Cooperation and Coordination in Peace Operations – United Nations and Regional Perspectives

Challenges Forum Report 2012
Challenges Forum Report 2012
Cooperation and Coordination in Peace Operations—
United Nations and Regional Perspectives
The International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations is an international network with the purpose to contribute to the enhancement of the analysis, planning, conduct and evaluation of multidimensional peace operations. The process aims to generate practical recommendations and encourage their effective implementation at the international, regional and national level. The Challenges Forum also seeks to widen and strengthen the international network of actors involved in peace operations.
International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations

Challenges Forum Report 2012

Cooperation and Coordination in Peace Operations—United Nations and Regional Perspectives
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<tbody>
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<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APSA</td>
<td>African Peace and Security Architecture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASF</td>
<td>African Standby Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>Command and control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-34</td>
<td>Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations of the United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIC</td>
<td>Center on International Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civil–military cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CISU</td>
<td>Centre for Intelligence and Security Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIVCAP</td>
<td>Civilian capacity for peace operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSTO</td>
<td>Collective Security Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFS</td>
<td>Department of Field Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPA</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Political Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPKO</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSRSG</td>
<td>Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>G20</td>
<td>Group of Twenty</td>
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<tr>
<td>GCSP</td>
<td>Geneva Centre for Security Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross domestic product</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>GFSS</td>
<td>Global Field Support Strategy</td>
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<td>HPG</td>
<td>Humanitarian Policy Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally displaced person</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>IHL</td>
<td>International humanitarian law</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMPP</td>
<td>Integrated mission planning process</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPI</td>
<td>International Peace Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>JMAC</td>
<td>Joint mission analysis centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>JPT</td>
<td>Joint protection team</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINUSTAH</td>
<td>United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti</td>
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<tr>
<td>MONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NYU</td>
<td>New York University</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>OIC</td>
<td>Organization of the Islamic Conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONUCI</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCC</td>
<td>Police-contributing countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKO</td>
<td>Peacekeeping operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POC</td>
<td>Protection of civilians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>European Union Political and Security Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>QIP</td>
<td>Quick impact projects</td>
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<td>R2P</td>
<td>Responsibility to protect</td>
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</table>
xii COOPERATION AND COORDINATION IN PEACE OPERATIONS

RUF Revolutionary United Front
SC Security Council
SIDA Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SLEU74 Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime in Sierra Leone
SPLA Sudan People’s Liberation Army
SRSG Special Representative of the Secretary-General
SSR Security sector reform
TCC Troop-contributing country
TCU Transnational Crime Unit
UN United Nations
UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNAMI United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq
UNAMSIL United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNDSS United Nations Department of Safety and Security
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNMEE United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNMIL United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMISS United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan
UNOAU United Nations Office to African Union
UNOC United Nations Operations in the Congo
UNOCI United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire
UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNOWA United Nations Office for West Africa
UNPOL United Nations Police
UNPOS United Nations Political Office for Somalia
UNSMIL United Nations Support Mission in Libya
UNSMIS United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>WACI</td>
<td>West Africa Coast Initiative</td>
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<td>WDR</td>
<td>World Development Report</td>
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Challenges Forum Partner Organizations

(In alphabetical order)

Argentina: Ministry of Defence in cooperation with Centro Argentino de Entrenamiento Conjunto para Operaciones de Paz
Australia: Australian Civil–Military Centre
Canada: Pearson Centre
China: China Institute for International Strategic Studies in cooperation with the Ministry of National Defence
Egypt: Cairo Regional Center for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence
France: Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs (United Nations and International Organizations Department) and Ministry of Defence (Policy and Strategic Affairs Department)
Germany: Center for International Peace Operations in cooperation with the German Federal Foreign Office
India: United Service Institution of India
Japan: Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Jordan: Institute of Diplomacy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Nigeria: National Defence College in cooperation with the Nigerian Army, Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Norway: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
Pakistan: National Defence University in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence
Russian Federation: Center for Euro-Atlantic Security of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation in cooperation with the Center for Political and International Studies
South Africa: Institute for Security Studies
Sweden: Folke Bernadotte Academy, Armed Forces, National Police Board, Swedish Prison and Probation Service, and National Defence College
Switzerland: Geneva Centre for Security Policy in cooperation with the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs and the Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sports
Turkey: Center for Strategic Research of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in cooperation with the National Police Force, Armed Forces and the University of Bilkent
United Kingdom: Foreign and Commonwealth Office in cooperation with the Ministry of Defence and the Department for International Development

United States: United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute in cooperation with the United States Department of State, Bureau of International Organizations and the United States Institute of Peace

International Secretariat: Folke Bernadotte Academy
Acknowledgements

The Challenges Forum aims to contribute to the global dialogue on the analysis, preparation, implementation and evaluation of multidimensional peace operations, to raise awareness, generate practical recommendations and encourage their effective implementation. The Forum also seeks to broaden and strengthen the international network of actors involved in multidimensional peace operations. The Challenges Forum consists of partner organizations—leading official institutions, ministries and centres of excellences in their national and regional settings—and reflects a global and representative background and range of expertise.

The Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP), a pre-eminent research and training institution, was invited by the Challenges Forum partnership to hold its Annual Forum in Geneva in 2012. The Forum addressed the broad theme of cooperation and coordination in multidimensional peace operations. Through a series of Panel sessions and Working groups, the Challenges Forum examined the different issues faced by the broad range of actors of peace operations (United Nations, regional organizations, governments, non-governmental organizations, and local actors) in their mutual interaction, so as to improve the overall efficiency and effectiveness of their action. The main objective was to take stock of recent developments at the policy and operational levels on the topics of inter-institutional and internal coordination and cooperation, and to identify forward-looking policy responses.

GCSP is an international foundation established in 1995 with over 40 member states. The centre promotes the building and maintenance of peace, security and stability through training research and dialogue. Committed to the highest professional standards, the GCSP trains government officials, diplomats, military officers, international civil servants and NGO staff in pertinent fields of international peace and security. Through research and publications, workshops and conferences, the GCSP also provides an internationally recognized forum for dialogue on key security and peace policy issues in the interest of effective security policy decision-making. Some of the latter activities aim to facilitate discreet dialogue in post-conflict situations.

Many institutions and individuals in Geneva contributed to the planning and organization of the 2012 Challenges Forum, Cooperation and Coordination, on 9–11 May 2012. On behalf of the Challenges Partnership, we would like to express our deepest appreciation in particular to HE Dr Fred Tanner, Director, Geneva Centre for Security Policy; Dr Thierry Tardy, Head of Research, Geneva Centre for Security Policy; HE Mr Claude Wild, Head, Human Security Division, the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs; Brigadier Gen-
eral Erwin Dahinden, Head, International Relations, the Swiss Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport, and Isabelle Gillet, Coordinator, Protocol and Events, Geneva Centre for Security Policy. Their organizational as well as individual leading expertise, contribution and dedication to the Annual Forum 2012 ensured its relevance, timeliness, depth of the deliberations and smooth running.

In conjunction with the Annual Forum 2012, the Challenges partnership finalized work plans for its coming research and concepts development projects 2012-2014. The areas of research selected were: Future concepts and models for peace operations (to be co-chaired by Dr Wibke Hansen, Centre for International Cooperation, Germany, and Lt Gen Peekay Singh, United Services Institution, of India); Comparative policies principles and guidelines (to be co-chaired by Brig Gen Kamran Zia, National Defence University, Pakistan, and Prof William Flavin, United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, United States); Authority, command and control (to be co-chaired by Dr Alexandra Novosseloff, Ministry of Defence, France, and Dr Istifanus Zabadi, National Defence College, Nigeria); and Impact evaluation and assessment (to be co-chaired by Dr Ann Livingstone, Pearson Centre, Canada, and Ms Institute for Security Studies, South Africa). On behalf of the Partnership, we would like to express our thanks to the co-chairs of the Challenges work strands for their leadership and commitment to peace operations in general and to our common Challenges endeavour in particular.

Further, at the GCSP, the Challenges Partnership held a special session with the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) on the theme of Greening the peacekeepers. As part of a global launching process of the UNEP Report on environmental implications for and of peace operations, Mr David Jensen, Head of Programme, Environmental Cooperation for Peacebuilding, generously briefed and discussed the substance of the report with Challenges partners, core aspects of which are included in Annex 1.

The present report, the Challenges Forum Annual Report 2012, has been produced thanks to Ms Annika Hilding Norberg (main editor), Ms Malin Andrén, Ms Andrea Rabus, Mr Henrik Stiernblad, Ms Johanna Ström, Dr Thierry Tardy, Ms Sharon Wiharta, Ms Anjali Wijesooriya, and Ms Anna Wiktorsson.

We hope that the content of the report will serve as a resource of ideas and options for action for all those that are committed to making peace operations more effective.

Annika Hilding Norberg
Director
Challenges Forum
Introduction

HE Dr Fred Tanner, Director, Geneva Centre for Security Policy; and Dr Thierry Tardy, Head of Research, Geneva Centre for Security Policy

In 2011, Switzerland joined the Challenges Forum and was honoured to host the Challenges Annual Forum in May 2012. The event was organized by the Geneva Centre for Security Policy in cooperation with the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs and the Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport.

The Forum focused on the theme of cooperation and coordination in peace operations and looked at United Nations (UN) and regional perspectives. This theme was addressed in four plenary sessions that dealt with inter-institutional cooperation in peace operations (session one), military-humanitarian relations in the protection of civilians (session two), coordination between external and local actors in the fight against organized crime (session three), and the cooperation triangle between the UN Security Council, the UN Secretariat and Troop- and Police-Contributing countries (session four). Five working group sessions were also organized, examining the following themes: (i) the peacekeeping–peacebuilding nexus; (ii) inter-institutional cooperation and cross-organizational lessons learned; (iii) Afghanistan, lessons for the UN and regional organizations in the protection of civilians; (iv) South Sudan, consent and national ownership; and (v) command and control, UN and regional organizations arrangements.

The theme of inter-institutional cooperation has become central to the analysis of contemporary peace operations. From the Balkans to Sudan, Somalia and Afghanistan, peace operations are now characterized by the simultaneous involvement of several international organizations. This evolution carries hope for a more effective management of current crises as institutions allegedly intervene on the basis of their comparative advantages. In the meantime, it raises the question of the extent to which the overall effort of security governance can be maximized through an optimum coordination among the main actors involved.

Inter-institutional cooperation is supposed to enable institutions to achieve, through their cooperation, results that they would not be able to achieve on their own. It also aims to minimize the effects of duplication or redundancy among actors whose competences overlap. The inter-institutional challenge is being revisited in light of the new strate-
gic context and the potential impact of the global financial and economic crisis on peacekeeping. Cooperation appears to be all the more important as financial resources become tight, though scarce resources may also create tensions over how best to get access to them.

Peacekeeping partnerships have gone through significant evolutions over the last 12 years. There is a growing consensus that international institutions need to develop cooperation amongst themselves, as reflected by their ‘partnership agenda’. Liaison offices as well as working level interaction between the main security institutions are now relatively well established.

The UN has developed and institutionalized its relationships with regional organizations as a consequence of an increased field interaction. This has particularly been the case with the European Union, and more recently with the African Union. In most cases, cooperation has been the result of operational necessities more than of strategic design. While flexibility is important, moving away from ad hoc cooperation and promoting more structured—and therefore more predictable—partnerships are equally needed.

The issue of cooperation within peace operations also addresses the relationship between military and civilian actors and the extent to which they can be coordinated. This is particularly important in the field of civilian protection. As stated in the 2008 UN Principles and Guidelines: ‘The protection of civilians requires concerted and coordinated action among the military, police and civilian components of a United Nations peacekeeping operation and must be mainstreamed into the planning and conduct of core activities. UN humanitarian agencies and non-governmental organization (NGO) partners also undertake a broad range of activities in support of the protection of civilians. Close coordination with these actors is therefore essential’. Though essential to the coherence of international efforts, coordination of military and humanitarian actors has also proved to be difficult in practice, notably in relation to the preservation of the humanitarian space and the key humanitarian principles. One issue is that of the impact of the increased civilian protection imperative on military-humanitarian relations. In so far as civilian protection implies some form of robustness from the peacekeepers, it sheds new light on the consequences for the humanitarian space and the extent to which the two sets of actors can work together to achieve a common objective.
Another dimension of contemporary peace operations is their role in assisting in the establishment of the rule of law. State fragility is both a consequence of transnational organized crime and often a fertile ground for the development of criminal activities, and therefore a potential threat to peacebuilding efforts and long-term sustainable peace. Transnational organized crime is often a source of revenue for spoilers or former war parties. As a consequence, peace operations have an important role to play in fighting organized crime through the promotion of rule-of-law institutions, among other activities (as is the case in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Kosovo, Somalia, Guinea-Bissau and Sierra Leone among others). However, the extent to which the UN has effectively integrated the fight against organized crime in the planning and running of current operations remains an open question.

Similarly, an issue under consideration is whether the UN as an institution and peace operations as a response to state fragility are appropriate instruments to fight crime. Fighting organized crime requires a holistic approach that cannot be the sole responsibility of a peace operation, but one that must bring together a variety of actors, local and international, and that is openly long-term in nature. The appropriateness of mainly repressive methods and tools in face of the constantly evolving nature of the phenomenon and the high global demand for illicit goods (e.g. counterfeit medicine, illegal drugs, slave labour, child pornography, etc.) can also be questioned. In the same vein, organized crime belongs to the category of transnational threats that cannot be tackled through a traditional state-centric or exclusively security-focused policy response. Before it becomes a security issue that can be combated by traditional police or military methods, crime is a socio-economic problem, the management of which goes much beyond a security-oriented response. The fight against organized crime needs to bring together three sets of actors: the state, civil society and the private sector. This raises the issue of the ability of peace operations to reach out to the civil society and the private sector.

Finally, effective peacekeeping policies imply a close coordination between three key actors: the UN Security Council, the UN Secretariat, and troop- and police-contributing countries (T/PCCs). One is here at the junction between states’ policies and institutional efficiency. No operation can be successful if one of the three actors of this triangle is deficient, or if the triangular relationship does not reflect a fair division of tasks among the key stakeholders. In reality, the typology of financial and political actors as well as T/PCCs has led to a dichotomy between
two categories of states; such dichotomy characterizes UN peacekeeping operations and may be perceived as being at the expense of the idea of a shared understanding on the function and constraints of peacekeeping. One sees on the one hand countries that finance peacekeeping operations and—for some of them—design their mandates at the Security Council but deploy few troops, and on the other hand countries that contribute personnel but that are marginalized in decision-making. This has led to frictions between two groups of states whose responsibilities and visions of peacekeeping may diverge. For the main T/PCCs, although a lot has been accomplished over the last decade in the trilateral dialogue, an increased participation in the decision-making process is still called for.

These different issues were discussed in detail throughout the three day International Forum. The event brought together eminent speakers and over 200 participants from more than 50 countries. Speakers and participants included senior civilian and military officials from governments, representatives of peace operations’ recipient countries, the UN Secretariat, including mission staff, the African Union, the European Union, the League of Arab States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), civil society and academics.

The Challenges Forum Report 2012 includes the presentation and discussions held at the Forum. It also includes background papers by Richard Gowan, Center on International Cooperation; Alan Doss, Kofi Annan Foundation; Walter Kemp, International Peace Institute; and Ian Johnstone, Tufts University, respectively.

As an institution dedicated to training and skills development in which peacekeeping and peacebuilding issues are essential, the GCSP is pleased to present this report to the wider peacekeeping community.
CHAPTER 1

Opening Address and Welcome

HE Dr Fred Tanner, Director, Geneva Centre for Security Policy

Ladies and gentlemen, I would like to extend a very warm welcome to the International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations 2012. The Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) is privileged that we can host this annual event here in Geneva. I am grateful to the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs attended here by Ambassador Wild, and the Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sports, attended here by Brigadier General Dahinden for supporting this event and not only for joining the GCSP but also for collaborating with the Challenges Forum. I would also like to greatly thank Ms Annika Hilding Norberg, Director, Challenges Forum, and Mr Jonas Alberoth, Acting Director-General, Folke Bernadotte Academy, for their very impressive and energizing preparatory work.

GCSP has been working for many years in the field of peacekeeping and civilian peacebuilding. We have a dedicated programme at our centre—the Conflict and Peacebuilding Programme, which offers a range of courses in peacebuilding and leadership training. We have also been directly contributing to peacekeeping training through our work with Maison de la Paix for instance.

Being in Geneva, a global city with many organizations working with and dedicated to peacekeeping and peacebuilding actions, GCSP together with the Graduate Institute, Quaker United Nations Office and Interpeace founded a few years ago the Geneva Peacebuilding Platform which enables people to build peace around the world. This platform has rapidly evolved over the past years and functions as an important forum for exchange on the critical interface in peacebuilding, peacekeeping and humanitarian action.

In view of these various activities it has become essential for the GCSP to join the International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations in order to better valorize its experiences and activities in this important domain. This Forum is, in my view, not just about enhancing planning, conduct and evaluation of multidimensional peace operations; it is also
about partnership and community building. The GCSP considers community building as part of our mandate and continuously strive to bring together policymakers, experts and practitioners—both civilian and from defence—coming from various regions and various institutions dealing with crisis management, mediation and post-conflict reconstruction.

It is in this context that the overall theme of this annual meeting is underlined, which is about cooperation and coordination in peace operations. As the great majority of operations constitute more and more organizations, the theme of inter-institutional cooperation has become central to the analysis of contemporary peace operations. From the Balkans to Sudan, Somalia and Afghanistan, peace operations have moved towards hybridity. This hybridity carries hope for a more effective management of current crises. The complexity and the unattended consequences of this new paradigm have to be unpacked and analysed and I think this meeting will be an enormous opportunity for such a process.

This theme is particularly important in Geneva where a lot of peacekeeping and peacebuilding actors have their headquarters. Hence, one of the sessions of this conference is going to be dedicated to the interaction of peacekeepers and humanitarian actors; a relationship that Alan Doss, one of our associate fellows, terms in his paper, a marriage of necessity. External and local relations are of vital importance, without which peace cannot be established in the long-term.

Finally, as noted in the 2009 New Horizon paper, peace operations are directly dependent upon the dialogue between the Security Council, troop- and police-contributing countries and the UN Secretariat. No operation can be successful if one of these three actors of this essential triangle is inefficient.

Before I pass the floor to our partners on this panel, just allow me to acknowledge some people who made this Forum a reality. My gratitude goes to Dr Thierry Tardy, Head of Research at the GCSP; Ms Annika Hilding Norberg, Director, Challenges Forum; Mr Julien Thöny, Head of Multilateral Peace Section of the Human Security Department, the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs; and also Ms Isabel Gillet and her colleagues for all the preparatory work that they have been doing over the last few months to make this forum a success. I would
also like to thank the World Meteorological Organization, the City of Geneva and the Canton of Geneva for their support.

I give the floor now to Ambassador Claude Wild and take this opportunity to thank him for his immense contribution to and support of the work of GCSP.

HE Mr Claude Wild, Head, Human Security Division, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Switzerland

Switzerland is a new member of the Challenges Forum. Therefore it is a great honour and pleasure for me to welcome the Forum and its participants on behalf of the Swiss government for the first time here in Geneva. I would like to thank you for your participation and thank the Geneva Centre for Security Policy and especially the Challenges Forum Secretariat for the organization of this important event. We are particularly pleased to welcome so many experts and high-level representatives from the United Nations, from other international organizations, from individual states as well as from academia and from the research community in the field of peace and security.

This event is very timely as we are all faced with the increasing complexity of today’s conflicts and their multi-faceted root causes and consequences in a globalized world. At the same time we have realized the need for holistic approaches in crisis management and for innovative ways to ensure the sustainability of our peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts. In the 21st century, the United Nations organization is still the most important international player in this field. However, regional organizations are getting more and more involved. As the title of the conference indicates, today’s challenges can only be tackled by the United Nations and the regional organizations, if they work in close coordination and cooperation with other important actors that have an impact on crisis situations.

When analysing the strengths and weaknesses of international peace operations around the globe, we have seen that crucial aspects for the acceptance, and eventually for the success of these missions, are closely linked to the coordination and cooperation dimension. But what does coordination and cooperation really mean in practice? It means making sure that inter-linkages exist between peace operations and national as well as regional authorities and organizations. It means assuring that
members of peace operations communicate sufficiently and efficiently with the local communities among which they are deployed on the ground. It also means establishing participatory mechanisms, allowing for a broad understanding of the peace missions mandates by the local authorities and population. Of course, better transparency and accountability of the actions undertaken by peace operations should also be guaranteed.

Internally Switzerland is addressing questions of peacekeeping and peacebuilding in a whole-of-government approach—applying the principle of coherence, coordination and complementarity. Brigadier General Erwin Dahinden, my colleague from the Swiss Armed Forces, will elaborate on the military perspective. Therefore let me just give you some thoughts from the civilian point of view and from a human security perspective.

Switzerland has been a full member of the United Nations for ten years. In this short period we have done our best to become a reliable and innovative partner. We have also focused our action on some specific areas in the field of human security, such as the protection of civilians. Let us not forget that the ICRC and the Humanitarian Committee of the UN are headquartered in Geneva. Furthermore, Switzerland is the depository state of the Geneva Convention. Thus, we will always highlight the importance of promoting and respecting international humanitarian law, linking it to international peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions. In our opinion, these missions can and should play a pivotal role.

International peace efforts are characterized by the fact that we are having different actors with different mandates using different instruments that are active at the same time in the same difficult crisis context. Now, smart cooperation and coordination policies have to make sure that this multi-layered synchronicity of actors, mandates and instruments does not result in adding more chaos, but can be orchestrated into a positive outcome on the ground.

What counts at the end of the day is that through better coordination and cooperation, international peace operations are able to make a difference by contributing to provide a sustainable peace, security and improvement of living conditions to individuals and societies that come out of a crisis or an armed conflict.
To conclude, I would say that this year’s forum is an excellent opportunity to discuss in a frank and open manner today’s and tomorrow’s challenges as well as the responses we can give to these challenges in the field of peace and security. I would like to encourage you to take this opportunity to contribute with critical constructive input to the discussions. It is the aim of the event to provide the space for new thinking, for testing ideas and concepts as well as for an open exchange between the many different actors in the field of peace and security.

Brig. Gen. Erwin Dahinden, Head, International Relations, Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport, Switzerland

It is a pleasure for me to welcome you on behalf of the Swiss Armed Forces. I will present a brief overview of the contributions as well as the understanding of the Swiss Armed Forces of cooperation and coordination between civil and military actors.

We acknowledge that modern crisis management has to be comprehensive and we have to coordinate on different levels and on different lines of operations or actions to contribute to the overall goal. I must highlight that not one alone can reach the overall goal. One of the key challenges of an international peace operation is to coordinate the different processes and to bring them together in order to reach the overall goal, namely the self-sustaining peace in the concerned country. In addition, the root causes of the conflict still exist, as do the different networks at local level. It is also important to bear in mind that all international actors have their own agendas, focusing on their own priorities and interests, which are not necessarily the ones of the international peace operation, and this may lead to conflicting interests. In specific situations we can also observe the negative aspects of the ‘competition for donors’.

Depending on the background or government position or how you have to mobilize your finances, you may have different priorities. As we all know, nobody likes the idea of coordination much, but others should coordinate. It means that they should abide to what you are expecting to be constructive in the field. And I think that is the overall problem here, which is, to bring the actors together and to understand at the first stage their very different cultures. There is a similar word being used, integrated missions, which means that we should succeed in this coordi-
nation at least at a minimum level and we should also understand how priorities should be made in a certain circumstance of conflict.

In our understanding, we can sum up the different activities and phases in a post-conflict peace process into three main vectors: security, stability and development. They are interrelated and if we give them a positive spin they are supporting each other to make the positive turn to become a mounting spiral achieving higher levels of stability, security and development. Thus, a post-conflict peace process requires—in a first phase—a safe and secure environment. International peace forces are well designed to provide the appropriate level of security, which is constantly required. This secure environment allows the humanitarian and—later—the civilian actors to enter the country and to start their work to promote the peace process. These activities will help a second vector, by which the respective country becomes more stable through the improved functioning of the institutions. This phase is dominated by local capacity building activities, by reforming local government, including the security sector, and by reinforcing the civil society. These actions will push the third vector, namely economic development, which in turn leads to a more secure environment. In the end, the support provided by the international community should lead to a self-sustaining perpetuation of the peace process. Based on that, it is vital to understand that each player has a key competence and a key role to play. This is the basic premise of coordination.

This leads me to the Swiss experience. Our national framework is such that different ministries and agencies need to coordinate amongst each other and with international actors. What is important is that coordination does not only start when you are in the field; it has to start in the capitals; it has to start when you are planning. I would go further to say that it has to start with common training because if we are training together, for example with foreign affairs or humanitarian assistance, we have to understand the priorities of our partners and their different cultural approaches. When we plan an operation or organize an inter-agency coordination group, we invite actors from the implementation side. Through involving this kind of coordination groups, already at the planning level we can find out: where do we have the best assets? How can we best prepare our activities in a certain area?

Ambassador Wild indicated already before that we have this 3C process; where we want to have more coherence, more coordination and a
complimentary approach. What I learned from the military is accepting the different roles, accepting that somebody is taking over a task; that the comprehensive approaches relies on the actors and on coordination.

And as one observation for the discussion in the coming days, I hope that one positive effect of the present financial crisis and the budget cuts will be the increased cooperation between actors who in the past were able to do everything or most things autonomously. Let us try to do the best out of the available capital for the international crisis management.

Mr Jonas Alberoth, Acting Director-General, Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden

As we gather for the 2012 Challenges Annual Forum, peacekeepers and peacebuilders around the world, some of whom have joined us for this forum, are struggling to assist and protect countries and peoples from conflict, crime, famine, fear and persecution. In order to be effective in their efforts they need to coordinate their activities with a multitude of international, national and local actors.

They are also working hard to balance high expectations with limited resources in times when peacekeeping is gradually expected to do more and more with less. During the forum we will address a selection of key issues and questions. How can we encourage inter-institutional and cross-organizational learning and pooling of analysis and experiences? What type of strategic command and control structures would facilitate more effective cooperation? What lessons can be drawn from the international community’s engagements in countries like Afghanistan and South Sudan? These are the two cases that will be examined more closely. How can these experiences inform the work in other missions? How can the so-called operational triangle, that is the Security Council, the UN Secretariat and troop-and-police contributing countries, become a trident in response to both current and emerging challenges?

Times are changing. The challenges shift in weight and emphasis. Reality, however, keeps superseding plans, expectations and forecasts. Currently, many traditional contributors and funders of peacekeeping, peace operations and development corporations face financial difficulties. This requires intensified cooperation and an effective pooling of human, intellectual and financial resources for the benefit of the greater good, for more effective and efficient capacities of peace operations and
peacebuilding. In the Challenges Forum, cooperation, sharing and partnership is the foundation of our work. We know the true potential of effective and mutually supportive cooperation.

Strong and inclusive peacekeeping and peacebuilding partnership is required for the international community of peacekeepers and peacebuilders to be less vulnerable to financial hardships and shifting political realities. Building on the UN’s New Horizon initiative and corresponding reform and development processes of the regional organizations, we need to learn more about current and emerging conflicts and to refine the methodologies and instruments we use as we seek to tackle them. We need to learn more about and develop instruments to better assess what impact our missions and contributions have on the ground, and for the countries and peoples caught up in conflict. We need to effectively make knowledge and best practices transferrable. One such example is the publication of the Challenges Forum reports in the six official UN languages. We will soon also launch an interactive web-based working platform.

Thanks to our hosts, the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, in cooperation with the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs and the Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sports, we will be able to do just that. Thanks to the efforts of Ambassador Tanner, Dr Tardy and their team, we will be able to focus on the most critical issues of cooperation and coordination facing peace operations throughout the world, and hopefully come out more motivated and equipped with concrete suggestions on how to take this work forward.

Ms Annika Hilding Norberg, Director, Challenges Forum

The purpose of the Challenges Forum, as the Ambassador mentioned earlier, is to contribute to improved analysis, planning, conduct and evaluation of multidimensional peace operations, to develop recommendations and to encourage their effective implementation. The second and equally important objective is to broaden and strengthen the international network of actors involved in peace operations.

The Challenges Forum is very much a working partnership providing the international community with a strategic, broad-based, and dynamic platform for deliberations on peace operations among leading policymakers, practitioners and academics. The Challenges Forum was
initiated in 1996. The UN has been our common denominator, here represented by the Assistant Secretary-General for Rule of Law and Security Institutions and his team. I should also mention that the Challenges Partnership has moreover been enriched over the years through cooperation with regional organizations such as the AU, the EU (where several meetings have been held as part of an EU presidency), and NATO.

What have we done and what do we do? Some 30 Challenges reports on particular and critical issues of peace operations have been produced. They are based on the outcomes of Challenges Annual Forums such as this one, or the results from seminars and workshops, and include two concluding reports that were presented to the UN Secretary-General at the UN headquarters in New York in 2002 and 2006, respectively.

Ideas and recommendations that are generated in the discussions are picked up and have been turned into concrete policy development at both national and international levels. For example, Challenges Forum findings have made their way into the Secretary-General’s reports on peacekeeping, resolutions in the UN Security Council, and the reports of the UN Special Committee for Peacekeeping Operations, thanks to our partners in Australia, Japan and Turkey.

We are now in our third and more long-term phase of cooperation. How did the Challenges Forum start? It was initiated in 1996 as a round-table discussion involving primarily peacekeeping training centres in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the Russian Federation and Sweden. The Challenges Forum has developed into a global partnership for peace operations, which is co-owned and co-financed by the partners from 20 countries, including the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and major troop-, police-, corrections-, civilian- and financial-contributing actors. Half of the partners are civilian and half are military. Half are from the Global South and half are from the Global North.

Partners have also been involved in parallel cooperative projects. In 2006, the Challenges Partnership was invited by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) to support the launch of the UN DPKO-led process to develop the principles and guidelines for UN peacekeeping. UN DPKO was in the lead of that process, but the part-
ners were pleased to convene workshops to assist in member state consultation processes.

Encouraged by the UN, the Challenges Partnership then set about to operationalize the principles and guidelines document into Considerations for Senior Mission Leadership in UN peacekeeping; an effort coordinated by Major General Robert Gordon, Senior Adviser to the Challenges Secretariat. The Considerations Study involved analysing the mandates of UN peace operations, identifying the main objectives, the required outputs, supporting the necessary activities, and not least, the considerations that the mission leadership would need to bear in mind related to prioritization, sequencing, and identification of required resources and so on. With input and comments from the broader UN system and some twenty current and former senior mission leaders—SRSGs, Force Commanders and Police Commissioners—the Challenges Considerations Study is now used by partners around the world as well as by the UN, the AU and, most recently, the EU used it in its first senior mission leadership course. Thanks to our challenges partners, the study has been translated into Arabic, Chinese, French, Russian and Spanish.

The Challenges Annual Forum 2012 is particularly important for the Challenges Forum effort for a number of reasons. Our hosts, the government of Switzerland, and the Geneva Centre for Security Policy with Ambassador Fred Tanner, Dr Thierry Tardy, and the whole team, has brought us together, inviting us to engage with each other and in particular the international community of humanitarian actors. We hope this will be the beginning of a more systematic cooperation with members in the humanitarian community. We are both honoured and privileged to be here, and very much look forward to three days of, no doubt, challenging but I am sure immensely rewarding deliberations.

The Status of Peace Operations 2012: Trends, Facts and Figures

Ms Megan Gleason, Senior Programme Officer, Center on International Cooperation, New York University

I am pleased to present a quick overview of the findings of the 2012 volume of the Annual Review of Global Peace Operations. I also want to take the opportunity to note that the Annual Review would not be possible without the generous support of our founders, the governments of Norway, Germany, Australia as well as the Compton Foundation.
2011 was an eventful year in peacekeeping. At the outset of the year the UN was facing electoral related violence in Haiti and in Côte d’Ivoire. Also, early in the year there was a referendum for the independence of South Sudan, and its subsequent independence in July as violence flared in a disputed territory of Juba. In Libya we had a NATO campaign that was followed by the authorization of a UN political mission. In Somalia, a strengthened AMISOM continued its operations against Al-Shabab.

All of these development occurred against the backdrop of increasing strain at headquarters and an increasingly difficult relationship between troop and police contributors on the one hand, and financial contributors on the other. For all of these developments it is worth noting, as our Director, Bruce Jones, does in his Director’s comments, that 2011 could have been a disastrous year for peacekeeping. Events in Côte d’Ivoire, South Sudan and Somalia all ran the risk of rapid deterioration at various points throughout the year.

However, peacekeeping demonstrated a very clear strength in 2011. It supported the many electoral processes that occurred in countries hosting peacekeeping operations. In Somalia, AU troops rested control of Mogadishu for the first time in many years.

Several new missions were also deployed in 2011—South Sudan; Abyei, Sudan and Libya. These new missions in 2011 also demonstrate a continued demand for international support, including and supporting the extension of state authority, which is the thematic focus of this year’s volume of the Annual Review.

Peacekeeping continued to grow in 2011, albeit at a significantly reduced pace than we have seen in previous years. In 2011 we saw a growth of 2.7 per cent, while in 2010 we saw a growth of 30 per cent. Hence, this is quite a small change.

However, in terms of UN uniformed deployments, we saw the first decrease since 2003, albeit quite a small decrease. More interesting though, is when you drill down into these figures, we see a decrease in terms of the number of military personnel who are deployed and a slight increase in terms of the number of civilian police who are deployed.
The decrease that we saw in the deployment of UN peacekeepers was matched by an increase in the deployment of non-UN peacekeepers. In NATO it is a three per cent increase in deployment in 2011. The deployments to Afghanistan remain largely stable. In the AU we saw a 35 per cent increase in number of troops deployed, a figure driven by the deployments to Somalia. This growth was registered prior to the council’s authorization this year for a nearly 50 per cent increase in that mission.

This is table listing the top troop-contributing countries to UN missions, by aggregated troop numbers and by per capita troop contribution. We calculated the per capita numbers using UN population data. The top three aggregated troop contributors are Pakistan, Bangladesh and India, and the top three per capita troop contributors are Uruguay, Jordan and Fiji. Interestingly, four countries make both of these lists, Ghana, Rwanda, Nepal and Uruguay.

As I mentioned, the focus of the thematic essay this year was the extension of state authority. Jake Sherman, CIC’s former deputy director, authored the thematic essay which explores the international communities’ experience in supporting extension of state authority, with a particular focus on UN missions. It identifies a number of lessons as well as continuing challenges for this type of support. Extending and consolidating the reach of state institutions has become a critical component of international peacekeeping, because the majority of today’s peace operations are deployed in states where the state has reconstitution and where violence and insecurity continue after the signing of a peace agreement.

The first multidimensional mission that was tasked with the extension of state authority was the UN mission in Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL in 2000. Since then the council has authorized a range of missions to support the extension of state authority. The language used in authorizing mandates tends to be quite similar, so here we have the authorization language for UNAMSIL Security Council Resolution 1313, ‘to extend state authority to consolidate state authority’. But in practice, supporting the extension of state authority is largely contextual and in some cases it entails the geographic extension of state institutions, notably in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). In other cases it has been more focused on strengthening the capacity and effectiveness of
The essay identifies a number of important lessons from the international community’s experiences in supporting the extension of state authority. Among others that extension of state authority often depends on peacekeepers’ tactical use of force, that state presence is not the same as legitimate state authority, and that supporting states is distinct from supporting governments.

However, peace operations struggle with a number of continuing operational challenges in terms of supporting the extension of state authority. Three are particularly critical. First, coherent support requires strength in internal, within the UN, and external integration, between the UN and bilateral and multilateral actors on the ground. Two, rapidly deployable and appropriate civilian expertise is in short supply. Very important steps were made last year around the civilian capacity review and other policy processes. However, the international community still struggles with getting the right expertise on the ground at the right time. Third, financial resources are inflexible and programming capacity remains inadequate. This is just a quick overview of some of the main findings of this year’s Annual Review.

Mr Richard Gowan, Associate Director, Crisis Diplomacy and Peace Operations, and Managing Global Order, Center on International Cooperation, New York University

The Political Missions review covers multilateral operations, which are primarily civilian missions involved in conflict prevention, conflict management, peacebuilding and governance support. They do not include troops or police.

In 2009–2010, CIC realized that we had been looking a great deal at peace operations, and that we had managed to map the world of peace operations very well. However, we had not done quite such a good job of looking at this other type of multilateral mission, the civilian political missions. These missions are very important and operate in critical situations such as Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia. Since we launched the first volume of the Review of Political Missions, the UN has deployed a political mission to Libya, which was one of the most controversial and one of the most discussed UN operations of the last 12 months. The
man leading that mission in Libya is Ian Martin, who was involved in setting up the CIC Review of Political Missions. However, Ian Martin has always argued that we must break down our thinking, or the divide we have in our thinking, between peacekeeping with troops and civilian crisis management. I think that the Libyan mission shows him doing that in action.

There are more than 50 political missions deployed by various organizations worldwide, involved in a full range of activities. The main deployer is the UN. It has 3,900 staff in political missions, costing over $600 million. The second biggest deployer is the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which deployed most of its missions back in the 1990s, but still has over 2,000 staff in the field, costing over $100 million. You may be struck by the difference between the UN budget and the OSCE budget. The fact is that most of the UN budget is directed at two political missions, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the UN Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI), which are very large and which also have major security problems. That explains the difference between the UN and the OSCE. In addition, the AU is also deploying civilian political missions, with 12 AU liaison offices with over 200 staff deployed in conflict sensitive places like Sudan, South Sudan and Côte d’Ivoire, and a much smaller budget of only $10 million. However, as we see a series of peacekeeping operations draw down in Africa, we may well see these liaison offices playing a more important diplomatic role in stabilizing countries like Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire.

While this Forum focuses primarily on peacekeeping, it is worth thinking about the role of the civilian missions in conflict management. At a time when, frankly, money is short, there is an argument that you will hear around the UN that political missions are a cheaper alternative to peacekeeping. Is this true? It is not really true. The majority of political missions are actually deployed alongside peace operations. So that in Afghanistan UNAMA is deployed alongside the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Political missions tend to work alongside military missions or replace them in a peacebuilding role, as in Burundi. Although it is possible, in some future crisis, we will see small political missions deployed where we would once have sent large blue helmet missions. Libya, I think, is an example of that possibility.
There are problems with deploying civilian missions too. It is one thing to send 20,000 blue helmeted troops into a dangerous country. It is quite another to send a few hundred civilian staff with limited security, and political missions are deployed in dangerous places. For example, UNAMI, which tragically lost many lives back in 2003, and has continued to operate in a very dangerous environment in Iraq. Another example is the UN Political Office in Mogadishu, which is adapting to an extremely unstable environment. In 2015 UNAMA will be left on its own, without NATO military protection and the leverage that NATO troops provide to the UN in political issues in Afghanistan. I think there is a great deal of worry in New York about how the UN will operate once NATO goes.

Those are some thoughts on political missions and that last footnote on Afghanistan leads me to the final part of this presentation: What are we going to see in peacekeeping over the next five years? We are at a moment of change in peacekeeping.

The growth in peacekeeping has begun to tail off and peacekeeping is plateauing. It is not growing in the very rapid way that it did in 2003, 2004, or 2005. In fact, in the next few years it is very likely that the overall international peacekeeping effort is going to shrink. As noted, ISAF, by far the biggest peace operation today, is leaving Afghanistan in 2014. The UN is downsizing in Haiti, Liberia, probably the DRC and also to an extent in Darfur, Sudan. The European Union (EU) is limiting its new military deployments—well, it is not sending any new military deployments—and it is limiting its deployments to small civilian missions. The net result is that the peacekeeping footprint in five years’ time could be much smaller than it is today. The UN might only have 70,000 peacekeepers in the field. The EU and NATO might have no large military missions overseas, although there will probably be some residual presence in the Balkans. There will be an increased emphasis on civilian political missions managing places like Libya because of the cost factors and the intervention fatigue that we see in some contributing countries.

Peacekeepers may start to feel downsizing blues. There are already debates in New York about whether certain peacekeeping missions such as the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) should be scaled down faster than it is currently planned. Certain troop-contributing countries fear that their units are going to be downsized, thereby reducing their leverage over peacekeeping in the UN system. Similarly, there are some
within NATO headquarters who are concerned that they are leaving Afghanistan too fast and that they may leave chaos in their wake.

Is peacekeeping going to shrink inevitably? Not necessarily. It could go the other way. We might be on the verge of another peacekeeping boom. The AU is expanding its operations in Somalia, with UN logistical support. The UN or ECOWAS may have to deploy troops to Mali, who may also end up in a very robust operation against Islamists, just as the AU has had to in Somalia. The UN is almost certainly going to have to expand its peacekeeping presence on the Sudanese border. In a year’s time we may have UN or Arab League peacekeepers in Syria. The CSTO in the post-Soviet space is also looking into conducting peacekeeping operations. The EU and NATO can provide backup, logistic support, rapid reinforcements. Some western countries may want to put their troops into UN operations after they leave Afghanistan. I do not know what is on the horizon, but it seems relatively certain that we are entering into a period of really significant change in peacekeeping.

For the last five years peacekeeping has bumped along. It has roughly stayed the same. Missions have kept on keeping on. Now we face new challenges in places like Mali and Somalia, and we face new opportunities in drawing down missions in places like Liberia. It is going to be the effects of those processes that we discuss at this conference.

Discussion

The discussion centred on current and evolving definition of peacekeeping and peace operations, and specifically on CIC’s definition in its publications.

HE Dr Tanner posed a question on CIC’s approach or definition of peace operations. ‘You have included ISAF in your presentation of global peace operations, a qualification that could be challenged or questioned by several observers. Could you perhaps tell us what is the starting point at CIC?’

Mr Gowan responded that there is always a massive conceptual debate over ‘what is a peace operation?’ and ‘what is a political mission?’ Our definition of a political mission ranges from the UN in Afghanistan and Iraq to OSCE governance support offices in Central Asia. The honest answer is that we do not have a hard and fast definition of what a peace
operation is or what a political mission is. What should we describe the current mission in Syria as? As I think Jean-Marie indicated last night, it is hardly a peacekeeping operation. You might call it a war-watching operation. We are not going to do a stand-alone book on war watching operations. We have always covered operations that have UN mandates, and that is why ISAF is included. We see, and I think this is a more controversial point, a certain continuity (in terms of robust operations) between some of what ISAF does in Afghanistan and some of what the AU does in Somalia, but also some of what the UN does in the Congo. Clearly, the scale of operations in Afghanistan is much greater. I think that we do see a continued drift towards peace enforcement in places like Somalia. I think that if a mission were deployed to Mali, it would be involved in peace enforcement rather than just peacekeeping. This drift puts a strain on peacekeepers and it is something we need to discuss. In the meantime, however, we will just keep shifting our definitions.

Dr Tardy asked another question. ‘According to William Flavin; peacebuilding is also a part of this whole spectrum. The peacebuilding support office and all the other peacebuilding activities that are carried out by that office. How would you characterize it in relationship to these other missions?’

Mr Gowan responded ‘we cover peacebuilding missions such as those in Burundi and Sierra Leone in the political missions book. It is possible over time that you are going to see a real proliferation of new peacebuilding offices as certain missions draw down. That is why we also point to the EU liaison officers as potential platforms for peacebuilding. I think we have to distinguish between peacebuilding missions, which usually take on specific duties from peacekeeping operations, and longer-term peacebuilding as a much wider activity of the UN and other international organizations. For example, the UN is now going to engage in helping Myanmar in peacebuilding, which is quite different from the situation in Burundi. We do not cover all aspects of peacebuilding, we simply look at where there is a mission and cover that.’
Inter-institutional Cooperation in Peace Operations: United Nations and Regional Organizations

Challenges

Background Paper: The UN, Regional Organizations and a New Generation of Challenges

Mr Richard Gowan, Associate Director, Crisis Diplomacy and Peace Operations, and Managing Global Order, Center on International Cooperation, New York University

The New Strategic Context: Downsizing Peacekeeping?

Peacekeeping is at the end of an era. For over a decade, the United Nations, NATO and regional organizations including the European and African Unions have contributed to long-term state-building projects in cases ranging from Kosovo to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The next few years will see a number of these missions downsize or close. The most striking transition will be in Afghanistan, where the NATO-led International Assistance Force (ISAF) is set to wind up in 2014. NATO and the EU are also cutting back their military and police operations in the Western Balkans. The UN will reduce its presence in cases including Haiti, Liberia and the DRC. UN police officers and Australian troops are scheduled to withdraw from Timor-Leste. In all likelihood, the AU-UN force in Darfur will also shrink significantly from its current level of nearly 25 000 uniformed personnel.

It is possible that unforeseen crises will demand the deployment of new large-scale missions. The case of Somalia, where the AU has engaged in its biggest operations with logistical back-up from the UN and has taken on robust operations, is the main exception to the downsizing trend. The need to deploy a new mission to Abyei in 2011 also highlights the continuing potential for new missions. There is a continuing possibility that ongoing or new crises in the Middle East may eventually necessitate the deployment of a large peacekeeping forces or even peace enforcement operations.

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1 This paper is a commissioned background paper for the International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations. The views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Challenges Partnership or the Host. It draws extensively on CIC’s Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2012 (Rienner, 2012) and Review of Political Missions 2011. The author thanks the editorial teams of both publications for their assistance, and gratefully acknowledges Thierry Tardy, Megan Gleason, Alischa Kugel, Tristan Dreisbach and Morgan Hughes for their input on this paper.
However, the simultaneous downsizing of multiple missions makes it probable that the overall peacekeeping burden will be significantly reduced by 2015. It is fair to suppose that there will be 60,000–80,000 UN peacekeepers in the field three years from now—down from 100,000 today.

Other organizations are also likely to limit themselves to relatively small, focused operations in the near future. The EU, for example, has notably reduced the rate at which it deploys new missions and is currently focusing on setting up small civilian presences rather than vastly more expensive military interventions such as its 2008 deployment to Chad and the Central African Republic.

The potential reduction of the peacekeeping burden offers international organizations a degree of relief after a prolonged period of intense activity. In some cases peacekeeping forces have outlived their usefulness, as a prolonged international presence can lose legitimacy and leverage over time.

But the period also presents serious risks. As the 2011 World Development Report (WDR) notes, ‘many countries now face cycles of repeated violence’ and ‘90 per cent of the last decade’s civil wars occurred in countries that had already had a war in the last 30 years.’ Even if countries do not revert to full-scale war after peacekeepers leave, other forms of insecurity can increase. Organized crime can quickly corrode weak state institutions and limited conflicts can affect parts of a country.

Given the amount invested in peacekeeping and state-building to date, there is a need to minimize the risks of stable states reverting to violence. This involves ensuring that national authorities and local actors are fully involved in each transition process, and that development agencies calibrate their aid to reduce the risks of a return to conflict. These policies lie beyond the scope of this paper, but it argues that effective peacekeeping partnerships between the UN and regional organizations can also play an important role in reducing and managing the risks of downsizing peace operations.

The paper argues that it is also crucial for the UN and its partners to balance reductions in their commitments in by increasing support to those weak states that need it most: Somalia is an obvious example, but others such as South Sudan may also need more assistance. The case of Afghanistan, where ISAF is set to leave the UN to carry the political burden alone, is especially problematic.

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The State of Peacekeeping Partnerships

The growth of peacekeeping since the late 1990s has relied heavily on cooperation between the UN and regional organizations. Whereas UN officials were once suspicious of ‘subcontracting’ operations to other organizations, they have now heartily embraced a ‘partnerships agenda’. The doctrines of other organizations have followed a similar strategic trajectory. While the framework for cooperation that exists for managing inter-organizational or multi-organizational cooperation evolved in ad hoc manner, it offers a solid basis for handling the coming challenges outlined above.

Cooperation has been driven by operational realities, not grand strategic designs. Over two-thirds of EU peace operations have deployed alongside a UN mission. All NATO ground operations have involved cooperation with the UN, EU or Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In Darfur, the original AU mission was supported by the EU, NATO and the UN. Since 2007, the UN and AU have run a hybrid mission in Darfur, integrating their military and mediating efforts.

In Somalia, the AU bears the burden of peacekeeping but the UN provides both logistical and political support. The EU is training the Somali army. The EU, NATO and a range of individual powers, including the U.S., have ships off the coast combating Somali pirates. This is one of the most complex multi-organizational peacekeeping arrangements currently in action, yet the AU has made progress in bringing Mogadishu under government control and the pirate menace has begun to shrink.

Cooperation is always complicated by bureaucratic, financial and political issues. Turf wars persist. However, as Joachim A. Koops notes, ‘peace operations partnerships between the UN and regional organizations have advanced considerably both in operational and institutional terms.3 Examples of recent progress on institutional linkages include the establishment of a new UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Liaison Office in Brussels, the creation of a UN-AU Joint Task Force on Peace and Security and the appointment of a civilian NATO liaison officer at UN headquarters.

In the field, cooperation is often just a fact of life: EU personnel hitch rides in UN helicopters in the DRC, for example, while UN officials take advantage of NATO protection in Afghanistan. In Kosovo, senior officials from the UN, EU and OSCE were able to get round political obstacles to cooperation during the 2008 independence dispute by having breakfast in the same hotel. Good per-

sonal relations between mission leaders also allowed (i) UN and ECOWAS officials to successfully diffuse a political crisis in Guinea in 2010; and (ii) the UN, OSCE and EU to contain the 2011 Kyrgyz violence.

Institutional differences can still constrain field-level cooperation. The EU and NATO are unable to share intelligence with partners in many cases. Organizations maintain very different—and sometimes incompatible—command and control systems. Yet there are ways to limit these problems in extremis. After the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, the UN mission set up a Joint Operations Tasking Center (JTOC) involving UN agencies and ‘military liaison officers from the U.S., Canada, the EU and the Caribbean Community to facilitate the prioritization of humanitarian response, coordination between humanitarian actors, and centralized, strategic planning.’ In the Libyan case, the UN, EU and World Bank deployed a common assessment team to identify common priorities.

There has been rather less progress in terms of top-level political contacts between organizations. As Mauricio Artiñano points out, ‘the only regional body that meets regularly with the members of the Security Council is the AU Peace and Security Council’ and ‘there is no indication that any of the other regional organs, such as the European Council or the North Atlantic Council, have any interest in meeting directly with the [Security] Council.’ This means that even when these organizations commit to deploy missions simultaneously, as the EU and UN did in the case of Chad and the CAR, there is no direct dialogue between the ultimate decision-making bodies. Secretariat officials or diplomats from major powers (France in the case of Chad) must carry messages to and fro instead.

However, the experience of AU–UN cooperation also demonstrates the limits of high-level political dialogue. Discussions have been complicated by differences over the Security Council’s unwillingness to mandate a UN force in Somalia, its use of the International Criminal Court in Africa and its decision to approve the use of force in Libya. There is talk of a renewed need for AU and UN officials to ‘deliberate on the conceptual, philosophical and practical issues in the partnership.’

4 Alischa Kugel, ‘Reflecting on the Experiences of Major TCCs—the Case of Brazil in MINUSTAH’, unpublished CIC paper April 2012. A version of this paper will be published in a collection of CIC essays in late 2012.
6 The details on Chad/CAR in this paper are based on Alexandra Novosseloff and Richard Gowan, Security Council Working Methods and UN Peace Operations: The Case of Chad and the Central African Republic, CIC, 2012.
7 Koops, op.cit, p.3.
Nonetheless, for as long as missions mandated by different organizations are co-deployed in the field, there will continue to be significant practical and strategic stimuli for cooperation. How will these stimuli alter as and when organizations begin to cut back their operational commitments?

**Potential Challenges for Peacekeeping Partnerships: The Dangers of Downsizing**

The inter-organizational relationships outlined above have developed to manage the problems of growth in the overall demand for peace operations. Different problems will emerge as missions shrink and close, potentially requiring alternative forms of cooperation between organizations.

When one organization draws down, it can create hazards for others. The story of EU-UN cooperation in Chad/CAR illustrates this. In 2008, the EU deployed a military force to assist humanitarian operations in Chad while the UN sent a parallel police mission. From the outset, it was clear that Chad preferred the EU presence to the UN, but the European mission closed after one year. The Chadian authorities (i) set limits on the transfer of EU assets and bases to the UN; (ii) made a series of demands for aid in return for accepting the UN’s continued presence; and (iii) eventually insisted that the UN mission close in 2010, despite the efforts of the Security Council and France.

When an organization closes a peace operation, it may fall to other actors to deal with ensuing tensions and violence. The UN maintained a preventive deployment from 1992 to 1999 in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). In 2001, the country came very close to civil war. The OSCE struggled to prevent the conflict and NATO eventually had to deploy a military mission while the EU deployed one of its first police missions (Operation Concordia) to help restore public order and promote police reform. The crisis in FYROM might have spiked in 2001 if UN forces had still been in place, but they clearly left a vacuum for the three European security organizations to fill.

The UN’s departure from Timor-Leste at the end of 2005 also precipitated serious disorder, leading Australia and New Zealand to deploy troops (and the UN to launch a peace mission) to restore order in 2006. Sometimes conflicts can erupt as an existing peace operation is approaching closure: the final months of the original UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) were complicated by escalating violence over the region of Abyei. Ethiopia deployed a stand-alone force, the Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNIFSA) to halt the drift to war.

These cases highlight the risks inherent in downsizing any peace operation, even in cases where a mission has done a good job of fulfilling its mandate prior to
drawdown. Cases such as FYROM and Timor-Leste were both perceived as success stories for peacekeeping before violence reoccurred.⁸

There are cases of organizations successfully managing the downsizing of peace operations. In the Balkans, for example, the UN and OSCE managed a phased transition of policing responsibilities in Eastern Slavonia (Croatia) in 1997–1998 after the withdrawal of the UN Transitional Administration in the region. The EU took on police duties from the UN in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2003 and military duties from NATO in 2004, ensuring continuous security. The UN and EU managed to transfer rule of law responsibilities in Kosovo in 2008 in spite of disputes over its independence.

In each of these cases, the success of transitions relied on (i) in-depth strategic and tactical discussions between the organizations involved in advance of the transition; and (ii) the willingness of a regional organization to stay engaged in the security situation over the medium to long-term. Although the details of each transition were often complicated—EU officials admit that they fumbled many aspects of the transfer of policing duties in Bosnia, for example—the clear message that international actors would remain engaged in each case helped ensure long-term stability.

Looking ahead, there is at least one case where the drawdown of one organization’s peace operation will certainly create challenges for other international actors. When ISAF exits Afghanistan in 2014 it will leave behind (i) a civilian UN mission that has seemed adrift in recent years, and (ii) an EU police reform mission, although the latter may depart alongside NATO. Both will face not only the challenges of operating in a high-risk environment without the assurance of NATO protection for its personnel and maintaining political credibility in the absence of Western military leverage.

The risks of drawing down missions elsewhere are less certain. However, it is possible that the downsizing of the current UN missions in West Africa and the DRC may (i) precipitate significant new conflict or (ii) at least create the conditions for increased low-level violence and political crises. This is not to argue that countries in these regions definitely face further instability. Ultimately, their stability rests on ingenuity and commitment of their own leaders. However, it would be irresponsible of international actors not to consider how to mitigate the security risks involved.

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⁸ It is worth noting, however, that the UN’s withdrawal from FYROM resulted from a diplomatic dispute in the Security Council rather than recommendations from UN officials on the ground, who were aware of ongoing risks.
The UN and other organizations have taken serious steps to avoid countries reverting to violence as peace operations shrink and close. They have maintained operations in cases including Haiti and Liberia for far longer than was initially expected. The UN has also developed detailed transition planning frameworks—in Timor-Leste, for example, the outgoing missions has tried to identify actors capable of taking on each of its tasks after it has gone. The UN also invested in peacebuilding offices to take up duties from peace operations in cases including Burundi and Sierra Leone. It is likely that such offices will be set up as a matter of routine as other blue helmet missions close.

Similarly, the EU aims to build on its recently founded European External Action Service (EEAS) to improve its assistance to fragile states, an issue that the European Commission previously prioritized. The AU has a network of liaison offices, mainly in countries where the UN has peace operations (including Côte d’Ivoire, the DRC and Liberia) or the AU has sent troops in the past (such as Burundi and Comoros). These small missions could be the basis for new peacebuilding initiatives.

But it is necessary to envisage a fuller array of mechanisms to reduce the risk of countries returning to violence. In a contribution to the 2011 WDR, the leading peacekeeping officials of the AU and the UN called for ‘creative solutions’ to address this challenge, including ‘long-term programs for security development and reform, light monitoring and over-the-horizon reinforcements.’ The final section of this note returns to these policy options and frameworks for implementing them.

Potential Challenges for Peacekeeping Partnerships: Managing the Hardest Cases

Although downsizing missions may be the main priority over the medium term, it should not distract from the continued need to stabilize outstanding failed states. As we have noted, the most obvious of these is Somalia and the international response involves multiple organizations working together.

The Somali experiment may best be described as ‘plug-and-play’ peacekeeping: different organizations have brought different capabilities to contribute to the overall stabilization process. Rather than setting up a large-scale integrated mission (such as the UN presences in the DRC and Liberia). Some of these roles (such as the EU and NATO maritime deployments) go beyond regular peace operations. The UN’s contribution, providing the logistical framework for the AU mission, is also a significant innovation: it may have to play a similar role as a ‘service provider’ in future cases.
The main lessons of the Somalia operation include (i) the need to continue developing the military peacekeeping capacities of the AU (and potentially other African organizations) to take on sustained robust operations; (ii) the utility of the UN as a logistical ‘service provider’ to other organizations; and (iii) the need to expand thinking about peacekeeping to include maritime and aerial operations.

But it is also necessary to recognize that the combination of organizations involved in Somalia (the AU, UN, EU and NATO) did not come together through a rational planning process. Their efforts are still far from fully coordinated. Instead, as we have noted, it has emerged through a series of compromises that have caused AU-UN tensions. There were also significant early flaws in the UN’s logistical support—sometimes even affecting the provision of basic rations to AU contingents.

The greatest lesson from Somalia may be the need to improve the mechanisms for planning complex multi-organizational operations. Organizations that usually work well together can struggle to cooperate effectively in the planning stage of a new mission due to political and operational uncertainties. However, international and regional organizations have found ways to improve common planning by deploying joint assessment missions such as that sent to Libya by the UN, EU and World Bank last year—the UN and regional organizations need to build on these precedents.

The Somali case is not an easily transferable model to areas where there is no regional organization or sub-regional body ready to take on the same risk as the AU. In the last year, other regional organizations have taken steps towards a greater role in peace operations. The Arab League deployed monitors to Syria and the Association of South-East Asian Nations mandated a military observer mission to deploy to the Thai-Cambodian border. More experienced organizations such as the UN, EU and NATO should encourage the Arab League and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). However, unless the League is drawn into a larger peace operation in Syria, the new players will take some time to evolve.\(^\text{10}\)

**Recommendations**

This paper has argued that two major peacekeeping challenges lie ahead, and that each has implications for inter-organizational partnerships: (i) managing and sharing the risks involved in downsizing and closing a number of major peace operations simultaneously; and (ii) preparing responses to major crises

that will require multiple organizations to deploy military and civilian assets. In this context, the UN and regional organizations can pursue three strategic policy priorities:

1. Develop joint mechanisms risk assessment and risk management: where peace operations are winding down, the UN and concerned regional organizations can pool their resources and information and set up joint risk assessment mechanisms to track security dynamics. Such discussions must involve the host government, which has ultimate responsibility.

2. Experiment with joint tasking mechanisms: going beyond joint assessments, the UN and its partners can build on the example of the JTOC in Haiti described above, setting up ‘clearing house’ mechanisms for organizations to share responsibilities especially as missions close. Organizations can also develop joint transition plans—modelled on those that the UN has used in cases such as Timor-Leste—to work out responsibilities as peacekeepers depart.

3. Strengthen regional frameworks to manage risks: the UN and regional organizations can cooperate in developing regional contact groups and initiatives such as the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region to address regional conflict dynamics. Equally, the West Africa Coastal Initiative (WACI) set up by the UN has tackled threats from drug-related organized crime in the region, and may be a model for partnerships in other regions.

4. Explore systems of regional security guarantees to reinforce/replace peace operations: in cases where the risks of a reversion to violence appear significant, the UN and regional organizations can develop security guarantees for countries where peace operations are downsizing. These could include commitments by a regional organization to reinforce UN mission if a crisis blows up as it is drawing down or after its departure. In Africa, the development of sub-regional stand-by forces may facilitate these commitments, but for the time being most such guarantees will have to be agreed on an ad hoc basis. Again, it is essential that national authorities are comfortable with the proposed reaction mechanisms.

5. Expand the UN’s role as logistical ‘service provider’ and make wider use of the EU/NATO logistical capacities: if the AU and regional organizations are to (i) continue to undertake operations such as that in Somalia or (ii) reinforce existing missions as they downsize, it is essen-

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11 Such mechanisms are more likely to work in cases (like Haiti) where there are no major political obstacles to cooperation, but may be less easy to construct where there are complex dynamics involved.

tial that the UN increase its ability to offer them logistical support as a quid pro quo. The EU and NATO, having provided logistical support to AU in Darfur, can also offer increased logistical support to other organizations as the Afghan campaign winds down. Many questions over the command and control of logistical assets remain unresolved, but cases such as Darfur and Somalia suggest that pragmatic solutions can be found in the field.
Presentations

Synopsis: What is the state of partnerships between the United Nations and regional organizations in the field of multidimensional peace operations? What are the main achievements and challenges?

Chair: HE Mr Jürg Lauber, Head, United Nations and International Organizations Division, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Switzerland

We have a de facto international division of labour that has not emerged as a result of a strategic vision, but rather as a result of operational and field necessities. One could also argue that there is in fact not much of an interaction between organizations at the political level. Thus, one of the key questions for this panel is whether this state of affairs is satisfactory from the perspective of the organizations and member states, or whether this should be addressed. If it should be addressed, how do we introduce a more strategic vision?

The member states have a responsibility to do this. They need to introduce more coherence in what the individual organizations do, and they need to participate in the discussions between regional organizations and between the UN and the regional organizations to develop such a strategic vision.

As you probably know, Switzerland will assume the chairmanship of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in 2014. One of the issues on our agenda will be the cooperation between the UN and the OSCE. As one of the important regional organizations in Europe, we will certainly look into that and for that reason alone I am very happy to be here and to listen to our panellists.

Mr Dmitry Titov, Assistant Secretary-General for Rule of Law and Security Institutions, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations

The UN Secretariat, in particular DPKO and the Department for Field Support (DFS), are fully committed to further enhancing our cooperation with regional and sub-regional organizations, both with our major current partners and developing new cooperation with other organizations. This commitment to stronger regional partnerships features prominently in the Secretary-General’s five-year Action Agenda for his
second term. The Action Agenda also emphasizes the need to deepen our strategic and operational collaboration with regional organizations in support of ‘nations in transition’. This commitment enjoys the strong support of our member states. In the first resolution it passed this year (S/RES/2033, 12 January 2012), the Security Council expressed ‘its determination to take effective steps to further enhance the relationship between the United Nations and regional and sub-regional organizations, in particular the African Union, in accordance with Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter.’ We are particularly pleased about the recent progress we have made with several of our key partners, which I will summarize briefly.

With the African Union, our cooperation has continued to expand significantly in both operational and institutional terms. This audience is fully aware of the extent of our cooperation in Darfur and Somalia, but there are many other contexts in which we work together more and more closely. At the institutional level, the UN–AU Joint Task Force on Peace and Security, which meets twice a year, and the United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU) are among the most important mechanisms for engagement.

At the strategic and political level, the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the AU Commission have been convening a number of mini-summits on specific crisis situations, including Côte d’Ivoire, Libya, Somalia and South Sudan. The Security Council, in Resolution 2033, has committed itself to further strengthen its own relationship with the AU Peace and Security Council. As the background paper points out, the AU Peace and Security Council remains the only regional body that meets with the Security Council on a regular basis.

With the European Union, we are cooperating closely with the EU missions and delegations in DRC, Somalia, South Sudan, and many other countries. We are working with the Crisis Management and Planning Department of the European External Action Service on a wide range of initiatives aimed at further strengthening our institutional partnership. We have re-launched the UN–EU Steering Committee on Crisis Management, making it more strategic and results oriented, and have broadened and deepened our institutional cooperation across the peace and

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security spectrum. In November 2011, the EU Political and Security Committee (PSC) endorsed an ambitious set of proposals to enhance EU support to UN peacekeeping. We look forward to the action plan the EU External Action Service (EEAS) is developing that will translate these proposals into concrete deliverables.

With NATO, our missions in Afghanistan and Kosovo have been working well with Security Council-mandated NATO forces on the ground, and we have been able to strengthen our dialogue at the senior level at headquarters through regular video teleconferences, visits, etc. The recent UN–NATO Staff Talks, which we hold on an annual basis, also generated an impressive list of action points in several areas, including training and logistics. In addition to these major partners, we are also expanding our partnership with other regional actors, for example to implement the Joint Declaration on Comprehensive Partnership that the Secretaries-General of the UN and ASEAN signed in November 2011. In March 2010, our Secretary-General signed a joint declaration with the CSTO. We are in the final stages of discussing an additional Memorandum of Understanding between DPKO and the CSTO that will focus more specifically on our cooperation in the peacekeeping field. We are keen to explore opportunities for closer collaboration with the League of Arab States, and I look forward to having further discussions with Ambassador Hitti in the coming days.

I would also like to share some reflections of a more general nature as we discuss the current state and future of partnerships between the UN and regional organizations. The way in which we cooperate in any particular situation is mostly dictated by the unique circumstances of that situation, as well as the political views of the host country and our own member states. As a result, any attempt to devise grand overarching strategies or standard models for cooperation will run into serious difficulties. The same is probably true for many attempts to allocate specific pre-assigned roles to different regional organizations.

Furthermore, there are too many differences among regional and sub-regional organizations for the UN to adopt a standardized approach. Even within our partnership with the same regional organization, the way we work together in different contexts will vary greatly, for example with the AU on Côte d’Ivoire, Somalia, Sudan (Darfur), and South Sudan. Although, this may be frustrating for policymakers that look for overall trends or standard models we can adapt for the future, it reflects
one of the virtues of a relatively unstructured system of collaboration: it allows for a great degree of flexibility and enables us to tailor the partnership arrangements to the specific situation and political dynamics.

With an eye to the future, I would argue that it is precisely because the exact circumstances and configuration of players will always be unpredictable that we should invest in some key areas for collaboration. We should engage as early as possible whenever a new crisis or situation emerges. The earlier we can come to a shared understanding of a situation the better. This includes joint assessments visits, like the one the AU and UN recently conducted on the Sahel, or the close collaboration between the EU and the UN in the planning process for Libya. We also held a workshop with NATO last year to learn more about each other’s strategic assessment methodologies. Closer cooperation between our respective situation centres is another important priority in this context.

Ideally, this shared understanding and early engagement should also extend to our member states. There will always be some cases where political differences among member states will make cooperation quite difficult or impossible. But we have found that flexible mechanisms and formats that bring together the key member states can help, for example, to agree on a broad division of labour between the main international organizations during a relatively early stage of a crisis. Timely and strategic engagement with regional partners is equally important during the later stages of a crisis when our missions start drawing down.

We should also promote regular or even day-to-day contacts between relevant colleagues as much as we can. This applies both to the most senior level and the working level. The better we know each other, the more easily we can cooperate on an ongoing basis—and just as importantly—on the next unprecedented and unpredictable crisis. Our liaison offices and desk-to-desk contacts at the headquarters level have proven to be extremely valuable in this regard. The largest and most important examples of this are the UNOAU and the EU delegation in New York. But even a small liaison presence, such as the one the UN established in Brussels last year and the NATO liaison presence in New York, have significant improved our ability to engage with regional partners.

A third point relates to the need to learn lessons from our cooperation in different contexts and actually apply the relevant ones. Learning these lessons together is an excellent way of strengthening our partner-
ships and building trust, as we have done recently with the AU (regarding support to AMIS and AMISOM) and NATO (regarding security for elections in Afghanistan). For example, among the lessons identified with the AU were firstly; the need to harmonize policy at the mandating and authorization phase so that planning and resourcing are commensurate to the tasks; and secondly; the need to have clear overall command and control arrangement and provide clear strategic guidance on the achievement of joint objectives.

Finally, in virtually all situations, we cooperated not just with one regional actor or sub-regional actor but with several—sometimes five or six. In addition, in major thematic areas, such as the rule of law, we work closely with a broad range of regional and other partners, whether on common standards, training or rosters of expert personnel. Our institutional and headquarters level engagement with regional partners needs to better reflect this reality. Already, we have agreed with some of our partners, such as the EU, that other regional actors and partners need to be brought into our discussions more frequently. As you know, the Secretary-General is convening a retreat with key regional organizations on 9 June 2012. At a lower level, we have also organized a number of events in the last 12 months where we have brought together several regional partners, rather than just talking to them separately. We will continue to promote this broader engagement.

Mr Sivuyile Bam, Head, Peace Support Operations Division, Department of Peace and Security, African Union

At the African Union, in addition to the UN, we also cooperate with other institutions, such as the EU, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), and several sub-regional organizations in Africa. The challenges we have in this regard are ongoing. There is a lack of common perception and understanding between the AU Peace and Security Council and the UN Security Council (SC) of what the relationship needs to look like and what the issues are that need to drive that relationship. For example, when the AU PSC and the UN SC meet, it is not certain whether they meet as entities or as member states of the respective decision-making bodies. The second thing is not only to confine the relationship between these institutions to peacekeeping, but to talk about the relationship with respect to the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), which more broadly includes early warning, early response, and post conflict reconstruction and development.
Turning to other organizations, for example NATO, the relationship at this stage still needs to be improved. We have NATO officers embedded in the peace support operations division assisting in planning. While collaboration at the operational level is good, the question that arises is whether the AU and the NATO will develop a relationship at the strategic level. Similarly, the EU has provided support to the AU, in terms of financing AMISOM troops—is the cooperation between the two organizations only going to be on the issue of financing or will it be broader and more strategic? According to experts, the UN engages when there is some peace to be kept, while the EU’s approach is to create space for peace to be kept. Does this mean, in the context of Somalia, that we intervene if there is no peace to enforce so that peace can be established? Are these the issues that need to be discussed? Basically the first issue is the perception of the relationship. How is it perceived by both institutions? There will be a meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council and the Foreign Affairs Council of the European Union shortly, where hopefully these issues will be discussed.

The second, of course, is the overall process. Who makes the decisions? Who ultimately takes the decision for example on issues of intervention? Take Mali as an example, ECOWAS is talking about deploying a force of several thousand troops. At the AU, we are trying to find out what informed ECOWAS and what is the intention of this intervention? Is it going to deal with the insurgents? Or is it going to deal with the co-leaders? What will be the main functions of the mission? Who makes the decisions? Should it be an AU Peace and Security Council decision, or should it be referred to the UN Security Council? Between these two institutions these are some of the issues that need to arise in this relationship.

The third issue that also needs to be looked into, of course, within this broad scope is: are we seeing the same threats? Are these organizations, understanding the new and imagined threats in the same paradigm? Are they seeing them as being issues that need to be addressed simultaneously? Again, we will be looking at the issue, for example, of how both institutions are responding to the piracy issue, whether it is off the coast of Somalia or West Africa. Is it consistent? Is it the same? Because there have been issues, especially between the AU and the EU, and EU and NATO, around the forces that have been sitting off the coast, as to whether those forces only confined to piracy.
In peace operations, AU member states would be reluctant or are still reluctant to provide capabilities, whether it is boots on the ground or in-kind support to AMISOM, but the same member states are seen as willing to provide support to UN missions. Is there competition between the AU and the UN? Or can the African Standby Force (ASF) (a stand-by capability that is held in their countries origin) be put at the disposal of the UN when the UN needs it?

This then ties up to another issue that continues to arise. One of the issues that have arisen out of AMISOM, especially when the UN came in, was that some of the TCCs were not able to put their capabilities at the AU’s disposal; whether it is assets or medical personnel to hospitals and so forth. The question that has arisen and is still on the table of all of our principals is; can the AU request non-AU member states to send in their personnel? For example, can we approach China, India or the UK and say ‘Yes, this is an AU mission, but can you provide us with expertise and personnel?’ It continues to be a challenge, and our member states have requested to look into this matter. The reality is that there is an unwritten rule; if it is an AU mission, it is only AU member states that can send in capabilities. It is not set in stone, but this has been the approach so far. So the question is, could the AU live with that politically? If so, a new door could be open, it opens up new accesses and new issues that AU would be able to deal with. I think there would be less pressure on AU in terms of capabilities, because then they would have a wider pool of capabilities to look into.

There is a common understanding amongst all the organizations—the AU, EU and NATO—that there is a need to have a comparative advantage and to avoid duplication. For instance, in Somalia there is the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS), as well as a political office within AMISOM. These are both political offices and supported by the UN logistical support. How is this going to work out? Are we going to have two political threats? UN Security Council Resolution 2036 approved a support package for over 17 000 uniformed personnel, but only 20 civilian personnel for AMISOM. The question that has arisen is, do we actually cut down on the civilian administration of AMISOM and only leave what we call substantive support? Or do we keep the administrative people and take out everything else, so that the other functions

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will be done by UNPOS? Those are some of the issues that will need to be dealt with.

On a positive note, we are making some progress on issues such as the district desk designative. We found them to be very helpful and we need to expand them and extend it. We think there is a need to interact, not only between the district desk, but also at a level where all the various functions of APSA, your early warning, your early response mechanism, could actually be shaped amongst the member states. This goes for the same with our sub-regions. There is a need to ensure that the institutions that deal with peace and security in the sub-regions have to have more interaction between the AU and the UN. There will be a meeting between the counterparts at the end of this month in Maputo. One of the issues that we shall be putting on the table is the overall relationship between the AU, UN and the sub-regions. Is it a linear relationship? Meaning, at the bottom you have the sub-regions, then the AU, and the UN at the top. Or is it a flat relationship? How is this going to work out? Because it has got implications on how that relationship is conceptualized. With those few comments I would like to thank you.

Dr Jamie Shea, Deputy Assistant Secretary-General for Emerging Security Challenges, North Atlantic Treaty Organization

I shall speak on the NATO perspective on peace support operations or what we call stabilization operations, because in NATO we would prefer only to do peacekeeping. That would be a luxury. Unfortunately, that is not the case, particularly looking at Afghanistan, where NATO is. I would like to give you a sense of where I think current missions are going to be going in the years ahead and how that could impact on NATO and the NATO and UN relationship.

I am glad to say that we have a much more normal relationship with the UN now than at the end of the Cold War, when we began to engage in so-called active area operations, non-article 5, non-collective defence operations, for the first time. We got off, frankly, to a rather bad start. There was the dual key arrangement in the Balkans where we had a separate UN military command and a separate NATO military command following also different rules of engagement and therefore working across purposes. The blame is not on either organization, the blame, of course, is on the international community (what we tend to call without knowing what it means) that decided on that approach at the time.
Since Bosnia, we have had an improved and more efficient division of labour where NATO essentially has conducted the military tasks and the UN has conducted police, training, institution building and the civilian representation. That has worked a lot better. It is also to be said that the comprehensive approach, which NATO is very committed to, has been more of an ad-hoc arrangement, which worked out, sometimes painfully, on the ground in each successive operation.

There is yet to be a permanent template, a permanent set of institutional arrangements. One of the tests are day to day coordination meetings, now that NATO is drawing down from Afghanistan in 2014 and therefore will not have the same type of cooperation arrangements in the same way as we had in Bosnia, in Kosovo, in Libya and in Afghanistan. To what extent can we still keep up, as it is necessary to keep up with these essential links to avoid having to go back to the drawing board when the next mission comes along.

Referring to Afghanistan, we are now at a critical moment and will shortly be meeting in Chicago. This will in fact be the largest meeting in NATO’s history, because we will have 28 allies around the table and 25 partners, including the EU, the World Bank and of course the UN. Indeed, one of the first tests that we will have to pass is not only to define an end state mission for NATO in Afghanistan, but to ensure that we keep the current ISAF mission going, even with significantly reduced number of forces, but with all of the functions of ISAF, including where necessary, combat until the end of 2014. In this way we at least give the Afghan National Army the biggest possible breathing space to organize, to equip and to be ready to assume responsibility.

More importantly, when we look beyond 2014, and here, let me be clear, NATO is not walking out of Afghanistan. We will continue with what will be a relatively sizeable mission on the ground in Kabul and presumably outside Kabul as well. We will continue with the training, the mentoring and the assistance of the Afghan forces. We are also anticipating that we will not be the only institution staying, but other institutions, most notably the UN, will also have some substantial presence remaining. One thing we must not lose sight of is that there is not only the security needs, which NATO will have to continue to ensure, but there is also the whole Bonn agenda on the side of civil institution-building, women’s rights, economic investments development, fighting corruption, and so forth. This is an area where the UN role is absolutely
critical. NATO will need to establish a trust fund that will make sure that the funds already donated for the Afghan security forces, about $4 billion, are properly managed, properly dispersed, and that there is a transparent process. If there is no confidence in that mechanism, the donations will not keep flowing for long and that will be detrimental to keeping the Afghan national army well equipped and in the field. I hope that in Chicago, the first thing we can do, NATO and the UN, is have a serious talk about how we can collectively manage the transition in Afghanistan.

Looking ahead, it is clear that in the alliance we are now in a situation of winding down the operational tempo. Since 1992 NATO has conducted 27 different military operations outside its territory. Some of those have been operations within an operation, hence the large number. All except one, the Kosovo air campaign, have been under a UN mandate and we report to the UN Security Council every month on the progress of those operations. Let me also stress again that NATO did not view Kosovo as a precedent from breaking away from UN legality and UN authority. We have seen it as a rather regrettable but, if I may say so, necessary exception to that particular principle at the time. But even then, during Kosovo and as the NATO spokesman at the time, I remember very well that notwithstanding the absence of a specific UN resolution, we continued to work very closely with the UN High Commissioner of Refugees, in terms of building refugee camps in Albania and in the Former Yugoslav Republic Macedonia. We worked very closely with the UN Secretariat for the follow-on mission throughout the duration of that operation.

Indeed, in the recent Libya example we had probably the highest level of cooperative planning with Ian Martin, the UN Special Adviser to the Secretary-General to coordinate post-conflict planning for Libya, and with UN headquarters. Unfortunately, the situation has prohibited the planning to bear fruit to the extent that a UN peacekeeping force could not materialize.

NATO has probably done two things, though the second one may be a bit controversial with you. First, NATO has kept 150 000 troops in the field serving UN mandates for the last decade, which is probably the largest single source, if you take NATO as a collective of contributions to UN operations. Secondly, we have upheld, for the first time ever, the principle of responsibility to protect in Libya. I know that there will be
a debate about what that exactly means and how far one can go with it. Let me also mention that we have devoted an enormous amount of time and attention to introducing UN Security Council Resolution 1325 into NATO’s military doctrine, rules of engagement and training of our troops. We not only mainstreamed Resolution 1325 in NATO, but in the relations with our partners as well.

Two things in particular have been of enormous help in developing this relationship, which are extraneous. Number one is the regional organizations. There is no doubt that our support for the Arab League in Libya (for the African Union and even if it is not necessarily everything that we could or should be doing) in Darfur and Somalia have helped enormously to improve NATO’s image and legitimacy with the UN. The second factor is that we had 22 non-NATO countries in ISAF, of which the biggest per capita to contribute is Tonga. Australia is the eight largest contributor, including all of the NATO countries. We have eight non-NATO troop-contributing countries in KFOR in Kosovo. Many of these countries, like Ireland, Sweden, Finland, and Austria, are coming into a NATO coalition with a great deal of UN peacekeeping operation experience, in particular the civilian–military interface, development and crowd-control expertise. This has been of immense help to NATO in adapting to the new types of operation, which are more than peacekeeping, but less than war fighting.

Looking ahead, where do I think we need to go? First of all, post 2014 we need to keep NATO to be able to conduct operations. I see two dangers at a strategic level. One is that the US pivots uniquely to the Asia-Pacific region. Its military redefines its role, particularly with $500 billion in budget cuts and with possibly more to come as part of the deficit reduction. It reconfigures its role to naval operations, to air operations (cuts in the US are essentially in the infantry and in the marines) and to more traditional great power type scenarios. There will be less interest in the US to participate in stabilization operations, particularly after the experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan.

Second, the Europeans see ISAF as the end of an era of ‘risky’ interventions that did not succeed and cost a lot of lives and resources, and Europe goes back to being a fortress Europe, while NATO reverts to being an organization centred on Article 5, to maintaining the conventional balance of power in Europe. We have to keep NATO, albeit slimmed down with declining defence budgets, in the business of being
able not only to do these things itself, but to support other organizations. A great deal of focus for example post ISAF is going to be on maintaining interoperability, maintaining connectivity, making sure that we do not throw the muscle out with the fat in terms of multinational planning structures, multinational headquarters, vital common capabilities such as airlift, alliance ground surveillance, intelligence and reconnaissance capabilities. We do not want to be in a situation in ten years’ time where it will take us eight months to put together a force similar to the present day Libyan operation. We need to keep NATO engaged in the business of global security and stabilization missions. We need to learn the lessons, but learning from our mistakes does not mean deciding that it was an entire waste of time and that we do not do it anymore.

Further, we need to take a hard look at how we can help others to do a better job, in particular if we are going to do less. Training is the key. NATO has a wealth of experience in training foreign local forces. We have big planning structures, big headquarters and 25 different centres of excellence. Now, if the UN is worried about improvised explosive devices (IED) exploding in Somalia or elsewhere, we can provide expertise as we have spent billions of dollars and set up a centre of excellence in Madrid looking at IEDs. The first thing we need to do is to take a hard look at what assets we have, what are the particular needs and how can we bring them together.

The future is likely to be hybridity. You may not have NATO in Afghanistan for over 12 years. However you are likely to get NATO, as the EU has successfully done in Africa, coming in at a particularly crucial stage of an AU or a UN operation for an election, like the EU successfully did in the DRC or for an emergency rescue. Or for a transport, as both EU and NATO have done in supporting AMISOM and the mission in Darfur. The UN needs to tell us what is going on in its operations so that we are sensitized in a way that makes it possible for us to assist if we are called on.

We need to expand a little bit on the horizons. What do we mean by prevention? We are all running out of money. We are in a situation in Europe, where 17 out of 28 NATO countries have fewer than 45 000 troops in their armies; 5 NATO countries have fewer than 10 000 forces in their armies. We have 8 NATO countries today that arguably have a full spectrum capability. If we no longer have the means for
expensive cures, what do we mean by prevention? We talk about it all the time, but how does it work? Should we be leaning towards UN type preventive deployments, like we had with the UN Preventive Deployment Force in the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia a decade ago?

What about climate change? As you know, the UN Environmental Programme calculates that one third of all UN peacekeeping operations are taking place in countries where climate change is one of the possible causes of conflict and will exacerbate. How can we do a better job, particularly with our simulation and mapping solutions, to try to identify those kinds of crises? What kind of climate change diplomacy or mitigation strategies should we be following? We need to do a better job of analysing the hybrid nature of the threats. Mali has been mentioned, what is the cause of the crisis in Mali? It is not one thing. It is a variety of factors such as weapons coming in from the Touareg from the fall of Gaddafi; it is 200 000 climate change refugees; it is three droughts in succession; it is an increasingly effective terrorist organization; it is narcotics coming in from Latin America; and it is hostage-taking. That is the hybrid threat. Where on that chain of causality do we intervene? It is not always on a military level. Sometimes treasuries can be as effective as militaries.

Let me conclude on two final points. One: privatization of security. The UK has a private sector consortium that puts together a fleet of ships wholly run by the private sector to be hired out to deal with the problem of piracy in the Gulf of Aden. We have private sector armed guards on ships. In my country, the private sector now builds and runs prisons. It does investigations on behalf of the police. It protects banks against cyber theft. There will be a massive increase of the role of the private sector in performing security tasks in the 21st century. How do we integrate that?

My final point is on new technologies. Today 45 countries have drones. The US gets all of the publicity, but 45 countries have these capabilities. These are going to be basic technologies tomorrow. Robotics, artificial intelligence, drones technology surveillance. How can we integrate these new technologies into more effective stabilization operations? How do we deal with the international humanitarian law aspects, the authority aspects, the responsibility aspects? I think we need to think about these
things as well. Let us have a dialogue that is more on preparing for the next operation.


The EU is reflecting on how to improve its partnerships with various organizations. The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) from the very outset has been a project open to partners. We work at engaging partners, countries and organizations, and we also try to establish a structured partnership. So far 34 non-EU countries have participated in CSDP operations. Of these, we have concluded a framework participation agreement with one country and await the final council approval for three other countries. This plan to come to structured arrangements is something that we should aim for with respect to international organizations as well, and not least the UN.

The challenges are high and the operational tempo is still high. It is not foreseeable whether that tempo will be reduced. Currently it is almost the opposite, crises are popping up. The EU is already setting up three new operations this year and the nature of these operations is quite interesting. One is a regional maritime capacity-building mission in the Horn of Africa, another is a civilian advisory assistance and training mission in Niger, primarily focusing on fighting organized crime and terrorism, and the third is an airport security strengthening mission. These missions aim at providing added value, as they link into existing structures and existing endeavours from various organizations such as the AU, the ECOWAS, and the International Maritime Organization. They are civilian in nature, though at least two of them need military expertise, so they have a bit of a hybrid character. They are also working in relatively complex theatres with a relatively complex set of missions.

By the second half of 2012, the EU will have 17 ongoing CSDP missions, all of them in complex scenarios. This leads me to my main point; we are faced with a situation of reduced budgets, shrinking resources and that is quite an interesting coincidence. The three challenges we have seen—coherence, complementarity and coordination—can be added by another three—comprehensiveness, capabilities and the concurrency of forthcoming challenges and operational theatres. The rela-
Cooperative advantage of the EU lies with the topic of comprehensiveness. We are increasingly establishing this kind of comprehensive approach, for example in the Horn of Africa, where the Council and the Commission have established a fund worth several hundred million euros for five years for development activities, but also for CSPD tools to foster stability. With respect to other means, we have tools to control financial flows in our area of freedom, security and justice. So the EU is very well suited. The way we could share work is essential as the number of new missions is clearly a real challenge.

With respect to the UN, it is an example of how we can foster and better structure our arrangements. We have a long history of the EU working together with the UN as with NATO, and since 2007 we have been engaging with the AU. We clearly need to have closer relationships with the League of Arab States and ASEAN, just to mention two examples. I will not dwell on our relationship with the AU and NATO, but focus on the UN. We have a long history in operations, from the Balkans to the African Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa, where the EU has been able to autonomously deploy and operate in support of the UN. On numerous occasions this has included bridging deployments, it has included stand-by deployments, or even deployments following UN operations, such as in Kosovo. Now, of course, we are looking at how to support the UN in implementing its observer mission in Syria. So far, these relationships have been more or less ad-hoc based. We are now at an important turning point, where we seek to move to a more structured cooperation on the basis of the UN’s real needs and increased effectiveness.

The action plan provides a variety of probable measures: a clearing house function, to bundle member states contributions; providing a new so-called modular approach to a UN operation; EU autonomous civilian deployment in support of the UN, new autonomous military deployment as a part of UN assistance to the AU, and other regional and sub-regional organizations; and working together with the UN on cost-cutting issues like capability development, training and exercise, and doctrine development.

This action plan is currently being discussed and worked out in more detail. A point of caution is that the contributions come from EU member states and at the end of the day it is EU member states who decide. The EEAS can only make the proposal. We know issues like the provi-
vision of a new component under UN command is a very critical issue that will likely not happen, because the EU would definitely like to have its missions under the political control of the EU.

One word on the EU–UN Steering Committee, which was established on the basis of the joint declaration signed in 2003, and became dormant over time because it was focusing on too many issues. We revitalized it and agreed to focus on operational oriented issues. We concluded that, for example, on the DRC, Somalia and South Sudan, this dialogue on a high level operational focus is extremely valuable.

What are the key challenges? Capabilities in the UN context, however, we have to also face that the EU, like NATO, are facing significant shortfalls. We are together working on this, in the NATO context on the smart defence, and the EU context pooling and sharing. We hope that we can provide added value.

Let me, perhaps with a view to the excellent background paper, make one or two final comments. It pointed out that the key challenges will be managing the dangers of downsizing while at the same time get along on the hardest case. We have to be clear with the public, who would have high expectations of a peace dividend from the deployment of peace operations; and we have to be clear that we have to maintain the forces and capabilities to react if the situation deteriorates.

Concerning the proposal to come up with more joint activities on the various levels, we have to be more united in making our decisions on the various fields. It is essential that we not only do this in crisis management, we should also do this in the field of conflict prevention. Meanwhile, we have established a relatively well-suited system in the field of crisis management, but we should also come up with such joint mechanisms for peacebuilding. We should however be realistic. Comprehensiveness can only be achieved to a certain degree, because who wants to be coordinated?

Let me conclude. The EU has gained a lot of experience during its ten years of CSDP and we have gained a lot of experience in working with partners and with international organizations. CSDP has come of age, but we now need to live up to the high expectations, and we need our partners for that. We are willing to share expertise, we are willing to structure the dialogue and to structure the relationship, which are all
very necessary. When we do this together, when we come up with structured and well-defined proposals, this is the best way to meet the challenges of the future.

*HE Mr Nassif Hitti, Head, Arab League Mission in France and Permanent Representative to UNESCO, League of Arab States*

First and foremost on the Arab League, I think, despite the fact that this is the oldest regional organization, the charter was ill-equipped for many reasons. At the time of its foundation with seven members, it was not a priority as an institution to deal effectively with international conflict, internal conflict or inter Arab conflict. The two articles of the charter are fully loaded with vetoes. If a state accepts so and so and so, and considers so and so and so, then we can deal. If a state accepts all these things, then there is no reason to negotiate. As in most regional and international organizations, most development happens through task expansion and task creation.

We are at a time when the Middle East is back as a centre of gravity for national political geopolitics, but this time for different reasons. There are several challenges concerning any activity to be conducted by the Arab League alone, by the Arab League with the UN or with other regional organizations.

First, is the process of failing states. A failing state is more dangerous than a failed state. Somalia is a failed state, but then you could detect sometimes the process of failing states. In some cases, the territorial integrity of some states is put on the front burner—not directly, but indirectly, it is there. Some conflicts, particularly where the societal cohesion is not very high, could result in an internal process of fragmentation. For these reasons, there is a need to look back and look differently at what we can do together.

I mentioned that the Arab League is ill equipped, but we have developed practically by the advice and the good lessons from the AU. The Arab Council for Peace and Security, which models the AU PSC, was established in 2007. However it is not really functional, so at the top of the agenda of the Arab League is the need to reform its structure. It is not fully functional, because it is a consultative mechanism; yet, it is supposed to address the trilogy of conflict prevention, management and settlement. The focus now is how to empower this consultative mechanism
and make it an effective mechanism, first within the Arab League and then in terms of cooperation with other regional organizations and with the UN.

First and foremost, we have to develop and strengthen a diplomatic early warning system. This is an area where we could draw from your and other regional organizations’ collective experience. Incidentally, we are developing and we will be developing good contact with the EU and with the AU on these matters. It is very important here to launch a process, a comprehensive institutionalized process, bringing in the UN, and bringing in all the concerned regional and sub-regional organizations in terms of training, expertise, human resources and technical resources. How to develop technical resources and simulation technique, is extremely important in this respect, and in organizing seminars about these topics. What we need is to have regular sessions of exchanging experience and expertise.

I would like to underline several other points. First, the establishment of contact groups: in many instances, if we establish a contact group, we could install and integrate it into the prevention of the conflict and it could work well. Second, parallel public diplomacy, the wise man diplomacy is extremely important. The wise man diplomacy is not exclusive of formal diplomacy. It facilitates and opens doors for formal diplomacy. The third is something that is becoming à la mode, particularly with Libya although it existed before—the responsibility to protect. Brazil has recently launched the idea of responsibility while protecting. We have to think of how to develop responsibility while protecting.

Why is cooperation between the international and the regional level important? There are two elements of complementarity. First, experience vs. expertise. Regional organizations have the experience, have better understanding of what is going on the ground vs. the expertise. Second, legitimacy vs. neutrality. There are times when we need the legitimacy of our brothers and our friends and people with whom we have a certain sociological solidarity. It is important that the regional organizations are there. But incidentally, with the Syrian case, it turns out to be the other way around. At the start of the conflict, the Syrians did not want the internationalization of the approach, but along the way, they did not want the ‘Arabization’ of the approach, and they referred to Kofi Annan only as the UN representative and not as an Arab League
representative. It works both ways, but these are two important matters.

The crux of the matter, a major challenge that is facing us is another trilogy. The first challenge is comparing internal to interstate conflict, the problem with internal conflict is that there is no number to call, and there is nobody to dial, so you cannot hold anybody entirely responsible. The second challenge is there is usually no equity among enemies or adversaries. States, even if they do not talk, do not recognize each other; are still states and accept that they need to treat the other on equal footing. Third is the exclusive approach, where the conflict parties are selective about who and how they negotiate with and set criteria.

Basically, we must keep in mind some basic assumptions. First, we have to maintain a working consensus. It is not enough to have a consensus as a launching pad, it has to be a working consensus, and the big powers have to always be involved.

I will conclude, Mr Chairman, by making a comment on what could be a very good case, hopefully the exemplary case of international regional cooperation, the Kofi Annan mission. The Kofi Annan mission came at a balancing point between those who wanted to go too fast and too much, and those who wanted to go too slow and too little. That was the point at the basis of the understanding at the international level. It was an Arab international issue that needs to be maintained, confirmed and really consolidated.

Second, we must be aware not to unload responsibility and adopt a wait and see attitude. Third and connected to the second; states, international organizations, regional organization must accompany the Kofi Annan mission forcefully, without intervening. Fourth, it is an integrated framework of six points. The points are not only interconnected, they are interpenetrated. Interpenetration is much more important and much more difficult to handle than interconnectedness. Otherwise we would fall into what happened with the Arab League observer mission, which ended up becoming ‘a violence observing’ mission and addressing what you call calm-keeping mission, not peacekeeping, calm-keeping mission.

Last but not least, a flexible time frame is very important. However, it has to be always well defined and not open-ended. The Syrian crisis will
prove to be very important as a model of success or (God forbid) failure. This is where you are facing up to a very complex and complicated matter, where the active geopolitical competition confronts a very vulnerable society structure.

*Discussant: Mr Richard Gowan, Associate Director, Crisis Diplomacy and Peace Operations, and Managing Global Order, Center for International Cooperation, New York University*

Five very brief comments; on these occasions I always think that peacekeeping partnerships are actually quite like romantic partnerships. You get together in an ad-hoc way, you have some sort of exciting interactions and you have some big arguments. Then over time, you get used to each other and the type of arguments you have with your partners become more routine and you end up arguing about things like the colour of paint.

It seems to me that most peacekeeping partnerships have followed the same path. Six, seven years ago we were getting together in ad-hoc ways between organizations, we were having fierce disagreements and we kept on breaking up. Now, the relationships have matured and the arguments that we are having, the differences are the sort that take place within stable relationships. I think this is actually a very positive sign. The quality of the debate we are having here indicates the maturity of some well-established relationships. It is not the sort of discussions that were held seven or eight years ago.

Four substantive points: First drawdowns. I agree with General Huhn that we do not need to just think about drawing down in Afghanistan and the mechanisms for doing that, but also in other cases like Liberia, for example, where the UN will be drawing down and we will need to work with regional partners. To an extent, if the UN can help NATO draw down in Afghanistan, it behoves NATO to think about where it can help the UN draw down. Obviously, in a case like Liberia, the main relationship is between the UN, the AU and ECOWAS. In the paper that I wrote for this Forum, I describe in more detail some of the challenges involved in drawing down peace operations, and some cases in the past, such as Macedonia, where cooperation between organizations wobbled as peacekeepers have left and I argued that we need to avoid such wobbles in the future.
Second, the importance of middle powers to inter-institutional relations. Dr Shea mentioned the significance of countries like Denmark, Sweden and Ireland to cooperation between NATO and the UN in Afghanistan. There is a select group of powers that understand more than one international organization. Some powers, to be frank, tend to work through one single organization, understand its methods, are comfortable with that organizations methods. Others, such as the Nordic countries and the Irish, are able to work across organizations. They can actually create political links and operational compromises between secretariats that secretariats may not be able to play themselves.

Third, money matters. Whenever we talk about inter-institutional, inter-organizational cooperation, we always talk about operational cooperation. We talk about partnerships between different missions in the field. That is the level we tend to talk at. Sometimes we mention that politics matters too. As Mr Bam mentioned, there are certain countries that matter not only because of their operational contributions, but also because of their financial contributions. Certain western powers are central not only to NATO operations and EU operations, but to UN peacekeeping; contributing with 70 per cent of the total budget, perhaps even more. Even to AU operations, where the EU provides a lot of the funds, the US is a big contributor. We always have to think, when we talk about partnerships, about the role of those big financial players in making partnerships work. Just as the most common cause of romantic relationships failing is financial problems, one of the major causes of peacekeeping relationships failing in the next few years is financial problems. That not only means that we have to think about financial interests and limits of primarily western powers, but also opportunities for increasingly rich countries, perhaps including those in the Arab world, to provide more money for UN operations, but also to AU operations. India, for example, has started giving money to the AU.

We are too often simplistic about financial debates in the UN and in other peacekeeping settings. The standard debate about money and peacekeeping goes like this: Western countries say ‘It’s too expensive!’ Non-western countries say ‘You’re not giving us enough money!’ Then you have an argument. Looking ahead in a changing economic environment, there are going to be new sources of finance across organizations making relationships possible. We have to talk very seriously about financial cooperation as well as operational cooperation.
My last point has to do with the map. When we talk about cooperation, we name individual missions and we talk about how institutions interact. However, I think there is one overwhelming reason that the EU, NATO, AU, ECOWAS and UN are going to be cooperating in-depth in the next five years and that is simply to do with the map. If you look at where the new crisis that we are worrying about is, it is a band of countries stretching from the Sahara to Somalia: Libya, Mali, Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan. Those are all countries that directly affect African security. Although they are within Africa, they also do impinge on European security. They are countries such as Sudan and Somalia where the UN has a long-standing presence. That is the group of crises that is now coming on to our agenda just as the Balkans came on to our agenda in the early 1990s. You cannot handle those situations without ECOWAS, the AU, European countries that have a huge amount of interest in, for example, the Islamists threat in Mali and Somalia, and the UN, because it provides the framework for us all.

**Discussant: Professor Vera Gowlland-Debbas, Professor Emeritus, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Switzerland**

I have noticed that reference has been made to rule of law in post conflict societies. There has been little reference, and it does not seem to me that much room is given in the examination of the challenges of peace operations to the rule of law as it applies to the conduct of peace operations. We have had a number of judicial challenges, whether it is NATO in Kosovo, or in Srebrenica. We have also had responsibility of international organizations as central to the debate. I wonder in terms of coordination, how does one coordinate responsibility issues, what does one do with non-state actors in peace operations? What binds them, what is the applicable law? What kind of mechanisms do we utilize? The UN’s status of force agreements have a claims commission, which has never worked. The ombudsperson in Kosovo is a very weak mechanism indeed. Increasingly, there is going to be a proliferation of challenges to these kinds of operations, and what room is to be given to rule of law?

I do want to say that I do not see room for responsibility to protect within the Security Council mandate. The Security Council does not need a doctrine of responsibility to protect. It has already acted in terms of human rights issues and so on under its chapter 7 mandates. I find that a very false debate.
Discussion

Ms Zinati posed a question on the Chicago summit, in case there would be a discussion of development of the partnership between NATO and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative countries and whether that would draw important aspects of partnership.

Prof. Johnstone directed a question to all the panellists. ‘You spoke about the importance of cooperation and hybrid challenges and hybrid missions. Can you say more about the possibility of a division of labour or will all of the organizations seek to develop a full spectrum of capabilities, which strikes me as redundant? On the other hand, we all know it is awfully difficult to say ‘You do this and we will do that, and let us sort it out that way’.

Mr Stauffacher asked ‘when you cooperate, how do you share information? What data are you willing to release, regarding situational awareness, and also on the needs on the ground?’

Mr Lauber posed several questions. One question was concerning the rule of law in operations, including responsibility and mechanisms to implement. The second addressed to Dr Jamie Shea regarding NATO partnerships and privatization of peacekeeping. He also had other questions with regard to division of labour, coordination, exchange of information ‘How do we get that? There is much more to do in this regard, due to capacity limits, due to limited experience. Where do you want to see this going? Where do you see platforms that could help this process?’

Mr Titov responded that complex peacekeeping operations reflect the footprint on the ground. He asserted that there are over 14 000 police officers serving in 19 peacekeeping and non-peacekeeping operations mandated by the UN, added to that you also have almost 600 justice and correction officers in various peacekeeping operations and up to 400 people dealing with DDR. There is a nexus between security and justice economy which is mentioned in the 2011 World Development Report. Mr Titov also pointed out that there are many players and there are many various concepts. In some cases this area is considerably donor driven. In addition to generous and general political support from member states of the Security Council, he personally would like to see more focus in the Security Council and the General Assembly. Obvi-
ously, the big players in the Council are involved in daily management of very volatile situations. They are driven by a political imperative, by a lack of helicopters, absence of police units. Eventually, that absolutely indispensable element is regulated in the second, third year of their attention. Although they are increasingly discussing that issue.

Mr Titov stated that this area requires a lot of national support and that it is something still perceived in post-conflict situations, which is too close to the heart of power. There is sometimes a push-back. Therefore very careful treatment of the issue is absolutely indispensable. ‘From Afghanistan to the DRC, we know how difficult it is to create a nationally based model for that. Who coordinates? Even at UN level we are still in discussion of who is in the lead? Hopefully, there will be a report published soon by the Secretary-General that will bring some of us closer together as a small secretariat. The DPKO, which provides considerable expertise in the area of police, justice and corrections, could at least be co-located formally with the UNDP. If it happens, we will be able to expand the area to operationalize the cooperation as much as possible.’

In response to the questions on privatization Mr Titov stressed that the issue is still there in the ideological sphere. ‘Privatization is a source of concern, which is also the reality. There is tremendous interest among private enterprise in how we operate and what we discuss here and we know that. The question is on legitimacy, operational capacity, because these are organizations based on profit. They have to be quick in, quick out. They want to maximize money.’ He argued that we have seen in several peacekeeping operations that private companies are very eager to do the job, but also very eager to pull back as early as possible because it makes no sense for them to stay forever, unless serious governments are behind them and provide a lot of funding, which would ensure them to keep their footprint on the ground. On protection of civilians, he said ‘We are doing it, from the operational side to capacity-building side. The concept is still developing. The main parameters of what is needed in this crucial part of our operational activity are there, as is the awareness among member states. We have to institutionalize the concept as such, and I think we are on the right track.’

Dr Shea commented that in all of the missions there are substantial rule of law issues that come up. For example trafficking and soldiers involved in prostitution. ‘We have spent a lot of time in NATO trying to
standardize doctrine, education of forces, command and responsibility, to try to stamp out, not that it is ever going to be totally successful, but to stamp out the exploitation of child prostitution and prostitution in areas where there are a lot of soldiers around.’

Secondly, with respect to the prisons and the maintenance of them, Dr Shea pointed out that some of the features of these operations are that you arrest insurgents, and you put them in prison, and you have got to make sure that the rules apply. ‘How do you ensure that if they pass a local control that for example torture and forceful interrogations are not going to take place?’

With respect to rules of engagement, Dr Shea acknowledged that there have been cases where a number of prosecutions, not just in the US, but in many NATO countries, soldiers violated rules of engagement. These situations are utterly painful, because the soldiers did not always act malevolently, but it has unfortunately happened. ‘Responsibility for us paying out compensation for, forgive the term, collateral damage. Again, it is not always harmonized in terms of responsibility to compensate across various forces. The passing on that sense of a rule of law to the forces is not going to be so easy, but we have to at least make sure that we do not only train people to fire off an AK47, but we are actually mentoring them for leadership and responsibility as well. How should this be done? Is it by having legal advisors in the command structure?’ According to Dr Shea the organization that deploys the force in the first place has to have the responsibility for ensuring that those rules are upheld. One thing that is really helping is the social media. To some degree the universality of transparency is helping in this respect, but it is also causing embarrassment.

He briefly touched on the issue of privatization and said that the private security companies are already in peace operations, but they should be limited to support functions rather than combat functions. He believes the state should have the monopoly of violence, legitimate violence, and therefore not use private sector in combat. Privatization is not just big, expensive companies coming in offering their services. It is also the forming of private militias to fill security gaps, because you do not have enough state controlled local forces, like in Afghanistan or Iraq. What type of rules of engagement do you have there? This is really an area that needs to be further explored.
HE Mr Hitti commented on some points. ‘Concerning the issue of responsibility to protect and the UN Charter Chapter 7, one has to start thinking outside the box. We have been facing these problems on a day-to-day basis, we need to work on how to legitimize and not hide behind international legality. International legality could be the product of international consensus and try as much as we can to consolidate this matter, whether within the Security Council or outside of the Security Council framework.’

As a second point, he stated that there is a need to think about setting up another standing committee including the UN and the partners and units of UN and regional organizations to try to work out on a continuous institutional basis in terms of exchange of information and expertise on all these evolving issues.

Brig. Gen. Huhn commented on the question of division of labour and how to share information. According to him, division of labour is linked to the core competencies of the various organizations. ‘It is clear that when it really comes to extreme robust military engagement, then we are one organization here at the table that is best suited for that type of operations. With regard to the EU and its ability to put together many strengths which it has at its own disposal, it is clearly what makes this organization ideally suited in complex scenarios like the one we have in the Horn of Africa. There we have a comprehensive EU strategy, an EU special representative, and we have the money to finance AMISOM. We have spent over €300 million to finance this force, to train Somali soldiers to be integrated into AMISOM. Soon 3000 have been trained. This kind of capability and capacity-building is a success story. The EU will invest a lot of money into the development and the strengthening and stabilization of state institutions. It is essential that we have the core capabilities at our direct disposal.’

Concerning the exchange of information, with respect to the ongoing situations in Syria and Mali, he further noted ‘we have done it in Libya, with partner organizations, with the UN and with NATO. It is done with formalized agreements. The security agreements have to be in place, it is done in step-by-step talks, and this is something to which the EEAS provides a particular value. We have a lot of elements in the field, over 140 delegations. The UN presences provide a lot of added value, provide a lot of information and can exchange a lot of information with other organizations also present in the field. Now we talk to DPKO on
a daily basis about the developments in Guinea-Bissau and elsewhere. It is now institutionalized in a way that it clearly provides added value and can react on a very short notice. We have to institutionalize our relationships."

Mr Bam highlighted the importance of the focus on the issue of cooperation in hybrid missions in all organization developing the full spectrum of capabilities.’ Discussions have already started on this issue; for example, the establishment of the ASF called for five regional depots which is known as the one plus five. There should be one at a continental level, and there should be five at the regional level, so that when the forces are deployed, whether military, police or civilian, they are supported. The AU is currently discussing with the UN whether we could have a contractual agreement with the UN, instead of setting up a fully fledged base in Cameroun, Douala, which has got everything inside. It is a political issue. It is an issue that needs to be further discussed."

He also noted that when it comes to the issue of pledged capabilities, member states have pointed out that the pledges are merely commitments. ‘Whoever comes first takes that pledge. A country is not going to have separate contribution pledges for the UN, the EU and so forth. If for instance a country pledges a signals unit, and the UN comes in first, then they will get that signals unit and not the EU. The realization is that we do not have the capabilities at any given stage. Member states will have these challenges, if we open up the accessibility of those capabilities to be accessed by all the institutions, that debate will have to take place at that level.’ Mr Bam also acknowledged that one of the challenges that are impeding the development of the argument is that it tends to displace capacity. Instead of developing one’s own capacity, one tends to depend on somebody else.

Col. Leijenaar offered a comment on the cost of private security companies. She mentioned that she was previously Chief Security Advisor for the management of all UN security personnel in Afghanistan. Based on her experience in using a combination of different forces to assist in protecting the UN in Afghanistan, ranging from ISAF or Afghan soldiers, for external support and protection outside the premises to international private security companies for providing internal security support, the cost that the UN pays for internal, international private security companies is cheaper than having peacekeeping force provide those services in Afghanistan. She asserted that the rules of engagement are
critical when dealing with private security companies. Also the combination of forces, the command control communication, networks and exercising these different entities is extremely important. The legitimacy of the security companies in relationship with the host government is of critical importance.

Mr Cikoti pointed out that the number of challenges is constantly growing, increasingly unpredictable and increasingly mutually interlinked. The example being cyber threats, creating a completely new realm, the world is no longer a geographic entity, it is a network and virtual entity.

He wondered if there has been any thought given to the institutionalization of putting together different security concepts in order to meet these challenges? Putting together the global security concept of UN, the collective security of NATO, cooperative security of EU, comprehensive security of OSCE, the Arab League and other regional organizations would be very relevant. If there is not better communication between them than an institutional integration of them, further more, the threats are communicating better and faster than the institutional responses to them.

Ms Millington touched on the issue of funding and the need for the rise of new actors to contribute financially, in terms of increasing their financial contributions or taking up financial burdens where there is a need. She mentioned that she would be curious to know a bit about the panel’s thoughts on the role of the private sector and on foundations. What might be the likelihood of those institutions and those foundations engaging on these issues and, in that context, the dangers and the advantages of that?

Mr Alghali raised a question on the panel’s perspectives on the situation in Mali, whether ECOWAS or EU will give a mandate not just for Mali, but going forward in times of such cooperation, and their thoughts on how such mandates in such missions include sub-regional, regional and global multilateral institutions.

Brig. Gen. Zia posed a question on neutrality, ‘It pertains to UN-mandated missions. Regional organizations and member states have greatly contributed and helped the UN in achieving a number of tasks. However, certain organizations or an individual state undertakes a certain venture and the UN decides to confer legitimacy by declaring it a UN-
mandated mission. Thereafter, if any action that takes place which is beyond the confines of the national law or international law, in particular gun strikes, then the inability of the UN, although it is a UN mandated mission, to lay down the parameters or inability of the UN to actually intervene in this particular matter. Do you think somehow it stands to undermine the very element of neutrality or impartiality of the UN, in some way?’

Prof Nikitin added ‘I understand the fact that the regional organizations are not yet ready for joint decision-making in the moment of crisis. We have different procedures, different rules, and organizations. But are we ready for joint fact-finding missions at the earlier stage of the crisis? Is it possible, for example when the crisis in Syria is evolving, to send a fact-finding mission composed of Arab League states, EU and NATO states, which probably is a general ally of the UN, so that at least general information which your organizations would get would be more or less comparable? The decision-making process could be separately undertaken by the respective organizations. Ambassador Hitti raised an issue of the possibility of setting up a new standing committee. That could be a next stage and it would very interesting to see the reaction of the representatives of EU and NATO. Are we ready to establish a kind of standing committee where the secretary-generals of organizations could meet in a case of emergency?’

HE Mr Hitti commented ‘my remarks about a standing committee was not based on a single issue. It is not to address a single issue. It is to be an ongoing work of exchanging information from each and every case, experience, lessons and to try to work together. Even if an organization, regional or international, deals directly on a particular issue, what it does, what it has done in certain areas could be of very importance for the lesson of the others. On the second point, we should start in any crisis to dispatch a group, it is part of prevention. When I spoke about a wise man delegation or parallel public diplomacy, what I meant is similar to a fact-finding mission. It is partly fact-finding, partly exploring possibilities without commitment, and keeping doors open. These are very important matters, even if they are done sometimes by unofficial people, but they are mandated officials to do that. That is what we should encourage and that connects with the first point of a kind of standing commission. It really is a very important matter, not always in a reactive fashion to a particular crisis. There are many common ele-
ments about different crisis, even if they are at opposing corners of the world.’

Brig. Gen. Huhn made his remarks concerning the issue of joint missions. He stressed that they did this sometimes in the past. Libya is just one example where the EU went into the theatre together with the UN, since time was of the essence and doing that together clearly brought advantages. ‘Perhaps this could be replicated in Mali, with ECOWAS and the AU. My question is what kind of requests for support will come and whether the EU is then ready to provide support to this kind of requests. I would not only link it to logistics. We have for example in operation Atlanta, where Luxembourg provides maritime patrol aircrafts, chartered with a civilian contractor. The form of assistance is broadening that is an interesting development.’

Dr Shea responded to Ms Zinati’s question, ‘Jordan is a trusted and valid partner, and that is not just rhetoric or because there will be a meeting in Chicago with 13 core partners. These are partners the alliance consider to have made some of the largest contributions to security in a broad sense, and Jordan is one of the 13 that will be invited.’

He also commented on the interesting phenomena of hybrid threats and interlocking institutions. ‘It is clear that we face two particular problems. One is going in without sufficient analysis of what we are getting into. In the process, we make a lot of mistakes. We should change track, change strategy and have a surge. Put the forces in, and start training the local forces. One of the things we need to do inter-institutionally is have a much better sense of what we are up against, to design the mission for what we are actually going to find on the ground. This would save us a lot of time and a lot of money. NATO went into Afghanistan in 2003, but we actually did not define our strategy until 2008. At the Bucharest summit we finally came up with a campaign plan. We spent the first five years analysing, investigating and assessing. It is not really right, but that was our strategy. By then the public opinion had started to go south, a lot of money had been spent, we left the south of the country virtually unoccupied where the Taliban reconstituted.’

The second major issue mentioned was the tendency to rush in with a military response because it is easy to do, but is it always the best solution? ‘Take piracy for an example, the ransom money is about $120–240 million a year. I am not underestimating the significance, while the
cost of the naval operations is estimated between $8–12 billion a year. There is opportunity costs associated with not being there. But it is quite right that once we start looking at it in terms of cost effectiveness, training Somali coast guards, doing legal arrangements, having a court for pirates, providing assistance to surrounding states and at least having a military mandate that helps in terms of blockading ports, we need to make sure that the money we are spending is really dealing with the problem.’

Another example is countering IEDs. ‘NATO has spent billions of dollars over the years dealing with the nano-second moment of when the device explodes in Afghanistan to save the life of the soldier or to protect the vehicle, which are legitimate reasons. However, we have woken up to the fact that it is a question of defeating a network. For a couple of hundred thousand dollars, working with the US coastguard in a US operation called Global Shield, we have had some success in blocking the illegal importation of natural glycerin and ammonium nitrate into Afghanistan, which reduces the supply for manufacturing. We have used intelligence assets to see where the ground has been disturbed to plant the bomb. We have worked on forensics and the Afghan legal system, so that we can successfully prosecute the people who have put the IEDs in. Just a few examples of a networked approach.’

Mr Titov commented on whether the UN is ready to partner with regional organizations. He mentioned that the answer is yes, in principle. ‘We do advocate joint, parallel or simultaneous assessments and possible implementation, if there is comparative advantage of those involved. There are no major inhibitions. On the integrated security threat system, there is a huge gap at the UN. Mechanisms are triggered by emerging crises and it is only at that moment that joint instruments and inter-agency coordination groups emerge. They work together but not in a systemic, cross-cutting manner or in a preventative function. The Secretary-General has recently decided to integrate information flow across the departments and agencies.’

‘On the rule of law, it is first and foremost, still a very sectoral area. We have not been able to tie together into one system. Various organizations are contributing and sometimes competing in this area. A more holistic and operational approach in which we roll out as one model is absolutely important. Secondly, is the availability of specialists on the market. Increasingly we feel tremendous crunch: We do not have high-
grade planners, investigators, prosecutors, juvenile prison officials or specialists in prison health and so forth. Interoperability among various rosters is a must and yet in most of the cases these rosters are absolutely closed and organizations are very possessive, they are not opening up. Unless we are operating smarter, we will not be able to create more cost effective and complementary systems. This is one of the priorities, which we have to tackle pretty soon.’

Mr Titov added ‘On cooperation with various regional organizations, we believe that there should not perhaps be a template model. It will not allow flexibility for us to operate. There should be principles; there is a charter, some instruments within the General Assembly and Security Council. Operationally we have to be flexible. And, yes, we have started to compete, or we appear to compete, but if you look very carefully, we do not. We are still in a complementary stage. We have to find those instruments of cooperating in all of this, and we definitely need to support the AU, ECOWAS and many others. Their capacities are still very small compared to the issues they are facing.’

On the use of private security companies in Afghanistan, Mr Titov stated that the UN has been relying on foreign internal security for a while now. When it comes to operational function for private companies, it will become a reality, one way or another. However the rising costs is an issue. He underscored that private companies are no longer supplementary bodies. In Afghanistan alone the ratio is approximately 60–40 per cent, if one takes the whole sum of various internationals serving in Afghanistan, with many of them performing core functions such as core security, core analysis, prison management and so one. It is therefore an important area that needs to be regulated.

Mr Gowan cautioned against going for formal divisions of labour. ‘What we have seen in the case of the EU–UN relationship, every policy document is proved irrelevant by the next crisis. I believe that in inter-organizational cooperation the journey is more important that the destination. It is the process of building relationships so that we know whom to call at the right time, rather than actually having a division of labour written down on paper that matters.’

On the point of cyber security, he noted ‘it is unquestionably one of the greatest threats of our time, something that peace operations probably cannot deal with. The five main sources of cyber attacks and cyber intel-
Intelligence infiltration are probably the permanent five members of the Security Council. I do not think that the best possible EU–NATO–AU–ECOWAS framework for fighting cyber security would have an iota of impact in Washington, Moscow, Beijing or even Paris and London. I think we have to understand that sometimes peacekeeping is what it is in Syria and what it is on the Sudanese border right now. Something that has not changed very much. However much we deal with other threats, we should not try to dump everything under peace operations.’

The question of whether private donors can influence conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peacebuilding is a highly relevant issue in Geneva, where the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation is an influential actor in the World Health Organization. ‘I think in the area of conflict prevention, private funders can play an important part. They already do. There are many aspects of peacebuilding, especially concerning for example the work of UN Children’s Fund, the periphery of peacebuilding, where private donors are incredibly important. When it comes to peacekeeping I think it has to stay with governments. However clever private foundations are, they cannot replace the five original powers in understanding the massive political interests that affect decisions over a case like Syria.’

Mr Bayley inquired if anyone could imagine a future not too long from now where the traditional financial contributors contribute the troops and the troop contributors contribute the finances?

Mr Gowan added ‘Could we imagine a world in which China and India pay while NATO countries send troops to trouble spots? Yes, it would be nice. I think that the reality of the funding situation means that that will take time.’

Dr Shea added, ‘I think that we have had a tendency over the last few years for the western countries to leave UN peacekeeping operations, at least in terms of troops, which is what you are referring to, and go more for the western frameworks such as EU or NATO. Even Canada, which proudly used to proclaim that it had been part of every peacekeeping mission since the inception has dramatically reduced its participation. If we are going to support the UN more, we need to recommit. At the same time, we should try to make the financial contributions reflect the changing base of gross domestic product (GDP).’
Keynote Address: Cooperation and Coordination in Peace Operations—United Nations and Regional Perspectives

HE Ms Gunilla Carlsson, Minister for International Development Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sweden

Ladies and gentlemen, it is a privilege for me to be able to address this audience that I make so good use of in my operations as the Development Minister for Sweden.

Let me start by expressing my appreciation to the government of Switzerland and the Geneva Centre for Security Policy for making this Forum possible. I would also like to take this opportunity to welcome Switzerland as a full member of the Challenges Forum.

With her historic track record of involvement in international humanitarian affairs, Switzerland will be uniquely able to contribute to the future deliberations of the Forum. How appropriate it is to gather in Geneva, where there are so many important UN bodies and other international organizations.

The theme of this year’s forum is Cooperation and Coordination in Peace Operations. It is now more than 15 years since the International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations was created. The rapid growth of the partnership and the scope of the Forum discussions testify to the need, felt by many countries and institutions, to discuss and analyse the increasing complexity of peace operations and other forms of crisis management. It is a particular strength of the Forum that it has an equal number of participants from the Global North and the Global South.

It is a well-known fact that war and armed conflict are the greatest obstacles to development and poverty reduction. Economic and social development comes to a halt. Human rights are violated. Resumption of armed conflict is a constant threat. In these conflict and post-conflict countries we already see that non-fulfilment of the Millennium Development Goals. The challenges that these societies face are vast and complex. This leads us to consider what optimal combination of capabilities is necessary to foster inclusive political settlements and conflict resolution and to establish and strengthen people’s security and foster sustainable and long-term development for all. What lasting impact do our missions have in generating for example development, employment and
improving livelihoods? Because that is in the end where we should turn to and that is what really counts in the everyday life of the affected people. We need to learn more about what really works and what needs to be refined in order to be effective in easing the suffering of men, women and children caught up in conflicts around the world.

Since I took office as the Development Minister, a large part of our development cooperation takes place in these affected countries. I believe we need to promote peacebuilding and state-building in active dialogue and democratic inclusiveness. Do not forget women and youth. They are the future. We also know that we have an obligation with Resolution 1325. We talk about it, but do we do enough? I also think we need to promote security, through disarmament, security sector reform, and transitional justice and democratization initiatives. We have to work towards national ownership, even if we know that it can be very problematic, but that is the only way that we will be able to have accountability and long lasting results. In this context it is important that international efforts prioritize early warning and conflict prevention, because it is the best way not to fall back into armed conflict.

The relationship between security and development, and between security and humanitarian action, are among the many challenges we face. There are indications that the international appetite for large-scale multidimensional peace operations is now waning, mainly because of the costs involved. And there is another reason for having more of preventive actions. Shrinking the size of missions will create new demands for cooperation and efficient use of the available resources. To address all these aspects, the Forum has been careful to involve military, police and civilian experts, as well as a vibrant mix of academics, practitioners and officials. It is what all actors together can achieve that matters.

It is not only the number of actors involved in conflict management that has grown fast. Peace operations and other conflict management efforts now employ complex sets of tools, military and civilian that must be coordinated with each other in order to be truly effective. While military observers can still play a very important role, most peace operations also include elements that aim at strengthening and rebuilding all parts of the affected societies. Preventive diplomacy, peacebuilding and state-building activities have all become indispensable tools.
The Swiss hosts here have made a concerted effort to involve a broad range of the Geneva-based humanitarian community organizations in this year’s forum. I welcome this initiative to bring together actors and communities with different perspectives and different mandates. These discussions are essential for generating holistic solutions to very complex and multifaceted challenges.

Humanitarian action is based on neutrality and independence, which in principle is easy for all parties to subscribe to. But in practice, access to those in need is often challenged. Sometimes by imposing travel restrictions or refusing visas, sometimes by restrictions on how the humanitarian response should be conducted. In Syria for example, the humanitarian needs are growing and humanitarian actors are ready to scale up their efforts. However, there is no agreement yet on the modalities of the international response.

The focus of tomorrow morning’s session—how military and civilian actors can cooperate in protecting civilians—is a challenge which I personally believe is important to tackle. Even though the protection of civilians is now regularly included in Security Council mandates for peacekeeping operations, much remains to be done when it comes to establishing the criteria for successful implementation of these provisions. How do humanitarian, development and other international and non-governmental institutions see multidimensional peace operations and their role in protecting civilians?

Another area of particular interest to me is the nexus between peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Since its creation almost seven years ago, Sweden has been an ardent supporter of the UN peacebuilding architecture. We have recently deepened our engagement by assuming the chairmanship of the Liberia configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission. This position will further strengthen our peacebuilding activities in Liberia, which range from bilateral support to the Liberian police, to financial support channelled through the UNDP Justice and Security Trust Fund, and the participation of Swedish police and corrections officers in the UN Mission in Liberia. Our enhanced commitment will allow us to further focus on security sector reform, rule of law, national reconciliation, and women, peace and security. These are all key endeavours in rebuilding post-conflict societies, and in rising to our paramount challenge, to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. In this context, I welcome the Busan endorsement of the New Deal, and its
peacebuilding and state-building goals. I look forward to actively participating in the development of this new concept within the New Deal pilot project that Sweden will conduct together with Liberia and the United States.

As a development minister, one aim with Sweden’s enhanced Liberia commitment is to contribute to an ongoing, open and fruitful dialogue between the field and New York, and within the UN system, to maximize synergies and promote a more holistic approach to peacebuilding. For Sweden and for myself I hope it will also become a good test case and lots of good lessons learnt, which I hope we can take to other engagements in the future.

The international community needs to see measurable results, so clear and well-established indicators to evaluate impact are essential. The follow-up of results should be conducted transparently and in close cooperation with counterparts in the conflict areas. The vital discussions that occur in the Challenges Forum therefore feel more important than ever. As we announced earlier this year, the Swedish government has provided additional financial support over the medium term for a strategy to reinforce the forum coordination and to strengthen the capacity of the Challenges Forum Secretariat, which is hosted by the Folke Bernadotte Academy. This will make it possible for the partnership to develop and pursue the important objectives and results envisaged. It will allow the partnership to stay strong at the strategic, policy and doctrinal level while at the same time pursuing operational work in the field. I look forward to continuing to work with you and thank you for giving me this opportunity.

Discussion

Dr Ryan posed a question with regards to the minister’s reflections with reference to the role of the private sector, ‘I wonder if you could expand on what you consider to be the considerations that apply when governments and donor nations go into the private sector to support peace operations?’

Minister Carlsson responded that it should be taken into consideration now if we would like to deliver results earlier. She further added, ‘I think the patience out there is not that long. How can we encourage investors and private sector, whether it is global or small locals? We
have elaborated a lot in Sweden, first to see that the humanitarian assistance is conducted in such a way that it is not totally destroying the market economy that might have existed prior to the conflict. Secondly, we have learnt that if we also provide some risk capital in order to cut the costs, economic or development activities can take place a little earlier. Thirdly, we have learnt, and my trip to Mogadishu last autumn reinforced the point, that addressing youth unemployment is of utmost importance. They want to start work instead of entering into conflict again and there were a lot of good ideas among the locals. How good are we at listening and trying to organize that, instead of coming with our own way of doing business as development actors?’

Minister Carlsson added, ‘the local entrepreneurs and the diasporas want to go back to assist and to help, and they are not ready to wait until the UNDP has set up its two year programme because it takes two years to set it up. They want to return immediately and begin doing business in a very modest way. Many of them are also social entrepreneurs. How can we assist the diaspora and the local markets to expand in these very tough situations where normal people perhaps do not go in the first hand, but where those that are affected and those who believe in the future would like to do more? We try to elaborate further thinking. That is why I also want to mention the New Deal, because although we have worked a lot in situations of fragility, we need to think anew, I think it is about creating jobs, that might be the best medicine for long lasting peace.’

Dr Tegera posed another question with regards to the problems of the Mano river region, ‘do you have an intention to extend some of these ideas from Liberia to some of those countries neighbouring it?’

Minister Carlsson replied, ‘Yes, we have had some experiences there. Another reason why we are co-piloting with the US on the New Deal for Liberia is that we have a longstanding tradition based mainly on the mining industry. When I took office, we already had Liberia as one of the countries that we worked with. That is why I dare to say to Minister Konneh and others that we are working actively together with the finance minister but also the president. This is a test case. If it shows that it works, why should we not expand it? Sweden is a medium sized country, we cannot do too much of bilateral development assistance everywhere. That is why I would rather like to encourage the other multilateral actors and other bilateral donors to take on, perhaps
already now, that kind of concept. I know that Mali and Burkina are not really neighbouring countries, but we are also active there, because West Africa needs a lot of attention, particularly long-term perspectives in order to promote peace and stability. May I also take this opportunity to mention African capacity and capabilities. What we have seen with ECOWAS, what we see with the African Union, there is now a lot of opportunities growing in Africa to take its own responsibility and being able, to have capacities, and that needs to be recognized and supported. I think that is also part of the notion of national ownership, and to not just think that we have to do it together, we are there to assist.’

Dr Shea stated, ‘a couple of years ago when NATO first went into Afghanistan, I was working for George Robertson, the Secretary-General of NATO, and he used to express to me his frustration that he could not get the UK Department for International Development (DFID) to programme more of its funds in Afghanistan, because DFID argued that their mandate was to fight global poverty and therefore India was more important than Afghanistan. As you know, sometimes the military is frustrated that we cannot align our development priorities without peacebuilding priorities. From your perspective, in terms of prioritizing Swedish development aid, how much priority would you give to supporting peace support operations that you are involved in vis-a-vis what you consider, perhaps, to be your mandate, which is to spend the money where they can do most good to fight global poverty?’

Minister Carlsson responded, ‘I mentioned in my speech that when I took office, we sought to see where development assistance can make the best results and efforts. It really is in conflict and post-conflict situations. There was some initial reluctance. We also tried to categorize our countries and to inform why we were there. That was the first step. Then explain that here is poverty and encourage our aid-agency, SIDA, to do more. We also have the Folke Bernadotte Academy that channels some of the thinking and the knowledge on civilian crisis management, capacity-building, rule of law and democratization.

Minister Carlsson added, ‘is state-building then a contradiction to poverty reduction? I think it is a precondition for having long lasting results, and to honour agreements on ownership and to have their own systems. Sweden has been the country that has mostly used the Afghan system in order to promote long-term results. Unfortunately, I have been a little bit disappointed due to the high level of corruption, and the
lack of capacity to deal with that. So I have to rethink a little bit. Now we are really elaborating, specifically in Afghanistan, but also in some other countries. We are still active with development assistance in post-conflict countries. I have previously mentioned Liberia and Somalia. In general, we have tried to see how we can align, how we can work together? Afghanistan is now number three on our list of bilateral development assistance. If our military efforts there cost us about 2 billion Swedish kronor approximately, we do development assistance for 1 billion Swedish kronor. We also have the multilateral framework present, which goes hand in hand. We learn more and we have the credibility. However we also have to make people understand that we have different mandates. I am really happy that we now have a civilian leadership for our work in Afghanistan, and try to be there in the transition phase.'

Minister Carlsson continued, ‘it has been easier in Sweden than it has been for some other traditional donors to do this change. It was possibly because it was one of the first things that were addressed as I took office. People realized what was taking place with the bilateral assistance, but there was not that much reluctance. We have to be humble about the instruments of development assistance, and it tends to be that many people working in the security sector part have no clue about how technical it is, how much regulations there are, for good reasons. We are long-term people. We really would like to see results and we are using money wisely. You talked about tax-payers earlier. I have also learnt a lot dealing specifically with the military branches and how they deal with their money. I think development assistance can teach a lot.’

Prof Flavin asked, ‘given the global financial challenges, some of the pullback from peace and stabilization operations with the pull-out of Afghanistan, the pull-back from Iraq, there are challenges to keep many of our domestic supporters sticking to it, what do you recommend as a way to navigate through these various problems to maintain the initiative and maintain the focus, given all of the distracters and other things that seem to be appearing out there?’

Minister Carlsson responded, ‘I wish I knew. We really have to be able to tell the story and to show that this is a good investment for our common future. But how do you portray that? What we have to learn now, taking the Somalia example, is that it is better that we from the beginning already start to think about transitions—job creation, well-being, rule of law. We start to plan with those perspectives, and to say that
some of the security efforts that we do is part and parcel of delivering civilian services. I am trying to plan and to portray things like that. Then it might perhaps be easier to do more in the beginning when the money is mostly needed and where our efforts tend to be more rapid. I talked about prevention. That is the most cost efficient thing we can do. But when the crisis has elapsed, how can we more quickly go there with all our capacities at the same time, but with the civilian planning in the end?’

Minister Carlsson added, ‘it sometimes feels like, at least in Afghanistan, we have done it wrong, we started to talk about security, not human security, not human development. Development cooperation and humanitarian assistance were add-ons. I think we have to learn that lesson. If we can tell that to people, we might be able to mobilize more resources; perhaps both in the regions that are affected, because they pay the high price. There is an interest also locally to raise money. To perhaps be more innovative in financing, perhaps to have a more of a holistic approach, and trying to tell why we are doing this. There is money out there for poverty reduction, even though development assistance is shrinking at the moment. But how can that be linked to long-term development? That is what it is about; it is not enough to fight poverty. It is to pave the way for development.’

Dr Carriere asked, ‘on armed military peacekeeping—we talked about its high costs, the complexity of missions, limit to the effectiveness in the area of protection of civilians. There is an alternative, or perhaps a complementary development, and that is unarmed civilian peacekeeping, which is not based on threat power, but based on relationships by civilians with all the conflict parties. The kind of work that we do at the local level, especially by trained professionals, deter violence and help to protect civilians. My question is do you see any increase in the proportion of the people who are doing this kind of peacekeeping, unarmed civilian peacekeeping rather than armed military peacekeeping?’

Minister Carlsson, responded, ‘that is exactly what are we trying to do, to have more civilians coming out there as early as possible. To monitor is very important. We should be able to report, we should ask for transitional justice in order to pave the way for reconciliation. It is also important to see what we have tried to do in Sweden to bring in the area of security when it comes to the rule of law, to see that there is police. There is increased pressure to have more international police officers,
lawyers, and corrections officers. We are trying to do that as we have to deal with security in many dimensions. We should also pay a tribute to classic armed military peacekeepers, because sometimes this is the precondition for people to feel secure. There need to be a mix of capabilities. One cannot think in sequences. You have to already from the first day start to think about reconciliation, democratization, police, rule of law, and to have the active participation of the whole society. I encourage having much more thinking and discussion about how we encourage the local population to be part of this? How do we make outreach to the young generation? Why do we not use women much more? Because they did not cause the conflict and so are not part of the conflict solutions as they are not those who should stop fighting. How do we create those modalities? Many of those conflicts that you have addressed here today are high-profile ones such as Afghanistan and Syria. However, there are so many smaller conflicts every day where people make miracles in peacekeeping operations and trying to promote peace and stability. We need to think about a village instead of a nation or a continent—that is a good start.’

‘Thank you so much for giving me this opportunity. It was really enlightening for me and for my team. I thank you so much for giving these challenges to me as a development minister. I had a few questions; I think what we could do is that you go back home and talk about those things with your development ministers and others, discuss how donors and others can have a holistic approach, and to rethink a few of those things that we have been discussing. Thank you.’

HE Dr Fred Tanner, Director, Geneva Centre for Security Policy

Indeed, it is a privilege that we are able to welcome you here in Geneva. I think I speak on behalf of all colleagues and friends who are present that your presentation has been very enriching. It is a view, which fits perfectly in what we are discussing. Development assistance is part and parcel of the peacekeeping community, particularly with regard to creating conditions for sustainable, long-term development and peace. It is an extremely important part of our discourse and our activities today. Your personal commitment to peace and security is impressive and inspiring. I also want to thank you for your support and for your government’s support to the Challenges Forum. We are all stakeholders here, and this is very good news, this horizon you provided in your presentation. Finally, I would like to convey as Director of the Geneva Cen-
tre for Security Policy that it is a privilege to have you as a representa-
tive of Sweden here, as Sweden is one of the 12 founding members of
our centre, and thus a member of our Foundation Council. So this fits
perfectly in all of our activities. Thank you.
Peace Operations and the Humanitarian Space: How Can the Military and Civilians Cooperate in Protecting Civilians?

Background Paper: Civil–Military Relations—A Marriage of Necessity?  

*Mr Alan Doss, Associate Fellow, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Former Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General*

The subject of this paper—peace operations, humanitarian space and the protection of civilians—has been a long-standing, and contentious, topic of debate among military and humanitarian actors.

This debate has not been confined to UN peace operations alone. Military forces from NATO, the EU, the AU and ECOWA have all faced, at one time or another, protection challenges and been criticized for protection shortcomings. The campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, and now again in Somalia and Libya, have kept these issues at the forefront of the humanitarian agenda. The debate continues, and indeed the discussion in the Challenges Forum, this year and last, reflects the sense that this is unfinished business.

This paper, written from the perspective of a former head of a UN peacekeeping mission, focuses on three points of contention that have characterized and conditioned that debate in UN peace operations:

- civil–military relations, and the perceived clash between UN military goals and humanitarian objectives in conflict situations;
- the structural integration of humanitarian coordination in UN peace missions, which has created, in the view of some humanitarian actors, a conflict of interest between political ends and humanitarian principles; and

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15 This paper is a commissioned background paper for the International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations. The views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Challenges Partnership or the Host.

16 The author served in several UN peacekeeping missions including as the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Liberia.

• the seeming intrusion of UN peacekeepers into humanitarian space in the context of civil–military cooperation activities (CIMIC), blurring the lines between armed peacekeeping and humanitarian action.

The paper looks at how these issues have interacted, influenced and impacted UN peace operations. It will draw some conclusions on non-military ways to protect civilians and how they can be articulated within peacekeeping activities; it will conclude with some recommendations on how to improve civil–military cooperation to better protect civilians.

Civil–Military Relations: A Marriage of Necessity?

Civil-military relations are sometimes confused with CIMIC—civil-military cooperation. The former relates to the relationship of military authorities to civilian political authority. The latter has come to define cooperation between military and non-military actors in furtherance of military or security objectives.

Civil–military cooperation is a well-established principle of UN peace operations. UN multidimensional peacekeeping missions, unlike NATO or EUFOR operations, are usually structured around a civil–military relationship that gives primacy to the political leadership of the mission: the Force Commander reports to the civilian, political head of the mission who, in turn, reports to the Secretary-General and the Security Council.18

When the objectives assigned to UN forces are purely military in character, the relationship between the civilian and military structures is reasonably straightforward. The strategic parameters of UN military operations are defined in the mission mandate handed down by the Security Council and Force Commanders have the primary responsibility for designing and implementing the operational strategy that is required to implement the directives of the Council with oversight exercised by the Secretary-General and the Head of Mission. However, as peacekeeping missions have been assigned growing responsibilities for civilian protection, the lines between civilian and military responsibility have increasingly overlapped at strategic and tactical levels.

Expanding the Reach of Protection. Starting with the UN mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) in 1999, peacekeeping missions have been given mandates with language calling for ‘the protection of civilians under imminent threat of

physical violence’. This language has been used in all of the large multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations deployed over the last ten years. In the case of the two largest missions—UNAMID in Darfur and MONUC/MONUSCO in the DRC—the protection of civilians was assigned as the principal priority of those missions, with the demand that they ‘use all necessary means’ to ensure civilian protection.

The failures of UN peacekeeping operations in protecting civilians have been well documented, notably in the landmark Brahimi Report (although its findings were largely based on a review of missions that were undertaken before protection language started to become widely adopted in UN mandates). That report, and others, concluded that these failures were systemic and symptomatic of structural weaknesses in the way the UN mandated, resourced and managed protection operations. Almost a decade later, the ‘New Horizons’ non-paper drafted by DPKO and DFS, reviewed progress in UN peacekeeping, examined the challenges ahead, and pointed to a generic problem, warning that ‘the mismatch between expectations and capacity to provide comprehensive protection creates a significant credibility challenge for UN peacekeeping’. Whether generic or mission specific in origin, the challenge of protection has required a step-shift in the civilian-military relationship in UN peace operations. Three areas of innovation stand out: policy development, protection management and operational response.

Adapting the Policy Framework. Protection of civilians (POC) mandates have obliged mission personnel to work in a more coordinated, joined-up fashion to improve protection. This requirement has been spelt out as UN policy in the following terms: ‘The protection of civilians requires concerted and coordinated action among the military, police and civilian components of a United Nations peacekeeping operation and must be mainstreamed into the planning and conduct of core activities. United Nations humanitarian and non-governmental actors also undertake a broad range of activities in support of the protection of civilians. Close coordination with these actors is, therefore, essential’.

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20 African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur.
21 United Nations Mission in the Congo (MONUC), which was succeeded by the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Congo (MONUSCO) in July 2010.
How has this directive been applied in practice? The vehicle favoured for enhancing protection coordination is the country protection strategy. To date only a handful of these strategies have been developed largely in response to, rather than in anticipation of, a protection crisis.

Although the UN General Assembly and Security Council have adopted resolutions on various aspects of protection, they have not adopted an overall concept of what protection means and implies in a peacekeeping context. The subject is still a highly contentious one as evidenced by the debates in the UN’s Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34), where any notion of forceful external intervention in the name of civilian protection, including by UN peacekeepers, is treated with great caution by many UN member states. In the view of one commentator, this reticence among states may well be heightened by the conflating of the concept of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) with the civilian protection provisions in UN peacekeeping mandates, ‘vindicating the ones who fear that civilian protection in peacekeeping operations could be a guise to further interfere in the internal affairs of sovereign states’.

Fortunately, this policy gap has not prevented the UN Secretariat from developing an operational concept for the protection of civilians by peacekeeping missions. The concept is drawn up around a three-tier construct: protection through political processes; providing protection from physical violence; and establishing a protective environment.

This three tier approach is a recognition that protection requires not only the physical interventions of armed peacekeepers, indispensable though they may be, but also collateral measures that tackle the underlying political and institutional failures that have resulted in the protection crisis.

It is also an acknowledgement that a peacekeeping mission—and in particular its military component—cannot resolve a protection crisis in an isolated manner, bereft of collateral support from national actors and the international community. As the DPKO/DFS operational concept points out, ‘the three-tiers are mutually accommodating and should be taken forward simultaneously, in accordance with mission mandates and in light of the circumstances on the ground. In many instances, there will be strong links between the activities in one tier and those of another—the tiers are mutually reinforcing’.

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26 Holt and Taylor, *op.cit.*, p.11.
This guidance, together with an inventory of lessons learnt in protection practice and a drafting framework for protection strategies should certainly help current and future UN peacekeeping operations to develop a comprehensive approach that anticipates rather than responds to protection crises. Nevertheless, one recent review of protection strategies cautioned that they subsume but do not necessarily resolve divergences of views on protection ‘between missions and local authorities on the one hand, and between security and humanitarian dimensions of the missions on the other’.30

Managing Protection. Protection strategies are only as good as their implementation. Effective implementation requires strong management mechanisms to ensure that they are implemented. Where they exist, and provided they enjoy genuine support from the top leadership—civilian and military—such mechanisms can play a critical role, bringing together mission components to design and implement a comprehensive approach to country-specific protection challenges. However, this is not yet a standard mission requirement and some missions clearly still struggle with the problem of integrating civilian and military dimensions into a coherent, joined up, policy planning process. Such mechanisms should include partners that have protection responsibilities and concerns such as the UNHCR, UNHCHR and OCHA. MONUC, for example, established a senior management group for that purpose.

Bringing the wider humanitarian community into protection planning remains a significant challenge. Many humanitarian actors are very reluctant to join any planning exercise that includes the military out of concern that humanitarian principles may be compromised or their neutrality tarnished by association.

For their part, military actors sometimes reciprocate this reticence, even though UN missions are encouraged to reach out to the humanitarian community. Concern for operational security is sometimes cited as the reason for this reluctance to engage but cultural factors may play a role as well. Traditional military hierarchies are not always at ease with the less formal and unceremonious style of humanitarian actors. Where these relationships seem to work well, they are often informal and based on personal relationships, which do not always survive the vagaries of military or civilian staff turnover.

Rethinking the Protection Model. Protection failures have also compelled the UN to rethink and re-tool its operational models of protection, emphasizing a more cohesive operational interface between military, police and civilian components.31

With varying degrees of success, missions such as UNAMID, UNMISS,\textsuperscript{32} ONUCI and MONUC/MONUSCO have developed various tactical innovations aimed at enhancing protection. MONUC/MONUSCO, for example, has pioneered an innovative approach with its joint protection teams (JPT) composed of military and civilian staff, working in remote areas where the threat to civilians is high. JPTs have led to a greater insistence on the forward mobility of UN forces to curb attacks, better training for troops engaged in protection duties, enhanced community liaison, surveillance centres and improved tactical intelligence.

‘Smart’ protection is still very much a work in progress. DPKO/DFS has developed training modules for the protection of civilians in UN peacekeeping.\textsuperscript{33} They include a range of scenario-based exercises, as well as a module on conflict-related sexual violence. It remains to be seen how widely this training package, which is available to all troop and police contributors and peacekeeping training centres, will be used and whether, as a result, commanders and troops will be better prepared for protection duties.

\textit{The Limits of Innovation.} All of these efforts to strengthen mission protection capacities and coordination, while highly welcome, have not prevented egregious violence against civilians in places like the eastern Congo and Darfur, essentially for three reasons.

First, the nature of the protection challenge—politically inspired violence, cross-border insurgency, uncontrolled criminality, among others—may change over time. Capabilities and tactics need to change accordingly. This is not easy for the UN, which constantly faces an uphill struggle to find the right blend of military and logistical capabilities (and qualified civilians) for the job at hand.

This gap is especially apparent in times of crisis. Military doctrine dictates that reserves should be held available to deal with emergencies. However, protection is a very troop intensive exercise and when crisis strikes, the UN has no recourse to surge capacity. Such capacity may be forthcoming from bilateral sources (as it was in Sierra Leone and at times in the Congo and Côte d’Ivoire) but there is no certainty. Standby arrangements for surge capacity have been discussed in UN circles for many years but there seems to be little progress in turning such ideas into operational reality.

\textsuperscript{32} United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan.
The second reason lies in the rationale for the deployment of UN peacekeepers. Typically, the international community has sought to address armed conflict through the negotiation of peace agreements, on the assumption that peace brings protection. UN peacekeepers have usually been deployed to support peace agreements not protection. However, peace agreements often fail, and attacks against civilians have continued or worsened, leaving the peacekeepers trying to protect civilians under imminent threat without having the means to do so because the missions were initially configured to keep a negotiated peace and not to enforce protection.

In practice, protection has usually worked best when the troop-to-task and area-to-troop ratios were relatively favourable and when the deployment of UN forces on the ground was quick enough to achieve area domination before armed spoilers could re-assert control. In other situations, where the UN build-up has been protracted and the ratios less favourable, UN forces have struggled to assert the primacy of protection.34

A third element that has to be factored into the protection equation is national responsibility. In all of its resolutions and pronouncements on civilian protection, either at a thematic or mission level, the Security Council has insisted on the duty of national authorities to ensure the protection of their citizens. This is a primary prerogative of sovereignty, a view echoed in the R2P concept. Peacekeepers are usually called in when governments are unable or unwilling to exercise their full powers of sovereignty, including their responsibility to protect their own people. When national security forces are incapable of stopping violence against civilians or, worse, are themselves guilty of inflicting abuse, the responsibility to protect quickly defaults to the peacekeeping missions, even though it may have neither the resources nor the authority to discharge that responsibility.

Given the fact that missions often face the dilemma in which they are deployed to support a host government that in some instances is responsible for harming civilians with physical violence, DPKO has instructed its missions that, ‘in cases where the government is unable or unwilling to fulfil its responsibility, Security Council mandates give missions the authority to act independently to protect civilians. Bearing in mind that missions operate within the principles of peacekeeping and in accordance with the mandate, they are authorized to use force against any party, including elements of government forces, where such elements are themselves engaged in physical violence against civilians.’35

34 For a more in-depth discussion of this issue and some comparative analysis see Alan Doss, ‘Great Expectations’, op.cit.
Despite this admonition, it is still a big ask—politically and militarily—for UN peacekeepers to launch operations against government forces. Troop-contributing countries may well question the use of their contingents for this purpose, arguing that such operations, conducted without consent of the host government, exceed the peacekeeping remit.

So, unfortunately, unless there is a parallel and effective programme of security sector reform (SSR) in place, the UN’s ability to protect civilians is likely to be compromised by the abusive behaviour of undisciplined national security forces. In Sierra Leone, the national army was effectively cantoned and retrained under British supervision; the United Kingdom made a multi-year commitment to SSR that included not only re-training but also management reforms tied to budgetary support. In Liberia, the army was essentially abolished and the United States has funded and trained a new and smaller professional army. These measures greatly reduced the protection demands on the UN missions, which did not have to worry about protection dangers emanating from the government’s own security forces.

In contrast, in the DRC and in Côte d’Ivoire, the national security forces remained intact and under the control of the government, compounded, in the case of the Congo, by the attempted integration of thousands of poorly trained and ill-disciplined ex-combatants. A MONUC effort to promote reform at the operational level in the Kivus quickly ran into trouble when Congolese army units were implicated in atrocities.

Overall the conclusion that emerges from the experiences of the last decade is that civilian–military relationships at the mission level—institutional and operational—are gradually being re-shaped to strengthen UN interventions in support of civilian protection. However, this is an incremental process, which needs to be reinforced. There are still profound challenges that remain unresolved. One is how far UN peacekeepers can engage in the pre-emptive use of force to prevent attacks on civilians. Another one is how UN forces should respond to the protection challenges posed by abusive national security forces.

**Squaring the Circle: Integration and the Projection of Humanitarian Space**

The notion of a UN mission integrating civilian, military and police components reaches back to the days of ONUC, the original peacekeeping mission in
the Congo. However, the concept and structure of an integrated mission encompassing a humanitarian dimension was only formally adopted in late 2000 with the appointment of a Deputy Special Representative to the UN peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), who combined this function with that of UN humanitarian coordinator.

Integration in Practice. Over the intervening decade since the adoption of the humanitarian integration model in UNAMSIL, the debate about integration, its implications, merits, drawbacks and impact on the humanitarian system and the concept of humanitarian space has rumbled on, revolving around several, recurring issues:

- Security of UN humanitarian workers may be compromised by association when UN peacekeepers are engaged in robust action;
- Protagonists who are in conflict with peacekeepers may restrict humanitarian access in retaliation;
- Perceptions of humanitarian actors by local communities and non-state armed actors may be negatively affected by the military activities of the mission and any misbehaviour of peacekeepers;
- Humanitarian advocacy may be constrained by the subordination of humanitarian principles to the political aims of a mission (an argument also used against the ‘double hat’ when UN resident coordinators are designated as humanitarian coordinators).

These issues were re-visited in a recent study commissioned by the UN Integration Steering Group. That study examined the impact of UN integration arrangements on humanitarian space and concluded, among other findings, that ‘despite reforms to the policy of integration over the last decade, the debate remains polarized’.

In its research, the study team looked at the security of humanitarian workers and stated that the team ‘found no clear evidence of a direct link between UN integration arrangements and attacks on humanitarian workers in the contexts reviewed.’ But the report cautioned that highly visible integration arrange-

36 The ONUC organization chart established civilian as well as military structures and relationships, including with UN agencies and programmes. In recent times, the challenges of mission integration and coordination have been well defined in Chapter 7, part III of the so-called ‘Capstone Doctrine’, ‘United Nations Peacekeeping: Principles and Guidelines’.
39 Ibid., p.2.
ments may blur the distinction between UN political and humanitarian actors and therefore pose an additional risk to the security of humanitarian personnel.

The study also considered the access issue, concluding that in ‘some cases, UN integration arrangements have supported increased access to UN and non UN humanitarian actors by facilitating the use of mission logistical assets, the provision of area security by UN peacekeeping forces and the use of military escorts’. However, the study cautions that this should not become the default option and points to the other impediments to access created by bureaucratic obstacles, insecurity caused by armed groups and poor infrastructure.

On the issue of relations with local stakeholders, the study ‘did not find evidence of official UN non-contact policies relating to humanitarian engagement or of a widespread practice of political interference in humanitarian engagement with non-state armed actors’. However, it did conclude that integration arrangements should be determined by informed understanding of how integration will be perceived locally.

As regards humanitarian advocacy, the research team found that ‘in a number of contexts, the UN integration arrangements have facilitated advocacy efforts amongst UN humanitarian and UN peacekeeping and political actors’, finding also ‘instances where UN integration arrangements have strengthened the influence of humanitarian considerations in decision-making processes within the UN integrated presence’.

Overall, the study ‘found evidence that UN integration arrangements have had both positive and negative impact on humanitarian space.’ A subsequent discussion at the Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG), acknowledged that ‘tensions and hostility with regards to integration may stem more from the way in which integration is sometimes being carried out in practice rather than integration per se’. Indeed, the integration debate has sometimes been driven by institutional positioning within the UN system, as well as personal relationships among actors, rather than an objective assessment of the merits or flaws of integration.

40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid., p.3.
43 Ibid. In addition, for a personal assessment of this aspect of integration, see also Alan Doss, ‘Eyewitness: Crisis, Contention and Coherence; Reflections from the Field’, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 15, No.4, August 2008, pp. 574-576.
44 UN Integration and Humanitarian Space, op.cit., p.4.
Integration, Coherence and Coordination. The same discussion in the HPG drew a distinction between structural and strategic integration, contending that even if structures are not integrated there should be coherence in UN policies and that ‘strategic integration, if implemented in an appropriate manner, is in the interest of all’. In other words, whatever the degree of structural integration, coherence is a worthwhile objective, difficult though it may be to achieve in practice.

So, can strategic coherence be achieved in the absence of an integrated structure? A call for better coordination is usually the response. However, coordination should not be confused with coherence; coordination can facilitate coherence—it does not replace it.

Personal experience from field operations suggests that coherence (and solution finding) starts with ‘integrated thinking’, putting the problems (not mandates) at the centre of the discussion. Ideally, this would find practical expression in some kind of common vision on how partners, inside and outside of an integrated structure, would work together to tackle the inter-related political, security and humanitarian challenges that most conflict situations generate.

This approach is now being attempted within the UN system through integrated mission planning and strategic frameworks. It remains to be seen whether it will work, or if it will go the way of earlier efforts to achieve strategic coherence, which have been dogged by the ‘shopping list’ syndrome of multiple, institutional demands, lacking a clear sense of the priority and cohesion (UN humanitarian appeals have sometimes suffered from the same malaise).

Developing coherence beyond the UN system is of course even more complicated. The reluctance of some humanitarian actors to sit down with military and political actors further complicates the search for coherence in operational situations, which is why, as the HPG suggests, ‘humanitarians need to find a balance between neutrality and coherence.

Armed Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Action: Blurring the Lines or Expanding the Space?

Humanitarian actors have expressed their concern that armed UN peacekeepers and UN mandated forces are increasingly impinging on humanitarian space, confusing the role of military and humanitarian actors to the detriment of the latter. Much of this concern has centred on CIMIC activities. NATO currently

46 Ibid., p.3.
47 Alan Doss, ‘Eyewitness: Crisis, Contention and Coherence; Reflections from the Field’, op.cit.
48 The search for Coherence, op.cit., p.4.
defines CIMIC as ‘the coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies’.49

The UN has not defined CIMIC in a doctrinal sense. Instead, CIMIC is understood as a set of activities that are carried out by peacekeepers, using their own or UN resources, as a means to reach out to local populations through interaction with communities and civil society, using both dialogue opportunities as well as material assistance (the latter usually funded as quick impact projects—QIPs).

*Peacekeeping and Protection: Trespassing on Humanitarian Space?* In the case of both UN peacekeeping and UN-mandated operations, the claim has been made that peacekeeping operations are increasingly intruding into and subverting humanitarian space. They are said to do so for two main reasons. First, in providing material assistance, they blur the line between assistance based on humanitarian principles (impartiality, neutrality and independence) and assistance driven by political or military motives. Secondly, they crowd out assistance provided by humanitarian actors, who may be forced to compete on unequal terms with military actors.

The increase in mandated protection responsibilities for UN peacekeeping missions has drawn UN peacekeeping operations ever deeper into this debate on the concept and practice of humanitarian space. Does robust action by UN peacekeepers in defence of civilians restrict humanitarian access? Do UN agencies risk losing their humanitarian access in consequence? And do robust operations enlarge or diminish humanitarian space?

Active protection requires UN peacekeepers to take action to defend civilians. They cannot therefore remain strictly neutral. But neutrality and impartiality should not be confused. The concept of humanitarian space should not be conflated with the notion of neutrality, which would imply that UN peacekeepers (and indeed humanitarian actors) would remain aloof even in the face of attacks on civilians.

It is difficult, and perhaps unwise, to make general assumptions about the impact of robust operations on humanitarian space. In some cases, for example in the Ituri district in eastern Congo, there seems little doubt that robust action, even though it initially caused displacement, did create space for humanitarian agencies to reach vulnerable populations, partly because the action was relatively short lived but also because of the political accommodation with neigh-

bouring Uganda, which helped to constrain the rebel militias. For various reasons, robust action in the Kivus has proved less effective and the level of humanitarian access has waxed and waned in function of the security conditions on the ground.

Protection and Proximity: a Danger of Humanitarian Displacement? There is another important implication for humanitarian space resulting from protection focused mandates. Protection requires proximity and confidence. Outreach to the local population is therefore essential for peacekeepers charged with providing protection and deterring attacks on civilians. Humanitarian actors, however, have questioned the provision of material assistance by peacekeepers furnished as a part of that outreach, apprehensive about CIMIC displacing and militarizing humanitarian action. This concern has been most loudly expressed in the context of the Afghanistan and Iraq operations but it has also arisen in relation to UN peace operations.

Humanitarian concern about cooperating with the military has occurred even when robust action was not at issue as was the case in the aftermath of the earthquake in Haiti. As one review put it, ‘In order to establish a clear separation from military actors, the humanitarian system created a firewall around itself. This meant missed opportunities’.  

Obviously, UN peacekeepers should not duplicate or replace services that humanitarian actors can provide. But nor should assistance from peacekeepers be ruled out if it is not readily available from humanitarian sources, with the proviso that it is not used to reward or penalize communities or create dependency. There is a risk, of course, that humanitarian action will be used to achieve purely military goals without due respect for humanitarian principle. However, the integrated model favoured by the UN does provide some safeguards by allowing for the articulation of humanitarian concerns at the senior levels of mission leadership.

Conclusions: Getting the Balance Right

This paper concludes with six recommendations on how non-military ways to protect civilians can be better articulated within peacekeeping activities and how civil-military cooperation can be improved for that purpose.

First, protection is about politics. While the credible threat of military force for protection should not be excluded, the overall approach must be political, aimed at ending violent conflict and the denial of basic rights (including access

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to humanitarian assistance). Integrated protection strategies reflecting this multidimensional approach should be developed up-front, as an urgent and mandatory task for all missions assigned protection duties, not as a post facto add-on. Such strategies should be developed in a consensual, inclusive fashion.

Second, if protection strategies are to have any real prospect of success, they must draw in all armed protagonists (national, and where needed, regional) even those whom the international community would rather keep at bay. That was an important lesson from the Sierra Leone experience where the rebel RUF, despite its horrific record of violence was induced into a peace process and successfully disarmed.

Third, on the ground, a closer rapport between military and civilians is equally vital to protection. Opportunities for creating a civilian–military dialogue and joint planning for protection should be pursued at all levels, central to local. Too often civilians and military are talking past each other. Both need to recognize that they must be part of the solution or they will quickly become part of the problem.

Fourth, joint civilian–military teams should develop operational strategies on the ground in forward areas where the need for protection is most acute. This requires the military to recognize that non-military actors have an important and legitimate stake in the way that military operations are conducted but also for humanitarian stakeholders to accept that the military are vital partners, not to be dogmatically shunned in the name of humanitarian principle.

Fifth, joint civil–military consultative mechanisms should be put in place to guide and objectively monitor, on the basis of agreed indicators, the progress of protection and the impact of actions taken in support of protection.

Finally, while the debate on civil–military relations and humanitarian space is certain to continue, it is worth bearing in mind the observation of the HPG that ‘humanitarian space is not the exclusive domain of humanitarian actors: national and other authorities, which can include both civilian and military institutions, have the right and the obligation to provide for the well-being of the civilian population’.\(^{51}\)

Protection is a common challenge that requires a common response.

Presentations

Synopsis: How do humanitarian, development and other international and non-governmental institutions see multidimensional peace operations and their role in protecting civilians? What are the non-military ways to protect civilians and how can they be articulated with the peacekeepers’ activities?

Chair: Mr Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Director-General, United Nations Office at Geneva, United Nations

The previous session focused on regional issues and now we turn our attention to the equally relevant issue of military and civilian cooperation in protecting civilians.

Protection of civilians is at the very heart of humanitarian work and of peacekeeping, which is aimed fundamentally at stopping violence and enabling a peaceful life to develop. With protection of civilians included in the mandate of almost all UN peacekeeping missions, it is now ever more important. The complexity of the tasks that peacekeepers are asked to address today involves them in increasing political issues. Supporting the implementation of peace agreements is an inherently political activity.

The question remains whether cooperation between peacekeepers and humanitarian actors presents a challenge to the humanitarian principles of impartial and neutral work. This is a valid question even if the fundamental aim of both the actors is protection.

Despite moving towards a period of consolidation, the UN continues to face high demands on its peacekeeping operations. Ongoing conflict and environmental degradation are just some of the factors that have led to larger, more severe and more complex humanitarian emergencies than ever before.

The expert panel today is a demonstration of how relevant Geneva is in these discussions. Geneva is a critical convening point and I hope that our discussion today can help verify how we can further explore this expertise to help protect civilians.
Mr Alan Doss, Associate Fellow, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Former Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General

The key elements of my paper are three interrelated issues. Firstly, the issue of the evolution of civil-military relations resulting from the increasing use of UN peace operations for civilian protection. Secondly, the debate that has gone on for many years, which is about the integration of UN humanitarian actors into peace operations and the concern that integration dilutes or even obscures humanitarian objectives and principles. Thirdly, the seeming intrusion of UN peacekeepers into humanitarian space, a consequence of the use of CIMIC-type activities in protection operations. These are issues that come up for other types of interventions, such as in Afghanistan and Somalia.

I have four basic conclusions. One, there has been an improvement of civil-military relations within UN missions. Even though, on occasion, those relations can still be quite fraught, both inside the mission and with civilian actors outside of the mission. I call this a marriage of necessity rather than a love-match. It is an unavoidable marriage. As protection mandates become ever more explicit for peacekeeping operations, there is obviously a greater need for civilians to work together. The increasing number of protection mandates is often the result of pressure from the humanitarian community, which has pushed very hard and successfully to the extent that protection becomes a core part of many of the peacekeeping missions. In fact, over the last ten years, all of them, with perhaps one exception, have had a strong protection mandate. Yet there has been recognition that protection cannot be achieved by the military or security actors alone. Therefore civilians and military need each other to ensure effective protection in times of armed conflict.

My second conclusion is that while the General Assembly and the Security Council have yet to agree on a unifying concept of protection for peace operations, there has been a strong and generally positive evolution in UN policy as well as operational guidance. This has come particularly from the UN Secretariat—DPKO, DPA and so forth—starting in some ways with the Capstone Doctrine, reinforced by New Horizons, and more recently in a series of documents being issued by DPKO on guidance for field missions, all of which have stressed the importance of civil–military relations as a core responsibility of the mission, the mission leadership (military and civilian). To some extent the Secretariat has stepped into the political breach and has enabled us to come out
with some better guidance. A lot of that has been built on operational experience, innovated experience at a field level. Frankly, much of this has come as a result of failure, of mistakes we made. I can confess to being a part of those mistakes. We have had to learn, sometimes the hard way, and try to correct the line of approach. There is still unresolved constraints inherent in mandate contradictions, capability limitations and of course national caveats from troop and police contributing countries that create a gap between expectations and reality on the ground, which in turn can provoke friction between civilian and military actors within and outside our missions.

My third conclusion is that protection mandates have obliged UN missions to move beyond the traditional boundaries of civil–military relations and indeed the political humanitarian divide. Protection requires a much greater degree of interaction and integration. In my view, integration is about integrated thinking—about putting the problem in the middle and then finding common solutions to deal with it. It is not and should not be about who reports to whom or who is at the end of the dotted line on an organogram. It is about coherence, not just coordination. Coordination only takes you so far. What we really need is strategic coherence which can then turn into appropriate operational policies.

I recognize that integration is still very much a contested notion, still being debated. One of the very first meetings I went to as the UNDP Regional Director in the early nineties was a five-hour long discussion on the integration of humanitarian actors with the resident coordinator.

Fourth, as peacekeepers have been drawn into a much more active, high-profile protection role, they are increasingly being drawn into the humanitarian arena. I would argue that peacekeeping, even robust operations are not necessarily a threat to humanitarian space. They can actually enlarge that space. We have seen in places like Ituri, the DRC, where that was the case. Recently we had a debate about the ramifications of arresting Gen. Bosco Ntaganda, on the displacement of refugees and so forth. In order to move forward there is a need for some form of reconciliation on our side. Humanitarian assistance should not be automatically banned by peacekeepers. They need to be close. The key is that in providing humanitarian assistance they have to respect basic humanitarian principles of impartiality and that they do not deny or use humanitarian aid for political ends.
In conclusion, I have several recommendations. First, integrated protection strategy should be done up front, not as an add-on. They have to draw together, political, security and humanitarian responses in a coherent manner. They must draw in all the protagonists, including the nasty ones. An example is a lesson from Sierra Leone, we would not have brought peace back to that country unless we had brought the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in. It was not easy and some of them eventually went before the UN Special Court for Sierra Leone. Second, strategies are only as good as their implementation. We need integrated mechanisms to implement integrated strategies, including setting up opportunities for dialogue between civilian and military components. If possible, joint planning for protection would be ideal. At a minimum, we need to cooperate with each other. Third, joined-up approaches need to apply in forward areas. The message in Kinshasa needs to be echoed in Goma, and so forth. One can multiply that by many other countries. Fourth, consultative mechanisms are required to assess progress on the ground, which is not always the case. Very often there is a half full, half empty dialogue going on. There is a definite need to find some common grounds when attempting to make assessments of programmes. Finally, we have to recognize that humanitarian space is not the exclusive domain of humanitarian actors. It is not an exclusive zone. Political and security actors also must feel the commitment to protecting and enlarging humanitarian space.

**Mr Rudolph Müller, Chief, Emergency Services Branch, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, United Nations**

Thank you very much for inviting OCHA to participate in this workshop and to reflect on how the military and civilians can cooperate in the area of protection of civilians. In doing so, I would like to focus on UN peacekeeping missions with protection of civilians mandates and to distinguish these from peace enforcement or stabilization missions, which are of a different nature and bring with them, very specific challenges. I would also like to use this opportunity to highlight some positive developments and to note some of the challenges humanitarian actors face in interacting and coordinating with peacekeeping missions on the protection of civilians, as well as steps we are taking to ensure that such interaction takes place more effectively.

Let me first highlight how the missions can look like and how they interrelate with OCHA and the humanitarian community. The most
common system right now is the so-called one foot in, one foot out system—OCHA’s default structure of relationships—the agency and the humanitarian coordinator are part of the mission and in all of the cases it is a combined Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General who functions as the Resident Coordinator or as the Humanitarian Coordinator. Often the individual may also have other responsibilities such as being the Designated Officer for Security. While the Humanitarian Coordinator may be part of the mission, the OCHA field office, is outside of the mission. There is a number of advantages to this structure—greater leverage on the humanitarian issues, better interactions with partners, more autonomy to act, but it also has a number of disadvantages. There is also the ‘both feet in and both feet out’ system, but it is not very common. This system is imposed in conflict situations during the longer-term rehabilitation phase.

Protection of civilians is an umbrella concept, not necessarily the issue of one particular entity or the military, but also includes other actors such as the police. It appeared, for the first time 13 years ago on the Security Council and since then the Security Council has had a number of discussions on the issue. There are currently eight UN peacekeeping missions that have protection of civilians mandate which refer to physical protection, legal protection, and humanitarian assistance. It is not merely physical protection.

It is important to note that protection of civilians is not only a limited mandate for civilians under imminent threat. It covers a wide range of other activities that can be undertaken by peacekeeping missions, such as creating the security conditions for the conducive delivery of humanitarian assistance. For example in Sudan, the humanitarian approach to peacekeeping included mine clearance to facilitate new roads and establishing access. With the right of entry and with the mission’s presence in the area, there was a certain element of security achieved and a huge protection factor for the affected people.

What are some of the positive experiences of coordination for the protection of civilians? In Sudan, thematic steering committees on returns and reintegration, protection of human rights were established. They are chaired by the SRSG or by the DSRSG and are composed of the relevant missions and UN country team actors and the military police. We also have the equivalent in the DRC. These committees seek to avoid an overlap with UN agencies, particularly the clusters. Military and police
missions have been planned in consultation with humanitarian actors to allow access for needs assessment missions, human rights investigations, and the like.

The Senior Management Group, which includes OCHA and UNHCR, endorsed the establishment of community alert networks which involved distributing mobile phones to local communities in isolated areas in eastern DRC, so they could contact local authorities and the mission’s military bases in close proximity in case of an imminent threat, and request intervention.

MONUSCO, in cooperation with international NGO partners, stepped-up efforts to establish early warning systems in vulnerable areas. For example establishing community alert networks that involved distributing mobile phones (or high frequency radios in villages without mobile network coverage) to local communities in isolated areas in eastern DRC so they could contact local authorities and the mission’s military bases in close proximity in case of an imminent threat, and request intervention.

The use of military assets is jointly planned and prioritized. In Darfur, humanitarian actors worked with the mission to provide escorts for women collecting firewood. This has been widely featured in the media and has enhanced protection to a large degree; violence has reduced drastically as the population was previously subject to rape and all kinds of assaults. In the north of the DRC, setting up a temporary operating base in the insecure areas contributed to protection efforts. There were also a number of synergies in Afghanistan where UNAMA Human Rights Unit co-led the Protection Cluster with UNHCR, enabling a good level of information-sharing, and so on.

There are a number of challenges and dilemmas. One particular challenge is knowing which component of a peacekeeping mission to engage with. Missions do not always speak with one voice on protection. Understanding a mission’s overall approach may require engaging with several sections and knowing which section or component works on which aspect of protection issues. Moreover, in the past some missions have not always recognized the need to coordinate their activities with humanitarian actors. This is essential where their activities overlap.
More fundamentally, effective interaction and coordination between humanitarian actors and peacekeepers have been hampered by concerns over the inherently political nature of UN peacekeeping missions and its implications for the humanitarian principles of independence, impartiality and neutrality which guide the work of UN and non-UN humanitarian organizations. There are different views and perceptions on that issue.

The dilemma, from the point of view of the humanitarian community, is that their access and security can be seriously undermined if they are perceived by belligerents or segments of the population as aligned to the political objectives of a mission which may, in some situations, even be a party to the conflict. In the DRC and Afghanistan, segments of the NGO community have begun to withdraw from UN humanitarian coordination mechanisms and some are threatening to do so in other contexts, most notably Somalia, because some UN humanitarian actors are perceived as lacking independence from the UN and the mission’s broader political objectives in these contexts. Concerns have also been raised by humanitarians with regard to the handling of sensitive protection information and the need to ensure its confidential nature so as to not put sources and victims at risk.

The development of guidance on interaction and coordination between protection clusters and peacekeeping missions was included within the Global Protection Cluster workplan for 2011 and 2012, with OCHA designated as the lead agency. OCHA is leading an inter-agency team, comprising OHCHR, UN Population Fund, UN Human Settlements Programme, UNHCR, UN Mine Action Service, NGO-consortium InterAction and World Vision, in consultation with DPKO, to engage protection actors in various country settings to determine what level and type of guidance would be most relevant to their work.

Although a range of guidance on protection has been developed for use by humanitarian organizations, this does not address sufficiently the question of how such organizations should interact and coordinate with peacekeeping missions. We also recognize, that it is important for the mission, that the humanitarian community has a coherent and well-communicated position on their day-to-day interaction with the mission.
The precise outcome will be determined on the basis of consultations with humanitarians in the field. However, some possible issues for consideration include: Different conceptual models of protection adopted by peacekeeping missions and humanitarian actors; guiding principles for interaction with missions; overview of possible coordination structures; clarifying working methods, including in developing and implementing parallel protection strategies, contingency planning and response plans, undertaking protection assessments; modalities of information sharing, advocacy and communication and training and scenario planning.

To conclude my presentation, OCHA is confident that these efforts will go a long way in addressing the concerns, challenges and ensure a more effective interaction and coordination between humanitarian actors and peacekeeping missions on protection.

Ms Christine Beerli, Vice-President, International Committee of the Red Cross

Protecting civilians and improving cooperation between humanitarian organizations and the military is an important goal, one that confronts all of us in our daily work, albeit in different ways. An increasing number of humanitarian agencies as well as soldiers and police are involved in protecting civilians, both within and outside multidimensional peace operations; and they have different mandates, objectives and ways of working. Most UN peacekeeping missions now have a mandate to protect civilians. Increasingly UN military and police forces are deployed to post-conflict and conflict settings, often where the ICRC already has a long-standing presence. They are expected to help protect civilians in their own capacity in a way that humanitarian organizations are unable to do. Thus, UN forces and humanitarian organizations such as the ICRC, can take different and complementary approaches to enhancing the protection of civilians.

We all have a common appreciation of the gravity of the problem of protecting civilians. On the one hand, it has been an issue of major concern at the international level for more than a decade now, and in some respects progress has been impressive. Never before have we had so many policy statements and resolutions, so much global information and advocacy, and so many groups claiming to carry out protection
work. On the other hand, the reality on the ground has rarely kept pace with progress on the policy level.

The reality is that civilians continue to be the main victims of armed conflict and violence. Recent or ongoing armed conflicts or other situations of violence in Afghanistan, Côte d’Ivoire, Libya, Somalia or Syria, to name just a few, have claimed countless civilian victims and caused immeasurable suffering. The fundamental reason for the dismal reality on the ground, compared to the impressive progress we see on a policy level, is that states and non-state actors lack respect for International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and other relevant standards. This, coupled with a prevailing culture of impunity, is the main cause of the immense human suffering we are witnessing.

Various factors compound this challenge. When armed groups are motivated by crime or banditry, it is all the harder to talk to them about their obligation to protect civilians. The constant evolution in the means and methods of warfare, sometimes accompanied by what might be described as reckless disregard for the protection of civilians, is another factor. Yet despite, or rather because of, the blatant violations committed by parties to conflicts around the world, the ICRC firmly believes that the relevance and importance of IHL has been reaffirmed rather than weakened.

For the ICRC, protection and assistance go hand in hand. Our operational presence in hugely diverse situations of armed conflict and other types of violence around the world ensures proximity to victims, and our impartial, neutral and independent approach enhances our ability to help them. Protection can facilitate assistance, and well-organized assistance should increase the population’s resilience in the face of threats. We always try to engage in confidential and constructive dialogue with states and non-state actors to uphold the rights of victims, aiming as much as possible to prevent violations from occurring in the first place. Such dialogue is facilitated by strict adherence to a principled approach. We remind the parties of their obligations to protect civilians and we promote compliance with international humanitarian law at all levels. This includes helping authorities to incorporate IHL into national legislation and army training manuals.

At the same time, the ICRC works to address victims’ needs for food, water, shelter, other essential items and medical care; tracing missing
family members and restoring links between them; and by ensuring that people in detention are well treated. We are very careful not to compromise the perception of our neutrality and independence. The ICRC does not work in isolation. At the global level, the ICRC is engaged in many debates on the professionalization of protection work. For example, the ICRC took on the role of convener in the drafting of professional standards in protection work for humanitarian and human right organizations that were first published in 2009. It is currently revising these standards with a large group of UN agencies and NGOs.

In the field, the ICRC often cooperates with different individuals and groups concerned about specific issues. This is also the case with different components of UN peace operations. Our experts on mines and unexploded ordnances work closely with the UN Mine Action Services. There have also been numerous examples of cooperation in arranging family reunions on the ground. Cooperation can also mean making appropriate referrals. ICRC delegates often refer individuals, whom they meet on their field trips to other organizations, including UN agencies, which can provide them with essential support. Finally, pre-deployment briefings of UN peacekeepers by the ICRC are another example of successful cooperation in many troop- and police-contributing countries.

The UN has gone a long way in including protection activities in the mandates of its peacekeeping missions, thanks to the joint DPKO/OCHA concept note on protection of civilians and its three-tiered approach. Subsequently, a framework was developed that missions are now using to draft context-specific strategies for protecting civilians. DPKO has made efforts to mainstream the rights and needs of specific groups, such as women and children, into its operations.

Over the last couple of years, DPKO has better defined the roles and responsibilities of different missions’ components when it comes to protection. This was necessary to avoid blurring the roles between the military, the police and humanitarian agencies. The ICRC has strongly advocated this at previous events within the framework of the Challenges Forum. Beyond the work that was done at DPKO headquarters, much attention has been given to the role of international military forces in protection versus the role of humanitarian organizations. Humanitarian agencies strive to make protection of civilians an inherent part of assistance and development activities. Protection can also be a
stand-alone activity that addresses the root causes of abuses and violations. This can be accomplished by encouraging the authorities to fulfil their obligations or by improving the capacity of populations at risk to reduce their exposure to threats.

For the military, protection is part of its training. It is indeed inherent in conventions and standards regulating the use of force. Respecting IHL and the rules relating to law enforcement does ensure better protection of the population during military operations. Yet for peacekeeping forces, the concept of protecting civilians goes beyond respect for IHL while conducting military operations. In other words, beyond protecting the population from the harm that can result from the use of force, modern peacekeeping also encompasses a proactive role in protecting populations from threats that are caused by other actors in the context where peacekeeping forces are deployed. UN military can use coercive means, alongside coaching and mentoring of national forces. Thus, they can help protect civilians in a way that humanitarian organizations cannot.

We have gained considerable clarity regarding the distinct contributions that humanitarian organizations and the military can make to protecting people on the ground. However, there is still a risk that populations and local stakeholders will be confused about the roles and responsibilities of humanitarian agencies, political leaders and the military in protecting civilians. This can be especially challenging when UN forces engage in military or law enforcement operations alongside national forces, while at the same time conducting integrated field missions with humanitarian organizations. While no one questions the need for coherence within the different components of a peacekeeping mission, and of a commonly agreed-upon strategy and plan of action, it is still problematic for various components of the mission to conduct joint missions on the ground.

Despite these challenges, there are clearly ways in which the different approaches to protection can coexist and even complement one another. Indeed, the promotion of a rights-based approach, and the recognition that protection is rooted in IHL as well as international human rights law, refugee law and regional and national laws, provides a common starting-point. The men, women and children in need of protection must remain at the centre of any action that is undertaken. Humanitarian aid must be allocated strictly on the basis of humanitarian needs,
not in accordance with political, military or economic objectives. Impartiality must be the minimum humanitarian principle respected by all parties. For the ICRC, preserving its independence from political and military objectives is non-negotiable.

Let me also emphasize that the need for the highest professional standards holds true across the board—in humanitarian and human rights organizations as well as in military and police forces deployed within missions. Competent staff and adequate resources are the key to fulfilling what are often complex tasks. In the case of peacekeeping missions this entails the capacity to provide physical protection, as well as to build an environment respectful of the rule of law.

The challenge of protecting civilians, in all its various dimensions, is a daunting one. This challenge ultimately rests with states and non-state actors, both of whom are bid by provisions of IHL. Yet there are many parties involved, both civilian and military, with their own particular contributions to make. By understanding and respecting each other’s role and mandates, and seeking to complement rather than undermining them, we can ensure that progress on the policy level is felt where it matters, on the ground, by people suffering in the midst of war and other situations of violence.

Mr Amin Awad, Director, Division of Emergency, Security and Supply, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, United Nations

Look at our mandates, the principles and how they are challenged in today’s changing environment; challenged by perhaps government, by non-state actors and other elements. Yet a pragmatic way of looking at the challenges is to see the possible areas for cooperation between the humanitarian and the military. I will also touch on the issue of leadership, which very much defines any cooperation on the ground.

In the last decade we have seen a complex range of dilemmas facing the humanitarian community on the ground. The events of 11 September 2001 marked a big shift. Much has been said about the blurring of lines between the humanitarian, political and military, and the corresponding ‘misperception’ by the conflicting parties, particularly those hostile to foreign intervention, regarding humanitarian work. It negatively impacts humanitarian actors ability to have the means to send their staff
(and the associated protection) to enter highly hostile or dangerous areas to help the populations in need.

This has happened because of the hostility of some elements in some areas that we moved into. During the Balkan conflict in the 1990s, we were often caught in the crossfire. Today that crossfire is no longer the threat or risk that we usually assess before we let our people go into the field, rather it is the threat or risk of being a target, which is the focus currently facing us. That has made us change the way we achieve security when we go into theatre, going from rapid risk assessment to rapid threat assessment. Therefore, the UN system has to change, and we, unlike the ICRC, has a global security governance, a security regime, that is the Department for Safety and Security (UNDSS), and we abide by the security rules and laws emanating from UNDSS. We have moved from evacuating to learning how to remain and how to deal with a threat rather than the risk. There is a complete change in the way we respond to these situations.

On the one hand, many speak about the shrinking humanitarian space. There is an opposing opinion saying that the space is not shrinking, but there are elements that curtail our movements, there are other opportunities that can make us maintain that space and even expand it.

The UNHCR principles, statutes and mandates are based on the 1951 Refugee Convention, and the 1964 and 1967 Protocols, based on the issue of statelessness. Our roles go beyond the classical scope of pure humanitarian action. Protection issues are very sensitive, challenging and potentially threatening. Our work is entirely non-political, while politics really rubs shoulder with international protection, when you try to do public advocacy or quiet advocacy for the right of people of concerns, these rights of population does not need to exit, when we talk about asylum, it is a sensitive and a highly politicized issue. When we speak about statelessness and identity in countries that could be challenged by a big number of stateless individuals in their own territories that they have not recognized. Yet, when it comes to registration, return is sensitive, crossing borders could be sensitive. Mixed flows of migrants, refugees or asylum seekers could be threatening, it could be politically contentious. It makes it to the top of the agenda of the governments and the media only in the exodus of the migrants and the asylum seekers immediately after the collapse of the regime. For instance, immediately after the collapse of the Gaddafi regime, hundreds of thou-
sands of people who flooded the coast, created a lot of discussion in Southern Europe.

These are just some of the challenges and a few of the issues. When we go far afield to places like Pakistan or Afghanistan and other places where the environment is really very hostile, issues such as monitoring return, providing protection, assistance, registration becomes challenging. Despite the increasing security measures and the change in our system, as far as assessing threats and how far our people can go, they are all reminders that this indeed is a difficult environment to operate in, and it brings us to the issue of neutrality and distinction of our mandate. However, the longevity of UNHCR and other actors, who have always operated in similar situations in the last 60 years, is served by protecting the mandate and protecting the way a population sees our work. Take the Afghanistan-Pakistan situation for example where we provided assistance for 30 years. We have assisted families who have fled several times, we have assisted families who have returned many times, we have assisted people in the deep heartland of the countries and villages, and these are the same; these are not big populations, these are the same people who come back around, and maybe some of the wrong elements could be among them. There is recognition that the emblem makes a difference. When people see that it is an organization which is providing protection and assistance in the different and difficult circumstances.

Some of the issues are always challenges in these highly complex and charged operations; the issues of political agendas, the heavy borrowing from the humanitarian vocabulary, and the design of humanitarian action as a way of political objectives or foreign policy objectives, are just a few of them.

There is a consensus emerging and there is a greater knowledge, expertise and exposure to each other’s mandates between the humanitarian and the military, through policy documents, lessons learnt and through the many operations conducted, not necessarily limited to UN missions. We have seen successful interaction where the military brought its advantage and the humanitarian brought its advantage, which produced fruitful cooperation. For example, in the context of the former Yugoslavia where the military played a big role in protecting civilians; in creating humanitarian corridors, in helping with airlifts to places that the humanitarians could not access. As also seen in the context of Macedo-
nia and Kosovo, owing to the cooperation between NATO, the UN and the OSCE, a lot of work has been done as a result of the cooperation of the three.

As far as preserving the humanitarian mandate and principles goes, yet engaging with the military, humanitarians have a lot of work to perform. We should communicate clearly and consistently to the population beyond our communities that we support; i.e. to the opinion makers and governments. We have to make our advocacy efforts very consistently and broadly. We also have to communicate with the military at different levels. We have to be open for joint planning, for joint understanding of our mandates, for induction training, and from the outset in an operation where we find ourselves that we have to coexist with the military, there ought to be a framework for partnership.

There are always difficulties because of differences of culture between the military and the humanitarian community. The military has what they term the three Cs, which are command, control and communications. In the UN, our three Cs are usually cooperation, coordination and consensus. We are perceived by the military as being loose, unorganized, soft, slow and requiring consensus. On the other hand, we resent the command from the outset that the military has, as a way of operating. As long as we are able to marry both approaches, we are able to get somewhere, perhaps arriving at a strategic partnership, understanding each other’s mandates, and being open for training.

Col. Victor Manuel Nunez, Head, Planning Department for Peacekeeping Operations, Argentine Armed Forces; and Former Chief of Military CIMCOORD Office, MINUSTAH

A UN multidimensional peacekeeping mission has a head of mission and three components—civilian, police and military. The mandate for the military component of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) was on three areas—to establish a secure and a stable environment, to promote the human rights, and support the political process. It operated in this manner until 12 January 2010, when the earthquake hit the Port-au-Prince area and produced serious damage not only to the local population but the mission as well. One of the most damaged buildings was the Christopher Hotel, which was the mission headquarters. The mission’s senior leadership—the head of mission together with the principal deputy head of the mission and the acting
police commissioner—lost their lives. A number of military contingents that were deployed in other parts of the country arrived in Port-au-Prince to assist, but also primarily to provide security to their respective diplomatic delegations. The only significant security presence in Port-au-Prince from a protection of civilians’ point of view thus was the presence of the US-Canada joint force. The mere presence of uniforms on the street produced a sense of security. The aftermath of the earthquake saw the arrival of a large number of NGOs and international humanitarian agencies. According to OCHA data, there were about 3,600 humanitarian agencies and NGOs present.

A little over a week later, the UN Security Council authorized a new resolution.\textsuperscript{52} The only significant change was the increase in authorized number of military personnel from 6,000 to over 8,000. The then Haitian minister had spent about five years fighting the gangs’ activities and put more than 300 gang members in prison. After the earthquake, all the gang members escaped from the prison, taking with them the prison guards’ uniforms and weapons. In less than one minute, we lost all the results of the mission’s previous work. The Haitian national police was not so professional; their standards were well below the international standards, and the local population do not trust them.

Approximately two or three weeks later there were reported incidents of rapes, gang rapes and physical threats in the internally displaced persons (IDP) camps and settlement areas. The military component was particularly concerned about these developments as Resolution 1908 makes no explicit provision for the military’s role with regards to protecting IDPs. The military personnel were not trained or properly equipped to provide security in IDP camps. In addition, there was a lack of a formal system to collect information from the different IDP camps to map criminal activity and the level of insecurity in different areas. There was reluctance by humanitarian workers to approach the military personnel, even to pass information, and often when they did approach the military personnel, it was too late.

A key partner for the military component in MINUSTAH was OCHA personnel on the ground, who understood the situation, how to operate within the mission, without the mission, within the UN system and without the UN system. In essence it was key to integrating the different

\begin{footnote}
\textsuperscript{52} UN Security Council Resolution 1908, 19 January 2010.
\end{footnote}
actors on the ground towards the single purpose of providing security. Once we received, collected and confirmed information about the gangs and the rapes in the IDP camps, we approached the gender unit and the child protection unit, since the women and girls were the poor victims of this activity. The civilian component was reluctant to work with military personnel in the IDP camps—they considered that the security in the IDP camps were the responsibility of the government and the Haitian national police. As a result, they did not back the intentions of the military component to establish security systems in the IDP camps.

We prepared one integrated IDP camp security plan based on the sole decision of the force commander. The force commander took the initiative and we started to work in the IDP camps. OCHA supported this effort by approaching the camp manager, who then asked the camp coordinator to work with the military component to establish the rules under which the military component would work in the IDP camps. As it was not previously considered a military task, several national contingents specified caveats on the use of weapons and equipment, which affected the activity in the IDP camps. The caveats represented a huge problem within the military component to establish this security plan in the IDP camps. Developing a comprehensive strategy for providing protection of civilians can take a long time. In the meantime, it is needed to put in place some immediate tactical measures by the military to provide immediate security until a comprehensive plan is put in place. The humanitarian workers should be aware that passing information to the military component of a UN mission is crucial to help the military prepare its plan.

With respect to MINUSTAH and the start of the mission itself, the commitment of all the components in the mission—civilian, police and the military—is vital to the mission’s success. The commitment to the development of policy is also vital.

In conclusion, in the military life, if your land fails in opportunity, it is not the solution to the problem. You must provide the solution, and you must take the measures in a timely manner. Within the UN system, within the mission, much time is spent thinking about the possible consequences of one action. There is a risk of coming into a paralysis, because of analysis.
Discussion

Col. Leijenaar commented on strategies for security management for preparations before missions and highlighted the importance of coherence. She emphasized that security risk assessment, in particular the role of the Chief Security Advisor in a country such as Afghanistan where there is no peacekeeping force to protect the UN, is of critical importance to humanitarian space. The collaboration with ISAF, the Afghan National Army and the NGO community in Afghanistan (and depending on whom) determined the level of accessibility. This was important when taken in connection with the new UN security management, which increasingly shifts away from mere evacuation or relocating staff to finding ways to enable staff to stay and operate. This brings a transformation from a threat level environment into mitigation measures. The role of the Chief Security Advisor within OCHA is significant, in determining whether access is possible. Mitigating measures should be well thought out in order to allow humanitarians to function and operate in these environments. In this particular case, an entity such as OCHA is working outside the normal mitigation measure box, and they are able to access areas in Afghanistan of huge importance. Another fundamental aspect when it comes to humanitarians dealing with chief security advisors is to realize that the mind-set of the security advisors is to enable humanitarians to have access in order to gather as much accurate information as possible. A final point was made about that the tension between reducing security costs while still being able to ensure the safety and security of humanitarians when accessing dangerous areas should be taken in to account.

Dr Lipner posed a question on the challenges and opportunities in working with NGOs and police in relation to POC, ‘what is the role of the police in this? There are a number of UN humanitarian agencies, the ICRC, military and general missions and what exactly is the role of the police in this nexus?’ Ms Beerli responded that the police has a vital role and the ICRC is increasing its collaboration with the police on issues of international humanitarian law and human rights law.

Dr Haering underlined that mine action is an important area of civil-military interaction. In a number of countries, mine action activities are undertaken by civilian and military organizations. Often civilian and military activities are planned and conducted in parallel, sometimes even jointly, in for example, Afghanistan, Lebanon and South Sudan.
She further stated that the UN Mine Action Service is currently structuring the experiences and assessing the experience of other actors and preparing a handbook of civil-military cooperation in mine actions.

A researcher indicated that protection of civilians is of increasing importance and therefore proper training and equipment of military missions in order to engage in POC is vital to prepare for future operations. Protection is about politics. He asked if there is a comprehensive approach of the missions of the various institutions in that direction.

Col. Manuel Nunez responded from the Argentinean point of view that his country is involved only in MINUSTAH. They consider the process of pre-deployment training as the first step before entering a mission area, thus including protection of civilians in the regular programme of pre-deployment training is much needed since that is not so presently, even though the task is closely connected with the military activity patrol in providing security to convoy premises. Regarding the IDP camps, one must be very careful and should be prepared to interact with the locals. When patrolling in a red area in Port-au-Prince or when providing security, integration of the protection of civilians as a concept within the pre-deployment training is significant.

Ms Beerli commented on Mr Doss’s background paper and stated that perhaps protection issues should be conceptualized as about respecting the law instead of being about politics. Concerning security management and access, it is out of the scope of peacekeeping operations, which is problematic, particularly on the ground, but humanitarian organizations work around that issue. In situations such as Côte d’Ivoire, Libya, and Syria, UN organizations are perceived as being partial to one of the conflict parties. The ICRC was the only humanitarian organization on the ground in those countries and the need for change was voiced.

Mr Doss responded to a question about his evaluation of the UN’s action in Côte d’Ivoire during the election crisis in 2011. He mentioned that he was in the mission for a while and that he is probably not a particularly neutral observer on the subject. He thinks that protection is both about politics and principles. The use of force should always be the last option and should not be a substitute for a political strategy. It should be an enabler for a difficult strategy only if needed, and in the UN’s case, only tactically. The UN is not resourced materially or moti-
vationally to carry out expeditionary type campaigns nor should it attempt to do so. Interventions that involve strategic use of force are beyond the UN’s scope politically and organizationally.

Mr Yazgi asked, ‘missions are often mandated to support the national governments, and protect civilians. In many cases we are called upon to protect civilians against the same state forces from abuses and so on. How do we reconcile the two? Can we reconcile the two?’

Mr Doss replied that missions have learned through experience and increasingly understand the ramifications. Protection mandates have increased and thus they need to be careful and have to deal with national dimension. When it comes to protection, three factors are essential to succeed: (i) have a favourable troop to task ratio; (ii) have a favourable troop to the operational areas to be covered ratio; and (iii) deal with the problem of abusive national security forces. He argued that if a mission is given a full-fledged, robust protection mandate and all the necessary means then there has to be an agreement on how to deal with national security forces; cantonment, demobilization and security sector reform. The Security Council needs to be willing to step in with political support. The opportunity is greater in the early phase, waiting and trying to address it becomes increasingly difficult as the spoilers have already returned—many of them are unfortunately in the national security forces. Timing is crucial.

Dr Zabadi raised a question about whether the military, the police and other components have an enhanced cooperation and coordination system on the ground. If they do not, are they willing to obtain such training opportunities? Ms Beerli agreed that training is very important. It is vital to coordinate with other components in the humanitarian world. The importance of training the military and the police is getting more and more significant.

Ms O’Donnell commented that there are ongoing debates about humanitarian space and integration. One of the principle concerns is that integration is associated with sublimating political humanitarian objectives under political objectives. She stated that DPKO is training peacekeepers to understand and appreciate the importance of humanitarian action. A lot of the humanitarian partners are working hard to be very clear and dispassionate in the understandings of humanitarian space. She highlighted the DPKO/OCHA/UNHCHR supported Human-
itarian Protection Guidelines/Stimson Centre, which took a dispassionate look at issues of humanitarian space. Yet how many of these are left out at the door of integration? How does one square that circle?

She reflected on the trade-offs between strategic coordination and structural coordination. She thought it was a false debate that structural coordination, exemplified by the fact that the deputy head of the mission is both the humanitarian and resident coordinator, can be achieved without strategic coordination, which is an understanding or meeting of the minds, or vice versa. She further raised a third dimension to coordination, which is operational coordination. However this concept needs to be clearly articulated if it is limited only to joint operations or if it refers to joint premises or convoy escorts. The nature of operational coordination can affect the local communities’ perceptions of the mission. While structural and strategic coordination are important and the need for such coordination should be systematized, operational coordination should be context-specific and taken on a case-by-case approach.

Lt. Gen. Mehta commented that once a mandate is received, it should in principle be translated into roles, tasks and responsibilities at the various levels—strategic, operational and tactical. He highlighted that missions are weak on that particular aspect and therefore fail to bridge the mandate-implementation gap. In addition to the integrated mission planning process (IMPP), there are many sub-plans and all planning should have a tri-component approach if the rhetoric of cooperation and coordination is to be put into practice. A plan entails the involvement of all actors with clear defined roles and responsibilities. If joint planning is regularized, achieving the necessary synergy in the field will be easier to realize.

A question on ensuring the longevity and sustainability of peace and prioritizing which crises are addressed was raised, ‘Even though there are positive examples of Kosovo and Macedonia, there is still some tension in the Balkans, but these have arguably been overshadowed by the events of the ‘Arab Spring’. How prepared are organizations to ensure peace and to deploy humanitarian and peace workers? Should there be another mini crisis, has all the attention, the resources and all the funding been channelled towards another region? Is there a fear that when focusing on one region there is less focus, attention and perhaps prevention ability on the other?’
Mr Müller responded that they are getting prepared for Syria. It is his function as the Chief of the Emergency Services branch that provides a comprehensive set of tools and services to intervene rapidly in crisis and disasters. They have people on standby, who could be brought in very rapidly into a crisis. For example in Haiti, one of the key issues of a complex emergency is that it has a certain degree of lead time that cannot be anticipated in natural disasters. Thus they were able to deploy the first people within 24 hours. There is to some extent, an element of early warning, analysis and monitoring. All of the operations and agencies are improving their early warning mechanisms.

In the specific example of Macedonia; the EU, NATO, OSCE, and other security regional organizations that have been operating during the last two decades, are closely monitoring the events and intervening politically where necessary.

Dr Carriere stressed that given the growing (and unmet) need for direct physical protection, it is time to broaden the concept of peacekeeping so that it includes unarmed civilian peacekeeping actors, civil society organizations who can be deployed earlier, not having to wait for a Security Council mandate. They can be deployed at the local or community level. They could in principle be deployed for longer periods, not be subject to UN security phases and deployed at a much lower cost.

Mr Doss responded that while civilian actors are important, the specific context is important. If there is a violent conflict going on, the risk factor would increase when deploying unarmed civilians into that area. He referred to General Metha’s point regarding bringing the various elements together. Presence, ideally civilian, is critical for protection, but if violence escalates, some form of military or security force may be needed. The military presence can make a difference, but only if they change the way they work. For example, they should be on foot rather than drive through the villages to interact with the communities. He further highlighted that having association with local people is vital and there are ways to do it well.

With regards to the question on the role of the chief of security in situations where there is no peacekeeping mission; one can have a crisis without a peacekeeping mission being present. In cases where the chief of security is present and is responsible for advising the designated offi-
cial when civilian actors can access areas, the new approach of looking at threats and mitigation as opposed to rigid phasing system may improve the situation. He disclosed that the designated official is responsible for any risks and decisions taken. Whether there is a peacekeeping mission or not, the designated official, based on the advice of the Chief of Security, has to err on the side of caution and security.

Mr Karlsrud asked if drones could be of help to expand humanitarian space and implement protection mandates? He also wondered if there was a need to revisit the practice of including humanitarians in the mandate. He argued that it has had unintended consequences such as a government threatening all NGOs with expulsion unless they agreed to governmental escorts.

Mr Doss acknowledged there is a current intelligence deficit in most peacekeeping missions in forward situations because they lack the right equipment, although improvement in the area of joint mission analysis has happened through the creation of joint mission analysis centres. The use of drones could be helpful, but it depends on the type of drones. A cost-benefit analysis should be done. What are the alternatives? What could be done with the same amount of money used on drones, to improve the tactical intelligence? Better signals perhaps, intercepts and human intelligence—having people moving into areas more frequently, interacting with the local people—which a drone in many contexts would not be of much help.

HE Mr Stauffacher highlighted how the Haitian civil society provided helpful crowd source information to MINUSTAH. He raised the question of how the international community can improve in sharing information beyond and between military, civilians and others and also have a better organization within the UN system. How should the international community capture a whole host of new information providers such as text messages, tweets, and other mobile phone and social media tools?

Col. Manuel Nunez in response acknowledged that the Achilles heel of the system is the information itself. Any military presence in IDP camps is considered an outsider. Meanwhile all the humanitarian workers, the camp manager, the NGO provider of food or water and other basic services, are considered part of the social group. There is a basic and natural trust between the locals, the IDPs and the humanitarian work-
ers. Many of the humanitarian workers live inside or near the IDP camps, so there are people in the right place to obtain information. When the military personnel approach the IDP camps there can be initial mistrust and reluctance by the local population. Therefore, the cluster system is a useful and established framework for the military personnel to exchange information with civilians, NGOs, various agencies and humanitarian workers.
Peace Operations and the Rule of Law: Coordinating External and Local Actors in Tackling Organized Crime


Dr Walter Kemp, Director for Europe and Central Asia, International Peace Institute

Organized Crime: High on the Agenda

The international system is geared towards dealing with problems within or between states. However, many contemporary crises involve powerful non-state actors and transnational threats, like criminal groups. These groups do not sit in the United Nations General Assembly or the Security Council. Yet some of them are more powerful than states, and their macroeconomic clout is bigger than many economies. This is not a scenario that the UN was created to deal with, but it is the reality confronting member states.

Over the past twenty years, states and international organizations have largely failed to anticipate the evolution of transnational organized crime from a localized problem into a strategic threat to governments, societies and economies. Now they are living with the consequences. Parts of cities, states and even regions are out of the control of central governments. Organized crime is a clear and present danger in almost every theatre where the UN has peace operations.

The extent to which organized crime has become a threat to security can be gauged by the increased frequency of debates on crime-related issues in the Security Council, for example on drug trafficking, piracy, Afghanistan, parts of Central America, the Sahel, and West Africa. Crime is having a detrimental

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53 A commissioned paper by the International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations 2012. The paper does not necessarily reflect the views of the Challenges Partnership or the Host, but is intended to generate a thought-provoking and result-oriented discussion.

54 Walter Kemp is Director for Europe and Central Asia at the International Peace Institute (IPI). He was previously Spokesman and Speechwriter at the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, and from 1996 to 2006 worked for the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe. He is currently leading a project entitled ‘Peace without Crime: Towards an Integrated Response to Transnational Organized Crime’.

impact in other areas as well, for example in relation to development, health, the environment, and the rule of law.

While governments have been revising their national security strategies accordingly, the UN has been slower to respond. Member states adopted the United Nations (Palermo) Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its three related protocols in December 2000. Furthermore, in 2004, the UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, identified trans-national organized crime as one of ‘six clusters of threats with which the world must be concerned now and in the decades ahead’.56 And yet, perhaps because of the strong focus on terrorism after 11 September 2001, the issue was low on the UN’s agenda for the first decade of the 21st century.

The situation is changing. Concerned about the increasing threat that organized crime poses to security, the Security Council has invited the Secretary-General to ‘mainstream’ the issue of fighting crime into the work of the United Nations.57 A UN System Task Force on Transnational Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking was established in March 2011 ‘to develop an effective and comprehensive approach to the challenge of transnational organized crime and drug trafficking as threats to stability and security’. The World Development Report 2011 has increased awareness about the relationship between instability, crime and development.

What can the UN and its member states do to increase their effectiveness in fighting transnational organized crime? This is a big question, and requires an in-depth review of how the UN system is currently dealing with the problem, and what could be improved. That is the focus of an International Peace Institute (IPI) project called ‘Peace without Crime: Towards an Integrated Response to Transnational Organized Crime.’ This paper focuses on one aspect, namely the role of peace operations and the rule of law. As James Cockayne has pointed out in a previous Challenges paper, ‘peace operations, already thinly stretched, should not now be expected to become the primary or sole provider of the wide range of services needed to tackle organized crime—or the primary developer of such services at the national level’.58 Nevertheless, they have a significant role in preventing and combating organized crime.

Crime in Every Theatre

Organized crime is a threat to peace in almost every theatre where the UN has peace operations. For example, it has an impact on peacekeeping missions in DRC, Haiti and Kosovo, political missions in West Africa and Somalia, as well as peacebuilding work in Guinea-Bissau and Sierra Leone. ‘If UN peace operations aim to build peace, security and the rule of law, then, logically, they need to be part of the strategy that addresses threats to these objectives, including transnational organized crime’.59 At the moment, this is not the case.

This is potentially dangerous because criminal groups can be spoilers in peace processes, they can threaten the security of UN staff, and failure to understand their motivations, connections, and incentives can exacerbate rather than calm the situation. Yet there are only a few references to organized crime in the UN strategic doctrines on policing and peacekeeping, like the ‘New Horizon Initiative’60 and the so-called ‘Capstone Doctrine’.61 And very few peace operations have crime-related mandates.

Five Recommendations

In order to reduce vulnerability to organized crime, and to improve the capacity of peace operations to deal with this challenge, this paper makes five concrete recommendations:

1. Make more effective use of threat assessments;
2. Promote a culture of analysis;
3. Strengthen rapid reaction criminal justice support;
4. Enhance local and international criminal justice capacity, particularly through South-South cooperation;
5. Smooth the process from ‘trusteeship’ to ‘ownership’.

Threat Assessments. The UN does not need to gather intelligence on its member states, nor would its member states want it to do that. Indeed, there have been heated discussions within the C-34 committee (which deals with peacekeeping) on even using the word ‘intelligence’. However, the UN needs to be aware of developments on the ground, not least—although not exclusively—in theatres where it has peace operations. As the Brahimi Report (2000) pointed out, ‘the

United Nations must be prepared to deal effectively with spoilers if it expects to achieve a consistent record of success in peacekeeping or peacebuilding in situations of intrastate/transnational conflict.\(^{62}\)

To figure out who the criminals are, their impact on society, and what to do about them, peace operations require a detailed knowledge of the motivations and *modi operandi* of peace spoilers.\(^{63}\)

At the moment, there is a widespread impression that the UN is not particularly good at gathering and analyzing information, not least in relation to organized crime. As pointed out by the Senior Advisory Group on *Civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict*, ‘the United Nations often prepares its plans when it knows the least about a country and its capacities’.\(^{64}\) The International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding has also identified the ‘lack of context and conflict analysis’ as one of the major challenges to achieving peacebuilding and state-building goals.\(^{65}\) As pointed out in a report by the Center on International Cooperation (CIC), without improved analytical capacities and arrangements leading to a shared strategic direction, the executive bodies of international organizations risk leaving these political missions flying blind.\(^{66}\) This is echoed by a report by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) that says that ‘failure to understand the political, economic, and social contexts will mean failure to develop effective solutions’.\(^{67}\) The UN system is starting to recognize this need. For example, the ‘New Partnership Agenda’ on charting a new horizon for UN peacekeeping stresses that ‘the strengthening of system-wide conflict assessment must be a priority of ongoing UN integration efforts’.\(^{68}\)

The main source of information gathering and analysis within UN peacekeeping missions is the Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC). JMACs were established through a Department of Peacekeeping Operations Policy Directive on 1 July 2006. The rationale for the JMAC, as well as Joint Operations Centres, is ‘to monitor developments and to understand the operational environment on a continuous basis’.\(^{69}\) JMACs can enable intelligence-led policymaking, support


\(^{63}\) Cockayne and Lupel, p. 157.


\(^{68}\) ‘A New Partnership Agenda: Charting A New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping’, p. 11.

integrated mission management, mission security, and strategic planning and forecasting.

JMACs, which are headed by a civilian staff member, are composed of a mix of military, police and civilian personnel. JMACs have been fully established in seven of the 16 missions administered by DPKO. Where the JMAC can provide quality analysis and where the SRSG and his senior staff realize the self-interest—for the sake of operational success and staff safety—of using that information, then the JMAC is a key resource. However, there are no JMAC equivalents within political or peacebuilding missions. This is a major lacuna.

There are other parts of the UN system that carry out situation assessments, particularly on organized crime. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) produces periodic threat assessments, usually about regions (rather than countries) affected by transnational organized crime. UN Panels of Experts have carried out top quality assessments, for example of the DRC and Somalia, but they are not strictly speaking about organized crime. Furthermore, on a case by case basis the UN draws on available information from national law enforcement agencies and INTERPOL. This should be done more systematically, for example plugging crime experts within UN field operations into the existing INTERPOL I/24 network.

Information gathering and analysis on organized crime should also be part of the IMPP. This process, launched in 2006, is designed to ensure that there is a shared vision among all UN actors as to the strategic objective of the UN presence at country level. As the IMPP guidelines point out, the success of such integrated missions depends on a shared in-depth understanding of the specific country setting. That understanding is derived from a Strategic Assessment which is usually carried out in the planning stage of deploying an integrated mission. Such assessments are also vital for post-conflict needs assessments. Recently, joint assessment missions were carried out in the Sahel and the Gulf of Guinea.

Political-economy analysis should be a key part of such assessments. As Mats Berdal points out, ‘A political-economy approach that helps to identify what are complex but not unintelligible structures of incentives and disincentives for continued violence is an important aid for policymakers, enabling in theory at any rate, a ‘stakeholder analysis of conflict’ to be undertaken’. Furthermore,

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as Colette Rausch observes, ‘an assessment provides the necessary baseline information from which realistic goals and a strategy to address serious crimes, including prioritization, timing, and sequencing of actions, can be developed’.  

The problem is that the UN currently lacks the guidelines to help assessors focus on the threat posed by organized crime. As a result, UN staff involved in pre-deployment or mandate review processes are not attuned to look for crime-related problems. The result is that crime-fighting measures are often left out of mission mandates. If there is no mention of crime in the mandate, it is very hard to mobilize the resources and attention needed to tackle it.

To help fill this gap, IPI—as part of its ‘Peace without Crime project’—has created a guide called Spotting the Spoilers. This guide is designed to help practitioners identify warning signs of criminal activity in the theatre where they are operating, assess the impact caused by organized crime, and prepare assessments which can be used by policymakers to take remedial action. Not least, it can build national capacity to spot the spoilers.

A Culture of Analysis. What is vital is to have assessments that are timely and tailored to the specific situation on the ground. After all, the point is not to have an exhaustive study, rather the aim should be to produce the evidence and analysis that can enable a quick and effective policy and/or operational response.

Furthermore, situation assessments should not be a ‘one-off’ exercise. As pointed out in the World Development Report 2011: ‘To adapt to the reality of repeated cycles of violence and multiple transitions, assessment processes would become lighter and more flexible to provide regular, repeated assessments of risks and opportunities.’ Furthermore, they should be translated easily into strategic and operational options. As an IPI study has observed, such assessments should stimulate a culture of analysis.

Regional analysis is essential for dealing with transnational threats. Regional offices, like the UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA, Dakar) and the UN Regional Center for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA, Ashgabat) could be key hubs of regional information-gathering and analysis. The

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73 Rausch, p. 18.  
75 Mark Shaw and Walter Kemp, Spotting the Spoilers: A guide for assessing transnational organized crime in fragile states, IPI, New York, April 2012.  
78 Ibid., pp. 2 and 15.
West Africa Coastal Initiative (WACI) is an example of a relatively successful attempt to exchange and pool information.

Improved system-wide information management is crucial. As Melanie Ramjoué points out, the UN is actually well positioned to collect large quantities of data. ‘It deploys tens of thousands of staff, many of whom have valuable cultural and linguistic skills and who become privy to information through their daily interactions with local communities and political actors’. The problem is not the collection of information: it is the analysis of this information and its management in order to transform it into actionable intelligence.

In that respect, it would be worth revisiting a proposal made in the Brahimi Report to create an Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat at UN headquarters that would consolidate the various departmental units that are assigned policy and information analysis roles related to peace and security. As the Brahimi Report pointed out, the UN system needs ‘a professional system for accumulating knowledge about conflict situations, distributing that knowledge efficiently to a wide user base, generating policy analyzes and formulating long-term strategies. That system does not exist at present’. More than a decade later, this is still the case.

Therefore why not create a unit within the Secretariat (perhaps called a Joint Policy Analysis Center) that synthesizes political economy and conflict-related information from, and for, all parts of the UN system (and other sources, like INTERPOL)? Such a unit could be a collection and analysis point for information related to security issues (including organized crime), and ensure that the analysis is then distributed effectively within the UN system. It could service peace operations, relevant departments (like DPA and DPKO), sanctions committees and other agencies of the UN. The Center could report either to the Policy Committee or the Executive Committee on Peace and Security.

Rapid-reaction Justice Support. Not only does the UN suffer from limited information and analysis to identify organized crime, it has limited capacity to deal with the problem. It is striking that despite the threat posed by transnational organized crime in so many theatres where the UN is active, and despite its impact on so many aspects of the UN’s work, the UN has such limited capacity

79 Ramjoue, p. 468.
80 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
in this field. While there are over 100 000 blue helmets and 13 000 blue berets, there are only a few dozen organized crime experts in the UN system.

DPKO finds it difficult to attract military and police experts with the skill-set needed to deal with organized crime. As the ‘New Horizon’ non-paper observes: ‘Military peacekeeping rarely succeeds without a civilian component—but finding sufficient highly qualified civilian staff is often as hard, or harder, than finding troops’. This is particularly the case in the justice sector. As pointed out in the World Development Report 2011, ‘The supply of personnel is constrained, since states do not have the kinds of reserve capacities in police and criminal justice that they do in their militaries’.

The lack of justice expertise in this field means that there are few practitioners able to assist in rebuilding the rule of law, and developing national justice capacity. Worse than that, it increases the risk of relapse into conflict. As Jean-Marie Guéhenno has pointed out, ‘The journey from war to sustainable peace is not possible in the absence of stronger civilian capacity. Without this capacity, there may be breaks in the fighting, but resilient institutions will not take root and the risk of renewed violence will remain’. As a result, ‘The current systems of the United Nations can neither rapidly provide civilian capacities aligned with national needs nor cope with constantly changing circumstances’.

Fortunately, the issue is now getting serious attention as a result of the follow-up to the independent review on civilian capacity. The UN is trying to create a platform for qualified experts. This Civilian Partnership Cell would be a ‘docking mechanism’ (in the Department of Field Support) that makes it simple to establish and operate successful partnerships.

But this will only work if the UN can attract people to ‘dock in’. Therefore, the UN needs to simplify the system of attracting and accepting short-term civilian experts, while member states need to make it easier for such experts—not least in the justice sector—to take on short-term assignments.

One idea is to create a rapid-reaction criminal justice team, similar to the Mediation Support Unit or the Rapid Response Unit of the Office of the High Com-

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88 Ibid.
89 Ibid., p. 19.
90 Ibid., p. 15.
missioner for Human Rights. This would enable a short-term surge of international experts to strengthen national rule of law capacity, particularly in countries where there are no UN peace operations. One way to do this would be to scale up the existing Justice Rapid Response network—an intergovernmental stand-by facility of criminal justice experts.

Another idea, currently being explored by the UN Police Division (UNPOL), is to embed pre-formed organized crime experts within field operations. These so-called Serious Crime Support Units (SCSUs), on the model of Formed Police Units (FPUs), would enable the rapid deployment of national crime experts to a peacekeeping operation in order to help build local crime fighting capacity and, indirectly, help improve intelligence gathering and law enforcement. Ideally, these units would eventually put themselves out of business by building up national crime fighting agencies and/or enhancing the capacity of INTERPOL National Crime Bureaus.

There should also be a pool of organized crime experts as part of the UN’s Standing Police Capacity. When not deployed to hot spots, they could be used as part of threat assessment teams and for training in-coming UN police on organized crime issues.

Enhancing National Capacity. Responding to organized crime and illicit trafficking has resulted in an enormous amount of technical assistance. This includes: support for police equipment and training; strengthening prosecution services; building independent judiciaries; providing training; and prison reform. Much of this work is bilateral, or carried out through the UN, particularly UNODC and the UN Development Programme (UNDP).

Finding the appropriate entry point requires tact. States are wary of appearing to have a problem with crime or corruption. A more general rule of law support function and/or development assistance (which includes a criminal justice component) can therefore be more palatable options.

What is also essential is that assistance is provided in a holistic way, covering the whole spectrum of criminal justice. It should also be organized pursuant to a national strategy in order to ensure national ownership as well as clear objectives and a framework that is common to external and local actors. Otherwise it is too often the case that support is supply- rather than needs-driven, too many countries provide the same things, and there is an over-emphasis on the securitization of responses rather than a more comprehensive approach that

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91 This Unit, established in 2006, is designed to swiftly prevent or address deteriorating human rights situations on the ground. The unit has a roster of over 70 human rights experts. Since its inception it has carried out more than 32 rapid deployments.
also takes into account criminal justice needs, anti-corruption measures, and development assistance. That is why even if the UN may have a limited role in providing technical assistance, it can provide the framework to ensure coordination and a comprehensive approach. This is particularly important in the transition phase from peacekeeping to other, lighter presences. Indeed, states may be particularly vulnerable to spoilers as international troops and police draw down.

However, as noted under point 3, very few states have personnel to spare when it comes to providing technical assistance on transnational organized crime. One way of overcoming this problem, and of increasing the pool of civilian capacity, could be to more effectively engage non-traditional troop and/or police contributing countries that have expertise in dealing with organized crime. The BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) as well as emerging powers like Indonesia, Mexico, Turkey and Colombia all have significant national expertise in dealing with organized crime. This would raise the profile of these countries within the operational work of the UN, enhance South-South cooperation, and give them a leadership role in dealing with one of the greatest threats to international peace and security.

Smooth the Process from ‘Trusteeship’ to ‘Ownership’. Sometimes the penetration of criminal groups into a society is so deep and the rule of law so weak that international actors must temporarily take over justice functions. This is often the case in fragile states, for example in post-conflict situations. In several cases (like Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Fiji and the Solomon Islands) judges and prosecutors have been brought in to supplement national capacity. The international community, usually under UN auspices, has also helped to establish and run commissions of inquiry and criminal courts.

Perhaps the most prominent example of a law enforcement institution established as a partnership with external actors is the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala, known by its Spanish acronym CICIG. CICIG was established by treaty agreement between the UN and Guatemala and began work in January 2008. The specific objective of CICIG is to assist Guatemala in investigating and dismantling violent criminal organizations. The Commission operates under Guatemalan law, in the country’s courts and following Guatemalan criminal procedure. Yet CICIG also has some elements of an international prosecutor. Key staff, including the head of the Commission who is appointed by the UN Secretary-General, are internationals.  

The challenge with such arrangements, which outsource key aspects of the justice system, is to ensure a smooth transition during which the international community can scale down its assistance, and ultimately leave. Otherwise transitional justice becomes increasingly permanent, building dependence rather than capacity. It is therefore advisable to integrate national experts as much as possible into the internationally supported justice structures in order to build the capacity and ownership that are needed to enable a successful hand-over and a sustainable justice system. The need for country-led and country-owned transitions out of fragility is stressed in the New Deal for engagement in fragile states recently agreed in the context of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding.

Without national capacity to uphold the rule of law, fragile governments will have to rely on international expertise. Furthermore, without justice, efforts to promote security and development will falter. Indeed, strengthening the capacity of peace operations to tackle organized crime and enhance the rule of law is only one aspect of a much broader strategy that is needed to reduce vulnerability to corrosive effect crime. In particular, it is vital to promote development, strengthen integrity, and fortify social antibodies against criminality. That is why a holistic approach at country level and a system-wide approach within the UN are vital for tackling organized crime.

**When Your Interlocutors are Part of the Problem**

There is one final point that needs to be considered in relation to peace operations and the rule of law, and it is probably the most sensitive. What happens when there is clearly a problem related to organized crime, but the local actors do not want external assistance? As has been pointed out by James Cockayne and Adam Lupel in a recent book on *Peace Operations and Organized Crime*, ‘since peace operations function on the basis of host-state consent, many countries may resist efforts by the Security Council or other international authority to mandate peace operations to take preventive action against potential peace spoilers, not least because some of them may be connected to, or protected by, the host-state government.’

Therefore, what do you do if the people that you have to work with are actually part of the problem, namely involved in, or somehow complicit in, illicit activity?

Answering this question in full goes beyond the limits of this paper, but there are a number of options to consider depending on the circumstances: Take a bottom-up rather than a top-down approach, for example the type of ‘citizen security’ projects undertaken by UNDP in Central America; Contain the problem, for example by working with regional partners (i.e. the regional response

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93 Cockayne and Lupel, p. 11.
to piracy off the Horn of Africa, ECOWAS strategy in West Africa); Name and shame the perpetrators; Use international mutual legal assistance, for example extradition, asset confiscation.

Taking a tough approach may make it difficult for the mission to operate in the affected country. But ignoring the problem will empower those who profit from instability, and further exacerbate the problem. As Cockayne and Lupel point out, ‘the transformation of an illicit political economy requires guidance in how to trade off the goals of political stability, effective state-building and law enforcement in countering organized crime’.94 This is a tough call. Getting it right is essential for the effectiveness of peace operations and their ability to uphold the rule of law.

94 Ibid., p. 91.
Presentations

Synopsis: How does coordination take place between peacekeepers/peacebuilders and local actors in the area of the fight against organized crime? How compatible are the agendas/priorities of external and local actors?

Chair: Mr Dmitry Titov, Assistant Secretary-General for Rule of Law and Security Institutions, Department for Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations

The theme of today’s session is peace operations and rule of law—coordinating external and local actors in tackling organized crime. Having been a practitioner and not maybe very closely associated with this theme directly, I would be very glad to hear answers to this very important question: Is there any organization that is coordinating external and local actors in tackling organized crime? What needs to be done in this area? Less than two weeks ago the Security Council described the evolving challenges and threats to international peace and security—terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destructions, small arms and light weapons, and for the first time, transnational organized crime. The United States recently adopted a special comprehensive strategy and concluded that transnational organized crime poses a growing threat to national and international security.

We discussed piracy and the associated figures and statistics. Piracy worldwide has increased exponentially since 2007, where there were 263 attacks. Last year that number had increased to 439 attacks with an additional 105 reported attempts; 45 vessels were hijacked and 176 vessels boarded and the list could continue. In the area of substance (cocaine, heroin, morphine, cannabis) trafficking, the levels have doubled over the last ten years. In 2010, the estimated volumes of heroine being used reached a staggering level of 375 metric tons.

You are aware that two years ago, in another statement adopted by the Security Council, the Council approved the need to establish special transnational crime centres at the UN, and the Secretary-General at that time stated that the international community must do much more. In 2011, a first UN task force on transnational organized crime and drug trafficking was instituted. Yet, the real challenge is to have coordinated, strategic and tactical objectives and work in this area. DPKO actively
participates in this task force on transnational organized crime and drug trafficking as well as another body, which was established recently, the Counter Terrorism Implementation Task Force. I am very pleased that the West Africa Coast Initiative (WACI), originated from the Police division of the DPKO and from the Belize High Commissioner at that time. In addition to the DPKO, our colleagues in United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the Department of Political Affairs, the Office of the UN in West Africa, INTERPOL and ECOWAS are participating in this very important undertaking.

Considerable challenges remain. Those challenges are a lack of capacity, sometimes political will and definitely funding. I could also stress that the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations is making the issue of organized crime one of his priorities for the next couple of years, and I hope that member states, together with partners like the Challenges Forum, will actively support that notion.

Mr Henrik Stiernblad, Head of Operations, Malmö Police District, Sweden; and Former Police Commissioner, UNMIL

Dr Kemp’s background paper addresses a number of relevant and interesting issues. At the same time, I hope there will be a debate because it is not without sensitivities that we will possibly engage in moving peace operations in this direction. I would like to cover three aspects—the threat of crime (including transnational organized crime) to: first, post-conflict federal states, second, peace operations, and third, to stable states.

First of all, you are all familiar with the history of the conflict in Liberia: the use of child soldiers, the impact of organized crime on the illicit trade in weapons which fuelled the conflict, the illicit trade of national resources which was used to buy weapons to fuel the conflict, and so on. Liberia is unfortunately not a unique situation; we have seen similar patterns of organized crime–armed conflict linkages in several countries. It is increasingly an accepted fact that there are strong links between organized crime and conflicts within states. However, it is also important to recognize that organized crime tends to fuel conventional crime. It can also operate in loose networks and engage in what resembles conventional crime. I have observed this in Sweden as well, that organized crime appears in very loose networks and cascades down to street-level crime.
While more attention should be paid to transnational organized crime, we should not disregard conventional crime, irrespective of the type—violent crime, rape, armed robberies, and so on—because crime affects vulnerable people who cannot afford secure living circumstances. I draw from my experiences in Liberia where we would see ordinary people in large numbers being targeted by violent armed robbery groups that consisted of young men that were former child soldiers. During the war these young men were abducted into militant groups, fed drugs, and grew up in a context that affected them for life. The DDR process was fairly successful in Liberia, but it did not fully achieve its goals as it did not manage to reintegrate the young men into society nor into an economy that had available jobs. The young men thus spent the days sleeping or using drugs and during the nights they roamed the streets of Liberia in gangs, robbed people, attacked residential compounds and used violence as a means to get money to buy more drugs. It was a vicious circle that we were not able to sufficiently address.

The core and rationale of policing is to combat, prevent and investigate crime as it affects ordinary people. It serves democracy in several ways: first, the police is accountable to as diverse a set of interest as possible, namely the people; second, it enhances the legitimacy of the government by demonstrating that the authority of the government will be used practically and on a daily basis in the interest of the people; third, it creates a very vital trust in the people.

We must improve how we fight this phenomenon, but not at the cost of stopping our assistance to fragile post-conflict states to provide everyday security and deal with commercial crime, including developing sound criminal justice institutions. This is only one element of state-building, the holistic approach that Dr Kemp suggests in his paper is necessary with a full range of key functions in police, prosecution, judiciary, and corrections at its core. It also needs to be based on principles like accountability, transparency and the rule of law.

With respect to coordination between local and external actions, is there an institution that is ready to engage in this? Maybe there should be, maybe there should not be. Coordination is about having a common understanding of the problem or situation we are addressing. We must base coordination on a sufficient degree of agreement on aims and means, and it should include respect for the different motivations and priorities of actors. Most importantly, it must include recognition of
national ownership and a readiness to compromise to achieve this com-
mon aim. Perhaps another way of framing coordination is to view it
from the perspective of coherence, getting external and local actors to
act in a coherent manner. It should be noted that there are different lev-
els of coordination, ranging from the strategic to the tactical.

Finally, let me touch upon threat assessment and analysis. We must
improve our ability to understand the situation and to base our deci-
sions on good data and the understanding of the facts as we see them in
front of us. Threat assessment and analysis aims to achieve an informed
understanding of the reality that we operate in. In the case of Liberia,
the mission had a joint mission analysis cell (which increasingly is a
standard component in peacekeeping operations), however it was
understaffed and did not have sufficient systems or tools to base its
work on. It was dependent on the experience and skills of the people in
that joint mission analysis cell. It could only deliver as good as those
individuals were.

When I first arrived as the new Police Commissioner, we received word
that there was going to be major demonstrations. We concluded that
there was a big risk of riots and that we had to start thinking about
sending in formed police units to deal with the situation. During the dis-
cussions, I raised several questions, ‘what do we know about these
groups that are going to demonstrate? How likely are they to use vio-
ence? How likely are they to escalate the whole confrontation? What
kind of weaponry are they likely to use?’ But I could not get any evi-
dence-based answers. I got anecdotes, good guesses, but not a solid
threat assessment and analysis. It is unacceptable that we send person-
nel into the dark not knowing what we are dealing with, not sufficiently
at least. In my day job in Sweden, I base operational decisions on intelli-
gence, on strategic assessments based on intelligence and on operational
intelligence. It is the same whether we talk about the Global North or
the Global South—any developed police organization relies heavily on
intelligence.

The term sometimes has a negative connotation. It is perceived as being
about covert work and spying. Intelligence, at least in the police con-
text, is derived primarily from open source information. It is about
putting the pieces of information together, drawing conclusions, and
assessing which direction we should take. If the police is able to perform
the way it should, serving the interests of the ordinary people, it will get
the trust back from the people and we will get a cross feed of good information that would further refine and improve our work. There are excellent systems of geographical information systems, based on statistics, which we have used to predict where and when crime will increase in our national policing contexts, such a tool would be an important enabling capacity in peacekeeping and peace operations.

**Dr Sandeep Chawla, Director, Division for Policy Analysis and Public Affairs, Office on Drugs and Crime, United Nations**

I will focus on two issues—of developing threat assessments of transnational organized crime and developing a culture of analysis—raised in Dr Kemp’s paper and offer you my own perspectives on how we might deal with the issues.

A starting point of our discussion is that when we deal with threat assessments in peace operations, we have to go beyond simple dependence on either the military or the police to tackle something as difficult and complex as transnational organized crime. If we expect the military or the police to do it, and if we expect only law enforcement based strategies, we will not be very effective.

Transnational organized crime is an extremely difficult and complex phenomenon to comprehend. The Palermo Convention, adopted in 2000, seeks to counter and address transnational organized crime. Interestingly, the convention itself does not define transnational organized crime. Now, are we being fanciful, that we have an international convention against something that we cannot define? That we cannot therefore measure? No, we are not. The reason is simple, transnational organized crime is such a complex phenomenon in which the supply and demand balance each other off in such a way in which the divisions between the legal and the illegal and the licit and the illicit are perpetually grey and shifting. We live in a world, whether we like it or not, in where there will always be people who want illicit drugs, who want child pornography, who want slave labour, who want counterfeit DVDs or counterfeit medicines, who want counterfeit branded products. There is a demand for these things. There will always be people who will come into the market to supply them. If you take them out of the equation, what will happen? You will have the standard problem of displacement that we face in all areas of organized crime and drugs. Other suppliers will come in, other intermediaries will come in, which does not solve the
problem. What we have to do rather than concentrating on commodities or individuals is to deal with the systemic problem of the market itself. The market is where we can tackle transnational organized crime most effectively. Arresting a few people here or there will make no difference; it will only displace the problem either from one commodity to another or from one region to another or from one country to another. If you impose controls on the production of counterfeit goods or drugs in one country, the production will simply shift elsewhere. For instance, we managed to bring the trafficking of cocaine across the Atlantic to the Caribbean under control, but the locus of drug trafficking simply shifted to West Africa. It is called the balloon effect or the displacement effect and has been occurring for many years, yet our capacity to respond to it internationally tends to be limited.

I would argue first and foremost that in order to deal with the problem, we need more analysis, a more sensitive understanding of political economy and a recognition that transnational organized crime is a development and security issue. We translate this into practice by giving more attention to integrated mission and development planning within the UN. Initiatives such as the West Africa Coastal are beginning to have some effect, but they are only the first steps. We need to go much further with this.

How we go further with it is much more difficult and that brings me to the second set of issue: how do we create a culture of analysis? We are clear and say it over and over again that it becomes a mantra and a litany we repeat, that we have to do all of this work in the context of the rule of law. And we have to bring the rule of law to countries that for one reason or another. We do not worry too much about why they like an analysis but we have to bring it to the countries and we say that the UN is the best institution to bring it to countries. I would argue that the UN is a necessary condition to creating the rule of law within countries but it is not a sufficient condition and the real problem is that the UN system thinks it is a sufficient condition.

Why do I say this? We are living within an interstate system that was created 350 years ago—the Westphalia settlement. The system created two paradoxes in international affairs, which we still have not solved. It created a system in which all states were judicially equal, but they were also equally sovereign. Sovereignty was absolute. Equality was absolute and the system is meant to work on that principle. What does this mean
in practice? The principle of equal sovereignty and absolute equality is violated every day by the very existence of the Security Council and the veto. It is violated every day by the very principle that even though we created a whole body of international law to deal with issues like this, we still end up in situations when ultimately war results and the whole system breaks down.

The UN works perfectly well as an interstate collaborative body that gets states together, but in order for the system to work fully, it needs three elements—the state, society and the economy. The UN only represents the states; civil society, and the private sector are left out and are only brought into the exchanges of the UN in a piecemeal fashion. What do we do in the UN when we confront a problem like providing the rule of law to societies? We just do more of the same and only focus on the state. There is an old dictum here. If you always do what you have always done, you always get what you have always got. We have the same cycles. When we face a new problem, we create a new UN entity. We put it through the same vicious circle of governments and funding deficits that are widely faced across the whole UN system. We continue to maintain an ideological commitment to what I called the ‘old Robin Hood form of the UN’. Although it does not work in reality, we still maintain an ideological commitment to it.

We need to try and do something different. We cannot expect to generate new institutions and hope that coordination will improve despite expanding the bureaucracy. We need to accept the limits of the interstate system and start working more closely with multi-stakeholder coordination that brings together the state, society and the economy.

We have seen in the last twenty years or more the successes achieved by multi-stakeholder coordination—women’s rights, rights of the child, convention on disability, the international action against landmines, the international action against cluster munitions, the international action against armed violence, the international criminal court, and the human rights council. They were a result of successful multi-stakeholder coalitions. There is no single organization to coordinate external and local actors in this issue, but there are multi-stakeholder coalitions that can be established.

We need to stop trying to provide the thick version of the rule of law, as a recent and very interesting report by the Digital Cultures Research
Centre demonstrates that they were quite shaky foundations. We need more analyses, we need more political economy and we need it before crises occur, not after, because if we get the analyses after, we will have what one of the previous speakers in the last panel called the paralysis of an analysis. We need to abandon the search for ever-bigger goals. What is more useful is to try implementing what we have in a different way so that we can get real results and not keep searching for goals. One way is to have a much more thoughtful and detailed analysis based on an understanding of the interrelationships between the state, the society and the economy. UNODC tries to demonstrate this through a series of studies on transnational threat assessments, in the course of this year, starting with Central Africa. We will produce four or five more on Central America and the Caribbean, East Asia and the Pacific, on West Africa, on East Africa so that these threat assessment can be some sort of pieces for the integrated mission planning required.

Mr Morie Lengor, Director, Crime Services, Sierra Leone Police

I will start by going over some of the fundamental factors that contributed immensely to the UN success in Sierra Leone, which may be relevant to other peace operations. I will then look at what we are doing locally and in partnership with external actors to tackle organized crime. I will also look at the inadequately explored areas to further coordination and end up with obstacles to effective coordination.

This could be an operation anywhere as it is good as its mandates, with material and human resources at its disposal, and commitment of the host country to have sustainable and lasting peace. The main objective is to deepen and entrench the principles of rule of law, democracy and good governance, supporting or strengthening the rule of law institutions in the state. It is now mostly accepted that organized crime is a potential spoiler in peace operations and it could be catastrophic for ongoing peace operations. How it is tackled depends on the mandate. I maintain that building the capacity and capabilities of the local institutions to ensure local ownership, is a more reasonable, efficient and sustainable approach.

Education, cooperation and coordination are the strongest factors that hold modern, complex, multidimensional peace operations together. I quote: ‘coordination implies cooperation, extending the systemic use of policy and options to achieve detailed aims in a cohesive and effective
manner, leading, learning, sharing, emerging and implementing’. In the spirit of comparative advantage and the complementarity, I believe the UNODC and INTERPOL, because of their accomplished expertise, could help to conduct assessments and develop an organized crimes strategy for peace operations. In Sierra Leone, the UNODC has proven value in coordinating local and external actors, including INTERPOL, DPKO, UNDP, UNOWA and WACI, in support of the implementation on the ECOWAS regional action plan to address the problem of illicit drug trafficking and organized crime. The core of WACI is the formation of a multiagency institution called the Transnational Organized Crime Unit (TCU) in four pilot countries—Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone. UNODC has launched a big project in Sierra Leone, called the SLEU74, to build institutions and capacities to respond to the threat of illicit drug trafficking in organized crime. The UN mission in Sierra Leone has contracted international local staff to manage the project partnership in SLEU74, and also provides specialized training and equipment to TCU.

TCU in Sierra Leone is more advanced in its formation and operation than in the other three countries, in part because of the maturity of the security sector reform process. The security services have developed the culture of cooperation, coordination and intelligence sharing. Before TCU came into existence, we already had the Joint Drug Interdiction Task Force (JGITF), which brought together key institutions such as the police, office of national security and immigration, national revenue authority, customs unit and the national drug law enforcement agency. TCUs build upon JGITF to include other forms of organized crime such as human trafficking, smuggling, small-arms trafficking, maritime piracy, terrorism and money laundering.

The respective agencies have signed a memorandum of understanding, which in turn has led to the development of standard operations procedures. TCU operations are intelligence-led. They are part of an Integrated Intelligence Group, intended by the Centre for Intelligence and Security Unit (CISU), to analyze and disseminate intelligence in a coordinated manner. CISU links up with international, internal and external intelligence agencies and is very effective because of its professionalism and trust. It influences some power, being an effective tool to leverage governance and sustain coordination and cooperation on local and external levels. In cases where there is no central local institution to bring together the key institutions to tackle organized crime, memo-
randa of understanding, supported with standard operating procedures between the state and other agencies could be helpful. Labelling legislations for the local institutions of those to address organized crime types may either be insufficient or non-existent and there may be a need to address this as quickly as possible for coordination on local level to hold.

Operationally, what are the national priorities and which area has been very contentious and difficult? Ideally, the less controversial ones should be tackled first; on the ground, making room for mistakes and building confidence is very important. Funding Sierra Leonean legislature and tackling money laundering are most challenging. But again, it depends on the assessment and the mandate of the mission and the strategy which one adopts. Indigenous key stakeholder institutions should be targeted to share the vision of the mission. Missions should not hesitate to be Machiavellian with institutions that might be obstructive and uncooperative in tackling the very serious and urgent problem of organized crime. Where it could, it should hold back support under its control for certain institutions. Missions have inadequately explored areas for coordination with the private sector and especially the banks and other commercial institutions participation. Organized crime needs to be stopped. Civil society and legal organizations can be extremely helpful in providing outreach information and support if they trust the mission. This type of community policing, termed locality policing in Sierra Leone, should be supported.

The main organizational task depends very much on the representative even though we have found out recently in Sierra Leone that there have been an increasing number of women involved in organized crime either as victims or perpetrators. Security Council Resolution 1325 should not be tested straight to its limit in coordinating local and external actors to tackle organized crime.

Threats to effective coordination include poverty, no local capacity or capabilities, and corruption in the security and justice sectors, institutional rivalry, inconsistent policies and fragmented approaches.

I conclude by leaving you with a quote from the UN Secretary-General’s 2005 report in larger freedom, ‘collective security today depends on
accepting that the threats which each region of the world perceives as most urgent are in fact equally so for all’.95

Dr Aloys Tegera, Director of Research, Pole Institute, Democratic Republic of the Congo

Thank you very much for allowing me to give you a few thoughts on trafficking. Organized crime in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, particularly in eastern DRC, is much more the responsibility of not only tribal militia or organized militia, but also the security forces.

Allow me to start with an anecdote, several consultants came to our institute and asked how we would evaluate the performance of MONUSCO. I said to them, ‘listen, for me when the peacekeeping mission came to Congo, the entire country was like a boiling pot with a lot of problems. The managers put a lid on it. This lid they put on top of the boiling pot has allowed a few things to be done, but nonetheless the boiling pot is still there.’ Putting the lid on the boiling pot has allowed the transition of government between 2003 and 2006, it has allowed the preparation of elections in 2006, and has allowed a number of positive developments. However, inside the pot, you see all the problems. The biggest challenge is to be right in the front of this cooking pot, while at the same time, not being able to really touch on the root causes of why things are the way they are.

I tried to give some context to what the situation is in the DRC. Most organized crime is born out of armed groups, including some national army elements. When we talk about the DRC, I sometimes hear people speak of post-conflict situations, a failed state, this is all euphemism. When you live in the DRC, you come to terms with something, which is concrete. The state has ceased to exist in many areas, and this is a reality. The outcomes of the 2006 elections were buried five years later, as we on 28 November 2011 witnessed the very opposite results. We realized that the reality is all of the effort that had been invested into the country could quite suddenly disappear. The main question is; how to impose law and order in a larger context?

At the heart of the problem in the DRC is the absence of a state. Assistance can prove to be a trap, if peacebuilding does not go hand in hand with state-building. As a previous speaker said, a failed state can be an opportunity, but I think the absence of a state, is an even bigger opportunity to seize. The mushrooming armed militia groups, which are responsible for organized crimes, are the consequence of the state’s lack of capacities to impose law and order. Unfortunately, the root causes of insecurity and organized crime is summarized in three words—identity, land and power. In itself, this triangle of identity, land and power, is normal because in each country, in each society, this is true. We all deal with our native identity. We all deal with our own land problems. We deal with our own compromise with power. This triangle in a normal context is quite perfect, because it reflects the reality of any society, but within the DRC context, where you do not have a state in such a vast territory, where you have provinces isolated from each other, where within one province there is no connection at all, it ends up being a deadly triangle where maybe moving from one point to another one, is totally impossible. Thus, problems which are related to violence around nationality issues, violence about land becomes even bigger, because we are in this context where each province is isolated from each other and each community is isolated from each other. This triangle is not unique to DRC, it can also be found somewhere else, but for us, it has become a deadly triangle.

The other reality we have is that there is a huge gap between the political elite and the population. Usually in a normal country, the link between the political elite and the population is the public services, which are provided by the elite to the population. In our context, this does not exist. Public service is something unknown. Then we wonder when we come as a peacekeeping mission and land into a context where you have a world of a political elite entirely separated from the population. Where do you put your priority? Where do you put your energy and your money? We presumably do not deploy a peacekeeping mission just to help the elite.

Over the last two days, we have been discussing different aspects of essentially protecting civilians. This is an important issue, and you find the civilians where the population is. So what do we invest in this kind of sector where the population are? Some of what I say is not necessarily the definition of what peacekeeping missions should be doing, but I am aware that if the task really is civilian protection, we should also
come to realize where we should invest our energy and our money and our effort so that we at least can make a difference.

Working within this inadequate absent state, my first priority would be to empower the population. In the DRC, when we speak of empowering the population, we have reasons to talk about things that may not necessarily fit squarely with the peacekeeping missions. We have to talk about infrastructure, order and energy, as these are things which the population can use. We have to talk about education and healthcare and maybe with these, we can hope that within a generation we may end up having an emerging middle class that can start asking questions of the elite, which is completely cut off from the population.

With respect to SSR, what do we do? Are we going to take a patchwork of militias who have been fighting each other and hope to make them into an army? Alternatively we could try to reach out to a new brand of the younger generation that has nothing to do with the corruption, with the massacres and so on. Coordination is a key part of the required strategy, it is the key to combining peacebuilding and state-building.

*Discussant: Dr Walter Kemp, Director for Europe and Asia, International Peace Institute*

It is clear that threats posed by organized crime is a danger not just limited to a few cities or neighbourhoods, but to the security of states, even regions and arguably to international peace and security. That is why increasingly, it has reached the agenda of the Security Council as an issue that has come to the table as part of a wide range of other issues and from so many different theatres. What is different from just twenty years ago is that organized crime is now global, it is no longer a local issue. It has reached macroeconomic proportions.

If we combined all of the illicit gains by criminal groups it would be equivalent to the world’s twenty-first economy, or Sweden, and possibly join the G20. Organized crime has penetrated so many different aspects of life, including the environment, the financial markets and so on. However, the international system is not really equipped to deal with this threat, because the international system is based on interstate relations and yet now there are none-state actors which in many cases can take on governments of the states where they live, and at the same time also transnational actors.
What do we do with these two types of threats? Do we ignore them? Do we attack them head on? Do we try to co-opt them? Is this even a role that the UN should be playing? Should we leave this to national police forces or create some kind of international police force? This is certainly an issue for the UN, because by its definition, transnational organized crime requires a multilateral response, and as Dr Chawala pointed out, a law enforcement response on its own is insufficient. We have to look at this in the context of development, justice, the rule of law, and so on.

It is a perfect issue for the UN or at least some other multilateral body, although I argue that the UN ought to be the institution. Even if we do not think the UN should be dealing with transnational organized crime, it certainly affects many aspects of the UN’s work. For example, it is present in almost every theatre in which the UN has peace operations. We have heard about the DRC and the Sierra Leonean examples, but think of Haiti or Kosovo, Somalia or Timor Leste. It is actually harder to think of theatres where organized crime does not have an impact on peace operations.

In the past, organized crime was seen as a type of peripheral issue to the work of the UN. I like to use the analogy of when you go into a bookstore, there is usually a separate crime section, that is the way it was in the UN—organized crime was seen as the responsibility of UNODC. However, there is a growing realization that this issue has come into the mainstream of society, which is why the UN has decided that it has to have a mainstream approach and that the issue has to be looked at globally.

We cannot look at this only in an international context or a regional context; we have to be looking at the illicit markets, the supply for the demand and the trafficking. Furthermore, it is not enough as was just pointed out, to put the lid on the pot, you have to somehow stop the water from boiling and that is a serious challenge which requires looking at development, reducing vulnerability and so on.

We are undertaking a project, which is aimed at assisting the UN task force to come up with ideas across the spectrum. I am only looking at the slice of the impact organized crime has on peacekeeping. I would like to highlight a few points.
One is on the use of threat assessments. In many cases people are operating in situations where they are not aware of the motivations and incentives of different groups, who one may think are criminals, but might actually just be opportunists working in the environment, where they are or they may be certain groups who are making money illicitly but by definition are legal. Who are they? What are their links to the licit society? What do we do about them? It is no longer the case that we have business and political world, and an underworld—these worlds are now very much mixed up. How do we identify these people? In many cases they are not interested in peace or in war, they are just profiting from instability, and the less we identify who they are and what is making them tick, the less we will be able to effectively deal with them. Thus, we need better ways to assess organized crime. Organized crime should be a part of a general integrated assessment approach. IPI has recently created a toolkit to do organized crime threat assessments.

Secondly, it is very often a question of information management and in this age of Google, there is often too much information, we have to separate the wheat from the chaff, to make effective analyses and connect the dots. This is something that I think the UN can do better and for that it would probably have to be an increased analytical capacity not only to look at organized crime, but more generally to make these kinds of observations. I highlight the need for a culture of analysis. What we need at the UN is something between the operational level and the weekly security brief.

The third point is once we have identified the problem, who do we send to deal with it? There are now about a hundred thousand blue helmets, there are about fourteen thousand blue berets, but there are very few people within the UN system who has the skill set to deal with organized crime. Do we train peacekeepers to be more sensitive to the problem? Do we train the police who now are more or less doing community policing to do more sensitive criminal work? This is certainly something that the UN is grappling with and is now in the context of the civilian capacity review.

One idea that has been developed by UNPOL, is to put in serious crime support units within different countries, probably international formed units, so we send teams of police experts, for example, from the UK to Sierra Leone or the US to Liberia. They are also looking at having more organized crime experts as a part of the UN standing police capacity.
and to generally have more capacity to deal with this. The point was made that one should also enhance national capacity. At the end of the day we cannot keep sending internationals to countries to deal with these types of issues, there has to be more technical assistance, but also capacity building to deal with the whole range of criminal justice approaches and not just the security aspects. There you have a risk of securitizing the problem and giving a lot of hard work to people who may themselves be a part of the problem so it is dealing with prison reform, dealing with prosecution services and the whole spectrum.

One suggestion that I have is to draw on the experiences of the middle income countries, who have plenty of experiences of dealing with organized crime. I think of Mexico or Brazil or Colombia and they also have the language skills to deal with situations in West Africa or other parts of the world, so one could draw more effectively on these skills.

My fifth point is to smoothen the process from trusteeship to ownership in effectively helping the state to regain sovereignty in so many different ways; the state has lost its ability to govern, it can no longer provide public services or public security, so you can help to bring the state back in.

The final point is what happens when the people that you are dealing with are actually part of the problem? If your interlockers are corrupt or if they somehow are involved in illicit activity, do you take a bottom-up approach to try and strengthen the social antibodies in communities? Do you try and contain the problem within one country so there is no regional overflow? Do we actually take these people on, arrest them and if so, where do we take them? The International Criminal Court does not really deal with organized crime situations.

Should we be more Machiavellian as was suggested? Should we name and shame the perpetrators? Could we cut their financial flows, for example, or do we negotiate with them? Perhaps some of them are actually not interested in power, they are simply interested in making money, so can we channel that into more licit activities? This would require a trade-off between security and justice, which is a tough call to make.

As I said in the beginning, organized crime has such an impact in so many theatres where the UN is doing peacebuilding and peacekeeping,
there has to be greater understanding of the incentives of the people that we are dealing with and then making them a part of the solution and not a part of the problem.

Discussion

Mr Titov commented, ‘The serious crime police units should take root in varied peacekeeping operations. It is a cynical move that we have to move in that direction, and that we have moved in that direction. The unit existed in Sierra Leone, another is being created in Liberia and potentially in Côte d’Ivoire, and there is a similar arrangement in southern Sudan. Thus, these are serious operational issues and implications. One small remark on intelligence; intelligence as a concept, is still somewhat controversial within the UN, but it is not insurmountable. If handled properly, hurdles could be overcome and trust could be built among different stakeholders. There is already much improved law information, situational awareness and elements of intelligence in the field.’

Dr Ryan raised a question on capability, ‘Military standardization of forces is a very well understood factor, however, the police forces in the deployed peace operations are often now widely variable in terms of the preparedness and capability and ability to deal with the problems of transnational crime that they may confront. We are increasingly deploying police into conflict-affected states. What do we need to do to ensure that the police forces we deploy will be more effective?’

Ms Lalchevska, added to the same question, ‘How does peacekeeping affect organized crime and how does the presence of military and humanitarian action affect organized crime, particularly in the case of trafficking of women? Also is it true that in circumstances where there is lawlessness, the international community including humanitarian and military peacekeepers are immune to the laws of the country? Could you comment on the accountability of people involved in peacekeeping and humanitarian action?’

Mr Seymour pointed out that organized crime and corruption are both familiar bedfellows. ‘Corruption is not necessarily organized crime, however corruption that is endemic in a country in which we are trying to implement peace and conflict programmes threaten and clearly undermine our ability to do so and the point has been made frequently,
approved solutions become part of the problem if the police or the military or whatever are part of that corruption. Too often many peacekeeping missions have tried to put a lid on the boiling pot without addressing issues of corruption and at times, is associated with organized crime in favour of trying to achieve stability, because they considered it to be difficult, too sensitive or are simply not resourced to address corruption. What can we do to raise awareness of corruption? What can we actually do to address corruption and the corruption–organized crime link in the long-term? Clearly, corruption is one of the causes of a conflict, which left unchecked, has the potential to cause significant long-term issues.’

Dr Chawla pointed out that ‘deploying police forces more effectively requires a comprehensive process of threat assessment, provision of training for police forces, having the transnational organized crime units, and using the handbook. It is also crucial to have a demand driven approach.’ He also pointed out what currently happens—the country asks for support, the UN provides available expertise, whether good or bad. The current discussion about civilian capacity is very different from a demand that is generated internally within the country not necessary from the government, but within civil society with research groups and others to be able to respond to this.

He further argued that the impact of peacekeeping on transnational organized crime and corruption are linked issues. This is the age of accountability and there is more than enough pressure from an open press from humanitarian groups, from non-government organizations, from watchdog organizations, law organizations and from transparency groups. The public scrutiny is the only way in which individual abuses can be tackled. He highlighted that, in UN peacekeeping, the problem is not systemic, the problem is at the individual level. The systemic problem is the problem of corruption and how that fits into the local society. A lot is happening in the international context. For example, in the human rights council, several countries have developed mechanisms to review their own performance against the corruption convention and whether they are implementing it. These are very slow starts, but they are very promising indeed. An issue like corruption, which goes so deep down into political, economic and social systems, the only way we will ever be able to deal with it is countries instituting a pure review process. We see how remarkably successful that can be with human rights even
though the start was very slow and that this is definitely the direction to go.

Mr Stiernblad reflected on the issue of how we ensure that police officers would be able to do a better job. ‘The complexity of the challenges that peacekeepers are facing and what is really needed is policing research. We should not think in large quantities anymore, we should think in smaller, specialized, highly trained and the best individuals we can get. The challenge is that those same officers are needed at home, because many countries face the challenges there as well and they are as complex. With respect to the issue of peacekeepers and immunity, it is a big problem that we need to address. Countries have a very critical role to play in discussing the possibility of lifting the immunity of their peacekeepers. DPKO and other actors are looking into it very closely, but I respect that it is an issue which is difficult to solve.’

Dr Kemp commented on the capacity point, ‘very few countries have spare capacity since they try to develop it for national contexts. Some countries now have broad organized crime, not under control, but to a large degree, contained. They have officers who are experienced. Instead of sending an officer from a Nordic country to Guinea-Bissau, we should send someone from Brazil who speaks the language, who would understand that there are people from his part of the world who are there. He would be able to be much more effective.’

Regarding corruption, Dr Kemp asserted that ‘it is important that it is considered as a part of the capacity-building process. There is more attention paid to developing empty corruption agencies and financial intelligent units, but the biggest problem is in the timing. If you know that some of your counterparts are deeply complicit in illicit activity, it is in your best interest to take them out early or to wait longer, because then your situation as the head, as chief or as SRSG for example, can be very tenuous. However, if you more or less attack or arrest your inter-locker, the ability for you to carry out your mandate could be seriously compromised. The flip side is that the longer you wait, the conditions that you are creating enable an environment for illicit activity, which is going to make it more difficult for you to create a condition of peace. It is worse, so this is the trade-off that has to be balanced.’

Dr Tegera noted that corruption should be on the agenda of any peacekeeping mission since it affects the entire state apparatus and eventually
the livelihood of the population, as in the case of the DRC. ‘The World Bank’s request to publish mining contracts for instance is an example of increasing transparency and addressing corruption. This was the first time that there is access to information of who’s who in a contract. This type of information is vital to be able to ask the right people the right questions.’

Mr Lengor mentioned that ‘the UN has actually done and is continuing to do a lot of good work in Sierra Leone. The intervention in times of peacebuilding is very comprehensive. The strengthening of support of democratic and rule of law structures; setting up the national electoral commissions, law reform commission, political parties for restriction of commission and most importantly supporting the anticorruption commission which have brought a lot of corruption issues to the light. It would not be perfect, but I think they are making their own mark, so these institutions should really be supported.’

Ms Newton had a question on model legislation for transnational crime, which the UN has an interest in being able to apply across UN missions. ‘Transnational crime and organized crime can be dealt with by police and by multinational task forces that have an interest in the outcome and achieving multi-jurisdictional lockup, including extradition agreements. Without extradition the most suitable jurisdiction to deal with the issue cannot be resolved. The international law enforcement community are very happy to be involved in UN missions, but the question is how the UN would structure a peacekeeping mission to allow those jurisdictions to exist and inserting organized crime units within the jurisdiction. The impact of transitional organized crime and the financial flows and gains is felt globally and across UN missions, so is it just an ability to get our foothold or the ability to provide and share intelligence because most jurisdiction have the intelligence.’

Dr Chawla responded to several questions. ‘On transnational organized crime, the development of any kind of model law is compromised by the fact that it only deals with very generic issues. We still do not have a clear or common definition of what constitutes a serious crime, because some countries still use capital punishment for drug related offences. The other approach is the transnational organized crime convention and concerns both small arms and the smuggling of migrants, we are nowhere because of the level of ratification of the protocol is so low and there is no consensus position. The area where we are moving forward
is human trafficking and there is now the development of both model laws, because you have a critical mass of countries that are willing to do something about it. At the end of 2012 UNODC will produce a global assessment of the situation of human trafficking in the world, and will look at an inventory of the legal system for legal cooperation across countries.’

Mr Titov made some final remarks. ‘It is absolutely unavoidable that the international community will, in the coming years, have to mainstream addressing organized crime in any peacekeeping, peace mission or political mission. It should be part of a compact formed between the receiving government and the peacekeeping mission. Otherwise we will never be there. We will have our operations running for ten, fifteen or twenty years without achieving sustainable results. Indeed it is only part of the problem, but this is the root of the cause, the root issues, which have to be tackled.’

‘We have to reinvent the police model in peacekeeping operations. It cannot be a labour intensive model anymore. It should be a model of deploying specialists for tackling real issues. People who will and can primarily look at capacity development, national capacity development. It should also be a model that has good programmes with adequate funding. Otherwise why would we have those police officers standing the guard for years without being able to create a national police academy? The UN Police Commissioner Anne-Marie Orler is creating a new concept of international policing and I sincerely hope this idea would be reflected in this concept.’
CHAPTER 5

The Cooperation Triangle (Security Council/Secretariat/Troop- and Police-Contributing Countries) and Military/Civilian/Police Capabilities for Complex Peace Operations

Background Paper: The Cooperation Triangle and Civilian Capacity

Professor Ian Johnstone, Professor of International Law, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University

Introduction

When the ‘New Horizon’ process was launched in 2008 (culminating in the publication in 2009 of ‘A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping’), peacekeeping was in an era of overstretch. The number of uniformed and civilian personnel in the field had reached a peak and the range of tasks they were asked to perform had grown substantially. Finding resources and capabilities to meet that demand was an enormous challenge. Today’s context is different. The steady expansion in large-scale peacekeeping that occurred since the year 2000 seems to have leveled off and is likely to decline in the years ahead, due in part to the desire to find cost savings in contemporary operations. Alternatives to large multidimensional operations like the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) and the recently approved UN Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS), have become more popular. This may be an opportune moment for consolidating the various mechanisms that have been put in motion in recent years, but care must be taken not to allow money concerns to drive the process at the expense of realistic assessments of what effective peace operations require.

This paper begins with an overview of the context for the capacity debate, asking the question capabilities for what? The following section considers military and police capacity through the lens of triangular cooperation among the Security Council, Secretariat and troop and police contributing countries (T/PCCs). The fourth section concerns the civilian capacity review and implementation process. While the focus is on civilian aspects of multidimensional peace oper-

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96 This paper is a commissioned background paper for the International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations. The views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Challenges Partnership or the Host.
ations, the civilian capacity review has implications for a range of UN prevention, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and good governance-related activities that implicate the entire system. The paper concludes with some issues and recommendations for consideration at the Challenges Forum.

Context

As noted, concerns about peace operations capacity have their origins in the expanding scale and scope of contemporary peacekeeping. The numbers grew to 130 000 in 2010, operations became more ‘robust’ and they took on ever-more complex civilian functions. The more robust approach was manifest most significantly in the protection of civilian mandates UN operations have been given since 1999. Questions about how to fulfil this mandate led to doctrinal development, signalled first in the ‘United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines’ (‘Capstone Doctrine’)\(^97\) and then elaborated in a Lessons Learned Note and Operational Concept presented to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping (C-34) in 2009.\(^98\) The Committee ultimately embraced protection of civilians as a core function of peacekeeping though with sharp differences of opinion as to what this meant in practice. Meanwhile, the Security Council in Resolution 1894 decided that the protection of civilians should be given priority in decisions about capacity and resources. Given the comprehensive concept of protection of civilians embraced by the UN—protection through political processes, protection from physical violence, and establishing a protective environment—identifying the required capacity and resources is no easy task.

Meanwhile, mission mandates and policy documents have converged on a list of five recurring peacebuilding priorities:

- Support to basic safety and security;
- Support to political processes;
- Support to the provision of basic services and the return of displaced persons;
- Support to restoring core government functions;
- Support to economic revitalization.\(^99\)

To some this looked like a holistic vision of how external actors could contribute to the consolidation of peace. To others, it was a laundry list of desirable objectives that were impossible to fulfill. In any case, the list provoked reflection on which aspects are the core business of peacekeeping. The Capstone Doctrine highlights security, rule of law, support to political processes and coordination of other actors. The New Horizon Progress Report of October 2010 specifies three primary roles for peacekeepers as ‘early peacebuilders’: articulating priorities and guiding strategies; providing a security umbrella and political space for other national and international actors to implement peacebuilding tasks; and implementing some peacebuilding tasks directly, such as police, justice, corrections and security sector reform. In a strategy paper on early peacebuilding, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Department of Field Support (DFS) stress security, political processes and the extension the state authority, including by laying the foundations for long-term institution-building. In a nutshell, peacekeepers focus on politics and security, but with the understanding that these cannot be disconnected from the other peacebuilding priorities, typically undertaken by other actors like the World Bank and UNDP as part of an integrated approach.

These policy documents tie into another important debate in recent years, about transitions and exit strategies. This was driven in part by financial considerations, but also by the fact that some relatively successful missions were ready to start winding up, in Liberia and Timor for example. The discussion was further complicated by deteriorating or outright withdrawal of consent by host governments, in Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Sudan. The Security Council held a thematic debate and adopted a presidential statement on transitions in 2010, which included an appeal for benchmarks as a way of measuring progress in mandated tasks and facilitating handover to national authorities. Thus the building of national capacity is critical to smooth transitions, a job that peacekeepers share with many other external actors and is often taken up by successor arrangements.

A final complication is the major disconnect that may exist on time frames. The World Development Report of 2011 argues that building legitimate institutions and governance to end repeated cycles of violence takes a generation. Yet peacekeeping, peacebuilding and even development interventions are of much shorter duration. For the purposes of the Challenges Forum, this raises unresolved questions about what a peacekeeping operation can expect to do during the relatively limited period in which it is typically deployed. Is it possible to lay the

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foundations for institution building during that period? What can be done to ensure seamless transitions to long-term peacebuilding that may take as much as a generation?

As it turns out, the expected decline in the number of peacekeepers did not occur in 2010 and 2011. Indeed UN missions survived the crisis in Côte d’Ivoire, a fraught referendum in South Sudan, and volatile elections in the DRC, while a new mission was established in South Sudan, UN support for AMISOM expanded and a small political mission was deployed to Libya. Moreover, the likely decline in military personnel deployed to peacekeeping missions is not likely to be matched by a proportionate decline in civilians and police. Indeed, we may see an increase in the latter categories.

Yet the tone of the debate on capacities is different from 2008–09. The pressure for greater efficiency and oversight still exists, but financial issues have moved to the fore, exemplified by a pitched battle in the 2012 meeting of the C-34 on troop reimbursement rates. An unspoken question that lurks beneath the discussion on capabilities therefore is not simply whether peacekeepers can do more with less, but whether they should try to do less—to scale back from the ambitious agenda that has characterized operations since 1999.

**Triangular Cooperation**

The ‘New Horizon’ process, launched in 2008, identified four priority areas for a new partnership between the Secretariat and member states: policy development; capability development; the global field support strategy; and planning and oversight. Triangular cooperation falls mainly within ‘planning and oversight’, although it cuts across all four areas.

The ostensible purpose of triangular cooperation is to improve oversight of peacekeeping while enhancing awareness among key stakeholders of the challenges and concerns associated with complex operations. The history is well documented in a background paper prepared for the Challenges Forum 2010. In June 2001, the Security Council adopted a resolution that laid out a set of procedures for more systematic consultation among the Security Council, T/PCCs and the Secretariat. The Security Council Working Group on peacekeeping was set up around then with the express purpose of encouraging closer and more interactive dialogue among those groups. The importance of triangular cooperation was reinforced in a 2004 presidential statement and

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another in 2009. The latter stressed the progress that had been made to that point:

- improved dialogue with the Secretariat on the general challenges of peacekeeping;
- deeper consultations with T/PCCs;
- more political-military meetings on specific operations; and
- improved use of benchmarks.

It also identified areas where further reflection was required, highlighting the need for more systematic consultations in advance of the deployment of a technical assessment mission, and debriefing on its main findings on return. The Council also called for ‘more meaningful engagement’ with T/PCCs before the renewal or modification of a mandate.

The 2009 Security Council Presidential Statement welcomed the ‘New Horizon’ non-paper, including the call for a capability-driven approach, which ‘moves away from a numbers-intensive strategy to one that focuses on the skills, capacity and willingness of personnel, as well as material, to deliver required results’. The Security Council weighed in again with another presidential statement in August 2011, which added little other than to call for circulation of the agenda for T/PCC meetings by the 15th of each month.

Meanwhile, triangular cooperation has been a major theme in C-34 debates and reports. In its 2010 report the Committee for the first time included a section on the topic and made a number of specific requests:

- that pre-deployment threat assessments be made available to potential T/PCCs;
- that potential T/PCCs take reconnaissance visits to new missions;
- meetings between the Secretariat and T/PCCs, ideally one week prior to Security Council consultations, on mandate renewals;
- regular comprehensive briefings for T/PCCs on the situation of each peacekeeping operation;
- that the Secretariat provide the Security Council and T/PCCs with an assessment of capabilities, force generation and logistical resource requirements prior to launching a new operation or reconfiguring a current operation;
- better guidelines for pre-deployment visits for military contributions and formed police units.

Many of those requests were reiterated in the 2011 report of the Special Committee. A significant new request was for the Secretariat to consult with T/PCCs when planning any change in ‘military and police tasks, mission-specific rules of engagement, operational concepts or command and control structure ... to ensure that their troops have the capacity to meet the new demands’. Triangular cooperation was also a lively topic of discussion at the 2012 session of the C-34 and many new paragraphs were proposed. As of the time of writing, no report had come out due primarily to differences over the rates of reimbursement of peacekeepers.

Bearing in mind the various specific requests that came out of these inter-governmental bodies, it is possible to compile a list of the progress achieved on triangular cooperation by the end of 2011:

- Regular briefings by DPKO for the Security Council and T/PCCs before the renewal of mandates, and before and after every Technical Assessment Mission;
- Informal briefings by DPKO as required to inform T/PCCs about specific developments in a mission area;
- Routine updates of mission-specific planning documents as required by the Security Council; T/PCCs informed through meetings and individual briefings;
- DPKO and DFS maintain contacts at all levels with member states to ensure that States are well-informed about events on the ground;
- Integrated Operational Teams hold informal consultations with Security Council members at the expert level to brief them on mission-specific areas of interest;
- Relevant DPKO offices regularly offer briefings to T/PCCs when there are significant events related to the missions;
- Situation Center weekly briefing to interested T/PCCs on key developments; Office of Operations factual weekly briefing note to the Security Council;
- Security Council formal consultations with T/PCCs ahead of each mandate renewal. The Secretariat generally issues reports of the Secretary-General one week ahead of those meetings to allow for meaningful consultation. DPKO also supports these consultations by providing a briefing;
- Occasional briefings by Force Commanders and Police Commissioners of both the Security Council and C-34;

This list draws on reports of the Secretary-General to the 2011 and 2012 sessions of the C-34; the ‘New Horizon’ Progress Report No. 2, December 2011; speech of Under-Secretary-General Hervé Ladsous to the C-34 and talking points prepared by the Office of Operations in December 2011, as well as interviews with DPKO officials on 19 March, 21 March and 24 April 2012.
• Completion of an initial assessment of the Secretariat’s capability gap lists, currently the subject of consultations with member states. As part of this process, DPKO has developed baseline capability standards and guidance under three pilot initiatives for infantry battalions, military staff officers and military medical support;
• Intermission cooperation to overcome critical capacity gaps on a temporary basis in the context of the 2010 presidential elections and post-election crisis in Côte d’Ivoire, presidential and legislative elections in Liberia in 2011, and to deal with the crisis in Jonglei, South Sudan in 2011;
• DPKO’s Police Division’s development of a strategic guidance framework, to foster a common understanding on the full spectrum of police tasks in peacekeeping operations. This is in response to the continuing high demand for formed police units and specialized policing skills, such as experts in forensics and organized crime, as well as those with experience in mentoring, advising and institution-building.

One other important development in the ambit of triangular cooperation was a strategic dialogue held with a delegation from India in 2011. The Indian delegation comprised senior representatives of the Ministries of External Affairs, Home Affairs and Defense. They met with the DPKO Offices of Operations, Military Affairs, Rule of Law and Security Institutions, and Policy Evaluation and Training, as well as DFS. This dialogue went beyond day-to-day operational issues to touch on strategic, policy and other substantive matters that go to the heart of contemporary peacekeeping.

Despite this substantial progress in the last several years, triangular cooperation remains a source of contention. The reasons for this are complex and not necessarily founded on deep substantive differences. The divisive C-34 meeting in 2012 suggests that the peacekeeping partnership is fraying. The negotiations on triangular cooperation had a somewhat surreal quality, where the number of paragraphs and arcane matters like the placement of references to PCCs in relation to TCCs seemed more important than content. Economic pressure is part of the problem. Those who foot the bill for peacekeeping want to see cost efficiencies (including for example greater use of drones for surveillance), whereas large TCCs and others do not want to see decisions about peacekeeping driven entirely by money. More generally, giving the TCCs more say through triangular cooperation may be seen by the donors as a way to deflect criticism for the decline in financial support, but TCCs do not see ‘voice’ as a substitute for funding.

Moreover, the vehicles for triangular cooperation that do exist are not used to maximum advantage. The meetings the Secretariat holds with TCCs and PCCs are well attended but interaction on policy and mandate questions—the ques-
tions that originally gave rise to demands for more consultation—tend to be minimal. The Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping, after a promising start in 2009, has not lived up to expectations. And some of the issues that do arise in formal and informal interactions with TCCs and PCCs are more appropriately dealt with at the field level, for example the sequencing of contingents to be repatriated.

A more substantive source of contention is the extent to which internal and working documents in the Secretariat should be shared. Understandably, UN member states would like to see everything that would be useful for decisions about deployment and the like. But some information, like threat assessments, is too sensitive too put in writing. A related concern is the appropriate scope of engagement with T/PCCs on the design of technical assessment missions (TAMs). Briefings before and after TAMs are now standard practice, but too much encroachment on the prerogatives of the Secretariat may hinder its ability to make objective recommendations to the Security Council.

Finally, an important part of the current context for these debates is that emerging powers and large TCCs—most notably India—are insisting on playing a role as decision-makers as well as decision-takers. China, Brazil, South Africa, Nigeria, Indonesia and Egypt are substantial contributors to UN peacekeeping as well, and are not likely to be satisfied with serving as mere resources. This suggests the need for a more proactive approach to dialogue with major and potential T/PCCs on policy and strategic issues, as well as on operational matters.

Civilian Capacity Review

The civilian capacity review is rooted in the proposition that sustainable peace requires strong civilian capacity and resilient institutions, one of the animating themes of the Secretary-General’s 2009 report on peacebuilding. The CIVCAP review was undertaken by a Senior Advisory Group led by Jean-Marie Guéhenno, whose team was housed in the UN’s Peacebuilding Support Office, signaling that it is not directed only at peacekeeping but rather the entire UN system’s support for post-conflict societies. It resonates with the 2011 World Development Report as well as the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding’s report A New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States. The former emphasizes the importance of security, justice and jobs to sustainable peace—all of which require legitimate institutions that can take a generation to build. The latter is an initiative of fragile states that have lived through conflict.

They call for a commitment to five peacebuilding and state-building goals: legitimate politics, security, justice, economic foundations, and revenue and services. The civilian capacity review process also aligns closely with recent peacekeeping initiatives, including the ‘New Horizon’ Process, the Global Field Support Strategy and the ‘early peacebuilding’ paper produced by DPKO/DFS in June 2011.

The report of the Senior Advisory Group frames its proposals in terms of four elements: national ownership; civilian partnerships; expertise; and nimbleness. The Review team mapped the international civilian capacities available in the five priority areas identified in the 2009 peacebuilding report (listed above). It broke each down into subcategories and identified UN agencies, regional organizations, bilateral donors and civil society actors that had personnel with the requisite expertise who could be deployed quickly. From that, it produced a list of functions where capacity gaps in the UN system existed, from DDR, SSR and JSR, to political party development and public financial management, through to employment generation and private sector development.

The Secretary-General followed up with his own report, setting out a roadmap for action along three axes:

- developing greater national capacity and ownership;
- building external partnerships and making the necessary adjustments within the UN system;
- and exercising organizational agility.

The roadmap includes a set of priority actions that could be taken by August 2012, at which point the Secretary-General will report back the General Assembly and Security Council. A small team under the authority of Under-Secretary-General Susana Malcorra, is charged with following up on those recommendations. A partial list of the priority actions and a brief review of their status follows.

- **Developing guidelines for better use and development of national capacity.** This is currently being undertaken by the UNDP-led inter-agency working group. Part of the exercise requires orienting the many existing guidelines to post-conflict situations.

- **Giving a stronger strategic direction to new planning processes.** The Integrated Mission Planning Process guidelines will be revised by the year 2012, giving

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clearer instructions on how to engage national actors in planning processes, and how to ensure that national perspectives and capacities are taken into account.

**Review of how gender expertise is structured and deployed.** This is being undertaken within the mainstreaming mandate of UN Women.

**Consulting states and regional organizations on developing stronger partnerships; establishing an online platform to broadcast civilian needs and available capacities.** The principal vehicle for this is CapMatch, an online ‘virtual marketplace’ designed to share information that will help to match mission needs with potential providers of niche capabilities in short supply. Initially it will be open only to member state providers, but eventually regional and other multilateral organizations may use the device, as could nongovernmental organizations. Ideally, CapMatch will facilitate South–South cooperation, perhaps with financial assistance from wealthy countries. The platform has been designed and will go live soon.

**Exploring modalities to broaden the scope for deploying personnel provided by governments and other entities.** The CIVCAP team is currently examining what can be done within existing regulations and what modalities would require adaptation of the rules. Various models are being explored for four categories of partners: open market consultants; member states; intergovernmental organizations; and nongovernmental organizations. Among the innovative ideas being considered are: systems contracts for consultants; letters of assist with governments; memorandums of understanding with regional organizations; and institutional cooperation contracts with nongovernmental organizations.

**Detailing critical capacity gap areas and ensuring that designated UN focal points engage with external partners to address them.** The capacity gap mapping undertaken by the Senior Advisory Group is a work in progress. Identifying ‘focal points’, as proposed by the Secretary-General as an alternative to the cluster system, has become bogged down in predictable turf battles.

**Pursuing a corporate emergency model in the UN Secretariat for the purpose of rapid deployment.** The idea here is to replicate the Haiti experience for the purpose of rapid deployment in emergencies, allowing for lateral movement of staff across the UN system as well as fast-track recruitment mechanisms. The Office of Human Resources is working on this.

**Piloting these approaches in the field.** Many of the above initiatives and others listed among the Secretary-General’s priority actions, like financial agility, are being put to the test in pilot projects. Thus local procurement is being piloted in UNMISS. UNSMIL has established a ‘civilian partnership cell’ in the Libyan transitional government. Financial agility is being experimented with in
UNMIT, as is South–South cooperation with Peacebuilding Fund resources. Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia are also pilots for South–South cooperation on security sector reform. It is too soon to judge the efficacy of the civilian capacity implementation process. As noted, the Secretary-General will submit a report to the General Assembly in August 2012. The goal is for much of the foundational work to be done by the end of the year. At this stage several general comments can be made, which may shed light on the prospects for success and stimulate discussion at the Challenges Forum.

First, the initiative was widely embraced by member states when launched because of its breadth and the inherent appeal of its underlying concepts: ownership, partnerships, expertise, and nimbleness. The emphasis on national ownership was appreciated by the global South, led by the g7+ group; donor countries had been developing their own rosters and were anxious to find ways of using them; and emerging powers like India and Brazil were looking for modalities to contribute more to the civilian aspects of peacekeeping and peace building.

Second, facilitating South-South cooperation has become a major impetus in the implementation process—the idea being that countries from the South have expertise to share that may not reside in the global North. This is in line with The New Deal initiative referenced above, whereby those who have lived through conflict seek to share knowledge and experience with countries in similar situations. The challenge here is not necessarily funding but rather making the right match: getting post-conflict societies to identify what they need and finding the right southern supplier.

Third, enthusiasm for the initiative within the UN system has been mixed. One of the foundational elements of the CIVCAP process is to strengthen interoperability and flexibility across the UN system, in order to make better use of the resources the organization in support of peacebuilding. Yet perennial tension between the crisis management side of the house (operating on the basis of Security Council mandates) and those involved in development has obstructed progress. Moreover, the emphasis in the report on creating a more professional, agile United Nations by drawing on outside expertise has met with some resistance from within. Thus one of the great opportunities—and challenges—for the CIVCAP process is to push the UN system further down the path of ‘delivering as one’, in partnership with the World Bank, regional organizations, donors and non-governmental organizations.

Fourth, the civilian capacity process is closely intertwined with other initiatives underway at UN headquarters. It did not emanate from the ‘New Horizon’ process but fits within that vision. It relates to the work of the Peacebuilding Commission and Peacebuilding Support Office, as well as WDR 2011-inspired
activities. Procurement and human resources reform is part of the equation, including the various standing capacities and standby rosters that are being built: the Standing Police Capacity, the UN roster of security sector reform experts, the new standing Justice and Corrections Standing Capacity and the Human Rights Rapid Response and Peace Mission Section. In a climate of fiscal austerity, it is important to maintain coherence among these overlapping reform efforts and to resist the temptation to seize the least expensive but not necessarily best option.

**Issues for discussion and recommendations**

*General.* Revisit the question ‘capabilities for what?’ Is the goal to do peacekeeping better, to do more with less, or to do less by scaling back on the ambitious peacekeeping agenda that emerged in the last decade?

Consider the alternatives or successors to large-scale multidimensional peace operations. What capacities are needed for political and peacebuilding missions? Without a large troop presence, what sources of leverage does a mission have to advance its political, security, justice and development goals?

*Triangular Cooperation.* Identify the substantive differences that are at the core of ongoing debates over triangular cooperation. Are the TCCs and PCCs mainly concerned with Secretariat practices or those of the Security Council? What are the limits on open, triangular consultation, for example with respect to threat assessments, the terms of reference of technical assessment missions, etc.?

Consider how to improve existing mechanisms. Can the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping be used better as the principal venue for triangular consultations?

Engage in strategic dialogue with major troop contributors, as well as those whose contributions may grow in the years ahead. The dialogue with India in 2011 is a useful model. As the demand for formed police units and specialized policing skills is unlikely to decline in the near future, similar efforts should be made with those contributing countries—actual and potential.

*Civilian Capacity.* Reflect on time frames. If the *World Development Report 2011* is correct that building legitimate institutions and governance takes a generation, what are the implications for peacekeeping and early peacebuilding? What level of national capacity can realistically be built during the relatively brief period when a peacekeeping mission is deployed?
Ensure coherence among the many reform efforts underway in the UN Secretariat, funds and offices, a responsibility that naturally resides in Executive Office of the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General’s office could also serve as catalyst for a wider ‘whole of system’ effort extending to the Peacebuilding Commission, UN specialized agencies, the World Bank, regional organizations and development banks, and other partners.
Presentations

Synopsis: How do the Security Council, the Secretariat, Troop-contributing countries (TCCs), Police-contributing countries (PCCs) and Civilian-contributing countries (CCCs) cooperate in planning and running peace operations, and in addressing the capabilities shortfalls? What are the main achievements and limitations of the process launched by the ‘New Horizon’ in this respect?

Chair: Mr David Harland, Executive Director, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue

The subject today is the triangular cooperation between the Security Council, the Secretariat and TCCs. In my view the heart of the issue is finding what are the comparative advantages of the UN that all three legs of that triangle can agree upon? What are the basic points that they can agree to—is it the unique span of the UN and its unique legitimacy or the tolerance level for fatalities?

Mr Amr El Sherbini, Director of United Nations Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Egypt

This is a very critical and important issue with differing positions and viewpoints. I will speak from a T/PCC perspective. The T/PCCs request more and meaningful cooperation with the Security Council and the Secretariat and this is really required. At times the Security Council sends signals of willingness to engage with the TCCs. As a TCC and PCC, we believe that in order to have better implementation of peace operations on the ground, we need to have better cooperation between the Security Council, the Secretariat and T/PCCs. In the future, perhaps civilian and financial contributors should also be part of an inclusive dialogue for better implementation on the ground for the missions to be able to achieve their mandates.

As a T/PCC, we face a problem that mandates are designed by the Security Council through a dialogue with the Secretariat, but not sufficiently with the TCCs. We receive the mandate, the concept of operations, the rules of engagement that we then have to implement, but we were not engaged from the outset. We are never asked if we can do it or if the mandate is achievable. The issue of including TCCs early in the decision-making process has been raised several times. It was most recently
underscored during the New Horizon process: at the beginning we perceived that the process would be meaningful for the coordination and cooperation with TCCs. There were good perspectives and initiatives from the United States when it insisted that TCCs need to be much more involved in the T/PCCs meetings with the Security Council.

During Japan’s Presidency of the Security Council and its chairing of the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping, Japan promoted the idea of TCCs to be much more involved. TCCs were allowed to speak, but the problem was that nothing was implemented. We have not seen anything real on the ground. Egypt was invited as a major TCC, and our position and opinions were reflected, but it went no further. This is a problem of dialogue and the reason why there is no results from the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations so far. We are now waiting for the report to be agreed and issued. The problem is partly due to a lack of trust in the New York environment, which we need to overcome in order to have better cooperation.

I will focus on the two key questions of this session. First, how should the Security Council, the Secretariat, TCCs, PCCs and CCCs cooperate in planning and running peace operations, and in addressing the capabilities shortfalls? The answer is very clear. We have fixed mechanisms in New York, which are working to some extent, but the result is not very impressive for the T/PCCs, and it is a problem. We do not need mere meetings to be briefed or to receive our report; we need to be engaged in the assessments and in the discussions as the TCCs are the ones implementing on the ground. Perhaps we need to assess how we can better implement or achieve more coordination? Do we need more types of groups of friends for the missions, informal meetings? We need to explore new mechanisms.

Second, what are the main achievements and limitations of the process launched by the New Horizon in this respect? In the beginning of the New Horizon process, we had very high aspirations for triangular cooperation. We had the idea that we really wanted to do something new. The United States intervened with an idea of engaging more T/PCCs in the discussions with the Council. We also had an initiative from Japan, but then everything stopped in 2010. The limitation is that you have some decision-makers who do not want to involve the TCCs in the decision-making process. They want to keep it as a small club. Instead we need to address how we can change it in the future for better implemen-
tation on the ground and for real cooperation and real partnership. Peacekeeping is a partnership, it is a partnership between the three parties.

I have two examples: one is very recent and relates to a mission drawdown. Egypt was confronted by rumours in January and February this year indicating that there may be a drawdown in a mission. However, we were never officially informed by the Secretariat or by the Security Council that there would be a drawdown. As a major TCC, we went to double-check the rumours and when they were confirmed, we asked the Secretariat, which informed us that the mission was in the process of planning for a drawdown. However, we were never informed in any detail what would be the drawdown, how it would be done, in which direction it would move? As a major TCC, it was important to be engaged in the process from the beginning.

A good example of cooperation is the transition from UNMIS to UNMISS. During the first mission we were informed that there would be an end of the mandate, that there would be a new formulation and a new mission in South Sudan. So we were prepared to see a new dimension and a new mission. We were ready for whatever decision would come from the Council, the host country and from the peacekeeping actors on the ground.

These are two examples regarding cooperation triangle. They have not been fully discussed formally. The Secretariat will tell you that more is needed but never in sufficient detail. TCCs feel that they are never really engaged in the strategic assessment review, in decision-making and in renewing the mandates. Whenever mandates are up for renewal, they should be discussed with the TCCs, ask them what the problem on the ground is—can they do it or not?

The issue also came up over the course of discussing the protection of civilians in the last four years. In the beginning, it was difficult for some TCCs to accept the concept. Some were of the view that it was not acceptable because the mandate was not clear. Following discussions, the concept was clarified to concerned TCCs, benchmarks were set and other details were agreed upon for better implementation of protection-of-civilians mandates by TCCs and other relevant actors in the mission.
We really need to explore new formulas for cooperation between the three parties of peacekeeping—the Secretariat, the Security Council and the contributing countries. We need to see positive signals from the Council, a new environment, something similar to what we had in 2009 and in 2010.

Perhaps we need to build more on the New Horizon process. We had that important second phase but we feel that there was no follow-up. We need to continue and to reinvigorate what we had, but can we? Can we apply benchmarks? Can we assess and measure what we have with the view to identify a process of regular assessment and improved implementation? This could be done in the General Assembly and Security Council working groups on an annual or biannual basis. It would include the T/PCCs, financial contributors, Security Council and the Secretariat. We need to sit together and see what implication the new financial environment has on peacekeeping on the ground and in general. Can we engage TCCs in more peacebuilding activities? They can be early peacebuilders, but can they be much more engaged? Can they have a role in CIVCAP? Major TCCs have an interest to engage and to contribute but how do we engage them? This is an issue we need to discuss through any governmental forum and informally through forums like the Challenges Forum.

Ms Victoria Holt, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State, United States

I would like to refer to Ian Johnstone’s point in his paper about what it means to do more with less, and whether we should scale back on our ambitious agenda. I think we should always have an ambition to do better. It is not about funding or number of people, it is how we actually achieve the goals, how we achieve something that has been set out. It is how you shrink the space between the aspirations of the Security Council Resolution, which is usually extremely well intended, and the practical reality of what we are trying to achieve in the field. This requires a lot of people coming together being candid with each other and figuring out what we can achieve operationally?

This is a conversation that also needs to take place in our national contexts. This is a small community who knows the issues—we are that community—and if we are here talking about problems, then we are also the people who have to go home to encourage the people we work
with to believe in this enterprise and help us fix it. Why? There are hundreds and thousands of people waking up every day in foreign countries, wondering ‘why am I here?’ Because their government has sent them—whether civilian, police or military—we have asked them to do this job and we are responsible for them. We are giving them the tools they need and the backing they need to succeed. The very nature of peacekeeping is fundamentally a risky business and this is why this conversation is important.

Many governments have challenges. They are politically unstable, there are threats to the peace, but there is only a very small group that can afford the counsel and have enough hope of a political peace, but just enough risk that allows the international community to put together peacekeeping missions. Again, it is where there is enough chance of peace that external actors say ‘we will give a shelf to the political agreement, it is on the verge or need to be on the verge’. We give the political agreement a security backup with some hope for long-term governance and that this unusual mix of outside support can push it to a better place, it could prevent war.

This is the enterprise. To be a bit of an optimist, many people here naturally go to where our problems are. Without much warning, we watch the UN mission suffer the most devastating loss in Haiti during the earthquake. US Army Marines headed down to help with management and to try to give assistance and where did the US turn? To the UN. Despite the loss of those UN officials, that was the proverbial place that we spent time working with the government of Haiti and to do the relief work. The experience opened the US government’s eyes to the potentials of the UN despite its own loss. The Côte d’Ivoire mission had some controversial issues in 2011 and 2012. The mission was not designed to be in a country on the verge of civil conflict when two people claimed the presidency. But today we have the emergence of the end of that civil conflict and the beginning of a new government. In some senses we did not design the mission for this, but we should be glad that the UN can often be resilient and flexible regardless of the mandate.

Accordingly, I will address some of the challenges. How can we all work together whether we are contributors to peacekeeping by personnel or financially, whether we are members of the Council or members of the General Assembly. I think nobody disagrees with cooperation
and I agree we can only do better in learning from each other and from field experience.

Our government does not deploy units to UN peacekeeping missions. We are fairly low down the list of contributors. However, we do send some individuals, we deploy a lot of police, we pay about $2 billion a year of the peacekeeping budget, and we train hundreds of thousands of other nationals for peacekeeping, so our investment looks different. Our knowledge is different perhaps from the major troop- or police-contributing countries, but there is no less or more value, it is just different. We are looking into improving our mechanisms. I will not go over the long list of items the Security Council agreed to in relation to the C-34: although this is fundamentally a political challenge, I think we can get through many of the issues.

The New Horizon process, particularly the changing role of the Secretariat, has been invaluable. The Secretariat is carrying out some of the reforms the Brahimi Report called for, for example, telling the Security Council and member states what they need to know, not what they want to hear. The New Horizon document communicated to member states some of the fundamental challenges that we face and it offers some ideas on ways forward. It helped to push forward the Global Field Support Strategy (GFSS), which is a modernized view of multiple platforms working together on cooperation and efficiency reforms. It highlighted some of what I personally call the fuzzy notion of Security Council resolutions. Security Council resolutions are by nature negotiated political documents, they are not operational plans. New Horizon also pointed out to us that we are not quite sure what the terms peacebuilding, protection of civilians, transition, and robust operations mean. What do you actually mean in the Council, how should missions interpret what has been learnt from their experiences? I think each of those concepts are in different stages of norm socialization, ‘protection of civilians’ has perhaps moved the furthest to being operationalized in the field, moving from theory to something that missions have a better understanding of how to implement. ‘Peacebuilding’ on the other hand, is still very much a working progress. Transition, is a key phrase for all of us, particularly if we look at transition in Côte d’Ivoire, Haiti, Liberia, Timor-Leste and we hope down the road, the DRC among others.

The civilian capacity review has provided a very important impetus to try and look smartly on how we provide the best personal throughout
the system, whether it is a peacekeeping mission or a political mission. Knowledge is not necessarily just in uniforms. Sometimes the best person to teach on the rule of law may not be necessarily a police officer, but someone who is an excellent teacher with the subject expertise. I think the civilian capacity review has been helpful in focusing on that.

Let me move briefly to future challenges. Firstly, the political process; the Council has a responsibility when it passes a mandate to actively stay on course of the political process. Peacekeeping is a part of the larger political process and that is a responsibility not just for Council members but for those countries whose troops who are serving in a mission and the host country’s neighbours who are involved in the peace to ensure that the political process advances. The narrow space I mentioned, is where we have to keep on course, for the reason that those who agree with peace need to be reminded and supported. They have their own challenges and that is a part of the deal of peacekeeping, it is backed up politically, but they should be backed up with capacity too.

We have discussed the topic of protection of civilians at length in this Forum, but the important point is to have the mission understand what their overall strategy is. Mission leaders need to understand and be aware of what is going on in the country they are deployed in. Who might do what to whom and why? What are the motivations? There are both opportunities to crime and the things they plan are purposeful. Either kind can help unravel the peace. Therefore, when you deploy, whether you are military, police or civilian, just know the area you are involved in, and understand what is happening. We speak of protection of civilians in mission-wide strategies. Mission leaders need to have information to plan how to achieve civilian protection. They need to know when the mediating team should go out and talk to the local community, when to send out a patrol because there have been reports of armed groups, and so on. That is in some sense what a good protection strategy would involve. I think a lot of progress has been made, but there still is work to be done.

The third challenge is to strategically identify the right balance of the rule of law and security sector reform in peacekeeping. If the basic idea is that we make a security promise to a political peace; the piece of glue that really helps the peace process to move forward is if we can help a host state govern, which is often more effective if there is a rule of law and some security sector reform. It is a challenge for UN missions as
they do not own the process, but they have to facilitate it. What is the right pace for peacekeeping missions, particularly for missions sitting in post conflict environments?

Finally, capacities; I think this should be the simple, easy part. It is the individuals who make you fly around, drive around your medical equipment, your communications, and your translators. Yet, we know they are often the ones in short supply. New Horizon pointed this out to us, and our gaps list tell us this. We need a better mechanism and I think there has been good work done. Take for example, helicopters: it is not just the supply of them, it is how we use them in the mission area. It is the internal rules for how resources are mobilized and I think all of us need to do a bit more work on solving this problem as well.

The questions I have raised are not new, they have in fact been moved into the mainstream, but we should take the next step to address them. I think there is a false choice between whether peacekeeping is going to level off as political missions take off. I think we know there might need to be more political missions but nobody really knows the future. I do not think we would have predicted the UN mission in Abyei, nor the fact that unarmed observers be sent to Syria with the full backing of the Security Council in an unknown environment. Hence, I think we all do have to keep our seatbelts on as the Council, the member states, TCCs and PCCs would all ask to do things they might not have prepared for. What can we do to help? We can make sure that all missions are backed up, we could improve mission-wide planning and we could assess the environment we are going into. We could also ask our ministers to pick up the phone when the missions require help, we could ask our think tanks to come and brief us, and we can remain flexible and nimble.

Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Jasbir Singh Lidder, former Deputy SRSG and Force Commander, United Nations Missions in Sudan (UNMIS)

In recent years, we have witnessed a motivated drive by the Security Council, the Secretariat and member states to induce efficacy in peacekeeping at policy and field levels. This cooperation triangle is noteworthy as the UN gets increasingly engaged in addressing contemporary global security challenges in a more efficient manner. The Council has taken discernible steps to process decisions in a broad base and more transparent manner commensurate with the emerging global dispensation and aspirations. The Council’s initiative in organizing permitted
briefings for the Secretariat, which and has the interaction of the non-Council members states by holding open debate and internal discussions is noteworthy. The Council’s visits to missions have also proved beneficial to the Council to better understand the realities on the ground, thereby helping an evolution of more focused and achievable mandates.

The Sudan experience has shown that there is a need to evaluate global security issues in the complete strategic entity and to graduate from the present pattern of sequential interventions to a concept of what I call holistic long-term stability in the regions. Peacekeeping is a continuum of the sub-conventional conflict. Its spectrum of activity includes mediation, conflict prevention, peacekeeping and where required peacebuilding and sustainable development. Notably there can be no quick fix solutions in a prolonged conflict environment.

The T/PCCs play a very crucial role in the development of peacekeeping operations, more importantly when they are mandated to undertake robust tasks, which often put lives at risk. The Council, Secretariat and TCC interface needs to be institutionalized through structured engagement. Increasingly, there is a more structured decision-making and mandate formulation process, which has led to more coherence. Such mechanisms, also enable the inputs of TCCs to be adopted meaningfully into all peacekeeping reforms. These measures often bridge the perceived gap.

Complex peacekeeping missions demand a paradigm shift from traditional peacekeeping to what I call a certain peacekeeping. The UN’s legitimacy and multinational character are its biggest strengths and should accordingly be reflected in its intervention. I believe that while retaining the heterogeneous entity of units is important and understandable, we need to concentrate on deploying homogenous brigade sized formations as in the DRC and Abyei. These brigades are more readily available and their geographical homogeneity is favouring such deployment. There is an in-built danger of such contingents being influenced by the national and at times regional interests when deployed in isolation.

The TCCs need to be deployed with resources (such as mobility, surveillance and communications) to execute the given mandates. As part of the New Horizon initiative the Secretariat’s efforts in developing standards and operational guidance for generating and sustaining critical
resources as well as enhancing training and education is praiseworthy. While physical mobility is important I have consistently stressed the need to upgrade mental mobility in the field. I believe that a mentally mobile leader can anticipate and innovate, thereby being a motivating factor to address critical strategic and operational issues in a timely and effective manner.

Caveats from the T/PCCs must be discouraged as they cause great undesirable friction of the field. While numbers matter, we need to increasingly emphasize on quality rather than quantity. The tours of the military and police staff officers should desirably be lengthened to one year. Initially the length of tours of units and staff should have some overlap to retain operational continuity. I recommend that the military and the police sector commanders are selected as UN staff to inject more accountability of the operational level. While the UN undertakes all this notable measures, it is equally important that the accountability of the T/PCCs is commensurately increased.

The DPKO and DFS’s early peacebuilding strategy has helped in defining the task of the peacekeepers in the peace transition process and adds value to the social economic dimension of peacekeeping. The window following after an immediate conflict is critical during which the peace process and development issues must be consolidated. This demands a complementary effort and a decisive will at the international level as well within the UN system to synergize and promote collaboration instead of competition.

The Global Field Support Strategy needs to be operationalized pragmatically to ensure that traditional challenges are addressed in a practical manner. As an issue that is being undertaken to optimize our structures and to change our procedures, it is prudent that the logistics out in the missions and the administration aspirations of the staff remain fully met in the field. Our peacekeeping missions, need to reorient the living conditions in the field to ‘spartan-yet-comfortable’ using available local procurement and skills. This would not only introduce savings but also project a people friendly image of the UN in the field.

Let me comment on delivering in the field. Robust peacekeeping as we all know demands a vibrant mission posture, which is not exclusively military. The constant dialogue between DPKO and member states on enhancing effectiveness of the military in terms of deterrent use of force
and operational readiness is noteworthy. For effective peacekeeping this dialogue must extend to all UN pillars as robust peacekeeping is ultimately a collective responsibility. Civil–military cooperation has to be settled in the UN integration philosophy. The UN has over the period strengthened its coordination through integrated mission capacities, notably the Joint Mission Analysis Center (JMAC), Joint Operations Centre (JOC) and Joint Logistics Operations Centre (JLOC). Experience shows that the joint planning and decision-making has improved meaningfully where these joint structures have been maximized. Information sharing is critical in the field for which a JMAC plays a critical role. Presently much of the JMACs efforts are concentrated on the strategic level, which increasingly, I feel, should shift to the operational analysis so that the mission leadership has 'real-time-actionable' information to act upon. JMAC requires qualified staff, ideally deployed in locations outside of mission headquarters, and work closely with the available military expertise as well as the humanitarians to develop a coherent collection, collation information and dissemination cycle.

The greatest challenge in the field actually remains translating the concept and the strategic frameworks into practical action. ‘Manoeuvre Culture’ needs to be strongly encouraged in the field to overcome what I called the ‘e-mail generated inertia’ and retain a pulse of the governmental developments. ‘Mission posturing’ should respond to the environment realities with inbuilt resilience for finding the mission’s rhythm as for emerging situations and priorities.

I would like to add a few things from a field perspective on the protection of civilians. ‘Predict and pre-empt’ should be the POC mantra, with military intervention viewed as a last-resort option. Pre-emptive strategies can be resolved through scenario-building whereby as they evolve, contingencies are operationalized with real-time information flow and periodic rehearsals with defined goals and responsibilities. Missions need to work very closely with the local authorities to identify protection concerns and clear mechanisms for information sharing and integrate operating techniques for physical protection. Notwithstanding the OCHA-DPKO guidance on the subject, POC continues to be viewed as a thematic issue. With a hands-on policy direction from the Secretariat, in terms of strategic framework, resources and capability requirements and training modules, protection needs to become an inextricable part of the mission’s conflict management strategy. Missions need to mainstream the protection mandate, identify protection concerns, roles and
coordination mechanism. The three lines of operation of the POC philosophy, namely political prevention, physical protection and phasing up protective environment are inclusive and call for a high degree of civil–military interface both within the UN system as well as outside the UN system, to execute the concept of ‘Holistic Security’.

A post-conflict country is quite timely in effective civilian capacity-building for national recovery. This would invariably invite multiple engagements by the international community—the UN, bilateral donors, regional players, NGOs and the civil society, at times with conflicting and competing demands. All peacebuilding issues should therefore be coordinated pragmatically within the national ownership agenda. Establishing legitimate institutions and government is a long-term endeavour and is accordingly about balancing priorities—between short-term quick impact and long-term sustainable development. Continued engagement and consultations with all stakeholders is prudent to develop strategies that can be contextualized to the factors and priorities in the field.

Leadership and training are key to effective peacekeeping. Conflict management requires a thorough understanding of the entire spectrum of conflict, which only comes with competence and experience. It is prudent that senior mission leadership selected possesses attributes of vision and motivation, and more specifically perseverance in the face of adversity. An area of distinct improvement in peacekeeping has been training and education. Pre-deployment training and mission-specific and scenario-based training modules developed by the Secretariat should provide the much needed operational guidance to UN military, police and civilian staff. The POC training capsules in particular help train personnel in an erstwhile grey area. The pure psychological condition awareness in local conflict nuances and upgrading of multi-cultural sensitivity require greater emphasis in pre-deployment and in-mission training. I recommend UN-led post training evaluation and validation to ensure minimum acceptability of training standards of the unit and the staff in the field.

Training is a management function and in the military a function of command. The mission leadership therefore must be empowered to conduct and monitor in-mission training so that missions remain sharply responsive at all times. Appropriate training and infrastructure needs to be built up in the field. All structured training should continue to pro-
vide the basic fundamentals, I sense the thrust of training should increasingly shift to ‘training-in-ambiguity’ for improved crisis management.

Let me conclude by stating that effective peacekeeping demands a consolidation of ongoing consultative processes with all stakeholders for which we have made good progress in recent past, development of pragmatic and achievable mandates, deploy highly-qualified and trained military and police, continuance of qualified and committed civilian staff and an inspiring leadership, so that the mission can excel in entirety. In the last few years we are in a definite upward trajectory and this momentum must be maintained if the UN is to deliver. The Challenges Forum I believe is an important engine for accelerating this momentum.

The Cooperation triangle and civilian capacity

**Lt. Gen. Chikadibia Obiakor, Former UN Military Adviser, Department for Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations; and Senior Adviser, Challenges Forum**

When we conceptualized the new partnership agenda, one thing that was clear to all of us was the fact that we were neither functioning optimally nor efficiently. At the same time, deployments were at a peak, the Secretariat knew it was not doing what it was supposed to do, and not doing it too well. The Security Council and the TCCs respectively had their own set of issues. It was agreed generally that something needed to be done to enhance cooperation.

Professor Johnston’s paper outlined several different structured measures that have been suggested to facilitate change. I may advance what I think the reasons are but I do not have solutions to them. The beauty of the UN is that when you least expect, it surprises you and embark on changes. It is also the most appropriate organization dealing with issues of peace and security.

The first issue identified as the problem for not having that optimal cooperation is the lack of trust and confidence among the relevant stakeholders. It exists in the Security Council and among the TCCs. The UN is a political organization and being so, sometimes you cannot allocate solutions to problems. The TCCs, despite their improved interaction, sometimes still find it difficult to understand what the basis of
the discussions of the Security Council is; and technocrats find it difficult that politics sometimes override empirical data in decision-making. This leads to a general problem of mistrust and lack of confidence between TCCs and the Security Council.

What is the problem between member states and the Secretariat? Member states, despite losing credit for interaction, all have input in all matters that the Secretariat is doing. It is not that it necessarily is bad, but when you have 115 member states trying to make input into a technical submission, then you have problems. Now to complete the triangle, what is the problem between the Secretariat and the Security Council? The Security Council is, despite all its missions and empirically based issues, a prisoner to what it finds politically expedient over what is technically right.

UN peacekeeping is underpinned by the relationship between the Security Council, T/PCCs and the Secretariat. For peacekeeping to succeed the partnership must explore ways to develop greater confidence in that all have equal stake in fulfilling peacekeeping mandates. It is also imperative to take cognizance of the fact that civilian capacity is a sin qua non for successful peacebuilding effort in post conflict states.

Discussant: Professor Ian Johnstone, Professor of International Law, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University

I stressed in the paper that the context for discussions about capacity has changed in the last two or three years. Lt. Gen. Obiakor spoke about the start of the New Horizons and new partnership process in a sense that there really were problems, and these problems were in part driven by the fact that peacekeeping had gone through a steady increase in demand in number of peacekeepers. The demands were growing exponentially and there were concerns about whether the resources and the capacities were there to fulfil those demands. I do sense that (at least temporarily) there is less appetite for large-scale multidimensional peacekeeping in the near future. I agree that it is unwise to try to predict these sort of things but if you look at the situation right now, there is not going to be a rush to set up a big multidimensional peacekeeping mission anytime soon.

This lack of appetite is driven by a few factors. Costs, financial austerity and trying to find savings in efficiencies are important, but perhaps
more important than they need to be. We heard from a speaker here earlier today about some of the hard lessons that have been learned over the last ten years. A better understanding of what the UN peacekeeping instrument is and perhaps is not capable of doing is one result. I think this is a good time to reflect on those sorts of things. Probably even deeper and more fundamental questions are being raised about principles relating to consent and ownership and how robust and how intrusive peace operations should be. I do not think we can disregard the fact that there are governments, host governments, who are not inclined to welcome large multidimensional missions that have broad functions in the area of governance. How you react to those situations is an important part in this context.

All of these things are meaningful and I think if we are talking about capacity, we have to keep all of that in mind. It does not mean that triangle cooperation is any less important. I think triangle cooperation may well be a missed number because, as Mr El Sherbini said, there are troop contributors, police contributors, financial contributors, civilian contributors the General Assembly and the Security Council—there are a lot of actors involved. But if anything, this sort of concern about large multidimensional peacekeeping makes it even more important to be thinking about cooperating, because what drove and provoked this desire for better consultation? Was it concerns by those who are implementing the mandate so they would have a say in designing the mandates? If you are going to be trying to fulfil all of these functions with less money, less resources, less personnel, it is all the more important to be having a serious conversation about what is realistic and what is not realistic. In addition, I agree and I am glad that Mr El Sherbini sees some potential for the Security Council working group because I do think there is a lot that can be done there.

One other idea that I put in the paper was a notion of a strategic dialogue between members of the Secretariat and individual contributing countries, certainly the large troop contributing countries, but also increasing maybe the police contributing countries. We speak a lot of how much the police have to offer to some of the current operations and some of the current functions.

On civilian capacity, it seems to me that the demand for a civilian function is not going to go down in the near future; the civilian capacity review was initiated on that understanding. The emanating spirit of the
review is national ownership and national capacity-building and not necessarily sending lots of internationals but working out how we can better build national capacity. Timeframes are important—the World Development Report 2011 pointed out that national capacity-building for sustainable peace takes a generation. The question is: what can an operation do in a fairly limited period of time that it can be deployed in relation to that generational task? The CIVCAP process is under way right now: the Secretary-General will submit a report in August 2012. Perhaps the most striking thing about CIVCAP is the emphasis on South–South cooperation and using some of the innovated devices of a virtual platform to try to facilitate and put together the demands of certain post-conflict societies, what some donors provide and they self may have to offer. There is a lot more going on there and I think it is worth watching and trying to come to grips with the fact that the way the UN does business on the civilian side in peacekeeping may well change.

Discussion

Mr Malikourtis highlighted that the instruments at the Council’s disposal are very useful provided they are not underutilized. During Greece’s seat on the Security Council in 2005–2006, it had the lead on the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE). Eritrea had decided to prohibit UNMEE helicopter flights, which provoked a small crisis within the Security Council and several meetings with the TCCs. Japan, chairing the working group on peacekeeping operations, and Norway, as chair of the friends of UNMEE, visited the area. Mr Malikourtis suggested perhaps it would have been more effective, if Greece, as a lead nation, decided to have more public meetings and to have somehow more pressure on the two sides. Against that background, he wondered if public meetings would make a difference with the participations of TCCs, or should the closed-door sessions continue to be dominant?

Mr Rivard commented that the precise objectives of the triangle cooperation are to improve consultations, assessment and lessons learned. Unfortunately, when looking at how it is translated in Security Council resolutions, the coordination and the consultation does not indicate a resolution that was connected to the reality of the field as expected. In his view, the resolution of UNMISS is totally disconnected from the reality of what the UN can do in the field, in trying to essentially create a country. He also discussed the importance of having civilian capacities
as a key element in peacekeeping operations, in order to at some point be able to replace the armed force that is very expensive.

Col. Leijenaar suggested talking about a cooperation ‘rectangle’, where the UN country team is included and called for the inclusion of the agencies, funds and programmes in the discussion of peace operations in the UN. One example is Afghanistan, where the agencies, funds and programmes have been in the country for fifty to sixty years, and they have in-depth historical knowledge and interaction in the country; whereas UNAMA arrived in 2002. Hence you create an environment with blue versus black UN and a mismatch of understanding of different entities and responsibilities. A comprehensive review was undertaken in Afghanistan in 2011, which initially involved only DPKO and one or two other entities, however the UN pushed very hard for the report to be to be included in the ‘One UN’ concept.

Ms Holt pointed out the possibility of a fifth partner in the discussion, namely the government and the country itself. The problem is when the parties to the peace no longer wish the UN to be helping them, and the mission might be asked to leave. She mentioned that they had a close call in the DRC a few years ago, when the senior leaders of the mission were asked to leave. The achievements of a mission can be nullified if the mission’s relationship with the host government is not managed well.

Looking at the DRC, there was a rightful complaint a few years ago that the mandate had too many tasks. Alan Doss said, ‘you have given us 97 tasks, it is impossible, we cannot do this.’ He had a point, therefore what the Council is trying to do is to understand the logic of a mission, which leads to a strategic question: If you are really going to secure the peace somewhere and cooperate with political parties, what is going to make a break there? What are the few things that have to be achieved so that the country can move to the next stage? I think, in the DRC, credit should go to the mission. The mandate was revised, it was shrunk down a bit, but it was still a lot while some priorities were given. Protecting civilians, stabilization and dealing with illegal armed groups—that is still massive and potentially overwhelming. We watched what UN mission could do with the support from two contributing countries, which New York might have issues with, while in the field they were brave, creative and innovated. We have seen contingences out in the middle of nowhere, doing patrols up and down dark roads, in an
area where villages were attacked or some of the worse rapes took place that the Security Council were briefed on. The mission rolls up its sleeves and does the work but it cannot last forever. The roots of our cooperation frequently come back to us from the field. To the extent we can draw on that field experience and bring it back to our politicians and conversations in New York, it is a place where we all can learn from each other. The Council is better at trying to focus on what makes a mission tick, what is too much and what is not enough.

Lt. Gen. Singh agreed that all stakeholders have to be a part of the discussion when a new mandate is developed, reviewed or renewed. ‘In South Sudan there is a particular example how the technical assessment mission was co-opted with the mission and we founded a mechanism called ITAP. It was a joint mission in which we had embedded also the country team. It was very much a part of the process in the planning. When things went wrong in South Sudan in the last minute, we did not know what the future was going to be. The political issues were unaddressed. We were looking for a technical roll over of UNMISS which did not happen, not to a sufficient degree. Many of the issues were left out. The Security Council was still struggling—should it have a mission and what to do about it? Those few who reached Sudan understood what the problem was. You can always review a mission and its mandate. A mandate is not something that is there forever. The Security Council should always welcome a possibility to review a mandate.

‘We get very obsessed with numbers. It is a game of well-qualified people and a concept of environmental security, of threat assessment in the area you are in and the profile of structure needed in the mission. We want quality troops, with good leadership, who are well-trained, with conceptual understanding and built up environment security without trying to do too much of the work of the humanitarians. It is critical to understand where the political process can go on and where the military truly can be an instrument to world peace. I increasingly feel we are not going get the type of troops that we are hoping for. If we want to cut costs it is going to be the numbers. We must go for quality and reduce quantity.’

Lt. Gen. Obiakor addressed the question by stating that whichever political meetings that are held, they are going to be insufficient. The issue is that when deliberations on a high level have been held, they need to be coordinated to deliver. Most times, it is not a question about
how much is spoken, but what is being said. A mandate needs to be matched with resources. When this is not done, the mission is going to be a failure. Operations should not be undertaken if there are no resources to match the requirements.

Mr El Sherbini commented that there are regular meetings taking place but the real involvement of the TCCs is not there. TCCs need to be involved in the strategy and process itself, which means to be involved in the renewal process of the mandate on an operational level. The disconnect between a resolution which is set in a closed room and the real work on the ground is often there, but there is an opportunity for the ones who have the experience of real cooperation on the ground to share this and push towards the creation of more constructive resolutions. Equally, an important discussion to have is whether mandates are achieved or not.

Prof Johnstone raised the issue of achievable mandates. The mandate for UNSMIL is to help the transition government to restore public security in order to promote the rule of law, to undertake inclusive political dialogue constituting holding of elections, to protect human rights, support transition and justice, to initiate economic recovery and to coordinate multilateral and bilateral donors. This is a very small political mission. If the mission is going to be that small with that kind of a mandate, then political leverage has to come in part from those on the ground, but also actors who are not on the ground. The UNMEE case is as in other places where the host government had said ‘we no longer want you here’. Some serious questions have to be raised about at what point the request to leave is to be accepted at face value, what steps can be made to persuade the host country, but certainly not to coerce the government into thinking twice about these issues.

Mr Harland stated that one of the basic comments heard was that the triangle is not really a triangle, and that there should be other stakeholders involved, whether it is the TCCs or the UN country team or the host government or the part that is conflicted. Further, the army becomes good when it does what it is good at. One of the strengths of the UN is that despite building a country, it has a rather unconvoluted decision making process. There are relatively few layers to it and there are relatively few players in it. When the election took place in Côte d’Ivoire the world was massively divided, the continent was massively divided, the regional organizations were massively divided, but the Sec-
retary-General took a very strong position and enabled the mission to play an absolutely decisive role in history of that country. There is strength in the narrowness of the base of decision-making. The strength we should be trying to build is the relative cleanness of the UN decision-making apparatus.

Firstly, Lt. Gen. Mehta asked what had been the effect of the reforms the Secretariat in general, and DPKO in particular, on the improvement of decision making? This is one of the arms of the triangle. Secondly, he brought up the issue of protection of civilians. He acknowledged that it is a moral issue first and not a capacity or a capability issue. Any professional contingent, armed contingent, police or military who exercises its capacity, irrespective of a mandate, is morally bound to raise the issue in mission areas. Third, he stated that the UN has for too long been stuck in the political principles articulated by Mr Brahimi, namely consent, impartiality and use of force (CIF). There are operating principles which apply to all the planning in the industry, managerial areas, militaries or police. Since we do not pay attention to these and instead keep just talking of CIF, we fail to reach where we want to go. What are these principles, selection and maintenance of aim? The principles are a unity of effort, economy, foresight and planning, administration and logistics, momentum of operations, safety and security. I can add one or two more, but surprise in deception is a principle of war.

Therefore, the next logical thing is the Security Council, which we are all articulating that we have a problem with. It is a very mature mechanism and believe the UN is one of the most creative organizations that, and I have experience both from the field and the strategic level, that we can innovate and create and we should not carry such things. Mr Brahimi said; ‘tell the council what it needs to be told and not what it wants to hear’. I think the fault is in the periodic reports to the Council, they have to be more accurate and sharp with a clear-cut recommendations.

We operate in a political environment where there is ambiguity and military commanders have been taught to draw their tasks or aims based on the operating principles that are articulated.

The last issue that Lt. Gen. Metha voiced was that if we heard to the operating principles, be it the uniformed and armed community or the civilian side, I think there will be much less friction in the three arms triangle.
Maj. Gen. Gordon suggested that the line between the TCCs engagement and the Secretariat might be closer between TCC and PCC engagement in the Secretariat’s business of running and manning a mission and what looks or could look like TTC or PCC interference. Outsiders, such as the European Union Commission and its Common Security and Defence Policy looks at the UN and thinks that the UN procedure looks like a sleek raising snake, compared to what the European Union has to go through in articulation of its policies by getting agreement on every little detail by 27 members states. United Nations has really good virtues, but there must be lines somewhere to meet the needs with TCCs, PCCs and good governance of missions, by the Secretariat. Where did the panel think that line should lie?

Mr Gentile underlined ‘that in all three panels of the day someone mentioned the importance of sharing analyses and good analyses. There is obviously no doubt that having a possibility to share analyses and sharing understanding so that each one can better inform its own analysis is beneficial.

When speaking of sharing information and analyses, it is quite important to make a distinction between the two aspects. There was a sense during the discussion that humanitarian organizations, police and military should all benefit from the information from each other and the capacity of getting different information. There is a need for certain prudence here since humanitarian information should not be used for military interventions, or for police investigation work. The information we get from people we talk to in the field is received with an agreement of consent and we have to respect that agreement. This is not only for the ICRC but is a common basic standards for humanitarian work and protection work which all of UN agencies have agree upon. If we put everything in the same packet then we will always have this kind of reluctance from organizations to share the information. If you clearly distinguish between the need of sharing analyses, having a better analysis of threats affecting the population and a better definition of tasks and resources, it is likely that everybody would agree.

Dr Tegera stated during the situation in Rwanda in 1994 the triangle did not work and the consequences were terrible, and raised the question whether lessons learned from this were taken into consideration and if they now influence ways of operating.
Lt. Gen. Obiakor responded to Dr. Tegera saying that the case of Rwanda is quite fresh to our minds, as is what happened in the Balkans and in Somalia. ‘Decision making, particularly in the organization talked about here, is a difficult task, mainly because of a strict organizational form. Further, decisions need to be coordinated into action. According to Lt. Gen. Obiakor, the failure in decision making is documented. It is clear that decisions are not reached for very many reasons and it is difficult to name all of them. However, one lesson learned by the entire UN, starting from the Security Council, the Secretariat and the member states generally, is not to make such mistakes again.’

Lt. Gen. Lidder pointed out that ‘apart from being important at the strategic level, the triangle is also very much applicable at the operational level. There is a military, political and humanitarian process. There are nuances in the field requiring a bottom-up perspective, rather than only top-down. What is a bottom-up perspective? We want TCCs which are effective, professional, lean and mean. TCCs which operate under a coherent command chain to the UN and that is not carrying a national agenda. Once a mandate has been given, it is carried out within the orders of the mission leadership. In what way is the leadership responsible? How can they be innovative? How do they actually, on the ground, find ways and means of implementing the mandate and not finding excuses not to carry out those resources? That is the bottom-up perspective in any professional organization and the UN is no different.

The next question is how to match the top-down and the bottom-up. According to the top-down perspective, the TCCs and other main stakeholders must be a part of the planning loop of the Security Council on the formulation level. They must be actively involved in all policy decisions whether it is operational, logistics or training. They must be cooperating in all areas and all policy development. Having said that, once they are deployed to the field, this phase is over unless some serious changes occur, such as a substantive number of casualties or some conduct discipline.’

Ms. Holt responded ‘based on the experience of Rwanda there has been an immense efforts to try and prevent the negative future. Why do you want missions to understand their operating environment? The answer is that a mission needs to know what the potential risks are, including the threats and vulnerability that a population may face. According to this, it has been helpful that the Department of Peacekeeping Opera-
tions has tasked the missions with protection of civilians. Particularly protection of civilians in imminent threat mandates. Missions with chapter seven mandates are to do mission wide strategies on protection of civilians. This is a real area of innovation for the UN, because UN missions, unlike any other missions, have been asked to be prepared to take action if populations come under threat.’

‘Others can speak in detail from the best practice from the integrated training service, but they have designed a training element and guidance that have been offered through the International Association Peacekeeping Training Centres. This means that the pre-deployment training at least briefs some of the troops and police before they deploy to mission. There is a guidance project which lays out how to address a situation if there is an escalating violence. Again, the ambition is early in prevention so that the civilians in the missions know what to look for and informs earlier, not just in secretary general reports, but reports to the council and TCCs. All of these efforts are to try to prevent an escalating situation. The mission must know what it has seen and be able to respond if it can, but no one can predict whether a mission would be able to face down such the violence as we saw in Rwanda.’

Mr El Sherbini responded ‘it is a moral issue that all troops need to implement on the ground, whether they have a mandate or not. This is something that should be implied whenever there are risks or a threat for civilians, and it is an issue that we fully support. Regarding the balance between good governance by the Secretariat and TCCs/PCCs involvement; if the Secretariat was to involve TCCs and PCCs more in strategic issues, and listened to them before preparing the SG reports to the Council on a mission, you would have assessments and evaluations from the inside. You could then include this and present a new report in a new form. This would not just be a traditional report that addresses some issues and not some others, and it could be kept for the close presentations. When the report would be submitted to the Council, it would be aware of the positions of the TCCs and PCCs and there would be a good understanding from both sides as to what could be done. If you have such things, all caveats need to be cancelled, they need to stop, and the peacekeeping missions on the ground, and the military component, need to work as a national army. They need to have a general command, which needs to be respected, and they need not to go back to its own country and capitalism. This is why we need a very strong system that works and that include all opinions and all positions. In such cases one
do not need any caveats. Caveats should be stopped and subsequently maybe it will be a better and more balance between the governance and the position of the TCCs and PCCs.

Prof Johnstone responded to the intervention to the risk of the triangle collapsing and the question related to Rwandan. ‘One of the lessons learned is the one Lt. Gen. Mehta referred to from the Brahimi Report. The report tells the Security Council what it needs to know and not what it wants to hear. What it needs is information and analysis that comes from a wide variety of sources and I think that lesson is understood. The Secretariat certainly realises that its responsibility is to make objective recommendations to the Security Council on how they move forward with the mission, how they terminate, or how to modify a mission. They are also learning to be as inclusive as possible in how it makes the recommendations. However, the Secretariat need to understand that at the end of the day, the Security Council takes the decisions and the Secretariat is to give it the best possible analysis, and not what it thinks the Security Council should do. Extending the triangle to a rectangle, in order to include UN country teams, is interesting and it also opens the opportunity to speak of civilian capacity. This is an idea that the UN might not adopt too easily, but the idea is that there has to be more flexibility and interoperability within the UN civilian system. This is to be able to draw upon expertise across the entire system, for short-term assignments to fill gaps as needed at the particularly moment, and to be prepared to draw on outside expertise and find new innovative ways of doing so. This could be through short-term assignments, so as to not disturb the complex system of human resources. This could permit flexibility and interoperability regarding what is not enough. It could however be met with resistance, there is non-enthusiasm across the system, both within the Secretariat with funds and programmes but also among the member states.’

The geometry of this is important, but there are clearly a substantial number of stakeholders who are increasingly having some say and how these things are managed. It is to be observed with a lot of interest how the civilian capacity fits in with the consultations with the troop contributors and the police contributors on the understanding that these things cannot be separated from one another.
Introduction of the Working Group Sessions

Chair: Dr Thierry Tardy, Head of Research, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Switzerland

This session is dedicated to parallel group discussions. The intended objectives of this session are the following: the first objective is simply to promote dialogue among practitioners, policymakers and scholars of contemporary peace operations, which is also an overall objective of the Challenges Forum. The second objective is to identify key challenges to the effective planning and conduct of peace operations. The third objective is to identify best practices. What are the best practices and also, whenever possible, to identify two to four policy recommendations, as the Challenges Forum is policy oriented. Given the theme of this particular Forum, these recommendations should primarily be aimed at the United Nations and the regional organizations. However, where relevant, recommendations to states, civil society, the NGO community or the recipient states of multidimensional peace operations, are equally welcomed.

Working Group I: The Peacekeeping–Peacebuilding Nexus

Synopsis: This Working Group focused on analysing the peacekeeping–peacebuilding nexus from the perspective of enhanced coordination and cooperation at the UN level, but also incorporating regional perspectives. The Working Group came up with a number of specific recommendations, covering issues of politics, integration, leadership, information and doctrine, and capability. It also briefly considered definitional issues.

Co-Facilitator: Mr Gareth Bailey, Deputy Head, Conflict Group, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, United Kingdom

The topic of the group discussion was the nexus between peacekeeping and peacebuilding. The dictionary definition of ‘nexus’ suggests connection, but also centrality and coming together. As a diplomat, one thing
which struck me was that this could be a technical discussion, but for me and the group in general, it was a political discussion. In the Security Council, in particular, the shape of peacekeeping and peacebuilding is determined by political negotiations. When we see models, outcomes and the mandates that we get, we should remember that this is often the function of a political negotiation and every situation is different from the other.

When discussing definitions we recalled that peacekeeping and peacebuilding sounds linear, but it is not linear. Peacebuilding begins from day one. However you may find yourself in a peacekeeping situation at the outset of a mission, to then go through a period of hope, and come out on the other side of peacemaking or peace enforcement.

The discussions centred on the following key issues: integration, leadership, information and doctrine, and capability. As a community, we have worked on integration and in particular integrated mission planning. Today we have a good grasp of the processes and tools available and we have had some success. We are able to make integrated assessments of the peacekeeping and peacebuilding tasks, and we should continue in that direction. However, integration has its limits. While strategic integration at the headquarters is necessary and desirable, a less integrated system in the field will lead to more resilience in a complex and fragmented system. As a peacekeeping operation finds itself becoming obsolete and less desired, it is useful for other peacebuilders, not necessarily associated with the peacekeeping mission, to take some of the strain and engage well with the host country.

The group discussion addressed why integration has been difficult to achieve despite many years of refining a doctrine of integration and joint planning. Every mission comes with its woes and stories of disconnect which partly boils down to communication, financing and to how donors are selective about supporting the activities or issues that they favour the most. While the UN may have conducted an integrated assessment, and correspondingly, an integrated mission plan, the donors’ agenda may not align with the assessed needs and priorities. This has often resulted in a disconnection between the funding and planning of activities. The recommendation is to talk more, talk better and for donors to align with the overall plan.
There were suggestions raised within the group to start looking outside the UN, which is not only a call to UN officials but the Security Council as well. We need to understand that we are not in a bubble and that it is not all about the blue helmet UN presence. The UN has to see itself as a facilitator. There is a portal for other efforts e.g. humanitarians, peace-builders, development actors, bilateral donors and particularly troop-contributing countries with their own agendas, and the need to be motivated to enter into a joint mission. Thus, a question was raised for the UN, not to simply do everything on its own but to identify who can best respond to the needs that have been identified while not necessarily having a UN badge or a UN stamp on that response. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) twinning capacity work in South Sudan, where IGAD members are twinned up with ministries and other institutions inside South Sudan to meet its needs, is a good example.

Leadership was a highlight of the group discussion. The UN has perhaps identified too much of a need for an ‘alpha leader’, someone who leads from the front and who sets the vision. Linking to integration, it was raised that a good leader instead would be one who is extraordinarily good at mediating between different efforts and coming out with a resulting vector. Thus, a mission with an appropriate level of integration coupled with a leader who is a mediator is the key.

There was a general consensus, on information and doctrine, that as a community we know about peacebuilding and peacekeeping separately, but we do not necessarily have a comprehensive or consolidated picture. We do not have a good overview of the comparative advantages of various actors. Who is good at what? Where should resources come from? Who has the best line or best practices, and how could these be aggregated together? This was mentioned as an area in which some of the Challenges Forum partners are working together on aggregating policy, doctrine and guidelines. We discussed improving our current methods of managing information in crisis by not just relying on our established tools, e.g. intelligence units, but also using new tools such as social media, or using broader sets of data such as crime data, use of electricity, energy and resources. Taken together, these indicators may increase the mission’s understanding of its environment.

With capabilities, it is a truism that the concept of civilian capacity needs championing, just as the uniformed element of peacekeeping and peacebuilding has had its boost. South–South was particularly interest-
ing to us in terms of cooperation. It could get around somewhat entrenched suspicions about the CIVCAP agenda. There is potential that rosters could become multinational as much as national, where a country could reach out to another country or the UN could request for experts by accessing the roster. The roster would not just be a whole list of Norwegians or a whole list of British, but it could truly be the best people that happened to be on the roster regardless of their nationality. There are also a number of ‘Global South’ states within the Challenges Forum who have developed or are planning to develop their rosters, and they are exchanging best views with those states in the North that have rosters.

Police is evidently not as available as soldiers, and getting police officers or units into the field is a greater challenge. Although police officers are needed for service in their home countries, the numbers are increasing in the field. Would there be mileage having a standing police capability? There are some limits to the idea. For example, can national police forces allocate a small percentage of particularly well-qualified and well-trained police officers to be able to deploy? It was not clear to some in the group that police should be under UN hat. The police could be deployed as a formal national unit and not necessarily with a UN badge. The question was put forward looking at policing as part of a wider rule-of-law effort. It is very well training a police officer to go out on the beat but if that individual is not paid or if that officer’s pay has been misappropriated, the overall impact of the training and reform effort is greatly reduced.

Finally, while the UN would remain the primary institution regional organizations have or can have specific peacebuilding capabilities, such as the OSCE and the AU, which is strengthening its civilian peacebuilding component. The question is how could these organizations, particularly with the UN as the leader, transfer skills and knowledge into other regional organizations’ efforts?

Working Group II: Inter-institutional Cooperation:
Cross-Organizational Lessons Learned

Synopsis: This Working Group concentrated on inter-institutional and cross organizational cooperation. It focussed on identifying new areas and the necessary policy responses.
Co-Facilitator: Maj. Gen. (Retd.) Robert Gordon, Senior Adviser, Challenges Forum; and Former Force Commander, UNMEE

We had a useful discussion building on session one. We tried to identify new areas or new considerations for our understanding. Why do we need to cooperate? No single organization has the monopoly or ability to manage the complexity of international crisis that we are facing now and in the future. Partnerships are really the only way to get the efficiencies in terms of material motives for partnership, as well as the ideological motives, which has to do with sharing values. The concept of partnership is important for different reasons, but it comes down to two main issues: being more efficient and cost effective; and sharing values with organizations.

We made the point that one of the thematic projects of the Challenges Forum will be focused on the comparative and gap analysis of the different principles and guidelines, on a functional basis that is available to help better understanding, coordination and cooperation between regional organizations. For instance, there is a tremendous amount of guidance and concepts for SSR in the various national, regional and international organizations but there is no one place where you can find all that under the heading of SSR.

On challenges, we divided the time between looking at challenges and trying to wrestle with those while looking at our responses to them. There is a list where we have identified expectations. This is always an issue with different organizations doing things for different reasons. Therefore, expectations are often very varied. In order to identify the need to manage expectations we have to have a shared strategic vision as to what it is that the international community wants to do about a situation, a crisis, or where peace and security is being threatened.

There is a need to address the challenge of managing the expectations of what organizations are trying to achieve. One of the issues that we identified is the lack of understanding of the motivational issues for the various organizations. What are the concepts, principles and guidelines that drive the different organizations? They are all diverse and have different organizational priorities, and the level of engagement is dependent on the priorities. Ideally, the priorities, principles and concepts should be harmonized. Certainly, in the short term they need to be better understood. Partnerships are basic building blocks of sovereign
states getting together and sharing interests for motivational material reasons. However, there are different levels of politicization in those interests, which in turn politicizes the partnerships between member states and organizations. This causes difficulty and friction when trying to arrive at cross-organizational coordination.

Different organizations bring different skills sets, experiences and funding mechanisms to any cooperative effort. Understanding what these are and celebrating the differences, and having degrees or specialization for these differences, is certainly an opportunity. Different organizations have different responsibilities to their member states and the member states, effectively, to their citizens. Also organizations have widely different structural frameworks and command and control mechanisms that make coordination more difficult.

Unless we share the vocabulary, the terminology, the understanding and the definition of what we are doing, what we mean, it is difficult to have that conversations. If we understand that we need these conversations and that communication is at the essence of a better partnership, it would be a step in the right direction. Clear mechanisms such as joint systems of risk analysis, joint systems of conflict analysis, joint early warning systems and shared intelligence are all key points in improving communication and ultimately, partnerships. We also need to strengthen inter-regional mechanisms. There are several around but we need to put more energy into strengthening these inter-regional mechanisms as well as strengthening the regional mechanisms themselves.

In conclusion, two points have to be mentioned. What are the comparative advantages of regional organizations? They all tend to do the same thing. Certain regional organizations, like the EU, are specialized in civilian rule of law and human rights capacities. Understanding differences is helpful. By that process, we are able to more clearly delineate the boundaries between the interests and responsibilities of international organizations’, regional organizations and member states.
Working Group III: Case Study Afghanistan: What Lessons for the UN and Regional Organizations in the Protection of Civilians in a High-Intensity Environment?

Synopsis: This Working Group focused on discussing Afghanistan as a case study and the lessons learned for the UN and regional organizations in the issue of protecting civilians in ‘high intensity’ environments.

Co-Facilitator: HE Mr Gilles Rivard, Deputy Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations, Canada; and Chair of the United Nations Special Committee for Peacekeeping Operations, Canada

The group looked at the lessons learned and some of them could be recommendations based on the experience from Afghanistan. Afghanistan is a unique situation, and it is different from the typical situations where UN missions are deployed. The group agreed that every case has to be treated separately. A series of points that were raised in the discussion will follow.

The first issue that was raised was the need for a robust mandate when trying to implement the POC mandate. The mandate has to be specific on what is meant by protection of civilians. In the case of Afghanistan, the mandate is quite clear, but ambiguities have evolved over time. Five years ago, the concept of protection of civilians was not mentioned as some countries did not want to talk about it. Many countries see protection of civilians as a responsibility of the host state. We know that in many countries it can bring abuse or clear situations where the host state is not in a position to protect their civilians. Nevertheless, POC is making its way through the C-34 and is now part of the vocabulary. It is generally accepted that we have to address the issue.

The group discussed the definition and common understanding of protection of civilians. What is a civilian? How do you define a civilian? The definition of a civilian in Afghanistan in comparison to other places can be different depending on the perception of the authorities or the mandate. We were told that the ICRC is trying to define a civilian in a ‘complex environment’. In the case of Afghanistan, you can be a civilian during the day, but what you do during the night that can be very different. Can you come back as a civilian the following day? This is also something that contributes to the complexity of the situation.
Afghanistan is a specific case in the context of peace missions. It is a situation where you have the UN, the Afghan armed forces, the Taliban and other groups, and many other international organizations working in the country. An important consideration when addressing protection of civilians is trying to engage all the parties, while it can be very difficult to conceive that engaging a Taliban on protection of civilians is important. Ten years ago it was unthinkable but now, through various organizations and communication media, we engage with the Taliban to make sure that at least they are informed about the impact of dealing with the protection of civilians.

How do we access the most vulnerable? The people who suffer the most are sometimes the people who are the most difficult to reach. The question of code of conduct among various entities has been mentioned as something very important. In the case of Afghanistan it took too long time to focus on the creation of a police force. We were too focused on the strengthening of the armed forces, and the question of whether the police force could contribute to the protection of civilians came very late. More importantly, it is to ensure that the mandate, and the implementation of it, emphasizes the role of the security sector, justice and the rule of law, all of those very important elements that actually create the environment to ensure accountability around POC issues. The idea of sharing information was brought up, which is to look at the civil–military interface and coordination. POC is a cross-cutting issue and to make sure that we work together we need to ensure that we synergize and respond accordingly.

The protection of civilians issue is not only related to the insurgency, but also to how the local forces behave. The example of a situation where you have the local forces that kills twenty insurgents but also killing five civilians. At some point it can be acceptable for them because they kill twenty insurgents. Corruption and organized crime may also be linked to the question of protection of civilians.

It is important to note that the protection of civilians has to be contextualised. In other words, it is not a one size fits all. Protection of civilians has to be addressed according to the specific context and to adapt to the local realities.

The point was made that in order to be credible, accurate data collection of incidents of killing civilians through verified or corroborated
information, reports, and using sound methodologists is important, so that there is no questioning of the reliability of data and sources. In the case of Afghanistan, it was particularly important as the Taliban pays attention to the public statements made by the international community. At the same, witness protection or protection of sources should be key objectives as well. Looking at the past ten years of integration of the human rights component in peace operations, this comes out constantly as one of the key added value across the board. On combating sexual violence, the role of public reporting and also the increasing request of having a high commissioner for human rights to report to the Security Council is also a welcome development in this regard. In addition, public information campaigns, making people aware and making use of media and public outreach are equally important.

Working Group IV: Case Study South Sudan: Consent and National Ownership—Two Principles in Conflict?

Synopsis: The Working Group concentrated on identifying key challenges to effective planning and conduct of peace operations, discussing best practices in this environment and making concrete recommendations. The Working Group also discussed what was achievable in shaping South Sudan’s border engagement with Sudan, the government’s relationship with its non-Dinka citizens and various strategies for dealing with corruption, demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of combatants to prevent South Sudan slipping back into conflict.

Co-Facilitator: Dr Alan Ryan, Executive Director, Australian Civil–Military Centre, Australia

One of the considerations that came to light is that national ownership is certainly an aspiration in peacekeeping operations, but consensus is sought for UN involvement, so you start with consent and then hopefully move to national ownership if you are successful. They are not necessarily in conflict, but there are some problems. The other consideration we started out with was the question of balance of national desire for ownership with the lack of capacity. We recognized that fledgling states do not leap into existence fully formed. Sovereignty in the world today is neither mutable nor indefeasible and the question is: how does the international community engage with a new state under those circumstances? A comment was made that in essence, all the principles of peacekeeping are in tension. The use of force and impartiality are two
principles in tension, and non-use of force and credibility are two principles in tension. The mission leadership needs to be aware of and manage them.

In terms of the key challenges to a peacekeeping operation, we saw this as a problem of sovereignty. A state without much capacity is on the edge of hardly being a state. There was certainly an issue of sequencing activities in a time of ongoing conflict. For example, how do we resolve the tension between sequencing DDR at a time when there is a need, at least what appears from South Sudan’s government’s requirement, for the existence of a national military force, and a fairly large one too. How do we proceed with DDR in relation to security and reform at a time when conflict has not been resolved?

In terms of key challenges and ownership, the question of whose ownership was raised. Is it ownership by the government or is it ownership by the broader people of South Sudan? Do we include the Dinka? What kind of sovereignty are we trying to extend, particularly when the government has limited reach outside of Juba and it does not have many of the tools to deal with the states? It was pointed out that if all you have is an army then it is quite likely that most of your solutions are going to involve the use of violence or forcing some form of violence, which is not necessarily appropriate.

Another challenge raised was the issue of financial support, what the arrangements were and how the multi-donor trust fund gave the international community a degree of leverage within South Sudan. We considered the limits of what a peacekeeping operation can do within its ‘shelf life’. This is a conflict that has been going on for more than sixty years and it needs to be seen in that context. Even when the mission leaves or when transition occurs, the conflict will likely not be resolved on our watch. It was certainly an appreciation that there was no single cause of conflict in this situation and that we need to avoid linear thinking. We have layered problems e.g. problems of ethnicity, of oil and corruption, and addressing problems, separately will not be effective.

In terms of best practices it was considered by the group that training was important, particularly in a community with 85 per cent illiteracy. We need to look at building capacity rather than attempting to do it for them. This is going to require generational change and a commitment that would go long beyond the life of this particular operation. We con-
sidered whether we had long-term vision in, for example, policing. There was also a question on how we deal with the army. The answer is that it is an ex-guerrilla force. It becomes the identifiable national army of a legitimate nation state. There was also a question of how well we were doing civilian capacity building.

A recommendation was put forward that we needed a more holistic approach to capacity building within South Sudan. There was an appreciation that we were trying to encourage the government to work with community leaders to promote disarmament, while at the same time having to provide security. The challenge we faced was that it was very difficult to start a disarmament process when people did not feel secure. We also considered the fact that we need to remember that the mandate is to support protection of civilians by the South Sudanese government, and if the government cannot do that what is our capacity and responsibility to conduct it? In most cases the approach has been to take the robust peacekeeping approach, but in this particular circumstance it was felt that given the state of the South Sudanese government, we did not want the peacekeeping forces confronting the SPLA. To the extent possible, we should avoid confrontation.

It was felt that if the national government is the only partner that the peacekeeping force is dealing with, we need a clearer notion of how much ownership is possible, understanding that there are limits to their ability to achieve the outcomes. We have to accept that they are the authority with whom we work with. To build ownership at the local level, we need to increase engagement across the country. It was viewed that the UN mission was perceived in some instances as being remote from the population. If capacity is to be created we need to focus on empowerment, not only of the government but of the national population as well. It was felt that we should identify milestones from the development continuum, to communicate them to the government and to get the government to sign up to it. In terms of protection of civilians it was recommended that we adopt the indirect approach. How we do this, and operationalize it, is harder than just saying it. One of the issues is identifying the hot spots and focusing on that, and providing the capacity and resources that the government might not possess; supporting police deployments and further improving civilian authority in the country.
Another recommendation is that we need to understand that the mission is not resourced to protect civilians to the extent it might be expected by external observers, or as required. We need to get the issue of state-building right, and perhaps we need to start thinking beyond. A recommendation is that peacekeeping forces start thinking about what we need to do as multi-generational state-builders, whether peacekeeping is the right instrument for building national capacity and state-building or whether there are other instruments. We should also consider what will happen after the peacekeeping force leave. Transition must focus on long-term capacity building with other partners and that really is the key to the situation. In terms of practical things that could be done within the operation, it was suggested that the provision of livelihood for the population should be a priority. Given that 98 per cent of the GDP of the country is oil-driven, the rest of the economy is virtually non-existent. However, possible support needs to be directed to developing small-scale enterprises across the country.

Finally, it was suggested that there should be an improvement to field level engagement with the local people. This was called ‘the grant’s eye view to peacekeeping operations. The field training of military personnel needs to overcome the perception that they are remote from the community and therefore less relevant in the long-term.

Working Group V: Command and Control, UN and Regional Organizations: Current Issues, Structures and Solutions for the Future?

Synopsis: This Working Group discussed the UN’s command and control (C2) arrangements in comparison to EU and NATO structures.

Co-Facilitator: Dr Alexandra Novosseloff, Senior Policy Adviser, Ministry of Defence, France

The group focused on UN-led operations, but there were a lot of comparative elements coming from the regional organizations as well. We focused on the military aspects of command and control, but acknowledged that there needs to be further thinking on the civilian components when it comes to C2 structures.

Firstly the key challenges. The first point is that there are fundamental structural differences between the UN and regional organizations. In the
UN context, the Security Council, the Secretariat through DPKO, and the General Assembly have a say and a role to play in peacekeeping operations. Some stakeholders, mainly the TCCs, feel they implement mandates without a voice in their definition. Those who pay are not those who decide and contribute in the UN, which in a way creates a lack of ownership of operations. That is a fundamental difference with the EU and NATO, where there is an illusion of responsibilities.

There were comments that there is little strategic direction given to missions. This is a fundamental difference between the UN and the regional organizations. In the UN, EU and ECOWAS, there is delegation all the way to the field and the strategy level is in the field. Some felt that this delegation of authority to the force commander can in fact be a strength, particularly in high-tempo operations. In NATO, you have operation commanders in between headquarters and the field.

Another fundamental difference is the strength of the military. The Security Council has in fact very little military advice in its decision-making process, whereas the EU and NATO have strong military committees and have a stronger say in the way decisions are made, while still subordinate to the political decisions. The second point is, although we cannot change the way the UN is structured, and the way it conducts command and control operations, the guidelines that have been written and now updated by the UN are fundamentally good, and they show the original culture of the political and military direction of peacekeeping operations. There is however a problem of consistency in implementing operations and that has to do with contingency planning. There is a need to better understand the expertise of the military, the police and improved leadership.

We also found that people are used to their own national command and control systems and are comfortable only with the systems they know, there is thus a need for a better understanding of how other organizations function. We found that there are common challenges between all these organizations. There is a common force generation challenge (force and capabilities) among the organizations. It is maybe more difficult when the force generation is for risky operations or theatres that are more complicated, for example Somalia.

There is also a perceived lack of transparency in the operational framework at the UN. Operational documents e.g. the concept of the opera-
tion, the rules of engagement and the plan of the operation are considered as internal documents and do not require Security Council approval. In the UN structure they are approved by the USG of DPKO, while in the AU, EU and NATO they are approved by the political bodies of those organizations.

Lastly, national caveats are explicit in the context of NATO and EU and they are often listed in the concept of operations. However, they are not always known, or very rarely known, in advance in the context of UN operations, which is a challenge when there is a crisis.

The group put forward several recommendations. There was a discussion on one of the remaining recommendations of the Brahimi Report, that was not implemented, namely the two-stage mandate. It was suggested that such a process would reduce the gap between the political objectives given in a mandate by the Security Council and the actual implementation of the mandate, and the force and capabilities generation.

Secondly, to give stronger, clearer, timelier and strategic directions to the mission. There were some references to the UN Interim Force in Lebanon’s strategic military cell of that gave better strategic direction at the headquarters level to the mission on the ground. While it may not be appropriate or desirable to replicate that specific structure, it serves as a useful reminder and possible model for providing stronger strategic direction to the mission.

Another recommendation is that the Secretariat needs to tell the Security Council what it needs to know and not what it wants to hear. Again, that has been one of the recommendations given by the Brahimi Report but it has not been fully implemented for various reasons. There is a need to avoid self-censorship by the Secretariat in planning its operations, and to perhaps be stronger in the face of the Council when there is a discussion on the needs of an operation. Very often the Secretary-General proposes a certain level of troops and the Council reduces that by half almost every time. There are of course financial considerations when the Council deliberates, but the Secretariat should say, ‘if you don’t want to give us as much troops as we want then we reduce the scope of the mandate’ to avoid the expectation gap.
There was a suggestion by the NATO representative that on the issue of involving TCCs in the process, one possible model could be NATO’s ‘NAC plus 22’ (North Atlantic Council) approach for ISAF. The 22 countries are contributing countries to ISAF, but are not NATO members and have regular meetings with the NAC to discuss the challenges of the operation. A final recommendation is to enhance the military advice both in the Security Council, the Secretariat and the office of military affairs in the DPKO. This could be a role for the Military Staff Committee (MSC). Another option would be to adopt the ‘operational commander’ approach in the UN context, which not only enhances the strategic direction, but would also reinforce the military expertise in the decision-making process of the Council, to make it more in line with reality and the prerequisite of the forces on the ground.
Concluding Remarks and Looking to the Future

Ms Annika Hilding Norberg, Director, Challenges Forum

The theme of the Challenges Annual Forum 2012 ‘Cooperation, Coordination in Peace Operations: United Nations and Regional Perspectives’ is essentially and ultimately about partnerships; exploring and strengthening partnerships for achieving efficient and long-term outcomes. Our intention has been focused on strengthening the partnerships that exist and to support nascent ones. Challenges Forum Patron Mr Jean-Marie Guéhenno’s recently assumed role as the Deputy Joint Special Envoy of the United Nations and the League of Arab States on Syria, is an illustration of the development of one such partnership, that between the UN and the Arab League. The UN and the Arab League have joined efforts to address an unfolding crisis. Mr Guéhenno extends his regards to the Forum participants and not least the Hosts of the Challenges Annual Forum 2012, the GCSP. Mr Guéhenno was pleased to have been able to share with the Partners his perspective on the unfolding challenges in Syria at the Challenges Reception held three days ago, while regretting he could not address this full Forum here today, as the deteriorating situation in Syria required him to leave for New York as the Security Council were to be briefed on the unfolding developments.

We have had a very rich annual forum with provocative deliberations and a number of concrete ideas about how we can, in our respective roles and capacities, develop better ways of planning and conducting multidimensional peace operations.

This Annual Forum’s host made a successful effort to involve a broad range of the Geneva-based humanitarian community organizations. This I hope and foresee is the beginning of a stronger partnership developing between the Challenges Forum (as well as various individual partner organizations) and the humanitarian community. Further, inspired by the dialogue among and with the senior leadership of the UN, AU, EU, NATO and the Arab League, we look forward to contributing to a strengthened global network of partnerships for effective and efficient multidimensional peace operations. As we have discussed, some best
practices and preferred methodologies are indeed applicable and can inform actors across the spectrum of missions and operations. Given our partners and no doubt the forum participants’ scope and relevance in terms of mandate and responsibilities, activities and not least determination, the analysis we have been engaged in is only the beginning of our effort. Paraphrasing the statement made by the minister speaking on Tuesday in relation to the Challenges Partnership, I would not say we are obsessed about peace operations, but almost. All of our partners, not least our host, have been working hard for years in their own national systems, in a regional context and in our common international global context, thinking, conceptualizing, developing policies and training on how to better plan and conduct military, police and civilian peace operations.

So, what happens now? Where do we go from here? As a useful example of how we can take some of the findings and ideas forward, I would like to use the example of our Egyptian partners. The Cairo Regional Centre for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Egypt hosted the most recent Challenges Forum event in Sharm el-Sheikh in February 2012. As the Strategic Seminar and Partners Meeting concluded, the Director of UN Affairs of the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in cooperation with the Challenges Secretariat briefed member states of the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations on the issues and ideas that had been generated during the Sharm El-Sheikh meeting. At the suggestion of our Egyptian Partners, the event was hosted during lunch on the opening day of the special committee work, and was indeed a concrete and constructive model for cross-regional cooperation in an environment, which can otherwise be quite political. The aim was to bring in some practitioners’ perspectives on some of the challenges facing peacekeepers around the world. I hope that we will all make an effort to make good and concrete use of the ideas and recommendations that have been raised.

The Challenge Forum Partnership decided at the partners’ meeting earlier this week to launch our thematic working groups to which the discussions of the last three days will feed into. The themes are: (i) Future Concepts and Models for Peace Operations, co-led by our German and Indian partners (Centre for International Peace Operations and United Services Institution of India); (ii) Strategic Command and Control, co-led by our French and Nigerian partners (Ministry of Defence of France
and National Defence College); (iii) Impact Evaluation and Assessment of Peace Operations, co-led by our Canadian and South African partners (Pearson Centre and Institute for Security Studies); and iv) Comparative Approaches, Policies, Principles and Guidelines, co-led by our US and Pakistan partners (Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute and National Defence University).

The first thematic working group on future concepts and models for peace operations will be kicked off by the next Challenges Forum event, a research workshop to be hosted in October 2012 by Centre for International Peace Operations and the German Federal Foreign Office. It will provide a critical opportunity for the partners to take a long-term perspective for the planning and conduct of peace operations. We also look forward to the Challenges Annual Forum 2013 to be held in Buenos Aires by our Argentinean partners.

We are delighted and honoured to be able to announce that the US Department of State, here represented by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Holt and Ms Deborah Odell, joins the United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) and the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) as our US partners in the Challenges Forum. It is particularly appropriate that this was finalized here in the framework of the Challenges Annual Forum 2012 that has been focused on cooperation and coordination between civilian and military contributors. Representatives of the US State Department, quite often Ms Holt, have participated as speakers and participants throughout the years, but this sign of deepened interest and commitment in our endeavour is greatly appreciated and welcome.

On behalf of the partners I would like to extend our sincere thanks to the representatives of the UN and the regional organizations, the speakers, background paper authors, participants, and of course most importantly on behalf of the Challenges Forum partners I would like to extend our deepest thanks to our host, Ambassador Fred Tanner, Director of the GCSP, Dr Theirry Tardy, Head of Research at the GCSP, Ms Isabelle Gillet, who coordinated the Geneva Annual Forum, and many more excellent individuals at GCSP, the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs and the Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport, who have made the Challenges Annual Forum 2012 possible and so productive. It has been a pleasure and privilege to cooperate with such dedicated and professional individuals and organizations.
Further, as Ambassador Tanner stated so clearly yesterday afternoon, we are all stakeholders in the Challenges Forum. The partners invest time, resources and intellectual thought in our common forum. I would therefore like to pay tribute to all the partners who really are the backbone and brains of the forum. I would also like to thank the coordination team in Sweden—colleagues from the Armed Forces, the Police, the Prisons and Probation Service, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I would like to thank the senior advisors team—Maj. Gen. Robert Gordon, Ms Aracelly Santana, and General Chikadibia Obiakor. Thank you also to Mr Jonas Alberoth, Acting Director-General of the Folke Bernadotte Academy, for his deep understanding of and contribution to our work. For providing the police and rule-of-law perspective, I would like to thank the incoming deputy director for the Challenges Forum, Mr Henrik Stiernblad, and Desk Officers Ms Andrea Rabus and Ms Johanna Ström, who are invaluable to our work.

The Challenges Forum is not about another conference or another report, it is a determined effort by partners in twenty countries to do more with less, to make a real and lasting contribution to the way in which we think, cooperate and coordinate peace operations. Thanks to our hosts, partners and participants, the Challenges Annual Forum 2012 in Geneva has indeed pointed us very much in a productive direction.

HE Dr Fred Tanner, Director, Geneva Centre for Security Policy

It has been an honour to host this event together with the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, the Swiss Federal Department of Defences Civil Protection and Sports, the Canton of Geneva, the City of Geneva and the World Meteorological Organization who have made important contributions to support and host the Challenges Annual Forum 2012. I would like to thank all the chairs, the speakers, the co-facilitators and the eminent scholars—Mr Alan Doss, Mr Richard Gowan, Prof Ian Johnstone and Dr Walter Kemp—who have written the background papers, which are already available online.

I would also like to thank all of you. This event’s success is because of the very intensive and rich background of the experiences you have brought to the debate. It is not just that we had interesting perspectives from capitals or headquarters—New York, Geneva, Bern, Cairo or Addis Ababa—but also views from the field, and from analysts and pol-
icymakers and that in my view is the fantastic aspect of this entire Challenges Forum. I am delighted that GCSP is now a partner. I am also very grateful to the Folke Bernadotte Academy, Minster Carlsson and to the Swedish government, which has made a commitment to continue supporting the Challenges Forum. The recent addition of the US State Department to the partnership reflects US’ strengthening its involvement in peacekeeping and is testimony of the excellent work the Challenges Forum is doing.

In this context, let me just say a few very final words of thanks. First, to Mr Jonas Alberoth, to whom we extend all our best wishes and thanks. Second, to Ms Annika Hilding Norberg. We very much look forward to be able to work with you in a very dynamic and energized process under your leadership in many years to come, so thank you very much. I would also like to thank the outstanding researcher and scholar at the GCSP, Dr Thierry Tardy, who has been engineering and conceiving the themes together with Annika. Finally, to Ms Isabelle Gillet and her entire team, thank you very much for the very good work you have done. I hope very much that we will stay in touch and continue working with one another.
Greening the Blue Helmets

*Mr David Jensen, Head, Environmental Cooperation for Peacebuilding Programme, United Nations Environment Programme*

**Introduction**

Peace and security can no longer be separated from the way natural resources and the environment are managed in a post-conflict setting.

At least 40 per cent of internal conflicts over the last 60 years have been linked to natural resources and all major peace agreements since 2005 have included natural resource provisions. A total of 17 peacekeeping operations, representing half of the total peacekeeping expenditure to date, have been deployed to countries where conflicts have had clear links to natural resources.

In addition, the sheer size of today’s peacekeeping operations places considerable demands on the environment and natural resources in post-conflict countries that often lack basic infrastructure to cope with these pressures. Close to 120 000 peacekeepers serving across 15 missions are responsible for over half of the total UN’s greenhouse gas emissions, produce over 180 tonnes of solid waste\(^{110}\) daily and consume 10 million litres of water\(^{111}\) every day.

Furthermore, the effects of climate change as well as the increased competition for limited natural resources stand to further exacerbate challenges posed by environment and natural resources to peace and security.

The majority of these issues are already being addressed by the UN system, from new policies, practices and peacekeeping mandates to high-level statements by the Security Council and the UN Secretary General. For example:

- In 2009, the UN Department of Peacekeeping and Field Support (DPKO/DFS) adopted an Environmental Policy for UN Field Missions.

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\(^{110}\) Based on 1.5 kg of waste generated per person per day calculated by the 2008 waste characterization study for the peacekeeping missions in Sudan.

\(^{111}\) Based on daily water consumption standard of 84 litres per person used for peacekeeping camp design purposes.
• In 2010, the Secretary-General called on the UN system and member states to make questions of natural resource ownership, control and allocation a key part of peacebuilding strategies.\textsuperscript{112}

• In 2011, the Security Council issued a presidential statement\textsuperscript{113} recognizing the importance of possible security implications of climate change and requested the Secretary General to include contextual information on climate change within his reporting to the Council.

Against this background, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), in close consultation with DPKO/DFS, has undertaken a two-year policy implementation review and analysis aimed at providing a comprehensive overview of how peacekeeping affects and is affected by environment and natural resources.

The findings of this analysis were published in the 2012 UNEP report titled ‘Greening the Blue Helmets: Environment, Natural Resources and UN Peacekeeping Operations’,\textsuperscript{114} and were presented at the Challenges Forum 2012 in Geneva on 8 May 2012.

The text below provides the summary of key findings and recommendations from this analysis.

**Analysis Methodology**

The analysis of how peacekeeping affects and is affected by environment and natural resources was conducted by examining the linkages, surveying innovative practices, demonstrating benefits and identifying gaps in current policy and practice. It was based on extensive consultations with DPKO and DFS at both the field and headquarter levels. A total of 25 case studies from 10 peacekeeping missions were analyzed in addition to contributions from experts from both the UN system and organizations such as the Swedish Defense Research Agency (FOI), International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) and Global Witness. The analysis was reviewed by 20 external experts.

The analysis was divided into two parts:

- Part 1 reviews the environmental management of peacekeeping operations and showcases good practices, technologies and behaviours


\textsuperscript{114} Available at: http://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/UNEP_greening_blue_helmets.pdf
already adopted for implementing the 2009 environmental policy. It identifies the economic, social and environmental benefits associated with the use of resource-efficient technologies and identifies the main capacity and resource constraints towards more systematic adoption. This analysis has been conducted to inform and catalyze the further implementation of the DPKO/DFS Environmental Policy for UN field missions.

- Part 2 examines the role of peacekeeping operations in stabilizing countries where violent conflicts have been financed by natural resources—including diamonds, gold, timber and oil—or driven by grievances over their ownership, access and control. It also evaluates how peacekeeping operations have provided support to UN Expert Panels that have investigated and monitored violations of commodity sanctions that have been used by the UN Security Council to restrict financing to individuals or groups that profit from the exploitation and trade of natural resources. The ways that peacekeeping missions can capitalize on the peacebuilding potential of natural resources through employment and livelihoods, economic recovery, confidence building and reconciliation are also considered. This analysis has been conducted to inform the scope of future peacekeeping mandates together with the development of new peacekeeping policies and practices addressing natural resource governance in post-conflict countries.

**Summary of Key Findings**

**Part 1**

1. **Resource-efficient practices, technologies and behaviours offer multiple benefits to peacekeeping missions.**

In addition to reducing environmental impacts of peacekeeping, they are proven to generate significant cost savings; improve health, safety and security of local communities and peacekeeping personnel; ensure self-sufficiency of camps and good relations with local communities.

Changes in behaviour alone have demonstrated a potential to reduce energy and fuel use by up to 15 per cent, with the use of low-tech solutions such as low energy lighting and appliances potentially saving up to 32 per cent. Based on 2009 fuel cost these reductions would provide a cost benefit in the range of $50–100 million per year. Furthermore, these savings would make peacekeeping operations more resilient to future fluctuations in oil prices, thus the very ability to finance future peacekeeping operations.
A combination of low-tech solutions such as flow regulators on taps and low flush toilets and awareness campaigns can achieve reductions in water use of up to 42 per cent.

A combination of comprehensive waste reduction measures such as composting or the use of anaerobic digestion can help divert up to 88 per cent of solid waste from landfill.

2. Examples of good environmental practice have emerged across all of the main sectors of the peacekeeping infrastructure.

A number of current peacekeeping missions have independently adopted environmental policies and undertaken impressive and far-reaching measures to introduce resource-efficient technologies and minimize the environmental impacts of their operations.

However, the implementation of the DPKO/DFS Environmental Policy for UN Field Missions has been ad hoc and limited. The main reasons for the limited policy implementation are: i) lack of dedicated human and financial resources; ii) limited metering and compliance monitoring; iii) low general awareness among all levels of staff; iv) uncertainty of mission duration.

3. Disasters related to environmental and climatic conditions occurred in 93 per cent of peacekeeping missions between 1980 to 2010.

Anticipation and capability to respond to climate-related disasters need to be increased. Furthermore, ability to identify raising tensions over scarce natural resources such as water needs to be developed.

Part 2

4. Peacekeeping operations in situations where natural resources have financed or fuelled conflict represent 50 per cent of the total peacekeeping budget ever spent.

Since 1948, 17 UN peacekeeping missions with a combined budget of $42 billion have addressed conflicts that were at least partially sustained by revenues from natural resources or by grievances over their ownership, access and control. This represents half of the total peacekeeping budget ever spent, yet only 25 per cent of the total number of operations in the same period. These figures highlight the significant costs associated with failed resource governance, and indicate the need for greater preventive action and more focus on resource governance as part of State building and preventing conflict relapse.
5. There is an increasing trend towards including natural resource provisions in peace agreements.

All major peace agreements signed between 2005 and 2011 have included detailed provisions on natural resources, as compared with only 50 per cent of the agreements concluded between 1989 and 2004.

6. There has been little progress in systematically considering and documenting how natural resources can support, advance or undermine the aims of a peacekeeping mission.

DPKO does not have systems in place to evaluate and document how natural resources and environmental conditions have impacted the implementation of a specific mission’s mandate. These linkages have not received sufficient attention due in large part to the many priorities mandated by the UN Security Council to a peacekeeping mission, as well as the overriding focus on mission security and operational effectiveness. However, there are good reasons to increase this capacity as missions may be impacted by these risks on a more frequent basis. In particular as the global population continues to rise, and the demand for resources continues to rise and there is significant potential for increased global competition and conflict over the world’s limited supply of natural resources.

7. While the Security Council has incrementally improved the scope and specificity of the mandates given to peacekeeping missions in addressing natural resources, successful implementation continues to be hampered by a combination of factors.

These factors include: the human and financial resources made available to peacekeeping missions by member states; the political will of the host country to tackle illegal exploitation and transparency challenges; and the cooperation of regional and global trading partners to comply with sanctions or ensure that companies meet due diligence standards where applicable. In some cases, non-elected transitional administrations or power-sharing authorities combined with private sector actors have undermined peacekeeping efforts to restore authority in order to continue profiting from resource revenues. Successfully restoring the administration of natural resources requires political, technical and financial support in four key pillars simultaneously: extending State authority into illegally occupied sites and controlling border areas; bringing transparency to resource concessions and associated revenues; participating in international certification schemes; and involving civil society in key resource management policies and decisions.
8. The UN Security Council has given uneven guidance on the appropriate level of cooperation between peacekeeping missions and Expert Panels mandated to monitor sanctions. Not all UN peacekeeping operations have specific mandates to work with Expert Panels, nor do all Expert Panels have mandates to work with peacekeeping missions. Furthermore, peacekeeping operations can only consider and implement Expert Panel recommendations when they are accepted by the Security Council and formally mandated to do so. Yet, given the mutually supporting and compatible interests of each entity, closer cooperation between Expert Panels and peacekeeping operations, drawing on the comparative advantage of each, could benefit the work of both. The UN Security Council needs to better understand the potential for improved collaboration, as well as the normative, political and operational challenges of encouraging such joint support. Clear criteria are needed which clarify when and how mutual support should be authorized.

9. A number of tools have emerged to help safeguard natural resources and restore good governance in post-conflict countries. These include temporary co-management mechanisms (e.g. the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme in Liberia), independent monitoring of resource management reforms (e.g. the Expert Panel in Liberia), due diligence requirements on sourcing minerals from conflict zones (the DRC) and principles such as the Natural Resource Charter initiative or the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. Host countries have also requested that peacekeeping missions help them join or comply with certification schemes or voluntary partnerships such as the Kimberley Process, the FLEGT (Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade) scheme and the EITI (Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative).

10. Successful reintegration of former combatants often depends on natural resources. Poorly governed natural resources in a post-conflict setting can be a major impediment to DDR efforts as illicit exploitation can offer financial benefits that vastly outstrip those offered by formal DDR programmes, with harmful environmental consequences that may jeopardize sustainable recovery and community livelihoods. On the other hand, natural resources can provide opportunities for emergency employment and the establishment of sustainable livelihoods for former combatants. Access to land may be a key determining factor affecting the successful reintegration of a former combatant into a community.
11. Natural resources can support various aspects of peacebuilding and offer a unique platform and entry point for the Civil Affairs section of a peacekeeping mission to engage local communities.

Access to land, freshwater, fisheries and forests can be pillars of recovery and a basis for employment, economic growth and sustainable livelihoods. Natural resources can provide an arena for dialogue and confidence building between divided communities, as well as a platform for cooperation between communities and emerging levels of local and national government.

Recommendations and Next Steps

1. **Effective implementation of DPKO/DFS Environmental Policy should be ensured.** As a direct follow-up of this recommendation UNEP and DFS/DPKO have developed a five-year cooperation framework aimed at full implementation of the policy by 2017. Securing necessary financial and human resources will be crucial in delivering the framework objectives.

2. **Compliance monitoring mechanism must be developed and fully implemented to support the implementation of the environmental policy.**

3. **Training on environment and natural resource management in a post-conflict context should be made a standard component of pre-deployment and in-mission orientation.** As a direct follow up to this recommendation, UNEP, together with UN Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) and IIISD, has developed an e-learning peacekeeping training material. The first out of four training modules, titled “Introduction to environment, natural resources and UN peacekeeping”, has been launched on 1 May 2012. [115]

4. **Security Council must be systematically informed of the linkages between natural resources and conflict—those linkages should be duly reflected in peacekeeping mandates where they connect to peace and security.**

5. **Peacekeeping missions should have the capacity and mandate to support the implementation of sanctions as well as the work of Expert Panels where relevant.**

6. **Environment and natural resource dimensions of conflict and peacebuilding should be incorporated into the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP) and the Integrated Strategic Framework.** The new UN Development Group (UNDG) and the Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs

[115] Available at www.unitar.org/events/greeningthebluehelmets
(ECHA) Guidance Note on Natural Resource Management in Transition Settings provides practical guidance on how natural resource management principles and practices can feed into transitional analysis and planning frameworks.

7. Civil affairs components of peacekeeping missions should capitalize on peacebuilding potential of natural resources and the environment. Natural Resource Management issues have been integrated into the 2012 Civil Affairs handbook.

8. Demobilization, disarmament and reintegration programmes delivered by peacekeeping missions and development partners should systematically consider emergency employment and sustainable livelihoods based on natural resources and the environment.

9. High-level expert panel should be convened to further assess options for restoring governance of natural resources in post-conflict countries and fragile states.

## ANNEX 2

### List of Participants Challenges Annual Forum 2012, Switzerland

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<tr>
<th>Family Name</th>
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<th>Position</th>
<th>Organization</th>
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<tr>
<td>A. Aziz</td>
<td>Majid</td>
<td>Course participant, GCSP ITC 26</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
<td>Qatar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdullatif</td>
<td>Arshad</td>
<td>Prison Reform Manager</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alberoth</td>
<td>Jonas</td>
<td>Acting Director General</td>
<td>Folke Bernadotte Academy</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
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<td>Aldredi</td>
<td>Ibrahim</td>
<td>Ambassador, Permanent Representative</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Libya to the United Nations in Geneva</td>
<td>Libya</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alghali</td>
<td>Zinurine</td>
<td>Coordinator Peacekeeping Unit</td>
<td>ACCORD</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amaanwi</td>
<td>James-Emmanuel</td>
<td>European Commission Marie Curie Research Fellow, Sustainable Peacebuilding</td>
<td>Peace Studies, University of Bradford</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>Arévalo de León</td>
<td>Bernardo</td>
<td>Deputy Director General, Research and Development</td>
<td>Interpeace</td>
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<td>Quaker United Nations Office in Geneva</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>Awad</td>
<td>Amin</td>
<td>Director, Division of Emergency, Security and Supply</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>Avasiloae</td>
<td>Sabina</td>
<td>Project Assistant</td>
<td>Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
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<td>Badawy</td>
<td>Ehab</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Cairo Regional Center for Training on Conflict Resolution &amp; Peacekeeping in Africa</td>
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<td>Badr</td>
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<td>Bam</td>
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<td>Head, Peace Support Operations Division, Department of Peace and Security</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bayer</td>
<td>Anna-Karina</td>
<td>Programme Coordinator, Geopolitics of Globalization and Transnational Security Programme</td>
<td>Geneva Centre for Security Policy</td>
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<td>Geneva Center for Security Policy</td>
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<td>Adviser Civil-Military Relations</td>
<td>Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
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<td>United Nations Institute for Training and Research</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>Project Manager</td>
<td>Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue</td>
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<td>Mélanie</td>
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<td>Federal Department of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>Permanent Mission of Tunisia to the United Nations in Geneva</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Isabelle</td>
<td>Coordinator Protocol and Events</td>
<td>Geneva Centre for Security Policy</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
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<td>Gleason</td>
<td>Megan</td>
<td>Senior Programme Officer</td>
<td>Centre on International Cooperation, New York University</td>
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<td>Anne</td>
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<td>Peace Nexus Foundation</td>
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<td>Gordon</td>
<td>Robert</td>
<td>Senior Adviser, Challenges Forum and Former Force Commander, UNMEE</td>
<td>Challenges Forum</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>Permanent Mission of Greece to the United Nations in Geneva</td>
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<td>Research and Knowledge Manager</td>
<td>Peace Nexus Foundation</td>
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<td>Gowan</td>
<td>Richard</td>
<td>Associate Director, Managing Global Order</td>
<td>Centre for International Cooperation, New York University</td>
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<td>Manager, Protocol and Events</td>
<td>Geneva Centre for Security Policy</td>
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<td>Holt</td>
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<td>Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of International Organization Affairs</td>
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