Building Capacity for Peace Operations in Response to Diversified Threats

Challenges
Annual Forum Report 2014
CHALLENGES FORUM
PARTNER ORGANIZATIONS

Argentina: Ministry of Defence in cooperation with Centro Argentino de Entrenamiento Conjunto para Operaciones de Paz

Armenia: The Institute for National Strategic Studies in cooperation with the Ministry of Defence

Australia: Australian Civil-Military Centre

China: China Institute for International Strategic Studies in cooperation with the Ministry of National Defence

Egypt: Cairo Regional Center for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence

France: Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs (United Nations and International Organizations Department) and Ministry of Defence (Policy and Strategic Affairs Department)

Germany: Center for International Peace Operations in cooperation with the German Federal Foreign Office

India: United Service Institution of India

Indonesia: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Japan: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Jordan: Institute of Diplomacy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Nigeria: National Defence College in cooperation with the Nigerian Army, Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Norway: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs

Pakistan: National Defence University in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence

Russian Federation: Center for Euro-Atlantic Security of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation in cooperation with the Center for Political and International Studies

South Africa: Institute for Security Studies

Sweden: Folke Bernadotte Academy, Armed Forces, National Police Board, Swedish Prison and Probation Service

Switzerland: Geneva Centre for Security Policy in cooperation with the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs and the Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sports

Turkey: Center for Strategic Research of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in cooperation with the National Police Force, Armed Forces and the University of Bilkent

United Kingdom: Foreign and Commonwealth Office in cooperation with the Ministry of Defence and the Department for International Development

United States: United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute in cooperation with the United States Department of State, Bureau of International Organizations and the United States Institute of Peace

International Secretariat: Folke Bernadotte Academy

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Building Capacity for Peace Operations in Response to Diversified Threats

Challenges Annual Forum Report 2014
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Preface

The International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations is a strategic and dynamic platform for dialogue among leading policymakers, practitioners and academics on key issues and developments in peace operations. Initiated in 1996, the aim is to contribute to the international debate by identifying key challenges facing modern peace operations and promoting awareness of emerging issues. The Challenges Forum seeks to support informed policymaking through analysis and the generation of practical recommendations and encouragement of their effective implementation at the international, regional and national levels. It is a global partnership with members representing all major troop- and police-contributing countries and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. This broad-based and inclusive membership allows the Forum to generate diverse but also complementary views and perspectives on the norms, concepts and practice of peace operations.

Ten years ago, China hosted its first high-level seminar on peacekeeping with the Challenges Forum. Since then, China has moved from being an emerging contributor to peacekeeping, to its present position as a major troop and police contributing country involved in and supporting many UN missions, with a particular focus on Africa. In October this year, China through the Peacekeeping Office of the Ministry of National Defence and the Chinese Institute for International Strategic Studies generously hosted a particularly timely and productive Challenges Annual Forum 2014. The international community of peacekeepers gathered for the Forum deliberations, which this year focused on capacity-building requirements in response to diversified threats—what is needed and how to develop the capacities required.

The Annual Forum 2014 was held in times of significant uncertainty when international, regional and national violence is challenging countries and regions in many parts of the world. The demand for United Nations peacekeeping has never been greater. UN peacekeepers are called upon to stabilize conflicts, protect civilians caught up in the worst of situations and create space for peace to take hold. In the months leading up to the Beijing
Forum, UN peacekeepers were increasingly being attacked in Mali, the Central African Republic, South Sudan and the Golan Heights to name a few. This made it clear that UN peacekeepers are exposed to a multitude of risks and threats, at times with fatal consequences. These challenges to UN peacekeeping, peacekeepers and the mandates of their missions include transnational organized crime, terrorism, asymmetrical warfare, cyber threats, the effects of climate change, state fragility, corruption and the spread of infectious diseases such as Ebola; all of which are increasingly transnational in nature and therefore require a more concerted approach.

In recent years, UN peacekeeping has undergone rapid and in some instances fundamental transformations to be able to function and address the threats in these volatile environments. Developments in the field suggest that the operational context may in certain ways have outpaced doctrinal development. Arguably, capacity-building has also failed to keep pace with the new environment and its demands. Are the conceptual framework, principles and modus operandi developed since the end of the Cold War adequate for these new types of operations? Can the existing principles accommodate the new mission typologies that are emerging or do these innovative operations require new doctrinal thinking?

In essence, the Challenges Forum Partnership has sought to establish what the new conditions for peace operations may be and to what extent they require new peacekeeping approaches—strategically, operationally, tactically and doctrinally. The program for the Annual Forum 2014 was based on findings of the pending Designing Mandates and Capabilities for Future Peace Operations report. During 2012–2014, the Partnership has pursued four work strands: i) future conditions for peace operations; ii) authority, command and control; iii) policies, principles and guidelines; and iv) impact evaluation and assessment. These are some of the overarching themes that provided the background and context for the Forum 2014 discussions.

The Forum aimed to explore how best to strengthen UN peacekeepers’ capacity to address non-traditional threats in their operational environments and against their mandates. But also to consider how best to enhance peace operations capacity to mitigate threats against the peacekeepers themselves. This involved looking at the logistic difficulties in complex and remote areas where peace operation are perhaps the most needed, and investigating the possibilities for building stronger partnerships for effective capacity-building of UN peacekeepers.
The topics raised at the 2014 Challenges Forum tie well into the issues and priorities of the ongoing international dialogue on how to enhance UN peace operations. Of particular relevance is the UN Secretary-General’s High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, set up to conduct the review that the UNSG launched during a UN Security Council debate chaired by the Russian Federation in June 2014. There are several initiatives exploring what types of capacity-building and capabilities generation are required for modern missions to achieve their mandates as expected and as required. Initiatives include the force generation focused process launched by a number of countries including the United States in the margins of the UN General Assembly in September 2014, the African Union developing its African Training Architecture for Effective Protection, Peace and Security and the EU-UN Partnership in Crisis Management and Peace Operations.

The Challenges Forum Partnership is pleased to offer the present report, *Building Capacity for Peace Operations in Response to Diversified Threats*, for the consideration of the international peacekeeping community. The report provides a comprehensive overview of the issue at stake when it comes to peacekeepers capacity-building in the face of non-traditional threats. It takes stock of where we are, and provides suggestions for the future in the shape of a number of targeted and realistic recommendations put forward by speakers, partners and participants during the course of the Forum deliberations. It is a collection of various perspectives and suggestions rather than a consensus report. The report is intended as a timely, informative and practical contribution to ongoing review efforts. The fact that it is a product of wide and inclusive discussions does indeed further strengthens the report’s importance and usefulness.

To conclude, despite what may at times appear to be ever mounting challenges, there is room for optimism since peacekeeping repeatedly proves that it is the art of the possible. I remain confident that the ongoing review efforts will generate a positive and productive global momentum around and for peacekeeping. I remain hopeful that the ongoing review processes will strengthen the international community’s resolve to come together to protect not only their own citizens and peacekeepers, but equally and essentially, vulnerable civilians in need wherever they may be. I hope the processes will generate new ideas about the means and methods that the UN needs to effectively carry out its peace operation mission and function.

On behalf of the Challenges Forum Partnership, I would like to express our
appreciation to all involved in the hosting of the Challenges Annual Forum 2014. First, to our Chinese Partners and colleagues at the Peacekeeping Office of the Ministry of National Defence and the Chinese Institute for International Strategic Studies. In particular, at the Peacekeeping Office; Maj. Gen. Li Tiantian, Maj. Gen. (Retd.) Liv Chao, Sen. Col. Li Zhang, Sen. Col. Gao Tong, Sen. Col. Jiyu Zang and the CIIS; Maj. Gen. (Retd.) Huang Baifu, Mr Li Jie, Sen. Col. (Retd.) Bai Zhongli, Ms Yu Shuan and finally to Ambassador Wang Xuexian, Former Chinese Ambassador to South Africa and Member of the UNSG’s Independent Panel on Peace Operations. We would also like to thank the chairs, speakers and participants for their invaluable contributions to the Forum deliberations and the Chinese Police Peacekeeping Training Centre for hosting a visit by the Partnership at the end of the Forum 2014. We would also like to thank the authors of the background papers for paving the way for an informed and inclusive dialogue, and the author of this report, Lisa Sharland, for her excellent job in presenting our discussions and conclusions in a comprehensive manner. We hope that the Forum 2014 participants’ expertise, ideas and recommendations contained herein may provide useful inputs and thoughts for reflection, paving the way for better peace operations and peacebuilding in the short and medium term and for enabling the creation of space needed for longer term peace and development to take place.

Annika Hilding Norberg
Director
Challenges Forum
Folke Bernadotte Academy
# Abbreviations

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAR</td>
<td>After Action Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
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<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>C-34</td>
<td>United Nations Special Committee for Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
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<td>CIED</td>
<td>Counter Improvised Explosive Devices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COE</td>
<td>Contingency Owned Equipment</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFS</td>
<td>Department of Field Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPA</td>
<td>Department of Political Affairs</td>
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<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FIB</td>
<td>Force Intervention Brigade</td>
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<td>FPU</td>
<td>Formed Police Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>GFSS</td>
<td>Global Field Support Strategy</td>
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<td>IAPTC</td>
<td>International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Device</td>
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<tr>
<td>IOT</td>
<td>Integrated Operational Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISIL</td>
<td>Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant</td>
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<td>ISR</td>
<td>Information, Surveillance and Reconnaissance</td>
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<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<td>ITS</td>
<td>Integrated Training Service</td>
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<td>JMAC</td>
<td>Joint Mission Analysis Centre</td>
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<td>JOC</td>
<td>Joint Operations Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINURSO</td>
<td>United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINUSCA</td>
<td>United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in the Central African Republic</td>
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<td>MINUSMA</td>
<td>United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali</td>
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<td>MINUSTAH</td>
<td>United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti</td>
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<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organization of American States</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>---------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>OIOS</td>
<td>Office of Internal Oversight Services</td>
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<td>OMA</td>
<td>Office of Military Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCC</td>
<td>Police Contributing Country</td>
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<td>POC</td>
<td>Protection of Civilians</td>
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<tr>
<td>SML</td>
<td>Senior Mission Leadership</td>
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<td>SSAFE</td>
<td>Safe and Secure Approaches in Field Environments</td>
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<td>SAG</td>
<td>Senior Advisory Group</td>
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<td>SRSG</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary-General</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<td>TNA</td>
<td>Training Needs Assessment</td>
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<td>TCC</td>
<td>Troop Contributing Country</td>
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<tr>
<td>UAV</td>
<td>Unmanned Aerial Vehicle</td>
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<td>UNDOF</td>
<td>United Nations Disengagement Observer Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Liberia</td>
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<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in South Sudan</td>
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Executive Summary

The Challenges Annual Forum 2014 was hosted on 14-16 October in Beijing by the Peacekeeping Office of the Ministry of National Defence of China and the Chinese Institute for International Strategic Studies in the Peacekeeping Centre in Huairou District, Beijing. More than 120 participants from 30 countries took part in the dialogue over two days. It was the second forum hosted by the Chinese partners. The theme for the annual forum was *Building Capacity for Peace Operations in Response to Diversified Threats*.

Discussions focused on strategies and mechanisms for building the capacity of peacekeepers to respond to the diversified threat environment of today’s peace operations. The challenges identified were significant, prompting one presenter to question whether peacekeeping was facing another near death experience, as it did in the 1990s, or whether it could resurrect itself and remain an effective tool to maintain peace and security in the 21st century. The Forum agreed that there were ways to address many of the challenges. Political dialogue and partnerships would be essential. Other factors identified as important included leadership, modern technology, situational awareness and intelligence, training, deployment of enablers and coordination with regional organizations.

The Challenges Forum focused on four key areas: promoting peacekeepers’ capacity to address non-traditional threats; enhancing the capacity of peace operations to address threats against peacekeepers; overcoming logistical difficulties; and building partnerships for the capacity-building of peacekeepers.

Peace operations continue to evolve and adapt in order to respond to the changing nature of conflict. As noted by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, peacekeepers currently operate in environments where there is ‘no peace to keep’, an ‘absence of clearly identifiable parties to the conflict or a viable political process’ and ‘asymmetric and unconventional threats’.1

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Transnational organized crime and terrorism are means often used by spoilers to achieve their objectives. Weapons of choice are more asymmetric in nature, such as improvised explosive devices, which have continued to kill and injure peacekeepers in significant numbers throughout 2014. Peacekeepers are increasingly viewed as legitimate targets by some actors. This creates new challenges, particularly in terms of force protection and protection of civilians. It also raises questions about whether peacekeeping needs to evolve more systemically to address these newer threats and whether it is the right tool.

Since many non-traditional threats also pose a threat to fragile host authorities, political dialogue between peace operations and host authorities is essential. Threats such as terrorism also present challenges regarding the role and comparative advantage of peace operations, in particular, whether peace operations should be undertaking counter-terrorism activities, or whether these should be undertaken by other partnerships. Clearer consensus is needed among peacekeeping stakeholders to determine the future role of peacekeeping in these environments. Situational awareness is essential in ensuring the safety and security of peacekeeping personnel; however, differences continue to exist over whether the UN should have an intelligence capability.

Approximately two-thirds of UN peacekeeping personnel are serving in contexts where there are significant levels of ongoing violence. Security threats against peacekeepers have intensified. Strong leadership, the adoption of deterrent mission postures, improved policy and planning processes, training standards that focus on security-risk management, capability-focused force generation processes, and the use and application of modern technology can all assist in lowering the security risk in peacekeeping missions.

With a nearly three-fold increase in the number of personnel deployed to peace operations in the last fifteen years, the UN’s ability to address logistical challenges are under increasing strain. Geography, remoteness of mission areas, environmental factors and in some cases, hampered freedom of movement, limit the ability of missions to rapidly deploy. This is further complicated by the sheer number of actors involved in the delivery of logistics support to peace operations. Incentives and penalties for troop and police contributing countries are starting to be phased in. These may assist in generating some capabilities, but they are unlikely to be enough. Inter-
mission cooperation and innovation may provide other means to improve logistics delivery in complex and remote areas. While peace operations might be able to procure some resources locally, they also need to ensure they do so in coordination with other actors and in a sustainable manner, or they risk creating adverse effects in the mission area.

Partnerships for training and capacity-building remain central to supporting UN peacekeeping efforts. The emergence and growth in non-traditional threats make it important that training needs are regularly assessed. Some studies undertaken by the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) provide important analysis to support training and capacity-building needs. If partnerships are to be effective, then there needs to be a greater degree of information sharing, as well as matching of recipient needs with donor expertise.

The findings and conclusions of the Challenges Forum 2014 provide some insights into the views and perspectives of peacekeeping stakeholders on the changes that are emerging in UN peacekeeping. This is particularly timely as the UN prepares to undertake its most significant review of UN peace operations since the 2000 Brahimi Report. The UN Secretary-General has announced the formation of a High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations. The panel is expected to consult widely and report back in mid-2015. Many of the issues under discussion during the Challenges Forum 2014 will also be considered by the Panel and may be of interest to the wider peacekeeping community.
Summary of Recommendations

Discussions throughout the Challenges Annual Forum 2014 identified several recommendations to improve the capacity of UN peacekeeping to respond to diversified threats. These build on many of the detailed recommendations provided for consideration in the background papers prepared for the forum (available online).

The recommendations detailed below include suggested reforms to address gaps in policy, planning, training and coordination. Several recommendations may be of interest to the UNSG’s High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations.

Session 1: Enhance preparedness and consensus on addressing non-traditional threats

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<tr>
<th>NO</th>
<th>RECOMMENDATION</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Develop a political dialogue on addressing specific non-traditional threats among peacekeeping stakeholders. Opportunities could include thematic focus during the annual Heads of Military Component and/or Police Components meetings with the UNSC; a dedicated meeting of the UNSC Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations; briefings of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34); and panel discussions hosted by think-tanks and Member States.</td>
<td>UNSC C-34 Member States</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Review and update military manuals, guidance and training materials to include information on addressing non-traditional threats, such as terrorism and transnational organized crime. Projects underway to finalise military manuals and police guidance should consider these challenges.</td>
<td>UN DPKO/DFS</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Assess comprehensively the needs and approach of UN peace operations to information and ‘intelligence’ in order to identify the necessary skills and capabilities required by military, police and civilian personnel. Preliminary lessons could be drawn from the All Sources Information Fusion Cell in MINUSMA. Further dialogue should be considered among Member States.</td>
<td>UN DPKO/DFS Member States</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Establish a mechanism or entity within the UN to examine and forecast future needs of UN peace operations, including innovations, technologies, equipment and capabilities that may address emerging threats.</td>
<td>C-34/UNGA Fifth Committee UN DPKO/DFS UN DPA</td>
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### Session 2: Deter, mitigate and respond to threats against peacekeepers

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<td>5</td>
<td>Improve mission planning process utilising the UN Integrated Assessment and Planning methodology and ensure security risk related processes are routinely considered as part of the process.</td>
<td>UN DPKO/DFS, UN DSS</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Ensure the security risk environment is considered by the UN Security Council during the mission mandating process.</td>
<td>UN DPKO/DFS, UNSC ‘penholder’</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Develop and adopt policy and guidelines for military contingents and formed police units along the lines of the UN Security Management System (in consultation with Member States).</td>
<td>UN DPKO/DFS, UN DSS, Member States</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Conduct a study to determine which tactics, techniques and procedures for military, police and civilians fit current and future peace operations, including in the areas of security risk management and force protection. Identify ways to ensure those tactics, techniques and procedures are included in pre-deployment training.</td>
<td>UN DPKO/DFS, Member States</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>Develop standardised guidance on force generation and deployment processes for the internal use of UN DPKO and DFS.</td>
<td>UN DPKO/DFS</td>
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### Session 3: Improve logistics delivery and systems

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<td>10</td>
<td>Create a roster of logistics experts to undertake preliminary in-country assessments and deploy as part of mission start-up. The roster could include retired UN personnel and contractors.</td>
<td>UN DPKO/DFS</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>Undertake a preliminary assessment of host and transit state capabilities when it comes to logistical support in advance of a potential mission.</td>
<td>UN DPKO/DFS, Regional Orgs</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>Monitor and report back on the implementation of the key enabling capacities premium to ensure it has the desired effect throughout 2014/15.</td>
<td>UN DPKO/DFS</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>Consider applying a separate readiness premium to reward rapid deployment.</td>
<td>UNGA Fifth Committee</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>Develop a pilot project on providing unit-based reimbursement for valuable capabilities.</td>
<td>UN DPKO/DFS</td>
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### Session 4: Build partnerships and coordinate capacity-building and training efforts

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<td>15</td>
<td>Match training needs of willing troop and police contributors with those countries willing to provide capacity-building support as part of force generation processes.</td>
<td>UN DPKO/DFS</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>Create a new database that will be managed by the UN listing all training courses and exercises that meet UN standards.</td>
<td>UN DPKO/DFS</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>Consider capacity-building donor workshops to ensure donors work more closely together, particularly with recipient countries and in coordination with the region and the UN.</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>Harmonise the standards of different senior mission leadership courses with the UN Senior Mission Leadership Course.</td>
<td>UN DPKO/DFS</td>
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1. Introduction

Opening remarks: Sen Col Zhang Li, Deputy Director General, Peacekeeping Affairs Office, Ministry of National Defence, China; Ms Annika Hilding Norberg, Director, Challenges Forum, Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden; Keynotes: H.E. Mr Wang Xuexian, Former Ambassador of China to South Africa; Mr Hervé Ladsous, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations—remarks presented by Mr David Haeri, Director, Policy, Evaluation and Training Division, Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support, United Nations; Maj. Gen. Li Tiantian, Director General, Peacekeeping Affairs Office, Ministry of National Defence, China

The Challenges Annual Forum 2014 was hosted on 14–16 October in Beijing by the Peacekeeping Office in the Ministry of National Defence of China in cooperation with the Chinese Institute for International Strategic Studies (CIISS). More than 120 participants from 30 countries, the United Nations, academia and think-tanks took part in the dialogue over two days. The theme for annual forum was Building Capacity for Peace Operations in Response to Diversified Threats. Background papers (available online)

1, presentations and discussions examined the evolving nature of peace operation environments, how these affect peacekeeping contributors, and what could be done in terms of capacity-building efforts, training and technology to address these new and emerging challenges.

The discussions took place at an important juncture in the UN’s approach to peace operations. Close to 120,000 military, police and civilians are deployed to sixteen UN peacekeeping missions around the world. Peacekeeping missions have been substantially reconfigured or newly mandated in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) and South Sudan (UNMISS) in the last twelve months. More robust missions in Mali

1 The background papers prepared for the forum are available online via the Challenges Forum website: www.challengesforum.org.

‘In this global context of fewer but more complex and deeply rooted conflicts, the Security Council has continued to turn to UN peacekeeping’.

David Haeri, UN DPKO/DFS
(MINUSMA) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) have been re-authorised by the UN Security Council. The UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) is adapting to the emerging security concerns from the Ebola pandemic. And the UN Disengagement Force (UNDOF) in the Golan Heights has been forced to respond to kidnappings of its peacekeepers. In all these contexts, peacekeepers and civilians have been under direct threat, and while peacekeeping missions have demonstrated their ability to innovate (as demonstrated in UNMISS), they are more often poorly equipped and supported to respond.

With these developments and ongoing concerns, in June 2014 UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon informed the UN Security Council that he had asked the Secretariat to work on a review of peacekeeping. He acknowledged the need to assess evolving expectations and develop a shared understanding of the way forward. Peacekeeping had changed significantly since the last milestone review—the Brahimi Report—in 2000. Some of the areas identified for the review to consider were included in the Challenges Forum discussions, including missions mandates, logistical support, training, political support and technology. Analysis emerging from the discussions could make an important contribution to developing a shared understanding on a way forward to address some of the challenging environments that peacekeeping operations are currently deployed in.

As one of the panellists stated ‘we can see an arc of crisis extending from the Atlantic Ocean to the Indian Ocean’. For the sixth year in a row, more than 100 peacekeepers have died while serving in deployed contexts where more than 175 million people are looking for a life free from conflict. The level of human suffering remains immense. Peacekeeping plays an important role in addressing that level of suffering. Conference participants acknowledged the importance of ensuring that peacekeeping remained a flexible and dynamic tool to assist countries seeking help to address insecurity within their borders, protect their civilian population and build sustainable peace. The challenges identified were significant, but surmountable if there was a shared approach going forward.

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China’s Contribution to UN Peacekeeping

China’s contribution to UN peacekeeping has continued to steadily grow since it deployed its first peacekeepers to UNTSO in 1990. China contributes the most uniformed personnel among the permanent five members of the UN Security Council, and is the fourteenth largest troop and police contributor to peacekeeping overall. China has dispatched more than 25,000 personnel to UN peacekeeping missions, some of whom have lost their lives in service.

China currently has more than 2000 personnel deployed to nine UN peacekeeping operations (MINURSO, MONUSCO, UNAMID, UNIFIL, UNMIL, UNMISS, UNOCI and UNTSO). This includes thirteen formed units for engineering, transport, medical and force protection.

During the forum discussions, China noted that it was preparing to send a 700 person infantry battalion to South Sudan. It would be the first infantry battalion China has deployed to a UN peacekeeping mission. China also announced that it was preparing to dispatch a helicopter contingent to Cote D’Ivoire (again the first time China has dispatched an aviation unit).

In addition to providing critical force enablers such as engineering, medical and transport, China has also engaged in providing support to policy development, capacity-building efforts and training.

The peacekeeping centre where the 2014 Challenges Annual Forum was hosted was inaugurated in 2009. The centre provides a three-tiered system of training, at elementary, medium and advanced levels. Elementary training is for contingent members. Medium level training is for UN Military Observers, staff officers and key members of contingents. Advanced level training is focused on development of mission leadership. Fifteen courses are held annually. Since its establishment, the training centre has hosted 60 courses with over 3000 trainees.
Operating in a Diversified Threat Environment

It was noted during the forum that history has demonstrated that a country has a better chance of emerging from conflict when a peace operation is deployed. Timor-Leste, Sierra Leone, El Salvador, Mozambique and Cambodia are all countries that have benefitted from the deployment of UN peacekeepers. But the operating environments in which UN peace operations deploy at present differ from many of those previous contexts.

At the political level, peace operations are more frequently deploying into contexts where there may be no clear peace agreement or readily identifiable parties to the conflict. Relationships with host government may be protracted and uncertain, and the role of the mission may be challenged by several parties (something which has occurred in South Sudan and Darfur). As one speaker noted, in some instances peacekeeping is being used as a ‘wedge’ to build momentum for political discussions. This has been the case in Mali and the Central African Republic.

One reason for this development is the pressing need for the international community to respond in situations where civilians are under threat. This is why the UN Security Council established a peacekeeping mission in the Central African Republic, despite the political uncertainty and ongoing conflict. It is also the reason why the UN Security Council significantly reconfigured the UN’s presence in South Sudan in May 2014. Nonetheless, when peace operations are operating in environments where there is no clear peace agreement, or where the host government challenges its mandate, it creates difficult conditions for balancing the principles of peacekeeping on host government consent and impartiality.

This makes political consensus on the role of peacekeeping all the more important. But relations between state actors are more contested now than they were a decade ago. This is adding to the challenges when it comes to the contexts in which peace operations are operating, sometimes affecting consensus on the overall direction and mandate of a peacekeeping mission.

Several peace operations currently operate in non-permissive environments, creating concerns about the safety and security of peacekeeping personnel.
Within a one week period in October 2014, ten peacekeepers from MINUSMA were killed in two attacks in the north. More than 31 peacekeepers have been killed since MINUSMA was deployed in July 2013 with dozens more wounded. In South Sudan, a helicopter was shot down in August in 2014, killing four UN personnel on board.

While it was noted that conflicts today are fewer in number, they remain some of the most troublesome. A few of them are facing a second or third wave of conflict, as is the case in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Darfur and South Sudan. These conflicts are driven by a number of factors ranging from failing states to transnational organized crime and humanitarian and health crises. Conflicts extend beyond nation states to the regional and global dimensions. Of even more concern, these conditions provide the right environments for terrorist organizations to flourish.

Operations by well organized non-state actors have targeted UN personnel and installations. Filipino and Fijian peacekeepers were kidnapped in the Golan Heights in August by Al-Nusrah. Fortunately, the Filipino peacekeepers escaped and the Fijian peacekeepers were released without harm, but the incident demonstrated that peacekeepers are now perceived as political players in the context of broader regional conflicts. The Syrian civil war and expansive reach of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) will continue to affect the mandate and operation of missions in the Middle East region in the short to medium term future. And peace operations need to be prepared and equipped to address some of the threats that this creates.

One threat that continues to devastate UN peace operations is the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). They are utilised with high levels of disregard in Mali. In the Golan Heights, the Irish have deployed a counter-IED contingent to address the growing concern along the ceasefire line. But these are not standard capabilities for UN peace operations.

In addition to targeted threats, issues such as natural disasters and health security have impacted the operations of missions in recent years. UNMIL was on target for drawdown during 2014, but the spread of Ebola in Liberia and other countries in West Africa have threatened the post-conflict

‘It is imperative to safeguard safety of the peacekeepers. It is also urgent to optimise training and enhance peacekeepers’ capability in dealing with complex situations’.

HE Mr Wang Xuexian, Former Ambassador of China to South Africa
stability in the country, placing greater demands on the mission to not only support the international community’s response to the epidemic, but also to reinforce the state security and governance institutions under strain as a result of the crisis.

Demand for peacekeepers remains high and cannot be met. And doctrine development and capacity-building have not kept pace with the rapidly evolving environment on the ground in peace operations.

Designing Mandates and Capabilities for Future Peace Operations

The Designing Mandates project was intended to address questions such as: do we need to develop new and supplementary thinking and doctrine from these new mission typologies rather than strain existing doctrine to cover all mission variations? Or are the existing principles still valid and the term ‘peacekeeping’ indeed elastic enough to include operations that undertake offensive and even combat-like missions?

Over the last two years the Challenges partnership sought to address some of these questions by examining whether this changing environment required new approaches: strategically, operationally, tactically and doctrinally.

As a result, the partnership undertook four strands of work to examine these issues:

**Peace Operations Under New Conditions**: co-chaired by the Center for International Peace Operations, Germany and the United Services Institution of India

**Policies, Principles and Guidelines**: co-chaired by the National Defence University of Pakistan and the US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute

**Authority, Command and Control**: co-chaired by French Ministry of Defence in cooperation with the Nigerian Defence College

**Impact Assessment and Evaluation**: co-chaired by the Institute for Security Studies in South Africa and the former Canadian Pearson Peace Centre supported by the Australian Civil-Military Centre

The 2014 Challenges Forum was based on the preliminary findings of these strands of work and sought to translate them into concrete actions for capacity-
Collective Reform and Innovation

There is reason for optimism. Consider the improvements in UN peacekeeping that followed the systemic failures in Rwanda and Srebrenica in the mid-1990s. In response to these tragedies, the UN commissioned an independent panel to take a serious look at its peacekeeping efforts. In 2000, the panel presented the Brahimi Report that identified ways forward for UN peacekeeping. The Report also expressed a political resolve within the international community to ensure that UN peacekeeping would be more effective in its future efforts. Around that same time, other important developments in UN peacekeeping took place. In 1999, operations with executive mandates were launched in Kosovo and East Timor, and the first UN peace operation with a protection of civilians mandate was established in Sierra Leone.

Although peacekeeping is yet again facing a range of seemingly insurmountable challenges, the international community has demonstrated its political resolve to address these challenges. In addition to the UN Secretary-General’s review of peacekeeping and special political missions, more than 30 countries committed to efforts in support of peacekeeping at a specially held US-led summit in September 2014 at the margins of the UN General Assembly.

Modern day peace operations are more versatile. They are called upon to address humanitarian crises, ethnic and religious conflicts and post-war state reconstruction. But they cannot do everything. Communication and coordination remain essential to these efforts. This requires cooperation between the UN Security Council, troop and police contributing countries,
host governments and the UN Secretariat.

During the UN General Assembly’s Fourth Committee debate on peacekeeping in October 2014, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations identified the following priorities to strengthen peacekeeping: expanding the base of contributors, cooperation with regional actors, rapid deployment, improved intelligence and situational awareness, performance, and extending state authority, including through integrated planning and common funding pools\(^3\). Part of the difficulty in addressing these issues remains in the scarcity of resources (including troops, police and equipment), as well as the need for a more strategic approach to UN peacekeeping. Throughout the forum it was noted that evolving concepts may challenge the three core principles of peacekeeping, which require further analysis.

Protection of civilians is at the core of peacekeeping missions. The UN’s legitimacy is challenged every time civilians are at risk and it continues to be the measure of mission success. The UN response in South Sudan saved countless lives. Progress has been made developing guidance and training materials, and operational concepts of joint protection teams. But increasingly dangerous environments require peacekeepers to be proactive and decisive. Static postures are no longer sufficient, nor is it enough to protect by mere presence. It is essential for peacekeeping to provide ‘proactive protection’. This requires a change in mind-set among all those who form the peacekeeping partnerships—troop and police contributors, as well as the UN Security Council and financial contributors. Everyone must be on the same page about the need to adopt a forward leaning posture.

Peacekeeping missions need to respond to threats to civilians at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. The campaign in eastern DRC in MONUSCO is a good example. This approach requires mobility and rapid reaction, with new capabilities, modified equipment and accommodation, and new technology. Force multipliers and enabling capacities are central to these efforts.

There are good examples of innovation and responses by peacekeeping missions. In South Sudan, the mission rapidly erected POC sites under tough circumstances. In Mali, peacekeepers patrol the streets of Kidal and help repair roads and schools. In the DRC, the deployment of the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) has expanded the reach of the mission to protect vulnerable civilians. But work needs to continue to ensure that peacekeeping missions carry on innovating and reforming. Discussions and dialogue as part of the upcoming Secretary-General’s review will be essential in ensuring there is consensus among the partnership on the approach to UN peacekeeping in the 21st century.
UNSG’s High-level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations

During a UN Security Council debate on peacekeeping in June 2014, the UN Secretary-General asked the Secretariat to initiate a review of UN peacekeeping. He noted that as the fifteen year anniversary of the Brahimi Report was nearing ‘it may be necessary to again take stock of evolving expectations of UN peacekeeping and how the Organization can work toward a shared view of the way forward’.

At the end of October 2014, the UNSG announced the establishment of a High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, consisting of seventeen eminent persons to undertake the review. It will be chaired by José Ramos-Horta, with Ameerah Haq serving as Vice-Chair.

The review will incorporate analysis of peacekeeping operations and special political missions. The UN Secretary-General identified several key areas the panel would assess: ‘the changing nature of conflict, evolving mandates, good offices and peacebuilding challenges, managerial and administrative arrangements, planning, partnerships, human rights and protection of civilians, uniformed capabilities for peacekeeping operations and performance’.

The review will also complement other significant studies underway in 2015, including the review of the UN’s peacebuilding architecture and the Global Study on the Implementation of UN Security Council resolution 1325.

It is anticipated that the panel will report back to the UN Secretary-General in mid-2015, with the report to be shared with Member States for implementation.

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2. Promoting Peacekeepers’ Capacity to Address Non-traditional Threats

Background Paper: ‘Peacekeeping at the Precipice: Is Everything Going Wrong for the UN?’
Mr Richard Gowan, Associate Director, Center for International Cooperation, New York University, United States; Panellists: Dr Katy Clement, Senior Programme Advisor and Senior Fellow, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Switzerland; Maj. Gen. (ret’d) Liu Chao, Former Force Commander, UNFICYP, China; Lt. Gen. (Ret’d.) Chander Prakash Wadhwa, Former Force Commander, MONUSCO, Member, United Services Institution of India; Mr Jean-Yonel Trecile, Inspector General and Director, Cabinet of the Haiti National Police, Haiti.

Peace operations have had to evolve and adapt to respond to the changing nature of conflict, sophistication of non-state actors, shifting geopolitics and the emergence of a range of non-traditional threats. These developments have presented a combination of immediate, systemic and in some cases, paradigmatic threats to UN peace operations at large. Discussions during this session explored the range of non-traditional threats that UN peace operations are being confronted with, what characteristics they have in common, and what capabilities and skill-sets are required for peacekeepers to deliver on their mandates given these challenges in mission areas.

As one presenter during this session suggested, UN peacekeeping is at the ‘precipice’. It is unclear whether peacekeeping is facing another near death experience, as it did in the 1990s, or whether it can resurrect itself and remain an effective tool to maintain international peace and security in the 21st century.

History has demonstrated that in order for the UN to respond to challenges, it often has to fail in the first instance. Parallels were drawn to the failures that occurred in Somalia, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia in

1 Richard Gowan, ‘Peacekeeping at the Precipice: Is Everything Going Wrong for the UN?’, Background Paper (Challenges Forum, October 2014).
2 Gowan, 2014.
3 Gowan, 2014.
the 1990s. The impact of those events resulted in the UN Security Council cutting back the deployment of peace operations. But it also prompted serious introspection regarding the protection of civilians in the context of peace operations. As a result, most peacekeeping operations mandated since 1999 have protection of civilians as an integral part of their mandate. Efforts by the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) to protect close to 100,000 civilians on UN bases when civil war broke out in December 2013 demonstrated how far the UN had come since its failures to protect civilians in the 1990s. It is possible for peacekeeping to remain a responsive tool, provided there is political support, leadership and innovation to meet new challenges.

Nonetheless, the success stories continue to be overshadowed by the challenges on the ground. The UN has come very close to being overwhelmed throughout 2014, with many of its missions pushed to breaking point. In a five week period from mid-August to mid-September, the UN had to deal with terrorist attacks in MINUSMA, kidnapping of peacekeepers from UNDOF in the Golan Heights, the shooting down of a helicopter in UNMISS and the unfolding crisis of Ebola, which affected the operations of UNMIL.\(^4\)

During a UN Security Council debate on peacekeeping in June 2014, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon identified three key challenges to the operation of current peacekeeping missions: environments where ‘there is no peace to keep’; an ‘absence of clearly identifiable parties to the conflict or a viable political process’; and ‘asymmetric and unconventional threats’.\(^5\)

Missions that were previously making progress fell into turmoil throughout 2013 and 2014. The fragile political bargain that emerged following the independence of South Sudan in July 2011 collapsed into civil war in December 2013, placing significant demands on the operation of the peacekeeping mission and straining the already delicate relationship with the host Government. The Syrian civil war has affected the operations of UNDOF in the Golan Heights, where peacekeepers are now viewed as legitimate targets by non-state actors. The agreement reached between Israel and Syria in 1974 has increasingly limited value in an operational

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\(^4\) Gowan, 2014.

environment full of competing non-state actors. And in Liberia, preparations to draw down the presence of UNMIL have been put on hold as the country faces a systemic health crisis with the Ebola epidemic. The pandemic not only threatens the operation of already fragile state institutions and the maintenance of the peace in the country, but also presents a new challenge to the safety and security of peacekeepers.

In recent years, new and reconfigured peace operations have continued to be deployed into hostile environments. The authorised deployment of 300 unarmed observers as part of the UN Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) in 2012 only lasted four months, with efforts hampered by the deteriorating security situation and lack of host government support. The deployment of MINUSMA to Mali in early 2013 took place in parallel with French forces undertaking counter-terrorism operations.

There are disagreements within the peacekeeping community as to whether these developments are new challenges, or simply part of the cyclical evolution of UN peace operations. During the UN Security Council debate on peacekeeping in June 2014, Jordan’s Permanent Representative—a former UN peacekeeper himself—argued that the challenges faced today are just as complex as those of the past, yet the means to address those challenges continued to diminish as fewer countries were willing to provide troops and police, and risk casualties when there was no immediate national interest at stake. Unfortunately, regardless of how you interpret the nature of current peacekeeping challenges, history has demonstrated that the evolution of peacekeeping has often resulted in periods of humiliation and introspection to the UN.

Whilst self-confessed pessimism shaped some of the panel’s discussions, positive developments were also highlighted. These included the demonstrated leadership and political determination of UNMISS opening up UN bases to protect the civilian population from the imminent threat of physical violence and the authorisation of the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) in the DRC. Other mission innovations like the OPCW mission to manage Syria’s chemical weapons and the UN Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER)—while not peacekeeping missions—demonstrate

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political resolve among the permanent members of the UN Security Council to ensure that the UN remains responsive to new challenges and threats. These responses provide examples of some of the innovative and flexible approaches that might be considered to address the emerging challenges to peacekeeping.

Despite these innovations there remain splits within the UN Security Council and among peacekeeping contributors on the role of peacekeeping missions and what tasks peacekeepers should be undertaking. Political consensus is becoming more fragmented, which is affecting the ability of some missions to meet basic operational goals. It is anticipated that the UNSG’s High-level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations will address some of these challenges and emerging needs. Formulating an agreed approach to the role of peace operations in addressing and responding to non-traditional threats will form an important part of those efforts.

Non-traditional Threats in Mission Areas

Non-traditional threats to peacekeeping missions are multi-faceted and often asymmetric in nature. As one presenter noted, they can emerge in a sudden or unexpected manner, have intra-state and inter-state dimensions, pose multiple risks to peacekeepers and exploit vulnerabilities that exist. They often arise from non-state actors, are transnational in nature, can be inconspicuous and difficult to detect, and require a response beyond the military sphere. Non-traditional threats may require the missions to negotiate with the host government, for either tactical or appeasement reasons, particularly when it comes to issues such as freedom of movement.

Non-traditional threats may include (but are not limited to): terrorism, transnational organized crime, piracy, asymmetric warfare, cyber insecurity, environmental degradation and corruption. It is possible that list will continue to grow as the individuals and groups that seek to disrupt the work of peace operations identify new means and methods to do so.

While there are commonalities among non-traditional threats, there are also differences that make it particularly important for the UN to plan and prepare to respond to them in mission areas.

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8 Gowan, 2014.
Terrorism creates a challenge for peace operations, the host authorities and regional neighbours. It poses a direct threat to the security of civilians. It often involves non-state actors seeking to disrupt the establishment of peace or any political agreement. And it frequently involves the use of asymmetric weaponry and tactics to carry out attacks on civilians and peacekeepers.

The UN Security Council has exhibited reluctance to expand the role of peacekeeping to include counter-terrorism operations. Discussions among conference participants also indicated that there was no consensus as to whether it is the role of peace operations to engage in counter-terrorism activities. Counter-terrorism operations often require the adoption of an offensive posture to defeat terrorist networks, which is generally something that peacekeeping missions are not prepared or trained to do. As demonstrated in Mali, MINUSMA relies on the work of French forces operating in the Sahel (as part of Operation Barkhan) to carry out counter-terrorism operations.

Nonetheless, it is difficult for UN peacekeeping to ignore or fail to respond to terrorist activities when they continue to directly target peacekeepers through surreptitious means such as the use of IEDs, suicide bombers and kidnappings. Recent events have unfortunately confirmed that UN peacekeeping needs to be prepared to defend itself against these attacks. In some cases, peacekeepers may also need to work with host state security forces in building their capacity to defend against them as well. Force protection, situational awareness, intelligence and training are essential to these efforts.

Transnational organized crime also poses a threat to the effective implementation of peacekeeping mandates. It presents itself in many forms, including the trafficking of drugs, weapons and human beings. It can fuel corruption, provide the means for non-state actors to prolong conflict and undermine already fragile financial and governance institutions. This creates challenges not only for the safety and security of peacekeepers and civilians, but also for the implementation of mandates which include early peacebuilding tasks. It is less likely that efforts to establish stable security, governance and financial institutions in countries emerging from conflict will be sustainable when there are endemic forms of crime and corruption that continue to operate across a country’s borders.

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The nature of transnational organized crime means that the UN needs to ensure peace operations are equipped to work with regional organizations and international agencies in an effort to address some of these challenges. Greater cooperation and communication with mechanisms such as UN Security Council sanctions regimes and training for peacekeepers on the implementation of arms embargoes could assist in these efforts.

Rapid evolutions in the cyber field also mean that the UN needs to improve its efforts to protect critical information systems. It is essential that command and control networks are defended, particularly when reliance on information remains central to the successful conduct of peace operations. Even a short attack on the UN’s electronic networks could interrupt communications and have a serious and devastating impact on operations.

One less explored non-traditional threat during the discussions was that of climate change, environmental disasters and health pandemics. The earthquake that took place in Haiti in 2010 highlighted the need for peace operations to be prepared to respond to any contingency that may arise. Natural disasters often have severe social and economic consequences. In some cases, they can contribute to disease and medical endemics. Peacekeepers need to be prepared to deliver humanitarian assistance in these circumstances.

Even those environmental occurrences that are expected continue to have an impact on mission operations and the potential cycle of conflict. In South Sudan, the rainy season has caused concerns about the spread of disease in IDP camps. The impact of extreme heat in places such as Mali affects the type of equipment that may function in the mission environments. In all these contexts, peacekeeping missions need to be prepared, trained and equipped to operate in these circumstances, and respond when they change. Transport, medical and engineering units are essential, at least to ensure that support can be provided until such time that humanitarian and international aid agencies are in a position to assist.

The spread of Ebola in West Africa was noted on several occasions throughout the discussions. UNMIL (and subsequently MINUSMA) have had to put in place contingency measures to support international and local efforts to stop the spread of the disease, as well as protocols to ensure that the disease does not create unnecessary risks for peacekeepers. Health insecurity is yet another non-traditional threat that may impact the future of UN peace operations.
In order to promote the capacity of peacekeepers to address non-traditional threats, peace operations need to understand their operating environment and work collaboratively (where feasible) with the host government in responding to them. Such efforts will require an ongoing political dialogue with the host government, greater consensus among peacekeeping stakeholders on the role of peacekeeping (particularly the use of force), information and intelligence and effective futures and contingency planning.

**Peacekeeping, Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime**

In some contexts, UN peace operations are mandated to undertake activities that assist in building the capacity of host authorities to govern and provide security, by supporting the development of state institutions and training local personnel. The adoption of resolutions 2151 (SSR) and 2185 (policing) and 2195 (terrorism and transnational organized crime) recognised these important functions.

Terrorism and transnational organized crime flourish in environments where there is insecurity and a lack of governance. These are often the same environments where peace operations are deployed. The fragile nature of security institutions such as the police, justice, corrections and customs enable threats to proliferate. Peace operations have an important role in strengthening these host state institutions, thereby reducing the risk that these threats pose to the local population as well as to the international community.

The peacekeeping mission in Mali (MINUSMA) includes provisions in its current mandate (resolution 2164) urging all Member States, particularly those in the Sahel and Maghreb, to coordinate efforts to prevent the threat of terrorist groups and those seeking safe havens, with an aim to limit their expansion as well as the proliferation of transnational organized crime and arms.

MINUSMA’s mandate also includes provisions requesting the mission to work closely with UN-mandated sanctions committees pursuant to resolutions 1267 and 1989 (Al-Qaida) to support information sharing, as well as supporting Malian authorities to address the proliferation and illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons. Provisions supporting the work of the UN-mandated sanctions committee and the implementation of arms embargoes have also been included in the recently established UN peacekeeping mission in the Central African Republic (resolution 2149).
Resolution 2185 (adopted in November 2014) recognises that peacekeeping operations and special political missions, particularly police components, can assist in capacity-building efforts to address illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons and provide expertise to host governments on the implementation of sanctions regimes.

More recently, resolution 2195 (adopted in December 2014) recognised that peacekeeping and special political missions may (if mandated) assist host governments to address illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons. During the debate that took place following the adoption of the resolution, the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs suggested that activities to address terrorism should be mainstreamed into the work of UN peace operations.10


Political Dialogue with the Host Government

Consent of the parties—generally the host government—is a prerequisite to the authorisation of any peace operation. But a difficult relationship between the host government, the UN Security Council and peace operations can often undermine the performance of a peacekeeping mission. In order for peacekeepers to effectively respond to the range of non-traditional threats previously outlined, it is critical that that the mission attempts to build a productive political dialogue and working relationship with the host government.

Discussions identified several examples of missions that have had difficulty in doing so in recent years. The role of the UN Mission in in Côte D’Ivoire was challenged following the electoral outcome during 2010–2011. More recently, in South Sudan, host authorities have harassed the peacekeeping mission and blocked humanitarian relief in some cases. In Darfur, the hybrid UN-AU mission is operating in an environment of increasing hostility from the Sudanese Government. Extending state authority in contexts such as the newly established mission in the CAR (MINUSCA) can be near impossible given the weak nature of host authorities. Even in environments where a peacekeeping mission’s relationship with the government is more stable, there are still challenges. Congolese President Joseph Kabila has threatened to expel peacekeepers from the DRC on
several occasions, despite the mission’s stable presence in the country for fifteen years.\textsuperscript{11}

One of the greater concerns with the emergence of non-traditional threats is the role of broader geopolitics. As one panellist noted, the UN needs to focus on rebalancing its relationship with the Arab world. The emergence and growth of the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) continues to have a destabilizing impact on UN operations in the Middle East, as demonstrated by the kidnapping of UN peacekeepers from UNDOF in August 2014. It was agreed that the UN needs to identify ways to bridge these divides at the political and strategic level as well.

In some instances, there may be a trust deficit with the host government. They may feel threatened by the presence of the peace operations. In many instances, it can come down to difference in leadership and personalities. But that makes it even more important that peacekeeping mission leadership invest the time in establishing a productive working relationship with the host government. Close cooperation with the host government and neighbouring countries is essential in addressing non-traditional threats, which are generally cross-border in nature and involve the work of non-state actors.

Good examples of this cooperation exist. One panellist described in detail the work that the UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) had cooperatively undertaken with the local policing authorities to build capacity and address criminal elements operating within the country. Several other examples existed among missions that had transitioned and drawn-down. But it was also acknowledged that many of these missions were not required to confront the number and scale of complex regional threats operating in regions such as the Middle East and Sahel today.

\textsuperscript{11} Gowan, 2014.
Addressing Transnational Organized Crime in MINUSTAH

Haiti has had peace operations deployed in the country since 1993, including several reiterations of UN peacekeeping operations. The UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) was first mandated in 2004 by Security Council resolution 1542. The mission has a multidimensional mandate, focusing on protection of civilians, restoring the rule of law and establishment of governance institutions and supporting the electoral process.

The devastating earthquake in Haiti in January 2010 required a significant adjustment in the mission mandate to support immediate humanitarian needs. Following gains in early peacebuilding efforts, subsequent mandates have started to authorise a drawdown of personnel.

The Haitian National Police (HNP) have had to deal with a range of non-traditional threats, including transnational organized crime and conflict between rebel groups and non-state actors. MINUSTAH has had some success in combatting criminal groups, however ongoing capacity-building efforts will be essential to ensuring that state institutions are not weakened by a culture of impunity and lack of accountability. The peace operation needs to be prepared to work with the government and security institutions to address the issue of transnational organized crime.

Consensus on the Future Role of Peacekeeping

Discussions during the forum demonstrated that differing views exist among stakeholders on the role of peacekeeping. This serves to further complicate efforts to develop a consensus approach to addressing some of the new and emerging threats that peace operations will continue to face.

The decision to deploy the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) into the DRC as part of MONUSCO was one identified area of contention.

That development has elicited differing political views among peacekeeping contributors. Some African contingents had demonstrated more willingness to use force in implementing peacekeeping mandates. The make-up of the
FIB with contributors from South Africa, Tanzania and Malawi supported this assertion.\textsuperscript{12} Whereas other peacekeeping contributors, including many from South Asia, were more cautious in their interpretation of the peacekeeping mandate, asserting that traditional peacekeeping principles prevented robust action being undertaken, or arguing that the mandate of the FIB was separate to that of the overall mission.

These differing interpretations also extended to implementation of the protection of civilians mandate in UNMISS. Again, differing interpretations on the role of peacekeeping when it comes to protection of civilians meant that national contingents had different approaches. Some interpreted the mandate broadly and as a result, suggested the need for wide-ranging patrols beyond UN bases, whereas others took a narrower view and remained on base.\textsuperscript{13} In some instances, the tendency (or compulsion) for national contingents to ‘phone home’ to their national capitals for instructions continues to place unsustainable demands on command and control arrangements within peacekeeping missions.

These differing views threaten the overall political compact that underpins peacekeeping, which can lead to disputes in the field, at headquarters and in the UN Security Council. As peacekeeping faces a broader and greater range of threats, it is critical that the stakeholders involved come to a consensus about the future role of peacekeeping, particularly its role in addressing non-traditional threats. The High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations will assist in setting that vision, but political discussions and dialogue among all stakeholders—in the Security Council, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34) and international forums such as Challenges—will form an important part of that effort. Engagement between senior officials in New York, troop and police contributing countries and regional organizations will also be critical.

\textbf{Situational Awareness, Information and Intelligence}

While it was agreed that improved situational awareness, information and analysis was an essential capability in identifying and addressing non-traditional threats, differing views existed among stakeholders on whether ‘intelligence’ has a role in UN peace operations. The emergence of non-traditional threats, particularly those that directly target peacekeepers,

\textsuperscript{12} Gowan, 2014.
\textsuperscript{13} Gowan, 2014.
has prompted further discussion on UN efforts to generate information and operational intelligence which will assist it in preparing for and responding to those attacks.

As one panellist noted, if you have consent of all the parties to an operation and everyone is happy you are there, you only require information. But, if an individual or a group is trying to kill or target peacekeepers, then the dynamic changes somewhat and you need to have a different type of program, such as an intelligence system. To eliminate attacks, you need to know who is behind them.

Those expressing concerns about the use of intelligence did so in relation to its potential use against the host government or other state actors. One way forward to address this concern might involve distinguishing between different levels of intelligence at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Intelligence at the strategic level may be classified as threatening to a regime and government, but at the operational and tactical level, it can be helpful to operational effectiveness. Such information could be used against ‘spoilers’ with the support of the host government, and may ultimately support the safety and security of personnel in the mission. In this regard, accurate intelligence or ‘good intelligence’ can play an important role particularly against the emergence of non-state actors and terrorists.

Unfortunately, intelligence at the tactical level is often lacking. Fifteen years ago the Brahimi Report proposed the idea of information analysis units. Most peacekeeping missions currently have Joint Mission Analysis Cells (JMAC) and Joint Operations Centres (JOC) to contribute to situational awareness among mission leadership. However, there were differing views among participants on whether these units were equipped to develop mission intelligence (as many career intelligence officers were reluctant to work in them for that purpose).

Differing views on the role of intelligence in peacekeeping restrict efforts to move forward and develop more sophisticated networks against potential spoilers. Improvements could be made in the use of more advanced technologies and communications networks. It is unclear whether disruptive technologies such as jammers might have a role, but these are issues that need to be considered in greater depth.

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An absence of political support around the use of intelligence is not the only challenge. The ability of peacekeeping to develop an effective intelligence capability will also continue to be hampered by a lack of confidentiality, both in terms of secure systems (potential cyber insecurity) and personnel. It has happened before. When MONUSCO was about to capture Bosca Nkonga in the DRC, the information was leaked.

Developments such as the establishment of an Information, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) Unit in Mali may be a model going forward. Sweden has deployed a unit of approximately 200 people to MINUSMA to support the work of the ISR unit, which is also supporting the All Sources Information Fusion Unit. It is anticipated it will reach full operational capability by early 2015. These developments may provide a conceptual approach for the use of intelligence and broader situational awareness in peacekeeping missions.

Effective situational awareness is only helpful if the peacekeeping mission is prepared, willing and able to react quickly on that information. This makes effective force processes generation and rapidly deployable capabilities essential. These challenges are examined in more depth in subsequent chapters. China’s experience in MINUSMA provides a useful case study on responding rapidly to the changing circumstances in the mission environment.

Experience of China’s Force Protection Contingent Deployed to MINUSMA

On the 6 December 2013, the Government of China decided to deploy a force protection contingent of 170 soldiers to Mali. It was the first time that the Chinese Government had sent an infantry company to serve on a UN mission. The contingent provided force protection for sector headquarters and Level 2 hospitals in the east sector.

During the ten month tour of duty, the contingent conducted 458 patrols, more than ten humanitarian operations and provided protection for 239 convoys. They also carried out tasks to protect civilians, including women and children.

The contingent faced two main challenges that affected its operational
effectiveness: terrorist attacks on peacekeepers, and environmental factors such as high temperatures and dusty weather.

The deployment highlighted the importance of rapid reaction. The Chinese contingent assessed that approximately 82 per cent of terrorist attacks took place before dawn. In order to deal with these threats, commanding officers needed to rapidly discern the enemy’s intention, then gradually escalate military forces. To respond to this, the Chinese contingent established a quick reaction platoon which was on 30 minutes’ notice to be deployed. Sentries also had the ability to address any threats within two minutes. Situational awareness was critical.

Futures and Contingency Planning

The 2000 Brahimi Report was forward thinking in identifying many of the challenges that peace operations would confront in the first decade of the 21st century. But history has demonstrated that peacekeeping is not a static tool, it is an evolving one. The peacekeeping principles have remained consistent throughout peacekeeping’s 60-plus year history. But their interpretation has continued to evolve and adapt to the changing circumstances that peacekeeping operations face.

The UN Security Council has demonstrated willingness and resolve to deploy peace operations into more challenging and high-risk environments in recent years. In many instances, this has been in response to immediate concerns about threats to civilians and the need to be seen to do something. But it has taken some time for peacekeeping missions to adapt and respond to the non-traditional threats in these environments. Ongoing analysis, planning and forecasting within the UN Secretariat and regional organizations will be needed to ensure that peacekeeping remains an effective tool.

Many innovations in peacekeeping missions have emerged in the field. But it is clear that the challenges confronting peacekeeping missions—particularly the emergence of a range of complex and non-traditional threats—requires strategic direction from UN headquarters. It also requires ongoing consideration of a range of questions: What types of threats will the UN face in the next few years? How might the missions be best
prepared to respond? What equipment and training will troop and police require? Improved futures and contingency planning—particularly within the Office of Military Affairs—may be worth further consideration.

The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Department of Field Support (DFS) have developed a strategic vision for uniformed capability development in the medium term. Priority areas of the agenda include: rapid response capabilities (including troops and strategic lift capacity), increased mobility of units (including aviation support), enhanced medical support, IED survivability measures, improved information and analysis and expertise to address transnational threats.15 Participants agreed this was a good start in addressing emerging non-traditional threats. But it is only the starting point.

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15 Ladsous, October 2014.
3. Enhancing Peace Operations’ Capacity to Face Threats Against Peacekeepers

Background Paper: ‘Enhancing Peace Operations’ Capacity to Face Threats Against Peacekeepers’
Mr William R. Phillips, International Consultant Peace Operations, Former Staff Member UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, United Nations;¹
Panellists: Dr Ulf Sverdrup, Director General, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Norway; Lt. Gen. Carlos Santos de Cruz, Force Commander, MONUSCO, United Nations; Ms Kristina Bergendal, Director, Deputy Head, Department of Security Policy, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Sweden.

Threats against peacekeepers and peace operations have intensified in recent years. Peacekeepers are deploying into increasingly hostile environments where they are confronted with a diverse range of threats, often with minimal preparation and limited equipment to respond to them.

As detailed comprehensively in the background paper, security threats to UN peace operations are usually categorised in terms of armed conflict, terrorism, civil unrest and criminality.² Peace operations are usually conducted where there is an acceptable level of risk. In cases where this does not exist, then measures are usually put in place to lower the risk. This may involve prevention measures (such as training) or mitigation to lower the impact (such as medical response).

Throughout the discussions, participants identified several areas of potential reform to prevent and mitigate the security risk to peacekeepers. These included strong leadership, the adoption of deterrent mission postures,

‘Increasingly, these deployments occur prior to a post-conflict period and in the absence of a political framework to steer a long-term political solution. This has shown to heighten security risk to peacekeepers’.

William Phillips, Consultant

improved policy and planning processes, training standards that focused on security-risk management, capability-focused force generation processes and the use and application of modern technology.

**Intensified Security Threats to Peacekeepers**

Security dynamics in modern day conflicts continue to evolve and adapt, increasing the threat posted to peace operations. As one panellist noted, contemporary conflicts tend to be prolonged and involve a range of actors, including the host government, anti-government forces, state-sponsored militias, armed criminal elements, other governments’ military forces and regional organizations’ military. Examples of groups that posed or continue to pose direct or indirect security threats to peacekeeping missions include the former M23 Movement of eastern DRC, janjaweed in Darfur, jihadist armed groups such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb or Ansar Dine in Mali, the Nuer White Army in South Sudan and armed criminal elements in Darfur and northern Mali.3

Another reason that threats against peace operations appear to have increased is attributable to the timing of recent deployments. Recently mandated peace operations in the CAR and Mali have taken place prior to a post-conflict period, in the absence of a political framework and with the consent of only a few actors. Peace operations may not have broad support from elements of the population and as a result, may find themselves targets by spoilers to the peace process and other armed groups. For example, in Mali over a sixteen month period, MINUSMA was the primary or secondary target of 74 hostile acts which killed eleven peacekeepers and injured an additional 58 personnel. In UNDOF, the Syrian Civil War has resulted in ongoing hostilities with an estimated 40 anti-government elements using heavy weaponry and improved explosive devices. Similar challenges have emerged in South Sudan throughout the last year, and may likely extend to the CAR as well.4 These developments raise legitimate questions about whether there are limits to peacekeeping in these circumstances.

Some participants suggested that it may be time to consider reviewing the principles of peacekeeping or at least updating their interpretation, noting that they were established in a different context. Views differed on

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whether it was possible for modern day peace operations to remain impartial between civilians and armed groups.

A key challenge for the UN Secretariat remains in ensuring that peacekeeping policy, planning, training and guidance keep pace with the developments that are occurring on the ground. At present, changes in the field are outpacing the UN Secretariat’s efforts to respond effectively. A more conceptual approach could assist in this area. It would bring together the political framework, mandate, strategic and mission-level guidance and planning direction, operational support and emergency plans, security policy and tactics techniques and procedures fitted to the operational environment.\textsuperscript{5}

**Policy and Planning Processes**

Responsibility for safety and security in peacekeeping missions is divided among several actors within the UN system. The strongest body of policy on the UN’s approach to safety and security in field missions is the UN Security Management System policy manual. It outlines an agreed set of policies that specify methods, procedures and standards for security management as it relates to deployed civilians and individually deployed police and military. But no coherent standard exists for military contingents or formed police units that are deployed. They often rely on national standards, which may differ from the UN’s approach. This can result in an *ad hoc* and poorly defined force protection posture. One reform that might improve the approach of UN peace operations to mitigating security risks would be to adopt policy and guidelines for military contingents and formed police units along the lines of the UN Security Management System.\textsuperscript{6}

The UN Integrated Assessment and Planning Policy provides further guidance that could assist in mitigating security concerns in peacekeeping missions. Nonetheless, a lot of planning continues to be conducted in stovepipes, which hinders integration of efforts, particularly from a security perspective. As a result, there is high potential for incoherent plans, resource wastage and high security risks.\textsuperscript{7}

\textsuperscript{5} Phillips, 2014
\textsuperscript{6} Phillips, 2014.
\textsuperscript{7} Phillips, 2014.
Improved mission planning processes which utilise the UN methodology and expand consideration of security risk-related processes would address some of these concerns.

In addition to internal planning and security processes, the UN Security Council also has an important role in determining what type of security environments it is willing to deploy UN resources into, and whether there are means through the mission mandating process to mitigate some of the concerns. In some instances, the UN Security Council may assess that the security environment is not yet right for a UN peace operation. In Somalia, the UN has modified its footprint in recent years, but continued to rely on African Union Forces (AMISOM) to carry out the more robust elements of peace operations in that operational theatre. Similar decisions are made in contexts where ‘bridging forces’ are deployed in advance of a peace operation (where the UN is unlikely to generate the necessary numbers of personnel and equipment in a short period of time).

If a decision is made to authorise a UN peace operation, then one approach might involve ensuring that the security risk environment is considered adequately during the mission mandating process.8 This could assist in making sure that the mission is provided with the necessary authorisations and capabilities to respond to potential threats against peacekeepers.

Deterrent Mission Postures and Strong Leadership

The overall posture of a peace operation can serve to reduce potential security risks to peacekeepers, as well as contribute to the end-state of the mission. If spoilers assess that an operation is likely to respond with force to attacks, it may reduce or remove intention to cause harm against the UN. Alternatively, if they assess that it is unlikely the peace operation will respond, then they may be more inclined to take offensive action against peacekeepers, or the civilian population.

As one of the panellists noted during the discussions, it is imperative that peace operations change their modus operandi from one of deterrence by presence only to one of deterrence by action. This requires force commanders to demonstrate leadership. But it also requires troops and personnel on the ground to demonstrate initiative, flexibility and a degree

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of independent thinking. For example, this might involve taking a more practical approach to night operations and how to protect themselves from snipers.

Nonetheless, the use of force is complicated. In one instance in MONUSCO, pilots were required to respond to an attack on their helicopters just days after arriving in the mission area of operations. They needed to be prepared to respond to the challenging situation they were placed in from day one. The same applies to mission leadership when they are confronted with challenging security situations.

Peacekeepers need to prepare for the reality that they will confront on the ground. They need to know where the threat is and be proactive. Spoilers should be the ones required to lose their freedom of movement—not the peace operation. According to one of the panellists, preparation for deployment to peace operations for military contingents should involve more training on combat procedures. Soldiers have to understand that sometimes they need to be overwhelming in their use of force to win the battle. The proposition that the use of force creates an adverse reaction in the local community is theoretical. In MONUSCO, experience had confirmed exactly the opposite. Failure to take action—particularly to protect civilians—usually results in the stoning of UN vehicles, or much worse.

There was general consensus among participants that the current system allowed for differing approaches to deterrence and the use of force, and as a result is not working in meeting expectations when it comes to mandate implementation. Some current and former force commanders acknowledged that information and intelligence operations would assist in ensuring that the mission was able to develop a more robust posture, as well as develop an ability to identify potential threats to the mission’s overall operations.
Innovation in MONUSCO—Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and the Fore Intervention Brigade

On 28 March 2013, the UN Security Council re-authorised the mandate for the UN Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). Resolution 2098 established a significant change from earlier mandates for the mission. It authorised the establishment of Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) and authorised the mission to neutralise armed groups. The decision to do so was influenced in part by the failure of MONUSCO to protect civilians when the M23 rebel group took over Goma in November 2012.

The FIB started to deploy in April 2013. It is comprised of contingents from Tanzania, South Africa and Malawi. Early operations defeated the M23.

The FIB continues to undertake action against the rebel groups that continue to terrorise and fuel conflict in the eastern DRC. The deployment of the FIB was re-authorised again in March 2014 through UN Security Council resolution 2147.

MONUSCO has also been a test case for the first deployment of Unmanned Unarmed Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) as part of a peace operation. The first UAV was launched by MONUSCO in December 2013. Since then, UAVs have provided valuable situational awareness that have assisted in mission efforts to protect the civilian population.

While both these innovations have assisted with the implementation of MONUSCO’s mandate, particularly as it relates to protection of civilians, some countries have expressed concerns about their application more broadly to peacekeeping, primarily from a legal, financial and policy perspective.


Training Standards to Focus on Security-risk Management

Reviews of security incidents in UN peacekeeping missions—particularly those with military and police components—have shown vulnerability in basic training areas. This has included aspects such as situational awareness, movement reconnaissance and ground movements, individual and unit
force protection measures, communications and emergency response. Furthermore, while mission environments may be somewhat similar in structure and require general security training, the presence of non-traditional threats increasingly meant that mission-specific security concerns needed to be included as part of pre-deployment training.

It is essential for military and police tactics, techniques and procedures to fit the operational environment and security situation. For example, traditional techniques were found unsuitable in the operating environment in Haiti, where the mission needed to be prepared to address criminal gangs. In response, the mission developed urban tactics that allowed it to respond to the criminal threat that they posed. Again, a similar situation emerged in UNMISS and its ability to deal with the protection of civilian mandate. An integrated approach was needed to bring together the various mission components to effectively implement the mandate. In doing so, they reduced the security risk to the civilians as well as the peacekeepers themselves.10

Training at the pre-deployment phase and in-mission also needs to focus on security risk management. Civilians and individual military and police deploying to peacekeeping missions are required to complete the program on Safe and Secure Approaches in Field Environments (SSAFE). Providing specific training for the security environment that contingents and formed police units are deploying into remains a constant challenge. For example, personnel deployed to UNDOF require training in counter-IED detection and response, mine awareness and the use of medical trauma bags. If it does not happen before they deploy, it increases the unit’s vulnerability to security risks and the mission is required to provide resources for that training.11 While this may be difficult in instances where some units are identified to deploy quickly, it is near impossible in situations where peacekeeping personnel are ‘re-hatted’ to a UN mission. In these instances, a lack of basic pre-deployment training may create a particular security risk in the early stages of a UN peacekeeping mission.

As circumstances in missions evolve, it is also important that pre-deployment training continues to be reinforced by mobile training. For example, it is clear IEDs are here to stay, therefore it is imperative that the UN makes use of the experiences from the ISAF mission in Afghanistan to assist peacekeeping missions with this evolving threat dynamic.

In order to address preparedness and training challenges, the UN should consider a study to determine what training, tactics and procedures for military, police and civilians fit current and future peace operations, including in the areas of security management and force protection. It should also look for ways to ensure that these are included in pre-deployment training for all mission components.12


**Capability-driven Approach: Military Manuals**

The capability-driven approach to peacekeeping emerged as one of four key strands of work as part of the New Horizons peacekeeping reform agenda in July 2009. The capability-driven approach focused on addressing capability gaps, developing a strong performance culture and coordinating capacity-building assistance.

In 2010 UN DPKO and DFS commenced work on pilot projects that focused on developing baseline capability standards and guidance for three military components: infantry battalions, staff officers and military medical support.

Based on the pilot projects, in late 2013 UN DPKO and DFS commenced work to develop military manuals to provide guidance for the following components: aviation, engineering, transport, force headquarters support, logistics, military police, maritime, reconnaissance, riverine, signals and special forces. Working groups were established to draft each of the manuals. According to remarks delivered by the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping in October 2014, at least 45 Member States have taken part in the project.13 Once the manuals are approved, it is anticipated an implementation plan will be developed during 2015.

The manuals will complement broader work underway as part of the UN’s uniformed capability agenda.

13 Ladsous, 2014.
Capability-focused Force Generation Process

The identification, generation and timely deployment of particular capabilities can reduce the security risk for peacekeepers.

Modern day peace operations need capabilities that deliver high mobility and capacity to maintain higher operational tempo. Hardware and technology that can cover wide geographic areas, provide air mobility and surveillance, and be in particular places at certain periods of time can assist in providing situational awareness and reduce security risks to personnel.

As the background paper identified, such capabilities might include long-range and high payload rotary aviation; high mobility ground vehicles (suited to the local terrain); transportable command and control; mobile engineering equipment; mobile accommodation (including tents and shelters); aerial surveillance systems; rapidly emplaced barrier and physical protective systems; mobile lighting and sensors; and mobile medical trauma kits. If missions are deployed to larger open spaces, then there may be requirements for mobile longer-range weapons systems.

Specialist personnel, units and equipment can also significantly reduce security risks in peacekeeping missions. Enabling and force multiplying capacities such as intelligence, engineering, medical, aviation, aerial surveillance systems, counter improvised explosive devices, explosive ordnance disposal, security and force protection, are essential not only for mandate implementation, but also for reducing risk in mission areas of operations. Mission support areas such as administration, human resource, budget and finance, logistics, information technology and communications are also essential to these efforts.

Hardware alone will not deliver on peacekeeping mandates. Civilian components within peacekeeping missions also act as critical enablers. This includes components working in the areas of civil affairs, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), security sector reform (SSR), justice, corrections, gender, women and child protection and protection of civilians. Most of these components are required to work closely with local communities and former combatants. In doing so, they assist in building trust with the local authorities and community about the role of the peace operation and how it can assist in providing a safe and secure

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environment for their community. This develops trust with local actors and directly contributes to lowering security risks in mission areas of operations. Increasing the number of female peacekeeping personnel deployed to field roles can make an important contribution in this regard, as it ensures the mission is better positioned to communicate with more than 50 per cent of the population.

If force generation processes are to become more effective at responding to immediate security needs in peacekeeping missions, they need to focus on the delivery of capabilities rather than on major or minor equipment. Some participants suggested that many troop and police contributing countries may be impeding the movement towards the deployment of more modern capabilities for fear of being left behind.

In order to address some of the capability challenges emerging from high operational environments, the UN Secretariat should consider establishing a mechanism to research and recommend equipment best suited for high operational environments, and to research new technologies and innovations, which may include a field mission experimentation program.16

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Role of Women as Enablers in Peace Operations

The UN Security Council adopted its first resolution on women, peace and security in 2000. Resolution 1325 recognised both the impact that armed conflict has on women and girls, and the importance of their active involvement in peace efforts. The UN Security Council has adopted six resolutions in the fifteen years since, many of which have focused on the participation and engagement of women in peacekeeping missions.17 For example, resolution 1889 (adopted in 2009) calls upon the UN Secretary-General to develop a strategy to increase the number of women participating in UN field missions, including peacekeeping operations. Resolution 2122 (adopted in 2013)

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encourages troop and police contributing countries to increase the number of women in deployments to peacekeeping operations.

The deployment of female peacekeepers can have an enabling effect for peace operations as they can assist in building trust and support with female members of the local community. Such activities are often essential to understanding community perceptions and concerns regarding threats to civilians, which affect the operational effectiveness of a peace operation. Female peacekeepers also indirectly act as role models for other women in the host community that might consider participating in the security sector.

Other thematic resolutions have recognised some of these links. Resolution 2185 on policing encourages greater female participation in policing, recognising that women contribute to mandate implementation by providing diverse perspectives which can build trust in communities, improving protection of women and children, and facilitating ‘gender-sensitive police approaches and mentoring’. The resolution encourages countries to strengthen efforts to reach the goal of the 20 per cent female UN police.

The UN Security Council will convene a High-level Review to assess progress implementing resolution 1325 in October 2015. The UN Secretary-General has commissioned a global study to highlight some best practices and ongoing challenges as part of the review.18

18 For further information, see: UN Women, New study to examine women’s role in peace and security over the past 15 years [website], (September 2014), http://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2014/9/launch-of-global-study-on-resolution-1325.

Use and Application of Modern Technology

Modern technology can improve operational effectiveness and enhance the safety and security of peace operations and local civilian populations. Many peace operations continue to operate with only basic levels of technology, in some cases at a level of disadvantage to the spoilers or potential adversaries they may face in the field.

Identification and deployment of the right types of modern technology to peace operations can provide a high return on operational effectiveness. In some cases, it will also lower the vulnerabilities within the mission to attack. The use of UAVs are a very good example. When used effectively,
UAVs can not only assist with mission efforts to protect civilians, but also enhance force protection as well. Security technologies such as closed circuit television, motion-sensing lights, enhanced building materials and ground based radar can improve situations awareness within mission areas instead of human monitors. This may enable more personnel to be deployed to remote operating bases, enabling greater patrols.\textsuperscript{19}

While there was agreement among participants that the modern technology can lower security risks in peace operations, there were differing views on whether further detailed examination of the legal and financial aspects was required. Some participants expressed concerns about the potential misuse of information that may be gathered from surveillance technologies (e.g. UAVs).

In order to explore some of the potential uses of modern technology in peacekeeping, it was noted that the UN has established an Expert Panel on Technology and Innovation in UN Peacekeeping. Part of the panel’s remit is to examine the various types and uses of technology to enhance the operational effectiveness of peacekeeping missions in the increasingly complex environments that they were being deployed into. The panel is expected to report back by the end of 2014.

\textsuperscript{19} Phillips, 2014.

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**UN Panel on Technology and Innovation**

In June 2014, the Under-Secretaries-General for Peacekeeping and Field Support announced the appointment of a five-member Expert Panel to provide advice on how new technologies and innovations could be used to benefit UN peacekeeping operations. Jane Holl Lute was announced as the Panel Chair.

The Panel has carried out its work throughout 2014. It is anticipated that the panel will provide advice on how technologies can be leveraged to enable peacekeepers to respond effectively to emerging and complex challenges in the field. This includes the emergence of non-traditional threats such as unconventional and asymmetric weaponry, which affect the safety and security of mission personnel and the overall implementation of the mandate.

The panel is expected to provide its final report by the end of 2014.
4. Overcoming Logistical Difficulties in Complex and Remote Peace Operations

Background Paper: ‘Overcoming Logistics Difficulties in Complex Peace Operations in Remote Areas’ by Dr Katharina P. Coleman, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia, Canada; Panellists: Brig Gen (retd) Gerald Aherne, Senior Consultant, Transparency International, Former Deputy Force Commander MINURCAT, Ireland; Mr David Haeri, Director, Policy, Evaluation and Training Division, Departments for Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support, United Nations; Ms Dina Gilmudtinova, Department of International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russian Federation; Maj Gen TPS Waraich, Additional Director General, Staff Duties Directorate, Ministry of Defence, India

The logistical challenges facing UN peace operations are significant. The UN now supports the highest ever number of deployed personnel operating in more remote and challenging environments, over greater geographical distances than before.

The number of personnel deployed to support UN field missions has nearly tripled in the last fifteen years. The UN supports 230 per cent more uniformed personnel in the field than it did in the year 2000. That number is closer to 300 per cent when you consider the field support being provided to AMISOM. There has been an increase by 50 per cent of civilian staff members. The UN now supports an approved uniform and civilian deployment of 172,200 personnel in the field. Those figures are even greater if you include the support being provided to 4,500 personnel working in political missions or UN field environments.

The statistics on some of the geographic challenges in missions are alarming. Peacekeeping operations cover a geographic area of 7.5 million square kilometres. It is an area slightly larger than the Roman Empire at its peak. Close to 60 per cent of personnel are serving in areas that are landlocked or

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difficult to reach. For example, the distance from Port Sudan to El Fasher (UNAMID) is over 2000 kilometres. In South Sudan, there are only 300 km of sealed roads in the entire country. In CAR, the road network is only usable for part of the year, and a round trip between Bangui and Birao (1,120 kilometres) will take you nearly eight days.

The UN manages a staggering number of resources, assets and stocks to ensure that peace operations are able to effectively function on a daily basis. It includes 220 aircrafts, 13,000 UN owned vehicles, 314 field hospitals and clinics, and rotations of more than a quarter of a million troops annually. More than ten million litres of water and 1750 tonnes of food are consumed by missions per day.

Logistical support to peace operations is a shared enterprise. There are some logistical support functions that are carried out by the UN. This support may take the form of material such as tents, generators, medical equipment or office supplies that are stocked by the organization in its global support base in Brindisi or regional support hub in Entebbe.2

The UN also relies on partnerships with Member States, host authorities, regional organizations and the private sector. Member States may take on leadership roles in providing particular capabilities such as medical units, engineering units or movement control. Host nations often facilitate access via permissions to certain space or provision of supplies and services (such as water, fuel, waste and medical). Donor and commercial contractors also assist in facilitating logistical support. For example, in 2010 NATO contracted DynCorps for strategic lift in Somalia. In 2011 Germany’s Federal Agency for Technical Relief directed construction for civilian personnel living quarters in South Sudan.3

Nonetheless, while there is a multiplicity of actors providing and facilitating logistical support for peace operations, it is unclear if the current division of labour is working most effectively in ensuring that logistical needs in peace operations are being met.

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2 Coleman, 2014.
3 Coleman, 2014.
Global Field Support Strategy

The New Horizons peacekeeping reform agenda foreshadowed a new approach to field support in July 2009. As a result, the Global Field Support Strategy (GFSS) was developed as a five-year project to reform the delivery of support to UN field missions. It focused on four strands of work: finances, supply and modularisation, service centres and human resources.

Several key reforms to peacekeeping operations emerged as a result of the GFSS. These included the establishment of shared service centres at the global level (in Brindisi) and regionally (in Entebbe). While both have distinct functions, they have assisted in streamlining and reforming operations in the field, providing greater economies of scale.

It is anticipated that the GFSS will be completed and form part of business as usual in UN peace operations by June 2015.

The Global Field Support Strategy (GFSS) is attempting to rationalise these processes and ensure a more efficient use of peacekeeping’s USD 8 billion plus annual budget. As the background paper outlined in detail, new tools have been developed through the GFSS to improve the delivery of logistics capability in the field. These include: faster access to money through an expanded commitment authority of USD 100 million; faster access to Strategic Deployment Stocks up to a value of USD 50 million; new approaches to ‘turnkey’ contracts at the global and mission levels; modular infrastructure packages to ensure faster deployment of mission infrastructure; regional coordination and sharing of assets through the Regional Service Centre in Entebbe; and regional service contracts. But much more needs to be done to improve field support efforts.

¹ Coleman, 2014.
Logistical Challenges Faced by Peacekeeping Missions

As one panellist noted, when peace operations have failed, it has been due to a lack of logistics. So, what exactly is logistics and why is it essential to the efficient functioning of UN peace operations?

According to analysis in the background paper, logistics is the science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of the operation’s personnel and equipment. This may involve the acquisition, storage and movement of equipment and supplies necessary for operations; and the transportation of personnel to, within, and from the mission’s area of operations. Effectively, logistics is about movement, maintenance and sustenance. The two key actors in these efforts are generally the UN and the host nation. UN operations are often overwhelmed by the challenges of the environment they are deploying into. Most host countries lack basic infrastructure, resource and skills. This makes partnerships an essential mechanism in addressing some of these challenges.

Missions are regularly confronted with several logistical challenges regardless of the level of security risk in the environment where they may be operating. These can include geography and remoteness, concerns about self-reliance, coordination between military and civilian functions, as well as challenges of interoperability. Areas of concern may include mobility, fuel and food, ammunition and force protection. Force protection requires defence stores for UN peacekeepers and fortifications, as well as in some cases, the ability to evacuate personnel.

Geographical remoteness, both within the state and external to it, is a challenge in several mission environments. In some cases the country may be landlocked, far from ports, air bases or rail. It could take days or weeks for basic supplies to reach mission personnel. This may be hampered even further by environmental factors or changes in season (e.g. the wet season in South Sudan). External remoteness is likely to make missions more

“We not only have more people to support but we are supporting them across vast spaces. Our peacekeeping area of operations today covers a massive 7.5 million square kilometres. An area that is by many accounts slightly larger than that controlled by the Roman Empire at its peak.”

David Haeri, UN DPKO/DFS.

5 Coleman, 2014.
vulnerable to political challenges. The armed area of conflict could be
difficult to reach once in the country. On the other hand, internally remote
regions may remain underserviced by infrastructure, making transport,
communications and medical support scarce. This places demands on air
transportation, engineering units and heavy transport.6

One challenge for military contingents and formed police units in the start-
up phase of peacekeeping missions is the need for self-reliance. In these early
phases of a mission, there may be competition over scarce local resources
by different deploying contingents, as well as the UN which is responsible
for sustaining civilian personnel, military observers and individual police
officers.

There can be a dichotomy of logistical support lines between the military
and civilian components, creating confusion or unnecessary duplication
in missions. The UN should consider reconciling the civilian and military
logistics and operational support in peacekeeping missions. Furthermore,
consideration should also be given to harmonising multiple sources of
logistics decision-making, particularly in key operational areas such as
mobility, fuel, food, ammunition and force protection.7

Another challenge to logistics is the use of different equipment and materials
in missions. As a result, different actors within peace operations may require
a variety of different spare parts and supplies to be transported. This does
not assist with economies of scale, with each having to be transported over
limited infrastructure and supply lines. This often places further demands
on already strained supply systems.

Increased security risks and heightened threat environments create further
challenges for the delivery of logistical support in peace operations. As
of 2014, approximately 44 per cent of the area of operations in peace
operations have been assessed by the UN’s Department of Safety and
Security as in ‘substantial, high or extreme danger’. This is up from around
26 per cent in 2011. This has meant that a lot of the logistical burden has
moved to the air to avoid some of the dangers of ground operations. This
is expensive and results in diverting assets away from other mandated
priorities in the mission environment.

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6 Coleman, 2014.
7 Coleman, 2014.
Hostile operating environments also affect the methods chosen to deliver support. The increase in the use of IEDs on roads may result in a mission preference to use air assets for transport (which are in high demand and low supply). Commercial or civilian aircraft may be deemed unsuitable for use in high risk environments. Hostile operating environments also place demands on logistical support across the mission through damage to infrastructure, denied access to local resources and humanitarian needs (which may place demands on electricity generation, water purification, construction and transport).8

Developments in the relationship between the UN and the host government can also adversely impact the functioning of UN operations, particularly when it comes to the freedom of movement. This can include less tangible obstructions such as customs clearance, flight assurance or convoy planning. This often plays out at the tactical level, enabling local authorities to act with a degree of impunity independent of government policy. Such scenarios further compound existing logistical challenges in peace operations as a result of geography, weather and limited mobility.

8 Coleman, 2014.
Rapid Reconfiguration of UNMISS—December 2013

Around 15 December 2013 a security crisis emerged in South Sudan after a political power struggle resulted in the outbreak of civil war. As a result of the deteriorating security situation, thousands of civilians flooded UN bases seeking protection from the threat of imminent violence. It placed significant pressure on UNMISS’ operations, both within Juba and at the state level.

The UN Security Council responded on 24 December by adopting resolution 2132 which increased the overall troop and police strength of UNMISS to an interim troop level of 12,500 personnel and police component of 1,323 personnel.

Given the demands on UNMISS’ operations and ongoing struggle to forge a political settlement, the UN Security Council reconfigured the mission mandate in May 2014. Resolution 2155 narrowed the mandate to focus on protection of civilians, human rights and humanitarian assistance. While regional efforts go on to find a political solution for a way forward, the mission continues to extend protection to nearly 100,000 internally displaced persons on UN bases.

Nonetheless, nearly a year since UNMISS’ revised troop and police ceiling was established, the mission has been unable to generate the number of personnel authorised. As of November 2014, only 10,515 military personnel and 936 police were deployed to the mission. The UN Secretary-General called upon countries to deploy ‘remaining surge capabilities’ and military equipment in his latest report (S/2014/821).

Rapid Deployment of Enablers and Logistics Support

In a best case scenario, in which all the necessary resources are in place to support a peace operation, UN officials acknowledged that it would take at least six months to rapidly deploy a peace operation once mandated by the UN Security Council. Unfortunately, most peacekeeping missions are not deploying with the necessary resources, increasing the lead time beyond six months to mount a UN peace operation.
The demand to rapidly deploy peace operations is partly explained by the political and humanitarian imperative to establish missions quickly to protect civilians under threat of violence. But the start-up phase remains an intense logistical challenge. Large amounts of personnel and materiel must be transported to the host nation. This may need to be supported on arrival in mission with infrastructure support (e.g. building or expansion of airports, requiring engineering support, leasing of buildings or warehouses, establishment of camps etc.).

The UN’s experience deploying MINUSMA in Mali provided some useful lessons. The After Action Review (AAR) suggested that DPKO and DFS seek approval from the UN Security Council to deploy military and civilian enablers prior to a peacekeeping mission’s authorisation. It suggested that joint deployment timelines be agreed between the Integrated Operational Team (IOT), Office of Military Affairs (OMA) and DFS including actions, milestones and deadlines in line with agreed mission concept. It also noted that senior management should be aware of changes to force requirements and how these might affect deployment timelines.

In order to address some of the challenges relating to the rapid deployment of logistics capabilities, standardised guidance on force generation and deployment, processes should be developed for the internal use of DPKO and DFS. The UN may also wish to consider undertaking a preliminary assessment of host (or transit) state capabilities when it comes to logistical support in advance of a potential mission. It could also support the creation of a roster of logistics experts to undertake preliminary in-country assessments, which may include retired UN personnel and contractors.

**Incentives and Penalties for Contributing Countries**

The only formal system currently in place to identify potential support from contributing countries is the UN Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS). But DPKO acknowledged that UNSAS has not been particularly successful. There is nothing preventing countries from coming to the Secretariat and pledging materiel to UNSAS, but then failing to deliver them when requested. Most missions only end up getting what they need nominally through UNSAS. Discussions with Member States need to be short-
circuited to ensure there is a clear identification of assets and capabilities that have been earmarked in advance of a mission deploying.

Financial incentives and penalties are one method being implemented by the UN to improve the rapid deployment of personnel and equipment by Member States. As the background paper notes, in 2013 the UN General Assembly endorsed a premium for ‘key enabling capacities’, and in 2014 it endorsed the addition of a ‘readiness dimension’ to the premium for deployment within 30, 60 and 90 days. Unfortunately there are drawbacks to this system and the potential incentives they create. Funding comes from mission budgets as opposed to a separate account as had been proposed by the Secretariat. This creates a disincentive for missions to propose the payment of the premium. Furthermore, the payment of premiums is currently capped at approximately USD 40 million (by application of the formula in 2013/14).

To address some of these concerns, the UN should monitor the implementation of the key enabling capacities premium to ensure it has the desired effect in the coming year. The UN should also start moving towards financial reimbursement for the delivery of particular capabilities (which deliver a desired effect or outcome). This could commence with a pilot project providing unit-based reimbursement for key logistic capability. Countries could also consider approving a separate readiness premium to reward rapid deployment.

There is a heavy expectation that contingents will deploy with self-sufficiency for 90 days, but this is often not the case. Strategic Deployment Stores at Brindisi may fill some gaps (particularly when re-hatting) but this is not its role or function. Countries are often reluctant to invest in COE until they know they will be deploying to a UN mission, creating even more delays. Some contingents may also be reluctant to utilise their equipment, or relocate it later on during the mission if they have invested significantly in the set-up phase of the mission. The introduction of penalties as a result of the findings of the Report of the Senior Advisory Group on Troop Reimbursement and Other Related Issues (SAG Report) and Fifth Committee resolutions may help in addressing some of these concerns.

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12 Coleman, 2014.
13 Coleman, 2014.
14 Coleman, 2014.
15 Coleman, 2014.
One particular challenge for infantry battalions is that they generally deploy without any light engineering equipment. To address this limitation in the start-up phase of peacekeeping missions, the UN could consider providing sector-level light earth moving equipment that can be used with minimal training for construction of basic camp facilities, including latrines, ground preparation and fortifications.

Private commercial contractors are another potential actor that can assist with the rapid deployment of peace operations. They can be put on standby, but this can be cost-prohibitive and may only increase in hostile environments. One measure might be to impose heavy penalties on private commercial contractors that do not deliver, to ensure better reliability.

**Coordination with Regional Organizations**

Close coordination between the different stakeholders is essential in the early start-up and planning phase of the mission, particularly when a regional peace operation may be ‘re-hatted’ into a UN peace operation (this was particularly true in the recent cases establishing peace operations in Mali and the CAR). Regional organizations may understand the situation on the ground better and they can provide assistance to the UN in the context of rapid deployment.

But it is also essential that the UN have mechanisms in place to ensure that troops and police that may be ‘re-hatted’ to UN peace operations are logistically prepared to do so. Financial trust funds alone will not ensure that peacekeepers have the necessary equipment and enablers required. DPKO/DFS should consider developing guidance that articulates roles and responsibilities during the mission re-hatting process.

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**Cooperation Between the UN and Regional and Sub-regional Organizations on Peace Operations**

During the last two years, the UN Security Council authorised the ‘re-hatting’ of two African Union peace operations to UN peace operations. In Mali, MINUSMA took over from AFISMA on 1 July 2013 (in accordance with resolution 2100). In the Central African Republic, MINUSCA took over from the AU-led operation MISCA on 15 September 2014 (as authorised by resolution 2149). Both transitions presented significant challenges for the UN peace operations.
In July 2014 the UN Security Council adopted resolution 2167 recognising the importance of regional cooperation in support of peacekeeping. The resolution made two important requests. It requested the UN Secretary-General to undertake a lessons learned exercise on transitions from AU-led operations to UN peacekeeping operations in Mali and the Central African Republic and to provide recommendations by 31 December 2014. It also requested the UN Secretary-General to produce an assessment report and recommendations, in close consultation with the AU and EU, on the partnership between UN and regional organizations in peacekeeping operations by 31 March 2015.

In December 2014, the UN Security Council adopted a presidential statement (S/PRST/2014/27) during Chad’s Presidency, requesting the UN Secretary-General to report annually on ways to strengthen the UN-AU partnership on peace and security.

Intermission Cooperation

Intermission cooperation has become a successful, short-term measure to support the rapid start-up of peace operations. It enables personnel and assets that are not in use in one mission to be transferred to another. It has been used to good effect recently between UNMIL, UNOCI and UNMISS. But as many participants noted, with the current demands on existing peacekeeping missions and the short supply of the personnel needed to fulfil current mandates, it is less likely that resources can be drawn from one mission to support another.

Intermission cooperation also creates political and financial challenges. It is politically complicated when it comes to the reassignment of personnel (which requires the approval of the sending state). It raises questions financially as the budgets for individual missions remain separate and there may be objections to reassigning staff between missions. Given these factors, some participants suggested it may actually be timelier to generate the capabilities from scratch. Despite this, it was acknowledged that intermission cooperation could assist in back-stopping missions in certain circumstances, particularly during times of crisis.

16 Coleman, 2014.
Local Contracts and Procurement Processes

The establishment of a peacekeeping mission can have a significant impact on the local economy and reconstruction within a host country. Decisions about where to build roads and airfields or dig wells, may have lasting consequences for the local community. It is a point that has been recognised as part of the UN’s Global Field Support Strategy.

Local procurement of resources may be the most effective means of obtaining resources in the early stages of a peace operation. If effectively and sustainably undertaken, these efforts can contribute to the local economy.

However, local procurement may not always be in the interests of the host nation. In situations where local resources (such as food) are scarce, missions may deprive the local community of access to basic necessities. Failure to communicate with other actors or partners in the region may result in unexpected competition for resources and services, which may substantially drive up prices. These are all considerations that need to be factored in as part of local procurement. Unfortunately, the impact of procurement on the host nation is not something explicitly listed as a factor for consideration in the UN Procurement Manual. Considerations beyond ‘best value for money’ need to be considered as part of UN procurement processes.17

In order to develop some best practices, procurement should be tracked more extensively and analysed for the effect it has on mission operating environments and the host nation. The UN Secretary-General may also wish to consider further principles for consideration beyond ‘best value for money’ as part of the UN’s procurement practices.18

DPKO acknowledged that there were systemic constraints underlying rules and regulations that were preventing a faster and more flexible approach. There may be a need to consider a regulatory regime for procurement and human resources that is far more streamlined, but which also preserves accountability and oversight requirements.

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17 Coleman, 2014.  
18 Coleman, 2014.
Innovation in Logistical Support

Technology and innovation could assist in overcoming some of the logistical challenges faced by peacekeeping missions operating in remote and complex environment. Technology can play a vital role in supply chain management and freeing up personnel to undertake other tasks within the mission. The UN has started using Geographic Information Systems to find new water sources and is exploring the use of solar energy. Cellular technology is untapped in many areas where missions operate. They are often being used as a payment mechanism as well, which could be integrated into assisting with mission procurement needs. In the future, 3D printing may even assist in supporting mission logistics needs, from printing spare parts to medical devices.19 It may eventually reduce the need for considerable stockpiles and conventional supply chains. Such technology is already in use by the US military.

If new approaches are to be developed to overcome some of the logistical challenges in peacekeeping missions, then consideration of new and innovative approaches should be a routine part of future planning. The UN Panel on Technology and Innovation is a good first step, but a more permanent entity should be established within the UN to monitor and assess technologies that may be of relevance to the UN.20

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19 Coleman, 2014.
5. Building Partnerships for Capacity-building of Peacekeepers

Background Paper: ‘Building Partnerships for Capacity-Building of Peacekeepers’ Mr David Lightburn, International Consultant on Peace Operations and Senior Adviser, Folke Bernadotte Academy, Canada; Panellists: Mr Li Jie, Executive Secretary-General, Chinese Institute for International Strategic Studies, China; Ms Carman Lapointe, Under-Secretary-General, Office of Internal Oversight Services, United Nations – remarks presented by Mr Rahul Sur, Chief, Peacekeeping Evaluation Section, Inspection and Evaluation Division, OIOS, United Nations; Ms Victoria Holt, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Department of State, United States; Mr David Haeri, Director, Policy Evaluation and Training Division, Departments for Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support, United Nations.

Capacity-building partnerships are essential to the work of UN peace operations. One of the most challenging aspects of capacity-building is preparing peacekeepers, and training and equipping them with the requisite skills for the complex and dangerous missions that they are likely to face. The proliferation in the number of actors involved in peacekeeping training and capacity-building adds further complexity to these efforts. But these partnerships support and drive the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping.

Strategic Partnership with the UN Security Council

History has demonstrated that in times of crisis, the world continues to turn to the UN. In recent years, this has included responding to the earthquake in Haiti, supporting the fair outcome of elections in Côte D’Ivoire, protecting thousands of displaced civilians in South Sudan, and implementing a political framework in the case of the DRC. Peace operations deploy to and react in places where there is a significant amount of risk and often a lack of appetite from major actors to get engaged. It has demonstrated remarkable effectiveness despite limited resources, but the challenges are mounting.

The level and extent of global crises are significant. The humanitarian community is dealing with four Level 3 humanitarian emergencies across Iraq, Syria, the Central African Republic and South Sudan. It was noted that a similar system of classification could be of value to identify which peace operations are on the brink of disaster and in need of immediate international assistance. Alongside humanitarian emergencies, ISIL is presenting challenges and demands, some of which have flow-on impacts to UN peace operations (as witnessed in UNDOF). These developments are happening rapidly and simultaneously, with direct and indirect impacts on peace operations.

Broader international developments provide a challenge and opportunity for UN peacekeeping, but this requires discussions to be taking place at more strategic levels. For example, what does the drawdown in Afghanistan mean for potential contributors to peacekeeping? How do we expand the discussion and engage potential contributors?

UN Security Council resolutions are important in setting strategic direction of peace operations, but they were only the starting point. Some SRSGs have remarked that mandates give them room to operate, whereas some have suggested there are too many requests in them. How can mandates be developed and used more efficiently to respond to some of the complex threat environments that peace operations are currently confronting? And how can peacekeepers be better prepared to respond to them?

The events that occurred in South Sudan in December 2013 were highlighted as a good example of UN Security Council responsiveness. Nonetheless, nearly a year later, UNMISS is still waiting for reinforcements. Initiatives examining some of the strategic challenges to UN peacekeeping will assist in addressing more systemic problems. The UNSG’s High-level Panel on Peace Operations is expected to provide some recommendations on the way forward. But it will also require political commitment from former, existing and potential peacekeeping contributors. The US-led High-level Summit in September 2014 demonstrated international resolve to support peacekeeping. In addition to some pledges of personnel and equipment, several countries announced capacity-building initiatives in support of peacekeeping.
Summit on UN Peacekeeping—September 2014

On 26 September 2014, US Vice President Joe Biden co-hosted a high-level meeting on peacekeeping with UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina (Bangladesh), Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (Japan), Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (Pakistan) and Prime Minister Paul Kagame (Rwanda), in the margins of the UN General Assembly. The purpose of the summit was to reaffirm support for UN peacekeeping, by generating new commitments and expressing support for the upcoming review of UN peace operations.¹

Countries participating in the high-level summit made commitments to address several issues, which were also the focus of discussions during the Challenges Annual Forum. These included providing troops for rapid deployment, expanding support for capacity-building programs and contributions of key enablers such as aviation, engineering and medical.

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon advised participants that the UN would host a meeting of military chiefs of staff from around the world in early 2015 to discuss further support for UN peacekeeping.

The Joint Statement on Support for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations agreed to by countries participating at the summit noted ‘that UN peacekeeping operations have taken on increasingly significant and challenging roles in response to contemporary threats to international peace and security’.² The joint statement also announced a commitment to reconvene again in the margins of the UN General Assembly in 2015.

Ministers and high-level representatives from the following governments took part in the summit: Bangladesh, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Egypt, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Indonesia, Ireland, Japan, Latvia, Mongolia, Nepal, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Rwanda, Serbia, Spain, Sweden, Tanzania, Uruguay, the United Kingdom, the United States and Vietnam.

Sharing Information on Peacekeeping Training

Peacekeeping training relies on a global partnership among a range of stakeholders. Different actors have different responsibilities when it comes to the development of training materials and delivery of training activities. While there is an overwhelming amount of information available about peacekeeping training, there is often minimal information available on what requirements need to be met by personnel deploying into the field. This creates particular challenges for Member States and organizations involved in peacekeeping training.

Member States have responsibility for pre-deployment training of their personnel. This is set out in UN General Assembly resolution 49/37 (1994). The Core Pre-deployment Training Materials (CPTMs) and Specialised Training Materials (STMs) are minimum standards, based on tasks defined by the UN Security Council. The Integrated Training Service (ITS) in DPKO is responsible for communicating these standards to Member States, but it does not undertake significant outreach to ensure that there is a clear understanding of the materials available, particularly as part of newer STMs.4

Communication via the DPKO website could assist in providing more comprehensive access to the information Member States require in order to develop peacekeeping training courses. This could be complemented by improved communication with Permanent Missions in New York and less formal gatherings such as International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres.5

Capacity-building to Support Training Needs

The UN has conducted two peacekeeping training needs assessments (TNA) since 2008. The outcomes of the first TNA identified peacekeeping strategy, policies and standards. The second TNA emphasised the link between the implementation of mandates and training needs. The conclusions of these reports provide important lessons for the development of Member State peacekeeping training, as well as regional organizations and capacity-building programs. For example, one of the findings that emerged from the 2013 TNA was that those who receive the training are

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4 Lightburn, 2014.
5 Lightburn, 2014.
not always the ones deploying to missions. It found that only 81 per cent of military and 70 per cent of police deployed to UN peace operations had received any form of pre-deployment training. Another problem is that training recognition for courses tends to be provided to countries that are not necessarily major contributors.

Partnerships are integral to peacekeeping training efforts and capacity development, but there is a need for greater coordination and sharing of information regarding training activities, particularly between the UN, donors, Member States and regional organizations. Development and use of an effective and regularly updated database could assist in distributing information about the availability of different courses, particularly for those countries that may not have sufficient training capacity. They could be categorised along the lines of the target audience for the courses (e.g., FPUs, UNMOs, UNLOs, police mentors, police inductions, senior leaders etc.). It would make information readily accessible for Member States and the UN, providing a clearer picture about what training needs are being met and where other emphasis may be required. The database could be managed by the UN, regularly updated, listing all training courses and exercises that meet UN standards.

Another challenge for capacity-building partnerships is avoiding duplication, as well as ensuring that initiatives are coordinated and match recipient training needs (rather than donor priorities). Donor countries need to work more closely with the UN and recipient countries. This could be done through capacity-building donor’s workshops, with a view to harmonising standards, priorities and schedules. Countries providing donor assistance could also work more closely with DPKO ITS through mechanisms such as train-the-trainers and mobile training support teams on newer subjects. Those relationships could be further enhanced with the engagement of countries that may not be principal contributors to peacekeeping, but are nonetheless willing to assist with capacity-building efforts. One other option would be for force generation processes to include matching the training needs of willing TCCs/PCCs with those countries willing to provide capacity-building support.

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6 Lightburn, 2014.
7 Lightburn, 2014.
8 Lightburn, 2014.
Efforts to coordinate on capacity-building of peacekeepers should also factor in training programs that seek to build broader military and policing skills and capacities. This could include the recently established US African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership to build the capacity of six African countries over the next five years. Similarly, initiatives that are not directly related to peacekeeping—such as NATO’s Capacity Building initiative announced at the Wales Summit and the EU’s training and equip initiative—indirectly support UN peacekeeping efforts. They all contribute to building capabilities, which may at some point deploy to peace operations.

It is essential that any capacity-building effort remains responsive to the implementation of peacekeeping mandates and the ability of peacekeepers to respond to the diverse threat environments that they are being deployed to. The UN should be seeking to build expertise in niche areas. For example, this could include drawing on NATO’s Counter Improvised Explosive Devices (CIED) training for UN staff and expanding it to troop contributing countries.

Some capabilities exist with more developed countries in the global ‘North’. This is particularly the case as it relates to challenges presented by asymmetric threats. Training and capacity-building in the areas of enhanced medical support, IED survivability measures, and other efforts to modernise approaches to emerging threats in peace operations, should be further explored. ‘Twinning’ and north-south endeavours, either in terms of joint deployments or training and equipment, could assist in ensuring peacekeepers are better prepared to respond to the diverse risk environment that they are being deployed to.9

Dialogue between the UN and regional organizations needs to increase on training, particularly in the areas of defence capacity-building and defence sector reform, as well as the operationalisation of the African Standby Force. This would be particularly useful in the re-hatting of AU troops to UN operations, as has occurred in Mali and the Central African Republic. In those instances, the UN needs to dispatch mobile training teams to provide basic standards training to a large number of personnel within a very limited period of time. Continued work in this area would develop those capacities much earlier. Greater regional coordination and burden-sharing

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9 Lightburn, 2014.
could also be explored among the African Union, Organization of American States, ASEAN, as well as the different regional groupings of the IAPTC.\textsuperscript{10}

**Delivering Sustainable and Targeted Training**

Peacekeeping training may be delivered through a variety of platforms and a range of target audiences. Different delivery platforms have comparative advantages depending on the timing, subject and audience involved. It is also critical that efforts to train-the-trainers assist with establishing a sustainable national training capacity in emerging peacekeeping contributors.

Simulation and scenario-based training as part of pre-deployment and in-mission training can be invaluable in preparing for mission crisis response. For example, UNMISS ran a simulation exercise with mission leadership prior to the events that unfolded in December 2013. There were differing views during the scenario as to whether the UN should open the gates, with concerns that they might be overwhelmed with weapons. On the other hand, history suggested it imperative for the mission to protect civilians. No scenario exercise could have foreshadowed what happened, and it was ultimately up to mission leadership to make a brave decision. But what the exercise highlighted was the difficult decisions that would necessarily be faced. You need to have a debate about what the options are when a mission is confronted with these scenarios. Such exercises have an important role to play in protection of civilians and assessing the vulnerabilities of the local population. You may not be able to predict events through such exercises, but you can better prepare.

Platforms such as e-learning and forms of blended learning can be more cost-effective and suitable for the delivery of training on certain issues and for preparing individuals.\textsuperscript{11}

Targeted training of particular mission components also needs to remain consistent and focused. Standards could be better harmonised around the delivery of senior mission leadership training. The UN has its own SML course and also offers induction training for senior leaders before they deploy to the field. Regional organizations such as the EU and AU have similar programs, but they are not recognised within the UN system.

\textsuperscript{10} Lightburn, 2014.

\textsuperscript{11} Lightburn, 2014.
Senior mission leadership courses should harmonise their standards with the UN SML Course.\textsuperscript{12}

Further cooperation between regional organizations on delivery of training programs, notably the AU and EU with the UN, could add value in preparing peacekeepers for hybrid missions. This could strengthen training capability within those regions. It could also provide for a greater degree of interoperability among militaries and police.

Another aspect of training cooperation is also required at the national level, within countries that are deploying personnel to peace operations.\textsuperscript{13} While many countries have well established military training institutions and cultures, there is often limited coordination with their police and civilian counterparts. This is particularly important given the multidimensional nature of peacekeeping, where actors need to understand their roles and responsibilities as they relate to protection of civilians, child protection and sexual and gender based violence. Similar understanding is required in terms of early peacebuilding tasks engaging the rule of law, security sector reform and DDR.

Of course, an important aspect of peacekeeping training is ensuring that it is delivering the desired effect in the field. The recently established UN Office for the Director of Peacekeeping Strategic Partnerships will assist in assessing operational effectiveness and could provide a valuable feedback loop on whether training needs are being met sufficiently. Ultimately, missions will be measured on their success in delivering on their mandate.

\textsuperscript{12} Lightburn, 2014.
\textsuperscript{13} Lightburn, 2014
Policing and Security Sector Reform

The UN Security Council adopted two significant resolutions in 2014, which highlighted the growing and important role of peacekeepers as early peacebuilders.

In April 2014, the UN Security Council adopted its first stand-alone resolution on security sector reform (SSR). Resolution 2151 was adopted unanimously during Nigeria’s Presidency of the UN Security Council. The resolution recognises the central role of SSR in peacekeeping and special political mission mandates, acknowledges the growing number and complexity of such mandates and reaffirms the central role of national ownership as part of SSR processes. Resolution 2151 requests the UN Secretary-General to consider undertaking work to strengthen the UN’s comprehensive approach to SSR and developing additional guidance (including for senior officials). The resolution also notes the important comparative advantages that the UN can bring to SSR efforts in collaboration with other actors, and the important role of police in supporting the reform and capacity-building of police institutions.

In November 2014, the UN Security Council examined the role of police in peacekeeping in more depth, holding a briefing with the heads of police components. The meeting was held at the initiative of Australia during its Presidency of the Security Council. The idea to host a meeting with the heads of police components emerged during the 2013 Finnish Security Council retreat (S/2014/213), modelled on the annual meeting the Security Council holds with the heads of military components (something that has occurred since 2010). It is anticipated that the UN Security Council will continue to hold similar meetings with the heads of police components on an annual basis.

In addition to hearing field perspectives on policing challenges during the meeting, the UN Security Council also adopted its first resolution focused on policing issues. Resolution 2185 attempts to address some of the systemic challenges facing UN police. It requests the UN Secretary-General to promote greater system-wide coherence in policing work, including through the development of standards, guidance and training. It also identifies the need for UN police to support work to address non-traditional threats such as terrorism, including through information sharing with counter-terrorism entities. The resolution requests the UN Secretary-General to submit a report on the role of policing as part of peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding by the end of 2016.
Role of Evaluation in Supporting Implementation of Peacekeeping Mandates

Discussions also explored the particularly unique role of the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) to the work of peace operations. In terms of capacity-building, OIOS performed a role in supporting the effective implementation of mandates and ensuring that existing needs were being met. In many cases, the findings have identified areas that would benefit from more training and capacity-building support to assist peacekeepers in delivering on their mandates. In this regard, the OIOS has assisted in identifying specific areas that would benefit from further partnerships for capacity-building of peacekeepers.

The OIOS was established in 1994 as Member States thought the UN required an independent office for internal oversight. It reports to the UN General Assembly. It has three divisions: an internal audit division; an inspection and evaluations division; and an investigations division. OIOS has a remit to cover nearly everything in the Secretariat, including peacekeeping missions and special political missions. Training, planning, security management, protection of civilians and mission support are just some of the areas that the office has examined in recent years.

Some recent findings that have emerged from OIOS reports have identified areas of reform to support capacity-building within UN peacekeeping. One report examined the enabling capacities provided by the Global Field Support Strategy (GFSS), police capacity-building in Côte D’Ivoire (focusing on whether personnel deploying had met qualifications required prior to deployment), an audit on transportation and the movement integrated control centre in Entebbe, evaluation on leadership, task and resource fit, cooperation with regional organizations and protection of civilians. In some instances, these reports have identified endemic problems in mission environments and areas that require improvement.

The role of OIOS came into particular prominence in 2014 as a result of a report written on the implementation of protection of civilians mandates in peace operations. Its findings have been the subject of references in UN Security Council debates and remarks by senior mission leadership on peacekeeping. The evaluation looked at the sufficiency of tactical level guidance. It found that peacekeepers often did not know what to do when they were confronted with fighting between two armed groups. The report recommended that the UN Secretariat issue concise self-contained guidance
to peacekeepers in their language so that they know what to do in particular scenarios (see inset below).

The investigations division recently participated in and contributed to a DPKO/DFS working group that will soon make recommendations to enhance the effectiveness of the UN to combat sexual exploitation and abuse. Recently the same division also investigated a case which involved DPKO and the host government.

Future planned audits will examine the SSR unit in DPKO, pre-deployment of uniformed personnel, the global supply chain, effectiveness of IOTs, and strategic transportation and deployment stocks. Planned evaluations will look at the results of national capacity-building in MINUSTAH, UNOCI and MONUSCO, and the integration between peace operations and country teams in these same mission contexts.

**OIOS Report: Evaluation of the Implementation and Results of Protection of Civilians Mandates in UN Peacekeeping Operations**

In March 2014, the UN OIOS released its report evaluating the implementation and results of protection of civilian mandates in UN peacekeeping operations (A/68/787). It was the second evaluation conducted by OIOS into protection of civilians in peacekeeping. The first report (A/67/795) was released in 2013 and reviewed the reporting by UN peacekeeping missions on protection of civilians.

The second OIOS evaluation into protection of civilians in peacekeeping examined eight peacekeeping missions as of 31 July 2013, with a special focus on MONUSCO and UNMISS. According to the report (A/68/787), the evaluation topic had been selected due to the centrality of protection of civilians to the effectiveness and reputation of peacekeeping.

The OIOS report acknowledges that considerable progress had been made since 2009. This progress had included the development of an operational concept, lessons learned study, framework for drafting comprehensive mission-wide strategies and a resource and capability matrix.

But the report also found the peacekeeping missions were not doing enough to protect civilians. Force was not being used to intervene when civilians were
under attack, even as a last resort. Several reasons for this were identified: there were differing views among UN Security Council members and troop-contributing countries on when force should be used; a ‘de facto dual line of command’ existed between the UN Force Commander and troop contingents (which may have national caveats in place); there was a lack of clarity about the responsibility of peacekeeping missions to act when host governments were unable (or unwilling) to protect civilians; missions perceived themselves as not having enough resources to act; there were concerns about possible penalties in an instance of excessive use of force; and tactical-level guidance was lacking in addressing the complexity of the situation on the ground when it might be necessary to use force. Failures were identified in several missions.

The report found that DPKO and DFS could only partially assist in changing this status quo. It suggested that a ‘frank dialogue’ was needed among troop and police contributing countries, financial contributors, host Governments, the UN Security Council, the Secretariat, and other actors, as well as the UN General Assembly.

The report made three recommendations. Most critically, it recommended that DPKO require all missions with a protection of civilian mandate to report failures by contingents to follow orders to UN headquarters, so that the matter can be reviewed and taken up with the troop contributing countries concerned (a point DPKO challenged in its response). The report also recommended that DPKO issue self-contained and concise guidance to military peacekeepers outlining what was expected in particular situations to protect civilians, and that DPKO, DFS and OCHA report back to the UN Secretary-General on efforts to improve the working relationships between humanitarians and peacekeeping operations on protection of civilian activities.

The findings of the report have been raised during discussions in the UN Security Council during 2014.¹

6. Conclusions

Panellists: Sen. Col. Gao Tong, Deputy Director General, Peacekeeping Office, Ministry of National Defence, China; Mr David Haeri, Director, Policy, Evaluation and Training Division, Departments for Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support, United Nations; Ms Annika Hilding-Norberg, Director, Challenges Forum, Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden; Maj. Gen. (Retd.) Huang Baifu, Vice Chairman, Chinese Institute for International Strategic Studies, China.

The Challenges Annual Forum 2014 took place at a formative point in time for UN peacekeeping. The discussions covered a wide range of issues and focused on the foremost challenges to UN peace operations and some of the systemic and innovative approaches that were needed to ensure peacekeeping continued to remain a responsive tool to the challenges of the 21st century. It was hoped that some of the findings and recommendations emerging from the discussions would inform the upcoming UNSG’s High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations.

The wide-ranging discussions demonstrated the breadth of challenges that current UN peace operations continue to face. Of particular concern is the diversified threat environment that peace operations are routinely being deployed into, in places such as Mali, the DRC, South Sudan and the CAR. In these contexts, peace operations are required to implement their mission mandate despite the absence of consent of many parties to the conflict, or an overarching political process to support long-term mission goals. These contexts are further compounded by alarming geopolitical developments, which are challenging the international compact that supports peacekeeping. As a result, some participants were particularly pessimistic in their assessments of the future potential of peacekeeping.

Discussions in the UN Security Council and other international forums in recent years have demonstrated that political consensus on the future role of peacekeeping is lacking and needs to be improved. Strategic-level direction from the UN Security Council as part of peacekeeping mandates can cause further confusion, as Council Members differ in their views on the role and
focus of peacekeeping mandates. Top-level design of peacekeeping needs to have consensus, particularly in the ability to tackle traditional and non-traditional threats.

Coordination and communication among Member States remain essential to these efforts. Peacekeeping troop and police contributors often disagree on the remit and breadth of mission mandates, leading to confusion and tension in the field. Increased dialogue between the UN Security Council and troop and police contributing countries would assist in identifying potential differences and examining them further. It would also ensure the UN Security Council took greater ownership of the decisions it was making as part of the mandating process. This is particularly important as the Council continues to mandate missions in complex and challenging environments, which place new demands on contributors and the capabilities they need to deliver in peacekeeping missions. Closing the feedback loop from the field would assist as well.

Peacekeeping missions also need to tailor their preparation, readiness and responses to the diverse security environments into which they are deploying. In some cases, this may require tailor-made training. But it is also important that communication is enhanced between all stakeholders on peacekeeping training to ensure that future training needs are being addressed and that training is being delivered to those personnel that are deploying into the field.

Protection of civilians is at the core of the majority of peacekeeping missions. Several examples of innovative and responsive approaches were identified during the discussions, including the action taken by UNMISS to open up UN bases to nearly 100,000 internally displaced persons, as well as the success resulting from the whole mission approach and deterrent posture being employed in the DRC. But as the OIOS study pointed out, further tactical level guidance is needed to peacekeepers in this area. Scenario-based training can assist in identifying potential contingencies that missions need to be prepared for, particularly at the leadership level. Greater political consensus on the use of force in the context of peace operations is needed, as views among contributors continue to differ and have an operational impact on the effectiveness of missions on the ground.

If peace operations are going to be effective in addressing non-traditional threats, then new and innovative approaches are required to address these
challenges. Intelligence was the subject of heated discussion throughout the two-day forum. While participants agreed that it was essential that peacekeeping missions maintained situational awareness, support for the use of intelligence in peacekeeping missions differed over the issue of strategic surveillance. Some participants expressed concerns that the information would be misused. But others suggested that with the right systems in place, intelligence at the operational and tactical level could provide value in enhancing the safety and security of peacekeeping personnel and improving the overall effectiveness of implementing the mission mandate. Each mission had different requirements in this area. The needs of the peacekeeping mission in Cyprus differed significantly from the needs of the peacekeeping mission in Mali. The UN needed to improve its overall approach to information and analysis. The deployment of the Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance cell to Mali, as part of the All Sources Information Fusion Unit, could provide a good model going forward and would benefit from further analysis.

Improving logistical support to missions in the start-up phase could greatly improve the deployment timeline for peace operations. It was noted with concern that the best-case scenario for rapidly deploying a peacekeeping mission was at least six months, meaning that most peace operations would take much longer to be fully functional. As a result, cooperation with regional organizations that may provide bridging forces is particularly important. The UN Secretary-General is expected to report back on some of the lessons learned from the re-hatting exercise in Mali and the CAR in early 2015. Further dialogue should continue on the areas of cooperation with regional organizations, as well as areas where they can complement UN peacekeeping efforts.

Geography and remoteness present ongoing challenges for UN peace operations. Providing incentives and readiness premiums to Member States that are willing to deploy key enablers are one mechanism to address this challenge. It will be important for the UN to review the effectiveness of these mechanisms in the coming year and adjust them accordingly.

Nonetheless, if peacekeeping is to improve in its efforts to rapidly deploy and meet mission needs then there is a need to expand and build on the base of existing peacekeeping contributors. China’s growing contribution to peacekeeping over the last two decades was acknowledged as a model for other countries seeking to expand their peacekeeping contributions. But
there was also a need for more countries from the global ‘North’ to re-
engage with UN peacekeeping. Many western and European countries have
the enablers and equipment desired by UN peace operations. More strategic
discussions between the UN and countries drawing down in Afghanistan
could assist in identifying what capabilities and training could be provided
to assist UN peacekeeping in its efforts to address the growing range of
complex and diverse threats (similar to many of the challenges faced in
Afghanistan).

Participants of the forum came from 30 countries and five continents. It
was natural that there were differing points of views discussed during the
forum. It is important that these exchanges take place, as they identify areas
of potential cooperation to assist peacekeepers in responding to the difficult
threat environments that they are being deployed to. As the hosts of the
forum concluded: ‘Autumn is the season for harvest’. The forum successfully
harvested the wisdom of the many participants over two days of discussions,
and in doing so, contributed to further strengthening the peacekeeping
partnership.
Appendix 1. Programme

Tuesday 14 October 2014

Opening Remarks and Welcome

Chair: Sen. Col. Zhang Li, Deputy Director General, Peacekeeping Affairs Office, Ministry of National Defence, China

Speaker: Ms Annika Hilding Norberg, Director, Challenges Forum, Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden

Keynote: Building Capacity for Peace Operations in Response to Diversified Threats: What Lies Ahead? H.E. Mr Wang Xuexian, Former Ambassador of China to South Africa; Mr Hervé Ladsous, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations—Remarks presented by Mr David Haeri, Director, Policy, Evaluation and Training Division, Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support, United Nations; Maj. Gen. Li Tian Tian, Director General, Peacekeeping Affairs Office, Ministry of National Defence, China

Session 1 | Promoting Peacekeepers’ Capacity to Address Non-Traditional Threats in Areas of Peace Operations and Against Their Mandates

Focus: The presence of non-traditional threats in mission areas have become critical, and in some cases, arguably significantly undermines the work and achievements of peace operations. The non-traditional threats include but are not limited to: transnational organized crime, corruption, terrorism, piracy, asymmetric warfare, cyber insecurity, and environmental degradation. What capabilities and skill-sets are required for peacekeepers to effectively carry out and deliver on their mandates, given the pervasive challenges posed in mission areas by non-traditional threats?

Chair: Dr Caty Clément, Senior Programme Advisor and Senior Fellow, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Switzerland

Background Paper: Mr Richard Gowan, Associate Director, Center for International Cooperation, New York University, United States

Speakers: Maj. Gen. (Retd.) Liu Chao, Former Force Commander, UNFICYP, China; Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Chander Prakash Wadhwa, Former Force Commander, MONUSCO, Member, United Service Institution of India; Mr Jean-Yonel Trecile, Inspector General and
Session 2 | Enhancing Operational Readiness of Regionalized Contributions

Focus: Threats against peace operations and peacekeeping personnel are not new but have intensified. What accounts for this change? How do we improve the missions and peacekeepers ability to deal with growing security threats? What strategies, capabilities and mechanisms are required? Making missions more robust (or increasing force protection measures) may in some cases generate an adverse effect causing resentment in the local population and undermine the success and legitimacy of the mission in the long-term. Would intelligence-led operations deter such attacks? How can instruments such as the UN OCC, JOC, and JMAC be improved? How can modern technology enhance the capabilities of peacekeepers to deal with security threats? And, what should troop- and police contributors do to prepare their peacekeepers and theirs tools for the future?

Chair: Dr Ulf Sverdrup, Director General, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Norway

Background paper: Mr William R. Phillips, International Consultant Peace Operations, Former Staff Member UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, United States

Speakers: Lt. Gen. Carlos Santos de Cruz, Force Commander, MONUSCO, United Nations; Ms Kristina Bergendal, Director, Deputy Head, Department of Security Policy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sweden

Wednesday 15 October 2014

Session 3 | Overcoming Logistic Difficulties in Complex and Remote Peace Operations

Focus: What is necessary to overcome the strategic, political and practical challenges to meeting the logistics requirements of modern missions, in particular complex mission undertaken in remote areas? Old problems and new challenges—are we providing and preparing the right capabilities? If not, why not, and what do we do about it? To what extent can intermission cooperation alleviate difficulties and can the concept be expanded beyond the military?

Chair: Brig. Gen. (Retd.) Gerald Aherne, Senior Consultant Transparency International, Former Deputy Force Commander MINURCAT, Ireland

Background Paper: Dr Katharina P. Coleman, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia, Canada

Speakers: Mr David Haeri, Director, Policy, Evaluation and Training Division, Departments for Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support, United Nations; Ms Dina Gilmudtinova, Department of International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russian Federation; Maj. Gen. TPS Waraich, Additional Director General, Staff Duties
Session 4 | Building Partnerships for Capacity-Building of Peacekeepers

**Focus:** Given the changing nature of peace operations and the increased complexity of modern missions and environments, what capacity-building partnerships will be required? How can the international community and its members best cooperate to ensure that peacekeepers in the future are identified, prepared and equipped in a way that supports future mission demands and environments?

**Chair:** Mr Li Jie, Executive Secretary General, Chinese Institute for International Strategic Studies, China

**Background Paper:** Mr David Lightburn, International Consultant on Peace Operations and Senior Advisor, Folke Bernadotte Academy, Canada

**Speakers:** Ms Carman Lapointe, Under-Secretary-General, Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), United Nations. Remarks presented by Mr Rahul Sur, Chief, Peacekeeping Evaluation Section, Inspection and Evaluation Division, OIOS, United Nations; Ms Victoria Holt, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Department of State, United States; Mr David Haeri, Director, Policy, Evaluation and Training Division, Departments for Peacekeeping and Field Support, United Nations

**Concluding Session**

**Chair:** Sen. Col. Gao Tong, Deputy Director General, Peacekeeping Affairs Office, Ministry of National Defence, China

**Speakers:** Mr David Haeri, Director, Policy, Evaluation and Training Division, Departments for Peacekeeping and Field Support, United Nations; Ms Annika Hilding Norberg, Director, Challenges Forum, Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden

**Closing Remarks:** Maj. Gen. (Retd.) Huang Baifu, Vice Chairman, Chinese Institute for International Strategic Studies, China

**Partners’ Meeting** | Partner Organizations only

**Chair:** Mr Jonas Alberoth, Deputy Director General, Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden
Appendix 2. Participants

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Ms Malin Andrén, Desk Officer, Challenges Forum Secretariat, Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden
Ms Maureen Brown, Senior Advisor, Challenges Forum, United Kingdom
Mr Christoph Bühler, Diplomatic Advisor, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Switzerland
Ms Signe Burgstaller, Senior Advisor, Challenges Forum, Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden
Col. Christian Bühmann, Head of Programme, Regional Development Programme, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Switzerland

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Gral. Ala P.A. DEMA. Jose De Jesus Barajas, Military Advisor, Embassy of Mexico in China, Mexico
Mr Gustavo Barros de Carvalho, Senior Researcher, Peacebuilding, Institute for Security Studies, South Africa
Ms Kristina Bergendal, Director, Deputy Head Security Policy Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sweden
Ms Julie Broussard, Country Programme Manager, United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women), United Nations

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Commissioner Dong Chen, Deputy Director, International Cooperation Bureau, Ministry of Police, China
Dr Caty Clément, Senior Programme Advisor and Senior Fellow, Geneva Center for Security Policy, Switzerland
Dr Katharina P. Coleman, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia, Canada
Mr Scott Cooper, Director, Civil-Military Outreach, Australian Civil-Military Centre, Australia
Mr Issa Coulibaly, Deputy Director of Studies, School of Peacekeeping Alioune Blondin Beye, Mali

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INTERNATIONAL FORUM FOR THE CHALLENGES OF PEACE OPERATIONS

The Challenges Forum is a strategic and dynamic platform for constructive dialogue among leading policy-makers, practitioners and academics on key issues and developments in peace operations. The Forum contributes to shaping the debate by identifying critical challenges facing military, police and civilian peace operations, by promoting awareness of emerging issues, and by generating recommendations and solutions for the consideration of the broader international peace operations community. The Challenges Forum is a global endeavor, with its Partnership encompassing Partners from the Global South and North, major Troop and Police Contributing Countries as well as the five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council.

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Challenges Annual Forum Report 2014

Building Capacity for Peace Operations in Response to Diversified Threats

The Challenges Annual Forum 2014 was hosted by the Chinese Ministry of National Defence Peacekeeping Office and the Chinese Institute for International Strategic Studies in Beijing. The diversified threat environment of today’s peace operations puts increasing demands on peacekeepers. As peace operations continue to evolve to respond to the changing nature of conflict, capacity-building strategies and mechanisms also have to adapt. The Annual Forum Report 2014 addresses the challenges at stake through the following four thematic areas: promoting peacekeepers’ capacity to address non-traditional threats; enhancing the capacity of peace operations to address threats against peacekeepers; overcoming logistical difficulties; and building partnerships for the capacity-building of peacekeepers. The Forum agreed that political dialogue and partnership are essential for progress, as are leadership, technology, situational awareness and intelligence, training, deployment of enablers and coordination with regional organizations.

This report comprises a comprehensive summary of the presentations, discussions and background materials of the Challenges Annual Forum 2014 on building capacity for peace operations in response to diversified threats. It also presents a number of targeted recommendations derived from the speakers and participants’ views on the current challenges of peace operations.

“In this global context of fewer but more complex and deeply rooted conflicts, the Security Council has continued to turn to UN peacekeeping. Today, there are almost 120,000 military, police and civilian personnel serving in 17 missions around the world. These increasingly demanding contexts raise operational and political challenges for UN peacekeeping.”

Mr David Haeri, Director, Policy, Evaluation and Training Division, Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support, United Nations