This meeting was specifically tasked to come up with concrete and workable recommendations relating to the logistics, finance, training, doctrine, structure and operational planning needed for the conduct of African peace support operations.

The mandate emanated from the previous year's meeting of the Chiefs of Staff, which had called for a working group of military experts to "come out with practical and realistic recommendations on the technical issues raised" at that meeting on the subject of peace operations under OAU auspices. \(^{27}\)

The OAU Secretariat had decided that this experts meeting would be held just prior to the second meeting of the Chiefs of Staff, and that it would be divided into three sub-groups, dealing respectively with: Logistics and Funding; Doctrine, Training and Liaison; and Command, Control and Communications. The sub-group on Doctrine, Training and Liaison was more


\(^{27}\) The First Chiefs of Defence Staff Meeting of the Central Organ of the OAU was held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 3 to 6 June 1996.
specifically requested to develop "guidelines which should inform doctrine and training" for the conduct of peace operations.28

The political sensitivities of African military officers soon became apparent, with one member objecting at the outset to the group's intent to discuss 'doctrine'. The objection was based on the grounds that the matters under discussion had no approval at the policy level, and that doctrine was a political and strategic concept. This, it was felt, implied abrogating the OAU principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of Member States, and could not be discussed by a group of military experts. After lengthy deliberation, it was decided to refer to the development of recommendations on 'guidelines' or 'concepts' for the conduct of peace operations, rather than to 'doctrine'.

Nevertheless, after two days of deliberation, the group could only reach consensus on the notion that the OAU should adopt and adapt the concepts, principles and practices of United Nations peacekeeping, and that Member States should only engage in peace operations mandated by the UN. The latter point, namely that all operations involving OAU Member States be conducted under a UN mandate was challenged by the question: "What happens when there is a crisis or impending crisis, and there is no UN mandate?" This was followed by the more pertinent question: "Why would the UN not react to a crisis?" The answers included lack of finances and other resources – including political will.

It was felt that this problem may best be addressed by OAU efforts to strengthen UN capacity for peace operations, by placing African crises on the UN agenda, and by providing the bulk of a ready force package for utilization by the UN. However, it was noted that the OAU or sub-regional organizations may have to first take action in order to place matters on the UN agenda, as illustrated by the ECOMOG decision to impose sanctions on the military rulers of Sierra Leona, which was later endorsed by the Security Council.29

Given the reality of a number of existing crises on the continent, the need was expressed for a clear vision of what the Organization can realistically be expected to do to ameliorate conflict where the UN is unable, unwilling, or slow to act. The concept that eventually emerged for the conduct of OAU peace operations included the use of sub-regional organizations, as a possible first line of reaction where the OAU is unable to act.30

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29 On 25 May 1997, President Kabbah was violently overthrown by Major Johnny Paul Koromah in a typical palace coup d'etat. On 26 May 1997, the Organization of African Unity condemned the coup and called for an immediate restoration of the constitutional order, urging the leaders of the Economic Community of West African States to take immediate action against the coup makers. In view of the intransigence of the junta, on 28 and 29 August 1997, the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government decided to adopt a package of sanctions and to establish a blockade against the regime as a further measure to force the early restoration of the democratically elected president.

The working group also reasoned that if the concept of peace operations under the auspices of the OAU is accepted, then the Central Organ needs to have some type of military instrument at hand for preliminary interventions. It was felt that this may be provided by a workable system of African standby arrangements, and that such a system would enjoy more support if contributors had an idea of the overall requirement of the end-user (the OAU). In this regard, the Chiefs of Defence Staff recommended that:

"The OAU could earmark a brigade-sized contribution to standby arrangements from each of the five African sub-regions as a starting point, which could then be adjusted upwards or downwards according to evolving circumstances". They added that: "While the OAU should adopt standard UN staff procedures for training and operations, it must also develop its own Standard Operating Procedures" and that "these must be disseminated to Member States for use in training and preparation for peace operations".31

Unfortunately, there has been absolutely no progress on the implementation of any of these recommendations at the continental level. Nor has a third meeting of the Chiefs of Staff been convened, which might trigger some urgent action in this regard. Not that this makes much difference from the perspective of doctrinal development. The recommendations that emerged on 'the concept of African peace support operations' were a compromise that amounts to little more than a confirmation of the move towards the 'Africanization' of UN peacekeeping.

However, the Chiefs of Staff did provide recognition for the concept of sub-regional engagement in peace operations, and this is perhaps where more significant progress will be made in the realm of future doctrinal development.

**PROGRESS AT THE SUB-REGIONAL LEVEL: SADC**

The Southern African Development Community (SADC), as an intergovernmental entity, has not succeeded in progressing much further than the OAU in the articulation of a common doctrine for peace support operations that includes peace enforcement. Indeed, while the southern region has over the past year witnessed two extremely forceful 'multilateral' military interventions under the auspices of SADC, the organization's military leaders have clung to the notion of embracing a 'universal UN doctrine' for the conduct of PSO. Doctrinal development has therefore been informed less by regional multinational operational experience than by 'mainstream' UN-type training and capacity-building initiatives.

For example, the most recent meeting of the Operations Sub-Sub Committee of the (Southern African) Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) did not address the issue of doctrine for PSO, but chose to focus rather on training and capacity building issues.32 The debate on the latter has largely been shaped by the Harare-based SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC), which specializes in the presentation of a variety of UN peacekeeping courses for select members of the armed forces of the SADC countries. This role and focus has been embraced by the ISDSC, with the Operations Sub-Committee recommending that the "ISDSC Defence Sub-Committee officially endorses Zimbabwe as the Regional Peace Keeping

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31 Ibid.
32 During the meeting of the 20th Session of the ISDSC, held in Swaziland during March 1999.
Training Centre". The March 1999 meeting of this committee was also presented with a report by the RPTC on a seminar that it had convened to consider the future of peacekeeping training in the SADC region.

Importantly, the deliberations of this seminar were guided by the assumption that: "Any [peacekeeping] capacity building within SADC should occur within the UN framework and comply with UN doctrine, procedures, guidelines, etc." The only decision, which is vaguely related to doctrinal development, taken at this seminar is recorded as follows: "Drawing from the direction of the ISDSC, the RPTC would provide guidance on peacekeeping concepts and serve as a repository for regional peacekeeping Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs) and policy documents." Thus, at the (official) regional level, there is a blind adherence to 'UN doctrine' with any further debate on doctrine for peace enforcement remaining taboo.

LEARNING FROM WEST AFRICAN EXPERIENCES

Although not articulated or presented as such, some basic tenets of African doctrine for PSO are emerging from the West African region. This has not been a deliberate construct of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) – it is rather a by-product of the involvement of members of this organization in regional peace operations over the past nine years.

The ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) was formed spontaneously in August 1990 as a direct reaction to the carnage caused by the civil war in Liberia. Armed with a peacekeeping mandate, ECOMOG forces landed in Monrovia on 24 August 1990, only to be met by fierce gunfire from the forces of Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia. No cease-fire was in place and the refusal of a major party to the conflict to accept the impartiality of ECOMOG meant that the force found it extremely difficult to execute its peacekeeping mandate. Indeed, within its relatively short lifespan, ECOMOG was forced to go the full cycle of peace support operations – from peacekeeping and peace enforcement in Liberia, to 'restorative intervention' in Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau.

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34 Ibid.


Former ECOMOG Force Commander, Brigadier General Mitikishe Khobe, categorized the type of peace operations conducted under the auspices of ECOWAS as: Intervention Missions; Peace Enforcement Missions; and Peace Keeping Missions. This description of ECOMOG operations roughly parallels (or indeed precedes) developments in NATO doctrinal thinking. In fact, it goes quite a bit further than extant NATO doctrine in that it provides for 'intervention operations'.

Once the ECOMOG task metamorphosed into hybrid operations involving peacekeeping, counter insurgence and peace enforcement, the principles of internal security operations were applied in varying degrees, according to their relevance to particular phases of operations. The inclusion of aspects of 'internal security operations' as part of the concept of peace support operations echoes, in some respects, Russian thinking on peace operations.

Whether or not such principles will or should find their way into an African doctrine for PSO remains a matter for debate and consultation. The important thing is not to discard such 'doctrinal statements' as being extraneous to the 'peacekeeping debate'. Observations and statements by former ECOMOG commanders obviously do not constitute an eloquent and integrated doctrine for African peace support operations. There is room for much refinement and adjustment and, importantly, a need for broader acceptance of such principles in Africa and abroad.

Progress in the evolution of West African doctrine for peace support has, as in the case of NATO in the Balkans, evolved less from academic reflection and the deliberations of 'experts' than from the harsh experiences of force commanders and peacekeepers on the ground. The difference is that the 'lessons learned' from the ECOMOG operations have not been as widely analyzed, and they are certainly not as well packaged as those that have emerged from the Balkans. However, they do provide a far more robust and practical articulation of principles and guidelines for the conduct of PSO in Africa than that which has hitherto been produced by either the OAU or by SADC.

CONSULTING WITH THE COLONELS: A 'BOTTOM-UP' APPROACH

At the unofficial level some modest but promising progress has been made in advancing a more practical and pragmatic approach to the issue of doctrinal development for PSO in Africa. From 24-26 August 1999, the SADC RPTC agreed to host an unofficial regional workshop of 'military experts' (of the rank lieutenant colonel/colonel) on "Integrated Principles for Peace

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37 M.M. Khobe, ECOMOG Operations in West Africa: Principles and Praxis, paper presented at an international workshop with the theme 'Towards a Global Consensus on Peace Support Operations: The African Dimension' hosted by the ISS and the Institute for International Relations (Prague), Pretoria, 21-23 October 1999. Subsequent to his ECOMOG command, Brig Gen Khobe was appointed Chief of Defence Staff, Sierra Leone Military Forces, a position which he occupied until his death on 19 April 2000.

38 E.T. Dowyaro, op. cit.
Mindful of the objections raised to the term 'doctrine' at the second OAU Chiefs of Defence Staff Meeting, the stated aim of this workshop was to:

"Enhance mutual understanding of the principles and guidelines for the conduct of PSO at the operational and tactical levels, through the proposal of workable solutions to existing problems and the recommendation of research projects to address those key problems/issues that could not be adequately addressed by the participants".

A Draft Working Paper was provided to orient participants and to guide discussions. The idea was to initiate a deliberate process which examines the best evidence of past conflicts, draws on African opinions and African experiences to bring together a considered, robust set of statements that will inform the evolution of doctrine for peace support. It was agreed that the workshop should focus on doctrine (i.e., the operational-level and the tactical levels) rather than political, legal or strategic matters. These higher levels normally result in nebulous discussions without form or conclusion. The working document contained some forthright questions, such as:

- Is there such a thing as 'UN doctrine for PSO'? If so, what are its strengths and limitations?
- If Western doctrinal publications are not suitable for Africa, where are they deficient?
- How can we express the doctrine deficit as regards Africa's requirements?
- How can we best approach the deficit – by a series of statements relating to Africa or a whole new doctrine?

Participants found that the much-vaunted UN doctrine on PSO consists of some training notes, manuals, and videos covering tactical matters. There is also a 17-page document on the conduct of peacekeeping operations, but it is thin on detail. Similarly, peacekeeping manuals from the Nordic countries emphasize "peacekeeping" techniques at the tactical level, largely to the exclusion of operational concepts. These publications all emphasize techniques, drills and procedures and do not really address key issues of doctrine at the operational level.

It was also felt that training exercises within SADC, based on such tactical skills, have shown up doctrinal weaknesses, and that the need exists within SADC to train to a common doctrine that embraces the types of PSO which these countries are conducting or are most likely to conduct in the future. At the moment, SOPs are being developed to fill the doctrinal lacuna. However,

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39 The workshop was organized and facilitated by the Pretoria-based Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in partnership with the Prague-based Institute for International Relations (IIR). It was funded by the government of Norway as part of the 'Training for Peace in Southern Africa' project, and is seen as part of a process of building consensus around real regional capacity building for peace support operations. However, participation was not based upon any regional grouping or mandate. Rather, the group was constituted through personal networks that enabled the identification of a number of experienced military officers and civilian experts who were willing and able to contribute to a candid debate in pursuit of the aim and objectives of the workshop. The group that finally assembled in Harare included military officers from Botswana, Britain, Kenya, South Africa, and Zimbabwe – as well as a few civilian scholars and experts.
these do not address critical facets such as multinational command arrangements and relations between the regional military and civilian structures.

Without the political baggage associated with 'official status', participants readily agreed that the doctrinal deficit in Africa centers around the need to define circumstances which should trigger peace enforcement methods. They agreed that extant traditional peacekeeping doctrine is not sufficiently robust to confront the new challenges of conflict resolution in Africa, and that war-fighting doctrine is overly destructive. Furthermore, war-fighting doctrine is predicated upon the defeat of a designated enemy and does not address the peace-building and reconciliation challenges necessary to create a secure and self-sustaining society and environment.

Participants felt there is a need for a more comprehensive doctrinal publication to address this issue coherently and provide inter alia operational concepts as well as tactical "SOPs". While extant (NATO) PSO doctrine goes a long way to filling the doctrinal lacuna between traditional peacekeeping and war-fighting, it needs to be updated and modified to suit the realities of Africa.40 In terms of immediate steps towards addressing the 'doctrinal deficit', the preference was expressed for a comprehensive draft publication, which could be circulated for comment as widely as possible in the form of a discussion document.

The author of the extant NATO PSO manual4142 was therefore asked to produce a draft PSO manual which takes account of the special needs of PSO in the African context and incorporates the doctrinal ideas developed during the workshop. The product of this endeavor was published by the ISS in March 2000, under the title: 'Peace Support Operations: A Draft Working Manual for African Military Practitioners'. This document is presently being circulated to select African command and staff colleges (and other relevant institutions) with requests for comments.

This is seen as a first step in a process designed to develop a common approach among African national military contingents for the conduct of "grey area operations". It is, in many ways, a 'quick fix' approach that has many weaknesses, as much of the NATO manual is probably too alliance-specific. But if certain fundamental concepts and points of departure can be accepted, then this is a good starting point. In particular, acceptance of military credibility, through the immediate deployment of robust forces into the area of operations, as a sine qua non for success in PSO will go a long way towards encouraging sound mission planning.

However, the draft manual is not meant to be a perfect product, nor is it complete. The endorsement of African multilateral organizations, such as the OAU and SADC has therefore not been sought. The idea was not to claim universal applicability, but to invite African senior command and staff colleges to use that which they find useful for instructional purposes, and to discard/replace that which they do not find useful. The aspiration is to begin an interactive

40 For a detailed exposition of the discussions and recommendations, see M. Malan, Integrated Principles for Peace Support Operations, ad hoc ISS Report, September 1999.

41 Colonel Philip Wilkinson, British Army, who was a participant at the Harare workshop.
process of peer review and refinement that will lead to greater consensus on PSO doctrine in Africa, that will eventually influence decision-making and training across the continent.

It is hoped that the working draft will be discussed at future regional peacekeeping work-shops, with a view to improvement and gaining wider acceptance for subsequent drafts. The widening process should result in the early inclusion of West African experts in the debate. Ideally, deliberations should extend to all regions and language groupings in Africa – but this will have to be preceded by a deepening and consolidation of tentative gains, lest these be lost through premature 'over-reach'. There are, after all, limits to what can be accomplished through the medium of an NGO project that operates under severe resource constraints.

**CONCLUSION**

The UNAMSIL debacle in Sierra Leone is the latest in a string of peacekeeping failures on the African continent, from which few lessons have been learned and little doctrinal revision has occurred. However, UNAMSIL did not disintegrate, as UNAMIR did in Rwanda, with only a handful of UN troops in place and with the world ignorant of the tragedy until it was half over. It has gone bad with the UN Secretary-General clearly challenging member states, particularly permanent members of the Security Council, to become part of the solution.

It is not much harder for the major powers to obfuscate the difference between the failings of the UN and the failures of member states. Combined with the fact that public understanding of the politics of intervention has deepened, this represents a considerable advance in the discourse on the principles and praxis of peace support.

Perhaps we can now end our preoccupation with questions of consent, impartiality and the non-use of force. This is essentially a non-issue. Everyone knows how to do chapter VI peacekeeping (within a benign security environment, of course). Everyone wants to do this kind of peacekeeping, even with its new found 'multifunctionality'. Indeed, a whole industry has developed around new-generation (chapter VI) peacekeeping with its attendant 'civilian component' and notions of 'new peacekeeping partnerships'. But this simply does not and cannot work in the contemporary African peace support environment.

On the other hand, no one really knows how to do peace enforcement operations. And no one really wants to do these operations – unless, of course, there are very strongly perceived own interests at stake. Hence, the concept of peace enforcement remains an extremely under-developed area of military doctrine – even though it is perhaps the most needed. The progress made by NATO in developing a doctrine for peace enforcement is encouraging, and there is no doubt much to be learned from this by African countries. However, doctrine is informed by military capabilities and structures, and there are limits to the applicability (or desirability) of NATO's hi-tech approach to intervention.

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43 The ISS is currently working with the ECOWAS secretariat in Abuja to host a West African Workshop on 'integrated principles of PSO' during August or October 2000.
There is nothing wrong with programs aimed at building African peacekeeping capacity, but these have to be linked to a realistic concept of operations and modalities for extremely rapid deployment. What was needed in Rwanda in April 1994, and is still needed in Sierra Leone in May 2000, is no-nonsense 'peace enforcement' and comprehensive disarmament – this is the quintessential doctrinal challenge which, if not met, makes a mockery of all further debate about the future of peacekeeping in Africa.

Questions and Answers

1. Is there a need to build a military capacity among African nations to conduct peace operations regardless of the type?

   It is difficult enough to build coalitions, but until you articulate what you are training to and what you are building capacity for, we will continue with so-called UN "training packages" which are inadequate. We have not articulated specific mission types such as conflict termination operations, stabilization operations, or crisis response operations. In our view, we wanted to stick to the more generic jargon to avoid confusion. As we conducted workshops in support of francophone African states and as we try to develop doctrine for the SADC nations in southern Africa, we can use the NATO doctrine as a base as these countries have many British traditions left over from the days of colonial rule. The problem is how can we apply the doctrine we develop. We need to start talking the same language, perhaps to the point of universal acceptance of an integrated military doctrine.

2. Comment regarding the acceptance of an integrated military doctrine: This must be taken very carefully with respect to the issue of sovereignty. There are doctrinal discrepancies between national doctrines. There is a working consensus among many nations that they will undertake these kinds of operations, in Sierra Leone for example, with or without any kind of doctrinal guidance. There may be an integrated doctrine some day, but, at this time, the process of how that doctrine is developed and established is most important.

   There is a difference between what is taught in terms of doctrine, especially to Africans, and what is expected of them when they actually go to participate. In this way, I have tried to reduce the discussion to the development of doctrinal manuals that can be used and are more useful than what has been taught.

3. The situation in Angola is not addressed. The ICRC has a term, "frozen peace" which describes a situation where there is no violence, but the root causes of the conflict have not been taken away. How do you take the analysis from the ECOMOG experience and relate it to the experience in Angola?

   Angola was "lean peacekeeping". I would not agree with describing the situation in Angola as a "frozen peace". There is an interesting article written by Masidi Nyaga that talks about "no war, no peace" and describes the continuing bleeding and rape of the Angolan people. Actually, since the first operations in Angola (UNAVEM I and II) there has been a no war, no peace environment and a criminalization of the economy. The Angolan people are worse off than they
were ten years ago. This reflects not a "frozen peace" but a frozen peace process. If there had been an articulated peace support or crisis response doctrine akin to NATO peace operations doctrine that called for planning for the worst case, then stepping back the situation would have been different. But to relate this to ECOMOG we need to ask the question: What happened if there is some kind of stalemate? Who is going to do the peacekeeping in this situation? Would it be SADC members? There would have to be a very robust force sent in, perhaps even bigger than ECOMOG in Liberia and Sierra Leone.

4. Please comment on the following: the sparse resourcing of ECOMOG in Sierra Leone and the lack of naval and air doctrine in support of peace support operations.

Nigeria and others should feel vindicated in that they were correct about the lack of resources in response to the crisis in Sierra Leone. In fact, others have made the same point, if ECOMOG had been resourced appropriately, they would have been able to do a better job in controlling the situation. With respect to the lack of naval and air doctrine, this aspect has been addressed in a conference that was held in Harare, Zimbabwe recently. While this has been addressed, air and sea power has not been used extensively in peace support operations in Africa, hence the lack of urgency to develop doctrine to support it. Despite this premise air power has been used more extensively in Congo than in many other places in Africa.

5. If you get the point of regionalization or sub-regionalization of peace enforcement with the robust force you talked about earlier, how do you get consensus with the regional organizations? Do you adopt NATO-type unanimity or simply try to achieve minimal consensus? The second question revolves around financing. Is Africa destined to be essentially dependent upon the "international community" for financing peace operations on the continent, and what does that do to credibility?

The mechanisms for sub-regional or regional organizations to act are under-developed and have been subject to scrutiny by the global community. Examples are what authority allowed Botswana and South Africa to go into Lethoso and what authorized EOCOMOG to intervene in Liberia, even though the UN Security Council praised that action. We are expecting a draft protocol to be published on mutual assistance, defense security within SADC within the next week or so. This protocol should outline more legitimate procedures other than the phone calls that took place before Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola intervened in Congo. The second point regarding financing - there are various ways that African countries find the money to support peace operations. Nigeria somehow found the money to sustain ECOMOG operations for ten years. Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola also found the money to intervene in Congo. When there are national interests at stake, whatever they might be, the money will be found. There are mechanisms such as the US-Nigeria dialog concerning Sierra Leone about putting more Nigerian battalions into that country. This dialog was based on the Nigerian desire to leave the area unless the US paid the bill. That said, if the UN is involved it has been articulated that each UN mission in Africa will look different. Some saw a trend developing when the UN returned to Africa when UNOMSIL was established. The doctrinal issues for Africa become universalized requiring the UN to come to grips with establishing doctrinal guidance that can be used in Africa.
India has participated in some of the most difficult UN operations and has won praise for its operations excellence in the missions. India has participated in thirty UN peacekeeping missions since the Korean War contributing over 50,000 soldiers in various parts of the world.

I shall address each of the issues listed on the slide.

The nature and number of UN peacekeeping operations has changed drastically in the 90's. In 1988 there were only five operations, and, in forty years of operation, there were only 13 missions until then. Between 1988 and 1999, India participated in ten missions as compared to the thirteen missions conducted in the previous forty years.
By the end of the Cold War, the principles of traditional peacekeeping changed dramatically. Peacekeepers often are in countries where the consent for their presence is sporadic; governments do not exist, or have limited effective authority. These operations are referred to in various ways, such as second generation peacekeeping, wider peacekeeping, peace support operations and others. When I say second-generation peace operations or peace support operations what I mean is anything other than peacekeeping operations.

India's policy has been to assist the UN and the international community in the task of bringing international order and security to the maximum extent possible. As a predominant member of the Non-Aligned Movement with a large standing army having extensive experience in counterinsurgency operations, India is ideally suited for such missions. Hence, India contributes troops willingly to UN mandated operations with the following guidelines:

There must be absolute unity of command and control vested in the United Nations. All troops must operate under the UN flag. Peacekeeping operations cannot be a substitute for political settlement between parties to the conflict. An open-ended mandate is a drain on scarce resources available to the UN. There is a risk that in such a case the UN presence would be exploited for political gain and interfere with negotiations. Conflict prevention does

**PRINCIPLES OF TRADITIONAL PEACEKEEPING**

- PKO based on consent of host govt & parties to conflict. Sovereignty of country not to be violated
- Impartiality and non interference in internal affairs of host country
- Min. use of force - in self defense blue helmets equipped only with personal weapons

**SECOND GENERATION PEACEKEEPING**

- Countries involved in conflicts more responsive to regional and international organisations for conflict management
- Concept of unilateral intervention for humanitarian assistance, safeguarding democracy and protection of human rights.
- Consent for deployment of troops is rarely absolute

**GUIDELINES FOR PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS**

- Operations should not affect and must respect sovereignty and territorial integrity
- Undertaken with consent of govt concerned - also have regional/international consensus
- Unity of command. No unilateral intervention
- Clear mandate with finite timeframe
not simply mean diplomatic or military efforts. It also means recognizing and addressing underlying social forces. The doctrine of humanitarian intervention needs to be treated with caution and cannot be equated to threats to international peace and stability. The situation in Somalia is an example of how a humanitarian intervention can rapidly change from a humanitarian mission to a peace enforcement operation. The applicability of humanitarian law as a guideline for peace operations can be problematic. It is most relevant to peace enforcement operations. Involvement in peace enforcement operations can undermine the neutrality of humanitarian organizations whose neutrality and impartiality are essential for success.

The Indian Army is capable of operating in varied terrain that is possibly unique in the world. Our operational deployment and sustainability range from mountains and glaciers in the north to deserts in the west, and from the jungles of the northeast to the environment of the highland territories. The Indian Army is one of the few in the world that has continuing operational experience in the full range of conflict from operations other than war: low intensity conflict, conventional warfighting and nuclear warfare. India's extensive experience in peacekeeping, which includes numerous deployments and the contribution of many force commanders, has allowed a fine tuning of peace operations doctrine and dealing with the delicate nuance of these operations. Natural disasters in India are not uncommon. The armed forces have a great deal of experience in assisting state governments when natural disasters strike.

The armed forces are often called out to assist civilian parties in need after natural calamities such as cyclones, earthquakes, floods and manmade disasters such as air and rail accidents. The military expertise includes humanitarian aid, food supply, medical assistance, evacuation of casualties, and assisting local government to restore normalcy as quickly as possible.
The demining experience in Cambodia capitalized on the significant demining capability of the Indian Army. The areas of expertise are: demining techniques, mine awareness, development of community action programs, providing training on mine clearance and generating public awareness, availability of low cost prosthetics, treatment and rehabilitation of amputees, vast experience in dealing with improvised explosive devices, and disposal of unexploded ordnance. The army possesses a large capability for logistical support to peace operations, especially in the area of extraction and support of large units. We possess a stand-alone capability to support any peace operation. Our industrial base is now capable of producing world-class goods for support to peace operations, and it is growing. Officers from the Indian Army are attending foreign schools and are training with other armies, regionally and internationally, lending to our ability to effectively interact with foreign armies.

When a mission is assigned, a core group of officers is dispatched to conduct a reconnaissance of the mission area. This group is led by a senior major and includes representatives of operations and logistical staffs. Their mission is to do the initial coordination with the UN planning staff and conduct an assessment of the mission area. Based on this assessment, the core group recommends the kind of equipment the force will need to accomplish the mission. The commander of the force manages the contingent and remains in constant touch with New Delhi.

Training for peacekeeping. The curriculum for training forces designated to a mission area includes general awareness of peacekeeping operations specific aspects of peacekeeping included in pre-deployment training. Army Training Command (ARTRAC) is lone agency in India for conducting training for UN peace operations. The training
mechanism for peacekeepers is conceptualized and conducted at two levels using a top-down approach. The ARTRAC is responsible for:

**ARTRAC**

* Doctrine and Concept Development
* Defining Approaches for Inter-operability-Services, Govt Agencies, Other Nation Contingents
* Refinement of Training Packages
  - UN Specific Training
  - Training for Contingents
  - Military Observers and Staff Officers
  - Demining
* Validation and Monitoring

Doctrine and concept development includes operations and logistics in keeping with Army and national policy, accounting for the changing nature of peacekeeping, and particularly attuned to national constraints and experiences. This philosophy is prevalent throughout the army's training basis and is emphasized in pre-deployment and deployment training courses. The ARTRAC uses experienced peacekeepers as instructors to ensure that the deploying forces have the best training and can function effectively within the constraints of national interests. Fundamental to the training are basic soldier skills that are taught upon entry into the army and reinforced throughout a soldier's tenure. The peacekeeping training center re-emphasizes the basic training to which every soldier is subject. Officers who are going to an observer mission or in support of a mission undergo a specific course; units are going to mission areas as a unit undergo training in basic peacekeeping techniques, UN procedures and area familiarization, and in other areas listed Slide 13.

**MAJOR SUBJECTS INCLUDED**

* Area Study.
* Mission Information including Background to the Conflict
* Information of the Country and Culture
* Language Training
* Human Rights and General Code
* Code of Conduct of Peacekeepers
* Health Hazards and Precautions
* Laws of the Country
* Media Handling
* Procedures for Investigations
* Driving Training and Rules in the Country

India supports the idea that peacekeeping should not be used as a substitute for addressing the root causes of a conflict which need to be addressed in a coherent, coordinated way with the proper political, social and developmental considerations. Prospective troop contributing nations must be included as early as possible in mission planning and in the preparation of the mandate, which should be clear and achievable. When changes are made to the existing mandate, commensurate changes should be made to the resources available. The Security Council should make changes to a mandate during a mission after a careful assessment of reports and
observations made by the commander on the ground. If humanitarian actions are to be included in the mission, that aspect should be made clear from the start, be included in the initial mission planning and be fully integrated into the concept. All forces operating under the UN flag should uniformly observe rules of engagement (ROE). All future contingents should be equipped with an outline of the worse case scenario so they can respond in self-defense. Actions upon attack on UN forces and actions to be taken if the peacekeepers are taken hostage should be addressed prior to deployment and emphasized throughout the operation. An effective media and public information system must be in place prior to deployment to the mission area. This is vital to the success of the mission and to the safety of the peacekeepers in the mission area. In addition, an effective media center will allow for the suppression of misinformation put out by parties trying to undermine the mission and will help to counter adverse media treatment of the force.

To conclude, participation in UN peace operations should not be based solely on strategic national interest but on a commitment to support and uphold the UN charter.

Questions and Answers

1. What effect has India's participation in UN peace operation had on doctrine?

Our experience, particularly in Sri Lanka and Somalia, has helped us a lot in determining the most important aspects of training and doctrinal development. As these missions changed from humanitarian to peacekeeping to peace enforcement many lessons were learned that have helped us to do better in subsequent deployments.

2. You mentioned that the mandate should have an "end date" before the force is deployed. What might be more useful for the force commander as a pre-requisite by the deploying authority to define an "end state"? This might help the commander in his mission analysis as he develops his commander's intent, in his guidance to his staff and, ultimately, in the development of his operations plan for the force.

I agree with you. The force commander should be involved in the planning of an operation from the very beginning, even before the mandate is written. His input based on reconnaissance and his other input will help determine the resource requirements and the objectives of the mission. In all, this process needs to be followed so that the mission will have the best chance to succeed.

3. What is the standard for the worse case scenario for the rules of engagement?

The worse case scenario is this - if you are prepared for the worse case and the worse case does not present itself, it is easier to reduce the posture of the force than to increase it. Worse case preparation provides a show of force going in, demonstrating resolve and enhancing credibility from the outset. If, after a time, the situation becomes more moderate, then the posture of the
force can be relaxed. Sporadic violations of a cease fire agreement or peace agreement can come at any time but particularly early in the operation. If the worse case has been planned for, then any violations can be dealt with from a position of strength. When planning the worse case scenario, an assessment of the situation on the ground is critical so that the threat can be postulated and actions to counter that threat planned in detail.
Each peace operation is distinct and unique and there are no school solutions for any of these. Peace operations therefore require innovation, flexibility, initiative and the moral courage of the individuals involved. The key is capturing that in doctrine without being dogmatic.

There is a body knowledge that exists based on at least fifty years of disarming, demobilizing, establishing secure environments, relocating individuals, stabilizing governments and other operations that might be contemporarily called peace operations. Despite this not being peacekeeping in the traditional sense, it certainly has created a body of knowledge that can be applied to peace operations undertaken by the Army today.
Recent events shown here have catapulted us into the new era of peace support operations.

In 1994, FM 100-23 was the Army's doctrine. This was based on actions that occurred up until that time. Since that time a great deal has changed. We have new doctrine, particularly in the joint arena, that has been articulated in Joint Publications 3.07 and 3.07.3. We also have had several Presidential Decision Directives. PDD 25, with which most of you are familiar, was as a result of Somalia. This PDD began to subscribe and describe how we would become engaged in such operations. PDD 56, published in 1997, addresses the management of complex contingencies, mandates that all US government agencies institutionalize their lessons learned from these operations and outlines a process for an interagency body to coordinate responses to these operations. Most recently, PDD 71 was developed to address the US capability to conduct civilian police operations in support of these operations and to improve our response to the justice and penal system in a country where the core institutions have collapsed. NATO doctrine is also available which is on its fourth revision. Given all of the available lessons learned and the guidance in both the joint publications and via the PDDs, it is time to revise the doctrine for the Army, and that's what we are doing now.

There has been much discussion about what are peace operations. We talk about the types of operations other than war, of which there are between 39 and 50 different types. This slide shows some of these listed on a continuum. Not all of these are peace operations, but they are representative of operations other than war for which we have doctrine.
The new Army doctrine, that will be published soon, puts all operations into one of four categories: offense, defense, stability and/or support. The stability operations category includes a range of operations conducted outside of the United States and its territories to sustain stability on a regional and global scale. Peace operations are included in this category.

Looking at this in another way, there are various "boxes" into which the operations conducted by the US Army fit. There is a war box and an operations other than war box. In these boxes offense, defense stability and support operations can be conducted in varying degrees of intensity and can be conducted either consecutively or concurrently. For example, as the slide indicates, the war box has heavy emphasis on offense and defense with some stability and support operations involved. Conversely, in the operations other than war box, stability and support operations are paramount with a smaller focus on offensive and defensive operations. Despite these neatly defined boxes, there are operations other than war that might have a larger slice of offensive and defensive operations such as an evacuation where forces would be sent into an airfield in a hostile environment. In this case, there would be more emphasis placed on offensive and defensive operations, but it is still an operation other than war. Hence, each situation will dictate how much of the "box" will be consumed with offense, defense, stability and support.

All of the documents shown here are being developed as part of the stability and support manual that will be published soon. Peace operations will be part of that manual FM 100-20, and there will be a subordinate manual, that will also be published, to specify peace operations with the context of offense, defense, stability and support.
Looking inside the stability manual we find the definitions we have assigned to various peace operations. These are very similar to the definitions NATO has assigned to these types of operations. The key is to achieve a peaceful settlement among all parties involved. What's bound here is that there is a settlement. There is an agreement that is being sought here. The subordinate elements are peacekeeping, peace enforcement and operations in support of those efforts, which include peace making, peace building and preventive diplomacy. One of the concepts we want to address is that all of these appear to be separate boxes disconnected from each other. One of our themes is that this disconnection is not the case. The boxes roll into each other, they overlap and intermix.

These are the imperatives for operations other than war. Political objectives are primary. The military commander must participate in the development of these political objectives so that when he develops his military objectives they coincide and support the political objectives. Security implies force protection. In this case we look for a balance between what is needed for the image of the force in the field and what is really needed as far as their protection is concerned. We also factor in domestic concerns that relate directly to the political support the forces have in the field. Unity of effort in a multinational operation deals with negotiations, conciliation, agreements and will not be anything approaching a "normal" military operation. Legitimacy addresses consent, impartiality and transparency. Perseverance addresses the tenacity with which the forces on the ground conduct operations, developing various aspects of the infrastructure in the short term, then looking to the permanent fix in the long term. Adaptability is the concept of how we make the doctrine flexible and have the commander adapt to the changing situation.
Planning considerations are listed here. The highlighted items are those that we need to look at very closely and continue to emphasize as we go on with the revision of our doctrine.

Of these possible missions, many are centered on peace building which is an aspect of peace operations that we need to address in more detail.

This slide addresses civil-military relations, how we put together the civil-military team in order to accomplish the objectives. While most of these items are true, our doctrine asks the questions: what if you don't have these kinds of mechanisms in place, what if there is no clarity of mission, what if there are no rules of authority nor integration of efforts? Our approach is that these items are nice to have, but what mechanisms can we put in place if they don't exist or if they are less than effective to ensure that we accomplish or achieve the objectives of the operation?

To illustrate graphically, the circles on the left should define your situation, but what happens if you are standing in the middle of the arrows? How might you turn the arrows around and make them into circles; by what mechanism can this be done?
The key here is how do you fill the gap which occurs when the CIVPOL does not engage in a timely manner leaving the military to conduct law and order operations - a mission for which they are not trained and which is not in their mandate? PDD 71 attempts to address this issue. We have engaged in these activities in the past, but does this mean the military must consider judicial systems and bring experts in prisons when they are deployed to peace operations in which these core institutions have failed?

Information operations were developed more for the warrior than for the peacekeeper, but it is an area that has implications for peace operations as well as for warfighting. The doctrine must address how to deal with information operations from the standpoint of the effect of the instantaneous transfer of information from the mission area to home station. The question might be: is it better to be 70% correct that day or 100% correct next week? With this in mind, the information that is used by political decision-makers in making decisions might be the myth of the immediacy rather than the truth of accuracy later. To be as responsive as possible, increasing the speed of the transmission of data may make the 70% solution close enough for effective control. Doctrinally we need to very seriously address information operations so as to leverage the technology to our advantage.

An important aspect of the doctrine centers on how the military interacts with the numerous NGOs and governmental organizations that will be present in a peace operation and throughout the mission area. How can the military design their operations to use the host government and joint military commissions to maximize the coordination within the mission area? What standards are used to determine measures of effectiveness? These should be developed beforehand.
This slide is the "fog of peace". These are all the things the military commander would like to have, but in reality probably won't have, since they are beyond his immediate control. The doctrine should provide a commander and staff with the tools to become capable of dealing with issues such as these. The doctrine should be flexible enough to allow him to deal with unknowns such as these. How can we design doctrine that allows for this? One way is through training.

Training should commence when the officer enters the Army. It should be integrated in every course that an officer or NCO is required to take along his/her career path. This way they have an understanding early on of peace operations and the requirements for forces participating in these operations. Focused training is used when units have been identified to deploy on a mission. The groundwork happens when the unit is identified a year out; then the unit begins to focus on the tasks required for the mission. This requires planning for the worse case scenario in the mission readiness exercises. And, the after action reviews are critical to ensuring that the unit, while combat capable, is also peacekeeping capable. Current doctrine for dealing with riotous crowds in Kosovo is the doctrine applied in dealing with protestors against the Vietnam War. Obviously this is not extremely helpful since the situations are completely different. So, the after action review of the situation in Kosovo is key for the development of more contemporary methods of managing crowds.

**Questions and Answers**

1. Public security is not your main concern, but, based on your experiences particularly in Kosovo, public security is a concern of the military and will remain a concern of the military. Certainly at the beginning of the operations public security is a concern, because there is no other force available to maintain the rule of law or even simple public order. Even if there is a CIVPOL, the military will still have a concern about public security. Thus your doctrine will have to address public security since it will continue to be an aspect of peacekeeping with which you will have to deal.

I agree completely. It is a definite concern, but not the ultimate responsibility of the military in any peace operation.

2. Peacekeeping and peace enforcement tend to overlap or become intertwined with one another. Is it your opinion that when a force is sent into an area they should be prepared for peace
enforcement then scale back once the situation is better defined, or should it go prepared for peacekeeping, if that is more likely but still not fully assured?

We need to carefully review the surveys and understanding of the country in question before we define the force to be sent to that country. If there is any question as to the stability of a situation, even if there is an agreement or ceasefire, these may not have been done in good faith or by those in actual political control of that country. If there is full consent and that consent can be confirmed, then the force can be structured accordingly. For the most part however, the stability of such a country, even with an agreement in place, may be very volatile particularly as the force enters the mission area. Until there is proof consent has been achieved, we must be capable of meeting the worst case.

3. What is the proportion of American officers within the CIMIC staff? Initially in IFOR, there was a majority of Americans with only about 25% being European.

I don't know the exact proportion, but the majority was not U.S.

4. Does US doctrine provide for the integration of, or support of, civilian police planners early in the mission stage to cut down on the planning gap created by the characteristic late arrival of these planners in the planning process for a mission?

The new doctrine does address this issue. PDD 71 supports this as well.

5. There are three "cutting edge" issues that are addressed by the latest draft of the doctrine: public security, information operations and measures of effectiveness. Are we going to see this at the Department of State and in other agencies that have an interest in these issues and need to have access to this doctrine to better interact with the military in these situations?

Let me explain the process. The draft has gone out to the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas for initial review by the Army. It will then come back with any comments, corrections, etc. After these corrections are made, the document then goes out for wider dissemination to the entire Army, its agencies and staffs that have expertise or interest in this doctrine. At the same time the joint doctrine on peace operations comes up for review. PKI will be reviewing this doctrine as well. Our hope is that the US doctrine, joint and Army, will begin to move together along with the NATO doctrine. Once the Joint Warfighting Center reviews the joint doctrine, we anticipate that we will be able to vet the Army doctrine with the interagency along with the joint doctrine using this venue.

One item that I thought might be included with the "cutting edge issues" is the planning dimension of peace operations, which PDD 56 mandates be accomplished within the interagency. Does the Army's draft speak to interagency planning of some kind?

We have an annex in the draft that addresses this issue in detail. This annex covers, in an outline form, the interagency planning factors that a military commander might consider when assessing his role in peace operations.
6. There is a conceptual and operational difference between a humanitarian assistance operation with a security component and a security operation (i.e., peacekeeping, peace enforcement) that has civil-military dimensions. This has significant implications for MOE and for training. The military has always supported the philosophy of "train as we fight". At this point do you think this philosophy should shift to "train as we deploy" getting back to the interagency issue of civil-military cooperation being essential to success in these operations? Do we need to look at more and innovative ways, for not only training, but for looking at the comprehensive campaign planning process with transition cells that not only represent the military panning process but compliment it with the civilian interagency planning as well?

I would certainly encourage it. As we begin preparation to deploy various division headquarters to missions, we have had interagency representatives at the NTC to assist them in considering those factors that are civilian in nature but that are key to ensuring success. But I would definitely encourage combined planning efforts between the military and the interagency. Anything to enhance the planning process between the military and civilian components of these operations is beneficial.

To follow up, having been involved in the development of Joint Publication 3-5.7, Joint Civil-Military Operations, which is also in the process of being reviewed, do you think that these publications will be able to be complementary in an environment that demands interoperability?

This is our hope. Unfortunately the doctrinal developers tend to work in their own "stovepipes" with very little, if any, cross talk or coordination. PKI is going to try to bring the stovepipes together and to look at all of the various groups.

7. In your doctrine is the culture of the region or country you are deploying to taken into account, and are your soldiers and officers trained to be aware of cultural differences in the areas to which they deploy, and are they trained to interact with local authorities?

As we have continued with the experience in Bosnia and as we have been looking at the preparation of the units going into this area, we have significantly upgraded the training the soldiers receive to deal with the cultural differences. Now, the soldiers receive fairly comprehensive cultural awareness training, negotiations training and other training that has adapted the soldiers to the situation in Bosnia.
Summary

Colonel George Oliver, Director, US Army Peacekeeping Institute

As we have reviewed and revised our doctrine, we looked at the doctrine of other nations such as Sweden, India, Britain and NATO. We have found that it is amazing how similar our doctrine is to that of these other nations. We have a different approach to understanding the theory, but in general we are very similar in the way we prepare soldiers to go out and do these missions. I would like to sum up a few themes that I found consistently addressed in the discussions today.

First, in terms of definitions, we are alike in the definitions of peacekeeping and peace enforcement. However, we have differences in the approach to the theory; but, in general, we agree on what these operations are and what is needed to accomplish the mission at hand. We come to the same conclusions. We heard several times today that a peace enforcement force is able to transition to peacekeeping, but it is difficult to have a peacekeeping force transition to peace enforcement. To do so requires more demanding analysis of the situation and a close evaluation of the aspect of consent, which is another common theme that was addressed during the discussions.

How consent is assessed and evaluated has a great deal of bearing on the planning for, and the implementation of, military force into a region. In some cases we may not know what constitutes consent, nor may we know if we have it or not upon deployment. If we can answer that question early, then we can tailor the force to meet each contingency.

In terms of the theme of peacekeeping versus peace enforcement, the United Nations cannot conduct peace enforcement operations, this is a given. In 1998 some 150 former force commanders from a variety of UN peace missions attending a conference commemorating the 50th anniversary of UN peacekeeping agreed that the UN is not capable of conducting peace enforcement operations. The UN comes together to make peace; these operations are akin to combat. This is not the job of the UN. The UN is not capable of achieving the kind political consensus and agreement as rapidly as is required in these near combat operations. If the UN cannot, then who does do peace enforcement operations?

We are seeing today in Kosovo that the best way to handle these near combat, peace enforcement operations is either through leadership by a regional security organization or by a lead nation-state. There was debate as to the definition of regional organizations and international organizations and debate as to what is the international community or a coalition of the willing. Regardless, those who are accustomed to training together will be more effective in a peace enforcement role. There may be a transition later in the operation as the parties come together to discuss peace or agree on a cease-fire. It is at this time that the UN may have a role to play.

As was addressed by Mr. Flavin, MG Nash said that we cannot fall off the standard military planning process, and we are learning day-to-day that an interagency planning process is also required to ensure that all aspects of these complex operations are effectively addressed.
We agreed that the concept of peace operations is changing. Dr. Abu Jaber and Mark Malan both addressed how the concept of national sovereignty is changing. The impact of the media, especially in terms of depicting human rights abuses and human suffering, may cause changes in how nations and organizations view peace operations. There may also be an effect on world opinion vis-à-vis these operations. This is yet to be realized. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan addressed this situation last September when he said that sovereignty would not be an issue when responding to violations of human rights.

Other issues that have been discussed but will require additional debate include command and control, and the capacities of nations to conducted these types of multinational operations based on the Russian and NATO view of them. Barriers caused by the multinational complexion on these kinds of seminars are broken down in these forums where ideas and concepts are exchanged and discussed.

The media described as the "CNN" or "BBC" factor will continue to drive world opinion and will have an impact on how we respond to crisis and will magnify the issues that revolve around them.
DAY 2 - PANEL DISCUSSIONS
This presentation represents some thoughts on this very important subject. The intent is to communicate some general thoughts and use them as points of departure for discussion as the seminar continues.

Countries like India are still conditioned to respond to the UN peacekeeping deployments under provisions of Chapter VI. We have been involved in Chapter VII operations as well in the Congo and Somalia. When the process was first started in 1947, the five permanent members of the military staff committee would provide the bulk of military forces in any UN operation.

UNPKO is an invention of the UN that has stood the test of time. It is extraordinary art that calls for the use of military personnel not to wage war but to prevent fighting. This is an important concept particularly when the military encounters NGO/IO in the field. Their
perception of the military is often that the military are "blood-thirsty thugs". This is most unfair to those in uniform. Those who have seen battle are much more aware of the horrors of war and don't need to be told what it is about, we have seen it first hand. There is a difference between collective security and peacekeeping, which was emphasized in other presentations. While collective security is a punitive process carried out with a degree of discrimination, peacekeeping is inherently impartial and non-coercive, and it is intended to be that way.

There is a fundamental principal of peacekeeping that holds that violence between nations, or within a single nation, can be controlled without the use of force. That said, there is also a premise, held particularly by military practitioners, that says force should be met with force. This premise is held by many nations based on their own individual experience over time. However, despite these ideas, an objective analysis of historical events might reveal that the introduction of force, particularly in the case of intra-state conflict, does not necessarily make the situation better and may make it worse. This does not mean that the use of force should be ruled out entirely. There are many occasions where the use of force did indeed prevent conflict. The entire point is that enforcement actions should have an element of subjectivity and bias built in.

In the Cold War era there were instances where peacekeeping was not conducted, but despite this, the UN did cover many situations and did conduct many missions to further the cause of peace with varying degrees of success.
The use of military contingents started with the use of UN forces in the Sinai and later in the Congo. In the Congo, the rules of engagement were modified to allow for the use of force by the contingents especially for self-defense and to counter the casualties that were suffered by the contingent. Both Cyprus and Namibia are examples of early success stories of UN peacekeeping. Despite these successes, there have been casualties.

Over 820 peacekeepers were killed in the early missions, which included 67 from India alone. These also included fatalities among CIVPOL and staff agencies.

Post Cold War: Changing Dimensions and Increased Risks

- Out of 50 ops since 1945, 35 were 1989 and after.
- From 11121 pers in Jan 1988, peaked to 77783 in Dec 1994; in end 99 down to approx 15000.
- Budget in Jan 1988 was $230.4 Mn; in Dec 1994 it was $ 3.6 Bn.
- Contributor countries rose from 26 to 74 and now 37.

Fatals during the period

- UNEF 1 - 106 incl 28 from India
- UNEF 2 - 53
- UNDOF - 35
- UNIFIL - 209
- UNICYP - 161
- ONUC - 245 incl 39 from India
- Namibia - 11

Note: Also some fatalities among CIVPOL, international and local staff.

The next two slides need no elaboration.

Because of the increase in missions in the post Cold War period there has been an escalation of what is expected of military contingents to peacekeeping operations. Because of the increase in missions and in the scope of the missions involved in modern peacekeeping, it is imperative that the mission is specifically defined and that all of the terminology is clear to all participants. One

Post Cold War: Qualitative

- Mostly intra-state
- Civilians main victims
- Humanitarian emergencies
example is the term "safe areas". In the early missions of the modern era, circa 1992-93, this term had to be defined so that the force commander could determine what kinds of things he needed to do and what forces he needed to accomplish the task. Once the term was defined then the force commander could estimate and articulate his needs to the SRSG. The point is that doctrine should be standardized so that when a task is required everyone knows what is expected.

UN missions have become more dangerous and member countries are not recognizing that this is the case and will continue to be the case. This is the case in Sierra Leone. The UN did not send in a robust force and has paid the price of their lack of foresight. Any military commander could have told the UN decision-makers that a larger, well-armed force was required, but the UN was not prepared to send such a force. Many of the belligerents today are lawless warlords and do not respect the UN troops as peacekeepers. The casualties (fatalities) continue with 455 being suffered in the post-Cold War period of the 1990's.

Member states need to understand that the UN has limitations in terms of what it can and cannot do in peace operations. In 1992 the UN undertook three major operations: Somalia, Yugoslavia and Cambodia. The UN did not have the capacity to handle one of the three, and
the results are now history. Thus, there must be a division of labor that spreads the requirements across a spectrum of the UN, regional security organizations and other international actors. The UN must exploit what it is capable of doing: traditional peacekeeping, preventative actions, humanitarian missions, mediation, and peace building.

Regional organizations have an increasing role but must balance the vested interests of the individual actors against the overall stability of the region as a whole. There is reluctance on the part of some countries (like India) to accept this theory. But whatever action is taken, it should be under the umbrella of the UN Security Council. A multinational force from the regional security organization under the authority of the UN Security Council should do enforcement actions. Shared command and control of an operation will never work. It must be very clear who is in charge of the operation.

This slide also does not need any great elaboration. There are two items to highlight. The transgressing of national sovereignty is a very sensitive subject for many developing countries such as India. The other item is preventive deployment. Macedonia illustrates how political, economic, social, and humanitarian issues can cause forces to be deployed. The president of Macedonia was concerned that once Kosovo ignited there would be a spill over into Macedonia similar to what happened in Albania.

When the Security Council sends the military on a mission, it is expected that they will at least support the military effort in the mission area. This is not always the case. The aspect of "rushing in", as in Sierra Leone, shows how a mission can go wrong without the proper preparation. The most successful missions have occurred only after

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years of negotiation and the acquisition of a sound peace agreement that will be adhered to by the belligerents. This agreement will, among other things, represent consent on the part of both belligerents and illustrate their desire to settle the dispute. In addition to a political settlement, it takes strong political support from outside the region for a long-term solution to be realized. This lesson has yet to be learned since the same mistake is made time after time in places like Sierra Leone.

There must be appropriate deliberation within the UN Security Council so that the mission for forces entering a peace operation will be supported politically. The worst case is that the Security Council succumbs to pressure, does not conduct the necessary debate and produces a less than adequate mandate. The experience in Yugoslavia is a perfect illustration of what can happen in the worst case - nine extensions of the mandate from June to December 1992 under extreme pressure from the European community. Troop contributing countries must be part of the decision making process with respect to the formulation of the mandate and the deployment scheme. If the Security Council is the sole decision maker, risks to the peacekeeping force will increase dramatically.

The arrival of contingents into the mission area cannot be delayed. The forces must move in and begin accomplishing the tasks laid out by the mandate. In Yugoslavia in 1992, it took three months to get all of the contingents into the mission area. The stand-by force arrangements are good, but the availability of these forces is often questionable. Political expediency will always override the stand-by agreement. Despite inherent problems with political expediency, there is a case to be made for keeping a stand-by arrangement. The dangers involved in these missions are real and the potential for casualties is equally real. The troops deployed must have a more than equal chance of success. This starts with a thoroughly debated, reasonable mandate, a well-conceived plan and political support from the UN. There is also a case to be made for a standing UN force despite the enormous cost and political reluctance to consider something like this.
As long as the mandate allows for the use of force, rules of engagement really need no more elaboration. The mandate must be clear, and the contingents adequately equipped to ensure that the mandated rules of engagement can be supported. Again, the worse case scenario is key to planning and should be considered during the debate of the mandate in the Security Council.

Operational control must rest solely with either the Force Commander or Head of Mission. Only in this way can there be an effective military force. The command and control must be able to inspire confidence. Earlier staffs were not effective since they had never worked together, and some had no previous operational experience. The best case is to use personnel who have worked together previously and have some awareness of the UN and UN procedures. This is one of the best arguments for a UN standing force. Without an effective command and control structure there is increased risk to the peacekeeping force.

Without a clearly defined mandated use of force peacekeepers are at great risk.

Contingencies must also be planned and prepared for both in the mandate and in the military plan. Specific contingencies are not put into the mandate, but the mandate must reflect the philosophy that will drive actions upon these contingencies. The mandate must define protected areas and what actions are to be taken if these areas are attacked.
The UN must, and will, be the focal point for conflict resolution and for preventive actions when crisis situations arise or are identified. But, in order to do this, the UN must have the support of the international community. These operations lend themselves to military to military cooperation even between historical belligerents. India and Pakistan cooperated in Somalia, for example, despite their long-standing disputes. Balance established by a well-debated and planned mandate is key.

**Questions and Answers**

1. Is it possible or acceptable to use the same force to conduct peace enforcement and peacekeeping operations especially when there will be a transition from one to the other? Does there need to be a distinction between using a regional force to do the enforcement mission then transitioning to a UN force for peacekeeping?

There are two or three aspects to this question. There is the possibility that a well-equipped peacekeeping force prepared for the worse case could conduct peace enforcement if necessary. The problem here is that once this force conducts peace enforcement it will be very difficult, if not impossible, to then transition again to peacekeeping. The credibility and impartiality that peacekeeping requires would be gone since a "bad guy" has been identified. In terms of the regional force, this is also feasible, but there is a problem which revolves around the continuity. The regional organization must be willing and capable of continuing the operation until the desired, or an acceptable, end state has been achieved. Kosovo is an example of what can happen when a regional organization starts but does not finish an operation. To be successful using this kind of arrangement, the regional organization must be willing and able to go into a peace enforcement action with the understanding that they will also continue with the peacekeeping action.
Can we have success with this arrangement?

Yugoslavia could have been a success if NATO had gone in, stabilized the situation and then brought in a UN force. The problem in Yugoslavia was that it was the other way around. UN forces went in and had to be rescued by NATO forces.

2. Assuming there is a stand-by force, should the training of this force be uniform in a common training location, or would training be better served by individual contributor nations within their own countries?

Ideally, the training should be uniform and in a common area, but it will not work that way in reality. The expense and the unwillingness of contributor nations to sacrifice their own training methods and practices would likely prohibit uniform training. The compromise would be to have some guidelines for the component forces to follow so that there could be common terminology and practices (even if the practices themselves are slightly modified by individual commanders). Then, at certain levels, have routine and regular interaction, either training exercises or seminars that would solidify these guidelines.

3. There has been an identified need for military advice to the UN Security Council. Can the Military Staff Committee provide such advice?

There is no doubt that the Security Council requires military advice. Within DPKO there is a senior military advisor, but this advice is provided to the Secretary General and not directly to the Security Council. Advice cannot be translated or passed on; it must be directed. This kind of advice is not usually acceptable within the diplomatic/political sphere; the military is perceived as too direct and not knowledgeable in the diplomatic arena to be effective in this role. The Military Staff Committee is not capable of such advice as it is notoriously non-functional. In order to be of any value and to be objective, this Security Council advisor(s) should come from other than a P5 country.

4. What is the relationship between the military and the civilian police? Should the CIVPOL structure be strengthened?

CIVPOL are at a disadvantage since they are dependent upon the military to accomplish their mandate. They cannot do what it was intended for them to do without assistance from the military. The relations between the CIVPOL and the military are not what they should be. This also extends to the local populace. The main cause of the problems concerns status and prestige. There is a requirement for very close coordination between the military and the CIVPOL in order to allay these perceived status differences; the CIVPOL must be integrated as part of the team. Personalities have a great deal of impact on the relationship. This must be overcome.

5. Is it possible to bring about the concept of the international force as the best means of fostering military to military cooperation? There are structures already in place such as NATO, but, outside of this kind of organization, how is it possible to generate this kind of cooperation?
The starting point is at the regional level. It must start there. The UN can assist in fostering this kind of cooperation. It all boils down to funding and political will. It needs to be encouraged and supported by the UN and by the larger powers. It will need to start with smaller contingents and build as confidence and cooperation grows through the smaller regional contingents.

6. Returning to the concept of peace enforcement and peacekeeping by the same force. In Liberia, the ECOMOG conducted both operations successfully. Given this success, it is possible for the same force to conduct peace enforcement then scale back to peacekeeping.

This reinforces the point regarding definition of terms. Peacekeeping is clear, but it covers a wide range of operations. Under Chapter VII there is a completely different set of circumstances at work. The bad guys are identified and are being dealt with. The operation in Liberia may have been termed peacekeeping, but, in fact, was peace enforcement since the rebels were identified and were disarmed.

7. Regarding the comment about stacking headquarters, terminology, UN regulations and the problems with these aspects of peace operations, which have been identified. The UN regulation requiring geographic balance causes problems with qualifications and is usually a decision made at the political level with no regard for operational requirements. This is not a bureaucratic problem but a refusal of member states to bend on this geographic balance issue. The discussion here while at the operational level should be pushed to the political level since it has stronger implications at that level than operationally. At the operational level this issue is being dealt with through the lead nation concept - in East Timor, as an example. The potential perception of bias, particularly in a regional context, may cause problems for the lead nation. This becomes a great example of decisions being made at the political level that clearly need to be made at the operational level.

This must be overcome. Troops cannot work in an environment in which there is no confidence. Operational decisions made at the political level are the cause of such an environment. The other option is to set up regional cells, which would include representatives from the military, CIVPOL and civil affairs, in areas that are more conflict prone. These cells would become the nucleus of forces that would flow into the region when required. This, however, would be very expensive, and who would pay?

8. While this discussion is centered on risks to peacekeepers, the other side of the issue is the risks to the local population. Is there a way to address the issue as it is addressed vis-à-vis the risks to peacekeepers?

There are risks to the local population, and our perspective is different from that of the US. In India we deal with situations like this in our own country, thus we are accustomed to dealing with insurgents and with local populations exposed to insurgent activity. This is very difficult since you are dealing with your own countrymen, however misguided, so there is a reluctance to use firepower against your own people. Our troops are already engaged in this kind of operation. So, when they deploy, they are restrained in their response since the situation in the mission area is not unlike that at home. This may generate more friendly casualties. The bad guy has not
been identified specifically, so this restraint, while well advised, does expose the peacekeepers to more risk.

9. Should the UN contract peace enforcement and peacekeeping to regional or willing organizations? Given the reluctance of the P5 to become part of peacekeeping and peace enforcement and the inadequacies of the UN to handle these operations, it would appear that this contractual arrangement would be most advantageous.

A balance must be struck between regional organizations and the UN in terms of involvement. Obviously, there will be vested interest if a regional organization becomes involved, and this can have an effect in the way the operation is handled. It will be situational to a large degree. Peacekeeping is one thing, but peace enforcement is something else. The UN is not staffed nor equipped to handle a peace enforcement operation.
Conflicts between force protection and rules of engagement. The question is not just of force protection or low risk tolerance versus rules of engagement, but, for the United States, it is a question of force protection versus engagement. The initial decision to become engaged in peace operations is driven by the force protection. It is the single biggest impediment to US involvement in peace operations. Do we have a “dog in the fight” is the first question that is asked by Congress and by the political leadership; does the situation in that country or region have an impact on US interests? Protecting soldiers is very important, but the real question is how high a priority is placed on this activity. This is a recent phenomenon. In the Gulf War, mission accomplishment was the priority, but in recent peace operations the priority has been, and continues to be, protecting the force. What is the cost of this preoccupation, and what are some recommended solutions to the problem?

The primary cost of this preoccupation with protecting the force is that is puts US soldiers at greater risk. It is totally counter-productive. Warlords now know that the best way to get the US to leave is to cause casualties. Even UN operations can be hampered since the warlord or chieftain will attack areas where there are US troops. The reaction is more force protection that hampers the operation even more.

This preoccupation also affects the shaping of strategies and tactics. The air war in Kosovo was not the best way to solve the problem, but it did minimize risk to troops and limited casualties. This gave rise to the on-going debate concerning the effectiveness of air power versus action on the ground. A corollary to this argument is the argument about which action turned the tide against Milosevic - the bombing by NATO or the ground action by the KLA and NATO's threat to mobilize ground forces.

This preoccupation with force protection has undermined US global leadership. How can the US ask others nations to send their soldiers into harm's way when we are reluctant to do so? There is no moral authority there to back up any such request. It undermines international organizations since the US has used its own standards to evaluate UN operations such as in Rwanda. The Presidential Decision Directive generated by the US experience in Somalia was used as an evaluative standard within the UN which was perceived as unilateral imposition of standards. This preoccupation with force protection also tends to undermine the morale of the deployed troops. Finally, it limits interaction with the local culture and people. Collectively this effects mission accomplishment.

There are two components to the problem; the first is political and largely domestic, and the second is international and mainly strategic. Politically, where does this preoccupation come from? Based on polls taken to address this issue with the American people, they are not the source of this preoccupation. Does it come from the military itself, from Congress or from the administration? No one seems to know. Regardless of where it comes from, what can be done...
to solve or stop it? We need to talk more about the transition strategy and the end state, not the end date. We need to do a better job of looking at peacekeeping operations in stages and looking at better division of labor. The UN cannot handle larger operations and have collapsed elsewhere. There needs to be more regional decision-making and participation. We have to get a better handle on military options needed to do the job. Do we go with the "Powell thesis" of overwhelming force, or do we examine alternatives such as sufficient force or minimal force in the different stages of these operations?

Finally, when looking at future operations we must look not only at worst case scenarios but at best case scenarios. In this way we can gauge the resources we need and can assess the amount of risk by establishing the parameters of the entire operation. To focus solely on the worst case creates a sort of "doomsday" cynicism that becomes pervasive and is applied to any peacekeeping operation.

Brigadier Mellor

From a commander's point of view, protection of the force flows from the concept of the operation and the mission. Military planning is fundamental to success even in peace operations. Effective military planning contains a clear concept of the operation and a clear mission statement that is understood by all troops involved. There are differences in planning for war and planning for peace operations. The first of these is no surprises. In war, the element of surprise is a fundamental principal. In peace operations there should be no surprises, and this should be a fundamental principal of peace operations. Everyone, the belligerent parties, the local authorities and the local populace, should know what the military is doing and how they are going to do it. The military then needs to be engaged with the local populace so that military activities are visible and clear. Obviously, this places troops at greater risk, but increased personal protection, increased mobility or arms attenuate these risks. Patrolling is key to visibility.

Rules of engagement are one thing, but applying these rules is another thing altogether. In East Timor, the important piece is not the rules of engagement but how they were applied and when the troops did not fire. In the Australian Army there are guidelines known as "OFOF" or orders for opening fire. These rules are printed on a card and carried by each soldier; they elaborate on the circumstances when they can open fire. It's not just the rules of engagement, but also the OFOF that are important. Mission and circumstances will dictate how much firepower is needed and what can be used. The fundamental truth is to arrive with as much as possible so it is there if needed. Nothing says that it must be used.

Attitude comes from training at the individual soldier level and junior commanders. This requires competent, confident and comfortable commanders at the tactical level. Training for these operations must start almost immediately, since junior leaders can find themselves under fire very quickly and must be able to respond accordingly. Thus, the early training must instill a good attitude and follow-on training must reinforce it. There is no enemy. There may be bandits and warlords, but there is no enemy, and this must be instilled in the troops early on. The attitude must be positive toward the hostile elements and to the local population. The attitude is a response mechanism instilled by training.
Success in peace operations, particularly peace enforcement operations, revolves around many aspects of the military art. However, intelligence is one of the fundamental keys to success. It is important to know what the hostile elements are doing. It is equally important to know what the factions and the various militias are doing. The UN has reservations about the use of intelligence in peace operations, particularly from sources from outside the UN. Commanders want to minimize the risks to troops as much as possible, and that requires the use and dissemination of intelligence. This is acceptable tactically, but, at the strategic level, there are always reservations about using national level intelligence sources. Cooperation between contingents is required so that vital information is disseminated within the parameters of national security requirements of the lead nation.

Somalia is often synonymous with failure, and, for the most part, it was a failure. This was a three-part operation: UNISOM, UNISOM II, RESTORE HOPE. The latter operation was a limited success primarily because the headquarters was a functioning corps headquarters fully staffed with personnel who had worked together and knew the operational plan. Other national contingents merely hooked into the headquarters and began to function. This underscores the need for homogeneous headquarters or headquarters that operate as a headquarters all the time to ensure success.

Captain (ret) Gordon Wilson

Rules of engagement as we know them have little historical basis and are a product of operations that have taken place in the latter part of the twentieth century. After several operations, mainly maritime, in the late 60's the UK had developed several versions of rules of engagement. And, by the time the UK was at war in the Falklands, they had developed very specific rules of engagement captured in a joint publication. NATO did not produce any rules of engagement until 1979, and those were maritime in nature. Air and ground rules of engagement were not produced until 15 years after that.

One definition of "rules of engagement" came from the British Royal Navy: "the matching of political control to executive power in a clear and readily understood fashion so that the man on the spot has correct authority and sufficient tactical freedom to achieve the aim of protecting his force." The post-Vietnam US definition of rules of engagement is "directives that the government may establish to delineate the circumstances and limitations under which its own naval, ground and air forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with enemy forces". After Vietnam, the feeling that there was too much political interference with the military led to a change in the wording of this definition, changing "that the government may establish" to "that any competent military authority may establish". This is a very important and fundamental change in philosophy. This change implies that the commander on the ground has a great deal of flexibility in not only enforcing rules of engagement but changing them as well. This flexibility is unprecedented throughout the world and, with respect to multinational operations, causes concern among some American allies with whom they will participate in peace operations.
By and large, Americans will open fire more readily, and this is a by product of the more flexible rules of engagement under which American forces tend to operate. An example is how American forces often are allowed to open fire upon hostile intent, not necessarily a hostile act. Obviously this allows for a very subjective interpretation of what constitutes "hostile intent". This becomes even more problematic in a peace operation where there is no real enemy and political tensions are high.

There are two aspects to this philosophy of rules of engagement. One is the Gulf War, and the other is UN operations in general. The Gulf War was a high intensity campaign that was characterized by multinational forces each having slightly different rules of engagement. The maritime rules of engagement were fairly clear, but the rules of engagement among the multinational ground and air forces were not harmonized until forty-eight hours prior to the start of the air campaign, despite the six month lead time in which to do so. The air defense operations were never harmonized.

With peace operations, the rules are interpreted down to the private soldier level on the ground. If this goes wrong, the soldier may be subject to the law of the land, and if he uses force, the soldier may be held, or accused, or charged with murder under those laws. If he does not use force, he may be killed or injured for his adherence to the rules of engagement. This is a very difficult situation for young soldiers to have to interpret rules of engagement on the spot under enormous pressure. There is no time to access the chain of command, making the situation even more difficult. Thus there is enormous pressure placed upon the individual. Previously the UN standard was simple, self-defense if fired upon. Now the rules of engagement are applied to the defense of the mission to include not only the force itself, but protection of humanitarian supplies, disarming armed factions, assisting refugees and defending UN property. While these rules allow for a fairly clear idea of when force can and cannot be used, they do not allow for the consequences in the former case. If force is used, the individual may be held liable for any deaths or injury caused by the use of force. Hence, the troops are in a dilemma that may impact their decision on whether or not to use force in accordance with the rules of engagement. Compounding the problem is harmonizing the rules of engagement among multinational contingents.

**Mr. Bakhtiyar Tuzmukhamedov**

In this discussion, several issues of law that probably have been overlooked in previous discussions will be addressed. The UN charter provides no legal basis for the commitment of military forces to a peacekeeping operation. Nowhere in the charter are the words peacekeeping, peace support or peace operations. This is a result of a very liberal interpretation of the charter. The debate that has been on-going during this seminar concerning definitions of various operations is a reflection of a gap that exists in the charter in terms of defining what actions are to be taken under Chapters VI and VII of the charter. Amending the charter would be very complex. An alternative would be adopting or negotiating agreements which would interpret the charter in a quiet fashion, so that peace operations are based on the clear letter of the law, not its spirit.
In a similar way, with the distinct shift to a greater role of regional arrangements, the UN must also close the gap that exists with Chapter VIII particularly in Articles 52 and 53 which address regional organizations.

There is a legal debate as to whether or not the Geneva Convention protects peacekeepers as a mission wanders from Chapter VI to Chapter VII. As we know, these missions can drift from Chapter VI to Chapter VII and back again. Once a mission drifts into Chapter VII and the mission moves closer to war, are peacekeepers or enforcers protected by the Geneva Convention even if the Chapter VII actions are very short in duration? Under one legal interpretation, the UN could be at war with one of the parties if they choose to take actions under Chapter VII. Given this interpretation, any UN observer who may be in an area where such action is taken may be subject to being taken as a prisoner of war under the Geneva Convention. Training in humanitarian law (e.g. the Geneva Convention) may become part of the training regimen for peacekeepers given this scenario.

Another aspect that has been overlooked is domestic legislation that regulates participation in peacekeeping operations. Japan and Germany have laws or constitutional court directives that specifically address their participation in operations outside their sovereign borders or, in the case of Germany, outside the area of responsibility of NATO, however defined. Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania also have specific laws governing their participation. There are constitutional questions that arise from these legislative constraints, some of these being parliamentary participation in decision making concerning a peace operation and accountability of the executive or commander-in-chief; there are differences in jurisdictional procedure where a parliamentary majority forms the executive or where the executive is challenged by the legislature where a rival political party has the majority.

The considerations above are largely political in nature, but there are other legal considerations that impact on the individual peacekeeper. Does national law adequately protect personnel involved in a peace operation? Is there any difference in the treatment of military participants and civilians? Is there any difference in the treatment of soldiers who go to a peace operation as individuals who serve in an international headquarters and those who go as a member of a unit? Is there any difference in treatment between military and civilian police? Of those who are sent by their government versus those who find their own way to a peacekeeping mission - does national law oblige the peacekeeper to behave in a prudent and responsible manner in order to not put the mission in jeopardy and others at risk? An example of these revolves around individual benefits that are accorded soldiers injured during war or in domestic operations but that may not be accorded them in a peace operation. If there is a very bureaucratic reading of the law, and given the decree of the executive, or the commander-in-chief, and the implementing order of the government, there may be no legal justification for benefits to be accorded to the injured soldier.
Discussion, Questions, Comments.

Col. Oliver: In response to some of the comments made by Dr. Baker concerning force protection, the perception that US forces are locked into their compounds in both Bosnia and Kosovo is not 100% true. There are American forces that routinely patrol the villages talking to people and generally being visible. There is an interaction with the people albeit with Kevlar helmet and flak jacket. We are all products of our experiences, and the US experience goes back to 1983 with the Beirut bombing that killed 242 Marines and to the Gulf War and the bombing in Dharan, Saudi Arabia. These incidents have shaped policy and have motivated the force protection methods and philosophy.

Lt. Col. Nunn: Situations that arise in peace operations require techniques that are unique to these operations and, in some cases, unprecedented among soldiers trained to fight. One of these techniques is the manipulation of the force profile. Even if the soldiers are required to have flak jackets and Kevlar helmets, these items can be removed if the situation warrants and then replaced if the commander receives intelligence that suggests a greater threat. By manipulating this "profile" the commander provides a signal to the people that he knows what is happening and is aware of the situation. This also represents a simple, but effective, way of establishing and pursuing the principle of force credibility. These techniques are designed to allow the military to operate amongst the population. This being the case, the soldiers must understand the culture and sensitivities of the people as well as the military concept of operations. More to the point, they must understand the consequences of their actions as well as the status of forces agreements that allow them to be operating within a given country. If the soldiers understand these needs, then they will have the confidence that they can accomplish the mission and interact with the local populace and gather intelligence. The people must understand that things are getting better which is difficult to communicate when the soldiers look like they are not.

Dr. Chopra: A question to Mr. Tuzmukhamedov. There are two schools of thought concerning this issue. One, going back to Somalia in 1993, says that the Geneva Convention does not bind the UN, as it is not a party to the Convention. The Yugoslav Tribunal has declared that the Geneva Convention is binding on all states regardless of consent. If this is the case, if there are violations of the Convention, then there should be punitive measures taken against the violator. This gap between what is written and the perceived responsibility of the contingents needs to be resolved. What are your thoughts concerning this issue?

Mr. Tuzmukhamedov: Most nations of the world are parties to the Geneva Convention. When states contribute forces to a UN peace operation, those forces remain under the flag of their own nations and, thus, are bound by the Geneva Convention. However, there should be a binding document developed and promulgated that covers operations that are either conducted by or on behalf of the UN. This document would define legal parameters of such an operation. Currently, there is a Secretary General's Bulletin that generally outlines the legalities of participation of contingents in UN peace operations, but it is not nearly enough and, at best, is a half measure. As a long standing measure, probably not.

MG Neretnieks: A few comments on the discussion and presentations. First, when soldiers are mingling with the local population there is a great opportunity to collect intelligence, itself being
a measure of force protection. Second, concerning the American preoccupation with force protection. American troops behave differently from other contingents partly because Americans have to deal with problems that other nations don't have. When an American soldier is killed it always makes headlines internationally. Everyone, either consciously or unconsciously, is aware that the US is an extremely important player in any peacekeeping or peace enforcement operation. Because of this central role, some view the US as a villain, and as such it is more of a target than other contingents. Don't make it too complicated, because, if you do, it becomes too hard to do our work.

Mr. Tuzmukhamedov: Despite the fact that to accomplish the mission some rules have to be broken, but there are rules that are absolute and must be observed.

Dr. Baker: The preoccupation with security/force protection is unique to the United States, both factually and operationally. The problem is that the preoccupation translates into an excuse to not get involved in a situation or crisis. Once the decision is made that an issue should have the US involved in some way, shape, or form, then it becomes a separate issue as to what kind of tactical or operational measures these high profile troops should take while in the field. These are two separate issues that at some point have become merged to the extent that we are not making the distinction as to what is legitimate protection or what is using these concerns to make a political decision rather than a military decision.

MG Neretnieks: Of course there have to be rules and regulations, but the fear is that through regulation initiative is hampered, if not killed altogether. People become afraid to do things because of regulatory constraints that restrict their freedom of action to a very narrow sphere.

LTG Nambiar: Two comments, the first one related to the question Dr. Chopra raised with Mr. Tuzmukhamedov, regarding international humanitarian law as it relates to UN peacekeeping. In two sessions in Geneva with UN lawyers present, the issue of UN reluctance to become involved with the Geneva Convention was discussed at length. The UN lawyers said that the UN did not have the authority to sign a protocol to the Geneva Convention since most of the member states were parties to the Convention already. Another aspect to this question concerns the Secretary General's Bulletin. This Bulletin has come under some criticism by the Special Committee commissioned by the UN to address legal issues in peacekeeping. Some member states of the Committee said that the Bulletin was issued without their consent or any debate. Thus, there is a clash between the Secretary General and the Committee. The second observation concerns the interaction of the military in emergencies involving the media and NGOs. Members of both rely on the military to help if they become involved in a dangerous situation. The commander in the field must make a decision as to whether or not to commit some of his force to rescuing the media or NGO knowing that the soldiers he sends may get hurt or killed doing so. The responsibility for the safety and health of the soldiers rests solely with the commander, and, given the constrained environment that restricts his freedom of action, it becomes a very difficult situation when media people and members of NGOs ask for assistance in this way.

Mr. Tuzmukhamedov: In the Southwest Sector (in Bosnia) we would have regular meetings that included as many NGOs and IO as possible. At these conferences the military, and
specifically the civil affairs people, would brief them on various issues on the general political peace process as well as situations in their immediate area of operations.

**Mr. Henthorne:** In terms of force protection, I have seen the need for it but have also seen the problems with it. The comments made by Dr. Baker and Brig. Mellor were excellent and are very accurate in characterizing the good and the not so good of this issue. I have seen the confusion that the troops have encountered through interviews I have conducted with soldiers training at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Ft. Polk. The confusion at the tactical level rests with the junior commanders (at company level and below). They want to do the job, but the force protection constraints are getting in the way. There are instances where bomb disposal teams and civil affairs teams have taken up to six hours to get off the compound, if at all, to respond to problems or requests for assistance. Force protection must be seriously re-evaluated because it is beginning to have an impact on military operations.

**Col. Oliver:** There was a study done here at the War College on this issue stemming from a comment made by a lieutenant addressing the issue with a group of cadets at West Point. The lieutenant said that if mission accomplishment and force protection are in conflict then he would do force protection. This study, and this comment, have inspired a debate in the military because when a junior leader is saying that force protection is paramount to mission accomplishment, something is very wrong.

**Mr. Lyerly:** Relating to force protection and its extension beyond the military, it is my understanding that in the past five years more than 40 delegates from the ICRC have been killed in various peace operations around the world. This is common to other NGOs and international organizations. The point is that the military are not the only individuals in a peace operation at risk. Minimizing the risk to peacekeepers, military and civilian, through information intelligence is extremely important. During RESTORE HOPE the JTF commander, GEN Johnston, routinely held meeting with NGOs to ensure that information was passed on to them. This meeting was held immediately after the nightly J2 briefing to ensure that the latest intelligence feed was available and fresh for use by the NGOs sharing the theater of operations. This was also an opportunity to compare and contrast the intelligence his J2 was getting with that obtained by the NGOs in the field. He found that he was getting more timely and accurate information from the NGOs than he was getting from the national level intelligence community available to his J2.

Kudos to Brig. Mellor for emphasizing that Operation RESTORE HOPE was a success. This also reinforces the conceptual difference between humanitarian operations that have a security component and a peace operation that has a civil affairs component.

The question is to Brig. Mellor. Trying to coordinate NGOs is similar to "herding cats." By expansion, trying to coordinate governmental agencies and international organizations is similar to herding squirrels; they are faster, they have larger tails and, when startled, they go to a much higher level. One of the two constants in a peace operation is change, the given that there is the "fog of peace" to contend with, the question is if surprise is a principle of war, why is there difficulty understanding even that level of surprise, if not more, cannot be anticipated in peace operations?
**Col. Oliver:** We need to explore this idea of humanitarian assistance versus a peacekeeping operation with a humanitarian component. We are having this debate within the Army community. One of the imperatives we have addressed was transparency that lends itself to this issue.

**Brig. Mellor:** One of the real challenges in any peace operation is dealing with the NGOs. Soldiers like to think that they are very organized and well ordered, but, when dealing with NGOs, they find that, by comparison, they are much more ordered and organized than they ever thought. The temptation is to immediately start organizing the NGOs. A much longer view is required. The better approach is to build confidence in the NGOs over time or at least until they understand that the military is there to provide a secure environment while the NGOs do their job. This is not a rapid process. But when we finally come to this understanding, then the military will have the confidence to suggest better ways to do their job so that it helps the military and the NGOs. In terms of surprise, coordination with local decision makers is key to ensuring that everyone within a village or town understands what we are doing and what our capabilities are to assist the local community. Without this understanding, people will do what they think is right including firing on soldiers patrolling, particularly at night, if they are startled or surprised.

**Mr. Dewey:** When talking about "the force", the total force must be addressed which includes the military and the civilian relief community. In fact the center of gravity for the civilian relief effort is the international organizations operating under a specific mandate from the United Nations. They must be responsible, while the NGOs may not be as responsible, for their actions. Regardless, the civilian component is a very important part of the operation and requires as much protection as the military force. Civilians are doing most of the dying, thus we need to focus on the total force when considering force protection.

**Capt. Wilson:** Regardless of the type mission that is being undertaken, Chapter VI, VI 1/2 or VII, the mission of the international organizations is indeed in the mandate and must be considered by the military. The ICRC has asked the question about how international organizations and NGOs are protected, particularly in situations close to war. The international organizations are very vulnerable since they cannot be seen as being under the protection of the military. The only time that they can really be protected is if they are in an area that is known for hostilities, otherwise the international organizations must be very careful in their association with the military. But who is responsible for their protection outside of these known areas of hostilities? This gets into the area of private security companies, which is a very dangerous proposition. But to fulfill the mandate the entire force must be protected whether the mandate implies or directs it or not.

**Brig. Mellor:** The NGOs and international organizations must want to be protected as well. That brings with it some limitations about what they can do. Some wanted no protection. There is no obligation on the part of civilians to fulfill security requirements, unless it is in the mandate or if there is an agreement. In Somalia, for example, there were some NGOs that were not interested in any security that was offered.
Mr. Anderson: There are different types of risk that are encountered by soldiers in the field during a peace operation. In the first instance, there is physical risk to the individual soldier that can be managed by the soldier himself. As a corollary, there is physical risk that would require assistance, and who does the soldier look to for this assistance? It is not the UN or the international force but their own state (nation) that is responsible for securing the individual soldier. The next aspect is the question of risk-benefit analysis. When a soldier goes in harm's way, the soldier has to be confident that such an analysis has been done. This analysis is done by the nation the soldier serves, not the UN. The third risk is the legal risk that is encountered by the soldier serving in a peace operation. There are rights and obligations that are afforded to the soldiers by status of forces agreements and by international law. Who is managing that risk for the soldier? The soldier must have confidence that someone is aware of the risk and managing the situation so as to minimize the risk to him/her. The fact that national leaders take so long to analyze this risk and try to manage it may be a source of comfort to the individual soldier contributing to his/her attitude regarding participation in a peace operation. If this is changed in any way, e.g., letting the UN or other organization conduct the analysis and manage the risk, then the soldier, regardless of where he might be from, must have the same level of confidence in the measures taken as if his own nation had done it. The question is can this management be transferred to an international organization?

Dr. Baker: In response to that comment, the time has not yet come to delegate this risk analysis responsibility to an international organization. There cannot be a high confidence level in the UN managing risk until there is higher confidence in the UN managing operations. Until there is confidence in the UN to handle and manage operations, there cannot be any transference of risk management.

Capt. Wilson: This does represent a "catch-22" situation. The nations that make up an international force tend to use their own rules of engagement, some of which are in conflict with those of other component nations. Hence, the effectiveness of the force is undermined. If the UN could be responsible for international risk management and it was supported by nations involved in a peace operation, then these rules of engagement could be standardized or at least applicable to the entire force.

Dr. Baker: This is the inherent problem with multinational operations, the lack of standardization leaves each component nation to its own rules of engagement and training to participate even though these rules and training may be in conflict with those of the others.
Disarmament, Demobilization & Re-integration (DD&R)

Ambassador Peggy Mason, Canadian Council for International Peace and Security

While it is very good to have doctrine to guide operations, if there are impediments to the doctrine being implemented, then what is the point of having doctrine at all? In this light, with respect to the force protection issue, Dr. Baker made a comment concerning US preoccupation with force protection being a relatively recent event. It seems that the US preoccupation with force protection is directly related to the perceived value of the vital national interests being engaged. How vital are these interests? It also seems that there must be a credible articulation of these interests at the highest policy levels for this problem to be viewed in a different context. There are no easy answers. There must be some understanding as to why it is worthwhile for any country to participate in peace operations.

There has been a contention that the "lessons learned" in peace operations have not been learned, but the more important question is who is not learning them? The UN has learned a great deal about these operations given the experience in UNPROFOR and the explosion of operations around the world since the end of the Cold War. A comment had been made earlier about the importance of relating the concept of the operation to all aspects of the mission, the military and civilian pieces. The UN got to the point where key individuals such as the force commander, the SRSG, and the commissioner of civilian police get together and discuss their vision of how the operation would be conducted before the deployment of forces. The problems at the UN are prevented from being solved because they are problems at the highest political levels where resolution is extremely difficult, if not impossible.

To do DD&R right there must be a sustained commitment over time. Some things can be accomplished in a short period very inexpensively. But for the most part, it is a time consuming, resource intensive proposition. The methodology for coming up with doctrine to cover DD&R was to study it and then to approach it from the planning point of view. If there is a plan, the planner has looked at the problem at the outset and has anticipated difficulties. Initially, the plan was to develop case studies, but this was eventually replaced with principles and guidelines mainly because, in the past, it was customary to look at the case studies and extract the necessary lessons. With the principles and guidelines a broader view was taken, and the lessons were extrapolated. Accordingly, a draft compendium of principles and guidelines has been developed and is provided for inclusion in this report. The UN has published versions of these principles and guidelines that are available and that capture the guidelines, for the most part, as well as work done by others in this regard.

The guidelines that were developed along with the UN were to be placed in a binder that could be updated constantly. The aim of this document is to provide a manual of policy and guidelines for the effective planning, management, implementation and monitoring of disarmament, de-mobilization and re-integration in a peacekeeping environment. This document is designed to assist not only planners from the military and from the UN but from non-governmental organizations, national government agencies and regional organizations in designing and implementing DD&R programs. The key statement that applies to these guidelines is that policy in this document is meant to be authoritative but not directive.
 Authorities at all levels need to exercise their judgement in applying these guidelines to the accomplishment of their mission. This document also reflects the concept of an integrated mission accounting for the political-diplomatic, military, humanitarian and police elements. The key is to develop policy and guidelines that make sense to, and can be applied by, all of the elements that make up modern peace operations.

Each conflict is unique. It is not possible, nor practical, to develop guidelines that apply to all situations since they are all different. General guidelines individually applied are "the hallmark of an effective planning process in a peace operation". This principle is particularly applicable to re-integration planning. The socio-economic and psychological preparation of the ex-combatant for civilian life is key since the most successful of these types of programs are "bottom up rather than top down". The critical piece to re-integration is facilitating capacity building among the former combatants rather than dictating this capacity to them. The key is letting them find their own level rather than trying to direct what that level could be or should be. In some ways this concept is analogous to Brigadier Mellor's comment about bring out the best in NGOs without trying to organize them to fit the military's needs.

The developmental methodology for these guidelines was to study mostly UN missions, but also NATO missions and others. This gave rise to conflicts in terminology, which were ameliorated through the use of a glossary. The glossary is consistent UN terminology, but for reasons of political sensitivity there are instances where there is not a common definition of specific terms. In cases such as these the most appropriate term was used as determined by the authors.

The manual is included in this report and reflects a comprehensive approach to the DD&R process. Reviewing the table of contents reveals that, generally, the DD&R process is integral to any peace operation and should be an integral part of the doctrine that is developed to guide all elements of these operations. The document has two chapters with multiple sections that address in detail the planning and operational aspects of DD&R. The most important points to be taken from this manual are:

- The planning for DD&R like all planning for a peace operation should be done inclusive of the military, humanitarian, police, and political elements.

- The planning should be as comprehensive as possible accounting for all aspects of DD&R with particular emphasis on the re-integration portion of the process.

- The DD&R plan should be an integral part of the overall plan for a peace operation.

- There is a generic DD&R plan that is included in the document as an annex for use as a start point for planners and practitioners.

- The guidelines only cover DD&R up to the point of re-integration. After that, as has been discussed previously, there is no accurate way to generically address re-integration as each situation differs so dramatically.
In terms of definitions there are several which require some discussion.

- Post-conflict demobilization is "the process by which armed forces, government and/or opposition or factional forces either downsize or completely disband as part of a broader transformation from war to peace. Demobilization typically involves the assembly, disarmament, administration and discharge of former combatants who receive some sort of compensation or assistance package."

- The disarmament portion of the process includes the collection, control, and disposal of small arms, light and heavy weapons of the former combatants and, in many cases, of the general population as well as the development of a responsible weapons management program. This comprehensive approach facilitates a much broader view of the situation to include the general population.

- Reintegration is that element of the process by which programs of cash or in kind compensation, training and income generation are meant to increase the potential of social and economic re-integration of former combatants and their families. A growing aspect of re-integration is the effort to promote both individual and societal reconciliation and democratization. Hence, the intent is to go far beyond simple job training, but goes much farther to re-build the affected society and promote democracy whenever possible.

When properly developed a DD&R plan can be an integral part of rebuilding a post-conflict society. The key to an overall DD&R program is an integrated, coordinated and comprehensive approach to the DD&R plan. The plan can then be used as an integral part of the overall national post-conflict development plan. This also includes the development of an integrated national defense force.

The entire process should prepare for the worst case. Disarmament will be the most problematic portion of the process, which will cause the worst case to occur. This underscores the need for security and planning, most notably, who will provide this security? It also underscores the need to have the former combatants involved in the DD&R planning process and involved as the overall DD&R process is executed.

Questions and Answers

1. When the disarmament portion fails, the entire process fails. The focus on the disarmament portion is very cogent to the needs of the military and should be integrated into the military doctrine.

The disarmament component of the guidelines has the most detail and is the most important from a military standpoint. The guidelines address roles in terms of who is doing the monitoring, what kind of monitoring is being done, who is controlling the weapons, who provides security and a myriad of other details that define who does what in terms of disarmament. The guideline itself was reviewed by the military in detail; our aim was to provide a basis for the development of military doctrine to be used as DD&R is executed during the overall peace operation.
2. What would you recommend for timing of pulling the plug? At some point in the DD&R process there has to be some sort of evaluation done to ascertain whether or not the process is working, and, if it is not, then what is the criteria for terminating the process and minimizing the losses and cost. If it is not working, then what is done? What's the mechanism for evaluating the "pull the plug" option?

One answer is that there would be a very serious evaluation of what part of the process the mission was in, disarmament, de-mobilization or re-integration, and then what measure could be applied. Much depends on the tenacity of the "bad guy". If disarmament is the key to the process as was mentioned before, and the "bad guy" is tenacious in continuing the conflict, then the international community in some form (e.g., regional organizations) might have to use force to disarm him.
Dr. Mendelson-Forman

Doctrine is essential to security, which itself is key to anything that the developmental community might do.

How peacekeepers deal with regular and irregular forces is a continuing challenge. Not listed on the slide is the distinction between ideological forces and war criminals. So far, doctrine does a good job in addressing military related activities but does not address the criminal element, which is characteristic of many modern peace operations. There are roles and responsibilities for peacekeepers.

Specifically, this presentation will address:
• A typology of DDRR programs and policy implications.
• The stages of DDRR: defining roles and responsibilities.
• Policy needs for Child Soldiers
• Lessons learned for future policy formulation.
• Challenges along the way forward.

There is some variance in the terminology used to describe what is generally referred to as DD&R. However, there is a UN typology that describes the larger operation in the Congo which is DDRR - Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration and Reconciliation. Recognition additional "R" represents an evolution as the longer-term implications of the policy are examined and recognized. One size does not good practice in El Salvador is not good practice in Tajikistan, for example. It is all the context in which the policy is applied. Doctrine must recognize this currently.
Types of DDRR are categorized based on the situation in a particular country or region of the world. There are other types or variations of types. These are the most common types.

**DDRR Typologies**
- **Type I** - Demobilization of regular and irregular forces after a formal peace accord. (El Salvador, Guatemala)
- **Type II** – Demobilization of irregular forces after a peace accord. (Tajikistan)
- **Type III** – Downsizing of the military as part of a political agreement, or power-sharing arrangement, or constitutional reform. (DROC, Uganda, Djibouti, Haiti)
- **Type IV** – Demobilization of only specific units or sectors of a regular force. (e.g., children and the elderly, e.g. DROC, Rwanda)

These are the most common types, but other variations might exist. The point is there is no one perfect scenario for such activities.

To be successful in the demobilization and re-integration effort there is one overarching principle - security and stability are key to sustained development.

**Steps for a Successful Demobilization and Reintegration Effort**
- **Principle**: Development cannot be sustained without political stability and underlying security.

**Fundamental Elements**
- **A Demobilization Phase** – disarmament, discharge from service, orientation to civilian life, and relocation to a community of the ex-combatant’s choice.
- **A Reinsertion Phase** – This includes the provision of a transitional safety net of cash and in-kind payments spread out over a period of months.
- **Social and Economic Reintegration** – This includes assistance in the form of access to productive assets (i.e., land and capital), training and employment, and information and counseling services.

Demobilization is a phased activity.

Ex-combatants are also among the most vulnerable. Therefore, the key to a successful program, no matter what the type includes:
- political will
- careful preparation of rapid assessments, including defining opportunities for ex-combatants.
- Simple monitoring to support transparent institutional arrangements.
- Profiling the needs of former fights and trying to reconnect them to families.

There are four keys to success.
Actions for Creating a DDRR Program

- Classification of ex-combatants according to their needs, vocational interests, and training capacity.
- Creating a safety net for transition periods with international aid workers.
- Developing a program that will deliver services while lowering the transaction costs.
- Providing for counseling, training, employment, and social support.
- Coordinating centralized and decentralized implementation authority.
- Connecting ongoing development efforts to ensure for a successful DDRR.

Defining Roles and Responsibilities

- Peacekeepers:
  - Disarming soldiers or combatants.
  - Preparation of discharge procedures, if applicable.
  - Destruction of weapons.
  - Communication of demobilization efforts to soldiers or combatants.
  - Providing administrative support to civilian groups charged with reinsertion.

- Development Agencies:
  - 1. Provide funding for immediate needs upon discharge.
  - 2. Evaluation of each former soldier or combatant for health needs, and future vocational training.
  - Linking reintegration with medium and longer term development programs.
  - Providing safety net for resettlement, including quick impact projects, as appropriate.

There are actions required to create an effective DDRR program. These are fundamental and are somewhat ideal and "textbook" in nature. They need to be challenged.

What are the roles and responsibilities in a DDRR program? Peacekeepers and developmental agencies each have specific roles in the program.

Vulnerable Groups

- Child Soldiers: rarely included in programs designed for adult demobilization because:
  - Militaries do not like to admit having children on their rolls.
  - Transaction costs for child soldiers are far higher than for those already adults.
  - Demobilization of children is a long-term commitment. Countries where such programs take place should also be assessed on the quality of other programs for the young.
  - Child soldiers need specialized training if they are to earn a livelihood.
- Development agencies have an important role to play in this area of child-soldiering.

There are groups within a conflict that are especially vulnerable, child-soldiers for example.

Vulnerable Groups

- Elderly soldiers: This group usually is rather small, but they may also require medical care that far exceeds the amount militaries are willing to pay. Analysis of pension rights and individual capacity to work must be part of any elderly DDRR.

There are other groups, the elderly for one. Women are a deliberate omission. The needs of women soldiers are no different from the needs of male soldiers in terms of what is required for demobilization, particularly in the disarmament phase.
Yet another vulnerable group, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, is the HIV/AIDS group. There is an on-going effect on the number of individuals capable of conducting security operations due to the AIDS epidemic. This epidemic calls into question the future of available manpower to man security forces in these countries.

There is another implication to this crisis. Those trained in demobilization believe that their efforts give the former combatants hope for the future. The average life expectancy of the demobilized combatant with HIV is three years. This implies having to work with former combatants in futures that at once promote a health prevention policy and take into consideration their own vulnerability.

Lessons learned are classic in nature and apply to many on-going situations such as in Sierra Leone. NGOs are key in this arena.

(Slide 16) These are resource intensive activities. Without resources there can be no program. Resources must come from external assistance programs. Thus, representatives from the developmental community should be included in any program or policy development that will address these needs and require the kind of resources necessary for success.
There have been instances where strict and effective weapons control has contributed to a
deescalation of violence and has made these instances more controllable thereby limiting the
intensity of resourcing and preventing hardship. These examples include El Salvador and
Albania. Former fighters can be a positive political force, but this requires training and
education.

The road ahead. For Africa, the AIDS epidemic will profoundly affect developmental
efforts and cause constraints to any reintegration program. Peacekeeping forces should receive
training on how developmental agencies work in the field to promote cooperation and
effectiveness in these multifaceted operations.

Mr. Mngqibisa

The topics that have been discussed in the previous presentations will be applied to
peacekeeping capacity building. I would also like to focus on the relationship between military
peacekeepers and civilian agencies involved in peace operations.

DD&R is an opportunity for social re-engineering of societies that have come out of
conflict. These societies have non-existent social structures, non-existent political infrastructures
and non-existent economies. These structures have to be re-built with great assistance. It will
also require a great deal of cooperation between developmental agencies and other elements
associated with peace operations. This cooperation is probably not forthcoming and, while not
out the realm of possibility, is unlikely because of the complexity of the overall situation.
Regarding demobilization there will have to be an imposition of values that may not exist by an outside force in order to promote nation building and democratization. There are three features that will define the imposition that is required.

- There has to be emphasis on individual growth. In order for the society to grow there has to be an individual aspect before a collective program can flourish.

- There has to be a value formation aspect. Many of the developmental agencies would like to think that their activities are value free to an extent. They would like to think that they are non-judgmental and are merely available to ensure that the needs of the former combatants are met. The imposition must inject positive values on a society that is valueless.

- There needs to be a sense of social belonging instilled into the society; this requires assistance with an emphasis on communal responsibility.

These may be idealistic, but these are also challenges that we have as peacekeepers. However, these ideals bring us to the core of why we are involved in conflict management of which peace operations are but one part. We can plan for and discuss the reconstruction of economies, but it is another matter to try to change or reconstruct behaviors and instill values.

There is a model, that some feel has been discredited, that puts us into different modes of action - peace making, peacekeeping and enforcement, and peace building. Within these three phases or structures, DD&R is in the peace building phase. Within this model there is not anything that is impossible for us to achieve if we all act accordingly. The problem is that within the international community it is difficult to ensure that everyone will act accordingly, will cooperate with developmental agencies and solve the problems for all of these complex situations. Primarily, this is why DD&R will not work as effectively as is possible given the presentation we heard earlier. There are several other reasons why DD&R will not be as effective.

- First, peacekeepers are not trained to work effectively with developmental agencies.

- Second, the society against whom the former combatant has fought may not be willing to receive him after the conflict has stopped.

- Third, is the society into which we want to re-integrate the former combatant normal? They too have just come out of conflict and have suffered the associated trauma that accompanies conflict.

Unfortunately, there are no real solutions to these problems, but there are certain fundamental needs that might set the conditions for these solutions to be realized. We, as an international community, need to have an understanding of commitment that creates comprehensive systems of addressing conflict. If the international community plays the role that we are capable of playing, we have fulfilled the duty we have as members of the international community to our less fortunate neighbors.
South Africa has experienced some of the positive results of a DD&R program but has not fully realized the desired "end state" of disarmament and re-integration of the combatants. Despite all of the advances that have been made in South Africa there are still weapon caches being found and instances where former combatants remain isolated.

Colonel Dempsey

As the former defense attaché in Liberia and Sierra Leone for the past year, there are several thoughts that are cogent to this discussion. In both these countries the disarmament process had two components: security and the actual disarming of soldiers. The latter activity was straightforward as a peace operation for which many armies around the world have varying degrees of doctrinal guidance.

Providing a secure environment is an entirely different proposition. Where all the combatants are willing to do so, the security is more a policing mission than a combat operation. Where there has to be an enforced disarmament, the security requirements become a warfighting task. This was especially true in Liberia and certainly is today in Sierra Leone. There are fundamental differences between these two activities.

There are certain peacekeeping tasks that become dysfunctional in a war-fighting scenario. In peace operations, some of the principles have been discussed, such as impartiality and neutrality. In war fighting, these principles are irrelevant. Troops confronted with the need to use deadly force in order to impose their will tend to be not very effective. Classic peacekeeping doctrine, that calls for the appointment of a peacekeeping task force commander who is a different nationality from his troops, fosters the perception that the commander serves the interests of the UN and the peace process and has genuine benefits in that it enhances the sense of impartiality and trust required for success in a peace operation. In war, this concept is an unmitigated disaster. War fighting organizations must have national contingents with clear national chains of command with clear mandates from the national government to use all resources at their disposal to accomplish the mission set before the unit.

The security aspects of disarmament may require two separate and distinct forces. This was the case in Liberia and is now the case in Sierra Leone. In both cases, there was a force to conduct the actual disarmament and another to provide security for the disarmament itself. The overall problem in Sierra Leone may be that the UN peacekeeping force was asked to conduct war-fighting operations, which these forces are fundamentally incapable of doing. DD&R processes by themselves will not bring about conflict resolution, but, if the former combatants are not successfully disarmed, de-mobilized and re-integrated, there will never be success in the overall peace operation.

The biggest failure, as demonstrated in both Liberia and Sierra Leone, has been making the transition from a disarmament process to the demobilization and re-integration process. There are several factors that contributed to this failure:

- First was the tendency for planners to grossly under-resource the demobilization and re-integration portions of the process. The cost of these latter portions were grossly under
budgeted mainly because anticipated donors, NGOs and other players involved did not make the contributions they pledged to make. An example is Sierra Leone. The DD&R plan for this nation was worth roughly $50 million of which only 2% was designated for training and education. These two aspects are arguably the heart of the demobilization and re-integration effort.

- There is tendency to lose focus and abandon active support for DD&R once the actual conflict is terminated. Once disarmament is perceived to be complete, there is a tendency to declare the matter settled. After disarmament is successful there is a hemorrhage of resources and, more importantly, a hemorrhaging of political will. This is a doctrinal problem in part because the focus is on conflict termination and not conflict resolution.

- Most individuals involved in DD&R fall into three categories: security, economic development and humanitarian assistance. There are barriers between these three categories, particularly between humanitarian assistance and economic development agencies, demonstrated in Liberia and Sierra Leone. There are different agendas competing, sometimes between conflicting interests and sometimes between agencies of the same government. If there is no lead agency to coordinate the myriad of activities and focus, the success of all other agencies will be hampered if not stifled. If there is no one group or agency in charge with tasking authority, a large group of equal players must reach a consensus in an environment of competing or conflicting agendas. This is a doctrinal problem.

There was an antipathy among the humanitarian assistance and economic development agencies to have anything to do with the combatants. It is very difficult to develop a functional DD&R process when many of the critical players resist being involved in the process. A related problem is the insistence that the combatants do not receive any special privileges, that they are not treated differently from the civilians. This is actually an excuse not to participate in the DD&R process, since they argue that resources are short and cannot ostensibly accommodate the needs of the civilians and the combatants.


**Discussion, Comments, Questions**

**Dr. Skocz:** There are two problems regarding DD&R that were not discussed, both technical. The first deals with counting; the other deals with the porosity of borders; and the problems are related. In discussion, generally about Liberia, and, specifically, about building peace in Liberia after the UN mission ended and how the US could contribute to that effort, the subject of weapons collection was addressed. The estimate of weapons to be collected was over 60,000. The UN, before they left, had collected between 30,000 and 40,000 weapons, which led some to question exactly how many weapons there were in the first place. What is the measure of success, and how do we know that we have gotten most of the weapons? The other aspect is looking at the security arrangements Liberia would have after the UN mission left. The obvious answer is the country has its own security system. If there was no security provided or if the arrangements caused a feeling of insecurity on the part of the dozen or so factions that were the belligerents in the conflict, what would prevent them from breaking into the caches that they obviously had? There's a bigger issue concerning the weapons trafficking from outside Liberia. Perhaps, in addition to the letter DDRR, there should be something that addresses weapons trafficking and the access to weapons from the outside. While these issues are technical in nature, they are part of the larger political issue having to do with the sense of security and the security arrangements that promote this sense.

**Col. Dempsey:** Disarmament was the end of the DD&R process in Liberia. There was no demobilization and no re-integration. There were several thousand former combatants on the streets of Monrovia. How can these former combatants be kept from rearming when all the promises that were made in DD&R are not forthcoming? ECOWAS explored the trafficking problem with the ECOWAS moratorium on the importation of small arms that addresses the issue by essentially closing the borders. In terms of methods or measures of effectiveness in weapons collection during the disarmament phase, the rule of thumb in Liberia was if no weapons were visible on the street, then there was success. The real results of the disarmament were that it was generally successful based on observation and discussion with people more familiar with the overall situation there. There are two reasons for this assessment. First, there was never anywhere close to the number of arms most people thought were in Liberia. Second, ECOMOG was very aggressive in cordon and search operations looking for weapons caches. Despite the general success of disarmament, it did not prevent the conflict from re-igniting later.

**Lt. Col. Bello:** It took a very long time to destroy all of the weapons that had been collected in Liberia. In fact, the ECOMOG headquarters moved out of Liberia to Freetown, Sierra Leone, leaving a handful of troops to guard the weapons. Liberian soldiers trying to rearm themselves constantly harassed these troops. The point is that once the weapons are collected they should be destroyed immediately.

**Col. Oliver:** To add the rest of the story regarding the Liberian weapons, there were about 20,000 weapons stored in various containers, which Charles Taylor wanted back to rearm his soldiers. When asked how to destroy these weapons expeditiously, the answer was to dump them into the ocean. That was not politically unacceptable and was not done. Instead, these weapons were blown up with explosives in the town square, which, in reality, was not effective but satisfied the need for a symbolic political gesture.
**Ambassador Smith:** In response to Ambassador Mason's remarks concerning the guidelines she has developed, there has to be a priority assigned to the component parts of the process based on the situation. In some cases, disarmament may be the priority, in other cases, demobilization may be. This is especially true given the characteristically limited resources granted these operations. Secondly, regarding who is in charge, the aspect of getting approval through consensus, while repugnant to the military, is always a problem. There will be no direction, but there needs to be leadership, and that must come from the SRSG or the equivalent. The SRSG must not only be prepared to provide this leadership, but must have the staff assisting him to do it. The UN has not done a good job with this.

**Col. Dempsey:** The SRSG is not in charge of anything, including the UN agencies that are involved in the operation. The SRSG does exercise the kind of authority, even over UN activities, that the US Ambassador has over US activities. Some one has to be in charge, but not the SRSG. In fact, it is very questionable that the UN can provide the kind of leadership that is necessary for success and to overcome the lack of leadership that now is pervasive in these operations. The question is, if not the UN, then who would lead?

**Mr. Mngqibisa:** The point is well taken, but, over the life of the mission, there may be the development of a center for, or at least a mechanism for, the overall coordination of activities in an operation. The CMOC might be an example of these coordination mechanisms. This does not address the concept of leadership, but does provide a way to sort out and coordinate the many activities involved in an operation of this kind.

**Ambassador McCallie.** The ambassadors of the component countries involved would want to meet with the SRSG and vest in him as much authority as would be possible, then cooperatively work together to solve the leadership issue. In addition, this group would be inclined to work together with the general in charge of the peacekeeping force to develop a consensual arrangement, which is beneficial to all of the parties concerned.
DAY 3 - PANEL DISCUSSIONS
Public Security Doctrine

Mr. Halvor Hartz, Chief, UNCIVPOL Unit, UNDPKO

This presentation is an update on the status of CIVPOL within UNDPKO and to address doctrines that guide CIVPOL operations.

There are three major operations: Bosnia (operational strength about 2,000 +); Kosovo is currently the largest and the largest CIVPOL operation in history, authorized 4,718; and Cyprus with a strength of 35. There are other more recent operations such as East Timor, Central Africa, Sierra Leone and Haiti. In terms of authorized strength CIVPOL is authorized 8,684. Currently, actual strength is 6,624 for a shortfall of 2,060. Over the past two years the need for civilian police has grown as has the actual strength, but there is still a shortfall.

The CIVPOL Unit in DPKO has 11 personnel assigned and has the mission of advising the Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations on police matters. Additional tasks include advising the police commissioners for on-going field missions and generating police officers to fill the needs required by the Security Council.

UNCIVPOL is very active in assisting contributing member states with selection and training of police officers for assignment to field missions. We establish selection and evaluation teams to conduct this assistance. Our intent is to ensure that police officers sent to peace missions are quality individuals and understand the larger context of a peace mission.

Regarding doctrine, civilian police have been part of peace operations since the beginning of the last decade. They were deployed in the Congo and in Cyprus, both of which are fairly static operations. The doctrine that guides the civilian police contingents today has evolved over this past decade building on lessons learned from the many missions that have occurred during this period of time. As recently as 1994, there was no doctrine to address exactly what civilian police would be doing in a peace operation. Some were simply told to go and monitor the situation, with no further guidance, not even a definition of what monitoring might be.

What has evolved over the ensuing years is a fundamental principal that police generally are the number one provider, and securer, of human rights. In contrast, the police can also be the first violator of human rights.

The doctrine governing recruiting procedures, as well as the composition of field missions, has remained the same since the earliest involvement of CIVPOL in peace operations, when the police in those missions had no executive authority. Because of this antiquated doctrine it has been difficult for CIVPOL to adapt to the ever-changing and challenging environment that has evolved as peace operations have become more complex.

Some of the characteristics of UNCIVPOL are:

- Multinational.
- Are grouped in units that are mixed.
- Have an independent chain of command.

When certain member states deploy military components, a civilian police contingent deploys "inside" that component's area of responsibility and is dedicated to supporting that component. Sweden is one of the member states that routinely deploys civilian police with their peacekeeping contingents. UNCIVPOL is organized much differently.

UNCIVPOL is recruited individually from the Member States. They are formally contracted to the CIVPOL Unit of DPKO for specified lengths of time. They are designated as "expert of mission", which is one of many categories of personnel working with the UN. "Expert of mission" personnel are seconded to the UN by a Member State for a specific period of time. The Member State pays the seconded expert of mission while they are working with the UN. The UN provides working space, a vehicle, means of communication, and they are provided with a substantial allowance to accommodate themselves in the country or area of deployment. There is minimal logistical support for CIVPOL. They are deployed alongside the local police with which they work. The CIVPOL personnel must find their own living accommodations; usually they rent a house in the village or town in the area of operations to which they are assigned. This serves to put the CIVPOL operatives in close contact with the local population that they are asked to help police.

The CIVPOL station more often than not is co-located with the local police station. If there are 24 officers assigned to the station, there may be 24 nations represented. Since there is no formal command or rank structure, the possibility exists that a Canadian RCMP corporal may have charge over a Norwegian police commissioner. Who has been in the mission the longest determines who is in charge of that particular station.

Within the UN mission, however, there is a police commissioner designated who has command over all of the police assigned to that mission. This force forms the police component of the UN mission in a specific region or country. The commissioner then reports to the UN SRSG. The police component interacts with many of the other components within the mission, but has only a single chain of command.

Traditionally, the concept of how the police component operates in a mission is captured by the acronym SMART:
- Supports human rights,
- Monitor the local police operations (but in this concept CIVPOL had no executive authority),
- Advising the local police on effective law enforcement,
- Report findings and observations to the SRSG and the Security Council, and
- Train local police to be more effective.

Any information that is reported to the SRSG is also reported to the local authorities, particularly in the area of human rights. Also reported is the performance of the local police. Over time CIVPOL has built on the basic SMART concept as the conduct of peace operation has evolved. One of the considerations added to the SMART lexicon is the consideration of the
environment in which the police are operating. The local police cannot function in a vacuum. There must be mechanisms in place that facilitate and overwatch their actions and activities. These mechanisms include:

- an effective judicial system

- an internal investigative element within the police establishment itself

- a free and independent media - electronic, print and visual.

In the absence of these mechanisms, the international community is there with the CIVPOL component to fulfill, at least in part, the assessment and evaluative role.

The legal basis for launching a peace operation is a Security Council resolution. When measuring the performance of the local police, this measurement is not taken against the local laws. This is a matter of debate between not only the belligerents, but between international lawyers. This places the CIVPOL in a situation where they have only the standards that have been developed by the UN over the past few years. These standards are very detailed and are the product of little known international treaties, conventions and agreements that have been written to govern police activities on an international scale. These standards address several aspects of policing such as the use of force and firearms, rights of the victim and rights of detained persons. Thus there are very fundamental, although very detailed, measures of effectiveness embedded in these treaties and conventions that allow CIVPOL to evaluate the effectiveness of the local police force. These fundamental measures have been encapsulated in a handbook that is issued to all of the CIVPOL members allowing easy evaluation and facilitating training.

Over the past few years the SMART concept has given way to other concepts that reflect the evolution of peace operations in recent years, particularly after the bombing campaign forced a cease-fire in Kosovo. These concepts were slow in developing since the original cease-fire agreement called for the police effort to be driven by the OSCE/EU/UN with none of the three taking direct responsibility for this effort. Another driving force behind the development of these new concepts was the complete withdrawal of the police from Kosovo, which left a vacuum for law enforcement. Initially, the UN mandate was used as the model for re-implementing law enforcement in Kosovo. The mandate took a phased approach to the problem. For a short period, until a sufficient number of international police forces could be raised, the mandate called for the military to conduct law enforcement operations. Later, as the numbers of CIVPOL could be deployed, this became the responsibility of UN CIVPOL.

During this period concepts had to be developed from scratch, since no one had done any conceptual thinking in terms of policing under the conditions found in Kosovo at the time of the cease-fire. Essentially, this included the entire law enforcement establishment including all of the components normally found in a police department anywhere in the world - canine units, anti-riot units, marine units and others. Most of this was done in a piecemeal way since there had been no comprehensive planning done to evaluate the needs of police in Kosovo. Making the problem worse is the less than effective procurement process under which the UN currently operates. Military units have their own logistics and have equipment already available when
they deploy, but CIVPOL must rely on member states, or on the UN procurement process, to equip themselves.

The people in Kosovo, and elsewhere, depended on the police to solve problems instantly, and they expected the same from the CIVPOL. But, the CIVPOL sent to these areas in particular were unable to even stop crime let alone help the local people restore stability to their communities. The press and the people all saw that CIVPOL was not being effective. There was a vacuum that had not been planned for, and the results were predictable; the CIVPOL were not able to do what they were sent to do since they were under-resourced and without authority to do so.

What can be done to improve the situation in Kosovo? First, the military component must understand that, as the first into a situation like the one in Kosovo, they will be the police, the prosecutor and all elements of the judiciary. Since the UNCIVPOL cannot deploy as rapidly as the military, there may be a need for a military constabulary that would relieve the need for infantrymen to conduct law and order and that would be able to begin law enforcement immediately without waiting for CIVPOL to deploy. Second, there have been lessons learned from the IFOR experience in Bosnia that were applied to the deployment to Kosovo, most notably KFOR did deploy with a specialized unit for policing as an integral part of KFOR. Unless this practice of including a policing unit with the initial force continues, the UN will continue to be slow in getting CIVPOL into the area of operations; and, thus, the military will continue to be the initial police force. Third, the process of selecting and training local police can be streamlined. Local police are always better to use to police their own communities.

Questions and Answers

1. What has been presented has doctrinal implications for both the police and the military. Who should be pioneering the work on addressing the security gap? Do you think that they will address these doctrinal deficits in sufficient detail, or should there be a parallel task group doing some extremely heavy thinking about this?

The existing panel, created by the Secretary General to address the problems with CIVPOL, has a wide mandate on how to change the doctrine on the use of CIVPOL. There are very senior UN experienced people on this panel. There probably won't be a single doctrine accepted by all, but compromises are possible. As a minimum, there should be a common framework under which all parties can operate.

2. In peace operations, what is the basis of the law that is to be enforced; in Kosovo it was Yugoslav law, in East Timor there was no law. How does CIVPOL deal with these situations when the law is either unsupportable or undefined?

This is a very important issue, and one that was not addressed. Where there is no functioning court, there can be no functional law. The police can enforce whatever standard was enforced previously, but if there is no court to decide guilt or innocence based on the evidence collected by the police and no correctional system to punish those found guilty, then there is no judicial
system at all. The result is that people are arrested and are detained for a time, but eventually they must be released. This continues to be an extremely difficult issue.

3. What is the relationship between CIVPOL and the military after CIVPOL has deployed and is in place first in the traditional CIVPOL authority and then in the, more recent, executive authority CIVPOL?

The relationship in the traditional sense has been very good mainly because CIVPOL and the military both wear uniforms, are similarly organized and embrace a similar system of values. In past missions, the cooperative spirit has been great between these components, and they have operated in the same areas and used the same facilities. Despite two separate and distinct chains of command, the cooperation at all levels was very good. In recent missions the initial effort was not as cooperative, but, as the mission evolved, this doctrinal cooperation was enhanced and strengthened.

4. Have there been problems with the command structure within the station houses? It was mentioned that in some cases corporals had charge over commissioners of police. This has caused problems in the past in other areas and missions.

There is a worldwide understanding of military rank. Certain individuals holding a specific rank are expected to have a specific span of control and are subordinate to persons of higher rank. The police are not the same in this regard. The span of control and responsibility for individuals holding a certain rank within various police organizations differs greatly from country to country. Thus, a corporal in the RCMP may be responsible for 100 police officers based on his years of experience, etc. Likewise, the police commissioner from Norway may have only 20 officers under his control. Because of these wide variances, it is difficult to determine who should be in charge.

5. Regarding the deployment of police without attention to the broader legal framework, there are two questions. Is this within the purview of the panel having been empanelled by the Secretary General to study doctrinal employment of CIVPOL? Are they studying this aspect as well as others? It seems that in other areas progress has been made, such as in DD&R where initially only one aspect of the problem was being studied. Secondly, do you see the Security Council making progress in recognizing this broader legal framework?

Prior to the deployment to Kosovo these questions were addressed. However, this is a most difficult question to address since there are so many pieces to it that are resident in the sovereignty of the country to which CIVPOL is deployed. It is very difficult to reconstruct institutions like the judicial system taking all of the culture and history upon which this institution was founded into account. Hence, while it is considered, there are no answers or solutions at this time to fully address it.

6. Since CIVPOL are not usually armed, is it understood that the military responds to situations requiring more force, or is the incident usually just reported to the SRSG? Does the CIVPOL have some authority or power to enforce laws and maintain order? This question refers to the issue of executive and non-executive and makes a distinction between the two. It is a weakness
that we are unable to respond to incidents like other civilian police around the world. In policing, techniques and span of power are very different from country to country. Hence, there is not a standard method of operation for police forces as there is for military forces. There do not seem to be any alternatives, except to get better at doing what CIVPOL is mandated to do from situation to situation.
Panel Discussion - Public Security Doctrine. Commissioner Sten Heckscher, Swedish National Police Board; Major Cesar Zorzenon, Chief of the Argentine Gendarmeria Training Center; Colonel Vincenzo Coppola, Commander Multinational Specialized Unit; Mr. Richard Mayer, Kosovo Desk Officer, ICITAP

Commissioner Heckscher

Despite the lessons learned from other missions, there is still a need for additional guidelines for police involved in peace operations. There is also a need for better plans and more coordination between the military and the CIVPOL, specifically between SFOR and IPTF. Between the CIVPOL and the military is the MSU, which is a military police unit with executive or constabulary functions whose task is to contribute to the maintenance of stability and security.

There is a lack of quantity of available trained police officers worldwide, since most are fully engaged in policing the cities and towns of their own nations. There is also a lack of quality, which is illustrated very graphically in multinational operations. How a police officer is trained in Africa is not the same as how an officer is trained in Europe or the US. Values and temperaments are very different in officers from Europe and the US and policemen in Kosovo.

In response to these problems, the EU has become more active in preparing for crisis management and specifically for training civilian police. A separate unit at the policy department of the EU has been established to address this issue. Active members of the Union are pushing other non-active members to become involved in this effort as well. There are no guarantees that the goals of operation will be reached. Quality can be enhanced and increased by enhanced training of national police officers to participate in multinational operations.

(Enclose chart here) A chart has been developed to show how police become more and more involved in a peace operation as the situation evolves; this represents a holistic approach to civilian police involvement in peace operations. Part of the function of CIVPOL is to re-build and then strengthen the judicial system in a given country. As the situation in that country moderates, CIVPOL takes an increasingly active role in not only policing but in building the judicial institution. This chart also shows that once military forces go into a country or region, this is the first step in a process that will eventually have to include civilian police.

Colonel Coppola

The area around Kosovo, and Kosovo itself, is an area where crime is endemic. For any force to deploy to an area like this without any thought of the presence or effectiveness of a judicial system, either national or international, is a mistake. The presence of organized crime and the diverse and volatile ethnic makeup of this region lead to frequent confrontations between peacekeepers and criminals. Albanian organized crime is extremely violent and causes problems for the international community. In fact, the real danger is that they do not accept the international community's intervention to stop the violence. The crime organizations have ties to similar organizations in other adjacent countries. They have money and are very powerful. Kosovo is a perfect environment for these crime organizations, since there is no banking system
making it is easy to launder money through Kosovo. Thus money coming in can be used to buy weapons and other illegal materials in Kosovo.

The crime organizations are clan or family based and, thus, very difficult to investigate. It requires an extremely well trained police force to effectively combat this well-connected and powerful organization.

There is no clear understanding of the relationship that should exist between military and UN police forces. The police want to be actors and present when there are problems within the area of deployment, but they are not ready to assume responsibilities in the security arena.

The small judicial establishment is mostly unskilled Albanian judges who are partial to their own people and rely heavily upon the police in making judgements. Additionally, there are no jails. Ninety-nine percent of those arrested for any crime are normally released within a very short period of time. This impacts on the credibility of the police and of the entire judicial system.

NATO doctrine developed after the security gap, caused by the slower deployment of police forces to a crisis, was identified after the initial stages of the operation in Bosnia. The solution was to create a police force within the NATO force as soon as the military forces deploy into Kosovo to begin collecting information and to start coping with the crime situation. Once the MSU was deployed into Kosovo, criminal information started being collected using the national assets of Italy and other NATO countries. Military police doctrine is being worked to cope with this problem as well, but, for now, the best solution is the MSU that was deployed with the NATO forces early on. In the end, with enough support, this system will work and be effective in re-building confidence in the judicial system. It is too early in the operation in Kosovo to tell if the unit and this doctrine will lead to success.

Major Zorzenon

Over the past five years, there has been a dramatic change in the command structure that has been applied to civilian police organizations supporting peace operations around the world. In the past, the commander of the police unit was a subordinate of the military commander in the area of operations; this being the case in Cyprus, Congo and Guinea. In 1999, in the mission in Namibia, the position of police commissioner was created. It was at this time that the separate chain of command for the police forces was created reporting to the SRSG or HOM. This gave the police commissioner the same authority as a military commander and not a subordinate.

The police forces have two functions in a peace operation: first, as international police officers in charge of monitoring the local police and ensuring that they are operating according to international rules against human rights violations; and second, where there is no local police force, as law enforcement. It is the latter area in which there are the most problems.

Mr. Mayer
In Kosovo, the International Criminal Investigative Training Program (ICITP) is working with OSCE to develop and train a four thousand-member multiethnic police organization called the Kosovo Police Service. This is not a police force, but a police service, and this is an important distinction. This organization is designed to provide police and community service to the citizens of Kosovo. The intent is to get this organization running by February 2001. They are being trained at the Kosovo Police School 20 KM NW of Pristina. OCSE has funded the refurbishment of the police school, and it is now operational.

There are 211 international instructors led by the US and OSCE. The course includes eight weeks of training in basic police skills. Those being trained are being selected for attendance. The selection process includes an oral interview, a written examination, a psychological and medical exam, a physical agility test and, to the extent possible, a background investigation. After the eight weeks of basic training, the candidates are sent to the UN police for eighteen weeks of field training. The school also trains the UN field-training officers so there is linkage between the classroom training and the field training portions of this course. So far, there has been limited success after training 583 police officer with another 507 more in the process. The plan is to induct and train 350 every four weeks to reach 4,000 by February 2001.

Of 1,090 officers already trained or in the process of being trained, 72 are Serbs, 41% are former KLA, 26% are former police officers and 33% are civilians. Seventeen percent are women, who are an important aspect of the program, since there has been a very beneficial effect caused by the presence of so many women in the program? Twenty-seven percent of the trainees have university degrees. As the process continues to evolve, programs in management and supervision will be added so that a supervisory pyramid can be built. In addition, there are plans to add courses in criminal investigation and forensics, crowd control, civil disorder management and other specialized police training. The end state is a police-training program that is robust enough to stand on its own.

The faster this program is built the faster this organization can help to re-build the judicial institution, and the faster the military may be able to disengage from Kosovo. From this process there are indications that bonds are beginning to form within this police organization between Albanian and Serbs alike. These indicators are on a very small almost individual scale but, nevertheless, are apparent and appear to be growing as the bond of police work seems to be overcoming the ethnic divides.

The impact of civilian police goes far beyond the aspect of law enforcement. The entire scope of criminal justice and the support of criminal justice systems are affected by the status of the local police. The UN should have an office that examines criminal justice programs not just police programs. There should be a structure that examines the entire system, not just the police.

There seems to be a lack of understanding on the part of the UN and others. People do not understand what police do and what their limitations are. The model that is being built in the training program in Kosovo is a police officer that is a problem solver, a community builder and a protector of human rights. There is a tendency to look at a policeman as a policeman regardless of where the observation is made. There is as little resemblance between police officers in different countries as there could possibly be. Internationally, the range of skills and
talents varies tremendously. Monitoring is very easy and leaves some room for error. But, when these officers are asked to conduct executive level law enforcement (powers of arrest, detention, use of force) where there is little room for error, this is where the wide differences become apparent.
Discussion, Questions, Comments

Mr. Lord: It is dogma in the US that the UN cannot do protectorates. However, in Kosovo, it seems that the protectorate mission, although not recognized as such internationally, seems to be successful. If this was recognized as a transitional protectorate then there could be a transitional legal code and a transitional judiciary and a police force. Because this is not a recognized protectorate, the situation is such that there is a system being administered that effectively does not exist.

Mr. Mayer: This comment goes far beyond the issue of civilian law enforcement and calls for policy decisions that go beyond the scope of this panel.

Col. Coppola: Up to the first quarter of this year no decision had been made concerning the type of penal code which would be put in place in Kosovo. For the past eight months we have been discussing this issue. Meanwhile, the policeman and the soldier on the street, as well as the UN appointed judge, has to rely on "natural law", e.g., a murder is a murder, and a theft is a theft, to provide a basis for his actions. But there was no real legitimate legal basis for these actions. This is the major problem, the discussion has to end, and some sort of legal code must be put in place. This underscores the need to understand the situation in any country before a peace operation is launched. If this analysis had been done prior to the war in Kosovo or just after the war ended, there would have been a code in place, and the situation would have been much more stable.

Mr. Morrison: A great deal of time has been devoted to documenting lessons learned from previous missions. Despite all this documentation, we have a tendency to continue to run off and get involved in missions without consulting all of the knowledge contained in this documentation. When the mission in East Timor was established was there any consultation and cooperation between Kosovo and East Timor; if so, to what extent? If not, why not? Is there any way that we can ensure that such cooperation and consultation occur for the next mission so we can build on the police work that has been done in the past?

There has been some review of lessons learned but not to the extent that has been suggested by this question. When we worked with OSCE in developing the police school in Kosovo, we used the lessons from Haiti where we did not plan for managerial and supervisory courses to follow on the basic courses established to start the program. Thus, we did plan for these courses in Kosovo. However, the communications between missions suggested by the question should occur within the UN, since they are involved in both areas, and should be the lessons learned archive. That said, any program started in East Timor would have the benefit of the lessons learned in Kosovo, but only from the point of view of the individuals who have been involved in both. We do not necessarily have access to all of the lessons learned in this regard from Kosovo.

Mr. Hartz: I agree with the assessment by Mr. Mayer. The only commonality is that the same desk officers with the CIVPOL unit dealt with both East Timor and Kosovo. There was no direct communication between those conducting operations in East Timor and those conducting similar operations in Kosovo. Lessons learned were passed on to the extent that they could be through this conduit. An example of this included modification of standard operating procedures where
the title of the mission was changed and everything else remained the same. Despite the availability of lessons learned, reviewing them is not the first task accomplished to prepare for the new mission. We were able to provide some advice to those in the mission in the sense that it will take time to develop the basically trained police in enough numbers to provide basic security. After about 2-3 years, then the managerial courses can be introduced and additional specialized courses developed to provide the supporting structure to form an effective police organization. Concepts that were developed for the police school in Kosovo were sent to the mission in East Timor for their use as they developed a similar facility in that area. We wanted to send instructors from the police school in Kosovo to East Timor, but, since they were working for OSCE, that became politically difficult and was not done. Our intent is to take the lessons learned and formulate a generic standard for future missions to use to get started with developing police training facilities.

**MG Neretnieks:** In terms of military operations, the tendency is to regionalize the operations such as ECOMOG and NATO leading peace operations of various types in their regions of the world. In this way the lead nation or lead regional organization has the responsibility for the mission and for success. Can the same tendency be applied to police operations, or are there separate lines of development occurring with the police? For example, what is the EU doing to assist in this effort?

**Commissioner Heckscher:** The EU is becoming aware that this issue must be approached in a much more ambitious way than ever before. Much has been mentioned that is very important. An example is that monitoring is very easy and can have a margin of error. Executive law enforcement is much more difficult and has a much smaller margin of error; thus, it requires much more planning and a much more effectively trained force. Action and reaction by members of a multinational police force must be known and a confidence built to be effective. In executive law enforcement this becomes very difficult since most police officers are very particular as to who rides with them on patrol. The EU is trying to develop the entire justice system, to include the police and the judiciary. The entire basis for any justice system is a legal infrastructure and an understanding of who owns the land. Armed troops are universal; justice systems are not. Each country has its own cultural and sociological basis for their justice system, and they are all different.

**Mr. Hartz:** The UN is encouraging participation by regional organizations under the auspices of Chapter VIII of the charter. This has been done in Europe with the police as evidenced by the hand over of police functions in Eastern Slavonia from the UN to the OSCE. We are conceptualizing an exit strategy in Bosnia that could be similar to the hand over in Eastern Slavonia. There have been several coordination meetings with the UN, OSCE, EU and WEU concerning information sharing while these organizations are building data banks concerning police resources. The UN becomes the arbiter among these groups in issues of international interest and, specifically, in the allocation of resources.

**Mr. Mayer:** There are not enough police resources to fulfill all of the needs at this point from any source either regional or international. When considering the needs of all the missions that are on-going and what is potentially on the horizon, the question becomes where will the required police officers come from? Countries are taking steps to contribute more, but there are
still only a finite number from which to draw. These police officers are members of functioning police organizations in their own countries. They form the pool of resources from which to draw. There are no trained reserves to augment existing police forces.

**Ambassador Mason:** The discussion regarding the volumes of lessons learned that have value but little utility eloquently made the case for doctrine in this area. Something that is in a useable form and accessible by all police agencies and organizations that outlines how police training and operations can be done. The other point concerns the UN protectorate. The concept is there and has been used in various locations. The UN transitional authority can provide the legal framework for the rebuilding of the internal judiciary and the criminal justice system. There are numerous examples of this authority functioning; one of these is in Cambodia where the transitional authority outlawed the possession of guns. Would this transitional authority provide a better opportunity to address the problems on the ground where there is no law or the legal system is completely ineffective?

**Mr. Mayer:** The transitional authority has worked in Eastern Slavonia under the leadership of Jacques Klein, but whether it would work in Kosovo is arguable and better left up to others to decide.

**Major Zorzenon:** The situation in Eastern Slavonia is indeed a success. It illustrates the need for the transitional authority to have complete power over the entire society. The authority to make and enforce laws must be absolute in order to establish the rule of law.

**Mr. Hartz:** In Kosovo there is room for great pessimism and for great optimism. The initial focus of the CIVPOL units was recruiting police officers. The feeling was that as soon as we reach the requisite number of police officers the problems are solved. Now the focus has changed. People are realizing that more police is not the solution to the problem. Even with the introduction of additional troops into the KFOR, the problem still was not solved. What is lacking in Kosovo is an agreed upon end state. One party to the conflict is pleased that Kosovo was declared part of Yugoslavia. If this is indeed the case, there should be no question as to which legal system should be in place and enforced. The other, majority, party is not pleased because they want a free and independent Kosovo with its own legal system. Between these two parties there is an international force that will continue to experience significant challenges. The only thing that can be done is to separate the parties and allow them space to resolve their problems and even suggest some ways to do that. This is not unlike a domestic disturbance for a police officer. The best that can be done is to create an atmosphere where more rational thought can be used and solutions can be developed. The parties want CIVPOL to take ownership of the problem, but clearly we cannot. The attitude should be leave the parties the ownership of the problem and facilitate the solution.

The military has a judicial component that can function as an interim judiciary in areas where there is none or in areas where the judiciary is ineffective.

**Commissioner Heckscher:** Each situation is unique, and there are no common solutions. There has to be great care taken when depriving people of their problems because this only creates new problems. The military once it becomes entrenched in not only the security mechanism but in
providing a judicial element, that force must be prepared to remain a long time until an indigenous judiciary can be built. There is not one good solution, and, whatever the solution, it will take time to develop.
Training Doctrine

Ambassador George Ward, Director of Training, United States Institute for Peace (USIP)

USIP focuses on training practitioners in peace operations and complex humanitarian operations including diplomats, soldiers, members of NGOs and international organizations. USIP is expanding by direction of Congress.

There are five objectives to this presentation. These objectives are tied to the philosophy that conflict is a fluid cycle of events that ebb and flow with peaks and valleys, from harmony and peace to acts of extreme violence.

- The first of these objectives is that training is relevant to all phases of this cycle of conflict. Peace operations have a number of groups of people involved, and the number of groups becoming involved in these operations is accelerating.

- It is not merely government civilians and military personnel but NGO and IO that are playing an expanding role in these operations. Regional international organizations are increasing their role as well. These disparate groups must learn to work together in order for these operations to do what they are intended to do. Joint military-civilian training is therefore crucial to this effort.

- Sometimes training is just training, but, in some circumstances, training can be a management tool for conflict.
- It is extremely important, especially as the demands of peace operations accelerate and become more complex worldwide, that training of professionals become more attuned to new technologies, specifically computer based learning and distance learning techniques.

Conflict has a life cycle. Not all of these are the same, nor do conflicts play out uniformly. But, every conflict does have some sort of cycle, and it is important to know where a particular conflict is in terms of this cycle. At every stage there may be a different, yet applicable, training vehicle or technique that can be used to address that stage of the conflict. Michael Lund has written about this life cycle in a book published by USIP entitled Preventing Violent Conflict. This book talks about the life cycle of conflict and addresses training techniques that are applicable to the different stages of the cycle. Durable peace is at one end of this spectrum, while war is at the other. In between are stages that are common to, but not always applicable to, all conflicts. Unstable peace, for example, is thought of as a negative peace where, while hostilities may not have erupted, there is a situation where there are two parties that consider each other enemies, and the potential for violence is high. Stable peace is described in the book as a "cold" peace or an absence of violence with limited cooperation which is marred by distrust and suspicion among the rival parties.

At every level of the cycle there are relevant training activities that can take place. During periods of durable and stable peace, routine diplomacy is the most common action taken among nations to build or strengthen relations of one nation to another. During these periods, cross-cultural communications training should take place in order to understand each other better. Innovative approaches to training this level are numerous. One technique is use an actor or role player to act as a third world belligerent countering proposals the third world point of view. During periods of unstable peace, preventive diplomacy techniques are used. To support these techniques, negotiations training would enhance the diplomatic effort to moderate a potential conflict and ease tensions by addressing issues and finding compromises for these issues. The techniques learned through this training are applicable to the tactical level and to the NCO on the ground. In most battalions going to Kosovo, every officer has received some negotiations training and is using it daily. The point is that at every stage there are appropriate training activities that can enhance the value of activities at that stage.
Training is important to every stage of the peace operation. It is critical that civilian and military personnel train together whenever, and as often as, possible. During mission planning the participants need the following:

- They need to train in problem solving and analysis to understand the situation they are in, analyze it in a structured framework and begin to devise solutions.

- They need familiarization training with the organization they will be working for. Often civilian police have limited ideas about the organization for which they will work. They need to know how the organization works, its goals, the institutional culture, etc.

- Cultural and area awareness and familiarization training is essential for understanding the area in which the peace operation will be mounted. Distance learning can be very helpful in this area.

During the mission execution, continued team training is crucial to continued success, but too often is neglected. There are stories from a number of peace operations where the peacekeeping force headquarters had never trained together prior to their insertion into the operation. There should be some opportunity for a headquarters to train before deployment into a mission area. This is particularly crucial when the headquarters is multinational. Computer based training can be done at a distance but can be effective.

The mission completion phase is the time for an examination of lessons learned. It has been mentioned that lessons learned are often compiled and then never read. Through training programs these lessons can be captured and examined.

In thinking about the goals outlined above, there are four models for achieving these goals and maximizing training opportunities and effectiveness.

- Conflict management skills training. This is the most traditional training involving all practitioners regardless of rank or grade. This training is focused on endowing them concrete skills in areas such as negotiations, mediation and problem solving. It is the most fundamental, entry-level training required for anyone entering a mission area.
- Training for coordination is very important if the civil-military cooperative effort is to be effective. This training allows for realistic, interactive training that goes beyond talking about it and involves actually doing it in a simulated, yet realistic, environment.

- Training should not exclude members of the host society involved in a peace operation. In this way, the conflict can be better managed and problems can be solved before there is violence.

- Distance learning is definitely in our futures. It will never replace face-to-face training but it is a cost-effective method of sharing knowledge and assembling a common base of knowledge.

There are five fundamental areas that are the foundation for conflict management skills.

- Communications, cross cultural or same culture within the same operation, is essential. Active listening is a part of that as well.

- Problem analysis is facilitated most effectively by the selection of one or more models of analysis. There are many very effective ones available.

- There is a very keen focus on negotiation and third party skills. Conflict management is founded on the ability to negotiate compromises to complex situations. In addition, there are several subsets of third party skills. USIP recently published a book, entitled Herding Cats, that talks about how to mediate situations with the many mediators involved in a peace operation. It describes management tools that facilitate this process through the use of case studies.

- Consensus building is often the last piece of the complex puzzle that may permit the withdrawal of the military and the return of normalcy to a region or country.

Training in these areas is necessary for diplomats, military officers and NCOs, international police officers and everyone who participates in a peace operation.

Synthetic Environment for National Security Estimates (SENSE) training was created at the request of the SACEUR (General Clark). The focus of this training is the economic reconstruction and development.
of a nation after a conflict and subsequent peace operation. General Clark reasoned that these areas were the keys to the eventual completion of the Bosnian peace operation. The Institute of Defense Analysis (IDA) developed a computer model based on the Bosnian economy to study this problem. SENSE emerged from this idea and analysis. SENSE is the model that combined the IDA model with lectures and seminars on micro- and macroeconomics to teach Bosnian leaders how to manage the economy. USIP took the model one step further by factoring in unique Bosnian aspects, such as religion, crime and corruption and other factors, to determine how to manage and improve the economy in Bosnia so that the leaders can solve their economic problems. The result was a complex negotiation seminar that is an exciting way to train in that a result is seen immediately. This is an attempt to bring together representatives from all organizations and agencies that participate in peace operations to see how it all fits together. There is no "school solution" in that either the economy gets better or it crashes.

When is training not just training, but actually relevant to the solution of the conflict? Last September, a group of forty Kosovar leaders were flown to Lansdowne, Virginia to participate in a training conference aimed at consensus building. The leaders worked together to achieve some consensus among the Albanians as a preliminary to eventually bringing together Serb and Albanian leaders. The meeting was successful in that it resulted in a declaration that said all the right things about cooperation and openness to a multiethnic society. It was unsuccessful in that once these leaders returned to Kosovo, most of the agreements were never implemented. It did produce a "spirit of Lansdowne" that was espoused by some leaders. Later a similar meeting was held in Sofia, Hungary with Serbian leaders. The Army began to cultivate small groups of people who espoused the "spirit of Lansdowne". Near Camp Montieth in Kosovo, 2nd Battalion, 2nd Infantry was able to identify and assemble both Albanian and Serb leaders in a small group and to train them in conflict resolution techniques. They began to meet together on a regular basis and were able to negotiate a variety of local events and activities. The training was a prelude to the problem solving workshops which produced some remarkable results. Initially, it was difficult, but, after a time, they began to speak to each other in their own language. In the end, they agreed on some local cooperative initiatives. All of this, by contributing to a more stable and cooperative environment, will ultimately contribute to the peacekeeping effort there.
A recurrent difficulty that has been mentioned in peace operations is fielding qualified civilian experts in a timely manner. The OSCE has taken on the problem and created the REACT program to solve this problem. The Rapid Expert and Assistance Cooperation Teams (REACT) include fifty-five nations involved in the OSCE. The idea is to speed the deployment of experts, both military and civilian, individually to peace operations by pre-qualifying these experts. USIP was asked to develop a distance-learning program to assist in this effort. The intent is to establish an accessible core of knowledge that describes OSCE, its mission, its culture and the mission in which they might find themselves.

What does this all mean for doctrine?
Training has to be an integral part of peace and humanitarian operations, not just during the "run-up" before deployment, but during and after the operation and during periods of durable and stable peace. It must target everyone including leaders of civil society in the host nation. New technology should not be neglected. By using this technology, the cost of peace operations can be lowered, and the commitment of forces and resources lessened.

Questions and Answers
1. What are your views as to when training such as problem solving workshops should take place, before the conflict? During the height of the conflict?

If the problem-solving workshop is being used as defined in conflict resolution theory, then it is best used at the high end of the cycle of conflict. After all, these workshops, so defined, are negotiation exercises that are brainstorming sessions. This would equate to just before violence breaks out or just after the peacekeeping mission begins. However, there are other types of training activities that are relevant at other times and stages within the cycle.

2. One of the issues studied in a review of the SENSE project was that the socio-psychological aspects should be considered along with the economic dynamics. One of the other issues that came out of the review was that conflict was not the only cause of crisis. Is there a broader role for this model which might cover conflict and other causes of crisis?
We tend to neglect the economic dimension and other social and political phenomenon. SENSE is a way to bring these other phenomenon into the equation while considering the economic dimension and still keep in those aspects that we are always focusing on such as the political and some social aspects of the crisis or conflict.

3. Training is something that the military does well, and the military is trying to educate interagency players in the necessity of training for peace operations. Is USIP enjoying success because your organization is not political; is this the way we will have to go to be successful?

Training is part of the culture of the military, and it isn't with other organizations and agencies like the US State Department. It is a very cultural aspect of an organization and has its basis in the resources the individual agency or organization has to commit to training. In some cases these resources are sparse. USIP is trying to identify existing audiences and tailor the course to them.

4. There has been much said about the many actors that are involved in peace operations and about how they all need to train together. At what stage in the pre-deployment training, for example, do these actors become known? By the time the actors have been identified, it may be too late for pre-deployment training.

The REACT program is designed to get at this problem in a cost effective way. USIP has been asked to train 1,000 people per year, and, if you consider all fifty-five nations of OSCE, this becomes a large number of trained personnel that can be called rapidly to deploy. Using the Internet, many of these can be reached, and the system gives them a common basis for understanding and limits the time it takes to train these people up for a particular mission.
Panel Discussion - Training Doctrine. Colonel George Oliver, US Army Peacekeeping Institute; Mr. Alex Morrison, President, Pearson Peacekeeping Center; Colonel Fernando Isturiz, International Peace Academy Training Program; Mr. Tony Anderson, Training Consultant

Colonel Oliver

While the primary focus of the US military is to fight and win the nation's wars, it is also our mission to carry out our national policies and deter war as in the Cold War. The Army's focus on training is multitiered.

The first tier is the Army education system that is the bedrock upon which the training system is based. The other services have a similar training scheme. This system extends to the officer and non-commissioned officer corps as well as to basic trainees. It is an education and training system. The more senior the individual, the greater the chance of exposure to peace operations. Although, exposure to peace operations at any level is not voluminous and focuses on the primary mission of the Army. That said, there is an increasing amount of emphasis being placed on peace operations. The most training in peace operations that takes place for officers is at the War College where the importance of the interagency is stressed and emphasized as the conduit for actions by the US on a global scale. Presidential Decision Directive 56 signed in 1997 mandated programs for interagency training.

Throughout the training process as we prepare for peace operations, we subscribe to a concept known as "just in time training". As a unit is identified, the training focus changes. The fighting skills that are taught for the primary mission are, in many cases, applicable to peace operations. Rules of engagement are obviously stricter, but, by and large, these skills correlate to skills taught to fight wars. "Just in time training" is an intensified program that focuses on the region and includes cultural awareness and negotiations training. The last phase of this intensified program is the Mission Readiness Exercise or MRE usually conducted at the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana. These exercises cover most possible scenarios the soldiers will see on the battlefield including working with NGOs and other civilian governmental agencies. This exercise is comprehensive and as realistic as is possible.

Throughout the training process several things happen that help units and individuals prepare for peace operations and warfighting, if necessary. One of these is the development of an After Action Review or AAR. This is a key part of an operation or mission to which units are sent to participate. These AARs are often negatively focused stressing the mistakes made and the lessons learned from those mistakes. The other step in the process is to capture lessons learned not captured by the AAR process. The focus is more broad based and lends itself to information all Army units can use. From these lessons learned we are able to evaluate the doctrine we have and develop new doctrine to incorporate the lessons these AARs have revealed.

International training is also included in the US training lexicon. An example of this type of training is the US assistance to African nations in partnership with other European allies in the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI). US Army Special Forces groups, along with trainers
from the UK and France, have been charged to train up to 12,000 African peacekeepers. The program has enjoyed limited but increasing success.

The regional CINC contact programs are designed to shape the environment within various regions of the world. The CINCs use peace operations to conduct this contact program. SOUTHCOM, EUCOM and CENTCOM have been working this program for several years with PACOM now getting into the peace operations training arena. The After Action Reviews that come from these exercises and operations are distributed and included in doctrinal re-writes and revisions.

Mr. Ken Dombrowski, Program Officer for the Center for Civil-Military Relations, Naval Postgraduate School, addresses the aspect of CIMIC relations relative to US peacekeeping doctrine.

The Center for Civil-Military Relations has designated lead agent for the Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities Program (EIPC) and for support operations education and training. Our program is focused on 18 countries around the world that are involved with peace operations in a variety of areas around the globe. We have developed a three phased peace operations curriculum to evaluate the peace operations training in a particular country. Phase I is a site visit to the country's peacekeeping training center. Phase II is a peace support operations instructor’s course. During this phase we will not be teaching peacekeeping, rather we will be teaching how to teach peacekeeping and peace support to those who attend the course. These individuals will be core curriculum developers, commandants of peacekeeping training centers, staff college instructors and others involved in the development and actual teaching of the subject area. Phase III is a series of mobile training teams that present the major topics of the core curriculum that the Center has developed.

Mr. Alex Morrison

There are several areas upon which this presentation will focus. The first of these is peacekeeping policy, doctrine and training, and the philosophies and foundation of the Pearson Peacekeeping Center (PPC) with emphasis on multidisciplinary and international cooperative training. There is a vital need for professionalism and absolute competence in training for and conduct of peacekeeping operations. There must be standards established to which military personnel deployed to peacekeeping operations must adhere. There are several ways in which national military forces can ensure they are capable of effective action, notwithstanding vaguely worded resolutions and mandates. The Pearson Peacekeeping Center is launching an initiative in the field of peacekeeping research, education and training which is designed to improve peacekeeping readiness and performance. This will also enhance the professionalism of the forces deploying to these actions.

The events in Sierra Leone have demonstrated the need for an enhanced, more professional, more highly trained peacekeeping force that is imbued with desire and positive attitude and is equipped, to the degree necessary, to accomplish the tasks not only at the level assigned but at least at the next higher and the adjacent horizontal levels. There seems to have been a greater degree of maturity and calmness during the discussions of the Sierra Leone crisis
than in other crisis that have occurred previously. This suggests that the degree to which the
discussion has been subdued and reasonable may be related to the countries involved in it and to
the more intellectual philosophy taken by these countries relative to peacekeeping.

The Canadian approach revolves around the concept that, unless a country is willing to
put the lives of its military forces on the line, that country cannot insist on an influential or
overwhelming or veto voice in what happens in peace operations. The belief in Canada is that
political leaders and military commanders, after considering the results of risk assessments, will
decide whether to deploy troops. Often these troops are deployed in areas of danger and risk.
The troops can be assured, however, that they are not being deployed in situations of needless
risk. If there are casualties, this is the price that a country pays to be a full player on the
international stage. In terms of UN Peace Operations, Canada has only one percent of the
world's population but has absorbed ten percent of the fatalities in UN Peace Operations. If a
Canadian peacekeeper is killed during peacekeeping duty, it will not be reported in the
international nor local news.

The calmness of discussion should be a foundation for future operations facilitating the
construction of an effective and efficient means of meeting the challenges of these future
missions. If military forces are deployed without the requisite training and competence
evaluation, there is great risk of military failure and the potential to put soldiers at needless risk.
In addition, a situation like this will draw unnecessary criticism to the UN or to the international
organization that was not ready to participate. Very few national armies are trained, prepared or
equipped to participate in multinational peace operations. The majority of these armies are
trained to defend the homeland and not much else.

The Pearson Peacekeeping Center's approach to peacekeeping research, education and
training is singular and not authoritative. The PPC is not a military organization; only three of
the one hundred faculty members are military. The mandate of the Center is to enhance Canada's
contribution to international peace, stability and security through the provision of quality
research, education and training in all aspects of peacekeeping. This is done through a program
of courses, seminars, research, publications and exercises. The PPC has underwritten a number
of exercises for many major organizations. There are three established pillars which are the
foundation for all that the Center does in this regard:

- One is the Center's definition of peacekeeping which is: actions designed to enhance
international peace, security and stability which are authorized by competent national or
international organizations undertaken either cooperatively or individually by military,
humanitarian, good governance, civilian police and other interested groups.

- The new peacekeeping partnerships are those organizations and individuals that work
together to improve the efficiency of peacekeeping operations. The term encompasses the
military, civilian police, government, parties to the dispute, government and non-government
organizations and agencies dealing with humanitarian aid and human rights, diplomats, the
media and other interested groups. There are no single discipline actions; they are always civil-
military in nature.
- The peacekeeping umbrella includes everything from interpersonal conflict resolution, observer missions, classical interpositional, Chapter, democratization and post-conflict reconstruction and development. PPC attempts to eliminate confusion by having a strict definition of peacekeeping and using it as an umbrella term. There have been exercises in which there was much confusion as the mission moved from deployment to peacekeeping to peace enforcement. There was great confusion as to which phase required what military action. PPC tries to eliminate this confusion through the use of the umbrella term.

Peacekeeping, whatever the individual and collective tasks assigned, must be conducted professionally and cooperatively. The best military peacekeeper is a general purpose, combat-trained soldier with the additional skills specific to peacekeeping. The tasks of the military are not just to fight and win the nation's wars, but also, to accomplish those tasks that are assigned to it by the civilian government. There are an increasing number of instances where the military is being asked to become more involved in international crisis response and less involved in warfighting.

With respect to professionalism and competency, the same process applied to selecting force commanders should also be applied to the selection of contingents. There should be a process by which national contingents are certified to participate in peace operations based on agreed upon standards. Hence, there must be the establishment of standards, training implementation measures and third party procedures for certifying the contingents. Obviously, the creation of this process will take time and cannot happen overnight. To begin, the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centers (IAPTC) has been discussing the certification of individual training centers throughout the world using specific criteria. These criteria conceivably could be used to certify national contingents as well, and, since the IAPTC would be the arbiter, the process would be less intrusive. Any process of this nature done by a non-governmental organization could be done quickly without governmental bureaucracy to delay the results. Agreement that there must be standards is the first step in injecting professionalism into peacekeeping operations.

There are other requirements that impact on the military that must be addressed if the military force involved in peace operations is to be enhanced. First is the international system of governance that is not likely to change, and so must be accommodated. Command and control is problematic since it is well known that the commander of a UN force does not command the forces under him. The national government commands these forces with the UN force commander left to convince and cajole the forces into doing the necessary tasks required for success. There are a variety of rules of engagement that do not always match. The UN, NATO, and the national contingent itself may have separate rules of engagement that do not agree and may contradict each other. Thus, the terms of service must outline the constraints and restraints that are imposed on national contingents.

Political and legal advisors are becoming more and more prevalent at lower and lower levels. These individuals may have contacts back to the national capital. Refugee and human rights advisors may also soon be part of peacekeeping force headquarters. It is not beyond the realm of possibility that there will be gender advisors as well. In the future these many advisors may be required for each headquarters.
The military should reach out for the civilian advisors and bring them into the planning process. Civilians should do the same as they plan for crisis response. Military campaigns will very soon be extinct since these operations are becoming increasingly joint and multidisciplinary.

Colonel Isturiz

Not long ago, military leaders believed that, with high training standards, motivated soldiers and the easier operations of peace, they needed no additional or specific training to be effective in peace operations. This being the case, it would also be easy for trained troops, prepared for the worst case, to be able to shift into a peacekeeping operation after being prepared for a peace enforcement operation. To some extent this is true, there are few casualties, there is no enemy per se and the equipment needs are less than those required for warfighting. If these operations are so easy to deal with, why is it that they are not always successful? Peace operations are difficult because they are different and very complex. They are based on vaguely worded, politically inspired mandates and resolutions that do not adequately address the tasks required of the military. Missions that drift between Chapter VI and VII, rules of engagement that hamper freedom of action and put troops at risk, and other aspects that make these operations extremely complex and very dangerous, further aggravate the confusion. Thus, training becomes a very, very important part of preparation for participation in peace operations.

Training builds self-confidence, upgrades operational efficiency and is the best source of force protection. It also provides ways to overcome some of the already highlighted deficiencies of peace operations. The main training problems are:

- There is no universally accepted, common doctrine for peace operations. National doctrine is only useful to a certain extent.

- Training requirements should be drawn from lessons learned. The distribution and availability of lessons learned does not lend itself to influencing the development of doctrine or to inclusion in the curriculum of peacekeeping training centers. Lessons learned systems have to move very fast. Ideally, any experience that was captured by a unit in a peace operation should be available to the unit that is designated to replace it so that problems and issues can be addressed in pre-deployment training.

- Training for peace operations remains a national responsibility of troop contributing member states. There are many good basic training manuals available. The only answer, as was discussed previously, is to develop a certification mechanism for troops deploying to a mission area.

What skills should be developed in training for peace operations? Some thoughts for consideration:

- Unit and observer mission training has no secrets and is backed by several manuals that are detailed.
- Soldiers must have basic combat skills, good training standards, plus an understanding of rules of engagement, clear do's and don’t' s and, most of all, good leadership at the lowest level.

- Military observers must be proficient with the basic techniques they learned as junior officers and NCOs, such as map reading, mine awareness, observation techniques and, most of all, a tactical interpretation of the facts they are observing.

Senior leaders and staff level officers must have a cultural, ethnic, religious, social and political awareness, since it is at this level where most of the implications for strategic problems occur. This is also where the civil-military coordination takes place and where the negotiations with senior level leaders from the belligerent parties take place. Interoperability conflicts among multinational forces and contingents also occur at this level. Thus, senior leaders and staffs must be trained to cope with these issues. All of this takes time, which is particularly scarce during the pre-deployment phase. The commanders and staff must have time to interact and get to know one another so that they can be effective.

Recently, Argentina has substantially increased its contribution to the UN peacekeeping effort after a long period of isolation. From small groups of observers, the Argentine armed forces now contribute infantry battalions, reconnaissance squadrons, mobile hospitals and CIVPOL contingents. In addition, Argentina established both peacekeeping and CIVPOL training centers, which are the only centers of their kind in Latin America. A substantial portion of an already scant defense budget is dedicated to peace operations.

Mr. Anderson

Very often, when training people for peace operations, there is a tendency to address concepts without going into why some aspect of peace operations is the way it is and why certain behaviors are more desirable then others.

The question of doctrine is very interesting since it is common to both civilian and military practitioners, but civilians tend to not like the word doctrine. Confident troops are made through training which builds the feeling of flexibility - that any situation can be handled. Training also motivates soldiers and leaders to do the job well and with enthusiasm. Leadership and stress management training are key to ensuring that soldiers in the field are well cared for and that their motivation is continued throughout the entire operation.

Unit officers should conduct most mission specific training to the maximum extent possible. It is tempting to bring in experts from outside the unit to brief the unit on the subject. If this becomes the case, soldiers have a tendency to believe that the officers are not enthusiastic about the mission. This may have an impact on the response the officer gets from the soldiers once the mission begins. There is a better link between the material that is being taught and the how it is going to be applied in the field on the operation. In this way, the commanding officer can say here are the principles and here is what I am expecting of you in the field when you come across these situations there. It takes time, but it may be the more effective method.
In terms of rules of engagement, they must be instinctive for the soldiers operating on the ground in a peace operation. If the soldier has to consult a card and try to match the rule to the situation at hand, the odds are that the soldier will come up with the wrong decision. There must be as few rules as possible; ideally just one that they can learn by heart and act on instinctively. Care must be given to not sacrifice effective mission accomplishment to force protection. The force protection profile becomes a measure of how well the force can blend with the local population and how the force is perceived. Adjusting this profile is one way of adjusting response without changing the rules of engagement. Mission specific training should be positive and humanistic, portraying the local population as human beings without creating barriers that cause the soldiers to view the locals as something other than human.

Human rights are also going to have an increasing role in military operations. In internal conflicts the key intelligence indicators are based on the degree to which human rights are being maintained. Human rights have a military dimension when dealing with an internal conflict since the way that the rights of the people are either abused or enforced often dictates the intensity and status of the conflict. A system is required for dealing with human rights abuses and for how the military goes about handling these abuses. There are three levels of knowledge required for addressing human rights abuses in a peace operation where the military is responsible for security and safety. The basic level for all ranks is recognition. The level for juniors leaders is speed of response or whether there is a response or not and reporting. The third level, at company or battalion level, is the ability to put the incidents of human rights abuses into a context of the operation itself; to see trends and not just a series of incidents in isolation. While there may not be a need for human rights specialists at unit level, there is a need for unit officers to be trained in human rights so that they can operate the system similar to the way an intelligence officer learns his system. Use the specialists already in the unit to collect data on the local population; use the chaplain to learn about religious aspects and so forth.

Discussion, Questions, Comments

Mr. Sharov: Many nations have dedicated many resources to training peacekeepers. But, no attention is paid to the local people who have to deal with the peacekeepers when they are in a specific place. Has any consideration been given to training local people in dealing with those forces?

Mr. Morrison: This has happened in several places such as Kosovo, Bosnia and Guatemala. Seminars and workshops have been conducted to teach and familiarize local populations with the peacekeeping organization on the ground and with the people who man these organizations. We have not done a great deal, and maybe we should do more and in a more formal way.

Col. Oliver: Tend to agree more must be done and in a more formal way. The US is looking very hard at training together, not just the military, but all the NGOs and IO and agencies within our government. The work of the Pearson Center in Canada and the work that has been done in Sweden leads the way in this regard. Dr. Jarrat Chopra and I are looking very hard at this issue with Brown University and, with Dr. Robert Rubinstein at Syracuse University, are looking at ways to educate people on the role and mission of peacekeepers.
Commissioner Heckscher: There is a tendency to focus on the event in terms of training, and there does not seem to be any focus on what happens before and what happens after an operation or deployment. Is there any attention paid to the environment in which the peacekeepers will operate? To what extent do we prepare people before they go to an operation? To what extent do we prepare families for the deployment? We tend to focus too much on the training itself and not enough on what happens before and after that event.

Col. Oliver: In the US, the AAR process occurs frequently to address just this kind of concern. AARs are conducted after every major action and sometimes during an action to evaluate a specific aspect of the action in progress. The US has, for a number of years, developed family support groups to address the needs of families during an operation where a loved one is deployed to a peace operation or other deployment. This is something that the civilian police might consider to respond to that need. The senior commander's spouse usually leads the effort.

Mr. Anderson: The families are important to the morale of the soldiers who are deployed. This is an easy thing to do for the military but not as easy for the police. It is equally difficult for the reserve troops that are often asked to deploy. It isn't just responding to problems, although this is an important part of it. It is the spouse having confidence that there is someone looking after them and their needs while their spouse is deployed. The follow up afterwards, at least in Canada, includes event stress counseling as required. Formed units are very easy, but again not so easy for police and members of the reserve.

Col. Isturiz: In the Argentine system we have a pre-deployment program followed by a leave to go home and get their affairs in order and then they deploy. The soldiers are given a checklist with recommended items for each soldier to consider and act on as appropriate. This was done because it was discovered that receiving letters and phone calls outlining problems has a tendency to depress the soldiers and lessen their effectiveness in the mission.

Commander Alily: Regarding Mr. Morrison's presentation, there are many problems with participation in peacekeeping operations by many countries. Despite these problems the paradigm is evolving, and there are doctrines being developed everywhere that are designed to increase the level of professionalism and competence. These doctrinal products, or the products resulting from doctrinal development and deliberations like this, can be distributed worldwide, and, in this way, standards can be established. If these standards are distributed beforehand, more countries might be willing to participate since the standard would be known and could be trained to in preparation for deployment.

Mr. Morrison: You say that there are standards to which countries and units should be expected to measure up. How do we determine that they do?

Commander Alily: I don't think that we should appoint independent groups or individuals to evaluate the training of national contingents. If a country sends a contingent and it does not perform well, then the UN will not seek that country’s assistance again. But, if there is a benchmark prior to deployment, then there is a base line to which contingents can train. There
are some countries that will not contribute troops simply because they feel that their army is not geared for peacekeeping.

**Mr. Morrison:** For force commanders and for civilian police there are now mechanisms in place to evaluate prospective force commanders and criteria for evaluating civilian police to serve with UNCIVPOL. If the criterion is not met within the prospective contributing country, then the police officer does not deploy. If this system is good enough for the police, it should be good enough for soldiers. You indicated there should be a benchmark, but right now the UN says that training is a national responsibility. My questions are: How would the benchmark be set? Who would determine if the benchmark is being met? Does that happen before moving to the theatre of the operation? Or, is it done when the unit is in theater?

**Commander Alily:** My fear is that once you make a pre-deployment evaluation mandatory many countries will not participate. The numbers of police and their responsibilities are not the same as those of the military, hence there can be a standardized process for selecting them. The more stringent the measure the less countries will be willing to participate in UN peace operations.

**Col. Oliver:** This is a very controversial issue. Each individual needs to consider their own opinion regarding the issue of standardization and training for contingents and individuals deploying to a peace operation. The interest has to be a professional and competent force. How we do that is a matter of preference, and there are many roads. One of the most important benefits of seminars like this is that we can discuss points like this, come to know one another better and, hence, work together better.
DAY 3 - WORKING GROUP REPORTS

Ed. Note: The discussion groups were given six topics to consider and discuss in their small groups. They were asked to discuss as many of the topics as time would allow and to present their views and to make suggestions for further research on specific topics drawn from their discussions.

Group 1  Col. Walthall

The military role in elections has several good examples based on the experience in Bosnia and in South Africa with elections and the military's support to them. After looking at the military's role in elections, we found that the military had been, and continues to be, asked to do much more than anyone in the military had ever anticipated. The fact is that in South Africa the military is still engaged in supporting elections. The reality is that the military must support elections and will continue to be expected to do so.

It is not just elections, but a much broader process of democratization in which the military must play a part. This role extends to that period before, during and after the elections are over. Before the elections, the military creates the right conditions for the elections to take place in a secure and stable environment. The military must remain to maintain security and stability while the election results are tabulated. There is a tendency for the military to want to withdraw after the election is over. However, one of the most vulnerable times for a nation, especially one that has just come out of an internal conflict, is during a transition of power such as after an election. An operation of this importance and impact must have a campaign plan associated with it. When this planning is done the conditions that are required for an election must be identified and tasks associated with creating these conditions assigned within an integrated plan. Who is doing which task? Are we getting the planning right? What is the mandate? Who was involved in forming the mandate? Was the military involved in implementing the mandate? All of these questions are not only questions that need to be answered but escalate in terms of the level at which they should be examined, the tactical, the operational and the strategic. All of these questions and issues led to several topics which require more study and will require fairly intensive research in order to help the military better address their role in elections.
Of course, the entire spectrum of military involvement before, during and after elections needs to be researched. In addition, the military must be involved in security sector reform that implies that the military does have a role in reform of the military sectors and in the civilian control of the military in these countries. This review and reform can occur before or after the election. The military should be involved in both the peace agreement formulation and the mandate. The military should be involved, but who else should be involved to ensure that all parties who will operate in the environment created by the mandate understand and have an opportunity for input? In addition, there should be guidelines for what needs to be covered in the peace agreement. If the military will be involved in implementing and enforcing the peace agreement and the mandate, then the military should have input into what will be covered to ensure that tasks that the military will be required to perform are realistic and manageable. These tasks should be tied to milestones and not to time, as the complexity of these operations dictate. The sequenced plan then should have an outline of the steps required and not a timeline which, given the complexity and possibly the volatile nature of the situation, is unrealistic. There may be some time sequencing required, but, fundamentally, not a timed activity. Finally, there should study that looks at having planning nuclei begin the plan and see it through execution. The same planners that develop the plan and are involved in the agreement/mandate planning should be ones that supervise the election.

The point is that there are...
many examples to compare and contrast to evaluate the question of military involvement in elections. What are the integration processes? What was the result of these processes in the examples given? Can we come up with a formula, based on the study of these examples, that might provide a framework for future military involvement in the election process?

The civil-military relationship and interface is another topic which, while widely and frequently discussed, still requires study, specifically how to achieve unity of effort. Many know what it is, but cannot articulate how to achieve it. When and how does the military turn over a mission to the IO/NGO community is a question that is still ongoing in several areas. The military must facilitate local capacity building so that the stage is set for the NGO/IO to come in and continue to build on this success. The civilian and military must train and exercise together to become proficient at the process. Only in this way can the hand off points become clearer and the unity of effort become a reality. Training and exercises also promote harmonization of the efforts of both. Harmonization implies integration, the whole process of making sure that from the start the planning and implementation of all the organizations involved are in harmony with one another; mutually supporting and very effective.
The group discussed two issues, the first of which is the peacekeepers responsibilities in facilitating the return of refugees and internally displaced persons.

First and foremost, refugees and displaced persons are not solely the responsibility of the military. Planning for the problems created by refugees and displaced persons should be part of an integrated campaign plan. CIVPOL has a role concerning the NGO and IO community in terms of control, movement and administration of these people.

The views of the refugees and displaced persons themselves should be part of any measure of success. While we as controllers of the situation see it one way, those who are subject to that control may have insights that we can never see nor appreciate. These views combined with those of the military and the NGO community will give a complete measure of success. The ethnicity, religion and the area from which they come are all factors in how refugees and displaced persons are handled and administered.

The CIVPOL has a major role in controlling refugees and displaced persons. CIVPOL can provide mechanisms for addressing disputes and issues with control of the groups, which at times can be large. There is also a need to address issues of property control and identity documentation.

Resettlement and rebuilding of social structures is time consuming and very problematic as it can be highly politicized. The ethnicity, religion and geographic affiliation are all factors in the effort to resettle and rebuild.
The timetable for resettlement may be in terms of generations not just months or years. A suggested research topic might be the historical examples from resettlement of Europe after the Second World War. This process took several years to complete and, with the proper research, may shed some light on the problems and challenges of resettlement and the handling of refugees and displaced persons. The group also speculated on the next great resettlement project, and the subject of Cuba immediately came up as a possible future resettlement challenge.

The second topic discussed was the restoration of law and order in peace operations. There is a difference between Chapter VI and VII in terms of support of the civilian police. In a Chapter VI operation there is normally some sort of authority for both belligerent parties. A prerequisite for a Chapter VI operation is that there is consent of the parties and, thus, an authority that has consented to the presence of the peacekeeping force. Chapter VII, as an enforcement operation, implies there is no consent and that there is a stronger need for the establishment of law and order. It also implies that the military has a greater, and perhaps exclusive, role to play in the restoration and maintenance of law and order.

In reality, CIVPOL is key to the maintenance of law and order, and their mandate is key to their ability to do that. There are three mandates that CIVPOL may have: executive, where they are effectively carrying out the law enforcement program and policy; monitor, where they are monitoring the actions of the local police force; or, training, where they are simply there to train more police or to rebuild the police force. The security situation and the capabilities of the military force will determine how active the CIVPOL need to be. Regardless, the military is asked again and again to perform law enforcement functions such as the apprehension of war criminals.
Another question requiring research concerns the issue of a Trustee system within the UN Charter. Is there a new colonialism under the auspices of the UN or other regional organization? Are places like Kosovo, that are under the protection and de facto governance of the UN or NATO, in fact trust territories of the UN or NATO?

**Group Two**  
Restoration of Law and Order in Peacekeeping Operations

- What is the situation when CIVPOL is only monitor and not executive arrest authority.
  - It depends on the assessment of the security situation in the area of operations.
  - Role may be much the same in support of the local police rather than the CIVPOL
  - Must still maintain the security presence
  - For most of the time the CIVPOL and local police arrangement does work for normal security environment

**Group Two**  
Restoration of Law and Order in Peacekeeping Operations

- Do we need to look at the Trustee system in UN charter?? Do we need to look at new legal modalities to administer problem areas? Is this an area to investigate? Have events taken over the theory??
Group 3  LTG Nambar

There were two topics discussed by Group 3; the first of which was support to humanitarian assistance operations. In terms of research, there are fundamental questions that must be answered if the topic is to be properly researched. First and foremost is the definition of humanitarian assistance operations. Next is to define who does what, when they do it and where they do what needs to be done to accomplish the required assistance. Also to be studied: who is in charge, the roles of the players who would obviously have a stake in the relief of human suffering, and the role of the military in this type of peace operation. Most of the latter includes logistics, security, and the link with the local population.

There is a wide gap between the military troops in the field and the NGO. This gap needs to be closed so that both the military and the NGO/IO community can participate and cooperate effectively in the name of peace. Transitional thresholds are those points where the mission can be adjusted with less military and more NGO/IO or vice versa. These thresholds must be identified and, while situational, could provide clues that may be common to any humanitarian relief action.

The second topic that was discussed determining success in peace operations. This is not an easy topic to discuss as this refers to a wide range of events which include, but are not limited to, formulation an end state, measure of political will to continue, achievement of goals and objectives, satisfaction of the mandate, and many other aspects both tangible and intangible. The determination of success is political one based on a number of criteria, which change from operation to operation. The political reasons for being involved in the first place and the resolution and mandate, or peace agreement, that put the mission in should have some definition of success in that particular operation.

The end state can be regarded as a measure of success. The mandate or resolution or peace agreement may indicate what the desired end state may be, but those involved in the operation must ask if the desired end state is achievable? Is it measurable? Is the desired end state clear enough to know when it is achieved?
A third topic was suggested, and it grew out the discussion of the first two topics. The group saw a need to educate political leaders in Congress or in Parliament on the nuances of peace operations so that when they consider involving their country in such operations they do so knowledgeably. Primarily, they need to understand that there is risk and that there will be a monetary expense that may be prohibitive in the long term. The better these leaders and decision-makers understand the situation the more informed a decision they will make relative to peace operations.

### Group Three
Briefing/Educating members of Congress/Parliament/Establishment

- Sustained Political support to missions
- Essential & continued funding
- Acceptance of risks
- Mission Status
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ANNEX B -

Introductory Brief
To Carlisle Barracks
Home of the
US Army War College,
Center for Strategic Leadership,
and the
US Army Peacekeeping Institute

Challenges of Peacekeeping & Peace Support
Into the 21st Century

“The Doctrinal Dimension”
22-26 May 2000
“...war is not a mere act of policy but a true political instrument, continuation of political activity by other means...”

Carl von Clausewitz  
On War

How does this statement impact on Peace Operations?

“For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.”

Sun Tzu  
The Art of War

Is this what we are trying to do in peace operations????
Conference Agenda

Tuesday, 23 May
Opening Remarks – COL George Oliver
Doctrinal Overview
NATO
Sweden
Russia
Jordan
South Africa
India
US
Dinner - speaker HRH Prince Zeid, Jordan

Conference Agenda

Wednesday, 24 May
Speaker - LTG Nambiar - Risk to Peacekeepers
Panel Discussion
Dr. P. Baker
BG Mellor
CAPT G. Wilson
Mr. B. Tuzhmukhamedov
Speaker - Ambassador Mason - DDR
Panel Discussion
Amb Hayford
Dr. Mendelson
COL Dempsey
Mr. Mngqibisa
Dinner Speaker - Amb Rolf Ekeus, Sweden
Conference Agenda

Thursday, 25 May
Speaker - Col Halvor Hartz - Public Security
Panel Discussion
  Com. S. Heckscher
  MAJ Zorzenon
  COL Coppola
  Mr. R. Mayer
Speaker - Ambassador Ward - Training
Panel Discussion
  COL Oliver
  Mr. A. Morrison
  COL F. Isturiz
  Mr. T. Anderson
Discussion Group Outbrief - Plenary
Dinner - Picnic

Working Group Discussion Items

Day Two - 24 May
  And
Day Three - 25 May

1. Support to Elections by Peacekeeping Forces
2. Determining Success in Peace Operations
3. Peacekeepers’ Responsibilities in the Return of Refugees
4. Peacekeeping Support to Humanitarian Assistance Efforts
5. Peacekeepers Role in restoring Basic Infrastructure
6. Restoration of Law and Order in Peace Operations
GROUND RULES

1. Have fun and get to know one another
2. Share ideas - everyone’s thoughts are important!!!!!
3. Explore new concepts
4. Help the UN and peacekeepers be more effective in carrying out their IMPORTANT missions.

Peace Operations = Peace Support Operations

“[Peace] Operations are immensely complex”

BG Rick Sanchez
Commander US TF Falcon
Kosovo, 17 April 2000
ANNEX C –

Discussion Groups
GROUP ONE

Group Leader: COL Walthall  
Group Facilitator: Jim McCallum

Group Members:  
MG Al Omari  
Dr. Baker  
Dr. Chopra  
Mr. Dombrowski  
COL Forster  
Mr. Henthorne  
Dr. Jones  
Mr. Malan  
Mr. Mngqibisa  
Lt Col Nunn  
Mr. Sharov  
Dr. Stepanova

U.S. ARMY PEACEKEEPING INSTITUTE
GROUP TWO

Group Leader: MG Neretnieks
Group Facilitator: Bill Flavin

Group Members:
- Commander Alily
- Lt Col Bello
- COL Coppola
- Lt Col Ellis
- BG Gupta
- COL Istituriz
- Dr. Lord
- Mr. Mayer
- Lt Col Moyer
- Dr. Rubinstein
- Lt Col Siyaya
- Mr Tuzmukhamedov
- Capt Wilson

U.S. ARMY PEACEKEEPING INSTITUTE

GROUP THREE

Group Leader: LTG Nambiar
Group Facilitator: COL Jim Perlmutter

Group Members:
- Dr. Abu Jaber
- Mr. Anderson
- COL Bissell
- Mr. Dewey
- Mr. Forrester
- AMB Hallqvist
- Mr. Johnson
- Mr. Lyerly
- AMB McCallie
- Ms. Hilding-Norberg
- Dr. Skocz
- Dr. Vannoni
- Maj Zorzenon

U.S. ARMY PEACEKEEPING INSTITUTE
ANNEX D –

Conference Break Out
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Category</th>
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<td>Civil Servants</td>
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<td>Military and Civilian Trainers</td>
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<td>NGO Representatives</td>
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**U.S. ARMY PEACEKEEPING INSTITUTE**
Annex E -

Project Report
Project Report

Challenges of Peace Keeping & Peace Support: Into the 21st Century

US Army Peacekeeping Institute, Carlisle
23 May 2000

Ms Annika Hilding-Norberg
Project Director & Coordinator
Department of Strategic Studies, National Defence College of Sweden

Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, distinguished guests and participants, First and foremost, I would like to express my sincere appreciation and thanks to Colonel George Oliver, Head of the US Army Peace Keeping Institute, and his staff, in particular to LTC Dan Miltenberger.

I would like to pay tribute to the commitment by the US Army PKI to the project, which started already at the first meeting in Stockholm. Subsequent contributions to the project by the US Army PKI were manifested by the participation in the series by COL Forster, COL Stewart, PROF Dewey, and LTC Miltenberger. When the time had come to host the fifth seminar here in Carlisle, the leadership of the institute had been taken over by Colonel Oliver. Though he inherited the somewhat dubious honor of making this seminar materialize, thanks to COL Oliver's brilliant guidance and stream of ideas, and with LTC Miltenberger's invaluable input, organization and energy, we have a rich undertaking and schedule ahead of us. It's been a great pleasure working together and a great privilege receiving your friendly and efficient hospitality.

Last but not least, I would also like to join Colonel Oliver and LTC Miltenberger in thanking Dr. Elihu Rose and Susan and the Elihu Rose Foundation as well as the U.S. Army for contributing financially to this seminar and making it possible. Thank you.

It is a great honor to address this distinguished forum and it is with great anticipation that I look forward to the days ahead of us. As Colonel Oliver and LTC Miltenberger have discussed the issues and particulars of the seminar here and now, I will say a few words about the seminar series Challenges of PK & PS: Into the 21st Century as a whole.

Outline – Content of Presentation

I will give you a short presentation of the underpinning assumptions of this project, its objective, methodology, products and expected end state, partner organizations and the focal points of previous sessions, announce the forthcoming meetings, and last but not least, I would like to mention the challenges of funding and some of the spin off effects from the projects.

Underpinning Assumptions

The fundamental assumption underpinning this project is that the multiple nature, scope and persistence of contemporary conflicts facing the world requires a multiple response. Whether being a traditional or new peace keeper, civilian or military, regardless of religion, culture and geographical origin, we all have an abundance of challenges to deal with as well as experiences
to share. The aim of this project is to, through an open and mutual exchange of ideas, try to harness the experiences made and lessons learned, to synthesize these ideas, formalize recommendations and develop a concluding report. Realizing the necessity of staying within the boundaries of the possible, the project nevertheless seeks to provide an inclusive and informal forum for addressing critical challenges of peace keeping and peace support efforts in a proactive manner.

**Objective**

In short, the objective of the seminar series is two fold;

1. To explore and convey more effective and legitimate ways of dealing with regional conflicts.

2. To encourage and facilitate increased co-operation and co-ordination between influential organizations and agencies from a wide variety of nations and cultures.

**Methodology**

The methodology of the project is;

1. To organize high-level workshops, seminars and conferences, each meeting with its particular focus and framework.

2. To combine theoretical discussions with practical issues of training and education. In connection to each session, visits to and presentations of the regional peace keeping training center have been organized. Here in Carlisle, our host is of course already a peace keeping training center.

3. To publish conference papers and seminar reports in multiple languages to increase the pool of peace keeping literature in languages other than English. To date, conference papers have been published in English, Russian and Arabic.

4. The development and publication of a concluding report. The Partners Meeting yesterday agreed on the overall framework, structure and timetable for the work on the concluding report. The final product, the concluding report, is to be presented to the United Nations, its Secretary General and its member states in the fall of 2001.

**Project Products and Expected End State**

The tangible project products include the latter two points just mentioned, the individual conference documentations and the concluding report. The expected end state is two fold; first, an increased understanding of the challenges and issues discussed, and secondly, an increasingly widened, strengthened and truly international peace keeping and peace support network.
Partners and Seminars: Hosts and Issues

The multiplicity of actors and nations currently engaged in crisis response is also reflected by the diversity of the partner organizations in our endeavor. The group is multinational, multidisciplinary, multireligious, multiregional, and multicultural. In addition to the US Army Peace Keeping Institute, let me introduce to you the other partner organizations in the project.

The first workshop was held by the Swedish National Defence College in September 1997. Subsequently, the Defence College is coordinating the overall project. At the first workshop, we made an inventory of the current challenges facing peace keeping & peace support covering a range of issues.

The second meeting was a conference organized by the Russian Public Policy Centre in Moscow in March 1998. There we addressed civil-military relations and international and national legal constraints and possibilities in regards to peace operations. The main discussion focused on the role of coalitions of the willing and regional organizations and covered primarily the evolving role of NATO as well as that of the Commonwealth of Independent States in peace operations.

The third meeting was hosted by the Jordan Institute of Diplomacy in October 1998. Stemming from the experience of the region, the conference started by addressing the changing concept of security. This consequently led the discussion into "softer" issues of peace keeping, such as preventive diplomacy, confidence building measures, post conflict peace building, civil-military relations, mine action, training and education of civilian police and peace keepers.

The Institute for Security Studies in Pretoria organized the fourth meeting, a workshop, in November 1999. Faced with the tremendous challenges to peace and stability on the African continent, the workshop was focused on issues related to capacity building in the African context. From the growing challenge posed by collapsed societies, war lords, and war economies to development issues, reform and/or the out sourcing of the security sector and its implication for peace support, the role of regional and sub regional organizations such as the OAU, ECOWAS, ECOMOG, and SADC, as well as a case study on the DRC.

The objective and substance of the fifth meeting here in Carlisle, you already know. The suggestion by the US Army PLI to address the doctrinal dimension of peace support was welcomed by the project and linked with other issues that the Challenges project had not yet fully, or at all, explored before; that is Risks to Peace Keepers, DD&R, Public Security & Doctrine and Training.

Looking to the future; it is a great honor and pleasure to introduce to you the sixth meeting in the series. As you will learn more about at the end of this seminar from LTG Satish Nambari, Director of the United Services Institution of India (the USI), and equally the first Force Commander of UNPROFOR, the USI will take place in New Delhi between September 13 and 15 this year. The seminar coincides with, and will be the first event held by India's new Centre
The focus of the sixth session will be on "Challenges of Peace Keeping in 2015: Perspectives."

I am also very pleased to relay from our Japanese peace keeping colleagues that they are positively considering hosting a seminar in Tokyo and have suggested that March next year could be a good time for such an event. The overall theme of the seminar would be on the challenges of safety and security for UN peace keepers and UN personnel. In particular in the light of recent, tragic developments in West Africa, this is an issue of particular and urgent need of further and continued assessment.

**The Challenges of Funding**

In addition to thanking Susan and Elihu Rose Foundation and the United States Army for funding the meeting here in Carlisle, I would like to mention the other main sponsors of the overall effort. They include the Swedish, Norwegian and Jordanian governments, the Canadian L. B. Pearson Peace Keeping Training Centre, NATO Information & Liaison Office, Hanns Seidel Foundation, the Armed Forces and PK Training Centres of each hosting country, the CIS HQ for Military Cooperation and Co-ordination as well as Jordan Television Corporation, to mention only the main contributors.

Before I conclude, please let me mention some of the spin-offs of the project.

One of the two main objectives of the project is, and has always been, to promote and encourage international exchange between relevant organizations and individuals. I would like to highlight some of the tangible projects of cooperation, which have originated from contacts made during the process of the Challenges Project. Exchanges between peace keeping training academies were agreed between Sweden and the Russian Federation, and between L. B. Pearson Canadian Peace Keeping Training Centre and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The establishment of a multidisciplinary and regional peacekeeping training centre was further developed at the conference in Amman. An Early Warning Program has been launched at the Institute for Security Studies in South Africa, supported by the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Furthermore, contacts were established between a British, a Russian, a Zimbabwean and an Indian scholar to look at ways in which to conduct a joint research project about War Lords and War Economies. In short, the aim is to facilitate the building of bridges and mechanisms to improve communication and dialogue between peace keeping experts and practitioners around the world.

**Concluding** what started out 3 ½ years ago as an idea stemming from the work on my doctoral thesis to organize a small round table discussion on the Challenges of Peace Keeping & Peace Support in Moscow has now become a global process, in scope, participation, input and ownership. The strength of the process is the heterogeneous nature of the seminars, workshops and conferences, each meeting contributing to the process with a particular emphasis and thrust of issues. Taken together, the process, when finished, should have covered, to a greater or lesser
extent, the majority of peace keeping challenges facing us. In order to be able to shed as many rays of light as possible on how to tackle the daunting challenges of peace keeping and peace support and in order to make our undertaking as thorough comprehensive and representative as possible, I invite you to come forward with any insights, issues, questions or suggestions that you may have. In the mean time, I would like to thank you for your attention.