DESIGNING MANDATES AND CAPABILITIES FOR FUTURE PEACE OPERATIONS
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Foreword

The nature of conflict is changing and so is the international craft of peacekeeping. The theory and practice of peacekeeping are being severely tested in some of the most violent environments; from Syria to Mali and the Central African Republic to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In Africa, where many of our missions are located, we see an arc of crisis that includes the Ebola epidemic, transnational organized crime and terrorism, which threaten the lives and livelihoods of millions of people.

At the same time, the global community of civilian, military and police peacekeepers must relentlessly seek to meet the challenges to international peace and security as they evolve. We are witnessing a surge in demand for United Nations peacekeeping. Tasked to protect civilians, over the last few years UN peacekeepers have been deployed in a steady pace, even as their platforms and resources are strained to their limits. Given the very real challenges of the 21st century, what should mandates for peacekeeping look like? What types of capabilities are required for our men and women peacekeepers to fulfil these mandates effectively and efficiently, while creating a lasting impact?

The current momentum for change and development and the imperative for reconsidering and strengthening concepts and methods of peacekeeping are now greater than they have been for many years. It is critical that we seize this opportunity. A number of efforts are underway, one example being this present report.

I would like to express my gratitude to the Challenges Forum Partnership for undertaking this extensive and timely report ‘Designing Mandates and Capabilities for Future Peace Operations’ which seeks to examine and provide recommendations to address some of the most critical challenges related to modern peacekeeping. Its content and recommendations are timely, and the report will no doubt be of great interest to all concerned with the role, relevance and results of UN peacekeeping.

By bringing together leading peacekeepers from all missions and corners of the world, including practitioners, diplomats, officials and academics, the Challenges Forum continues to foster a community for common problem-solving, while at the same time making distinct contributions for the betterment of peacekeeping, all of which are particularly welcomed.

Mr Hervé Ladsous

Under-Secretary-General
Department of Peacekeeping Operations
United Nations
Preface

If there is a will, there is a way.

The purpose of the Challenges Forum remains steadfast. Our mission is to explore and develop thinking and concepts on how to better analyse, plan, conduct, and evaluate complex peace operations. We encourage and seek action on the findings we generate.

There is a greater demand and willingness to deploy UN peace operations than ever before. However, with the continued international financial constraints, more needs to be done with less. The UN Secretariat has made considerable progress in adjusting peace operations to the new circumstances. With relatively small financial means UN peacekeeping can help prevent the recurrence of violence. Research shows that countries that have had a UN peacekeeping mission to support their transition from war to peace are half as likely to fall back into conflict than countries that have not had the support of a UN peacekeeping operation for that same transition.

So what are the great trials for today’s peacekeepers? Old and new threats and risks are challenging the international community. Millions of men, women and children around the world find themselves victims of protracted violent conflicts and insecure environments—many are struggling to escape Ebola and terrorism, including the barbarism of the Islamic State. In addition to the dangers and destruction caused by pandemics, violent non-state actors and environmental degradation; relations between major states have been deteriorating, which hampers necessary cooperation and delays the ability of the international community to find common solutions to crises as they emerge. In the midst of this disarray, men and women peacekeepers are doing their utmost to deliver on their mission mandates and to assist the vulnerable populations they are sent to protect.

In response to this changing and increasingly violent environment in which civilian, military and police peacekeepers need to operate, the Challenges Forum Partnership decided to bring its intellectual, technical, political and financial resources to bear in a results-oriented endeavor. The aim was to seek a better understanding of the complexities currently facing peacekeepers, and to develop possible solutions to the problems identified.

The present report, ‘Designing Mandates and Capabilities for Future Peace Operations’, builds on earlier work undertaken by the Challenges Forum Partnership in support of concepts development for peacekeeping. In 2006-2008, the Partnership, in cooperation with other colleagues from the Global South and North, contributed to the UN-led process which developed the strategic level ‘United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines’, the first of its kind. Subsequently, encouraged
by the UN, during 2009-2011, the Partnership explored how the new UN guidelines could best be operationalised by mission leadership given the combination of evolving mandates and an increased scarcity of resources. The Challenges Forum study ‘Considerations for Mission Leadership in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations’, available in the six UN languages, is used worldwide by senior mission leadership training courses conducted by the UN, regional organizations and states. During 2013-2014, the Partnership in cooperation with the broader police community, has been supporting the UN-led process to develop strategic guidance for international police peacekeeping. In particular, in March 2014 our Norwegian Partners, the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, hosted a Challenges Seminar focused on capacity building in cooperation with the UN Police Division.

**In essence,** the Challenges Forum Partnership continues to focus on forward-looking concept development for peace operations. The current report is one result of an inclusive, frank but friendly, cooperative project, designed by the Partnership to pursue the following dilemmas: What possible future conditions may shape tomorrow’s peace operations and in what way? What kinds of mandates will be required to meet these challenges? What types of capabilities and competences are necessary to ensure rapid and effective responses to crisis and conflict as they emerge? What authority, command and control structures will be able to provide a suitable framework to support UN peace operations in the 21st Century? In short, what is required to enable current and future missions to have a positive and lasting impact?

**This report is a common effort** by the Challenges Forum Partner Organizations and dedicated individuals within these organizations, who have given their time, intellectual knowledge and financial support to complete this project. The four areas of inquiry of this report were chosen by the Partners following deliberations of a list of prioritised areas that the UN DPKO advised were particularly pressing for the international community to consider.

**The present report** stresses the need to achieve collaborative approaches to overcome challenges that arise from increasingly transnational threats to essentially state-centric peace operations. This requires holistic training regimes which are permeated with common priorities such as the protection of civilians, the mainstreaming of gender and dealing with transnational organized crime. The report further points to the interconnectedness of the political and strategic levels to the field as essential for the successful adaption of peace operations to new emerging threats and security environments. The vitality of the early integration of monitoring, evaluation and assessment into mission programme planning in order to enhance the effectiveness and increase the outcome and reach of peace operations is also an area that needs to be prioritised.

**On behalf of the Challenges Forum Partnership** and their working groups that have generated the contents of this report, I would like to express my particular appreciation to our Partner Co-Chairs of the four work strands. Their leadership, commitment and unwavering focus over the past two years have been remarkable, producing a number of results and publications, not least the findings presented in this report.
The ‘Peace Operations Under New Conditions’ working group was co-chaired by the Center for International Peace Operations of Germany and the United Service Institution of India. The National Defence University of Pakistan and United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute co-chaired the working group on ‘Policies, Principles and Guidelines’. The challenges of peace operations related to ‘Authority, Command and Control’ was addressed by the working group co-led by the French Ministry of Defence Policy and Strategic Affairs Department and the National Defence College of Nigeria. Finally, the Pearson Centre of Canada co-chaired the work strand on ‘Impact Assessment and Evaluation’ in cooperation with the Institute for Security Studies in Pretoria and supported by the Australian Civil-Military Centre and the Folke Bernadotte Academy of Sweden.

Our appreciation is extended to the UN Departments for Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support for their overall engagement in and support of the project. We would also like to thank the UN Regional Service Centre in Entebbe, the Swedish Armed Forces, the United Services Institution of India, the Center for International Peace Operations in Berlin, the Folke Bernadotte Academy and the Ministry of Defence of France for supporting the field visits to MINUSTAH, UNOCI and UNMISS, and to our French Partners for the preparatory and coordinating work related to them. We would like to express our gratitude to the Cairo Center for Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Egypt for hosting the Strategic Seminar and Partners’ Meeting in 2012, which initiated the project, the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs and the Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sports of Switzerland for launching the work strands, the Argentinean Ministry of Defence and CAECOPAZ for hosting continued deliberations, and to the Government of Japan for sponsoring the finalisation and presentation of the present report. The insightful contributions made to the Challenges Forum by our Patron, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, is invaluable.

We recognize the important contributions made by Partners in translating the Executive Summary of the report into the six official languages of the UN and sharing the findings of our collaborative effort with the wider peacekeeping community: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Egypt, China Institute for International Strategic Studies, Ministry of Defence of France, Moscow State Institute of International Relations under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, and the Ministry of Defence of Argentina. Thank you.

The implications for capacity building based on the main findings of this report, was the focus of the Challenges Annual Forum 2014 hosted by the China Institute for International Strategic Studies and the Peacekeeping Office of the Ministry of National Defence of China in October 2014. The results of the deliberations in Beijing are presented as a compendium to the present report.

It is also a great privilege to acknowledge and salute the unwavering and generous support provided by the Government of Sweden for the hosting of the Challenges Forum Secretariat over the many years and as the Partnership has grown and the issues have become, if possible, ever more complex.
Since 1996, a constant stream of dedicated organizations, countries and individuals have joined the Challenges Forum. Half of the Partners are from the Global South and half are from the North. Half are civilian organizations and half are military. Our Partner practitioners, academics, and decision-makers are at the center of the Challenges Forum, providing the content, experience, expertise and resources to bear in our collective effort. The Partner Organizations form the backbone and essence of our work.

A few years ago, a senior UN official commented on the Challenges Forum: ‘the continuing relationship between the Challenges Forum and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations is a most welcome partnership. It has spanned more than a decade serving as a mechanism to bridge an age-old dilemma: that of the practitioners being too busy to think deeply about the longer term, and of the deep thinkers being too distant from the realities of practitioners. The Challenges Forum is as an entity—a partnership—that is striving to find that elusive middle ground bringing the two closer together.’

We look forward to continue fostering closer cooperation amongst different regions, religions, and cultures. Our common denominator is our shared belief that peace operations need to be inclusive and they need to work as effectively and efficiently as possible, and to have a decisive and lasting positive impact in the areas where they are deployed.

During the finalisation of this report, the UN Secretary-General appointed a ‘High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations’ which promises to put UN peace operations up front and center on the international agenda. This development is critical, timely and warmly welcomed. It is our hope that the findings of ‘Designing Mandates and Capabilities for Future Peace Operations’ can be of use and provide thoughts for reflections during the deliberations of the Panel.

Before concluding, it is with great pleasure that we welcome our new Partners, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia and the Ministry of Defence Institute for National Strategic Studies of Armenia. We appreciate that their contributions will, amongst other things, strengthen our common effort to follow up on the recommendations of this present report, as well as the findings of the ongoing UN Secretary-General’s review of peace operations.

In that light and spirit, the Challenges Forum Partners are pleased to humbly offer the present report for consideration and inspiration for the advancement of current and future peace operations.

Ms Annika Hilding Norberg
Director and Founder
International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations
Folke Bernadotte Academy
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and Major General Kristin Lund of Norway, Force Commander of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and the first-ever female Force Commander in UN history.

UN Photo/MARK GARTEN
Executive Summary

Introduction

1 In order to meet the challenges of today’s political and security environment, and to adapt to their new operating environment, peace operations are undergoing a number of important changes. The past few years has seen a number of significant developments for UN peacekeeping, such as the addition of a ‘Force Intervention Brigade’ (FIB) to the UN Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO). This and other recent developments in peacekeeping practice have raised serious political and doctrinal questions—such as the implications of the increasing robustness of peace operations in certain settings—and have challenged widely held principles of peacekeeping. Within the UN context it could be argued that doctrine is trailing operational practice. By identifying the new conditions for peace operations and possible challenges, this report aims to provide perspectives on how the international community can best prepare, respond and create resilience in order to decisively and effectively meet the challenges of current and future peace operations.

Understanding How Emerging Threats Impact Peace Operations and How to Effectively Respond to Them

The nature of contemporary conflict has changed considerably such that the linkages between armed conflict, organized crime and in some instances terrorism have become more prominent. Peace operations have had to rapidly adapt to the new global political and security environment. However, much remains to be learned on how best peace operations should and can respond to new threats that are often transnational in nature.

2 An important set of challenges facing today’s peace operations concern emerging threats, which are central features of the new political and security environment. These threats—such as transnational organized crime, the effects of climate change, and state fragility—are increasingly transnational in nature and require a more concerted approach. While there are different views on whether and how peace operations should work to address emerging threats they face in the field, it is clear that they have wide-reaching implications for all levels of peace operation practice and outcomes.

3 One central development among these emerging threats is transnational organized crime. The adverse influence on peace operation effectiveness of transnationally organized criminality—which the UN defines broadly to encompass virtually all profit-motivated criminal activity with international implications—has been noted in intervention-settings such as Haiti and Mali and the number of cases appears to be increasing.
Peace operations are generally neither explicitly mandated nor equipped to deal with the threats from transnational organized crime. Nevertheless, several missions have over time integrated measures to combat this threat into their mandate implementation. Generally, this has been gradual and out of necessity rather than by design or as a part of a distinct strategy from the outset of the mission. For UN peace operations in West Africa, for instance, transnational organized crime was recognized as one of the significant drivers of conflict and as posing a threat to regional stability and security. In response, the UN launched the West African Crime Initiative (WACI) in 2009, a coordinated and innovative effort by international organizations and West African Governments to combat organized crime.

In spite of a growing recognition of the threat transnational organized crime poses to peacekeeping intervention settings, the nature and scope of its impact, as well as how peace operations can best work to counter this threat, are poorly understood. A shortage of discussion and analysis on the impact of transnational criminal activities on peacekeeping activities has prevented sufficient conceptual and doctrinal development, and the management of transnational organized crime in the context of a peace operation is poorly addressed in terms of policies, principles and guidelines. The lack of a body of doctrine linking transnational organized crime to peace operations, in turn, has resulted in a lack of guidance for how to manage these problems at the operational or tactical level. For instance, there is a lack of established criteria for determining when crime is in fact transnational in character, and whether and to what extent criminal activities are having an effect on a mission.

Effectively combatting transnational organized crime in the context of a peace operation will require a host of efforts, from better assessment and planning procedures to broad agreement on the best strategies and tactics to employ. In this regard, local ownership and host state responsibility for efforts to combat transnational organized crime are also critical. There is substantial ongoing discussion about effective and legitimate policy responses, but while separate UN agencies and national agencies are examining aspects of this problem, work on how the military or the police should integrate their approach in the mission is lacking. This is spite of the fact that an integrated approach is recognized as critical for addressing this problem.

The adoption of new tools and technologies will also be critical for peace operations to effectively counter this and other emerging threats. International, regional as well as locally driven information gathering and analysis are critical for improving peace operation awareness and understanding of events on the ground, and to devise appropriate responses. The use of digital tools to track and monitor the real-time impact of crises, for instance, is a modernised way for peace operations to gain an improved awareness of the mission environment.
RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Together with the academic community and drawing on the expertise of mission personnel, the UN Secretariat should continuously identify emerging threats and their impact on peace operations in a systematic manner. Strategies should be developed for responding to the identified emerging threats, and regularly reviewed and revised as necessary.

B. Together with the academic community and drawing on the expertise of mission personnel, the UN Secretariat, in close cooperation with Member States, should develop a better understanding of the role and effect of social and other new media, and big data, on conflict and peace operations and as a predictor of peace and conflict.

C. The UN, in cooperation with Member States, should develop a systematic approach to the development of policies, principles and guidelines, provide training to address transnational threats, and further develop their regional approaches in the affected regions.

D. The UN Secretariat in cooperation with Member States should build a broad agreement on how to address organized crime in fragile and post-conflict situations. In addition, the relevant skills and structures required to address organized crime need to be identified and incorporated into peace operations where appropriate.

Equipping Peace Operations to Better Adapt to Evolving Operational Environments

To keep pace with the changing operational contexts, it is essential that peace operations modernise the way in which they operate in the field and consider how to incorporate modern technology. Equally, command and control structures and mechanisms should also concurrently be adjusted or enhanced for the increasingly non-permissive environments in which contemporary peace operations are deployed.

8 In 2013, the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations recommended the adoption of new tools and technologies in peace operations, as a means for tackling emerging threats. The application of modern technology to peace operations aims to understand and influence current-day mission environments in two fundamental ways. First, by gaining trust and support by communicating with host country populations. Second, by improving ‘situational awareness’ through information gathering, analysis and dissemination among mission staff.

9 While traditional communication tools remain important, new and social media have the potential to improve both the scope and
effectiveness of a peace operation’s communication efforts. Correctly used these tools enable missions to both take a more strategic approach to communications, as well as to enhance the ability of missions to react better to events as they unfold. New and social media enable two-way dialogue that not only provides a source of information to the public but can also generate support for a mission’s goals. UN, AU and EU missions have taken steps into the world of digital, social and other media.

10 With regard to information gathering and analysis, there is a growing recognition by the international community of the utility of various forms of surveillance, which can dramatically increase the reach of peace operations. As a result, the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) was authorized for MONUSCO in 2013 and on 18 June 2014 the UN informed of the intention to deploy UAVs in Mali. In the future, peace operations may also employ ‘crowdsourced’ tools to collect information and to gain a better understanding of context. Advances in information gathering have produced challenges for peace operations and open questions remain with regard to their proper use and utility. It is crucial to understand that technological tools are not the panacea solution to the challenges facing international peace operations and that they cannot replace a human presence. Yet, seen as a complementary tool, and properly integrated into an approach that is centered on the welfare of the host population, modern technology has the potential to help both to understand and to influence the mission environment.

11 The complexity of modern and multidimensional peace operations—bringing together military, police and civilian elements to achieve a wide range of tasks in an integrated fashion—places considerable demands on the existence of a clear and strong authority, command and control framework (AC2) to guide and direct activities at all levels of operation. Given the non-permissive environments in which today’s peacekeepers often operate, this is all the more important. An effective framework is essential for the successful planning and conduct of a peace operation, as well as for maintaining the confidence of Member States.

12 In 2008, the UN Secretariat issued a comprehensive policy document with a view to capturing AC2 doctrine and practice from headquarters (HQ) to field level. Prior to the publication of the 2008 report issues of authority, command and control had been left to the directives given to each individual mission. The 2008 policy was made applicable to all UN peace operations and aimed to provide greater clarification and guidance on AC2 issues, particularly for multidimensional peace operations. In spite of a number of limitations, this policy is still extant and provides the current UN framework for AC2. In 2011, the UN Policy, Evaluation and Training Division (DPET) undertook an internal evaluation finding
that while the existing framework was largely an appropriate, effective and flexible mechanism, it could benefit from additional clarity and strengthened application. The evaluation identified a number of challenges with the framework structure and suggested various recommendations to address them. However, it is noteworthy that the framework has yet to be updated and that no new policy directive has emerged since the 2011 evaluation.

13 Challenges related to AC2 have been identified at all levels of operation. At the strategic level of command for peace operations, the UN HQ level, there is a concern that a combination of numerous demands and lean staffing provides only light back-stopping for peace operations. The mechanisms that do exist at the strategic level—the Integrated Operational Teams (IOTs) and the UN Operations Crisis Centre (UNOCC)—are poorly equipped to manage situations of crisis, and are particularly fragile in situations of multiple crises. Indeed, with limited capacity at HQ, crisis management functions are often delegated to missions that frequently do not have experienced leadership in place to manage them.

14 The unique command structure between UN HQ and the field—between which there exists no intermediary level of command—places considerable demands on the character and competence of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) or Head of Mission (HoM) to bridge between the strategic and operational levels. As a result the selection, training and preparation of senior leaders are central to mission success. Calls have been made for more emphasis on these processes.

15 At the level of the mission, the Mission Leadership Team (MLT) is the main instrument for achieving unity of command and purpose between different mission components. Today’s multidimensional operations require a greater level of integration in this regard. However, there is considerable variance with regard to how this and other joint structures that exist at the mission level to facilitate integration are set up, and it is largely up to the preference of the SRSG. Due to a weak institutional standardisation of a mission’s framework structures, command relationships have tended to be ad hoc, unstable and inconsistent while suffering from a lack of clarity about roles. A more structured and less improvised approach could also benefit a mission’s collaborations with actors outside of its own organization, for instance between a mission’s security component and host country police forces. In order to achieve good interoperability in a peace operation, command arrangements need to be well designed, standardised and practiced. Particularly important for effective AC2 is the need for joint planning and information sharing to be strengthened at the mission level, including the use of more up-to-date information technology.
RECOMMENDATIONS

E The UN Secretariat should, in close cooperation with Member States, revise the existing DPKO/DFS AC2 policy in accordance with the evaluation and recommendations put forward in the 2011 DPET report, so that it is an integrated policy document that clarifies military, police and civilian relationships while respecting their expertise, responsibilities and roles, and standardises institutional structures at the mission level. The new policy should be widely disseminated to Member States, in particular to TCCs and PCCs, so that they can better prepare, plan and train their forces in line with the policy.

F The UN Secretariat, supported by the Member States, should develop stronger crisis management structures within DPKO/DFS. This could be achieved by enhancing the role of the UNOCC to allow it to become a more strategic Crisis Management Centre. A reinforced UNOCC, augmented by the appropriate leadership, should focus on supporting the relevant missions, be ready-equipped with decision-making aids and communications, be able to exercise command authority over the missions, be staffed by experts both in crisis management and in the region concerned, and be able to take on the conduct of at least two crises, if not three, at the same time. This will require subsuming during crises much of the role and resources of the IOTs.

G The UN Secretariat should strengthen and empower the Senior Leadership Appointment Section (SLAS) in the DPKO/DFS in order to improve the selection, training, preparation and mentoring of senior leaders. Participation in relevant senior leadership training should be mandatory and assessing the performance of participants at senior leadership training should be considered.

H Peace operations should adopt fit-for-purpose tools and technologies, with the support of UN HQ and continuously seek and apply new technological innovations as necessary. Member States should provide adequate resources—human and financial—to do so. This could include a review and modernization of the deployed DPKO/DFS C4I (Command, Control, Communication, Coordination and Information Systems) infrastructure in line with international best practice and current technology.

I Together with the academic community and drawing on the expertise of mission personnel, the UN Secretariat should carry out a careful analysis of lessons from the use of new technologies in peace operations (like the use of UAVs). The results should be shared widely with Member States. Building on the lessons learned, existing Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) on the use of monitoring and surveillance technology should be updated and complemented with guidance in additional areas as needed. If, for example, UAVs are provided by Member States, rather than a commercial contractor, further clarification may be needed on their treatment as Contingent Owned Equipment.
Strengthening Effective Cooperation and Coordination

The rise of new actors on the global security scene, and the growing presence of hybridity in peace operations underscore the necessity to reach a common understanding of objectives, concepts and principles of peace operations; to aim towards a common doctrinal approach; and more critically continue to bolster cooperation and coordination mechanisms.

16 The last decade has witnessed a rapid rise of new actors on the world stage, with important implications for the practice of multilateral peace operations. The number of potential actors in peace operations is expanding and several regional organizations have recently expressed interest in either carrying out peace operations, intent to do so, or created structures to allow them to carry them out. While these developments are generally positive they could also create difficulties for the UN system, depending on how these actors will opt to use their leverage and direct their resources. Importantly, the rise of new actors also raises critical questions with regard to standards, rules of engagement, common doctrinal approaches and issues of accountability in peace operations. The UN has a primary role to play in preventing the dilution of current best practices, which will require greater engagement between the UN and regional organizations.

17 Concurrent with the rise of new actors, the practice of peace operation partnerships—meaning the cooperation by two or more international or regional organizations and sometimes bilateral actors in an intervention setting—is becoming increasingly common practice. There are ongoing peace operation partnerships in a number of challenging contexts, including Mali, Darfur, the DRC and Somalia. While these approaches are set to become more prominent in the future, and in particular the UN-AU-EU triangle has seen much progress in this regard, numerous technical and strategic challenges remain. For instance, increasing interaction and collaboration will have to be matched using more effective coordination mechanisms. Here, also, the UN has a primary role to play.

18 The need to enhance current mechanisms for coordination and cooperation applies not only between but also within organizations. Within the current framework for strategic-level cooperation on matters concerning peacekeeping there is little, many argue insufficient, space for meaningful consultation with Member States. TCCs and PCCs in particular could benefit from an enhanced information flow regarding the strategic management of peace operations.

19 The last decade has also seen significant progress with regard to the development of policies and guidelines for peace operations, a critical aspect of ensuring strengthened peace operation effectiveness. Yet an examination of existing guidance at the strategic, operational and tactical levels on three priority issue areas—protection of civilians, gender, and transnational organized crime—reveals disparities within existing international, regional and national policies and doctrines.
increasing the reliance on a multiplicity of actors to carry out peace operations, the contemporary peacekeeping system places greater demands on harmonisation of concepts, principles and objectives, and the need to strive for a common doctrinal approach.

20 Since the first landmark Security Council resolutions, 1265 (1999) and 1296 (2000), the UN has been actively pursuing the development and production of policy, guidance and training materials on the subject. At the UN level, the protection of civilians is understood as a multidimensional endeavor requiring simultaneously conducted activities and contributions from a variety of actors, thus underscoring the demand for standardisation and close cooperation on the issue. While the protection concept is well covered at the UN strategic level, doctrines and guidelines of regional organizations and the vast majority of countries analysed for this study, does not cover the protection of civilians’ concepts neither specifically nor sufficiently. Most national military manuals, for instance, relates to the protection of the military force itself rather than considering how civilians in intervention contexts are to be protected. In general, the concept at the UN level remains to be fully institutionalised, with more formalised and component-specific guidance at the operational and tactical levels required. Regional and national structures need to enhance their focus on protection of civilians, adopt and adjust necessary guidelines on protection, in order to enable its effective implementation at the mission level. More specific guidance is also needed on host state ownership and responsibility, specifically in cases where the host state is unwilling or unable to assume its responsibility for the protection of civilians. A lack of adequate guidance on what is to be done and how the protection of civilians’ framework should be implemented could lead to inaction or inappropriate action, ultimately risking affecting peace operation legitimacy.

21 A survey of another UN priority area, gender mainstreaming, showed that the development of strategic level guidelines on gender in relation to peace operations had been pioneered by the UN and broadly adopted as standard by relevant international, regional and member state bodies. The UN Security Council has underlined the need for gender-sensitive approaches to the restoration of peace and stability and in all aspects of peacekeeping operations. As a result, most countries and organizations have developed policy plans in line with the UN approach, establishing frameworks with bureaucratic structures and individuals to monitor, assess and manage activities. Issues of gender mainstreaming are well represented in international and national documentation and there is also a degree of commonality to the approaches and terminology. Divergences occur, however, with regard to how to achieve the objectives promulgated in the strategic level policy documents, at the operational and tactical levels of delivery. In essence, the main challenge to ensuring effective gender-sensitive approaches of peace operations is the insufficient integration and implementation of the gender guidelines already adopted and available. For
example, many countries have not integrated gender policies and issues throughout their operational frameworks of their agencies and organizations, and military manuals at the operational and tactical level provide little guidance. Indeed, while the UN approach is strong at the strategic level, it has not been fully promulgated at the operational and tactical levels, even less so at the regional and national levels.

RECOMMENDATIONS

J The UN and troop and police contributing countries, and countries that contribute non-uniformed civilian personnel should strengthen their cooperation and coherence. Enhanced efforts to harmonise and increase the effectiveness of cooperation between the UN and regional organizations should also be a priority. New actors involved in peace operations should uphold UN standards.

K The UN Secretariat, in close cooperation with Member States, should develop enhanced policy and guidelines for integrated mission police and military command mechanisms that ensure effective planning and communication, and support clear command and control in high tempo joint operations. These mechanisms should be tested at the mission level through crisis management exercises, also involving external expertise.

L Strategic level mechanisms in UN HQ should be reviewed to achieve an improved level of triangular cooperation between the Security Council, the Secretariat and TCCs/PCCs. The Security Council should make better use of its Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations to provide a more senior and highly qualified advisory group, especially on matters of security. The Security Council needs budget sheets prepared by the Secretariat before creating any new peacekeeping operation or before the renewal or strengthening of the existing ones. In this way there might be better alignment between mandates and the resources needed to implement them.

M The Security Council and the Secretariat should do more to keep Member States informed of the strategic direction of missions, and the Security Council needs help with assuming its strategic responsibilities and carrying out its planning and oversight functions effectively. In addition, Member States should ensure that their representatives in New York are fully prepared for consultations with the Security Council and the Secretariat. The Secretariat needs stronger mechanisms to create a unity of command and purpose to support missions in the field at the strategic level.

N The UN Secretariat in close cooperation with Member States should develop a comprehensive doctrine that clearly defines the protection of civilians to ensure adequate preparation and training to support peace operations.
Drawing on the expertise of mission personnel, the UN Secretariat should develop a joint or integrated manual on gender mainstreaming for all the mission components (military, police and civilian) for the tactical level, which should be systematically used both in missions and by contributing countries in their preparations for sending personnel to missions.

The UN Secretariat, in close cooperation with Member States, should develop policy guidelines that clarify whether and how peace operations should address transnational organized crime. This should include establishing a definition of organized crime and its transnational aspects.

Building the Impact and Assessment Evaluation Base

There is a growing recognition of the importance to assess and evaluate the impact of peace operations.

Progress towards building policies, principles and guidelines for today’s multidimensional operations, alongside the imperative to demonstrate peace operations as a value-for-money tool, has reinforced the need for a better appreciation of the impact that peace operations are having on the conflict environment. While peace operations are increasingly asked to demonstrate results and positive impacts in countries of deployment—for instance, the UN Security Council now regularly requests missions to establish and apply benchmarks towards transition—this has yet to become systematised practice and there remains a fundamental lack of agreement on the terms, methodologies and protocols for measuring peace operation impact. As a result, there is an absence of a coherent body of knowledge that can articulate clearly, and with sufficient data, the impact of peace operations. Indeed, it is only in recent years that practitioners and policymakers have begun to seriously grapple in concrete terms with the question of how to assess the effectiveness and impact of peace operations.

Any assessment or evaluation approach requires addressing a number of critical questions. At a fundamental level, it must be clear why the evaluation is being carried out. Is the overall evaluation objective to assess whether a project, programme or mission as a whole achieved its intended objectives (‘accountability’) or to advance knowledge in order to improve ongoing or future activities (‘learning’)? While assessments should seek to provide a platform for both learning and accountability to gain maximum benefit, compromises are inevitably made with regard to what can and will be evaluated. Second, it should also be clear for whom the activity is being carried out. While stakeholder requirements ideally are complementary; in practice, this is not always the case. The use of an independent evaluation is one way to insulate evaluation from multiple stakeholder requirements and agendas and may make possible more rigorous assessments that can generate information that will contribute to learning.
Determining what should be measured is often complicated. To this end, it is important to establish what it is that is to be evaluated. (Is it specific mission activities, projects or programmes, or the mission as a whole?) In relation to what is the impact to be assessed? Does the success of a single project, for instance, bear any substantive impact on the overall mission objectives, and are there any unintended consequences? Given the multiplicity of stakeholder agendas, these questions are best determined during the initial stages of an assessment or before, such as at the mission planning stage. Because missions are so complex and component parts are so intrinsically interrelated, the question of what to measure is difficult. However, methodological approaches—often combining multiple tools—are being developed, adapted and refined to make it possible to factor in all component parts in an evaluation.

Another important dimension concerns the level at which the evaluation occurs, specifically, whether at the level of outputs, outcomes or impacts. While outputs are by far the easiest to measure, as they essentially identify the results of an input activity and are easily quantifiable, they do not always provide substantive information in relation to higher order questions such as peace operation effectiveness, impact and quality, making at most rudimentary judgments on the value or contribution of objectives. Outcomes are those that define the very purpose of the intervention but that are difficult to measure except subjectively. Assessing impact, which connects a form of change or progress to an actual reform, is extremely challenging and often viewed by stakeholders as too problematic or elusive. Yet there is an emerging view that impact evaluation can, and should, be carried out throughout the course of the programme implementation, and that they should be built into the design of the peace operation.

A number of tools and methodologies are available for assessing and evaluating the impact of peace operations; some of these are still evolving. Fundamentally, the methodology selected is dependent on the questions posed, which, in turn, is dependent on the purpose of the evaluation or assessment. In this context it is also important to consider the trade-offs between ‘attribution’ and ‘contribution’. While ‘attribution’—by linking an effect directly to a cause or, specifically here, by connecting the intervention causally with its impact—has been the gold-standard in impact assessment and evaluation, it is increasingly recognized that it is difficult to isolate effects of a particular mission in these complex settings. Current thinking is leaning towards a greater focus on the contributory nature of peace operations, concentrating on the ‘contributions’ of an activity or a series of activities to a particular end state. To this end, good practice is increasingly looking to use mixed methods, rather than relying on any one method, thus adding validity to the findings.

Given the inherently political nature of peace operations, efforts to assess their effectiveness or impact will often be fraught with political
considerations and will continue to be challenging. The reality is that impact assessment and evaluation of peace operations have political implications—for the mission, donors, the host country and contributing countries. These key stakeholders are likely to have different requirements, needs and expectations in relation to the assessment and evaluation of UN operations. Further on, in integrated missions different operation components have distinct institutional identities and each will have a stake in their reputation and sometimes funding. These dimensions cannot be ignored when making an assessment or evaluation. The challenge is to create a toolkit of approaches and methodologies that has broad relevance and, in the process, helps capture lessons that can improve good practice in current and future peace operations.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

Q Security Council mandates should require missions to systematically include relevant monitoring and evaluation planning in order to better determine whether the missions are meeting the benchmarks set.

R The UN should improve the planning culture within UN HQ and missions by developing and implementing accountable UN-wide planning tools and systems, and by training and practising selected personnel in all peacekeeping components in their use.

S The UN, in close cooperation with Member States, should consider extending the role and responsibilities of the new Office for the Peacekeeping Strategic Partnership from that of purely military and police oversight to mission-wide oversight of leadership, accountability and crisis management training, in order to ensure stronger, more consistent and more accountable implementation of the DPKO/DFS policy and guidance at the mission level. Or alternatively, the UN should consider empowering the annual mission reviews by DPKO’s Office of Operations to make an assessment of the performance of the mission leadership team in this regard.

T The UN and Member States should pay increased attention to identifying impact assessment and evaluation experts with technical skills and expertise who can support the planning processes and drive coordination among the stakeholders. The emphasis should not be on scrutiny or criticism, but focus instead on conveying the comprehensive impact of a UN peace operation.

U Sufficient time, financial support and political will are critical components of impact assessments and evaluation processes. Senior mission leaders should drive such processes from the initial stages of a mission.
When an assessment or evaluation is about capturing the outcomes and impact of a mission as a whole, rather than in terms of its component parts (the military, police or civilian), asking independent evaluators to undertake the exercise should be considered, thereby reducing the risk of the process being politicised.

International organizations and donor countries should aim to create mixed evaluation teams comprised of independent evaluators and stakeholders with vested interests in mitigating the risks and effects of politicised assessment and evaluation agendas, and reinforce the complementary objectives of the evaluation protocols.

International organizations should create or review mechanisms that support donors and other stakeholders external to the mission coming together to establish common funding allocations to promote better rationalisation of funding and to achieve joint outcomes.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AC2</td>
<td>Authority, Command and Control</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACABQ</td>
<td>Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>BRICS</td>
<td>The grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>C-34</td>
<td>United Nations Special Committee for Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>C4I</td>
<td>Command, Control, Communication, Coordination and Information System</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAN</td>
<td>Community Alert Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>CELAC</td>
<td>Community of Latin American and Caribbean States</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRSV</td>
<td>Conflict-related Sexual Violence</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSTO</td>
<td>Collective Security Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCAF</td>
<td>Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces</td>
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<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration</td>
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<td>DFS</td>
<td>Department of Field Support</td>
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<td>DM</td>
<td>Department of Management</td>
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<td>DMS</td>
<td>Director for Mission Support</td>
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<td>DPA</td>
<td>Department of Political Affairs</td>
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<td>DPET</td>
<td>Division for Policy, Evaluation and Training</td>
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<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>DSRSG</td>
<td>Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FIB</td>
<td>Force Intervention Brigade</td>
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<td>GFSS</td>
<td>Global Field Support Strategy</td>
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<td>GIS</td>
<td>Geographic Information System</td>
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<td>GSC</td>
<td>Global Support Centre</td>
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<td>HoM</td>
<td>Head of Mission</td>
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<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
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<td>IAP</td>
<td>Integrated Assessment and Planning</td>
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<td>IASC</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Standing Committee</td>
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<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information and Communication Technology</td>
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<td>IHL</td>
<td>International Humanitarian Law</td>
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<td>IHRL</td>
<td>International Human Rights Law</td>
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<td>IMPP</td>
<td>Integrated Mission Planning Process</td>
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<td>INTERPOL</td>
<td>International Criminal Police Organization</td>
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<td>IOT</td>
<td>Integrated Operational Team</td>
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<td>IRL</td>
<td>International Refugee Law</td>
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<td>IS</td>
<td>Islamic State</td>
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<td>ITS</td>
<td>Integrated Training Service</td>
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<td>JLOC</td>
<td>Joint Logisitcs Operations Centre</td>
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<td>JMAC</td>
<td>Joint Mission Analysis Centre</td>
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<td>JOC</td>
<td>Joint Operations Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>LAS</td>
<td>League of Arab States</td>
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<tr>
<td>LRA</td>
<td>Lord’s Resistance Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>M23</td>
<td>March 23 Movement Rebel Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIKT</td>
<td>The grouping of Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea and Turkey</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINUSCA</td>
<td>United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic</td>
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<td>MINUSMA</td>
<td>United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali</td>
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<td>MINUSTAH</td>
<td>United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>MLT</td>
<td>Mission Leadership Team</td>
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<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>MPICE</td>
<td>Measures of Performance in Conflict Environments</td>
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<td>MRM</td>
<td>Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism</td>
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<td>MSC</td>
<td>Most Significant Change</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>OHCHR</td>
<td>Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>OIOS</td>
<td>Office of Internal Oversight Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>OM</td>
<td>Outcome Mapping</td>
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<tr>
<td>OMA</td>
<td>Office of Military Affairs</td>
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<td>PCBS</td>
<td>Palestinian Central Bureau for Statistics</td>
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<td>PCC</td>
<td>Police Contributing Country</td>
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<td>PCP</td>
<td>Palestinian Civil Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKO</td>
<td>Peacekeeping Operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>POC</td>
<td>Protection of Civilians</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAMSI</td>
<td>Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROA</td>
<td>Rapid Outcome Assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>Rules of Engagement</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSC</td>
<td>Regional Service Centre</td>
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<td>SGF</td>
<td>Strategic Guidance Framework for International Police Peacekeeping</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIGAR</td>
<td>Special Inspector-General for Afghanistan Reconstruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLAS</td>
<td>Senior Leadership Appointment Section</td>
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<tr>
<td>SMC</td>
<td>Strategic Military Cell</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRS</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary-General</td>
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<td>SSPS</td>
<td>South Sudanese Police Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<tr>
<td>StratComms</td>
<td>Strategic Communications</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCC</td>
<td>Troop Contributing Country</td>
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<tr>
<td>TLO</td>
<td>The Liaison Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOC</td>
<td>Transnational Organized Crime</td>
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<tr>
<td>UAV</td>
<td>Unmanned Aerial Vehicle</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>Joint African Union-United Nations Mission in Darfur</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNASUR</td>
<td>Union of South American Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOCC</td>
<td>United Nations Operations and Crisis Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOCI</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNODC</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOWA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for West Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNPOL</td>
<td>United Nations Police Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSOA</td>
<td>United Nations Support Office for the African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSOM</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>USG</td>
<td>Under-Secretary-General</td>
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<tr>
<td>UUAV</td>
<td>Unarmed Unmanned Aerial Vehicle</td>
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<tr>
<td>WACI</td>
<td>West African Crime Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>VHF</td>
<td>Very High Frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WPA</td>
<td>Women’s Protection Adviser</td>
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Women leaders of Krinding camp for internally displaced persons in El Geneina, West Darfur, participate in a meeting with Edmond Mulet, UN Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations on 3 June 2012.

UN Photo/GONZÁLEZ FARRAN
1. Introduction

Peace operations have been critically shaped by the conflict environment of the past two decades. The nature and understanding of conflict have changed significantly. A notable feature of contemporary conflicts is their hybrid nature, involving a persistent mixed state of ‘no peace, no conflict’ with punctuations of violence, targeting civilians and fusing regular and irregular warfare. More recently, the intersection of conflict, organized crime and in some instances terrorism has become pronounced, as illustrated for example in Mali and the northern Sahel region of Africa.

The concept and practice of peace operations have thus had to evolve in response to the global security agenda and the changing characterization of conflict. While the United Nations (UN) and the regional organizations that conduct peace operations have been tasked with meeting new challenges in new operational environments, the one constant in this rapidly evolving landscape is the continuing high demand for peace operations. UN peace operations, in particular, are still seen as the tool of first choice for international peace and security.

This instrument of choice was severely tested in 2013–2014. Events in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mali and South Sudan challenged UN peace operations, potently illustrating that conflict dynamics are becoming ever more multifaceted and transnational, and that existing doctrine, structures and capabilities lack the maturity and coherence to adapt to the complexities of the shifting conflict environment. The situation in the Central African Republic and in Somalia point to a growing trend for the ‘modularization’ and ‘hybridity’ of peace operations, requiring multiple actors to address the challenges. The contemporary peacekeeping system of a multiplicity of actors on the ground necessitates strong and effective command, cooperation and coordination mechanisms as well as high levels of operational readiness among those involved. The UN Secretariat has begun a concerted effort to strengthening

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1 This report uses the Brahimi Report definition of United Nations peace operations that includes the four activities of peacekeeping, peacebuilding, conflict prevention and peacemaking. Peacekeeping is referred to as a complex model of many elements, military and civilian, working together to build peace. Peacebuilding is a term used to refer to a set of activities such as reintegrating former combatants into civilian society, strengthening the rule of law, improving respect for human rights through monitoring, education and the investigation of past and existing abuses, providing technical assistance for democratic development, including electoral assistance and support for free media, and promoting conflict resolution and reconciliation techniques.

2 As defined by the Department of Field Support in a Global Field Support Strategy presentation to the Fifth Committee, March 2010. The concept of modularization involves ‘development of pre-defined service packages: materials, supplies, equipment and services’. The main elements of the service packages are enabling capabilities. Hybrid operations are operations with a combination of two organizations acting together under a unified command structure.

the capabilities of peacekeepers to better protect civilians and to ensure the safety and security of peacekeepers, including by leveraging technology and innovation.\textsuperscript{4} \n
\textsuperscript{4} Launched in 2009, under the working title of ‘New Horizon’, the international community engaged in a major effort to strengthen ‘the future of UN peacekeeping and how we can make it a better and more relevant instrument for the 21st century. [...] At the root of this discussion is the recognition that we need a renewed peacekeeping partnership to build a vision and a practical agenda to meet the challenges of modern peacekeeping.\textsuperscript{5} ‘The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Field Support (DFS) have since embarked on a number of change management processes, using a capability-driven approach to peace operations, with a strong focus on the appropriate resources needed to deliver the desired impact on the ground. In this context, missions should be light, nimble and flexible, well-planned, intelligence-driven and multidimensional. Implementation of the capability-driven approach has to date focused on three key areas: (1) developing standards and the necessary practical guidance for military, police and civilian peace-keepers; (2) generating and sustaining critical peacekeeping resources through strategic planning and analysis, and better outreach and adequate support; and (3) strengthening preparedness, including pre-deployment and in-mission training of peacekeepers.

\textsuperscript{5} With respect to developing standards, in addition to the recently released UN Infantry Battalion Manual, the Office of Military Affairs, with the close participation of 41 countries, has developed manuals on functional areas such as aviation, engineering, Force HQ support and logistics.\textsuperscript{6} These will promote better standardisation and increase interoperability among troop contributing countries (TCCs) in the field. The Police Division is also developing doctrine for the police component. The Strategic Guidance Framework for International Police Peacekeeping (SGF) is based on a recommendation by the UN Office of Oversight Services (OIOS) to develop a UN police doctrine.\textsuperscript{7} It is a long-term effort to enhance the effectiveness of UN police peacekeeping through more consistent and harmonised approaches to the provision of public safety, police reform and support to local police services, including more sophisticated recruitment of staff with the necessary skills and experience. A DPKO policy was approved in February 2014, defining overall guiding principles. The process is continuing with development of guidelines within specific key areas of UN police peacekeeping.\textsuperscript{8}

\textsuperscript{6} The UN Secretariat has taken steps to improve resource allocation to UN peace operations. The Global Field Support Strategy (GFSS), initiated in 2010, aims to improve the quality, speed and efficiency of mission support provided by the DFS with a view to equipping missions with the necessary resources to fulfil their mandates. A particu-

\textsuperscript{7} United Nations, Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), Internal Audit Division, Management of UN Police Operations: Development of a comprehensive doctrine will increase the effectiveness of UN Police Operations, Assignment No. AP2007/600/01, 26 August 2008; and United Nations, DPKO/DFS, Policy on United Nations Police in Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions, Ref. 2014.01, 1 February 2014.

\textsuperscript{8} The UN workshop on capacity building and development was hosted in Oslo by the Norwegian Institute for International Affairs (NUPI) in March 2014 in cooperation with the Challenges Forum; the workshop on Operations was hosted in China by the Police Peacekeeping Academy at Lantfang in June 2014; the workshop on Command was hosted by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) and the Swedish National Police, in Pretoria in October 2014. The final workshop will focus on Administration.
larly important development has been the increased inter-mission cooperation between peacekeeping operations, allowing for fungibility—a pooling and cross mission use—of resources, which has been identified as an important step forward to fill critical gaps in the availability of personnel and equipment.

7 In 2011, a UN Senior Advisory Group’s Report on Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict focused attention on the recurring challenges of deploying civilian expertise in crisis-affected countries and in support of post-conflict peacebuilding. Since then, the UN and its Member States have embarked on a global effort to reshape the way that civilian expertise is mobilized in crisis and post-conflict settings. One of the main tools is CAPMATCH, an online platform to match the demand for and supply of civilian capacities.

8 In addition to these broader reform initiatives, various innovations have taken place in recent peace operations. In 2013, the Security Council in resolution 2098 authorized, for the first time, the use of unarmed, unmanned aerial surveillance systems in support of the protection of civilians in eastern DRC. At the same time, missions have started to move from crisis communication and more classic public information approaches to strategic communications supported by the use of social media. In May 2014, the Under-Secretaries-General for Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support established an Expert Panel to advise them on how best to use new technologies and innovations to benefit UN peacekeeping.

9 Equally important however is for contributing countries to reach a shared understanding of the norms, concepts and objectives as well as the evolving operational environment of peace operations in order to improve their effectiveness. Against this background, and in close dialogue with the DPKO, the Challenges Forum partnership embarked on a two-year project to contribute to the effective implementation of the UN initiatives as described. Four working groups were established in 2012 to cover the following thematic areas:

- **Peace Operations Under New Conditions**
  co-led by the Center for International Peace Operations, Germany, and the United Service Institution of India.

- **Policies, Principles and Guidelines**
  co-led by the National Defence University, Pakistan, and the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, United States.

- **Authority, Command and Control**
  co-led by the Ministry of Defence, France; and the National Defence College, Nigeria.

- **Impact Assessment and Evaluation**
  co-led by the Pearson Centre, Canada, and the Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria.

The aims of the work strands were to: identify new conditions for peacekeeping; contribute to an improved harmonisation of principles, guidelines, concepts and doctrine, and therefore a consistency of language and definitions; gain a better understanding of current UN authority, command and control arrangements, including factors affecting their full and effective implementation; and map the state of the art regarding evaluation of the impact of multidimensional peace operations.

10 By identifying the new conditions for peace operations and possible challenges, this report aims to provide perspectives on how the international community can best prepare, respond and create resilience in order to decisively and effectively meet the challenges of current and future peace operations. The report brings together insights and outcomes from various Challenges Forum meetings, including the Annual Forums held in Sharm el Sheikh, Egypt, in 2011, Geneva, Switzerland, in 2012 and in Buenos Aires, Argentina, in 2013;

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research workshops held in Berlin, Germany, in 2012, and in Oslo, Norway, in 2014; a dialogue meeting with UN mission personnel in Entebbe, Uganda, in 2013; and field visits to three UN peace operations—the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) and the UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS); as well as a panel discussions in New York, USA, in 2013 and 2014 respectively. In addition, desk research, questionnaires and structured interviews were undertaken involving Challenges Forum partners and their national interlocutors.10

Chapter 2 explores future trends and needs in peace operations. It discusses the emerging threats facing peace operations and underscores the fact that threats such as transnational organized crime, terrorism, piracy, asymmetric warfare and cyber (in)security will have far-reaching implications for doctrine, mandates, capacity and capabilities, and more fundamentally for consensus on the objectives and core business of peace operations. It highlights the need for peace operations to modernise the way they understand and influence the mission environment, and how they communicate and manage their relations with the host country. The applicability of and limitations on the use of modern technology in these contexts are examined.

Chapter 3 looks at the critical issues of policies, principles and guidelines, with a focus on three topics—the protection of civilians, gender mainstreaming and transnational organized crime. The past decade has seen significant progress in developing policies and guidelines on peace operations. The chapter surveys and compares existing international, regional and national policies and doctrines ranging from the strategic to the tactical level to identify common definitions and concepts, and where different terminology and approaches are used. It also analyses the gaps—what appears to be absent, and whether information is lacking or inadequate—in existing policies, principles and guidelines related to the protection of civilians, gender mainstreaming and addressing transnational organized crime.

The very complexity of modern peace operations demands a clear and strong command and control framework to guide and direct activities at both the mission and the headquarters level. An effective authority, command and control (AC2) framework is key not just to the successful planning and conduct of operations, but also to maintaining the confidence of the Member States involved in UN peacekeeping. Chapter 4 analyses current UN AC2 mechanisms and practice at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, in a rapidly evolving and demanding environment.

10 The Challenges Annual Forum 2011, held in February 2012, was hosted by the Cairo Center for Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Egypt, and addressed the theme of Peace Operations Beyond the Horizon: Enabling Contributing Countries for the Future. The Annual Forum 2012, held in May 2012, was hosted by the Geneva Centre for Security Policy in cooperation with the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs and the Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sports of Switzerland on the theme of Cooperation and Coordination in Peace Operations: UN and Regional Organizations. The Annual Forum 2013, held in December 2013, was hosted by the Ministry of Defence of Argentina in cooperation with the Armed Forces Joint Staff and CAECOPAZ and addressed the theme of Strengthening UN Peace Operations: Modalities and Opportunities for Regionalized Contributions. The workshop on The Future Is Now: Putting Scenarios for Peace Operations in 2025 into Today’s Operational Context was hosted by ZIF in Berlin in October 2012. The workshop on The Art of the Possible: Peace Operations Under New Conditions – A Dialogue with the Field Community was hosted by the Swedish Armed Forces and the United Service Institution of India at the UN Regional Service Centre in April 2013. The panel discussion on the implications of the Force Intervention Brigade for future UN peace operations was co-hosted with the Permanent Mission of Germany to the UN and held in New York in January 2014. The workshop and thematic meeting on the Strategic Guidance Framework for International Police Peacekeeping, with a focus on police capacity building and development, was hosted by NUPI, in association with the UN Police Division, in Oslo in March 2014. For further information on all Challenges Forum meetings and the resulting publications see <http://www.challengesforum.org>.
A growing culture of needing to ‘do more with less’ in peace operations is a function of the increasing complexity of mandates with burgeoning multi-dimensional tasks alongside a greater emphasis on ‘responsible stewardship of resources’ in an era of financial austerity. The emphasis on demonstrating that peace operations are a value-for-money tool has generated an interest in examining whether they lead to meaningful impacts and outcomes. The Security Council now regularly requests missions to establish and apply benchmarks to monitor progress towards transition, focusing on key milestones. Chapter 5 highlights the need to move away from a fragmented and ad hoc conceptualization, design and conduct of measuring effectiveness, success or failure. The fragmentation and incoherence are in part due to a lack of fundamental agreement on the terms, methodologies and protocols for measuring the impact of peace operations. The chapter explores current thinking and trends on what should be measured, at what level and how to measure it, and makes a number of policy recommendations.

In conclusion, the nature of the challenges facing UN peace operations has changed considerably in recent years, as have the tools and technologies available to the international community to address them. On 11 June 2014, the UN Secretary-General launched a major review of UN peacekeeping in order to ‘take stock of evolving expectations of UN peacekeeping and how the UN can work towards a shared view of the way forward’. As a humble contribution to this international dialogue on how to make current and future peace operations as effective, efficient and inclusive as possible, the Challenges Forum Partnership offers its report on ‘Designing Mandates and Capabilities for Future Peace Operations’.

11 Remarks by Under-Secretary-General for Field Support Ameerah Haq to the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 24 February 2014.
CHAPTER 2. PEACE OPERATIONS UNDER NEW CONDITIONS
The new peacekeepers’s binoculars? A Ugandan soldier from AMISOM launches surveillance equipment over town of Qoryooley, Somalia on 30 April 2014.

UN Photo/TOBIN JONES
2. Peace Operations Under New Conditions

Introduction

The world of peace operations has changed significantly in recent decades and will continue to do so in the future. This much is clear: But how will it change? What types of conflict will the international community face and what doctrines, instruments and resources will it need in order to respond to them? The Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF) used scenario methodology to create four scenarios for the state of international peace operations in 2025. Although the scenarios are not forecasts, they are plausible and instructive, and intended to help policymakers think about an uncertain future in a more structured way. However, they represent just four of an unlimited number of possible futures. The true value of the exercise therefore lies in the 14 factors that underline all four scenarios and that will influence all possible futures. These key factors are:

- Demographics
- Climate change
- The relationship between national interest and global interdependence
- The state of the global economy
- The evolution of international and regional organizations
- The effects of economic and political power shifts
- The evolution of norms and values across the globe
- State fragility
- Organized crime
- Resource scarcity
- Migration, refugees and diasporas
- New technologies
- New media
- Private security companies

This chapter is based on the work of the Challenges Forum Working Group on Peace Operations Under New Conditions, which explored future trends and needs in peace operations and the ways in which the international community can respond, prepare or create resilience. It reflects the perspectives of a diverse range of experienced actors. The scenarios prepared by ZIF were used to initiate the Challenges Forum work strand and discussions. Various

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workshops were conducted to develop recommendations that were tested with senior practitioners from various disciplines, including UN missions.14 A dialogue workshop meeting with practitioners in the field confirmed the high degree of change that peace operations are undergoing and provided a glimpse of the array of emerging responses required as new challenges become apparent on the ground. In addition, the working group undertook structured interviews with policymakers based on a questionnaire on trends, challenges and ways of being ‘prepared for the future’ from a policy perspective or from the perspective of decision makers in the Challenges Forum partnership. Interlocutors were asked for their perspective on emerging threats in the context of peace operations, emerging responses to new threats, the use of new tools, such as in the area of information technology, and ways to promote the successes of peace operations.

A Paradigm Shift?

18 During 2013 and 2014 significant developments occurred in UN peace operations. Although there is a tendency to claim that conditions are especially challenging now, or that we are standing at a crossroads, events in 2013 and 2014 might indeed portend significant change for future peace operations. Today, ‘[t]hose that oversee and direct peace operations are … being asked not only to “build the ship while sailing it”, but to steer it in several directions at once while concurrently repelling boarders’.19

19 Rather than the widely predicted slow consolidation in peace operations, driven partially by austerity, 2013 and 2014 saw a flurry of UN activity, mostly in Africa. In March 2013, the Security Council added a ‘Force Intervention Brigade’ (FIB) to the UN Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). In April 2013, the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was mandated to take over from a previous operation deployed by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and then the African Union (AU). In May 2013, encouraged by the successes of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the political process, the UN restructured and enlarged its presence in Somalia. The UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) now provides political guidance to the peace process. In April 2014 the Security Council authorized the establishment of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) and the transfer of authority was made on 15 September 2014. These missions operate in highly challenging environments and all but one (UNSOM) have very robust mandates.16

20 Some commentators will point to the fact that not all the developments are new: the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was redesigned as

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14 The two main Challenges Forum workshops were: The Future Is Now: Putting Scenarios for Peace Operations in 2025 into Today’s Operational Context, hosted by Center for International Peace Operations in 2012; and The Art of the Possible: Peace Operations Under New Conditions – A Dialogue with the Field Community, hosted by the Swedish Armed Forces and United Service Institution of India at the UN Regional Service Centre in Entebbe. Summaries of the workshop discussions are available at <http://www.challengesforum.org>.


a highly robust mission in 2006, UNOCI was already reliant on an autonomous security guarantee by French forces, just as MINUSMA is, and the deployment of a Rapid Reaction Force within MONUSCO was agreed by the Security Council in 2011. The question is whether the at times remarkable initial successes achieved by these initiatives are sustainable. They were each enabled by a specific combination of political support, financial resources and military capacities that are the exception rather than the norm in UN peace operations. In addition to being resource-intensive, these new types of operations also raise serious political and doctrinal questions. Behind the debate about whether they represent a revolution or an evolution in UN operations lurks the unease of some countries about a blurring of the lines between peacekeeping and peace enforcement.17

Within the UN context, doctrine is, arguably, currently trailing operational practice. There should therefore be an in-depth discussion between UN Member States, bodies such as the UN Special Committee for Peacekeeping Operations (C-34), the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations, and the UN Secretariat. What, for instance, do these developments mean for the core peacekeeping principles of consent of the parties, impartiality and non-use of force except in self-defence and in defence of the mandate?18

Recent developments have fuelled debate around the increasing robustness of peace operations in certain settings.19 In general, authority to engage robustly—using force at the tactical level—already exists in Chapter VII mandates and related rules of engagement (ROEs). However, such mandates and ROEs are not always implemented to their fullest possible extent. TCCs often have differing interpretations of the mission mandate and ROEs, and varying levels of political will to engage proactively. Other commonly accepted principles such as not deploying a peace operation where there is ‘no peace to keep’ are also being challenged.20

The growing importance and roles of sub-regional organizations in peacekeeping is also a defining development.

It remains to be seen whether TCCs will be willing to deploy their soldiers to increasingly robust operations where there is a greater likelihood they will suffer—or cause—fatalities, and whether they will be willing to accept the risk of fatalities on behalf of the mission mandate. Even though major contributors have confirmed their commitment to peacekeeping, some of them remain concerned about the potential increase in the robustness of peace operations.21

It is also unclear whether the command

These missions operate in highly challenging environments and all but one (UNSOM) have very robust mandates. §19

Behind the debate about whether they represent a revolution or an evolution in UN operations lurks the unease of some countries about a blurring of the lines between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. §20

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17 The challenge for the UN to balance this approach with its need to continue humanitarian operations and uphold humanitarian principles was raised by UN Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson, speaking at the Challenges Forum Seminar on Realizing Effective and Dynamic Cooperation for Peace Operations, New York, February 2013.

18 UN Security Council resolution 2098 of 28 March 2013 authorized the newly formed Intervention Brigade to ‘carry out targeted offensive operations’ and ‘neutralize’ armed groups that pose threats to state authority and civilian security in eastern DRC. It is worth stressing, however, that the same resolution reaffirmed the abovementioned basic peacekeeping principles.


21 Challenges Forum Working Group Interview.
and control structures and mission support arrangements will be able to keep up with high-speed, information-driven ‘robust’ operations, not to mention the need for well-equipped, well-trained and capable contingents.22

24 The doctrinal, administrative and operational framework of UN peace operations seems ripe for review. The recent strategic change is significant and driven internally by the decisions of the Security Council but also externally by a range of factors including new actors and partnerships, new threats and new tools. The forthcoming review of the UN Secretary-General will provide an important reassessment of what a potentially new or adjusted paradigm for peace operations should contain.

New Actors and New Partnerships

Actors

25 The past decade has witnessed the rapid rise of new actors on the world stage which could challenge both the economic and the political dominance of ‘Western’ countries. The most commonly known grouping is the so-called BRICS—Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. Another grouping is the MIKT countries—Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea and Turkey. This development may have wide-ranging consequences, including in the field of multilateral peace operations—in which many of the above have a long and proud tradition of participation.23 The emergence of these groups of actors raises a number of questions: How will they contribute to existing multilateral structures? If they decide to bring their new influence and resources to bear, how will this change those structures? Perhaps they will choose to remain on the sidelines. Will they instead create new structures, possibly lending additional weight to regional organizations?

26 The number of potential actors in peace operations is expanding. Several regional organizations have in recent years expressed either a strong interest in or their intention to carry out peace operations or created structures that will allow them to undertake such operations in the future. These include the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), the League of Arab States (LAS) and the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). While these developments are generally positive, they could also create difficulties for the existing UN system. Unless states are willing to increase their commitment substantially, any resources they devote to regional organizations may become tied up and no longer as available for UN operations.

27 Other crucial issues are the questions of standards, rules of engagement, common doctrinal approaches and accountability, which must not be diluted and should equally apply to regional organizations and other actors operating under UN principles. Given the potential rise in the multiplicity of actors, including partnerships between peacekeeping operations and for example the African Union (AU), European Union (EU) and bilateral actors on the ground, there is a need for greater engagement between the UN and regional organizations on

22 For a detailed discussion on authority, command and control issues, see chapter 4 of this report.

these principles and, where necessary, for the UN to assist new actors on the peace operations scene to uphold such standards. Closer interaction between the UN, regional organizations and other actors will also facilitate improved coordination and cooperation between the various organizations engaged in peace operations.24 Equally, some observers noted that liaison with and improved cooperation among contributing countries is important to ensure that their views are recognized and—based on previous lessons learned and best practices—integrated into ongoing operations.25

Partnerships

28 Peace operations partnerships, that is, cooperation by two or more international or regional organizations and sometimes bilateral actors in a (post-)crisis setting, is common practice today. This is particularly true of the most challenging operations, such as in Darfur (UN, AU), the DRC (UN, EU), Somalia (AU, UN, EU), Mali (UN, AU, EU, France) and Central African Republic (UN, AU, EU, France). True ‘hybrid operations’, that is, two organizations acting together under a unified command structure, however, are much rarer. The joint AU-UN mission in Darfur (UNAMID) is the only current example. Most partnerships are instead based on what should be a clearly delineated division of labour, playing to each organization’s comparative advantages such as greater legitimacy, local knowledge or experience, willingness to risk casualties, financial resources, and high-end military and logistics capabilities. One of the more complex examples is the international peace enforcement effort in Somalia. Here, AMISOM provides the ‘boots on the ground’, the EU offers support by financing some of the personnel costs, and the UN, through its Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA), supplies logistical support and funding for equipment.26 These approaches are set to become more prominent in the future. Increasing interaction will have to be matched with more effective coordination mechanisms, in which the UN clearly has a primary role to play.27 Much progress has been made, especially in the UN-AU-EU triangle. The three organizations now have liaison offices based in each other’s headquarters and there are regular, more-or-less formalized exchanges at both the working and the leadership levels.

29 Numerous challenges remain. Some are technical: How can UN and AU procurement rules, for example, be made compatible? How can Member States ensure an adequate flow of resources, including sustainable and predictable finances, to support other actors? Some are strategic: Does the future of peace operation partnerships lie in cooperation between actors that are ‘full service providers’, offering the entire spectrum from military to civilian expertise? The African Regional Organizations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), for example, are currently

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24 On 28 July 2014 the UN Security Council adopted resolution 2167 stressing the importance of regional cooperation for international peace and security. The resolution encourages cooperation between UN and regional organizations, with a special focus on the African Union to ‘strengthen their relationships and develop more effective partnerships’.


26 Under-Secretary-General for Field Support, Ameerah Haq, explored issues from Somalia and Mali as examples of the evolving UN and Regional Partnerships in Africa, at the Challenges Forum Seminar on Realizing Effective and Dynamic Cooperation for Peace Operations, New York, February 2013.

27 This includes the need to further strengthen consistent internal cooperation and coordination among mission elements and between peace operations and the UN Country Team. See below on the notion of inter-mission cooperation.
strengthening their civilian capacities. Or is the development of dedicated niche capacities by each organization for ‘plug and play’ missions, such as the EU’s resources in the areas of security sector reform, policing and border management, and the rule of law, the way forward? How can we strengthen the roles, numbers and impact of civilian contributions in peace operations?

If developments in 2013 and 2014, are an indicator, we might see a shift towards an à la carte approach, ‘which leverages partnerships, regional initiatives, coalitions, unilateral deployments and even the use of private contractors’. For this multitude of actors to be successful in their implementation will demand much more elaborate coordination mechanisms, including the possible use of operational level or even joint headquarters. There will also be a need to adapt to the dynamics in the field.

A New Dynamic: Emerging Threats

Emerging threats are those security challenges which are not on the traditional security agenda and for which the international community has not yet identified adequate policy responses and implementation mechanisms (compared for example to the regimes regulating the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons). In 2010, the Security Council acknowledged that ‘the evolving challenges and threats to international peace and security include armed conflicts, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and small arms and light weapons, transnational organized crime, piracy, drug and human trafficking’. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon reiterated in 2011, that ‘the combined stresses of crime, pandemics and climate change are pushing many poor and fragile countries close to breaking point’. Thus, although these new threats may have been around for some time, they can still be considered ‘emerging’ as there is still substantial ongoing discussion about effective and legitimate policy responses. There is however some disagreement over whether these identified issues are threats or security challenges, and whether or how peace operations should address them.

These emerging threats, are also characterized by their transnational character. By and large, they are less ‘bounded’, not only by borders but also by formal rules, international law and historical precedents, as elements which add to the unpredictability of future behaviour may unfold more quickly and suddenly, and could have cascading effects. In terms of response, they require a more collaborative and multidisciplinary approach that combines a diverse range of functional and regional expertise and given the gender dimensions of transnational crime, particularly as regards trafficking of persons, require gender and age sensitive analysis to better target the response.

Consequently, the debate about new threats is not just an intellectual exercise. The types of threats that peace operations will encounter in their respective areas of deployment will have far-reaching implications.

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for policies, principles, doctrine and guidelines, mandates, capacity and capabilities, staff deployment and staff security, and indeed for any international consensus on the objectives and core business of peace operations. For instance, in his 2013 report to the Security Council on security sector reform, the Secretary-General notes that ‘current approaches to security sector reform have been confronted with a proliferation of transnational threats, including trafficking in humans, drugs and arms; terrorism; insurgency; climate change and environmental degradation; organized crime and armed violence; and cybercrime.’

The debate on emerging threats is of course closely linked to the discussion on the capabilities and tools that future peace operations will need in order to be effective. One of the dilemmas is how to create the capacities needed to tackle the various new threats and tasks in the absence of a major influx of additional resources. Many argue that the international community will have to prioritise more rigorously in the future, as funds, personnel and equipment will remain limited. The questions that would need to be answered include: Which conflicts need to be addressed most urgently? What issues are vital for rapid stabilization and recovery? What are the most promising chances for missions to achieve their mandates?

Others suggest that international and regional organizations should focus on strengthening their core capabilities while at the same time developing their mutual cooperation in emerging fields such as combatting organized crime, maritime security, cyber security and intelligence gathering. Evaluating comparative advantages on a case-by-case basis would allow greater flexibility and not limit certain actors to taking on specific roles.

Another common theme raised in the debates on the scarcity of the resources at the disposal of the international community to address transnational threats and cross-border conflicts was inter-mission cooperation. In regions where several missions are deployed, inter-mission cooperation between—but not exclusively—UN peacekeeping operations can be a crucial asset. A significant step in this direction was made in 2004 by the UN missions in Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia and Sierra Leone. This practice is now much more common, enabling missions to carry out their mandates more effectively and efficiently. The UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations has noted ‘recent advances in inter-mission cooperation’ and encouraged ‘the Secretariat, in consultation with TCCs, to explore all opportunities and challenges for inter-mission cooperation for consideration by the Security Council and under the United Nations administrative and budgetary rules and regulations’.

Areas of cooperation include: Sharing resources, such as aviation assets or military capabilities; information and analysis, through the cooperation

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33 Assistant Secretary-General for Rule of Law and Security Institutions, Dmitry Titov, elaborated on the emerging threats to peace operations in the form of TOC, and highlighted that ‘Operating in high seas and in cyber space, organized criminals are therefore increasingly turning into a principal threat for international security and for peacebuilding processes’. Challenges Forum Seminar in Oslo on the theme Strategic Guidance Framework for International Police Peacekeeping, hosted by NUPI in cooperation with UNDPKO, March, 2014.


of Joint Mission Analysis Centres (see below); and cooperation at the strategic level to foster regional approaches.\textsuperscript{37} However, inter-mission cooperation is currently primarily focusing on sharing military assets and could be further expanded as appropriate to include police and civilian components.

\textbf{Transnational Organized Crime}

\textsuperscript{37} There is a growing recognition of the adverse effects of transnational organized crime (TOC) on international peace and security.\textsuperscript{38} TOC in post-conflict areas threatens the sustainability of peacebuilding efforts in the host country, the security and development of neighbouring states, and that of the broader international community. The Security Council has debated ‘the impact of the transnational organized crime on peace, security and stability in West Africa and the Sahel Region’.\textsuperscript{39} A growing body of policy-relevant research addresses how fragile and post-conflict states are particularly vulnerable to organized crime, and how illicit practices affect peacekeeping, peacebuilding and stabilization operations.\textsuperscript{40}

\textsuperscript{38} Illegal economic activities and organized crime are nothing new in peace operations—past missions, such as in Sierra Leone, Liberia or Haiti, have had to deal with the impact of the illicit trade in commodities such as diamonds or drugs, or the trade in weapons which often involve wider international criminal networks.\textsuperscript{41} However, the number of cases appears to be increasing. Mali is one example where the activities of TOC were much discussed ahead of the deployment of a peace operation. Similarly, there has been growing concern about criminal groups increasingly using West Africa as a hub of the cocaine trade from South America to Europe.\textsuperscript{42} In 2009, the UN initiated the West African Crime Initiative (WACI), a cooperation between the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), DPKO, the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), the United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA) and the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL). The

\textsuperscript{37} For an overview of institutional mechanisms conducive to inter-mission cooperation and a review of experience gained in Chad, CAR, the DRC and Sudan see Victor Angelo ‘Inter-mission Cooperation: Reflecting on Sudan and Central Africa Experiences’, Security in Practice, vol. 4 (2011).

\textsuperscript{38} Stefan Feller, UN Police Adviser, DPKO, speaking at the Challenges Forum workshop in Berlin on the theme \textit{The Future is Now: Putting Scenarios for Peace Operations in 2025 into Today’s Operational Context}, October 2012. At a Challenges Forum workshop in Entebbe in April 2013 the participants, consisting of Challenges Forum partners and UN and AU mission personnel in the region, identified what they saw as the top five threats to peace operations: transnational organized crime; terrorism; systemic inertia (UN and Member States); corruption and natural disasters.

\textsuperscript{39} See Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/2012/2, 21 February 2012.


\textsuperscript{41} Some of this is well-documented through the Independent Expert Groups attached to the Sanctions Committees. See for example the reports on sanctions against Liberia and Sierra Leone.

focus is on local capacity building in the fight against transnational organized crime and to work in a coordinated manner to support the implementation of ‘the ECOWAS Regional Action Plan to Address the Growing Problem of Illicit Drug Trafficking, Organized Crime, and Drug Abuse in West Africa’.

39 Peace operations are generally neither explicitly mandated nor equipped to deal with the threats emanating from TOC. Nonetheless, several missions have over time integrated measures to counter TOC-related threats—or their most detrimental impact on the host country and the peacebuilding process—into mandate implementation. Generally, this has been gradual and out of necessity, rather than by design or as part of a distinct strategy from the outset of the mission.

40 However, simply including the fight against organized crime in mission mandates will not be sufficient. The primary responsibility for dealing with transnational organized crime lies with the state and its rule-of-law structure. Yet, for the mission to be successful, an in-depth assessment will have to be made of the risks posed by organized crime in the mission area, and the results integrated into the mission planning process. Subsequently, the skills and structures relevant to combatting organized crime will have to be identified and incorporated into peace operations. In addition, there needs to be broad agreement on how to combat organized crime. For example, this could be supported by raising awareness of the issue through open discussions in the Security Council; or through enhancing international cooperation by creating new structures or refining existing mechanisms that facilitate information-sharing between various international organizations, Interpol and other law enforcement agencies. UNODC and DPKO have since 2011 had a joint plan of action to strengthen their cooperation to proactively address threats to stability and security.

41 While international measures to counter TOC are necessary, others argue that addressing TOC needs to be locally owned and regionally coordinated. This is particularly important due to a frequently observed dynamic—the so-called balloon effect—whereby effective responses to TOC in one country simply lead to a shifting of routes, groups and activities to a neighbouring country. Key lessons identified from previous experience include:

- Solutions cannot be imposed and timelines for effective responses will be long.
- Solutions are not limited to the area of law enforcement but also need to address the political and socio-economic conditions that lead to organized crime.
- Only long-term building of national capacities to combat TOC can be truly effective.
- Engagement against TOC in peace operations is primarily a political issue (not a technical one) and has to be led at the highest political level.
- Locally driven information gathering and analysis are required to devise appropriate responses.

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43 For a typology of possible interfaces between organized crime and peace operations, and the possible ways in which missions could respond or address the issue, see Wibke Hansen, Challenges Forum Policy Brief 2014:5 (note 40).

New Tools: Modern Technology in Peace Operations

Modern technology has the potential to increase the capacity of peace operations. Already in the year 2000 the Brahimi Report\textsuperscript{45} mentioned information technology as a key enabler and stressed the need for geographic information systems (GIS) experts in all missions. The New Horizon Report\textsuperscript{46} in 2009, reiterated this calling for ‘better use of technology to support lighter, more agile deployment; and improved financial agreement for greater operational flexibility’ and for ‘better situational awareness in the field’. In 2013, the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations observed: ‘Technology is power and in the hands of UN peacekeepers, it can be a power for peace’.\textsuperscript{47} One of its recommendations for tackling emerging threats was the adoption of new tools and technologies in peace operations. Specifically, it proposed the promotion of ‘international and regional capacities for early warning and information gathering, sharing and management’ and work to better ‘understand the role of new media and big data in conflict and conflict prevention, understand its impact and create capacities to use it proactively’. In 2013, prior to the meeting of the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations, Pakistan shared a concept note stressing that the use of modern technology will ‘increase the safety and effectiveness of present and future UN peacekeeping operations’. In June 2014\textsuperscript{48}, under-Secretaries-General Hervé Ladsous, DPKO, and Ameenah Haq, DFS, appointed an expert panel on technology and innovation in UN peacekeeping to advise how to use technologies and innovation in a way that benefits and improves the performance of UN peacekeeping. A report is expected in December 2014.\textsuperscript{49}

Fundamentally, the application of modern technology to peace operations aims to enhance understanding of and influence the mission environment in two ways. First, by gaining trust and support by communicating with the host country population, including countering misinformation by potential spoilers. Second, by improving ‘situational awareness’ and early warning, and in turn enabling early response, through information gathering, analysis and dissemination in support of decision-making. Hence, these new tools can be used in four main areas to:

- Inform strategic, operational and tactical mission planning.
- Enhance the ability of missions to react in a more timely manner and adequately to unfolding events by providing the right information.
- Provide intelligence capacity with regard to spoilers, for example, in the context of mandates to protect civilians.
- Serve as force and police multipliers and enhancing the safety and security of UN personnel, and of the host population.


\textsuperscript{46} United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field Support, A New Partnership Agenda – Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping, Section IV (New York, July 2009).


\textsuperscript{49} To support this process the Center for International Peace Operations hosted a high-level expert seminar in August 2014, on Technology and Innovation in Peace Operations.
Social Media and Strategic Communication

Social media are certainly not the only communication tools available to peace operations. More traditional communication tools also have an important role to play, as is illustrated by the VHF radios and mobile telephones used by the Community Alert Networks (CANs) operated by MONUSCO to provide early warning and the protection of civilians and peacekeepers. Nonetheless, social media increasingly shape our perception of the world, and are becoming as accessible in Bamako or Goma as they are in New York or Paris. New media have the potential to improve both the scope and the effectiveness of a peace operation’s communications efforts. Even if international organizations would want to dispense with such tools, their opponents certainly do not. The M23 rebel group in the DRC, Al-Shabaab in Somalia or more recently IS (Islamic State) in Iraq and Syria use Twitter, blogs and other social media platforms to wage misinformation campaigns to sabotage international efforts.

Correctly used, these tools enable peace operations to move beyond reactive crisis communication and to take a strategic communication approach in the original sense. These new tools should be used not because it is fashionable to do so, but because they enable missions to fulfil their mandates.

As a consequence, UN, AU and EU missions have taken the first steps into the world of digital, social and other media. Many peace operations now use Facebook and Twitter or live-stream events to enhance their strategic communications (StratComms) efforts. StratComms engage the audience in a two-way dialogue and thus not only serve as a source of information for the public, but can also generate public support for and affirm a mission’s goals. This is a key precondition for success, as peace operations are generally not successful through the threat or actual use of military force alone—nor should they be. Peace operations are built on legitimacy and consent, combining ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ power.

Information Gathering and Analysis

The development and humanitarian communities have made initial forays into the utilization of crowdsourcing tools to enhance their impact. The UN’s Global Pulse, for instance, launched by the Office of the Secretary-General, uses digital data sources to track and monitor the impacts of global and local socio-economic crises in real time. Thus far, however, these tools have not been used in a peace operation setting, and, while they have great potential, it must be noted that there are serious constraints on their use, including political manipulation, user security concerns, privacy and human rights implications, and important data governance and technology investment decisions to be thought through. There are also simple technology barriers, such as predictable access to electricity and bandwidth availability, as well as ‘education barriers among both the personnel of peace operations and the civilian population in remote settings’.

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50 For example, ICT4Peace provides a tool for the benefit of more effective communications and situational awareness for peace operations.
The use of various forms of crisis mapping using crowdsourcing systems is one way to gain a better understanding of the mission environment. Maybe the best known is Ushahidi, which, in the aftermath of Kenya’s 2007 presidential election, created a website based on open-source software to collect and map eyewitness reports of violence. Other examples are the Syria Tracker and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) Tracker, which in addition to providing crowdsourced texts, photographs and video reports use data mining to scan sources on the web such as official news reports, social media and blogs.53

While crowdsourcing is one possible way to gain situational awareness, there are other methods at the disposal of peace operations, in coordination with the host countries and national authorities. Various forms of surveillance equipment, digital and otherwise, have the potential to dramatically increase the reach of peacekeepers and enable them to conduct the fast, intelligence-driven, around-the-clock operations needed to deliver their mandates. There is a growing recognition by the international community of their utility and, after years of often acrimonious debate, there now seems to be an emerging consensus that these capabilities can be force multipliers, and are increasingly necessary for missions to successfully carry out their mandates. In an exchange of letters, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council of his intention to use unarmed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in the DRC. The first trial flight took place in early December 2013 and the full system became operational in the spring of 2014. On 18 June the UN announced its intention to deploy UAVs in Mali, where they would feed into the All-Source Information Fusion Unit with the aim of enhancing the situational awareness of MINUSMA as well as increasing its ability to protect civilians and its own personnel.55 This does not imply that these issues are uncontroversial. Some countries, particularly the host countries of UN peace operations and their neighbours, are extremely cautious, partly due to concerns over intrusive reconnaissance and intelligence activities in their airspace, or in close proximity to their borders, and the potential to equip UAVs with weapon systems in the future.55 Other concerns are that the use of technologies such as UAVs—which can gather and transmit information, but not the intentions behind the activities—should not be seen as replacing a human presence, but instead as complementary tools. The deployment of UAVs in the DRC also raises the essential question of the legal status of civilian personnel operating UAVs under the customary law principle of distinction. As the UN can be seen to be involved in hostilities in the DRC, peacekeeping personnel taking direct part in fighting (which is one interpretation of International Humanitarian Law of the use of UAV) lose their status as civilians and become combatants. Contractors operating UAVs providing intelligence used for tactical and operational decision-making can be deemed to be directly participating in hostilities (i.e. legitimate combatants) and as such one could possibly argue they could rightfully be attacked by enemy forces.56 Their recent deployment

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54 United Nations, Procurement Division, Unmanned Aerial System/Vehicles for Information Gathering (UAS/UAV), Request for Expression of Interest (EOI), EOIHM9777, 28 April 2014.


in the DRC will provide valuable lessons and should advance the assessment of how these new tools can better assist peace operations to fulfil their mandates on the ground.

Information is useful for the decision-making of the mission leadership only if the raw data can be analysed quickly and accurately, and the intelligence is then swiftly distributed to those who need it across the different components of a peace operation. In this field, too, progress has been made through the establishment of Joint Mission Analysis Centres (JMACs) and Joint Operations Centres (JOCs). Although it has taken some time for these entities to be standardised and for their operating procedures to be fully understood within missions, their utility now seems to be widely accepted even though challenges still remain for their optimal functioning.

JMACs have worked best as part of a collaborative tool in a mission that draws on wider working groups and expertise, and physically brings together colleagues from the military, police and civilian components. However, in many missions, personnel working in JMACs must strenuously solicit actionable priority information requirements (‘What do you need to know?’) from their mission leadership in order to target their information gathering efforts. The efficacy and potential of these new tools could be even more fully exploited in the future by adopting common practice on how to use these functions.

As in other fields, advances in information gathering have produced a number of challenges, including: ‘lack of trained analysts and processing capacity needed to use the information effectively; limitations imposed by the poor technological infrastructure in many countries; the politics of negotiating the use of certain technologies in and around countries with a low comfort level for “intelligence” tools and techniques; and the perennial challenges such as weather and terrain in settings like the remote reaches of eastern DRC’.

Other open questions include: How will new intelligence gathering systems be included in existing Command and Control mechanisms? Will they be operated by UN personnel or private contractors? Who is the owner of the data? Will their use be authorized by the Security Council or the Secretariat? And does their use in border areas constitute a violation of the sovereignty of neighbouring states? Finally, it is also crucial to understand that even cutting edge technologies are not a panacea for the challenges facing international peace operations. They are tools that must be integrated into an approach that is centred on the welfare of the host country population.

Conclusions

Current peace operations are faced with the changing nature of conflicts. Today’s challenges as well as the global strategic context have become increasingly transnational, while operations still take place in state-centric theatres. If we are facing a new paradigm involving new actors we should revisit our approaches—strategically, operationally, tactically and doctrinally. The transnational character of several of the emerging threats (such as organized crime, corruption or terrorism) has far-reaching implications for doctrine, mandates, capacity and capabilities, staff development and the
safety and security of personnel in peace operations. Thus, further conceptual thinking around these issues requires a collaborative and multidisciplinary approach to drafting effective response mechanisms to situations of violent conflict and state fragility.

The rise of new actors on the world stage in the past decade raises critical questions regarding cooperation and coordination in peace operations, applicable standards, rules of engagement, common doctrinal approaches and accountability. The UN has a primary role to play in improving the interaction between the relevant organizations and ensuring effective coordination mechanisms.

Modern technology, although not a panacea for the numerous challenges that peace operations face today in mission environments, has the potential to enhance a mission’s understanding of, and to influence, the mission environment. It can gain the trust and support of the host population by improving ‘situational awareness’ through information gathering, analysis and dissemination. Technology can also be a powerful multiplier for the force and police, and enhance the safety and security of host communities and UN staff and assets.
RECOMMENDATIONS

Together with the academic community and drawing on the expertise of mission personnel, the UN Secretariat should continuously identify emerging threats and their impact on peace operations in a systematic manner. Strategies should be developed for responding to the identified emerging threats, and regularly reviewed and revised as necessary.

Together with the academic community and drawing on the expertise of mission personnel, the UN Secretariat should carry out a careful analysis of lessons from the use of new technologies in peace operations (like the use of UAVs). The results should be shared widely with Member States. Building on the lessons learned, existing Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) on the use of monitoring and surveillance technology should be updated and complemented with guidance in additional areas as needed. If, for example, UAVs are provided by Member States, rather than a commercial contractor, further clarification may be needed on their treatment as Contingent Owned Equipment.

Together with the academic community and drawing on the expertise of mission personnel, the UN Secretariat, in close cooperation with Member States, should develop a better understanding of the role and effect of social and other new media, and big data, on conflict and peace operations and as a predictor of peace and conflict.

The UN Secretariat in cooperation with Member States should build a broad agreement on how to address organized crime in fragile and post-conflict situations. In addition, the relevant skills and structures required to address organized crime need to be identified and incorporated into peace operations where appropriate.

Peace operations should adopt fit-for-purpose tools and technologies, with the support of UN HQ and continuously seek and apply new technological innovations as necessary. Member States should provide adequate resources—human and financial—to do so. This could include a review and modernization of the deployed DPKO/DFS C4I (Command, Control, Communication, Coordination and Information Systems) infrastructure in line with international best practice and current technology.

The UN, in cooperation with Member States, should develop a systematic approach to the development of policies, principles and guidelines, provide training to address transnational threats, and further develop their regional approaches in the affected regions.

The UN and troop and police contributing countries, and countries that contribute non-uniformed civilian personnel should strengthen their cooperation and coherence. Enhanced efforts to harmonise and increase the effectiveness of cooperation between the UN and regional organizations should also be a priority. New actors involved in peace operations should uphold UN standards.
CHAPTER 3. POLICIES, PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES
Hervé Ladsous, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, addresses the Security Council in April 2012.

UN Photo/RICK BAJORNAS
3. Policies, Principles and Guidelines

Introduction

In recent decades there has been significant progress in building doctrine, policies and guidelines for UN peace operations. This chapter looks at the critical issue of policies, principles and guidelines with a particular focus on the protection of civilians (POC), gender and transnational organized crime (TOC). The Challenges Forum Working Group on Policies, Principles and Guidelines identified these three areas as ripe for analysis and assessment given their central importance to modern peacekeeping operations. The great majority of peace operations today have mandates to protect civilians, yet the challenges for missions in effectively implementing these mandates are at times overwhelming. Furthermore, in recent years, and reflecting a more impact focused approach by the international community, there has been an increase in the development of policies, principles and guidelines for mainstreaming gender in peace operations. However, the results on the ground are often unsatisfactory. Finally, while the need to address challenges related to TOC in the mission areas is a reality for most peace operations, the availability of policies and guidance to support missions in doing so has to date been limited.

The aim of this chapter is to identify existing official thinking in concepts, principles, guidelines and associated materials, including the doctrines which encompass the shared beliefs and principles that define the profession of carrying out peace operations. The principles describe basic standards of behaviour or modes of activity. They are what the profession thinks and the way organizations respond to events, and provide a compass to guide the organization. Without a well-developed and comprehensive approach, organizations can drift when faced with uncertainty. This makes it useful to identify gaps and disconnects, even though it should be noted that this is not an exhaustive study of these three topics in all their aspects.

The centrality of the protection of civilians, the need to ensure a gender aware approach, and the growing attention paid to transnational organized crime in contemporary peace operations make sound policies, principles and guidelines particularly important for ensuring and strengthening the effectiveness in addressing these critical issues. This chapter compares the existing concepts, principles, guidelines and associated materials of a number of national and multilateral entities, including a representative sample of their doctrines and official
The chapter describes the breadth and depth of the associated material produced by national and multilateral entities. It examines the guidance that has been provided at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. The documents were compared to identify common definitions and concepts, and where different terminology and approaches are used. The study determined whether key topics were mentioned and identified gaps. The gaps analysis focused on what appeared to be absent, or whether information was lacking or inadequate. Unofficial documents such as studies, research papers, academic writing, reports and handbooks were not considered in detail, but are referred to where their existence is relevant.

Protection of Civilians

Since the first landmark Security Council resolutions, 1265 (1999) and 1296 (2000), the UN has been actively pursuing the development and production of policy, guidance and training materials on the subject. A number of studies and papers have been written that try to determine how the will of the international community to protect civilians can be translated and transmitted to the tactical level in order to compel action. One of the main challenges is how to take the aspirations of the international community and translate them into policies, principles and guidelines that are coherent and can be effectively implemented.

Defining what is meant by protection, and who is a civilian are key to ensuring a shared and common understanding of the terms. Even with all the policy documents published, a comprehensive policy level definition of the protection of civilians is not readily available. Protection can range from protecting civilians from every threat to protecting them from acts of violence. This is probably because there are a number of different actors within the UN system mandated with the protection of civilians. Each of these actors being responsible for different elements, their understandings and approach to the protection of civilians necessarily differ. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), for example, sees protection of civilians chiefly through the prism of international humanitarian law and the provision of life saving humanitarian assistance to vulnerable, along the lines of the definition of protection adopted by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC). UN Office of the High Commissioner for Refugee’s (UNHCR) approach to protection of civilians has historically involved the provision of international legal protection for refugees seeking asylum, though it provides a significant amount of assistance to internally displaced persons. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) sees protection through the lens of international human rights law. DPKO/DFS interpret their...
protection of civilians mandate on the basis of the language provided in Security Council resolutions, i.e. to protect civilians from the threat of physical violence. DPKO/DFS have developed a conceptual framework that elucidates three distinct tiers of effort in implementing the task. The first tier is protection of civilians through the political process, the second tier is the provision of physical protection of civilians, and the third tier involves the establishment of a protective environment for civilians.

**Definition of protection**

**62 UN OCHA** provides the following definitions:

Protection: A concept that encompasses all activities aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with the letter and spirit of human rights, refugee and international humanitarian law. Protection involves creating an environment conducive to respect for human beings, preventing and/or alleviating the immediate effects of a specific pattern of abuse, and restoring dignified conditions of life through reparation, restitution and rehabilitation.

Protection of civilians in armed conflict: Structures and policies developed by the UN, States and other humanitarian actors, and based in international humanitarian law, human rights and refugee law, to protect vulnerable populations from the effects of armed conflict, ranging from the most immediate priorities of minimizing civilian casualties to more long-term priorities of promoting the rule of law and security, law and order within a State.

**63 The African Union** defines the protection of civilians as follows:

The concept of ‘Protection of Civilians’ (POC) includes activities undertaken to improve the security of the population and people at risk and to ensure the full respect for the rights of groups and the individual recognized under regional instruments, including the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights, the AU Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons, and the Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, and international law, including humanitarian, human rights and refugee law.

64 The United Kingdom is the only country reviewed that has adopted a policy definition of protection of civilians. The UK Ministry of Defence states that:

The protection of civilians encompasses all activities aimed at ensuring full respect of the rights of the individual in accordance with the letter and spirit of the relevant bodies of law, i.e. human rights law, international humanitarian law and refugee law. The UK, along with other members of the international community, has specific legal and moral obligations to ensure, where possible, civilians are not the target of physical attacks or subjected to acts of violence. The human rights sought by many within post-conflict peacekeeping environments are relatively basic: women and children feeling safe to collect water without the fear of being viciously raped; villagers free of fear from armed groups abducting their children, burning their houses and mutilating members of their community; there are too many examples to list them all.

**Definition of civilian**

65 Most documents use a definition of a protected civilian based on international humanitarian law (IHL). This law divides the population into combatants and non-combatants. The key distinction is whether the individual is engaging in hostile acts. The UN Infantry Battalion Manual states:

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[Under] Humanitarian Law, civilians are ‘protected persons’—they cannot be targeted and their life and dignity must be respected. Civilians are presumed not to directly participate in hostilities and are therefore entitled to full protection from attack. Civilians lose this protection only if, and for as long as, they ‘directly participate in hostilities’. The simple possession of a weapon does not necessarily give a person the status of ‘combatant’. Civilians who are in possession of arms (for example, for the purpose of self-defence or the protection of their property, etc.), but who are not currently engaged in ‘hostilities’ are entitled to protection.65

66 The definition used in the UN Infantry Battalion Manual describing civilians in peace operations has been modified in other DPKO training modules, but not in any other of the documents reviewed, to state that:

If, however, those individuals instigate violence against another individual or group, or if there is reasonable belief (based on historical precedent and/or reliable intelligence) that they are preparing to commit violence then those individuals are no longer entitled to protection.66

This modification is discussed further below under disconnects.

Levels of Coverage: Strategic, Operational and Tactical

67 Over 100 papers and reports by UN agencies and many of the UN Member States cover the issue of the protection of civilians. In recent years the UN has promulgated extensive guidance and training modules at all levels to address this challenge, including material addressing specific target areas of protection of civilians such as child protection and conflict-related sexual violence. National military and civilian agencies have produced various documents pertaining to the protection of civilians, but these are often less detailed than the documents produced by the UN. Countries have focused on related topics, such as gender, child protection and the prevention of mass atrocities. In contrast to the UN documents, many of the national documents focus on protecting their own forces and designated individuals, and offer only limited guidance on protecting civilians in the host country. Most of the documents provide either very narrow or very general definitions of what it means to protect and who is a civilian.

68 The strategic level encompasses those management activities conducted at UN HQ in New York, in the headquarters of the various agencies, funds and programmes, and in national capitals. It includes policy direction, developing mandates, publishing doctrines and providing global support for the operations. The operational level is the senior mission leaders in the field. It is the operational mission headquarters, which leads and manages the

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translation of mandates into action in the field and harmonises all the components in accordance with the strategic framework. The tactical level is below the operational mission headquarters.67

At the multilateral strategic level, the UN has issued statements in the UN Special Committee for Peacekeeping (C-34) reports on the various Security Council resolutions that call for the protection of civilians. Security Council resolutions 1296 (2000), 1674 (2006) and 1894 (2009) establish that the Security Council will remain focused on the issue, call on Member States to assist in protecting civilians and ask the UN Secretariat to develop strategic plans, operational guidance, and training and readiness programmes. Other related resolutions, such as 1820, 1888, 1960 and 2106 on conflict-related sexual violence within the framework of women, peace and security, 1261 on the protection of children in conflict, as well as 2122 on women, peace and security, reinforce and add to those on the protection of civilians. The DPKO/DFS Policy on United Nations Police in Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions defines the need for the police to work closely with the mission’s protection of civilians strategy. Strategic level country guidance is more difficult to find because it is rarely under the title of the protection of civilians. Only a few countries have a national strategy that directly addresses the issue.68 Most often, policy is focused on specific groups at risk such as children, women and refugees. For example, the US has developed action plans to respond to conflict-related sexual violence and prevent mass atrocities.69

At the UN, operational guidance exists in various documents. The ‘Framework for Drafting Comprehensive Protection of Civilians Strategies in UN Peacekeeping Operations’ provides missions with a set of practical guidelines to assist them in drafting comprehensive strategies tailored to their mission.69 Even though it is referred to as a strategy, it also provides operational-level guidance. The DPKO/DFS’s ‘Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations’ provides the conceptual framework for the protection of civilians in the context of UN peace operations, and informs other peacekeeping-related policy and guidance documents issued by the DPKO/DFS.70 The ‘Policy on Human Rights in United Nations Peace Operations and Political Missions’ outlines the role of human rights components in the protection of civilians.71 In addition, the DPKO/DFS Planning Toolkit from 2012 provides guidance on visualizing and planning for the protection of civilians. The Civil Affairs Handbook includes a section that describes the role of civil affairs officers in implementing the protection of civilians mandate.72 The ‘UN Police in Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions’ policy describes the protection of civilians as one of the core functions of UN policing but refers to the DPKO/DFS Operational

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Concept for a detailed description of police activities. The Infantry Battalion Manual outlines guidance for the military component based on the above documents.

At the tactical level, neither the UN and other international organizations, nor any of the countries have dedicated manuals on the protection of civilians, though a number of peacekeeping operations with POC mandates have produced mission-specific guidance on the task for their personnel at the tactical level. These include publications such as MONUSCO’s protection of civilians handbook, which includes a range of ‘dos and don’ts’ for military peacekeepers vis-à-vis the protection of civilians, and numerous force commanders’ directives and operational orders for implementing the POC mandate. There are also pages and chapters in operational-level documents, and some paragraphs in tactical manuals that address some of these aspects—such as guidance for commanders on how to think about the problem and the need for patrols in the operational area. The UN has developed five training modules with instructions and exercises for the protection of civilians focused on the tactical level that cover rules of engagement, leadership and preventive measures, and have scenario-based exercises for patrols.

**Topics Covered**

The following topics appear most often in the documents related to the protection of civilians in peace operations.

- **Legal and political considerations:** Most of the strategic documents identify the legal and political considerations inherent in the protection of civilians. Protecting civilians is the responsibility of a sovereign Government so the peace operation must therefore address international and local legal norms—in essence the legal framework. In addition, they must understand the mandate and the rules of engagement, as well as any status of mission agreements, authorities, obligations and prohibitions. These are covered by the UN in the training modules and in the Infantry Battalion Manual. Other considerations are civil-military relationships, host country consent, the role of the

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75 The modules are available on the UN’s Peacekeeping Resource Hub, [http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/PBPS/Pages/Public/library.aspx?ot=2&cat=88&menukey=_7_24].
police, the role of rule of law professionals, the role of international civil society and non-governmental organizations, maintaining impartiality, and vulnerabilities caused by the lack of basic necessities and the lack of host nation, and possibly international, capacity and capability.

**Conceptual framework:** The UN has developed a ‘three-tier approach’ to the protection of civilians, which establishes a conceptual framework. The UN Operational Concept describes three tiers of protection activities that should be conducted simultaneously:

1. **Protection through political process**—provide support to political processes, including peace negotiations and agreements, and support for the development of governance institutions and the extension of state authority, which seek to establish a safe and secure environment where human rights are respected;

2. **Protection from physical violence**—establish a deterrent presence through forward field military and civilian deployments, and take proactive action to reduce the vulnerability of civilians and respond to violent attacks using all necessary means, and;

3. **Establishing a protective environment**—create conditions conducive to the delivery of humanitarian assistance, promote and protect human rights, reform the police, judicial, penitentiary and defence sectors in the host country, reduce forced displacement and create the conditions for return, and conduct mine action.

73 The general concepts behind the UN framework—addressing the political process, dealing with violence and building the capacity of the host state to be responsible for the protection of its people—are evident in multinational and national documents. The exact UN framework, however, does not appear in any of the national documents reviewed by this study.

**Analysis and situational understanding:** The documents reviewed insist on an in-depth analysis based on integrated intelligence produced by all stakeholders. The key components of situational understanding are to understand the operational environment, the actors and the internal dynamics of the conflict.

**Assessment, benchmarking and evaluation:** Assessments are conducted to compare the current situation with benchmarks that depict the desired standard. The assessment frameworks of most documents include monitoring, evaluation and recommending or directing action. Assessments are conducted to enhance the mission’s understanding and provide meaningful reports vertically, horizontally and on the operational elements. The first priority is to understand the situation and identify problems, capabilities and any gaps that need to be addressed in order to improve human security. The second aim is to evaluate the performance and effectiveness of the host country’s structures, the international military, the police and other relevant actors in their implementation of a protection of civilians strategy, to determine whether any changes are required. Changes could include a revision of the strategy, modifications to recruitment and additional training or resources.

**Design and conduct of operations:** Within the protection of civilians framework promulgated by the UN, most designs of operations contain one or more of the following: preparation, planning, prevention, pre-emption, response and consolidation.


**Comprehensive engagement:** It is widely recognized that the protection of civilians is a multidimensional endeavor that requires contributions from a variety of actors. These contributors include not only the members of the peacekeeping mission but also NGOs, international
organizations and, most importantly, the host nation’s organizations, media and private sector. The UN has been developing integrated missions, and NATO and the EU have been working on comprehensive approaches for some time. Most of the countries reviewed agree that this is central to success.

**Planning:** Planning supports the protection of civilians by guiding the peacekeeping mission’s activities in ways that reduce civilian vulnerabilities and threats while anticipating and reducing the possibility that civilian harm may result during operations. Planning is a structured analytical effort that includes the commanders and planners who participate, the process and the end products. The DPKO planning tool states that planning helps to promote a ‘coherent, system-wide approach to the support of the provision of security, rule of law and sustainable security institutions’. It can address known situations or potential contingencies, and can be conducted quickly or more deliberately, depending on the time available and the level of resources allocated. Planning should be conducted with other relevant actors and include the host country. It involves: understanding the situation, framing the problem, identifying the actors, outlining roles and responsibilities, considering resources, establishing coordination mechanisms, and monitoring and reporting.77

**Developing and implementing an operational concept:** Military forces plan and conduct operations to resolve the identified problem set, reduce civilian vulnerabilities and exploit the critical vulnerabilities of perpetrators. They refine the concept as required. The concept should consider the framework and cover the areas of prevention, pre-emption response and consolidation.

**Special focus:** Some of the documents cover special topics that are directly related to the protection of civilians, such as mitigating civilian casualties, protecting children in conflict, preventing and responding to genocide and mass atrocities, and dealing with gender-based and conflict-related sexual violence.

### Commonalities, Disconnects and Gaps

The documents reviewed agree that the protection of civilians is integral to and essential for a successful peace operation. The documents also agree that international law should form the basis for action. The key sources of authority are: the UN Charter, international humanitarian law, international human rights law (IHRL), refugee law and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Furthermore, there are a number of different actors with protection of civilian mandates, which have different responsibilities and in turn different understandings of the protection of civilians. All agree that the host Government has the ultimate responsibility for the protection of civilians. This is reflected in several multilateral documents which underline their support role in relation to the host state. The challenge is how to ensure that the Government takes that responsibility seriously. Most accept the definition of civilian set out in IHL. The UN training modules for the protection of civilians previously mentioned reflect the consensus of the international community. They were developed through a series of working groups in various locations around the world, and are considered subject matter expertise.

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However, in practice questions often arise about the precise meaning of protection and who qualifies as a civilian, but also how the protection of civilians fits in relation to the concept of human security. Several documents recommend providing different levels of protection against a wide range of threats under the category of human security. There is no consensus in the documents reviewed on what the population should be protected from. This could be risks that range from immediate violence to want and starvation. Whether in a manual on counter-insurgency, peacekeeping, post-conflict stability or state-building, the focus is different but the goal is the same—a protected population, that is, to protect civilians.

Civilians are commonly defined as non-combatants. This way of defining a civilian by what it is not, rather than by what it is, can cause confusion or conflation, especially when it comes to the legal principles and concepts that apply. The key distinction is whether the individual or group is engaging in hostile acts or not. Based on field experience, this definition has, as we have previously seen, been modified in DPKO training modules to also distinguish those who are likely to engage in hostile acts from civilians. This modification, introducing intent, complicates the concept ‘under the protection of the PKO’ as it is used in the POC mandate and the protection accorded under IHL and should therefore be revised.

Despite recent progress in concept development as discussed above, without international and national formalised, component-specific manuals devoted to the protection of civilians at the operational and tactical level, it is difficult for TCCs or Police Contributing Countries (PCCs) to rigorously apply in-situ national training programmes. In most military manuals, protection relates to the protection of the military force itself and there is little consideration of how civilians are to be protected. Instead, national doctrines served as the basis for training, and influences organization, materiel procurement, leadership and education, personnel and facilities, leaving training modules to emphasize key concepts that have not been fully developed, or at times are not even discussed.

Host state ownership and responsibility are the bedrock of the concept, but there is little guidance on how to develop and ensure the host state’s continued consent but also active participation. More guidance is also needed on what to do if the host state is unwilling or unable to assume its responsibility. Although there are already some recommendations in the UN training modules, further guidance is needed on how all parts of the integrated mission support the political process and, if that process stalls, what the options are.

A positive public perception of how well the protection of civilians is being carried out is essential. The training modules highlight this point but do not provide detailed guidance on how to manage the expectations of the host population or their perceptions of the peacekeepers and the host state.

Although a degree of international consensus exists, as evidenced by the process that went into the development and checking of the training modules across many countries, there is as yet no formal doctrinal manual for peace operations to form the basis for training of the protection of civilians that can be used as a reference after the training is complete.
Implications

81 The lack of adequate and formal guidance could ultimately affect the legitimacy of the mission. Without a full understanding of what is to be done and how to implement the framework, missions risk losing legitimacy through inaction or inappropriate action. Current national documents tend to have a military focus and this may not always be appropriate as the protection of civilians is a cross-cutting issue that needs to be addressed by all the relevant actors, including the humanitarian community, and the civilian and police components. As there are a number of actors with protection of civilians mandates, there is a challenge in ensuring that all actors are aware of one another’s mandates. The roles and responsibilities of all actors need to be clear.

82 A larger question is whether IHL is a sufficient framework. Should the framework for the protection of civilians be recast in the context of the rule of law, rather than a military context as it is at the moment? This question needs to be addressed to ensure that peace operations are best positioned to succeed:

Often UN peacekeeping operations work outside the context of armed conflict, even if they are working in ‘other situations of violence’. The question of the applicability of IHL in such contexts remains contentious and even where IHL does exist it may not be sufficiently broad to cover the range of protection activities that may be required. As a consequence, many of the tasks identified by the Security Council, and by DPKO itself fall outside the remit of the protections offered by IHL and instead reflect the broader protections offered under IHRL and international refugee law (IRL). DPKO’s initial positioning of POC in IHL and then subsequent expansion to a broad array of human rights protections therefore adds to the breadth and scope of the concept without clarifying its meaning.

Related Protection Mandates

83 The conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) and child protection mandates contribute to the protection of civilians.

84 The CRSV mandate was established through the adoption of four Security Council resolutions on CRSV within the framework of Women, Peace and Security (1820, 1888, 1960 and 2106). Through these resolutions, the Security Council has recognized that the use of sexual violence in conflict as a tactic of war poses a threat to the restoration of international peace and security. Although peace operations addressed sexual and gender based violence prior to the adoption of these resolutions, the mandated activities and the necessity to implement specific mandated mechanisms in a systematic manner, which include the establishment of monitoring, analysis and reporting arrangements on CRSV, dialogue for commitments with parties to the conflict to prevent and address CRSV, strengthening prevention arrangements, and capacity building of mission personnel, are relatively recent. Because of the specificity and challenges of the mandate, dedicated capacity to address CRSV through the deployment of Women’s Protection

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79 See Challenges Forum, Considerations for Mission Leadership in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (note 77), which puts the protection of civilians into a broader mission planning perspective.

80 This is equally true of the guidance material for the humanitarian aid community in that little is written on how to interact and coordinate with peace operations to address POC in a comprehensive manner. Rudolph Müller, Chief, Emergency Services Branch, OCHA, in his presentation at the 2012 Challenges Annual Forum. The Global Protection Cluster made developing guidance on coordination with other POC actors one of the main priorities in its 2012–2014 workplan. See http://www.globalprotectioncluster.org.

81 Phoebe Wynn-Pope, Evolution of Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (Oxfam Australia and Australian Civil Military Centre, 2013), p. 16.
Advisers is mandated by the Security Council to lead and strengthen a coordinated response by peacekeepers addressing CRSV within the framework of peace and security.

The Child Protection mandate was established through Security Council resolution 1261 in 1999, which recognized that the situation of children in conflict—including the widespread use of child soldiers—was a serious concern for international peace and security. Since then, a very specific international child protection system has been developed by the International Community through the creation of the Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (MRM) on grave violations against children in conflict in SCR 1612 in 2005. Peace operations play a critical role in implementing the MRM through monitoring and reporting of grave violations and negotiating with armed forces and groups to end violations against children. Information gathered through the MRM is the basis for prevention and response action in peace operations to child protection concerns. In addition, because of the specific requirements of the mandate and addressing child protection within the framework of peace and security, Child Protection Advisers are deployed as dedicated capacity. Their task is to implement the MRM, lead the dialogue with parties to conflict, advocate with the Government to address immediate child protection concerns and create a protective environment for children.

CRSV and Child Protection issues are integrated into the development of DPKO/DFS policies, guidance and training for military, police and civilian personnel. The DPKO/DFS policy on mainstreaming the protection, rights and well-being of children states that all components in a mission contribute though their specific work to the protection of children. Dedicated training on child protection is available. As regards CRSV, dedicated DPKO/DFS policy and guidelines are under development, and training materials for military components are being revised to reflect policies and guidance.

**Gender Mainstreaming**

Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) recognizes that women, men, girls and boys experience conflict and post-conflict situations differently. The Security Council underlines the need for gender-sensitive approaches to the restoration of peace and stability in post-conflict contexts and in all aspects of peacekeeping operations. It is essential, therefore, that peacekeepers understand the significance and meaning of gender mainstreaming in the work they undertake. Without such an understanding, there can be little meaningful advancement in the effectiveness of peace operations. Gender mainstreaming is recognized at the international level. Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), and its subsequent related resolutions, aim to increase the participation of women when building peace and security, to strengthen the protection of women in situations of armed conflict, and to prevent violations against women, boys and girls including through the recognition that the use of sexual violence in conflict as a tactic of war poses a threat to the restoration of international peace and security.

These UN mandates have led most countries and organizations to develop policy plans in line with that of the UN. These resolutions also highlight the need to consider women as actors in peace operations, not only as victims.

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83 For instance, Japan expressed its intention at the 68th session of the UN General Assembly to enhance its assistance to developing countries for women’s empowerment and gender equality. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Japan’s Initiative Regarding Women’s Empowerment and Gender Equality: Toward a Society in which All Women Shine and National Security Strategy, 17 December 2013.
Security Council resolutions provide the baseline for defining gender in all subsequent handbooks and frameworks for peace operations. Key definitions of gender, gender-based violence, gender equality, gender mainstreaming and gender impact analysis are included in most of the UN guidance documents. The definitions were presented in the 2004 DPKO Gender Resource Package for Peacekeeping Operations and more detailed guidelines for the police and military components were produced in 2008 and 2010, respectively, with the DPKO-DFS Policy on Gender Equality in Peacekeeping Operations (2010) providing overarching guidance for all peacekeeping components. In March 2014, the DPKO-DFS Forward Looking Gender Strategy 2014–2018 was endorsed by the Extended Senior Management Team and launched in September 2014.

Gender refers to the social characteristics or attributes and opportunities associated with being male or female. These attributes, opportunities and relationships are socially constructed on the basis of different factors, such as age, religion, nationality, ethnicity and social origin, and are learned through socialization. They differ both within and between cultures and define identities, status, roles, responsibilities and power relations among the members of any society or culture. They are context- and time-specific and changeable—not static or innate. Gender defines power relations in society and determines what is expected, allowed and valued in a woman or a man in a given context.

The UN Economic and Social Council defines gender mainstreaming as:

The process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making women’s as well as men’s concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal

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spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal is to achieve gender-equality.86

91 ‘Gender-based violence is the term used to distinguish common violence from violence that is directed against individuals or groups of individuals on the basis of their gender or sex. It includes acts that inflict physical, mental or sexual harm or suffering, threats of such acts, coercion and other deprivations of liberty. Although women, girls, men and boys can be victims of gender-based violence, women and girls are the main victims.’87 In recent years, conflict-related sexual violence has received significant attention as a specific, particularly egregious tactic used by combatants and abetted by the absence of rule of law and pervasive inequality between the genders.88

Levels of Coverage: Strategic, Operational and Tactical

92 Gender issues are well represented in most of the international and national documents reviewed. Almost all provide historical background on gender relations and peacekeeping policies, as well as operations related to gender. Most of the standard gender concerns and objectives, such as gender-based violence and gender mainstreaming, are explicitly defined in the documents. Only few documents discuss gender identity and sexual orientation. The lack of coverage of these issues could reflect the lack of acceptance of such concepts in this area. Most of the documents identify the legal and political considerations inherent in gender mainstreaming.

These are derived from the various international conventions and charters, such as EU treaties and the Constitutive Act of the African Union. There is a body of law and practice that must be taken into consideration when addressing gender issues, and this is well recognized. The conceptual frameworks for implementing gender policies differ among countries and international bodies.

93 At the strategic level, gender mainstreaming is covered well by most international organizations and countries. UN and national action plans have been developed and promulgated, and frameworks have been established with bureaucratic structures and individuals to monitor, assess and manage activities. The DPKO has enumerated implementable policy goals for UN peace operations from the operational to the tactical level, supported by tools such as the DPKO/DFS Planning Toolkit.

Topics Covered

94 The following topics appear most frequently in the documents related to gender.

- Integration and institutionalisation:
  Institutionalise a gender-sensitive approach in conflict and post-conflict environments through interagency coordination, policy development, enhanced professional training and education, and evaluation. In peace operations, this includes working with host states to address their political and governmental processes, the rule of law, public administration and social programmes.

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■ **Participation in decision-making and peace processes:** To improve the prospects for an inclusive, just and sustainable peace by promoting and strengthening women’s rights and elective leadership as well as substantive participation in conflict prevention, peace processes, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, transitional processes and decision-making institutions in conflict environments for all genders.

■ **Conflict prevention and conflict resolution:** To promote greater roles for all genders in conflict prevention and conflict resolution, improve conflict early-warning and response systems through the integration of gendered perspectives, and invest in gender-related issues in health, education and economic opportunity to create the conditions for stable societies and a lasting peace.

■ **Protection from violence:** The documents are clear on the need to deal with gender-based and conflict-related sexual violence and to recognize reproductive rights. There is a focus on the challenges that peacekeepers face in providing security to victims of violence and the ways in which violence can be prevented. This topic is directly related to the protection of civilians (see above).

■ **Access to relief, recovery and reintegration:** To respond to the distinct needs of victims of gender discrimination and violence in conflicts, disasters and crises by providing safe and equitable access to humanitarian assistance. To ensure that disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), and security sector reform (SSR) processes are gender inclusive.

■ **Develop training and education programmes:** To train and educate all participants in missions so they can understand and apply the principles of gender mainstreaming.

■ **Development of concepts, doctrine and procedures:** To develop appropriate approaches to guide the planning, preparation, implementation, management, analysis and monitoring of gender issues.89

■ **Assessing and planning:** To develop tools for analysis and assessment and incorporate gender into the planning and management of missions. This must include agreeing internal and external approaches or strategies through dialogue with a wide range of stakeholders.90

■ **Managing responses:** To develop tools and measures to detect and monitor gender-related issues in peacekeeping operation areas, analyse and identify what has been successful in promoting gender mainstreaming and assess the effectiveness of policy in diminishing gender discrimination and violence. Show the effect and impact that an incorporated gender perspective has had in an operation and measure the effects. Identify indicators for measuring the effects. The UN has established gender advisers and reporting systems that include tools and measures for tracking and reporting. Security Council resolution 2122 (2013) on Women, Peace and Security particularly emphasizes: Accountability and reporting and requests the DPKO and the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) to update the Security Council regularly on issues relevant to women, peace and security; Identify best practices and lessons learned; Ensure gender equality through equal participation in all peacekeeping activities among all peacekeeping personnel.

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89 A recent example is the United Nations Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners and Non-Custodial Measures for Women Offenders 2010/13, the Bangkok Rules, complementing the 1955 Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.

Commonalities, Gaps and Disconnects

95 All the countries that discussed gender in their strategic policy documents used the UN resolutions as a guide, so there is a degree of commonality. Gender awareness is a key area that must be addressed if a peacekeeping operation is to be successful. All the countries reviewed recognize the cultural and political challenges associated with improving gender relations.

96 Divergences occur on how to implement the objectives promulgated in the policy documents. The UN has established the most comprehensive approach, from the strategic to the tactical level, and few others (regional organizations or countries) have developed their own approach. Countries vary greatly in taking a comprehensive approach at all levels from the tactical to the strategic. In addition, the roles and responsibilities of all the actors—military, police and civilian—are unclear. The countries reviewed have different ideas on how to systematically involve women in peace processes. These different approaches must take a demonstrably holistic approach. The question that therefore arises is whether countries and regional organizations are able to adopt the UN approach in practice. The UN approach has not found its way into the operational and tactical documents of all the countries surveyed. Although strong at the strategic level, it has not been promulgated at the operational and tactical levels. The US is one example. The US has a national action plan on Women in Peace and Security that sets policy objectives for all parts of the US Government.

In April 2012 the US Department of Defense published an implementation guide that sets out clear guidelines. However, the two most influential documents at the operational level, for the US Joint Forces and the US Army, mention neither gender nor women nor vulnerable populations. As a consequence, all the subordinate manuals do not adequately address gender and doctrine as the driver of education and training. It will take time for gender awareness to be institutionalised. This is an issue when countries join UN peace operations with little or no national military doctrine dealing with gender. The UN Office of Military Affairs (OMA) has carried out a survey among all military components on how and to what extent the military guidelines on gender have been incorporated into operational orders and other routine tasks and processes, the results of which will be important to forward the work on more effective peace operations.

97 Gender identity and sexual orientation are growing global concerns but because of the lack of consensus on how to define and deal with these issues, few documents cover them. This may well be an area that will gain in importance. In 2011, the Human Rights Commission directed the High Commissioner to look into gender identity and sexual orientation, and make recommendations in this regard. Since

It will take time for gender awareness to be institutionalised. This can become an issue when countries join UN peace operations with little or no national military doctrine dealing with gender.

then the Secretary-General has also identified these topics as issues that need further attention. It is yet unclear what the implication will be for peace operations.

**Implications**

98 The challenge remains—even if adequate doctrine and guidelines exist at the strategic level, do these affect the actions of those in the field dealing with dynamic problems? The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes has identified several consistent challenges in making such guidance a reality.

DPKO also faces challenges relating to the implementation of policy recommendations at mission level because of several factors, including the lack of a qualified focal point; implementing its gendered approach in vastly different contexts during the planning and implementation of peace operations; the limitation of an institutional accountability mechanism; delays in the appointment of mission gender focal points; and the lack of skilled personnel to take on gender functions. … Also, ensuring a coherent approach in the implementation of a mission’s gender action plans seems to be a difficult process, due to different cultural and security dynamics in host countries. Similarly, the rotation of military, police and civilian gender focal points presents a challenge at the strategic level—not only to integrate policies on the ground but also to maintain a sustainable pool of personnel with gender-related capacity.

99 Part of the solution is to ensure that the guidelines and concepts are institutionalised from the highest to the lowest levels, across all Member States and multilateral organizations committed to gender mainstreaming. Guidance should not just exist, it must inform education and training at all levels, including in-mission induction training. In addition, working groups, table top and physical exercises and simulations, need to be developed that make all parties comfortable with working with each other and dealing with these complex issues. In this way those joining the missions will at least have a background in and understanding of what is needed. However, gender mainstreaming is a mind set to be incorporated in all activities from everyday operations from planning and execution to evaluation and assessment. It can also be noted that while small traditional missions have focal points appointed to carry out the task on top of their core functions, bigger multidimensional missions have a gender capacity unit. At a time of financial constraints there is pressure to merge gender posts with Women Protection Advisers (WPA) despite its narrower mandate to address and report on CRSV. The challenge for all remains, how to take policy and guidance and breathe life into it.

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Transnational Organized Crime

100 Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) has been referred to as the ‘elephant in the room’ when it comes to peace operations.94 The discussions in the Challenges Forum workshops in Berlin and Entebbe, and the findings from the interviews conducted with policymakers in several Member States shared this assessment.95

101 The UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime defines transnational organized crime as:

A structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance with the UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit. Activities include human trafficking, migrant smuggling, drug trafficking, environmental resource trafficking, counterfeit goods trafficking, maritime piracy and cybercrime.

102 A number of terms are used interchangeably to refer to these various activities and groups. It should be noted that TOC groups may go under a variety of different names in different countries: syndicates, networks, criminal gangs and a host of other, more context-specific terms. The focus is often on the activity, such as human trafficking, rather than the general term, transnational organized crime.96

103 As the UN responded by deploying peace operations to the countries of West Africa, it became clear that TOC was one of the significant drivers of conflict and that the tools that the UN might normally use to establish a safe and secure environment and support a peace process would not be sufficient. In July 2009 the UN launched the West African Crime Initiative (WACI) with ECOWAS in cooperation with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the DPKO, the DPA, the UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA) and the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL). The joint initiative responded to the growing recognition of the serious and far-reaching nature of the threat posed by TOC to the security and stability of West Africa.

104 In 2010, ministers from Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone signed the ‘WACI Freetown Commitment’ endorsing the practical implementation of this new, coordinated effort by international organizations and West African Governments to fight organized crime. To further strengthen this initiative, the specialist post of Transnational Organized Crime Expert was created within the Police Division’s Strategic Policy and Development Section, to coordinate the DPKO’s participation. In addition, as an immediate response, two officers from the UN Standing Police Capacity were stationed in the UNODC office in Dakar in May 2010.97

105 The WACI was essential to efforts to apply innovative approaches to dealing with TOC. All sources agree that TOC affects the effectiveness of peace

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95 See chapter 2 of this report for a discussion on transnational organized crime and peace operations.


operations, but how does it do this and how should the operation leadership team respond? Compared to the study of local corruption and local criminal activity, there has been little discussion or analysis of transnational criminal activities and their impact on peace operations. Much crime that is considered local in nature may have transnational elements.

This section considers what has been written about local organized crime and corruption and peace operations from the strategic to the tactical level, in order to gain insights into its international criminal aspects. By taking this wider approach it is possible to identify the relationships between local crime and corruption and transnational elements. Gaps and disconnects are highlighted as issues for further research and the development of concepts, principles and guidelines.

**Levels of Coverage: Strategic, Operational and Tactical**

**106** Most of the documents reviewed had something to say about crime and corruption at the local level but neglected transnational criminal activities or their relationship to local organized criminal organizations and corrupt practices. Many documents used and defined the phrase ‘organized crime’ more frequently than ‘transnational crime’. Despite the differences between organized crime and transnational organized crime, many documents do not clearly differentiate between these two terms.

**107** UN and the US documents contained the most complete coverage of the topic. However, there was little discussion directly related to peace operations. The topics with an international dimension discussed were: drugs, resources, human trafficking, weapons/munitions, money laundering, the smuggling of migrants and corruption. The smuggling of migrants and transnational corruption do not seem to be universally recognized as transnational organized crime. These topics are discussed by UNODC and by individual countries in the aid and justice agencies as important topics in their own right, but they are not directly connected to a peace operation. Most countries look at these issues from a domestic protection perspective. The UN emphasizes the need for international cooperation, including mutual legal assistance between state actors, and even calls for international, regional or subregional institutions and measures to combat transnational crime. Similarly, the EU takes a policing approach to TOC.**98**

**108** Transnational terrorism receives more attention than transnational criminal activity, although the nexus between the two is recognized. Several documents discuss transnational terrorism but do not provide much operational guidance on how to detect, understand or handle the nexus.

**109** There are several analyses of the influence of organized crime and corruption on the political process, and how these activities can prevent the accomplishment of the UN mission, but the relationship to TOC is not clear. There are few examples of an integrated UN approach to transnational operations. In the UN Planning Tool Kit for UN Peacekeeping Operations however, a vignette of three paragraphs outlining the West African Coast Initiative is most helpful in describing the combined operations of INTERPOL, ECOWAS and the UN missions with the DPKO.

**110** UNODC analyses macro-level data and evaluations on transnational organized crime activity. The DPKO and OHCHR Rule of Law Indicators provide guidance at the operational and tactical levels on crime and corruption, in the context of strengthening the rule of law and the justice system. This

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does not specifically cover indicators of the existence of transnational criminal enterprises or what they might mean for a peace process. Cybercrime is only mentioned in one document, the ‘Multinational Force Standing Operating Procedures’, a multinational document developed under the auspices of US Pacific Command.

Most of the coverage focuses on identifying TOC and considering it a threat that must be dealt with. There is little guidance on how to deal with the problem at the operational or tactical levels in the context of peace operations. There is a greater focus on criminality and corruption, but little on how these might be connected to transnational entities or what this could mean for the peace process.

The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) Guidelines for Stabilization and Reconstruction and the supporting Measurers of Performance in Conflict Environments (MPICE) provide some recommended approaches at the operational level under establishing the rule of law. US Pacific Command’s Multinational Force Standing Operating Procedures contains an annex that is aimed at the operational level—a joint military and multi-agency approach to dealing with transnational crime and other actors. This was the only document reviewed that discussed procedures for linking military and civilian responses to a transnational problem in an operational area.

The UN has documents on approaches to the issue from the strategic to the tactical level, but does not reference these in its peacekeeping literature. The UN Convention and its Protocols, the UNODC Tool Kit and the USIP guidelines provide the best sources of information. The UNODC web portal contains useful tools to assist the UN agencies with approaching TOC-related issues.

**Topics Covered**

A number of topics regularly feature in the documents related to combatting TOC. Several national and international treaties and conventions deal with various aspect of the topic but few with TOC directly and as a whole. A wide variety of approaches, from the national to the international, must be taken into account when dealing with this complex problem.

- **Conceptual Framework:** Peace operations have not been directed by UN resolutions to address TOC. In Mali, where TOC is recognized as a key factor, Security Council resolution 2100 (2013) does not task MINUSMA with addressing the issue. The resolution does, however, make the Sahel and Maghreb states responsible for developing strategies to deal with terrorist groups and limit the arms traffic from transnational criminal organizations. The absence of guidance means that a framework similar to that for the protection of civilians has not been created.

Guidelines gleaned from UN and national policy documents include:

- **Integration and institutionalisation:** Develop policy and procedures to institutionalise an approach to dealing with international crime at all levels, from the international or national to the tactical.

- **Develop training and education programmes:** Train and educate all participants in missions to understand the definition of, and approaches to dealing with, TOC.

- **Develop concepts, doctrine and procedures:** Develop appropriate approaches to guide the

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99 See the UNODC homepage.


101 UNODC homepage.

102 UN Security Council resolution 2100 of 25 April 2013.
planning, preparation, execution, management, analysis and monitoring of transnational criminal activities and the relationships between local corruption and criminal acts and transnational crime.

- **Assessment and planning**: Develop tools for analysis, assessment and planning, including indicators and early warning to identify the existence of international criminal activity and its effects on the mission.

- **Managing responses**: Develop tools and measures to detect, monitor and punish TOC in areas of peacekeeping operations. Develop tools and identify indicators to assess the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping missions in the fight against TOC and the stabilization of host countries by strengthening the rule of law.¹⁰³

**Commonalities, Disconnects and Gaps**

All documents agree that transnational organized crime negatively affects peace operations and civilian livelihoods, and all agree that drugs, human trafficking, weapons or munitions and money are key components. The definition of TOC is deliberately broad in order to capture the dynamic nature of the enterprise. The term covers not only offences committed in more than one state, but also those that take place in one state but are planned or controlled in another. Crimes committed in one state by groups that operate in more than one state are also included, as well as those committed in one state that have substantial effects on another.

¹¹⁵ The UN definition outlined above encompasses virtually all profit-motivated criminal activity with international implications. This broad definition takes account of the global complexity of the issue and allows cooperation on the widest possible range of common concerns. There is international agreement on the general approach outlined above.

¹¹⁶ However, the absence of discussion on an integrated approach to the problem and its effect on peace operations at the operational level means that there is little information to compare. The broadness of the UNODC TOC definition complicates the challenge to define local crime and corruption and its relationship, if any, to transnational organized crime. The implications of TOC for peace operations are not clearly defined, although it is recognized as having had an impact on operations in Haiti and more recently in Mali. There is little discussion on the relationship between local crime and corruption, or transnational crime and its effects on a peace operations.

¹¹⁷ There has been little written about how a peace operation can take a fully integrated approach to dealing with TOC.¹⁰⁴ UN resolutions have not directed peacekeeping missions to address transnational organized crime. On Mali, the German Institute for International and Security Affairs notes that:

> The crisis in Mali has sharpened European awareness of the dangers posed by transnational organised crime in West Africa. The UN Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) set up in July 2013 will find itself confronted with the issue as well. But the problem of organised crime reaches far beyond the Sahel, and affects many coastal states in West Africa. Nor can it be

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¹⁰³ On assessment and evaluation, see chapter 4 of this report.

¹⁰⁴ For a useful overview, however, see Hansen (note 40).
reduced to the ‘crime-terror nexus’ and the drug trade. Transnational criminal activities in the region are more diverse than that, the challenges more complex: from piracy in the Gulf of Guinea to illegal extraction of natural resources, cybercrime and human trafficking. Europe is directly affected by these developments as a market and target, and, moreover, has a strong interest in West African stability. So there are various reasons for addressing the problem. However, existing efforts by the European Union and other actors to improve law enforcement will fall short if they remain isolated.  

Separate UN agencies and national agencies are examining aspects of this problem, but work on how the military or the police should integrate their approach to or relationship with the rest of the mission is lacking. There has been little written about how peace operations’ mission leadership can determine whether TOC exists and how it is affecting the operations. There are no indicators on transnational activity at the operational or the tactical level, and the implications or meaning of such activity for peace operations are not discussed. There is also little discussion on transnational cybercrime.

Implications

As chapter 1 notes, TOC can undermine all the good work of a peace operation. By its nature, its influence exceeds that of the peace operation. It can go unnoticed, and illicit revenue can dominate political structures and impede the peace process. Criminalized elites have been known to capture the levers of power in states, undermining the ability of the host country to take ownership of the basic functions of a state. Dealing with this will require a transformative and integrated effort that is guided by a body of doctrine. A body of doctrine linking TOC to peace operations is lacking.

Conclusions

Preliminary analyses of the priority areas of the protection of civilians, gender and combating transnational organized crime indicate that gender issues have been addressed by both the UN and other countries in a more comprehensive manner than the other priority areas. Broad policy direction and action plans regarding gender mainstreaming exist at the UN and in many countries, and the UN has produced guidance, handbooks and structures to help UN peace operations deal with this issue. However, not all of the countries have institutionalised gender issues throughout their agencies and organizations. Military manuals at the operational and tactical levels provide little guidance. The emphasis should now be to take the strategic level guidance and ensure that it is implemented by the member countries and missions in the field. This should include a holistic education and training regime.

The protection of civilians is covered at the strategic level by various policy initiatives. Protection of civilians issues need to be institutionalised at all levels. There is also a need for more coherent guidance at the operational and strategic levels on who is being protected and from what. There is a relationship between the military and rule of law contexts when it comes to protecting civilians. This relationship needs to be examined fully and guidance needs to be developed to ensure that peace operations are

best positioned to succeed. There is a need to review a possible modification of the existing framework to avoid an overt militarization of the issue. Again, priority should also be placed on ensuring full implementation of the protection policies and principles by states and in missions.

Combatting TOC in the context of a peace operation is the least developed of the three topics under examination. There has not been enough discussion and analysis of transnational organized crime as they affect peace operations. There are no established criteria for peace operations to determine whether organized crime has become transnational or includes both local and transnational elements, because the boundaries between local or domestic crime and transnational crime are often blurred. There needs to be a discussion on an integrated approach to the problem and its effect on peace operations at the operational level. Policies, principles and guidelines should be developed to clarify to what extent and how UN needs to conduct its operations given the pervasive existence of TOC in mission areas.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

The UN Secretariat in close cooperation with Member States should develop a comprehensive doctrine that clearly defines the protection of civilians to ensure adequate preparation and training to support peace operations.

The UN Secretariat, in close cooperation with Member States, should develop policy guidelines that clarify whether and how peace operations should address transnational organized crime. This should include establishing a definition of organized crime and its transnational aspects.

Drawing on the expertise of mission personnel, the UN Secretariat should develop a joint or integrated manual on gender mainstreaming for all the mission components (military, police and civilian) for the tactical level, which should be systematically used both in missions and by contributing countries in their preparations for sending personnel to missions.
CHAPTER 4. AUTHORITY, COMMAND AND CONTROL
The UN Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) is backing the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) in an operation against the rebel group Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), in the Beni region of eastern DRC, near the Ugandan border in March 2014. MONUSCO Deputy Force Commander Major General Jean Baillaud (second from right) is briefed by his troops during the joint operation.  

UN Photo/Sylvain Liechti
4. Authority, Command and Control

Introduction

124 UN peace operations are multidimensional, integrated and constantly evolving endeavors. They bring together military, police and civilian elements to achieve a wide range of political, security and peacebuilding goals in the aftermath of conflict. The very complexity of modern peace operations demands a clear and strong authority, command and control (AC2) framework to guide and direct activities at both the mission headquarters and the UN HQ level. An effective UN AC2 framework is key not just to the successful planning and conduct of operations, but also for maintaining the confidence of Member States in peace operations, a confidence which for some TCCs and PCCs was undermined by experiences in the difficult and complex missions fielded in the 1990s in Bosnia and Somalia.

125 Critics of the UN system perceive the inadequacies in the UN’s AC2 related to transparency, robustness and responsiveness in a crisis, as contributing to this low level of confidence in the UN system in some countries. Even while recognizing the differences in mandates and operations, the fact that AC2 is organized differently in the UN than in other entities, such as the EU, NATO and AU, is not well understood and is seen by some, in particular those countries that contribute to EU and NATO missions, as a disconcerting factor. It should be noted that challenges and inadequacies are also present in EU and NATO AC2 arrangements. For example, it has been argued that the EU command and control structures and processes are more a result of political compromise between its Member States rather an effective response to actual needs.

106 ‘Effective command and control is vital not only for timely and appropriate response—whether to localised attacks or large-scale emergencies—but also for minimizing their occurrence’, Challenges Forum Patron Jean-Marie Guéhenno and Jake Sherman, Command and Control Arrangements in UN Peacekeeping Operations, Challenges Annual Forum Report (Stockholm, 2009), p. 17.

107 EU and NATO AC2 arrangements are not without challenges either and are not being used as role models in this paper. ‘Whilst national political imperatives are always a deciding factor in international organizations crisis management operations, politicisation is particularly pronounced in the EU’s CSDP processes – especially compared to NATO and the United Nations’. Joachim A. Koops, Command and Control in European Union Crisis Management Operations, Challenges Forum Occasional Paper No. 1 (Forthcoming 2015).
In recognition of the fact that AC2 is a critical element of the UN’s efforts to effectively respond to the planning and oversight needs of peace operations, as well as of the efficiency of operations on the ground, the issue was identified as a key area in the DPKO New Horizon reform initiative of 2009:

To strengthen clarity and accountability in the command chain, DPKO and DFS will develop more robust accountability frameworks between headquarters and the senior mission leaders…

To strengthen contributors’ confidence in mission planning and command and control, DPKO and DFS will engage with members of the Security Council and contributing countries on strengthening mechanisms for consultation and interaction on mission planning processes within the framework of UN command and control.\textsuperscript{108}

The Policy, Evaluation and Training Division (DPET) undertook an internal evaluation of UN AC2 in peace operations in 2011. The evaluation identified that while the existing framework would benefit from additional clarity, it was largely an effective and flexible mechanism for exercising full command and control over military components in the field. However, the pressure and demands on UN peace operations are unrelenting, as they continue to be the Security Council’s chosen instrument for dealing with conflict and the breakdown of international peace and security. The need to do ‘more with less’ is a function of the increasing complexity of mandates with burgeoning multidimensional tasks alongside greater and harder donor scrutiny of the resources available. At the same time, international intolerance of seeing civilians becoming victims of conflict has increased the demands on peace operations to adopt proactive and integrated strategies to protect those embraced by their mandates. Indeed, even the accepted Brahimi principle that successful UN operations need a peace to keep has recently been challenged by events and deployments in particular in Eastern DRC, Mali, South Sudan and the Central African Republic (CAR). International responses have been further challenged by the paradigm of conflict morphing, with an increased association of conflict with transnational organized crime (TOC) and international terrorism, against which background existing doctrine, structures and capabilities lack maturity and coherence. In response, the DPKO has moved towards promoting a capability-based approach with a strong focus on the appropriate resources to meet requirements, as outlined in the New Horizon initiative. In this scenario, missions should be light, nimble and flexible with well-planned and intelligence-driven, integrated interventions. Leaving aside the availability of such capabilities and the training resources required, as well as the fact that mission credibility is closely bound up with a strong, capable and well-led military component, this environment calls for good leadership at all levels (including UN HQ) as well as clear AC2 mechanisms which enjoy the confidence of all.

In coordination with DPET, the Challenges Forum undertook to contribute to the international consultative process on AC2 at UN HQ and in the field, with a view to strengthening it where needed to ensure that UN peace operations remain a flexible, transparent and effective tool for delivering a broad range of mandates. To assess the current situation with regard to UN AC2, the Challenges Forum AC2 Working Group undertook three field visits to selected missions in late 2012 and early 2013: MINUSTAH in Haiti, UNOCI in

\textsuperscript{108} United Nations, DPKO/DFS, A New Partnership Agenda: Charting New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping (note 5), Section II.
Chapter 4. Authority, Command and Control
Côte d’Ivoire and UNMISS in South Sudan. The findings from these field visits are included in this chapter, alongside the experiences of a range of senior peacekeeping practitioners.

**Current UN Guidance on AC2**

Although UN command and control was recognized by Member States as an issue, it was not until 2008 that it was politically possible for the UN Secretariat to attempt to capture UN doctrine and practice in a comprehensive policy document applicable to all UN peace operations. Until then, issues of authority, command and control had been left to the directives given to each individual mission, which meant there was little or no standardization of practice. The 2008 policy was an attempt to provide greater clarity and guidance, given the emerging complexity of AC2, particularly within multidimensional peace operations.

The policy development was led by the military division of the DPKO with other divisions contributing. Nevertheless, the military focus of the policy prevented the policy from providing a fully comprehensive approach to the challenges of peace operations. This policy is still extant and provides the current framework for AC2 within the UN, from UN HQ to the field level. Most notably, it is in this document that the three military levels of command: strategic, operational and tactical, are first identified, discussed in comparative terms and related to UN and individual country’s military practice.

UN HQ is identified as the strategic level with the Under-Secretary-General (USG) for Peacekeeping exercising authority delegated from the Secretary-General for the direction and control of all UN peace operations. The UN, similarly to the AU, identifies mission headquarters as the operational level, in contrast to the policies of many countries, and of other organizations such as the EU and NATO, which tend to establish a separate operational level of command outside the theatre of operations. Within the UN framework, operational responsibilities reside in the function of the Head of Mission (HoM), which is often assumed by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG). The HoM works with his or her Mission Leadership Team (MLT) to carry out these responsibilities. Thus, ‘the HoM leads and directs the heads of all mission components and ensures unity of effort and coherence among all UN entities in the mission area…’ The tactical level is identified as the management of civilian, police and military operations below the level of mission headquarters.

The 2008 policy document also defined the roles and functions of the various key actors and arrangements for their integration into UN peace operations. The document recognized that practice in missions varied greatly. As such, it was more of a doctrinal paper capturing elements of current practice than a policy document giving directives on implementation at the mission level. Recognizing that more needed to be done, and building on the recommendation of the 2009 New Horizons report, DPKO in late 2011 undertook an evaluation, by the Division of Policy, Evaluation and Training (DPET), of the UN’s peacekeeping
authority and command and control framework, in order to achieve a better understanding of the UN system and strengthen implementation where necessary. The conclusions of the internal DPET Evaluation were briefed to Member States including the substantive session of the UN Special Committee for Peacekeeping in February 2012.

The evaluation found that the framework ‘generally works well…but requires strengthening in its application’. The evaluation was a clarification of the UN’s AC2 framework, recognizing the unique and complex nature of UN peace operations, which are ‘fundamentally a political endeavor’ characterized by a civilian/political leadership and ‘a flat, decentralized but flexible structure’ that combines uniformed and non-uniformed components which share a common strategic vision. It recognized this framework as complicated but cost-effective. A key and unique feature of the framework is the fully delegated responsibility and authority for planning, management, and command and control of the operation by the Security Council to the Secretariat and the DPKO and DFS. Within this framework, there is little scope for structured member state engagement, which remains a point of contention for those Member States accustomed to a more inclusive (or intrusive) role in policymaking and mission management at the strategic and operational levels.

Despite the general satisfaction with UN AC2 and its mechanisms for providing ‘a strong basis for conducting peace operations’, the DPET evaluation identified a number of challenges in the structure. These centred around:

- The need for better understanding and communication of the C2 framework, both internally to all in the mission and externally to all stakeholders.
- Ensuring that a clear strategic vision is cascaded down from the Security Council to the heads of all the components of a mission.
- The need for better leadership, and its concomitant training and preparation, at UN HQ and in the field.
- A need to strengthen planning at both UN HQ and mission headquarters levels.

Other issues highlighted were the importance of translating the Security Council mandates into strategic directions, AC2 issues related to inter-component coordination, and the need for clarity in roles and responsibilities within missions, especially as their internal complexity increases in response to additional mandated tasks. Various recommendations were made to address these issues, and their substance and implementation are discussed below. Most significant was an undertaking that the DPKO/DFS AC2 Policy should be updated and revised to reflect the changing dynamics of peace operations. These dynamics have further changed since the evaluation was undertaken, with the advent of new UN missions in Mali, Central African Republic, South Sudan, and Somalia114 and the introduction of an Intervention Brigade in the DRC with what can be characterized as a robust peace enforcement role.115 Significantly, however, no new policy directive on AC2 has emerged from this evaluation.

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114 Although the newly formed UNSOM is a UN special political mission rather than a peacekeeping mission, it is an integrated mission working alongside and providing the mission support to a robust military component being provided and led by the AU’s AMISOM.

Part of the purpose of the DPET evaluation exercise was to better inform Member States about the current UN AC2 framework and its differences. Significantly, of the countries canvassed on their views on UN C2, only 21 per cent said that the framework was ‘very clear’ to them. The remainder either did not know (2%) or felt the framework was only ‘somewhat clear’ (77%). Incorrect or uninformed perceptions of the UN system seem to be a significant contributor to the often quoted belief that many countries, particularly those from the developed world, have little confidence in the UN AC2 system. There is a perception of a lack of control inherent in the UN system, inadequate consultation and transparency between the Secretariat and Member States, and poor selection and preparation of the UN leadership within the AC2 system, as well as insufficient accountability.

There are also debates over the lack of a separate operational level of command, and concern that the ‘light back stopping’ of UN HQ might not be sufficient in the anticipated robust operations. None of these issues are new and many had already emerged in the DPET AC2 evaluation, but they highlight the underlying disquiet that although UN C2 seems broadly appropriate for its complex political purpose, there remain areas where it could be improved and strengthened. In order to focus better on these areas, this paper examines UN AC2 mechanisms and practice in three discrete areas: in UN HQ in New York; between UN HQ and the field; and inside the field missions.

**AC2 at UN Headquarters**

UN HQ represents both the grand strategic and the strategic level of command for UN peace operations. This responsibility is shared between the Security Council, the UN Secretariat and the Member States through their permanent missions. In contrast to regional organizations, which have a membership that is smaller than the UN, its 193 Member States do not attempt to mandate or direct an operation collectively. In fact, ‘in order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf’. In line with the UN Charter, therefore, the political and operational views of Member States are only reflected in Security Council discussions, and the decisions of the 15 members on the Security Council are taken on behalf of the entire UN membership. The Security Council then takes decisions, provided the resolution has nine votes in support and unless any of the permanent members vetoes. Thus, the Security Council can launch an operation on behalf of the 193 members of the organization with the positive votes of nine of its 15 members. Again, in contrast to the activities carried out by other peace and security organizations, those countries that decide on UN operations tend not to be the same as those which contribute personnel or

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116 Briefings by DPET on the main findings of their evaluation report to the C-34 in February 2012.

117 One senior European diplomat at a Being a Peacekeeper workshop on ‘Enhancing European Military and police Contributions to UN Peacekeeping’ in Berlin 2012 classified the UN AC2 system as ‘fire and forget’. There is however no evidence that there is a complete lack of confidence in the UN’s AC2 system. See also The Art of the Possible: Peacekeeping Under New Conditions – A Dialogue with the Field Community (note 10).

118 Grand Strategy is a term coined by Basil Liddell Hart, which brings into consideration all the high level resources and policies of a nation or organization including political, diplomatic, financial and economic, as well as military. See B.H. Liddell Hart, Strategy: The Indirect Approach (Faber: 1967).

capacities. This often creates a dilution of responsibilities and a tension between actors. This fundamental difference at the grand strategic level is one of the principal reasons why some states that belong to regional organizations prefer to use their regional organizations for international interventions—they have more control.

The Security Council is the decision-making body for the establishment of peace operations, but it delegates their implementation and conduct entirely to the Secretariat and the leadership on the ground. This often creates a significant disconnect between the political process within the Security Council and the reality on the ground faced by missions struggling to interpret and implement their mandates. Since its internal review of 2008–2009, the Security Council has tried to improve its analysis and prioritisation, and the follow-up of its resolutions, as well as trying to be more politically engaged with the parties to the conflict and TCCs/PCCs. However, some commentators still believe that the Security Council has much to say about the ‘why’ of an operation, but less about the ‘what’ and even less about the ‘how’. Others believe that the Council should spend more time on better articulating the ‘why’ and less time on listing all the tasks that a mission must undertake. Whichever view is shared, the Security Council does not approve the detailed decisions of the Secretariat such as the Concept of Operations, its subsequent planning, its initial instructions or its rules of engagement. All this strategic control is left to the Secretariat, which while multinational, does not officially represent the views of the Member States. It also calls for a strong Secretariat that, as recommended in the Brahimi report of 2000, can tell the Security Council what it needs to know.

TCCs/PCCs see little improvement in the strategic relationship between the Security Council, the Secretariat and the TCCs/PCCs. They still sense that they have no real or meaningful voice in this triangular mode of cooperation, let alone command or control. The large TCC/PCC meetings convened before any renewal of mandate are not adapted to the concerns of those who implement the mandates on the ground. They are described as too short, too insubstantial, too formal and too generic. Meanwhile, the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations currently plays an indirect role in guiding policy development. Moreover, real engagement with TCCs/PCCs is made more difficult by the fact that the Working Group only meets irregularly and in a way that is not always directly connected to the work of the Security Council. It is notable and a sign of good future practice that Pakistan, when

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holding the Chair, has improved the workings of the group.\textsuperscript{125} The UN Special Committee for Peacekeeping (C-34) is the third strategic mechanism in which the Security Council, the Secretariat and the Member States can interact. It has faced increasing difficulties in providing strategic direction to the Secretariat, in particular during its 2013 session when it was unable to agree its report. Having said that, in 2014, the report was agreed, but it should be noted that tensions and challenges still remain in many areas.\textsuperscript{126} Nonetheless, the C-34 is the only significant constitutional body that deals with peacekeeping while representing all relevant stakeholders. If it is to continue to play its role in formulating policy and guidance for the Secretariat, it will need better procedures and working methods. It will need to have more focused discussions on the challenges of peacekeeping in the field and focus its work on achieving a stronger consensus among all stakeholders on how to conduct such operations. At the same time, if the Secretariat is to maintain the confidence of the Member States it needs to be more inclusive in its dealings with them and more willing to find mechanisms to share key strategic documents with them.

\textsuperscript{139} It is therefore almost inevitable and perhaps pragmatic that strategic authority, command and control of peacekeeping is largely left to that part of the Secretariat represented by the DPKO/DFS with responsibility delegated to USG DPKO. This strategic-level HQ, responsible for implementing and managing Security Council resolutions, consists of about 900 people, of whom less than 100 are military personnel. It is currently responsible for 16 missions worldwide and around 120,000 peacekeepers. By any reckoning, this is startlingly lean.\textsuperscript{127} Furthermore, this ignores the DPKO’s principal and time-consuming political and advisory role to the Security Council through the Secretary-General, and to the 193 Member States in order to build and maintain an international consensus on and commitment to UN peace operations. It is a wonder that there is any residual capacity for the planning, strategic direction, deployment and daily management of its subordinate peace operations, both traditional and multidimensional. The DPKO is only a recent mechanism, born from pragmatic necessity out of the Department of Special Political Affairs in 1992, as the burgeoning business of peacekeeping required an increasingly professionalized and technical level of strategic management, if not command. However, critics of the UN highlight this leaness as a weakness, especially in times of crisis. They question whether the DPKO/DFS with its span of responsibilities at the strategic level has the capacity to adequately manage more than one or two crises at a time. In an earlier era, when peace operations were traditional and characterized by the principle of the non-use of force except in self-defence, such a light strategic presence was sufficient. In contemporary and morphing peace operations, with large multidimensional missions deployed in complex conflict zones, commanding

\textsuperscript{125} In 2001, the Security Council recognized the scope for further improvement in its relations with TCCs and the need to work together with a common purpose towards shared goals. It created a Working Group to that end, see United Nations, \textit{Statement by the President of the Security Council}, S/PRST/2001/3, 31 January 2001.

\textsuperscript{126} During the 2014 session, however, the Committee adopted the report by consensus.

\textsuperscript{127} The total number of personnel in DPKO and DFS is under 900, giving a field to HQ ratio of more than 129:1. NATO and EU comparative ratios are less than 10:1. Only the AU is leaner, but for AU operations the AU HQ in Addis Ababa often delegates most of its strategic direction of operations to its TCCs.
The light back-stopping at the strategic level rests with two recent creations: the Integrated Operational Teams (IOTs) and the UN Operations and Crisis Centre (UNOCC). The latter emerged from the DPKO’s Peacekeeping Situation Centre. The small IOTs are staffed by multidisciplinary generalists, including staff from the Office of the Military Adviser, the Police Division and the DFS. Although created to provide joined-up governance after the creation of the DFS, to some critics they serve only as an additional level of bureaucracy. They may be valuable coordinating mechanisms, but they are not crisis management centres. The UNOCC is a joint centre that provides integrated situational awareness to the UN senior leadership on peace and security, human rights and development issues. In the severest crises, it should be possible for UN HQ to take control of aspects of their management. For that to happen, the IOT concerned should be able to hand off the management of the crisis to a real Crisis Management Centre, focused on supporting the relevant missions, ready equipped with decision-making aids and communications, and staffed by experts in crisis management and the region concerned. Many believe that UN HQ needs to improve its capability to be able to simultaneously take control of multiple crises. Instead, with limited capacity at headquarters, this crisis management function is delegated to missions, which often do not have the experienced leadership in place to manage them and are too close to daily events to get a strategic perspective. As things stand, the ‘safety net’ seems insufficient to overcome the reluctance of some Member States to engage in UN peace operations.

If there is an area in which UN HQ can properly be called strategic, it is in the control of mission support. The need to get the best value from the budget, to present the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) and the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly with accounts, to conduct a procurement policy based on minimizing costs (and therefore one that is centrally controlled) and finally to reduce the risk of misappropriation, all have resulted in the control of support largely remaining in New York, with the DFS. DFS was split off from DPKO in 2007, to form a separate department. It has been argued that the resource and financial hierarchy ‘remains the real authority in peacekeeping’. The division of responsibilities between the Security Council, the Secretariat (in

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128 In the case of MONUSCO, to target and ‘neutralize’ warring militias.

129 Randhir K. Mehta, An Indian Perspective on UN PKO C2, Challenges Forum Working Group Paper, September 2013, ‘The tempo generated by the Council in peacekeeping is not sustained by Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support ...for reasons of antiquated processes in UN HQ and the capacities available with Member States’.

130 The Department of Peacekeeping Operations Terms of Reference for IOTs of 2008 describes them as ‘structures that monitor the overall implementation of the mandate’.

131 It is striking that it is often the same Member States that are reluctant to provide UN peace operations with the resources needed to address these perceived shortcomings.

132 The developing DFS Global Field Support Strategy is looking to rationalise the role of mission support by only placing the true strategic functions of oversight and planning in New York and pushing operational issues down to Regional Service Centres and to the missions.

133 Sartre (note 120).
This case DPKO/DFS) and the Fifth Committee leads to a lack of accountability for success or failure. The Fifth Committee has no inherent responsibility for successful peacekeeping and yet it has absolute financial authority. The Security Council has little control over the budget and resources of a mission that it has created and mandated. In terms of C2, this generates a situation in which there is an absence of unity of command or intent at the strategic level. Thus, accountability is loaded again on the mission and their dealings via DPKO/DFS with the Security Council and the Fifth Committee. What is needed is a Secretariat that can bridge these differences and above all guarantee political and military leaders in the field that they will receive timely allocations and deliveries of appropriate assets and resources to manage emergencies and crises. This is the core business of the strategic level of command. Questions remain, however, about whether the current arrangements can provide this.

An audit of the measures needed for UN AC2 to function well at the strategic level would have to conclude that the Security Council and the Secretariat need to do more to keep Member States informed of the strategic direction of missions, the Security Council needs help with assuming its strategic responsibilities and carrying out its planning and oversight functions effectively. In addition, Member States need to ensure that their representatives in New York are fully and effectively prepared for consultations with the Security Council and the Secretariat. The Secretariat needs to improve its crisis management capacities and stronger mechanisms need to be in place to create a unity of command and purpose to support missions in the field at the strategic level.144

\section*{AC2 between UN HQ and the Field}

The UN has a unique compression of its levels of command. There is UN HQ in New York and there is the field, and nothing in between. This makes it awkward to apply conventional military terminology to UN levels of command, although DPKO’s 2008 policy on AC2 seeks to do so.135 It also makes the UN’s AC2 structure lean and cost-effective, or in other words, ‘flat, decentralized and flexible’.136 Despite these evident advantages, this construct does place the onus on the SRSG or HoM to make the bridge between the strategic and the operational levels.137 One advantage of this flat system is that it guards against overly centralized decision making at the strategic and operational level, it fosters good and fast communication without intervening layers of command—and misinterpretation. It is also economical on personnel in a system that requires the Secretary-General to justify every post in the Secretariat to the Fifth Committee. The disadvantages, however, are that neither the strategic nor the operational functions perform very well, and the structure’s success is heavily dependent on the

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137 Almost literally in his or her personal New York dealings: reporting periodically to the Security Council, justifying the mission budget in front of the ACABQ, interpreting the guidance given by the Secretariat and keeping the key Member States informed and on side, while when in the field leading the Mission through the Mission Leadership Team and its multidimensional complexities.
character and competence of the SRSG and his/her immediate mission leadership team.

By placing the operational level squarely on the shoulders of the SRSG, the UN confers virtual sovereignty on the mission and a quasi vice-regal status on the SRSG. This often makes for uncomfortable relations between the Secretariat and the mission, and is characterized by a loose command function and weak follow-through on guidance and direction. The selection, training and preparation of senior leaders are central to a mission’s success.

A senior UN official in recent past has admitted that the ‘UN still tends to throw its leaders into the deep end of the pool without really knowing whether they can swim or not’.138 This recognizes both the difficulties of ‘swimming’ in contemporary missions and the risks inherent in the selection and deployment of senior leaders from Member States. To meet its objectives of universality and legitimacy, the UN recruits its senior mission leaders (political, developmental and security) from across the spectrum of its contributing Member States and the Secretariat. Some leaders are a known quantity and have learned their trade on earlier missions. Many are new to the UN and, although recommended as senior leaders by their own Member States, have not necessarily conceptualized or experienced the step change in complexity between senior leadership in a national context and senior leadership within a UN peace operation. They therefore learn on the job—some sink and some swim. This weakness in the selection, training and preparation of senior leadership for UN operations is compounded by the UN’s apparent difficulty in managing the succession planning of its senior leaders effectively. No matter how early the warning of senior personnel transition and despite recent improvements, long vacancies in senior positions are still all too common and compromise continuity as well as direction. In an AC2 structure in which so much responsibility for success is delegated to the mission, while being only lightly back-stopped by headquarters, this is a worry for those contributing countries that are used to having more influence in the selection and direction of their operational leaders.

Some argue that the USG for peacekeeping in a way is the ‘operational commander’, in that it is he or she who brings together the strategic political issues with the daily practical direction and control of all the missions. If this is true, and it is contrary to current published UN doctrine, then again the issue of the span of command with a small staff is germane. Certainly, individual missions, in particular when they are not in an acute crisis situation, report only a fleeting and periodic focus of DPKO attention on their issues.139 Furthermore, several report that the IOTs, the ‘safety nets’ at the strategic level, tend to look upwards—to the Secretary-General, the Security Council or the General Assembly—to serve the political and diplomatic machinery, rather than downwards to serve the missions. Missions speak of a ‘monitoring culture’ within the DPKO, with too much emphasis put on routine, burdensome upwards reporting, and less on support for mandate implementation coming back down. When guidelines or new directions are given there seems to be little capacity within UN HQ to follow up with missions and assist them with mandate implementation.140 Moreover, a mismatch is frequently identified between UN HQ’s demand

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139 Field interviews with mission personnel undertaken by members of the Challenges Forum Working Group.

140 An example, inter alia, of the lack of mandate implementation support given to missions is the increasing size and importance of Civil Affairs components of missions compared to the lack of Civil Affairs strategic direction or capacity within the DPKO. Interviews with mission personnel undertaken by members of the Challenges Forum Working Group.
for integration in the field and the lack of inte-
gration in UN HQ. This causes friction and alien-
ation, and according to some mission personnel,
there is ‘a lack of consultation, teamwork, commu-
nication and value added’ in the relationship
between the DPKO and the field.141

146 The creation of a separate DFS in 2007 brought
many advantages, including a better focus on the
operational level through such initiatives as the
Global Field Support Strategy which provides
synergies in resource allocation across missions
via the Global Support Centre (GSC) and the
Regional Service Centre (RSC). At the same
time, the DPKO/DFS split has complicated the
mounting of peace operations and their follow-up.
To split operations from their support is seen by
some as an additional complexity that challenges
the efficiency and coherence of the missions and
their command structure. There is a belief in the
field that the autonomy taken by the DFS from
the DPKO leads to friction rather than coordina-
tion.142 It has been observed that the DFS is seen
by the DPKO and missions as an increasingly
powerful gatekeeper of the two critical resources
for a mission’s operational success—personnel and
budgets. Having these functions departmentally
divorced from operations is a source of AC2
complexity, despite the other strategic benefits
derived from having separate departments. It
might also be observed that there is further
friction between DPKO/DFS serving the field
and the Department of Management (DM),
the authority-holding department, serving the
Secretariat. Making allowance for the natural
propensity of all organizations to be critical
of the level of command above them, there is

sufficient evidence to conclude that UN HQ and
the field missions are very different worlds, with
different structures, responsibilities and opera-
tional concerns, all of which are not as mutually
reinforcing as they should be. Ultimately, UN
HQ is a departmentalized advisory organization
designed and constructed to support politically the
strategic-level organizations in New York.143

147 The DPKO’s difficulty in fulfilling all the functions
of a superior HQ have led to past attempts to
reinforce the DPKO, resources permitting, by
strengthening its command and control capacity.
This has already been tried informally by Member
States seconding personnel to the Secretariat at no
cost to the UN. This was seen as divisive, however,
as only the richest states have the resources to
provide secondments, so the practice has been
discontinued. More formally, a Strategic Military
Cell (SMC) was created for UNIFIL in 2006 to
encourage European countries back into UN peace
operations. This was an attempt to address concerns
about the perceived weakness of UN AC2 arrange-
ments. However, it came with its share of problems,
as its commander by-passed the Office of Military
Affairs (OMA) and reported directly to the USG
for peacekeeping—but only on UNIFIL matters.
It was also seen as a special pleading measure for
Europeans and contrary to the universality of the
UN. Knowledgeable UN Secretariat commentators
report that it added little value and did not affect
the quality of decision-making at the USG level.144
As UNIFIL was not in crisis during the time of the
SMC, the system was never really tested. The SMC
was quietly wound up in 2010, and OMA was
reinforced by extra staff. Nonetheless, there may be
lessons from the SMC experience that are applicable

141 Field interviews with mission personnel undertaken by members of the Challenges Forum Working Group.
142 Field interviews with mission personnel undertaken by members of the Challenges Forum Working Group.
143 Even the military component of the DPKO, the Office of the Military Advisor (OMA), has no command and control function. It is
designed to offer military advice to the strategic level while providing guidance to the field.
144 Discussions at the Being a Peacekeeper workshop in Berlin 2012 (note 117).
to the AC2 of current peace operations. Not least of these are the concept of having J1 (personnel) and J4 (logistic) planners and operational staff at the strategic level embedded in the DPKO’s decision making structures to add more rigour to DPKO’s plans, as well as a surge capacity in times of crisis.145

An analysis of AC2 issues between UN HQ and the field would indicate an emphasis on delegation to the field, which is where the UN sees the operational level. This relies on good selection, training, preparation and support for the mission leaders charged with this responsibility, for which they need to be held accountable. The Secretary-General’s report on civilian capacity undertook:

to strengthen the capacity and accountability of senior UN leaders ... to build on existing initiatives to select leaders based on competence, to examine ways to conduct a more rigorous review of the track record of potential leaders, including on gender mainstreaming ... to use innovative and appropriate methods of assessment ... and in terms of improving the capacity of senior leaders to manage the United Nations response to conflict ... [and] to explore ways in which training for leaders can be improved within existing resources.146

There is little evidence that much of this is being implemented, except within OMA where an attempt is being made to prepare, through personal mentoring, those military leaders selected for UN Force Command. Meanwhile, the light back-stopping by the DPKO and its IOTs is just that, but does not seem to generate much confidence or approval at mission level, where the communication flow is seen by many to be primarily one-way. Questions remain therefore about where the high-level planning is being done once a mission is deployed, and whether the DPKO’s crisis management structure is sufficiently robust to command and control at the strategic level, multiple high tempo missions. To achieve this there is an obvious need for the DPKO to develop more robust structures, procedures and assets to enable detailed and continuous emergency planning at both the strategic and the operational levels, in order to give much needed command support to the field, especially in times of crisis.

**AC2 Issues within Missions**

With the advent of multidimensional peacekeeping missions, command and control in the field has become more complex, requiring a greater level of integration to achieve a unity of command and purpose between the different components. The instrument for achieving such unity is the Mission Leadership Team (MLT), presided over by the HoM or the SRSG, and usually including the two Deputy SRSGs, a Force Commander, the Police Commissioner, the Mission Chief of Staff, where applicable, and the Director/Chief of Mission Support.147 However, different missions have different structures as well as different names for this MLT cabinet Government. It is largely up to the SRSG how he or she wishes to structure

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145 ‘Given that the benefits that the Strategic Military Cell has demonstrated are applicable to all peacekeeping operations, it is important to capitalize upon this expertise and expand these benefits across all peacekeeping operations while at the same time ensuring that adequate support is maintained for UNIFIL. In particular, it is anticipated that complex missions will benefit from the additional military information analysis capability and the aviation and maritime experts who will be able to establish requirements, plan appropriately to meet these requirements, monitor implementation and draft rules of engagement.’ UN, Comprehensive Review of the Strategic Military Cell, Secretary-General’s Report, A/62/744, 14 March 2008, para.34.

146 United Nations, Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict (note 9).

their operational-level governance. In order to fulfil the mission’s integrated mandate, however, the HoM and the MLT need to develop a shared understanding and vision of the operating environment, implemented through an integrated mission planning process and cascaded down to all the mission components. Integration is facilitated through a number of joint institutions, such as the JMAC, the JOC, the Joint Logistic Operations Centre (JLOC) and integrated regional offices. Again, the composition and role of these joint structures vary from mission to mission with little standardisation other than DPKO guidelines. How far these guidelines are really followed is up to the SRSG. It has been noted in the past that some SRSGs feel sufficiently sure of their personal powerbase to pay little regard to DPKO direction.148

Every mission environment is different and faces a varied set of complexities and actors. There are clear dangers in stereotyping approaches and plans. While Security Council mandates tend to have a similar articulation and some stock tasks routinely attached to the resolution, their implementation has to be specific to the context of the mission. In other words, the function of a mission must drive its form. This desire not to over-regulate leads to the flexible, decentralized approach of the DPKO’s current AC2 philosophy, but it also leads to shortcomings in institutionalised structures and command relationships. A common theme reported from the Challenges Forum’s field visits was that the shape and responsibilities of joint structures, information exchange systems and coordination mechanisms tended to rely on leadership personalities and not on a common and shared understanding, or a rigorous implementation, of UN best practice.149 Weak institutional standardisation of a mission’s framework structures, compounded by an inadequate understanding by some senior mission leaders of basic material on doctrine and guidelines, as well as a lack of clarity in the roles inherent in the various leadership positions, mean that command relationships tend to be ad hoc, unstable and inconsistent.150 This may not matter much in missions where the tempo of events is even and relatively stable, but it does matter in missions characterized by robust, offensive operations that border on peace enforcement. Moreover, the consequence of such structural uncertainty is a tendency to form component and functional stovepipes that jealously guard positions, authority, resources and information—from which comes power. Breaking these down in pursuit of better integration between civilian, police and military personnel is a challenge for a transient senior mission leader for whom support from UN HQ may seem remote.152

148 Field interviews with mission personnel undertaken by members of the Challenges Forum Working Group.

149 Field interviews with mission personnel undertaken by members of the Challenges Forum Working Group.

In other words, a UN peace operation is one of the many instruments available to ensure that all UN and other international actors pursue activities at the country level in a coordinated and coherent manner.\footnote{United Nations, \textit{Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines}, (New York, January 2008).}

\footnote{This is compounded by TCCs retaining full command of their troops and being prepared to exercise national caveats in pursuit of national rather than UN interests.}

However, even within the mandated mission components over which an SRSG does have authority, there is a permanent tension between the conceptual requirement for better integration at all levels of the mission and the need for clear and direct AC2 by those elements of the mission mandated to exercise the use of force. This is as true for the police as it is for the military when crises require command structures that allow faster and more rigorous communication to support effective decision-making and implementation. This can be a challenge even in a homogeneous national organization with unified command structures. When the UN police force deals with a crisis in a multinational, multicultural integrated mission it needs to coordinate closely not only with the military, but also with the host Government police. Even in crises the host Government must not be relieved of responsibility for security in its own country.\footnote{United Nations, DPKO/DFS, \textit{Policy on United Nations Police in Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions}, Ref: 2014.01, paragraphs 35, 40 and 41.} It goes without saying that such a complex scenario involving different organizations with several parallel chains of command in often fast-developing situations requires well-designed, robust and effective command structures, in which people have confidence.\footnote{Sartre (note 120).}

Thus, the military and police elements of a mission tend to remain centralized in their AC2 and suspicious of integrating initiatives that blur this centralization and the authority of their respective commanders. This default centralization limits the effectiveness of a mission, as all components need to benefit from the synergies of shared expertise. Ultimately, confidence in field command and control relationships comes from good collective training and planning and a belief that directives and orders will be followed. This is hard to achieve in structural relationships that are essentially improvised in nature in addition to being multinational and multicultural.\footnote{Sartre (note 120).} Moreover, there is very little capacity or budgetary resource to give missions any form of collective training in facing and managing crises in

\section*{Chapter 4. Authority, Command and Control}
On the other hand, mission components are different and have different functions. For instance, the C2 of the UN Police, given its different structures, deployments and responsibilities, cannot be the same as that of the military. It also needs to be recognized that the UN Police operate with objectives and in a context that is different from policing at home. They must conduct operations with the host Government police and the UN military at the same time. Indeed, these very differences in function and objectives make smooth coordination between the police and the military difficult, unless there is close attention paid to coordination and C2 arrangements—especially in crises. According to the DPKO Policy on Authority, Command and Control, the UN Police are expected to be able to conduct complex joint operations with the military and the host nation’s police. Depending on the situation and the nature of the threat, this might mean putting police personnel under the command of military officers or vice versa. However, the point remains that unless there are clear, well-designed and practiced command arrangements, including joint planning and effective communications mechanisms, good interoperability will not be achieved. It is not evident from mission visits that such arrangements are in place in practice.

Civilian components meanwhile have flatter, more informal AC2 structures based on individuals rather than units. These need different AC2 arrangements that reflect their status as more permanent international civil servants. This civilian culture often sits awkwardly alongside the very different cultures of the uniformed components, whose time in mission is usually one year or less. One size does not fit all, and mixing these structures with their different cultures and needs in the conceptual drive for integration and the sharing of expertise is bound to result in challenges and friction on the ground. It is important to note that frequent efforts have been made by the Secretariat to try to provide management guidance to address some of these difficulties, which are well known. But it still remains hard to break down these barriers and cultures, however diligent the leadership might be. At present, given their improvised nature, there are practical limits to how far down a mission’s structure integration can successfully be taken without confusing the AC2 relationships on which a mission’s security depends.

Where UN AC2 might be thought to create problems within the mission is in the command relationships between the SRSG, the Director for Mission Support (DMS), the Force Commander and the Police Commissioner. However, most senior uniformed leaders are used to taking political direction from a civilian political figure and provided the SRSG does not try to personally command the force or police elements, but just makes his or her respective commanders answerable to him or her for their outputs, this is not a significant inhibitor. Indeed it is now well drilled into new Force Commanders, via the OMA’s productive mentoring process, that harmonious senior political/military relations are essential for mission success. Of more potential for disharmony are the AC2 relations between the rest of the MLT and the

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155 An example of this would be when armed police as represented by the Formed Police Units (FPUs) are deployed in the same hostile space and time as the military component. Clear and well-practiced C2 arrangements are essential in such circumstances.

156 TCCs pass their contingents to the operational control of the Force Commander and not to the SRSG, but the Force Commander reports to the SRSG as Head of Mission.

157 Called the Head of Military Component Course.
DMS. This tension is around the role of the DMS as the mission’s chief budgetary officer and chief steward of the mission’s resources. Since the advent of the DFS, it has been clarified that the DMS is accountable to the HoM, and not to the DFS, for the mission’s budget. Nevertheless, some HoMs report that the technical lines between the DMS and DFS, especially over budgetary issues, often by-pass these AC2 arrangements.158 The uniformed components often cite the limits on the AC2 authority of the Force Commander and the Police Commissioner over their logistics as an operational weakness when the tempo of operations is high. In the UN system, military logistics, engineering and aviation are regarded as mission assets and are tasked by the DMS through the integrated support services and the aviation branches of the mission support component, respectively, and not Force HQ, despite having embedded military staff, normally at the deputy level, in these joint logistics structures. This cost management and integration measure has long been contentious, especially for new Force Commanders unused to UN practice. This contentiousness is frequently reiterated by TCCs. There are clear accounting and accountability advantages for the UN in centrally managing these expensive military and police assets with high running costs, and it probably makes sense in more stable mission environments, but such a system is essentially a bureaucratic mechanism inconsistent with the conduct of high tempo military and police operations. In the changing context of UN peacekeeping in which robust operations are required for the protection of civilians in an environment shared with terrorism, these measures for the command and control of military and police logistics look constraining. However, it should be noted that, in the case of the force intervention brigade in MONUSCO, the mechanisms were tested and in this particular case, they managed to support the operations quite effectively.

158 It seems self-evident that for AC2 in integrated missions to work well there has to be a strong planning culture backed up by a culture of accountability for delivery. Unfortunately, the planning culture and related capacities in the UN are weak, both in mission and at UN HQ.159 Peacekeeping is ultimately a political activity and so unsurprisingly great value is placed within the Secretariat on the primacy of the political dimension—and that of the civilian Office of Operations. Planning tends to be regarded as a subordinate, less refined activity, and the only part of DPKO or DFS with significant dedicated planning capacity is OMA. The still unfinished story of the UN Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP) which morphed into the UN Policy on Integrated Assessment and Planning (IAP) in 2013 bears witness to this weak culture. It remains a surprising fact that, in contrast to most Member States and other international organizations, there is no single, adopted and practiced UN conflict analysis and planning system on which international staff are trained within the DPKO/DFS.160 Planners improvise planning, and training in planning, that is primarily subject to the preferences of the trainer. The release of the new Integrated and Assessment Planning (IAP)
Handbook is a welcome initiative in this regard. This vagueness in planning culture cascades down to missions. Missions report that there is weak use of the planning units: ‘the engines necessary to drive the mission strategy’. The IAP requires missions and UN Country Teams to produce an Integrated Strategic Framework but there are recent examples of missions where neither this nor a Mission Plan have been produced against which the performance of mission components can be held accountable. It is positive that the IAP recommended development of a Mission Concept (mission strategy) has recently been attempted in Mali (MINUSMA) and Central African Republic (MINUSCA). Moreover, the developing and critical role of the Mission Chief of Staff, within integrated missions, provides a potentially strong planning and integration focus for missions. But even this role is subject to interpretation at the mission level and fluctuates between being the MLT’s business and planning manager and the gatekeeper for the SRSG’s office.

The other key ingredient of effective AC2 at the mission level is a good flow of communications and information. This is not supported by the stovepipe culture in missions, the necessary default of improvised structures in a multinational, multicultural environment. Missions report limited internal information-sharing. Some systems and functions work well, while others do not. Furthermore the UN’s information technology, which might help internal communications, is unsophisticated. There is still heavy dependence on emails and voice transmissions operating within component stovepipes, which in a multilingual environment are subject to considerable misinterpretation. In contrast to many Member States, there are currently no UN C4I systems (Command, Control, Communication, Coordination and Information Systems) that can convey a real time ‘mission picture’ of events to all the relevant stakeholders, including UNOCC in the DPKO, while providing interfaces for AC2 direction and information exchange. The absence of such systems leads to much reported tension and friction as crisis management systems and structures are improvised in times of crisis, but rarely practiced to help develop integrated team building. When systems do appear, given the diversity of the actors involved, they are often ad hoc and not interoperable. Finally, compared to other international organizations working in complex, crisis-prone environments, little if any independent scenario-based training is provided to MLTs to put them through their paces and help team building—and what little there is, is not institutionalised. The Office of Peacekeeping Strategic Partnerships, created within the DPKO, acts as an inspectorate of the uniformed components and is a positive but limited step in this direction. It needs teeth and its functions should be widened to cover the whole of MLT and to help build teamwork in mission crisis management systems. Thus, a general picture of C2 at the mission level emerges of weak institutional structures prone to personalities and improvisation. This results in component stovepipes, which lack the integrating benefits of joint planning and high technology information exchange. In addition, they are rarely practiced or tested in their crisis management functions.

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161 Field interviews with mission personnel undertaken by members of the Challenges Forum Working Group.

162 Chuter (note 57).

163 The procurement of UUAVs for use in eastern DRC represents the first step in rectifying this situation, but their value will only ever be limited unless they are supported by C4I systems that allow rapid and informed senior leadership decisions. See also Chapter 2 of this report on Peacekeeping Under New Conditions.

164 William Flavin, Improving Command, Control and Management of UN Peacekeeping Missions, Working Group Paper, 2013, notes that in one mission visited by the working group, there were ‘at least three different systems passing information that do not interface’.
Conclusions

It is clear that the landscape of peace operations is changing. The mechanism of UN peacekeeping now has to tackle security issues, threats and environments which are far removed from the original premise of peacekeeping as envisaged by Folke Bernadotte, Ralph Bunch, Leicester B Pearson and Dag Hammarskjöld in the first generation after the Second World War. Exceptions to the norm include the UN mission in the Congo in the early 1960s, but in general, and for many decades, peacekeeping missions were not robust operations in the way they are required to be conducted today. Much commendable work has been done in the UN Secretariat, especially with the advent of DPET, to address this change and provide a set of guidance policies and manuals to assist contemporary peacekeepers in the management of this increasingly complex environment. However, it is less clear that the essential authority, command and control structures of peace operations have evolved at the same rate. While new structures, such as the DPKO and more recently the DFS, have been introduced in UN HQ to manage the more immediate challenges of peace operations, the strategic function of the Secretariat and its relationship with the field remain basically the same. UN HQ is still essentially a politico-diplomatic centre, staffed and structured to serve the various organs of the UN.

At the mission level, there is a heavy dependence on good senior leadership, which is not accompanied by a systematic and institutionalised attempt to select and train the best leaders, or to rehearse and validate them and their leadership teams in their crisis management functions. At the same time, a general AC2 picture emerges at the mission level of weak institutional structures prone to improvised manipulation by (sometimes inexperienced) senior leaders which tend to default to component stovepipes. Within this mission environment, better interoperability and integration, which might lead to more confidence in command and control, is hampered by inadequate planning and information sharing mechanisms.

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160 Since the 2000 Brahimi Report, the DPKO/DFS have invested substantial resources in the development of more than 150 guidance documents covering the full life cycle of peace operations. The number of documents produced by the DPKO/DFS has steadily increased over time, from 27 outputs in 2003–06 to 68 in 2010–13. Source OIOS IED 14.
The UN Secretariat should, in close cooperation with Member States, revise the existing DPKO/DFS AC2 policy in accordance with the evaluation and recommendations put forward in the 2011 DPET report, so that it is an integrated policy document that clarifies military, police and civilian relationships while respecting their expertise, responsibilities and roles, and standardises institutional structures at the mission level. The new policy should be widely disseminated to Member States, in particular to TCCs and PCCs, so that they can better prepare, plan and train their forces in line with the policy.

The UN Secretariat, supported by the Member States, should develop stronger crisis management structures within DPKO/DFS. This could be achieved by enhancing the role of the UNOCC to allow it to become a more strategic Crisis Management Centre. A reinforced UNOCC, augmented by the appropriate leadership, should focus on supporting the relevant missions, be ready-equipped with decision-making aids and communications, be able to exercise command authority over the missions, be staffed by experts both in crisis management and in the region concerned, and be able to take on the conduct of at least two crises, if not three, at the same time. This will require subsuming during crises much of the role and resources of the IOTs.

The UN Secretariat should strengthen and empower the Senior Leadership Appointment Section (SLAS) in the DPKO/DFS in order to improve the selection, training, preparation and mentoring of senior leaders. Participation in relevant senior leadership training should be mandatory and assessing the performance of participants at senior leadership training should be considered.

Peace operations should adopt fit-for-purpose tools and technologies, with the support of UN HQ and continuously seek and apply new technological innovations as necessary. Member States should provide adequate resources—human and financial—to do so. This could include a review and modernization of the deployed DPKO/DFS C4I (Command, Control, Communication, Coordination and Information Systems) infrastructure in line with international best practice and current technology.

The UN Secretariat, in close cooperation with Member States, should develop enhanced policy and guidelines for integrated mission police and military command mechanisms that ensure effective planning and communication, and support clear command and control in high tempo joint operations. These mechanisms should be tested at the mission level through crisis management exercises, also involving external expertise.
RECOMMENDATIONS

Strategic level mechanisms in UN HQ should be reviewed to achieve an improved level of triangular cooperation between the Security Council, the Secretariat and TCCs/PCCs. The Security Council should make better use of its Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations to provide a more senior and highly qualified advisory group, especially on matters of security. The Security Council needs budget sheets prepared by the Secretariat before creating any new peacekeeping operation or before the renewal or strengthening of the existing ones. In this way there might be better alignment between mandates and the resources needed to implement them.

The Security Council and the Secretariat should do more to keep Member States informed of the strategic direction of missions, and the Security Council needs help with assuming its strategic responsibilities and carrying out its planning and oversight functions effectively. In addition, Member States should ensure that their representatives in New York are fully prepared for consultations with the Security Council and the Secretariat. The Secretariat needs stronger mechanisms to create a unity of command and purpose to support missions in the field at the strategic level.

The UN should improve the planning culture within UN HQ and missions by developing and implementing accountable UN-wide planning tools and systems, and by training and practising selected personnel in all peacekeeping components in their use.

The UN, in close cooperation with Member States, should consider extending the role and responsibilities of the new Office for the Peacekeeping Strategic Partnership from that of purely military and police oversight to mission-wide oversight of leadership, accountability and crisis management training, in order to ensure stronger, more consistent and more accountable implementation of the DPKO/DFS policy and guidance at the mission level. Or alternatively, the UN should consider empowering the annual mission reviews by DPKO’s Office of Operations to make an assessment of the performance of the mission leadership team in this regard.
CHAPTER 5. IMPACT ASSESSMENT AND EVALUATION IN PEACE OPERATIONS
South African peacekeepers have laid down their helmets and flack jackets somewhere in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

UN Photo/MARIE FRECHON
5. Impact Assessment and Evaluation in Peace Operations

Introduction

The international community has used peace operations as a mechanism to limit or to prevent the spread of conflict since 1948. Over the years, peacekeeping roles and responsibilities have been expanded in response to the changing nature of conflict. It is no longer sufficient to keep the peace. A full toolkit of options is now required to help rebuild a fragile state into one that can develop the security, social, political, governance and economic architecture required to secure a sustainable peace over time. This has resulted in mandates that reflect the realities of the complicated environment in which missions are deployed, often providing for a range of peacebuilding tasks to support the transition to a viable state where the Government and its institutions are seen to be legitimate and responsive to the needs of the population.

It is noteworthy that despite some 65 years of peace operations, only relatively recently have there been the political circumstances necessary to enable the development of strategic principles and guidelines capable of guiding DPKO-led peace operations. The objective is to create a mechanism that will lead to more consistent approaches to mandate implementation, with the expressed intention of better meeting the obligations of a peace operation. The attempt to focus on an integrated approach, linking the mission stakeholders into a ‘One-UN’ decision-making body to improve the UN’s performance in the field remains problematic and is increasingly being questioned. Without the tools to demonstrate the benefits of this approach through impact assessment and evaluation, there is a growing inclination to conclude that the integrated approach has little to recommend its continuation.

The progress made in building policies, principles and guidelines has reinforced the need for a better appreciation of the impact that peace operations have on the conflict environment. In the discourse among scholars, policymakers and practitioners, there is an acknowledgement that impact assessment and evaluation of peace operations are conceptualized, designed, conducted and analysed

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in a fragmented and ad hoc manner. One consequence is the absence of a coherent body of knowledge that can articulate clearly and with sufficient data the ‘so what’ or impact of peace operations.

Of particular interest is the need to calculate the costs of peace operations not only in human terms, but also increasingly in terms that explain their residual benefits to taxpayers. The global economic crisis has exacerbated the emphasis on value for money, or cost-benefit analyses to demonstrate that the expenditure of taxpayers’ money has resulted in a peace operation with positive effects. One danger in emphasizing value for money without due consideration for other critical factors, such as the time needed to build institutions, gain public confidence and address the root causes of the conflict, is the risk of donor fatigue for engaging in peace operations. This is particularly the case when there is limited progress in establishing a sustainable peace through effective state-building.

An additional impetus for identifying the positive impact of peace operations is the need to demonstrate to the range of key stakeholders, including donors and Member States, that their contributions are creating the conditions for a more peaceful world. Yet, the requirement to share such data among donors and stakeholders is not a given and a substantial number of donors do not have mechanisms to ensure agreement on funding allocations that achieve joint outcomes and eventually allow for the measurement of impact. Smaller donors and stakeholders are often not included in this discussion at all. If all donors and stakeholders—large or small—were involved in forums such as donor consultation meetings and funding drives, this would add value to the eventual outcomes. In reality, there are too many turf battles that only lead to disjointed efforts without contributing to the success of the overall effort.

Compounding these issues is a fundamental question about the state of the art regarding the evaluation and assessment of multidimensional peace operations. This question remains largely unanswered and is challenging to explore given the lack of a coherent body of knowledge, or even fundamental agreement on the methodologies, language and protocols for measuring the impact of peace operations. Questions regarding the efficacy of even attempting to measure the impact of peace operations, given their time-based structures and rotation patterns, as well as the dynamic nature of international politics, are front-of-mind in this discussion.

The reality is that the current landscape of multidimensional peace operations requires a robust and well-defined impact assessment and evaluation toolkit that spans the spectrum of peace operations. If we fail to better identify what works and what does not, as well as the knowledge and skills required to examine the functions and impacts of peace operations, there is every likelihood that we will fail to achieve the aims of the UN as set out in its Charter.

This chapter draws on an extensive literature review, several papers written by members of the Challenges Forum working groups and other impact and assessment experts, and builds on the outcomes of several internal Challenges Forum workshops.168

Current Thinking and Trends

Practitioners and policymakers have only recently begun to seriously grapple in concrete terms with the question of how to assess the effectiveness and impact of peace operations. The literature on peace and security is rife with commentaries and approaches touching on the broader categories of peacebuilding.

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crisis management and conflict prevention. However, guidance on assessing and evaluating the impact of UN peace operations—or peace and security operations more generally, for example, through regional organizations such as the AU or the EU—is still somewhat sparse.

On the positive side, there is a recognition that the community of practitioners and policymakers is at a crossroads, and the need to find meaningful tools, methodologies and good practice guidance around ‘measuring what matters’ has become an imperative. At the same time, there is a recognition of the shortcomings in the current toolkit of options used to consider success or failure in peace operations. Criticisms range from a lack of methodological rigour and suitability, faulty conceptual frameworks and the absence of commonality in approaches (and language), to the absence of a shared vision of what is to be achieved through an assessment or evaluation. Many existing—and linear—cause and effect models of analysis are of limited use for assessing peace operations that are largely multidimensional in programming design and management, and are heavily nuanced and composed of complex causal relationships.

Definitional variances over key peacebuilding concepts, such as stabilization, state-building, peacebuilding and justice, also add to the challenges. A further complication is that the language used to discuss issues related to evaluation and assessment is not applied with any consistency. For example, terms central to the assessment of peace operations are used with no conformity in meaning—whether reference is made to impact, outcomes, effectiveness, monitoring or evaluation. There is no common definition of either evaluation or assessment and they are often used interchangeably. A simple definition of both is that the objective of an evaluation is to make a judgment or appraisal while the objective of an assessment is to provide feedback. The lack of a shared understanding of—or even a common use of terminology on—what works and what does not may prolong the discourse required to move forward the field of evaluation and assessment in peace operations. It may also result in assessment efforts and the quest for better tools and methodologies being abandoned as the challenges could be seen as overwhelming the benefits of impact assessments and evaluations of peace operations.

A critical point is the reality that peace operations are, at their root, political processes. Mission effectiveness, as identified in assessments and evaluations, will have political implications for external actors and the host country. The recommendations or conclusions resulting from these assessments may lead to changes in funding levels, force levels and structures, domestic support in contributing countries, national security and stability, regional security and stability, and a host of other considerations. Just as missions themselves are affected by domestic and international politics, so too is the decision-making process related to what should be measured, for whom and for what purpose. It has been noted in relation to how the integrated nature of peace operations can best be assessed and evaluated that ‘since evaluation is always political, a common obstacle to rigorous assessment of a policy intervention is a desire by agents involved to claim credit for successes and deflect blame for failures. This is considerably exacerbated in the case of integrated missions, where different components of the operation have distinct institutional identities, each with a firm stake in protecting their reputation (and often their sources of funding)’.169

While the issues around supporting the transition to a sustainable peace—from economics, to governance, security

169 Whalan (note 168), p. 10.
sector reform or rule of law support—are of central concern, there are always political issues that must be taken into account.

174 The reality is that policymakers, practitioners, Member States, the host country and other key stakeholders are likely to have different requirements, needs and expectations in relation to the assessment and evaluation of UN peace operations. The challenge is to create a toolkit of approaches and methodologies that has broad relevance and, in the process, helps capture the lessons that can improve good practice in both current and future operations.

175 Peace operations are highly complex. Their multi-dimensional structure means that military, police and civilian actors bring their specific capabilities into a web of activities, projects and programmes. These multiple inputs are intended to achieve, or to support the achievement of, overall strategic objectives that have been mandated at the highest levels of international or regional decision-making bodies. At the same time, missions do not operate in isolation of other key stakeholders—most significantly the host country and the donor community—all of which will probably be undertaking parallel activities, projects and programmes outside the mission.
space, either in support of mission activities or separate from these activities. While the UN may have made some progress in conducting integrated assessments, and correspondingly, an integrated mission plan, at times, the donors’ agenda may not align with the assessed needs and priorities. This has often resulted in a disconnection between the funding and planning of activities.

It is within this web of activity that the assessment and evaluation of peace operations take place. Multiple questions need to be asked and answered in order to move forward on any assessment or evaluation approach. What is to be assessed or evaluated? At what level? These questions are contingent on two fundamental questions: (a) why or to what purpose; and (b) for whom? Answering these questions generally dictates all that follows in relation to the ‘what’ and the ‘how’.

Answering the ‘why’ question means looking at issues focused on overall evaluation objectives. For example, is an evaluation being carried out to determine that an activity, project or programme, or the mission as a whole, is achieving its intended objectives—and as intended (accountability). Conversely, is an evaluation being undertaken to ‘provide evidence and improve knowledge of results and performance, which can help improve ongoing or future activities and increase understanding of what works, what does not and why’? Ideally, assessments and evaluations in the name of accountability are undertaken to ensure that mission objectives are transparent to multiple constituencies, including the host country and its population, donors, UN HQ and the mission leadership, TCCs and PCCs. Assessments and evaluations undertaken for the purpose of learning usually seek to identify lessons learned and good practices that can be applied to current or future peace operations.

To gain maximum benefit, assessments and evaluations of peace operations should seek to provide a platform for both learning and accountability in its broadest sense. However, in practice, and due partly to funding issues, security concerns, political agendas, limited manpower and resource constraints, compromises will inevitably be made in terms of what will or can be evaluated. It is far more often the case that evaluations are done to support learning, whereas ‘accountability mechanisms in peacebuilding are almost exclusively upwards in nature’. This means that the focus of accountability is not directed towards recipients of the assistance, but more likely towards the donors that fund, or the Member States that support, the interventions. In other words, such evaluations are an attempt to reassure the international community that they are spending their limited resources wisely and effectively.

In addition to the ‘why’, the parameters that define the assessment or evaluation will be affected by answering the question ‘for whom’ the activity is being carried out. The ‘for whom’ question is quite important as different stakeholders will have

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171 Challenges Annual Forum Report 2012, p.184
defined largely as the short- and medium-term effects (positive and negative) of input activity, outcomes are more meaningful as they provide greater information and a level of assessment and evaluation by answering the question: ‘Has intervention/activity/programme X made a difference in the short or medium term?’ The UNMISS (UNPOL) training efforts at Raiaf Police Training Centre in Juba, where South Sudanese Police Service (SSPS) officers are trained, has had a positive output in that a large number of SSPS members have been trained in basic policing skills and knowledge. The output can be measured and quantified in the short term. However, determining the outcome in the medium term is more complicated. This requires an assessment of how SSPS services are measured and interpreted by the local population, through the identification of indicators that allow for a determination of change in terms of, for example, crime reduction or maintenance of law and order. Indeed, even more subjective measurements of outcome may be needed, such as whether people have more confidence in the police or feel safer.

**TEXT BOX 3. OUTPUT VS. OUTCOME: THE EXAMPLE OF CAPACITY BUILDING OF POLICE SERVICES**

Defined largely as the short- and medium-term effects (positive and negative) of input activity, outcomes are more meaningful as they provide greater information and a level of assessment and evaluation by answering the question: ‘Has intervention/activity/programme X made a difference in the short or medium term?’ The UNMISS (UNPOL) training efforts at Raiaf Police Training Centre in Juba, where South Sudanese Police Service (SSPS) officers are trained, has had a positive output in that a large number of SSPS members have been trained in basic policing skills and knowledge. The output can be measured and quantified in the short term. However, determining the outcome in the medium term is more complicated. This requires an assessment of how SSPS services are measured and interpreted by the local population, through the identification of indicators that allow for a determination of change in terms of, for example, crime reduction or maintenance of law and order. Indeed, even more subjective measurements of outcome may be needed, such as whether people have more confidence in the police or feel safer.

Different requirements for information. For a member state or donor, it may in part be a ‘good news’ story or information that promotes a particular political agenda at home or justifies continued funding. For the practitioner, the why may be needed to identify what works and what does not—for either learning and/or accountability purposes. For the UN, the requirement may be to determine transition strategies or to report back to the Security Council. For a TCC, the why may relate to questions pertaining to troop drawdown. For the host country, the purpose of an evaluation or assessment may well be to determine population satisfaction with the mission, and to assess public confidence in their own Government’s ability to sustain a peaceful environment.

Ideally, stakeholder requirements will, at the very least, be complementary so that evaluations or assessments can accommodate different expectations in their design, the questions asked and the results generated. However, in practice, this is not always the case. The result may be that an evaluation or assessment will not necessarily yield the most robust findings, leading to only a modicum of either learning or accountability.

The reality of missions is that they are political. The questions of ‘why’ and ‘for whom’ in terms of their assessment and evaluation are not usually complementary in relation to stakeholder expectations and requirements. An independent evaluation—designed so that the political implications of the findings ‘have minimal opportunity to influence the assessment itself’—is a favourable approach.174 The value of insulating evaluation from multiple stakeholder requirements, expectations or political agendas is that more rigorous evaluations are possible and can generate information that will contribute to learning, such as an independent review process modelled along the lines of the US Office of the Special Inspector-General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). Another model is more of an attitudinal shift, specifically, to recognize and use failures as opportunities to improve learning and accountability so that lessons

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174 Whalan (note 168), p. 11.
are not only captured, but also learned and reflected in better practices within current and future peace operations. The alternative, as is often the case, is to shy away from looking at what does not work for fear that assigning blame will become the endpoint of such an enquiry.

**What to Measure?**

When the questions of ‘why’ and ‘for whom’ have been answered, determining ‘what to measure’ can be complicated. At the broadest level, there is generally a lack of common agreement on what is to or should be measured and, even more centrally, what is measurable at all. Some practitioners and academics prioritise the need to focus on ‘what matters’ or ‘what works’ (or does not work). Others highlight the importance of determining whether an activity, project or programme has made a difference. Still other practitioners and academics identify success or failure and the processes that led to either or both as being most important. A glaring gap is a common approach or understanding of what constitutes success.

In all cases, there is a significant degree of subjectivity and variance in definition, whether speaking in terms of what works, makes a difference, ‘matters’ or constitutes success. What is the ‘it’ that matters? This may well depend on the ‘for whom and for what purpose’. For example, for the TCCs, success—and the focus of interest in an evaluation—may be the elimination or reduction of insurgency activities, effective protection of civilians or reliable nonporous borders—the end state required for troop withdrawal or a drawdown in troop numbers. For PCCs, success may be a functional court system or the establishment of community policing—with a similar end state. A donor may deem success to be projects and programmes completed according to specified milestones and within budget. Success through a civilian lens may be the provision of basic services, or a functioning economy or governance structures. For the mission as a whole, it may be the absence of conflict, the likelihood of a sustainable peace or stability—words that are themselves somewhat amorphous and defined often in the ‘eyes of the beholder’. For the host country, success may be public support and what matters is the restoration of state authority and the establishment of a legitimate and stable Government.

Given the multiplicity of agendas and stakeholder investment in how success is envisaged, what constitutes success should be determined during the initial stages of an assessment or evaluation, if not before at the mission planning stage. Parameters for success among the various stakeholders should ideally be both qualified and quantified.

In addition to the particular lens that is being applied to assessment and evaluation, there is also the issue of what to evaluate in order to generate useful information. Is it specific mission activities, projects or programmes? Is the interest in a single set of interventions in relation to one programme or a combination of interventions in relation to multiple programmes? Perhaps the focus should be on the mission as a whole, taking a more comprehensive and integrated approach and examining how the projects and programmes achieve the overall strategic objectives of the mission. This is probably the most complex question as it goes to the heart of why it is so difficult to evaluate and assess peace operations. Can a programme be
assessed in the first instance in isolation from other key programme areas? For example, can rule of law programmes be evaluated or assessed without taking into consideration other programme areas, such as security sector reform, governance or economic reform?

As any number of practitioners have highlighted, the more successful programmes are those that link objectives in one sector to those in another, thus bringing the sectoral objectives into alignment with overall mission objectives. This complexity may be overcome in part by disaggregation: ‘the evaluation of integrated missions should combine assessment of the overall operation and its crosscutting themes with disaggregated evaluation of each component and individual goal areas. Evaluating integrated missions on a spectrum of success and failure requires the analyst to prioritise the operation’s goals (success in what) and stakeholders (success for whom).’

There is also the question of success in relation to what. For example, the success of one programme may have no substantive impact on the overall mission objective. Is this still a success story? A successful project or programme may also have unintended positive and negative consequences for other programme areas or on the achievement of the overall objectives of the mission.

The One-UN approach tries to address some of these issues through better integration of country team and mission management efforts. However, competition for resources, among other factors, often hampers the success of this approach. As some have argued, assessing unintended consequences should be central to evaluations of integrated peace operations. Whalan argues: ‘it is often precisely the points at which military, police and civilians intersect that the full spectrum of a mission’s effects can be observed. Evaluative practices for assessing unintended consequences can usefully build on the principles of conflict sensitivity, the primary purpose of which is to call attention to the potential for negative outcomes despite good intentions.’

Because missions are so complex and the component parts so intrinsically inter-related, the question of what to measure appears to be an insurmountable behemoth. This can be further complicated by two additional factors. First, there is the issue of defining measurable objectives and goals in the first instance. The long-term objectives—on which mission mandates and their component parts are based—may well be laudable, but vague in their definition. The ‘what to measure’ is thus complicated by lack of clarity of intent. Second is the fact that the ‘what’ remains largely political and often changes as goals and objectives are adjusted over the course of the mission. This can easily lead to the conclusion that because it is so hard to factor in the component parts, an evaluation cannot be done. However, ‘too hard’ is no longer viewed as an acceptable fall back position. No matter how complex, methodological approaches and tools are being developed, adapted and refined to factor in the reality of this web of

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176 United Nations, United Nations Environment Programme, Greening the Blue Helmets—Environment, Natural Resources and UN Peacekeeping Operations (New York, 2011). A policy launched by the UN to minimize negative consequences of peacekeeping and to ensure that they leave as light a green footprint in mission areas as possible. The policy was briefed and elaborated on at the Challenges Annual Forum 2012 in Geneva.
178 Whalan (note 168).
relationships and agendas that are a part not only of mission planning and implementation, but also of assessment and evaluation. These approaches to assessment and evaluation increasingly use a multiplicity of tools to create a robust picture of ‘causal’ or correlated relationships and processes that affect mission progress, effectiveness and impact.

**At What Level**

Commentary on what to measure in peace operations invariably includes discussion of the level of analysis, specifically outputs, outcomes or impact. The levels at which assessment and evaluation occur depend on a number of factors, not the least those related back to questions of purpose and ‘for what reason’. Additional factors may include funding issues and time constraints that affect the delivery of the activity, project or programme.

Outputs are by far the easiest to measure as they essentially identify the results of input activity. They are easily quantifiable, but do not necessarily provide substantive information in relation to higher order questions such as effectiveness, impact or quality. For example, an input may be the provision of training to jurists in human rights law. The output in this case is the number of jurists trained. This, however, provides limited information on the quality of training, what happens after the training and whether, for example, any change has resulted from addressing human rights issues in the court system. At the same time, and acknowledging that evaluation within peace operations can be highly political, it is far ‘safer’ to focus on outputs, as they make no judgment on value or contribution to objectives except in the most rudimentary fashion. In the contexts of security sector reform and police reform, assessments have tended to focus more on technical and functional outputs, rather than the more valuable and useful approaches that could help to better link initiatives with impacts. Similarly, in measuring the effectiveness of military activity, there is often a tendency to measure the number of patrols completed, patrol bases established, joint meetings held, investigations conducted, and so on. These outputs are fairly easy to measure but give little indication of the value of such expensive outputs in terms of outcomes. Do people feel safer as a result? Can people return to their homes? Can normal life resume? Do civilians feel better protected? These are outcomes that define the very purpose of the intervention, but they are usually hard to measure except subjectively.

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178 Reber (note 168).
Many stakeholders continue to view measuring impact as too problematic and too elusive. The focus on higher level mission goals, the long-term horizon needed to determine significance in relation to assessing whether change or progress has occurred, and connecting impact to actual reform makes this aspect of measurement extremely challenging. However, impact need not be assessed only after the completion of an intervention or several years later. Instead, ‘there is a growing view that impact can be measured in the more immediate term. This emerging approach offers opportunities for international actors that need to measure impact but cannot wait until the end of an intervention to review much needed information on what is working, what is not, and why’. Thus, impact evaluation can take place both during project and programme implementation and after. Some argue that impact evaluation programmes should be built into the design of an intervention and conducted throughout implementation — or at least once the implementation is complete.

Further, it has been suggested, that, ‘impact occurs at multiple levels and timeframes—there can be short-term, intermediate and long-term changes resulting from an intervention. How and when impact occurs will differ depending on the type of intervention and the context’.

Although concerns have been raised regarding the feasibility and desirability of carrying out impact evaluation in conflict situations, the need for it has been highlighted and it is increasingly recognized as good practice. Evaluations in conflict situations are critical not only to test design, data collection and analysis, but also to test the hypothesis of underlying theories of change in order to obtain a clearer understanding of what has changed on the ground. As DSRSG Aracelly Santana noted in 2011, ‘Evaluation is an essential element that can work against complacency, mediocrity and “business as usual”. An important aspect of it is continuity, in the sense that the organization—as it changes—must evaluate the past and make reforms accordingly.’

**Attribution versus Contribution**

No discussion on assessment and evaluation in peace operations is complete without considering the questions of attribution versus contribution. Attribution links an effect directly to a cause. Contribution, on the other hand, does not assume a direct cause-effect relationship, but looks at the contributions of an activity or series of activities to a particular end state. For example, rather than stating that a law and justice programme in country X caused a reduction in crime (attribution), the argument would instead be that the law and justice...
programme, in addition to other inputs, such as economic development, contributed to a reduction in crime. While this perhaps appears to be a subtle difference, contribution acknowledges the complexities and multifaceted nature of cause-effect relationships in peace operations and peacebuilding more generally.

194 Given the complexity and interrelated nature of peace operations, practitioners and policymakers question whether it is even possible to deconstruct the web of interrelated cause and effect relationships to determine causality. As Scherrer states: ‘…when it comes to measuring impact, there is a debate about the validity of attribution vs. contribution. Attribution is often promoted as the “gold standard” because of its ability to demonstrate a direct causal link between an intervention and its impact. However, in complex post-conflict settings, it is considered extremely difficult to isolate the effects of a particular peacebuilding intervention and thus to establish a causal link between the intervention and the observed outcomes and impacts’.185

195 That is not to say that there have not been efforts to attribute and identify causality. These efforts often involve adopting the more ‘scientific/experimental approach’, utilizing any number of methods including counterfactuals.186 However, this approach has been questioned, and concerns expressed that counterfactuals may be reductionist and fail to capture the complex interdependencies and interrelationships of inputs into the broader peace and security goals and objectives.187

196 This is an ongoing debate. Current thinking is leaning more towards a greater focus on the contributory nature of inventions to outcomes and impacts in that ‘there may be other factors that have also contributed to the observed impact’. This is particularly relevant in post-conflict contexts as it takes into account the complexity of ‘tracking causality’ in the non-linear multi-agency contexts within which peacebuilding support takes place.188 Thinking in terms of a ‘causal package’ recognizes that ‘an intervention plus other factors’ is a far more meaningful way of looking at impact evaluation in more complex settings.189

197 Increasingly, good practice is focused on the use of mixed methods, including quasi-experimental methods, rather than any one method, either quantitative or qualitative. The use of multiple methods helps add validity to the findings and will help to raise the bar in inferring if not causality, then at least the significant contribution of specific interventions to the achievement of goals or objectives. Furthermore, by letting go of the notion that only attribution will suffice or is the ultimate end state, the discussion on impact assessment and evaluation can put greater emphasis on the ‘plausible contribution of an intervention to observed outcomes and impacts’ and/or how to create better synergies and complementarities among those tools which seek to attribute and those which seek to identify contributions.190

186 Counterfactuals are essentially measures of what would happen in the absence of an intervention. See, for example, J. Fearon, M. Humphreys and J.M. Weinstein, Community-Driven Reconstruction in Lofa County (2008).
188 Scherrer (note 180), p. 8.
189 Stern et al. (note 187), p. 40.
190 Scherrer (note 180), p. 8
How to Measure

The question of how to assess and evaluate the impact of peace operations is a discussion of methodological approaches and tools. There is no one current trend or ‘best practice’ in relation to the evaluation and assessment approaches or methodologies proposed for peace operations. As there is no single template, there is no ‘one size fits all’ that has validity across the board.

There are a number of tools and methodologies available, some of which are still evolving, others based on methods embedded within the aid and development sector. DCAF,\textsuperscript{191} for example, suggests a range of methodologies for attribution (e.g. impact evaluation and theory-based impact evaluation), contribution (e.g. contribution analysis, outcome mapping, RAPID outcome assessment, see Table 2) and for identifying most significant change. Stern offers three main design approaches that are not yet widely used in impact evaluations, but which appear to offer help in linking interventions with outcomes and impact: theory-based approaches, case-based approaches and participatory approaches.

Two useful frameworks for looking at evaluation and impact through an integrated/comprehensive lens are the Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE) model,\textsuperscript{192} and the Diehl and Druckman framework.\textsuperscript{193} The MPICE model is arguably better suited for military stabilization efforts and/or for evaluation and assessment of peace operations through a military lens.

Conversely, the Diehl and Druckman framework is potentially well suited to evaluation of integrated missions in that it ‘bridges theory and policy, balancing the contribution of generalizable theorizing to better peace operations practice with the need for context-specific evaluation’.\textsuperscript{194} This framework does not speak directly to impacts or outcomes, but to:

success, with the component parts of the model built around goals, questions and indicators. The decision-making allows for identification of the primary goals of an operation to specification of appropriate measures of progress (quantitative and qualitative). It assesses progress towards attainment of the core goals of the mission…the template addresses the way in which possible indicators of success derive from practical questions asked about missions.\textsuperscript{195}

Efforts are also currently under way to develop impact methodologies framed around host state and population perceptions. This is a recognized methodology within the development arena, particularly when coupled with more traditional results-oriented evaluation approaches. These approaches are useful to development practitioners and policymakers as they increase the sense of local investment and ownership in the process and in the particular reform initiative. Reber highlights the added value when local populations have a vested interest and can see benefits from their participation. From his perspective, rule-of-law and police reform are well suited to this type of methodological approach.\textsuperscript{196}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{193} P. Diehl and D. Druckman, \textit{Evaluating Peace Operations} (Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 2010), p. 26
  \item \textsuperscript{194} Whalan (note 168), p. 7.
  \item \textsuperscript{195} Diehl and Druckman (note 193)
  \item \textsuperscript{196} Reber (note 168), p. 10.
\end{itemize}
By advocating greater use of participatory evaluation, including public perception surveys to facilitate assessment of the performance of security sector reform initiatives, Reber notes that ‘if the community does not discern any difference in terms of its safety and security as a result of the initiative, or fails to determine any immediate benefits for itself, it will not support the reform process and will make the long term sustainability of the reform virtually impossible’. A cautionary note on public opinion surveys and participatory evaluation is in order.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>APPROACH</th>
<th>APPLICATION</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SCIENTIFIC-EXPERIMENTAL</td>
<td>Claims attribution through use of counterfactual analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THEORY-BASED</td>
<td>Supports contribution by testing assumptions at each level of theory of change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARTICIPATORY</td>
<td>Supports contribution by listening to perceptions of the beneficiaries of which initiatives have made a difference in their lives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACTION EVALUATION</td>
<td>Supports the collective definition of goals, thereby helping to identify jointly what impact should be measured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOAL-FREE EVALUATION</td>
<td>Examines the ‘actual’ impacts of an intervention by deliberately avoiding knowledge of the intended goals and objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESULTS-BASED EVALUATION</td>
<td>Seeks to measure impact to the extent that it focuses on that level of the results chain (i.e. with the use of indicators); it ‘examines changes through time of multiple relationships between inputs and outputs. Results are not end states but variations in behaviour and performance during a process’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UTILIZATION-FOCUSED</td>
<td>Can address impact depending on methods and the designated use of the evaluation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

197 From Scherrer (note 180), p. 13.
198 S. Mehrag, Measuring What Matters in Peace Operations and Crisis Management (School of Policy Studies, Queen’s University, 2009), p. 34.
As is the case more generally, no single approach to evaluation is likely to answer all the questions posed in relation to determining outcomes or impact. Table 1 provides a broad-brush overview of evaluation approaches. Although not comprehensive, it is illustrative of the choices available and their potential applicability.

The approaches outlined in Table 1 are applied using a variety of methodologies. The methodology or combination of methodologies is dependent on the questions that need to be answered, which in turn depends on the purpose of the evaluation or assessment—learning or accountability. Table 2 provides illustrative examples of methodologies for measuring impact, categorized according to whether they are intended to support approaches that seek attribution or contribution.

How have these or other tools been used in practice? How could they be used in practice? In relation to police and security sector reform, it has been proposed that greater emphasis should be placed on public opinion and perception surveys, as they allow community members, as recipients of ‘better policing’ in a functioning security sector, to comment over time on perceptions of how well they are functioning, personal satisfaction and safety. The lack of reliable and valid public opinion data prevents a clear picture emerging of impact. As a result, greater emphasis must be placed on local perceptions and sentiments, as these are

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200 Modified from Scherrer (note 180), p. 18.
more useful ‘in determining public confidence in its institutions and on the success of the internal community’s efforts’.201 The importance of public perception has been demonstrated in the public opinion research undertaken in relation to the Palestinian Civil Police (PCP). This research, carried out by the statutory survey body, the Palestinian Central Bureau for Statistics (PCBS), is intended, in part, to assess community satisfaction and perceptions of police capacities, and more broadly the justice and rule of law sector. It is also an effective means of holding police to account, given the importance of public perception in police reform. The success of this effort has led to the use of public perception and opinion surveys to provide feedback on other assistance initiatives, and the information gleaned has been used to adapt programmes accordingly.202

205 Stakeholder evaluations and public perception surveys have demonstrated their utility in the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI). The ‘People’s Survey’ is a tool first piloted in 2006 to collect data on issues ranging from employment to law and order, public accountability and access to services. There is great potential value—still relatively unexplored within the realm of the evaluation of integrated missions—in independent local analyses as exemplified by the work of The Liaison Office (TLO) in Afghanistan, institutional auditors and investigative units such as SIGAR and issue-specific quasi-experimental impact evaluations using rigorous science methods, as well as in joint evaluations such as those carried out in the DRC and Sudan.203 Other examples include the extensive evaluation of international peacebuilding efforts in the DRC, using rigorous qualitative analysis such as comprehensive data collection and hundreds of interviews with respondents ranging from UN officials to victims of violence.204

206 The UN Office of Oversight Services (OIOS) has carried out a number of mission reviews to ‘evaluate the performance and achievement of results to determine the relevance, efficiency and effectiveness in terms of mandated objectives’.205 These evaluations use a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods and a number of data sources such as interviews, structured interviews, stakeholder surveys, population surveys and desktop reviews. The findings lead to concrete recommendations that the UN Secretariat is obliged to implement. For example, a recent evaluation of the effectiveness of UN policies on the protection of civilians contained some startling findings that will inevitably cause a review of practice.206

207 In sum, answers to the questions ‘why’, ‘for whom’ and ‘for what’ will inform the methodology, the design of the questions and the analysis that follows. If we are genuinely interested in the causal linkages within peace operations that affect outcomes and can assist with both learning and accountability, it is likely to be the case that the methodologies used will be framed around the following questions: ‘To what extent can a specific outcome or impact be attributed to the interven-

202 Reber (note 168).
205 See the UN OIOS website <http://www.un.org/Depts/oios/pages/other_oios_reports.html>.
tion? Did the intervention(s) make a difference? How has the intervention made a difference? Will the intervention work elsewhere?207

It is unlikely that a single methodological approach will yield the type of information required to answer all these questions. Nor is it likely that an ‘either or approach’ in relation to quantitative versus qualitative methods will be satisfactory. Perhaps it is best to recall that ‘the real choice is not so much between empirical versus non-empirical methodologies as it is between thoughtful, rigorous, and pragmatic approaches to project evaluation versus simple-minded, bureaucratic and dogmatic techniques’.208

Conclusions

Start early and stay focused. Monitoring, assessment and evaluation should be integrated into mission programme planning to contribute to more effective programming and to facilitate better evaluation.209 Specific timelines for measuring activity, outputs, outcomes and impact should be part of initial planning, to help to ensure that short- and medium-term outcomes and impacts can be measured during implementation. While it is the case that such early integration requires planning skills and foresight not always readily available in the tumult of mission start-up, this should not deter such efforts.

There is a need for a common terminology among key stakeholders, or at least a common understanding in terms of the evaluation and assessment of peace operations. As has been noted the monitoring and evaluation systems of the major stakeholders and disciplines still lack a common vocabulary or approach. ‘Without it, the actors that undertake development, security and political action find it difficult to develop a common understanding of the context in which they operate and this has negative implications for their ability to develop coherent strategies, and for their ability to monitor and evaluate progress towards achieving such strategies’.210

The host country, including the recipient local population, should be involved in the evaluation, and assessment planning and implementation processes. First, the host Government, where possible and feasible, should be more involved in the design and implementation of evaluation and assessment. Second, more effort must be made to gather data on public perceptions of and confidence in the mission and its components.

Measuring effectiveness or assessing the impact of peace operations will continue to be challenging. The reality is that quality, impact and effectiveness have political implications—for the mission, donors, the host country and contributing countries—whether they are providing troops, police, technical expertise and/or financial support. Complementarity in the goals and objectives of evaluations and assessments should be the gold standard for key stakeholders, regardless of whether they are donors, policymakers, host country counterparts or practitioners.

Unfortunately, evaluation can be viewed as a form of scrutiny and judgment about the external actor, rather than about a programme. Consequently, there is a tendency to tell good stories or no stories at all. Conversely, politics will often frame the questions posed and the results sought. This reality is not likely to change as peace operations are essentially

207 Stern et al. (note 187), p. 37; see also Table 4.2 for a summary of the design implications of different impact evaluation questions.


209 OECD (note 172), p. 31.

political. The political realities of impact assessments and evaluations should be factored into the design of these activities, and into the planning processes for designing an evaluation protocol. Even if politics cannot be taken out of assessment, the need remains to ensure a process that is as apolitical as possible. At the very least, efforts should be made to enhance the opportunities for candid assessment and improvement.

In their analysis, assessment and evaluation should be sensitive to the interlinkages among activities, projects, programmes and objectives. The more successful programmes are those that link objectives in one sector to those in another, and are more cumulative in their impact. Building assessment and/or evaluation frameworks around these interlinkages increases awareness of the contributory nature of activities and allows a better understanding of this cumulative impact. Thus, assessment and evaluation protocols must be driven by complementary objectives from the outset and designed with multiple stakeholders who all contribute to the end result.

No single method or approach is likely to provide complete information for evaluations or assessments of peace operations. Instead, there is value in considering the use of mixed methods as they are likely to yield more robust information and provide a broader understanding of what works, what is effective and what has made a difference. The key is to be flexible in approach and accommodate a broader range of methodological options.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Security Council mandates should require missions to systematically include relevant monitoring and evaluation planning in order to better determine whether the missions are meeting the benchmarks set.

The UN and Member States should pay increased attention to identifying impact assessment and evaluation experts with technical skills and expertise who can support the planning processes and drive coordination among the stakeholders. The emphasis should not be on scrutiny or criticism, but focus instead on conveying the comprehensive impact of a UN peace operation.

International organizations and donor countries should aim to create mixed evaluation teams comprised of independent evaluators and stakeholders with vested interests in mitigating the risks and effects of politicised assessment and evaluation agendas, and reinforce the complementary objectives of the evaluation protocols.

Sufficient time, financial support and political will are critical components of impact assessments and evaluation processes. Senior mission leaders should drive such processes from the initial stages of a mission.

When an assessment or evaluation is about capturing the outcomes and impact of a mission as a whole, rather than in terms of its component parts (the military, police or civilian), asking independent evaluators to undertake the exercise should be considered, thereby reducing the risk of the process being politicised.

International organizations should create or review mechanisms that support donors and other stakeholders external to the mission coming together to establish common funding allocations to promote better rationalisation of funding and to achieve joint outcomes.
CHAPTER 6. REPORT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A Rwandan peacekeeper from the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) Formed Police Unit (FPU) speaks to children while patrolling the streets of Gao, northern Mali, in May 2014.

UN Photo/MARCO DORMINO
6. Report Findings and Recommendations

The operational realities of contemporary peace operations are changing at a rapid pace. Peace operations are increasingly being deployed to complex mission environments, sent to situations in which violence has not abated and tasked with addressing challenges that are typically beyond the traditional remit of a peace operation, and that often require a multifaceted approach. A number of projections made for peace operations unthinkable a few years ago—such as the use of UAVs to gather real-time information and the use of social and new media—are now readily accepted by many countries as common practice that can serve as force multipliers. As shown in chapter 2, the challenges facing contemporary peace operations—transnational organized crime, the effects of climate change, state fragility—are increasingly transnational in nature and require a more concerted approach.

Missions such as those in the CAR, the DRC, Mali and Somalia also reflect the increasingly non-permissive contexts in which peace operations operate, pushing the limits of robust peace operations. The deployment of the Force Intervention Brigade as part of MONUSCO, in which it was mandated to ‘neutralize armed groups’ through ‘targeted offensive operations’, has arguably challenged and stretched the long-standing principle of the non-use of force except in self-defence or defence of the mandate. Although the FIB is seen as successfully contributing to the ongoing peace process in the DRC, and observers are cautiously optimistic that there are applicable lessons for future situations, discussions are continuing on the broader doctrinal implications of the FIB and other recent developments.

What these developments suggest is that the operational context of peace operations has undergone such rapid transformation that doctrine development and command and control mechanisms have not kept pace with current or potential future demands. Some observers have suggested that the conceptual framework, principles and modus operandi developed in the past two decades must be revisited to adapt to the new types of operations mandated. Others suggest that separate thinking and doctrine need to emerge from these new mission typologies rather than strain existing doctrine to cover all mission variations. Yet others argue that existing principles are still valid and that the term ‘peacekeeping’ is elastic enough to include operations that undertake offensive and combat missions.

Chapter 3 reveals that there is a lack of sufficient concept or doctrine development on how to address transnational organized crime in peace operations contexts. There is growing acknowledgement that organized crime or TOC clearly undermine the peace efforts of operations to assist countries transitioning to peace and development. However, there has not been enough discussion and analysis of transnational criminal activities as they affect peace operations at the operational or tactical levels.
The chapter also finds that while there is a significant amount of strategic-level policy and guidance at the UN, in regional organizations and in many countries on the issues of gender and the protection of civilians in peace operations, there is little guidance at the tactical level. Nor have all countries institutionalised these issues. There is thus a need to emphasize a greater ‘trickle down’ of guidance work in training and educational modules.

The findings of chapter 4 underline that the essential authority, command and control structures of UN peace operations have not evolved at the same rate as their operational contexts. Notwithstanding the progress made in UN command control mechanisms, stronger efforts are needed to ensure that Member States (particularly the troop and police contributing countries) are more effectively informed of the strategic management of missions. Furthermore, if UN peace operations are expected to be agile and adaptive to rapidly evolving circumstances, there is an imperative for the Secretariat to improve its crisis management capacities to provide a much-needed strategic level of command, and for stronger mechanisms to be put in place to create a unity of command and purpose to support missions in the field. The chapter also underscores that a sound command and control framework hinges on the selection, training and preparation of good senior mission leadership, supported by institutionalised mechanisms to enhance interoperability and strengthen integration in a mission.

Despite being the conflict management instrument of choice, peace operations are increasingly being tasked with doing more with less, and to demonstrate results and positive impacts in the countries where they are deployed. Chapter 5 illustrates that none of this is systematised and that there is a lack of consensus on what and how to measure. Given the inherently political nature of peace operations, measuring their effectiveness or assessing their impact is often fraught with political considerations, and this will continue to present a challenge. The reality is that impact assessments and the evaluation of peace operations have political implications—for the mission, donors, the host country and contributing countries. However, there is a need to ensure that the process is as apolitical as possible or, at the very least, that politics does not dominate the process but instead leaves room for candid assessment and improvement by all.
RECOMMENDATIONS

Understanding How Emerging Threats Affect Peace Operations and How to Respond to Them Effectively

The nature of contemporary conflict has changed considerably in such a way that the linkages between armed conflict, organized crime and in some instances terrorism have become more prominent. Peace operations have had to rapidly adapt to the new global political and security environment. However, a lot remains to be learned on how best peace operations should and can respond to new threats that are often transnational in nature.

A Together with the academic community and drawing on the expertise of mission personnel, the UN Secretariat should continuously identify emerging threats and their impact on peace operations in a systematic manner. Strategies should be developed for responding to the identified emerging threats, and regularly reviewed and revised as necessary.

B Together with the academic community and drawing on the expertise of mission personnel, the UN Secretariat, in close cooperation with Member States, should develop a better understanding of the role and effect of social and other new media, and big data, on conflict and peace operations and as a predictor of peace and conflict.

C The UN, in cooperation with Member States, should develop a systematic approach to the development of policies, principles and guidelines, provide training to address transnational threats, and further develop their regional approaches in the affected regions.

D The UN Secretariat in cooperation with Member States should build a broad agreement on how to address organized crime in fragile and post-conflict situations. In addition, the relevant skills and structures required to address organized crime need to be identified and incorporated into peace operations where appropriate.

Equipping Peace Operations to Better Adapt to Evolving Operational Environments

To keep pace with the changing operational contexts, it is essential that peace operations modernise the way in which they operate in the field and consider how to incorporate modern technology. Equally, command and control structures and mechanisms should be adjusted or enhanced for the increasingly non-permissive environments in which contemporary peace operations are deployed.

E The UN Secretariat should, in close cooperation with Member States, revise the existing DPKO/DFS AC2 policy in accordance with the evaluation and recommendations put forward in the 2011 DPET report, so that it is an integrated policy document that clarifies military, police and civilian relationships while respecting their expertise, responsibilities and roles, and standardises institutional structures at the mission level. The new policy should be widely disseminated to Member States, in particular to TCCs and PCCs, so that they can better prepare, plan and train their forces in line with the policy.

F The UN Secretariat, supported by the Member States, should develop stronger crisis management structures within DPKO/DFS. This could be achieved by enhancing the role of the UNOCC to allow it to become a more strategic Crisis Management Centre. A reinforced UNOCC, augmented by the appropriate leadership, should focus on supporting the relevant missions, be ready-equipped with decision-making aids and communications, be able to exercise command authority over the missions, be staffed by experts both in crisis management and in the region concerned, and be able to take on the conduct of at least two crises, if not three, at the same time. This will require subsuming during crises much of the role and resources of the IOTs.
**RECOMMENDATIONS**

G. The UN Secretariat should strengthen and empower the Senior Leadership Appointment Section (SLAS) in the DPKO/DFS in order to improve the selection, training, preparation and mentoring of senior leaders. Participation in relevant senior leadership training should be mandatory and assessing the performance of participants at senior leadership training should be considered.

H. Peace operations should adopt fit-for-purpose tools and technologies, with the support of UN HQ and continuously seek and apply new technological innovations as necessary. Member States should provide adequate resources—human and financial—to do so. This could include a review and modernization of the deployed DPKO/DFS C4I (Command, Control, Communication, Coordination and Information Systems) infrastructure in line with international best practice and current technology.

I. Together with the academic community and drawing on the expertise of mission personnel, the UN Secretariat should carry out a careful analysis of lessons from the use of new technologies in peace operations (like the use of UAVs). The results should be shared widely with Member States. Building on the lessons learned, existing Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) on the use of monitoring and surveillance technology should be updated and complemented with guidance in additional areas as needed. If, for example, UAVs are provided by Member States, rather than a commercial contractor, further clarification may be needed on their treatment as Contingent Owned Equipment.

J. The UN and troop and police contributing countries, and countries that contribute non-uniformed civilian personnel should strengthen their cooperation and coherence. Enhanced efforts to harmonise and increase the effectiveness of cooperation between the UN and regional organizations should also be a priority. New actors involved in peace operations should uphold UN standards.

K. The UN Secretariat, in close cooperation with Member States, should develop enhanced policy and guidelines for integrated mission police and military command mechanisms that ensure effective planning and communication, and support clear command and control in high tempo joint operations. These mechanisms should be tested at the mission level through crisis management exercises, also involving external expertise.

L. Strategic level mechanisms in UN HQ should be reviewed to achieve an improved level of triangular cooperation between the Security Council, the Secretariat and TCCs/PCCs. The Security Council should make better use of its Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations to provide a more senior and highly qualified advisory group, especially on matters of security. The Security Council needs budget sheets prepared by the Secretariat before creating

**Strengthening Effective Cooperation and Coordination**

The rise of new actors on the global security scene and the growing prevalence of hybridity in peace operations underscores the need to reach a common understanding on the concepts, principles and objectives of peace operations, to aim for a common doctrinal approach and more critically to continue to bolster cooperation and coordination mechanisms.
any new peacekeeping operation or before the renewal or strengthening of the existing ones. In this way there might be better alignment between mandates and the resources needed to implement them.

M The Security Council and the Secretariat should do more to keep Member States informed of the strategic direction of missions, and the Security Council needs help with assuming its strategic responsibilities and carrying out its planning and oversight functions effectively. In addition, Member States should ensure that their representatives in New York are fully prepared for consultations with the Security Council and the Secretariat. The Secretariat needs stronger mechanisms to create a unity of command and purpose to support missions in the field at the strategic level.

N The UN Secretariat in close cooperation with Member States should develop a comprehensive doctrine that clearly defines the protection of civilians to ensure adequate preparation and training to support peace operations.

O Drawing on the expertise of mission personnel, the UN Secretariat should develop a joint or integrated manual on gender mainstreaming for all the mission components (military, police and civilian) for the tactical level, which should be systematically used both in missions and by contributing countries in their preparations for sending personnel to missions.

P The UN Secretariat, in close cooperation with Member States, should develop policy guidelines that clarify whether and how peace operations should address transnational organized crime. This should include establishing a definition of organized crime and its transnational aspects.

Building the Impact Assessment and Evaluation Base

There is a growing recognition of the importance of assessing and evaluating the impact of peace operations.

Q Security Council mandates should require missions to systematically include relevant monitoring and evaluation planning in order to better determine whether the missions are meeting the benchmarks set.

R The UN should improve the planning culture within UN HQ and missions by developing and implementing accountable UN-wide planning tools and systems, and by training and practising selected personnel in all peacekeeping components in their use.

S The UN, in close cooperation with Member States, should consider extending the role and responsibilities of the new Office for the Peacekeeping Strategic Partnership from that of purely military and police oversight to mission-wide oversight of leadership, accountability and crisis management training, in order to ensure stronger, more consistent and more accountable implementation of the DPKO/DFS policy and guidance at the mission level. Or alternatively, the UN should consider empowering the annual mission reviews by DPKO’s Office of Operations to make an assessment of the performance of the mission leadership team in this regard.

T The UN and Member States should pay increased attention to identifying impact assessment and evaluation experts with technical skills and expertise who can support the planning processes and drive coordination among the stakeholders. The emphasis should not be on scrutiny or criticism, but focus instead on conveying the comprehensive impact of a UN peace operation.
RECOMMENDATIONS

Sufficient time, financial support and political will are critical components of impact assessments and evaluation processes. Senior mission leaders should drive such processes from the initial stages of a mission.

When an assessment or evaluation is about capturing the outcomes and impact of a mission as a whole, rather than in terms of its component parts (the military, police or civilian), asking independent evaluators to undertake the exercise should be considered, thereby reducing the risk of the process being politicised.

International organizations and donor countries should aim to create mixed evaluation teams comprised of independent evaluators and stakeholders with vested interests in mitigating the risks and effects of politicised assessment and evaluation agendas, and reinforce the complementary objectives of the evaluation protocols.

International organizations should create or review mechanisms that support donors and other stakeholders external to the mission coming together to establish common funding allocations to promote better rationalisation of funding and to achieve joint outcomes.
ANNEX. CHALLENGES FORUM PARTNER ORGANIZATIONS
# Challenges Forum

## Partner Organizations

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*See next page for Partners’ presentations*
The following Partner Organizations constitute the Steering Committee of the Challenges Forum, which governs the organization. Sweden provides the International Secretariat, which is hosted by the Folke Bernadotte Academy.

The present study ‘Designing Mandates and Capabilities for Future Peace Operations’ has been pursued and developed through an inclusive and comprehensive process undertaken by the Challenges Forum Partner Organizations. The study, intended as a contribution to the international dialogue on how to enhance UN peacekeeping, provides analysis of identified challenges and offers a range of possible recommendations and solutions to these challenges for considerations by the international community, states and relevant organizations.

The study does not necessarily represent official governmental positions on the issues concerned, but should be seen as an inclusive effort offering a ‘smorgasbord’ of reflections and ideas for the benefit of a deeper and more representative dialogue on the challenges facing current and future peace operations.

Argentina

Ministry of Defence in cooperation with the Armed Forces Joint Staff and CAECOPAZ

The Ministry of Defence of Argentina assists the Argentinean Presidency in its responsibilities related to national defence. Founded in 1958, the main activities of the Ministry of Defence involve the planning, direction and execution of research and development; understanding the administrative, legal and logistical aspects of defence issues; planning and coordination of civil defence and ensuring the contribution of military personnel to UN peace operations.

The Argentine Armed Forces Joint Staff’s main role is to assist and advise the Minister of Defence on military strategy planning in coordination with the Armed Forces in the National Defence System. Established in 1948, under the control of the Ministry of Defence, the Joint Staff contributes to national security by protecting and ensuring independence, sovereign and territorial integrity and resources of the nation against potential external threats.

The Joint Training Centre for Peacekeeping Operations of Argentina (CAECOPAZ) trains troops and individual personnel to be deployed in UN peacekeeping operations. Created in 1995, CAECOPAZ, dependent on the Operational Command of the Joint Staff, generates the main outputs of training of military and civilian personnel to perform tasks in peacekeeping operations, or other organizations, according to the standards set by the United Nations; supports the readiness of contingents in their pre- and post-deployment phases and evaluations of personnel to be deployed by the Armed Forces Joint Staff.

In 2001, Argentina hosted a Challenges Seminar on the theme ‘How to Determine Success in and of Peacekeeping Operations’ with a particular focus on education and training and including a visit to Exercise Cabanas taking place in Salta, and to military and police peacekeeping training centres. Again, in 2013, the Challenges Annual Forum was hosted by Argentina, the focus of deliberations was ‘Strengthening UN Peace Operations: Modalities and Opportunities for Regionalized Contributions’. Argentina regularly translates Challenges Forum reports and material into Spanish.

Australia

Australian Civil-Military Centre

The Australian Civil-Military Centre (ACMC) was established by the Australian Government to support the development of national civil-military capabilities to prevent, prepare for and respond more effectively
Annex: Challenges Forum Partner Organizations

to conflicts and disasters overseas. It contributes to international peace and security through lessons analysis, outreach, education, research, exercises and other activities that assist government and non-government organizations to improve civil-military cooperation.

Working with Government agencies, the United Nations and other partners, the Centre focuses on improving civil-military education and training, building capacity through multi-agency exercises and developing civil-military doctrine and guiding principles. The Centre generates knowledge through concept development, it identifies, exercises and tests best-practice responses to operational lessons and it shares its civil-military knowledge to develop effective Australian civil-military capability for conflict prevention and disaster management overseas. The Centre is a whole-of-government initiative, and resides within the Department of Defence.

In 2010, the Centre hosted the Challenges Annual Forum addressing ‘Challenges of Protecting Civilians in Multidimensional Peace Operations’. The ACMC co-chaired a working group in the development of the Challenges Forum study ‘Considerations for Mission Leadership in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations’, and contributed with a project manager for the work strand on ‘Impact Assessment and Evaluation’ for the present study. In 2002, the then Australian Partner Organization, the Asia-Pacific Centre for Military Law hosted a Challenges seminar on ‘The Rule of Law on Peace Operations’ at the University of Melbourne.

Canada

Pearson Centre (1994–2013)

The Pearson (Peacekeeping) Centre (PPC) was established in 1994, with financial support from the Government of Canada, as an independent, not-for-profit organization designed to help frame Canada’s response to the changing nature of conflict. It was the first civilian-led peacekeeping institution created in the aftermath of the failures of the 1990s. Using an integrated approach, the PPC focused on applied research to examine emerging trends and issues, and incorporated the lessons learned into training products and services. The PPC focused its training on providing course participants with the knowledge and practical skills needed to make them more effective members of a peace operation, bringing the Canadian perspective to international peace operations research, education, training and capacity building initiatives.

One of the most critical and long-lasting partnerships was with the Challenges Forum Partnership and Organization. The PPC was involved almost from the beginning, supporting seminar publications and hosting a Challenges workshop in 2001, on the theme ‘Human Rights and Gender Issues in Peacekeeping’, a seminar attended also by the Military and Police Community of the United Nations. PPC co-chaired a working group for the development of the Challenges Forum study ‘Considerations for Mission Leadership in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations’. The Canadian Chair of the Working Group of the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping regularly chairs Challenges seminars in New York.

Further, PPC co-chaired the working group on ‘Impact Assessment and Evaluation’ for the present study. Another example of cooperation amongst the Challenges Partnership, the UN DPKO and the PPC, was the PPC hosting of two workshops in support of the development of the Principles and Guidelines for UN peacekeeping, one to solicit input from the NGO community and the other from the top-five TCC/PCCs. The latter workshop was co-hosted with Jordan Institute of Diplomacy and the Folke Bernadotte Academy. The PPC regularly translated Challenges Forum reports and material into French. The relationship between the PPC and the Challenges Forum Partnership was vibrant, and continued until the Centre closed in 2013.
China Institute for International Strategic Studies in cooperation with the Peacekeeping Office of the Ministry of National Defence

The China Institute for International Strategic Studies (CI ISS) is a national non-governmental academic organization engaged in international strategic studies. The Institute was established in October 1979. The highest leading body of the Institute is its Council. It elects its chairman and vice-chairmen who preside over the work of the Institute. The aim of the Institute is to conduct studies on international strategic situations, global security, world political and economic as well as regional issues; to establish contacts and carry out academic exchanges with relevant international strategic research institutions, academic organizations and public figures at home and abroad; and to offer consultancy and policy advice to and undertake research projects for relevant departments of the Chinese Government, the military and other institutions and enterprises and serve as their think tank in the interests of national and international security, economic development, and world peace and development.

The CI ISS in cooperation with the Peacekeeping Affairs Office, Ministry of National Defence, hosted China’s first high-level seminar on peacekeeping in Beijing in 2004 as a Challenges seminar on the theme ‘Cooperation and Coordination in Peace Operations: Challenges for UN Member States’. China translates Challenges Forum reports and material into Chinese.

In 2014, the Challenges Annual Forum was hosted by China at the Peacekeeping Centre of the Ministry of National Defence. Assessing the implications for capacity building of the findings of the present study on ‘Designing Mandates and Capabilities for Future Peace Operations’, the theme of the Annual Forum 2014 was ‘Building Capacity for Peace Operations in Response to Diversified Threats: What Lies Ahead?’ The 2014 Forum also involved a visit to the Police Peacekeeping Academy in Lanfang.

Egypt

Ministry of Foreign Affairs in cooperation with Cairo Center for Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Egypt is responsible for representing Egypt on the international level and for dealing with foreign policy matters, including multilateral forums. The United Nations Division within the Ministry is responsible for following up on issues related to UN peace and security matters, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. The purpose of the Division is to contribute to the planning, conduct and evaluation of multidimensional peace operations from all its aspects. Further, the Division seeks to contribute to the policy development process on peacekeeping and to widen and strengthen dialogue among relevant international actors.

Egypt, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Cairo Center for Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA) hosted the Challenges Forum International Strategic Seminar and Partners Meeting in February 2012 in Sharm El-Sheikh. Following the seminar, Egypt in cooperation with Sweden, co-hosted a seminar in New York on the preliminary findings during the opening day of the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. The theme addressed was ‘Peace Operations Beyond the Horizon: Enabling Contributing Countries for the Future’.

The CCCPA was one of the co-chairs of the development of the Challenges Forum report ‘Considerations for Mission Leadership in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations’. Furthermore, Egypt regularly translates Challenges Forum reports and material into Arabic.
France

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development (United Nations, International Organizations, Human Rights and Francophonie Department) and Ministry of Defence (Policy and Strategic Affairs Department)

The United Nations, International Organizations, Human Rights and Francophonie Department is among other tasks in charge of all French diplomatic decisions and actions dealing with United Nations affairs. Its role is in particular to coordinate and centralize instructions sent to the French Permanent Mission to the United Nations and to follow United Nations peacekeeping operations.

The Policy and Strategic Affairs Department is placed under the direct authority of the Minister of Defence. Its mission is to analyse security-related national and international developments, to anticipate crises around the world, and to propose options on how to deal with international crises where France is, or might be, an actor. The Department also supports independent strategic thinking, in particular when led by French and foreign academic research institutes. It contributes to the quality of an external expertise on international and security-related issues.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development and the Ministry of Defence hosted the first Challenges Annual Forum in 2008, on the theme 'Partnerships - the United Nations, the European Union and the Regional Dimensions of Peace Operations: Examples of Cooperation within the Framework of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter'. The event was hosted as part of the French European Union Presidency Agenda. Most recently, the French Ministry of Defence has co-chaired the working group on ‘Authority, Command and Control', including the coordination of the Challenges Forum field visits to UNMISS, UNOCI, and MINUSTAH in 2012-2013. France contributes to translation of Challenges Forum reports and material into French.

Germany

Center for International Peace Operations in cooperation with the German Federal Foreign Office

The Center for International Peace Operations’ (ZIF’s) core mandate is to recruit and train civilian personnel and to provide analysis and advice on peacekeeping and peacebuilding issues. ZIF combines training, human resources and analysis expertise under one roof, allowing for an integrated approach. The Center was founded in 2002, by the German Government and Parliament to strengthen civilian capacities for international peace operations.

ZIF works closely with the German Federal Foreign Office and is responsible in particular for Germany’s civilian contributions to United Nations, European Union and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe missions. Through joint projects with international partners, ZIF works to expand international peacekeeping capacities and to contribute to the conceptual evolution of peace operations.

ZIF in cooperation with the German Federal Foreign Office hosted a Challenges Forum research workshop in Berlin in 2012 on the theme ‘The Future Is Now: Putting Scenarios for Peace Operations in 2025 into Today’s Operational Context’. ZIF has co-chaired the working group on ‘Peacekeeping Under New Conditions’ for the present study. A further contribution to the present study, in 2014, a Challenges Forum workshop on the theme ‘Force Intervention Brigade: A Sea Change for UN Peace Operations?’ was hosted by the Permanent Mission of Germany to the UN.

India

United Service Institution of India

The United Service Institution of India (USI) was founded in 1870 for the furtherance of interest and knowledge in the art, science and literature of national
security, defence strategy and international relations. The management of the USI is a Council composed of 24 members. The Director is the Chief Executive Officer of the Institution and a member of the Council.

The USI houses three centres: Centre for Strategic Studies and Simulation; Centre for Armed Forces Historical Research and the Centre for United Nations Peacekeeping. The main output of the USI is research on current issues within national security, defence strategy and international relations. The Centre for United Nations Peacekeeping acts as a training facility and is a repository of Indian experience in the field of United Nations peacekeeping operations.

The USI has actively participated in the Challenges Forum since the first seminar in 1997. In 2000, the USI hosted a Challenges seminar on the theme ‘United Nations Peacekeeping in 2015: A Perspective’ during which the Centre for United Nations Peacekeeping above was officially launched by the Government of India. The USI has co-chaired the work developing the Challenges Forum study ‘Considerations for Mission Leadership in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations’.

Most recently, the USI co-chaired the working group for this report on ‘Peacekeeping Under New Conditions’. In 2013, the Swedish Armed Forces and the USI co-hosted a workshop at the UN Regional Service Centre in Entebbe on the theme ’The Art of the Possible: Peace Operations Under New Conditions – A Dialogue with the Field Community’, the findings of which also informed this study.

**Japan**

**Ministry of Foreign Affairs**

The missions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan are to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, to promote a good international environment through proactive efforts and to enhance national interests in the international community while maintaining and developing harmonious foreign relations.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan was established in 1869. Under the leadership of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the ministry consists of the Minister’s Secretariat, 10 bureaus and 3 departments. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs mainly works in four areas; ensuring the peace and stability of Japan and the international society; contributing to the development cooperation for developing countries and the resolution of global issues; pursuing the revitalization of Japanese economy and international prosperity and fostering the understanding of Japan.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan joined the Challenges Forum in its first phase. In 2001, Japan hosted a Challenges seminar on ‘Safety of United Nations Peacekeepers and Associated Personnel Working in Conflict Zones’. The results of the seminar was raised in the UN Security Council, the General Assembly and provided the chapter content of a report by the UN Secretary-General to the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping that year. On the occasion of the submission of the current report to the United Nations, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan generously offered its financial contribution for the New York seminar.

**Jordan**

**Institute of Diplomacy of the Jordanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates**

The purpose of the establishment of the Jordan Institute of Diplomacy (JID) was to fulfil the needs of an institutional framework that upgrades the performance and effectiveness of Jordanian diplomats and other personnel involved in international relations and external communications. The Institute was established in September 1994, and is a part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates. The Institute’s council is chaired by the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The Institute organizes training courses of short and medium duration for all levels of diplomats working in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In addition, the JID conducts research and publishes relevant literature, data and information. It also organizes conferences.
and seminars related to conflict prevention, mediation, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding.

As a founding Partner of the Challenges Forum, the Institute hosted a Challenges seminar in 1998 addressing ‘Challenges of Peace Support: Into the 21st Century’ in cooperation with the Jordan Armed Forces and the National Police Academy. Again, in 2007, the Institute co-hosted a workshop in cooperation with the UN DPKO, Challenges Forum, Pearson Centre and Folke Bernadotte Academy in support of the development of the first UN Principles and Guidelines for UN Peacekeeping (i.e. Capstone Doctrine). Jordan regularly translates Challenges Forum reports and material into Arabic.

**Nigeria**

**National Defence College in cooperation with the Nigerian Army, Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Nigeria**

The National Defence College (NDC) is the highest military education institution in Nigeria and has been actively participating in peace support operations training and related activities since its inception. The Centre for Strategic Research and Studies has the responsibility of coordinating peacekeeping training in Nigeria. It is dedicated to the preparation of senior military and paramilitary officers and their civilian counterparts from strategic ministries, agencies, and departments of the Federal Government, and officers from other countries for higher responsibilities at strategic level. The NDC, formerly known as National War College, was established in 1992. The direction of its affairs is decided by the Board of Governors, comprising the Minister of Defence, Chief of Defence Staff, Chief of Army Staff, Chief of Naval Staff, Chief of Air Staff, Commandant NDC, and Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Defence.

The NDC imparts knowledge and develops the expertise and skills of selected senior military and civilian officers through a firm understanding of the essential factors that impact on national security, and prepare them for higher responsibilities at operational and strategic levels in national and international assignments. Through its Centre for Strategic Research and Studies, it organizes and runs high and mid-level strategic courses, such as Senior Mission Leaders Course, Peace Support Operations Planning Course, Defence and Security Management Course, and Civil-military Relations, among others. It also conducts research on critical issues bordering on security, defence and governance.

Since 2001, the Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the UN, Chair of the UN Special Committee of Peacekeeping, engages in and regularly chairs meetings of the Challenges Forum. In 2004, the Nigerian Defence College in cooperation with the Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence, and Armed Forces Joint Staff, hosted a Challenges seminar on ‘Regional Dimensions of Peace Operations in the 21st Century: Arrangements, Relationships, and the United Nations in its Responsibility for International Peace and Security’. NDC has co-chaired the working group on ‘Authority, Command and Control’ for the present study.

**Norway**

**Norwegian Institute of International Affairs**

The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) is a leading centre for research on international issues in areas of particular relevance to Norwegian foreign policy. NUPI has three main pillars of research and expertise: security and risk, growth and development, and international order and governance.

NUPI was established by the Norwegian Parliament in 1959. The institute is a state body under the Ministry of Education and Research, but operates independently as a non-political institution in all its professional activities. NUPI has an established reputation as a globally leading institution on matters related to international peacekeeping and peacebuilding. NUPI undertakes research and supports policy processes for the United Nations, the African Union and the European Union, and is also part of the PeaceCap network that does research on the role of new actors in peacekeeping and peacebuilding.
In 2014, launching the second phase of workshops in the development of a United Nations Strategic Guidance Framework for International Police Peacekeeping, NUPI hosted a Challenges Forum research seminar in Oslo in cooperation with the United Nations Police Division. Under the overarching theme of police peacekeeping capacity building and development, the seminar focused on framing the framework specifically addressing issues related to United Nations police peacekeeping, transnational organized crime and strategic perspectives on police capacity-building.

**Pakistan**

**National Defence University in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence**

The National Defence University (NDU) imparts higher education in policy and strategy studies, catering for the needs of the civil-military senior leadership, with an emphasis on national security and defence of Pakistan. It also acts as a national think-tank.

NDU was established in 1963. NDU is chartered by the President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan as its Chancellor, and the management is vested in a three-star rank officer from the Pakistan Armed Forces. NDU provides tertiary level education opportunities to the top civil and military leadership of the country in the fields of national security and war studies, government and public policy, peace and conflict studies, leadership and management sciences, strategic and nuclear studies and international relations. NDU also organizes a National Security Workshop and a National Media Workshop.

NDU co-chaired a working group in the development of the Challenges Forum report on ‘Considerations for Mission Leadership in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations’. Pakistan hosted the Challenges Annual Forum 2009 on the theme ‘A New Horizon for Peace Operations Partnerships – What are the next steps?’ in cooperation with Sweden. Finally, the NDU has co-chaired the working group on ‘Policies, Principles and Guidelines’ of the current study, an effort that has included the development of a Challenges Forum data base for current and future Partnership reference and benefit.

**Russian Federation**

**Center for Euro-Atlantic Security of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation in cooperation with the Center for Political and International Studies**

The Center for Euro-Atlantic Security (CEAS), in the Institute for International Studies, Moscow State Institute for International Relations (MGIMO University) under the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is one of the main Moscow-based Russian research centers concentrated on the studies of Russia’s relations with the international institutions (UN, EU, OSCE, NATO, CSTO, SCO, etc.) and major Euro-Atlantic powers in the area of international security, arms control and disarmament, and Eurasian security architecture.

CEAS was established in 2004 and brings to bear the combined knowledge resources of the MGIMO University, the Institute for World Economy and International Relations, the Russian Political Science Association, and is since 2008 a part of the MGIMO Institute of International Studies. The center works in close coordination with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia (various departments), holds ten permanent researchers, including retired Ambassadors and former diplomats of the Russian MFA and Collective Security Treaty Organization and it is financed through the budget allocated for the MGIMO by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

CEAS publishes numerous analytical reports, collections of articles, collective monographs and organizes international conferences and seminars, including on peacekeeping matters for the representatives of the relevant structures of the Russian Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Internal Affairs responsible for training Russian military and police peacekeepers for the UN. In 2014, CEAS convened an international
forum in Moscow on the role of Regional Inter-state Organization in Peacekeeping, during which consultations between the UN DPKO and CSTO were organized for the purpose of CSTO to contribute to UN peacekeeping in the future. CEAS translates Challenges Forum reports and material into Russian.

As a founding member of the Challenges Forum, Russia through the Russian Public Policy Centre hosted a Challenges seminar in 1998 on the ‘Challenges of Peace Support: Into the 21st Century’ in association with the Commonwealth of Independent States Headquarters and the Vystrel Peacekeeping Academy.

South Africa

Institute for Security Studies

The Institute for Security Studies (ISS) is an African organization which aims to enhance human security on the continent. The vision of the ISS is a peaceful and prosperous Africa for all its people. The mission and overall goal of the ISS is to advance human security in Africa through evidence-based policy advice, technical support and capacity building. The ISS is registered as a non-profit trust in South Africa, is accountable to a board of trustees and has a total staff complement of around 109 persons from 12 African countries. The ISS head office is in Pretoria, South Africa; and regional offices are located in Nairobi, Kenya; Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; and Dakar, Senegal.

The ISS pursues its vision and mission through the work of the four divisions: Governance, Crime and Justice that aims to promote democratic governance and reduce corruption; Conflict Prevention and Risk Analysis that aims to help prevent conflict and improve state capacity for risk analysis; Conflict Management and Peace Building that aims to enhance effective conflict management and peace building by assisting Governments and relevant regional and international institutions and Transnational Threats and International Crime that aims to combat transnational threats and international crimes by enhancing the ability of African inter-governmental organizations, national Governments and civil society. The ISS does independent and authoritative research, provides expert policy analysis and advice, and delivers practical training and technical assistance. In addition, the ISS runs several projects including the African Centre for Peace and Security Training in Addis Ababa, African Futures, gender mainstreaming, and an internship programme to build the capacity of young African researchers.

The Institute for Security Studies hosted a Challenges seminar in 1999 focusing on ‘Building Stability in Africa: Challenges for the New Millennium’. ISS co-chaired a working group and hosted a workshop for the development of the Challenges Forum Study ‘Considerations for Mission Leadership in United Nations Peacekeeping. Finally, the ISS co-chaired the working group on ‘Impact Assessment and Evaluation’ for this study.

Sweden

Folke Bernadotte Academy (Host of the Secretariat), Swedish Armed Forces, Swedish National Police and the Swedish Prison and Probation Service.

The Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA), established in 2002, is the Swedish Government agency for peace, security and development, and has the overall mission to support international peace and crisis management operations. The FBA is part of Sweden’s contribution to international peace and security, and its efforts to improve the lives of people living in conditions of poverty and repression. The FBA recruits personnel for international peace operations led by the UN, EU and OSCE, and conducts training, research and policy analysis and development. Believing in partnerships, the FBA cooperates with a wide range of Swedish and international organizations. In 2003, the FBA hosted a Challenges seminar on the theme ‘Peace Operations and Counter Terrorism’. In 2006, the first UN DPKO workshop in support of the development of the Principles and Guidelines for UN Peacekeeping was held by the Challenges Forum and FBA, during which the ensuing workshop series was developed as a result of Challenges Partners volunteering to host
various workshops on the themes required. In support of the Challenges Forum aims and activities, starting in 2003, the FBA hosts the platform for the Challenges Forum International Secretariat, which serves and coordinates the work and undertakings of the broader international Challenges Forum Partnership. At times and as required, partnership workshops or coordination meetings are held in Stockholm or New York.

The Swedish Armed Forces (SwAF) are Sweden’s ultimate security policy instrument. As such, the SwAF are on constant standby to undertake international missions and assert Sweden’s national integrity and to support Swedish society in the event of major crises. The Armed Forces, headed by the Supreme Commander, are accountable to the Swedish Parliament and Government. The Armed Forces central command is based at the Headquarters in Stockholm, which includes the Joint Operations Command. The mission-based organization, including Home Guard units, contains some 50 000 individuals. Sweden cooperates within the framework of UN, EU, NATO and OSCE and deploys personnel in support of those organizations. In 1997, the Swedish National Defence College hosted the first Challenges seminar on ‘Challenges of Peacekeeping and Peace Support: Into the 21st Century’, and the Challenges Forum International Secretariat 1997-2002. In 2013, SwAF and the USI India co-hosted a workshop at the UN Regional Service Centre in Entebbe on the theme: ‘The Art of the Possible: Peace Operations Under New Conditions – A Dialogue with the Field Community’, the findings of which also informed this study.

The Swedish Police (SP) contributes to and participates in development cooperation and international peace operations. The SP cooperates with police organizations in post-conflict and developing countries and deploy police officers to peace operations within the frameworks of the UN, EU and OSCE. The SP assists in the development of effective police services that work in support of human rights, rule of law and gender equality. Sweden deploys police officers to all parts of the world since the 1960’s. The SP also contributes to development of peacekeeping training by running international training courses and supporting the development of peacekeeping training capacity in other countries. The SP is engaged in policy development for peace operations with a particular focus on policing and the rule of law. The SP has participated since the beginning in the Challenges Forum and played critical roles in the hosting of the Challenges Forum Police Forum in cooperation with the UN Police Division in 2011, by providing the police dimension in the development of the Challenges Forum study ‘Considerations for Mission Leaders in UN Peacekeeping’ and in the support of the development of UN Strategic Guidance Framework for International Police Peacekeeping.

The Swedish Prison and Probation Service (SPPS) is commissioned to work abroad to the extent which has been decided by the Swedish Government at the request of the United Nations, European Union or other international organizations for the purpose of creating prerequisites for lasting peace and security. SPPS has actively supported UN and EU peace and capacity-building operations since 2005, when the first corrections officers were deployed. Since then, the SPPS has seconded professional corrections officers with a variety of skill sets, including alternative sentence experts, prison health officers, security management officers as well as trainers and mentors to missions in Liberia, DRC, Haiti, South Sudan, the Ivory Coast, Iraq and Kosovo. The SPPS has actively contributed to the Challenges Forum since 2006, raising the corrections profile in the international peacekeeping community and in particular for the benefit of the development of the Challenges Forum study ‘Considerations for Mission Leadership in UN Peacekeeping’.

Switzerland

Geneva Centre for Security Policy in cooperation with the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs and the Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport

The Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) is an international foundation established in 1995 with 45 Member States for the primary purpose of promoting peace, security and stability through executive education, research and dialogue.
Committed to the highest professional standards, the GCSP trains Government officials, diplomats, military officers, international civil servants and NGO staff in pertinent fields of international peace and security. Through research and publications, workshops and conferences, the GCSP also provides an internationally recognized forum for dialogue on key security and peace policy issues in the interest of effective security policy decision-making. Some of the latter activities aim to facilitate discreet dialogue in post-conflict situations.

GSCP in cooperation with the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs and the Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport of Switzerland hosted the Challenges Annual Forum 2012 on the theme ‘Cooperation and Coordination in Peace Operations: United Nations and Regional Perspectives’ in Geneva.

Turkey

Center for Strategic Research of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in cooperation with the National Police Force and the Armed Forces

The Center for Strategic Research of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey (SAM) is a think-tank and a research center which conducts and helps conduct research, and organizes scholarly events relevant to the spectrum of Turkish Foreign Policy in cooperation with both Turkish and foreign academicians, its counterparts from around the world as well as various universities and Government agencies. SAM provides consultancy to the foreign ministry departments as well as some other state institutions in foreign policy issues while also establishing regional think-tank networks.

SAM was established in 1995 as a consultative body chartered by law. SAM is situated under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and its chairman is designated with the equivalency of Director General in ministerial structure. SAM Chairmanship is offered to and accepted by experienced Turkish academicians with a distinguished record of studies on international relations. SAM has a widening range of publications: its principal publication, ‘Perceptions’, is a quarterly English-language academic journal that hosts the peer-reviewed articles of distinguished Turkish and international scholars within its pages. SAM also issues ‘Vision Papers’ expressing the views of the Turkish Foreign Minister, and ‘SAM Papers’ covering the current debates of foreign policy by various scholars.

In 2003, Turkey through SAM in cooperation with the Turkish General Staff Partnership for Peace Training Centre, the General Directorate of National Police (EGM) and the Bilkent University, hosted a Challenges seminar on ‘Challenges of Change: The Nature of Peace Operations in the 21st Century and the Continuing Need for Reform’. In 2006, Turkey enabled the inclusion of Challenges research findings in the report of the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations.

United Kingdom

Foreign and Commonwealth Office in cooperation with the Ministry of Defence and Department for International Development

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) has lead responsibility for the United Kingdom’s peacekeeping policy. The FCO is supported in delivery of policy by the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and Department for International Development (DFID).

The UK’s peacekeeping policy flows from the tri-departmentally (FCO, MOD & DFID) owned Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS). The strategy focuses on improving the effectiveness of the UK effort by strengthening the whole of Government approach and refining its priorities. It sets out why stability matters to the UK and identifies the three mutually-supporting pillars which guide UK responses to conflict: early warning; rapid crisis prevention and response; and investing in upstream prevention.

The Defence Academy is the institution responsible for post-graduate education and the majority of training for members of the UK Armed Forces and Ministry of
Defence Civil Servants. It also provides non-technical research and assessment, and is the Ministry of Defence’s primary link with UK universities and other international military educational institutions. The Academy delivers education in the management of defence at Government level; leadership at the corporate and strategic level; command and staff training; and the management and exploitation of military technology. It also contributes to the UK’s Defence Relations strategy, liaising closely with the foreign and commonwealth office and the department for international development.

UK representatives, also from the London School of Economics and Political Science, have participated in the Challenges Forum since the beginning of the Forum, and in 2005, the Ministry of Defence in cooperation with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department for International Trade and Development, hosted a Challenges seminar on 'Meeting the Challenges of Peace Operations in the 21st Century' at the Defence Academy in Shrivenham. The seminar was part of the United Kingdom’s European Union Presidency Agenda that year.

United States

United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute in cooperation with the United States Department of State, Bureau of International Organizations, and the United States Institute of Peace

The US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) promotes the collaborative development of peace and stability capabilities across the US Government and the international community in order to enable the success of future peace and stability activities and missions. The institute was established in 1993 at the US Army War College and in 2013 was designated the lead for the army as the joint proponent for peace and stability operations. The institute collects, evaluates, and disseminates lessons learned, informs and supports stability and peace operations policy development, develops and reviews stability and peace operations concepts and doctrine, develops and reviews civilian and military training and education programs, advises civilian and military in developing requirements and capabilities to plan, prepare, and execute peace and stability operations.

PKSOI hosted a Challenges Forum seminar in Carlisle on 'The Doctrinal Dimension of Peace Operations' in 2000; and a second seminar on 'The Rule of Law' in cooperation with United States Institute of Peace in 2004. PKSOI co-chaired a working group in the development of the Challenges Forum study 'Considerations for Mission Leadership in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations' hosting a workshop in 2009, in support of this purpose. More recent, PKSOI has co-chaired the working group on 'Policies, Principles and Guidelines' for the present study, an effort that has included the development of a Challenges Forum data base for current and future Partnership reference and benefit. The PKSOI has provided translation of Challenges Forum reports and material.

The United States Department of State, Bureau of International Organizations, has actively participated in the Challenges Forum since the 1990’s, and joined officially as a Partner Organization in 2012. Established to strengthen the US multilateral engagement, already in 1949, the Bureau of International Organizations is the US Government’s primary interlocutor with the United Nations. It is responsible for advancing the President’s vision as well as further developing the US position on the full range of global issues, including peace and security.
DESIGNING MANDATES AND CAPABILITIES FOR FUTURE PEACE OPERATIONS

The present study Designing Mandates and Capabilities for Future Peace Operations contains the findings of a two year global effort aimed at increasing the effectiveness, efficiency and long-term impact of contemporary and future peace operations. The Challenges Forum Partnership focused their attention on a selection of critical areas of inquiry, offering a range of recommendations and possible solutions to the challenges identified. The themes addressed are: Peace Operations Under New Conditions; Comparative Policies, Principles and Guidelines; Authority, Command and Control; and Impact Assessment and Evaluation.

The International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations

The Challenges Forum is a strategic and dynamic platform for constructive dialogue among leading policy-makers, practitioners and academics on key issues and developments in peace operations. The Forum contributes to shaping the debate by identifying critical challenges facing military, police and civilian peace operations, by promoting awareness of emerging issues, and by generating recommendations and solutions for the consideration of the broader international peace operations community. The Challenges Forum is a global endeavor, with its Partnership encompassing Partners from the Global South and North, major Troop and Police Contributing Countries as well as the five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council.

www.challengesforum.org