

Implementing 'Uniting Our Strengths for Peace': An approach to benchmarking 'HIPPO' recommendations in five key areas

Introduction

In June 2015, the High-level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (HIPPO) issued the first comprehensive review of United Nations peace operations in 15 years.¹ The Panel's report was released in time to feed into preparations for the UN's 2015 World Summit² and the Leaders' Peacekeeping Summit 2015³ in New York, which unfolded at the end of September 2015. Its release coincided with the report of the UN's Advisory Group of Experts (AGE) report on the organization's disjointed efforts to build and sustain peace after conflict.⁴ The Global Study on the Implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 was also released in 2015.⁵ The AGE report, the HIPPO Report and the Secretary-General's reply to it, and the *Global Study* on the implementation of UN Security Council resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security offer common points of departure for all stakeholders weighing the UN's present and future roles in the field of peace and security. In parallel with the UN Reviews a range of complimentary workshops and seminars were hosted and reviews and reports developed by Member States and the non-governmental community to contribute to the overall momentum for change and reform.⁶ In May 2016, the General Assembly will convene in New York for a High-level Thematic Debate on UN, Peace and Security, where

BACKGROUND PAPER

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The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views, opinion or position of the Challenges Forum Partnership.

¹ United Nations, *Uniting Our Strengths for Peace – Politics, Partnership and People, Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, A/70/95-S/2015/446, 16 June 2015. (Hereafter, HIPPO Report.) The Secretary-General's initial reply to the HIPPO Report is, *The future of United Nations peace operations: implementation of the recommendations of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations. Report of the Secretary-General*, A/70/357-S/2015/682, 2 September 2015.

² United Nations General Assembly, *Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*, A/RES/70/1, 21 October 2015.

³ Hosted by the Heads of States of Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Japan, Netherlands, Pakistan, Rwanda, Uruguay and the United States and opened by the UN Secretary-General, the President of the General Assembly and the President of the United States. See summaries of results from the Challenges Forum, at <http://www.challengesforum.org/en/About/News/Leaders-Peacekeeping-Summit-2015/>, and the International Peace Institute, at <http://futurepeaceops.org/pks Summit/>. For the summit declaration, see <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/28/declaration-leaders-summit-peacekeeping>.

⁴ United Nations, *Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture*, A/69/968-S/2015/490, 30 June 2015. (Hereafter, the AGE Report.)

⁵ UN Women, *Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace – A Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1325* (New York, 2015), <http://wps.unwomen.org/en>.

⁶ See for example, the Challenges Forum Report, *Designing Mandates and Capabilities for Future Peace Operations*, presented to the UN Secretary-General, New York, 26 January 2015, <http://www.challengesforum.org/en/Reports-Publications/>, and the *Commission on Global Security, Justice & Governance, Confronting the Crisis of Global Governance*, The Hague Institute for Global Justice and The Stimson Center, June 2015, <http://www.stimson.org/programs/global-security-justice-and-governance>.

¹ The author was Project Director of the *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, also known as the 'Brahimi Report', A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000, Annex.



the findings of the reports and the work on their implementation are to be addressed.⁷

This paper focuses on the HIPPO Report and how one might best track its implementation. The paper has several parts. Following this introduction, the Selecting Topics to Benchmark section lays out reasons for benchmarking five sets of recommendations rather than the entire Report; Monitoring Implementation describes the methodology proposed for benchmarking and scoring the implementation of those recommendations; and Building Benchmarks discusses the choice of specific measures to benchmark specific recommendations. The consideration and implementation of such a broad array of policy and institutional reforms in as complex and high-stakes an endeavor as UN peace operations will require many years. So the paper concludes with some observations on the HIPPO Report and the future of peace operations as benchmarks for its various recommendations are met (or not) by the UN system and UN Member States.

II. Selecting Topics to Benchmark

The HIPPO Report contains 125 separately listed recommendations, counting all sub-recommendations separately. It also contains other important policy prescriptions that were not pulled into recommendations lists. This paper develops and discusses benchmarks for 61 recommendations, both listed and embedded, in five substantive areas, to serve as pilot cases for developing a method for measuring, tracking and following up on implementation. Each of the areas selected has been a focus of the Challenges Forum Partnership for a number of years and each is a subject of intense current debate. In the 15th year of the Women, Peace and Security agenda, issues related to women's security in zones of conflict and women's roles in peacekeeping, peacebuilding and sustaining peace are only growing more salient, with great attention paid not only by the HIPPO Report, the AGE review of peacebuilding and the UN Women *Global Study*, but also the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. UN Police is the second focus of the HIPPO Report selected for benchmarking, given the growing attention paid to the essential role that international police peacekeepers play in complex peace operations, the role of the Challenges Forum in contributing to the development of police strategic guidance, the Police Division review slated for completion this summer, and the anticipated UN Secretary-General's Report on policing due in the fall. Staff safety and security was selected for benchmarking because of the increasingly violent environment for peacekeeping, the broad support for safety and security enhancement, and in light of the current reorganization of the Department of Safety and Security (DSS) and of the UN system's overall approach to the problem. Strategic Communication is the fourth area, because it is, in peace operations, an often neglected area, that in this digital and communicative era needs to be an integral and increasingly pro-active

⁷ United Nations, Office of the President of the General Assembly, *High-level Thematic Debate on UN, Peace and Security*, <http://www.un.org/pga/70/events/hltd-peace-and-security/>.

element of mission strategy. Funding mechanisms round out the selection, because without more effective funding some of the thornier issues in the HIPPO Report will never be able to be addressed.

A. Women, Peace and Security

As a matter of importance for UN peace operations, Women, Peace and Security dates formally from the passage of UN Security Council resolution 1325 in October 2000, but in 1992–1995, societal violence in Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina threw an ugly spotlight on rape as a weapon of war and a tool of genocide. Shortly thereafter, the Fourth World Conference on Women, held in Beijing, recognized the importance of increasing the role of women in conflict resolution and the need for greater ‘protection of women living in situations of armed conflict.’⁸ In fall 2015, reports and initiatives addressing women and conflict, and women and peacebuilding included, in addition to the HIPPO and AGE reports and UN Women’s *Global Study*, the Sustainable Development Goals passed by the General Assembly in September and the Secretary-General’s latest report on implementation of the resolution 1325 agenda.⁹

In furthering the goals of Women, Peace and Security, the UN has stressed the importance, in policy development and practice, of focusing on gender: how women and men, girls and boys are defined or limited by respective social norms, roles and power. A *gender perspective* focuses attention on the power relationships between and among women and men and, as an analytical tool, ‘sheds light on who has access to and control of resources, who participates fully in decision making in a society, what the legal status of men and women is, and what the beliefs and expectations are of how men and women live their daily lives.’¹⁰ Gender *mainstreaming* uses a gender perspective to promote greater equality between women and men.

The *Global Study* cautions that dealing with gender per se only takes women part way down the road to effective equality—and security—in society. Gender is only one ‘axis of difference’ that

‘intersects with many other forms of identity and experience. Nationality, ethnicity, political and religious affiliation, caste, indigeneity, marital status, disability, age, sexual preference; all of these, and others, are important factors in determining women’s lived experiences of conflict and recovery. It is well understood that these identities can intersect to amplify vulnerability...’¹¹

The recommendations embodied in the HIPPO Report related to Women, Peace and Security build on a growing body of research, analysis and field experience that documents how women are targeted for

⁸ UN Women, *Global Study*, p. 30.

⁹ United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on women and peace and security, S/2015/716*, 16 September 2015. The UN Sustainable Development Goals can be found at <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/index.php?menu=1300>.

¹⁰ S. Dharmapuri, ‘Not Just a Numbers Game: Increasing Women’s Participation in UN Peacekeeping, Providing for Peacekeeping’ No. 4, *International Peace Institute*, 2013, p. 23; and Challenges Forum, *Considerations for Mission Leadership in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, 2010, p. 34.

¹¹ UN Women, *Global Study*, p. 34.

conflict-related sexual violence.¹² That violence can reappear, once major fighting ends, as an epidemic of rape and domestic abuse. Women also participate in fighting or bear double burdens as heads of households whose husbands, partners or fathers have been conscripted or killed. Unless the difficult economic, social and security burdens borne by women in conflict-affected environments are reduced significantly, it is difficult to see how the effects of conflict can be said to have been reduced. The Women, Peace and Security agenda addresses all of these issues. The Challenges Forum has stressed the importance of Member States implementing gender-related UN guidelines not just at the strategic level but in the field, with appropriate ‘tools and measures to detect and monitor gender-related issues in peacekeeping’ that can also show the ‘effect and impact that an incorporated gender perspective has had in an operation.’¹³

B. UN Police

UN Police are seconded by Member States either as individual police officers (IPOs) or as members of formed police units (FPUs). The current trend toward deploying police in formed units started with the uneasy security situations of Kosovo and East Timor in 1999 and the recognition that military units are not trained or equipped to provide public security. At the end of 2015, the UN deployed about 13,900 police peacekeepers, of which 9,000 (65 per cent) were deployed in FPUs.¹⁴ Formed units ‘have three core tasks: public order management, protection of United Nations personnel and facilities, and support for police operations that may involve a higher risk above the general capability of an IPO.’ IPOs in turn carry out all other UN policing tasks, as mandated, ranging from direct law enforcement to operational support for local authorities and reform or restructuring of local police services and supporting institutions.¹⁵ The HIPPO Report recommendations with respect to UN Police cover a wide range of issues, in turn, from urging rapid completion of consolidated operational guidelines¹⁶ to the need for training and administrative improvement, continuing performance evaluation, and both greater advance consultation by the Secretariat and Security Council with police contributing countries (PCCs) and greater accountability for police behavior in missions. Inasmuch as UN Police may work closely with the local population in places where conflict may have had a devastating impact on women, the Report places appropriate emphasis on gender sensitivity and gender balance in UN Police policy and practice. UN Police may be the most visible presence of a peace

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¹² In addition to the UN Women *Global Study*, recent contributions include Theodora-Ismene Gizelis and Louise Olsson, *Gender, Peace and Security: Implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1325* (London and New York: Routledge, 2015) and Valerie M. Hudson, et al., ‘The Heart of the Matter: The Security of Women and the Security of States,’ *International Security*, Vol. 33, No. 3 (Winter 2008/09), pp. 7–45.

¹³ Challenges Forum, *Designing Mandates and Capabilities*, pp. 42–43.

¹⁴ UN DPKO, ‘Mission Summary Detailed by Country,’ 31 December 2015. Online at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors_archive.shtml.

¹⁵ United Nations, Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support, *Guidelines - Police Operations in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions*, Ref. 2015.15, 1 January 2016, Section D.

¹⁶ The UN Police Division in cooperation with Member States has developed strategic guidelines for international police peacekeeping at the strategic and operational levels. The HIPPO Report urged the Secretariat to finalize the third phase—tactical operationalization of the guidelines. The Challenges Forum Partnership contributed to development of operational-level guidelines in the areas of capacity-building and development and police command. See March Andrew Reber, *Challenges with Assessing Impact in International Police Reform and Assistance*, Challenges Forum Occasional Paper No. 1, March 2014; Marina Caparini, *Capacity-building and Development of Host State Police: The Role of International Police*, Occasional Paper No. 3, May 2014; and Maureen Brown, William Durch and Henrik Stiernblad, *Principles of International Police Command*, Occasional Paper No. 5, May 2015. Available at: <http://www.challengesforum.org/en/Reports-Publications/>.

UN Police may be the most visible presence of a peace operation in communities, making UN Police competence, comportment and accountability of paramount importance not only to the mission but to the people they serve.

operation in communities, making UN Police competence, comportment and accountability of paramount importance not only to the mission but to the people they serve. Yet UN Police have serious issues of leadership, recruitment of appropriate specialist expertise, and keeping up with the sheer numbers of officers mandated for UN missions globally. As is well known, countries do not routinely train police for international service, nor are most routinely trained to train other police in their own services, let alone rebuild administrative structures and operational practice, in a foreign land and language. Yet that is the expected routine for UN Police. Currently, a UN Secretary-General-appointed external panel is reviewing the Police Division's structure, staff and functions, and later in 2016, the UN Secretary-General will present his own report on UN policing, where the issue of benchmarking development could indeed constitute one important element.

C. Staff Safety and Security

UN personnel have been operating in dangerous environments for many years. Some have worked amidst natural disasters or situations of mass forced displacement due to conflict. Others try to keep, build or sustain peace in places where armed groups are either not party to a peace accord, rejected that accord, or use violent tactics to maneuver for advantage in the course of its implementation.¹⁷ More recent is the rise of violent extremist groups like al Qaeda or ISIS/Daesh, for whom the United Nations is one element of a system they seek to replace. At a less apocalyptic, but still critical level, decisions and actions (or failures to act) on the part of the Security Council have undermined the image and credibility of the UN in places where its services and programs matter to the lives of millions. What Great Powers do in pursuit of their interests, or what their politicians say to satisfy domestic constituencies, can also expose UN personnel and UN program beneficiaries to increased levels of physical threat.

The UN system took a decade to respond to the evolving threat environment post-9/11. A deadly attack on the UN headquarters compound in Baghdad (August 2003) led to the UN security management system being assessed as 'dysfunctional' and to creation of the DSS in January 2005 to pull that system together.¹⁸ Yet another vehicle bombing of a UN compound, in Algiers (December 2007), demonstrated that security remained inadequate in process and attitude. The 2008 Independent Panel on Safety and Security of UN Personnel and Premises Worldwide, chaired by Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi, found

'a kind of passivity of the System that the Panel finds difficult to understand, let alone explain. For example, absolutely everyone agrees that in some duty stations the UN has too many offices and too many staff. Many agree that quite a few of these staff are probably not needed at

¹⁷ For a good review of historical and contemporary safety and security issues, see Haidi Willmot, Scott Sheeran and Lisa Sharland, *Safety and Security Challenges in UN Peace Operations*, International Peace Institute, July 2015.

¹⁸ *Report of the Independent Panel on the Safety and Security of UN Personnel in Iraq*, 20 October 2003, <http://www.un.org/News/dh/iraq/safety-security-un-personnel-iraq.pdf>. (The "Ahtisaari Report.")

all. And with the benefit of today's communication tools, quite a few who are necessary could very well work out of other, safer locations. And yet, no one moves, no one suggests solutions, no one brings these issues to the higher echelons of the hierarchy, up to the Secretary-General himself, if necessary.¹⁹

Through 2009, UN 'security phase' assessments also remained tightly coupled to a sequence of automatic constraints on UN activities that were unaffected by considerations of risk mitigation or the criticality of UN programs to the local populations that they served (or the mandates they worked under). Since 2010, UN security management has been decoupling the assessment of risks posed by threats from the implications of risk for programming. Since 2013, security management system reform efforts have been substantial. The implications of threats for programming are now determined by contrasting residual risk (what remains after protective measures are taken) with 'programme criticality,' or importance to local clients. This is the context in which the HIPPO Report's further recommendations on safety and security were made. Terrorist targeting of UN operations is not decreasing. Improving safety and security of all staff—international and locally hired—is of paramount importance, even as the UN system as a whole implements risk assessment and threat management procedures that allow it to better 'stay and deliver' in difficult circumstances.

D. Strategic Communication

Strategic communication is, in its simplest formulation, 'the purposeful use of communication by an organization to fulfil its mission.'²⁰ But, as Robert Gordon and Peter Loge observed in a recent Challenges Forum Occasional Paper, within peace operations,

'Strategic communication ... is more often regarded as a thing to do, rather than as a holistic way of thinking about doing things ... [or] to be about the use of Twitter, and not about the role of social media in policy formation or in the construction and maintenance of communities.'²¹

This is, of course, as argued, a mistake. As the Expert Panel on Technology and Innovation in UN Peacekeeping stressed in its December 2014 report, 'A mission's strategic communications capacity plays a critical part in conveying key messages both internally, and externally, as well as undertaking effective outreach to the host population, national authorities and international audiences.'²² Under-Secretary-General Hervé Ladsous has also recognized effective strategic communication as a key component of an effective political strategy, to dispel misconceptions that can undo months of work on the ground and even lead key constituencies to

¹⁹ The Independent Panel on Safety and Security of UN Personnel and Premises Worldwide, *Towards a Culture of Security and Accountability*, 9 June 2008, <http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/terrorism/PanelOnSafetyReport.pdf>.

²⁰ Hallahan et al., 'Defining strategic communications,' *Intl. J. Strat. Comms.* 1:1 (2007), 3, cited by Gordon and Loge, p. 7.

²¹ Robert Gordon and Peter Loge, *Strategic Communication: A Political and Operational Prerequisite for Successful Peace Operations*, Challenges Forum Occasional Paper No.7, November 2015, p. 5.

²² UN, *Performance Peacekeeping – Final Report of the Expert Panel on Technology and Innovation in UN Peacekeeping*, 22 December 2014, pp. 70–71.

A mission that cannot explain itself to the people or elites where it is deployed, that does not listen to the voices of the people surrounding it, or learn about its environment from them and adapt its methods and messages in response, has no business being deployed.

become ‘spoilers’.²³

In short, communications theory, as well as communications tools, ‘needs to be central to [peace operations] research, planning and practice.’²⁴ A mission that cannot explain itself to the people or elites where it is deployed, that does not listen to the voices of the people surrounding it, or learn about its environment from them and adapt its methods and messages in response, has no business being deployed.

The HIPPO Report’s section on strategic communication is relatively brief, but very much in the spirit of the above observations, considering strategic communication as a tool to make peace operations more people-centered as well as more effective, pro-active and situationally aware.

E. Financing Peace Operations

Few subjects related to peace operations are as rational and irrational, simultaneously, as its financing. In 1973, Member States adopted a new, ad hoc system of assessments (obligatory dues) for peacekeeping that removed much of the financial burden from developing states and shifted it to the Permanent Members of the Security Council. In 1994, Member States settled on the Support Account for Peacekeeping as a separately derived and approved budget whose cost was pro-rated across missions in proportion to their share of the total peacekeeping budget. The Support Account paid not only for DPKO personnel but for other ‘temporary posts’ throughout the Secretariat having to do with recruitment, budgeting or procurement for peacekeeping operations. All mission budget cycles were eventually synchronized in a 1 July – 30 June budget year. Member States finally formalized and better rationalized the peacekeeping scale of assessments in January 2001.

Member States have insisted over the years that peacekeeping budgets should pay only for peacekeeping, that is, for direct costs of staff and operations. This philosophy worked well when UN operations were mostly military and not directly involved in rebuilding host-state governance capacity. ‘Capacity building’ is considered development, and development funders have generally insisted that it remain voluntary, which has left peace operations without programmatic funding. The disjunction also arises in part because the Security Council decides what missions should do, but does not vote their budgets. So missions end up with unfunded mandates. Much recent innovation has been focused on trying to bridge this funding gap between what missions are directed versus funded to do. The Brahimi Report recommended that at least some disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) funding be put into mission budgets so that DDR could get underway in a timely manner, without waiting for voluntary funding to come through. The 2012 UN Secretary-General Decision that created the Global Focal Point

²³ Undersecretary-General Hervé Ladsous, ‘Keynote Address,’ Conference on Strategic Communications for a New Era of U.N. Peace Operations, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace and Challenges Forum, 23 June 2015, <http://www.usip.org/events/strategic-communications-new-era-of-un-peace-operations>.

²⁴ Gordon and Loge, pp. 9, 20. For a cogent summary of the Challenges Forum workshop on the subject, see *Strategic Communications for the New Era of Peace Operations*, Challenges Forum Policy Brief 2015:1, July 2015.

for Police, Justice and Corrections at Headquarters level was an effort to get DPKO and UNDP to collaborate so as to better match up operations' mandates and fundraising for mandated programs, including through the use of Multi-Party Trust Funds (MPTF) for field operations. Since that time, one or two missions have been given their own MPTF through which to accumulate still-voluntary programming money. One effort attempted to bridge Secretariat and UNDP human resources policies and plans by creating joint posts for rule of law advisers in the UN's new Assistance Mission in Somalia. Incompatible human resources and financial rules snarled the effort for the better part of a year.²⁵

For 2015–2016, the UN budget for peacekeeping, including its support to AMISOM and 15 other peacekeeping operations and UN Headquarters support for those operations, is about \$8.3 billion.²⁶ In addition, as of this writing 11 special envoys or advisers, 11 panels of experts, and 10 field missions are funded as special political missions (SPM), with a total budget of about \$566 million for 2016.²⁷ Both of these budgets use assessed contributions from Member States. Headquarters support is chronically underfunded, however, as there is no equivalent, for SPMs, to the Support Account for Peacekeeping.

This official budgeting process is supplemented frequently, informally and on a small scale by individual Member States that agree to provide temporary 'extra-budgetary' (XB) funding for specific initiatives at Headquarters and in the field. As of this writing, for example, the Strategic Force Generation and Capability Planning Cell, established in 2015 in the DPKO Office of Military Affairs, runs on XB funding.²⁸ Because it is an option that is, in practical terms, available to developed but not to developing states, there are unspoken limits as to how much XB money can flow without risking political and financial backlash. Because XB money is voluntary, it can also be cut off with little warning.

There is a long way to go to rationalize the funding of peace operations and the tasks they undertake. Some of the change has to come from Member States and some from the disjoint elements of the UN system that guard their own roles at the expense of greater systemic functionality. The HIPPO Report attempts to deal with this problem not through organizational change but through funding, by recommending that assessed mission budgets be given program funds and that all peace operations be funded by a single 'peace operations budget.' Changing the financial arrangements would change a fundamental structural element of peace operations, and financial arrangements are both concrete and traceable. Thus, the HIPPO Report's budget ideas, dry as they may seem, are among its most important.

Changing the financial arrangements would change a fundamental structural element of peace operations, and financial arrangements are both concrete and traceable. Thus, the HIPPO Report's budget ideas, dry as they may seem, are among its most important.

²⁵ *Independent Progress Review on the UN Global Focal Point*, p. 41.

²⁶ \$8 billion was the approximate marginal cost (or 'war cost') to the United States of deploying one Brigade Combat Team of 9,000 troops to Afghanistan for a year. For \$8 billion, the UN maintains about 124,000 personnel (including 105,000 uniformed personnel) in the field for a year. US Congressional Research Service, *Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001–FY2012: Cost and Other Potential Issues*. R40682, July 2 2009, pp. 1, 53–54. United Nations, *Financing of the support account for peacekeeping operations and the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy*, A/C.5/69/23, 23 June 2015. UN peacekeeping's budget year is 1 July to 30 June.

²⁷ United Nations, *Estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council*, 16 October 2015, pp. 33–34.

²⁸ UN Secretary-General, A/70/357–S/2015/682, para. 86.

III. Monitoring Implementation

This paper builds on a methodology developed by the Future of Peace Operations Project at the Stimson Center to track the implementation of the Brahimi Report at the three year mark.²⁹ The paper develops a set of benchmarks (significant threshold levels of achievement) for 61 recommendations in the five selected areas or dimensions of the HIPPO Report. Benchmarks are means by which the implementation of recommendations may be monitored and judged over time, as may the actions of those responsible for implementation. In the language of monitoring and evaluation, the paper sets out an approach to monitoring outputs from the Report—signs of entry into force—rather than its broader outcomes—field results and their contribution to sustainable peace, as intended, or to some other visible end product.³⁰

Assessing outcomes and longer-term impact involves larger issues of data availability, validity and objectivity; direct versus indirect causality ('attribution' versus 'contribution,' or assigning relative credit or blame across likely sources of influence); and competing theories of change (assumptions about cause and effect). For purposes of this paper, the theories of change (explicit or implicit) that underlie the Panel's recommendations are accepted, and focus is instead placed on how best to decide whether the Panel's recommendations have been realized.

In some instances, topically related recommendations occur in more than one place in the HIPPO Report, and some important proposals were not highlighted in the Report's recommendation lists. Those proposals were drawn out of the text and gathered together with related, listed recommendations, in Annex I. Each recommendation listed in Annex I is associated with its paragraph of origin in the Report. Because the HIPPO Report did not assign unique numbers to its recommendations, Annex I uses a topic tag and sequence number for each recommendation and sub-recommendation, for ease of reference.

The heading entries in Annex I (reproduced in Table 1), reading left to right, are the tag-sequence number, the Report paragraph of origin, the full text of the recommendation, the text of one or more benchmarks for that recommendation, space in which to mark one or more columns representing different UN system entities or activities with potential roles in implementation, and space for scoring implementation over time.

The benchmarks are largely 'self-indicating,' that is, are themselves measurable without a proliferation of subsidiary indicators. The most intuitive such benchmarks are tangible, visible, and binary: something that can be sensed and that either functions or does not (e.g., mission gender adviser reports directly to Head of Mission or does not; funding

²⁹ William J. Durch, Victoria K. Holt, Caroline R. Earle and Moira K. Shanahan, *The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace Operations*, The Stimson Center, December 2003.

³⁰ For a clear discussion of benchmarks and benchmarking, and clear definitions of terms, see United Nations, *Monitoring Peace Consolidation. United Nations Practitioners' Guide to Benchmarking*, UN Peacebuilding Support Office In cooperation with the Fafo Institute for Applied International Studies and the Norwegian Peacebuilding Centre, 2010, pp. 18–19. For a good review of problems and approaches in evaluation, see Jeni Whalan, *Evaluating Integrated Peace Operations*, Challenges Forum Occasional Papers No. 2, April 2014, also Michele Lipner and Ann Livingstone, *Impact Evaluation and Assessment of UN Peace Operations: What is the State-of-the-Art?* Challenges Forum Occasional Papers No. 6, June 2015.

authorities are changed or not). More often, even tangible benchmarks are met by degrees (e.g., a threshold percentage of female senior UN Police officers; new budget authorities but with insufficient funds; an institution that has new buildings but an old bureaucratic process). Behavioral or attitudinal change is harder to achieve and to assess and is itself neither tangible nor binary, but still measurable by various means (public opinion surveys in person or via media; focus groups; surveys of expert observers). Recall that this effort is not trying to measure outcome or impact, just existence. Existence is the cue to go looking for the other two. Just not yet.

Each benchmark has a different combination of columns marked as relevant to its implementation. In general, the more columns checked, the more complex the implementation process. Some benchmarks may be met by decision of the Secretary-General alone, if the initiative applies only to the UN Secretariat and does not require bureaucratic reshuffling or additional people ('posts') or funds. Reforms that involve posts or assessments involve the General Assembly, its 5th (Financial) Committee, and the powerful Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Question (ACABQ).³¹

Many of the initiatives in the HIPPO Report require not only the agreement of the UN's intergovernmental bodies but the support of other UN Agencies, Funds and Programs ('AFPs') or actions by regional bodies and individual Member States. States may need to agree to earmark standby military or police capacity for peacekeeping or to implement UN standards in their peacekeeping training programs. Recommendations that depend upon such distributed implementation efforts are, by and large, the hardest to implement widely and consistently. However, in the case of third party peacekeeping training and equipping programs, donors' embrace of UN standards raises the prospect of those standards becoming common usage.

The rightmost columns in Annex I are for scoring implementation quality according to scaling guidelines reproduced in the Table 2. Each benchmark for each recommendation is intended to be scored at one, three and five years after the HIPPO Report's release to develop comparative trends. Repeat scoring at intervals allows development of summary implementation trends. Each category of actor with a role in implementing a recommendation could be scored separately and scores could be averaged to generate an implementation quality score for each benchmark. That accounting could become rather onerous, as some categories (e.g., Member States) comprise many actor-members, risking a plunge down the analytic rabbit-hole. But informed-impressionistic category scoring could serve the rough and ready intent of the scoring system better than a single, even fuzzier judgment encompassing all actor categories, and could offer a quick reminder as to which actor categories

³¹ The ACABQ is a group of 16 Member State representatives serving 3-year appointments on a rotating basis that reviews in detail every budget bill that goes before the 5th Committee, down to the level of individual posts, with the help of a permanent staff headed by an Undersecretary-General. UN General Assembly, *Appointment of members of the [ACABQ]*. Note by the Secretary-General, A/68/101, 12 March 2013.

were leading and lagging on implementation of which issues.

Since relatively few benchmarks are fully binary, one needs to be able to score partial implementation, either plateaued at an interim level or reflecting a process of change that is still underway, as well as full implementation and even over-fulfillment (it has happened). These sentiments are all reflected in the scoring guidelines in Table 2.

Table 2: Scoring Guidelines

- 0.0 = No implementation action taken.
- 1.0 = Proposed by Secretariat; rejected by inter-governmental bodies.
- 1.5 = Proposed by Secretariat; pending decision by inter-gov't'l bodies.
- 2.0 = Proposed by Secretariat; accepted by inter-gov't'l bodies in reduced initial form.
- 2.5 = Proposed and accepted; awaits mission-specific implementation.
- 3.0 = Implementation/rollout underway of reduced-form concept.
- 3.5 = Implementation/rollout underway of full concept.
- 4.0 = Fully/widely implemented per Report recommendation.
- 5.0 = Implementation exceeds Report recommendation.

One could also, in principle, try to establish consensus on implementation priorities by adapting the common UN system 'programme criticality framework' for risk assessment. The criticality framework was developed to help determine when to 'stay and deliver' which programs under different levels of residual security risk in the field. Only 'most-critical' programs, for example, are to be implemented in 'very high residual risk environments.' Risk and criticality are determined independently.³² The program criticality (PC) measure is:

(Contribution to *strategic result* if implemented) x (likelihood of implementation with available resources, in specified time frame)

The methodology is designed to be implemented in a particular field setting, by consensus of the UN entities operating there. An effort to apply similar methodology to prioritizing HIPPO recommendations would lack the geographic constraint, and the security crisis time frame, both of which help to link estimates of cause, effect and priority to immediate context. The criticality of HIPPO's higher-level recommendations is harder to determine, as are the 'strategic results' against which their implementation might be judged. The highest-level result would of course be 'sustaining peace'. While advocates for a high-level program goal can lay out the logics of their positions and make good cases for their contribution to that goal, the specific cascade of influence from policy change to field impact is hard to trace. Many other variables intervene along the way. Lower-level strategic results might be specified within categories like policing or staff security, so that recommendations

³² UN General Assembly, *Conclusions of the High-Level Working Group on Programme Criticality. Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), A/69/786, 19 February 2015, Annex.*

compete for priority within categories. Yet without some prior sense of which categories contribute how much to sustaining peace, prioritizing categories of activities would likely devolve to decision makers' political power and preference.

IV. Building Benchmarks

This section provides background and other support for the benchmarks presented in Annex I, listing the corresponding recommendations labeled with their individual sequence numbers for ease of cross-reference to the Annex tables. Related recommendations within each major category are clustered under 'short title' sub-headings here and in Annex I.

A. Women, Peace and Security

1. Gender-sensitive force generation strategy

WPS-1 The Secretariat should develop a gender-sensitive force and police generation strategy, including by encouraging troop- and police-contributing countries to develop and/or implement national action plans on Security Council resolution 1325.

In a separate report, the Secretary-General recommended that T/PCCs receive extra reimbursement if their contingents exhibit willingness to take greater risks, or contribute key enabling capacities to operations, especially if those units are at high readiness for deployment to UN operations.³³ UN Women has argued that a similar premium arrangement should be devised to encourage the selection, training and deployment of women military and police personnel to UN missions.³⁴

2. Gender-sensitive mission analyses

WPS-2 The Secretariat and missions should carry out gender-sensitive analysis throughout the analysis, planning, implementation, review, evaluation and mission drawdown processes.

The Gender Equality Marker (GEM) methodology promulgated by UNICEF could be used for periodic assessment of the gender content and focus of mission analyses and policies. Expected outcomes of programming are rated from zero (no gender impact anticipated) to three (gender impact is the primary focus of the policy).³⁵

³³ United Nations, *Results of the revised survey to establish the standard rate of reimbursement to troop-contributing countries... Report of the Secretary-General, A/68/813*, 26 March 2014, paras. 59–69. Risk premiums are paid by the UN directly to the members of units in missions. Enabling unit premiums are paid to T/PCCs.

³⁴ UN Women, *Global Study*, p. 142.

³⁵ UNICEF, *Guidance Note: Gender Equality Marker: Tracking of Resource Allocations and Expenditure for Gender Equality Results*, 16 September 2010, http://www.unicef.org/gender/gender_57305.html.

Attention to gender dimensions of policy should be routine within UN missions and not relegated just to the gender focal point or adviser.

3. Expertise and advice in missions

WPS-3.1 Missions should integrate gender expertise within all functional components requiring gender knowledge and experience.

WPS-3.2 The mission senior gender adviser should be located in the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, reporting directly to the SRSG.

WPS-3.2 The mission senior gender adviser should advise HoM and senior mission leadership at the strategic level on integrating a gender perspective in mission activities.

The Secretary-General supports having senior gender advisers report to the Head of Mission and advise the senior mission leadership team, but noted in his Women, Peace and Security 2015 report that seven of nine senior gender adviser posts in peacekeeping missions were vacant at the end of 2014, suggesting a lack of priority on the ground. Attention to gender dimensions of policy should be routine within UN missions and not relegated just to the gender focal point or adviser. GEM could also be used to evaluate the effects of gender advice in missions by periodically scoring mission policies and programming.

4. Expertise and advice for missions

WPS-4 Missions should have full access to the policy, substantive and technical support from UN Women on implementation of SCR 1325, together with support currently received from the Departments of Political Affairs and Peacekeeping Operations.

Headquarters-level advice and support for missions are important as an extension of mission gender resources, to extend the perspective beyond the immediate mission area, and to find and coordinate potential donors for Women, Peace and Security programming. A good way to benchmark implementation of this recommendation might be the creation of a Headquarters-level Global Focal Point for Women, Peace and Security, hosted by UN Women and complementing the current Global Focal Point for Police, Justice and Corrections.³⁶

³⁶ The latter was developed using existing posts and resources, though an initial external review concluded that modest administrative resources could substantially improve its performance. See Netherlands Institute of International Relations and Stimson Center, *Independent Progress Review on the UN Global Focal Point for Police, Justice and Corrections*, June 2014, pp. 27–30.

5. Leadership

WPS-5.1 The Secretariat should ensure that compacts between the Secretary-General and heads of mission specify performance indicators relating to gender.

WPS-5.2 Continue to appoint more women to senior mission leadership positions.

WPS-5.3 Review the obstacles and structural factors preventing women's recruitment and professional advancement and support the promotion of serving female staff to senior leadership roles.

No issue is more important to women's equality in mission host states, or to taking the discussion of women's rights and interests beyond issues of victimization, than promoting leadership roles for women in UN field missions and Country Teams, which, to succeed, must effectively address remaining obstacles to that objective. An implementation benchmark is suggested of 50 per cent women for mission senior leadership positions, including at least 30 per cent women as heads or deputy heads of mission,³⁷ and benchmarks of 10 to 15 per cent increases in the rates of recruitment, advancement, and placement of women in senior UN leadership roles in general, by the third anniversary of the HIPPO Report's release, as evidence of obstacle reduction.

No issue is more important to women's equality in mission host states, or to taking the discussion of women's rights and interests beyond issues of victimization, than promoting leadership roles for women in UN field missions and Country Teams...

B. UN Police

1. Gender-sensitive approach to policing

UNP-1.1 The Secretariat and Member States should develop a strategy with concrete measures to increase the percentage of women police in deployments to UN peace operations, in particular senior officers.

UNP-1.2 Member States should accelerate these efforts both through generic recruitment and by providing specialized personnel to units for the protection of women and children against sexual violence.

UNP-1.3 Police components should coordinate closely with women protection advisors, gender advisors, and child protection advisors within the mission.

In 2009 the UN Police Division set a goal of 20 per cent female UN Police deployed in UN operations. As of December 2015, 15 per cent of IPOs were women, and 7 per cent of FPUs, for an average of 10 per cent for all UN Police. The dominance of FPUs in UN deployments obviously drags down the numbers. UN Women's *Global Study* endorsed the HIPPO Report's recommendation to incentivize PCCs' contributions

³⁷ 'Currently 23 per cent of heads of mission and 17 per cent of deputy heads of mission are female.' UN Secretary-General, A/70/357-S/2015/682, para. 114.

of female officers and suggested consideration of special measures (e.g., relaxing the minimum number of years in police service as an eligibility criterion) to boost recruitment of female officers.³⁸ Concrete measures to increase the percentage of women police in UN deployments could include ‘gender balance awards’ to PCCs when at least 20 per cent of their IPOs qualifying for and deploying to UN peace operations are female, and reimbursement bonuses when the percentage of female officers in qualifying and deploying FPU is at least 15 per cent. UN Police Division should aim for 25 per cent senior police leadership in missions by 2020. Indicators of Member State collaboration to these ends would include 10 per cent increases in female police officers on domestic police rolls by 2020 and contribution to missions of specialized protection units that are at least 20 per cent female by 2020.

2. Transnational organized crime expertise

UNP-2 Missions should acquire expertise in [trans-national organized crime], when requested and in partnership with others to support national police capacity.

This is an implicit recommendation, not drawn out into a bolded/ numbered list but important nonetheless. A nascent peace in many zones of conflict is threatened by organized criminal entities trafficking in drugs, guns, timber, minerals and people, sometimes in league with corrupt officials.³⁹ UN Police must have the ability to collect and use police intelligence, and as necessary interdict such criminal conspiracies, not only to execute their mandates effectively but for purposes of self-protection.

3. Police strategy: evidence-based, optimally staffed, continuously evaluated

UNP-3.1 The Secretariat should complete the strategic guidance framework on UN Policing currently under preparation and propose commensurate resources for its implementation.

UNP-3.2 UN police strategies should be based on capacity assessments in country; [should be] reflected in mission planning, staffing and recruitment; and should include specialized teams and the use of long-term civilian experts.

UNP-3.3 Police contributing countries supporting police development and reform should be encouraged to extend rotation cycles to 12 months.

UNP-3.4 Mission leadership should consistently monitor and evaluate police development efforts, taking into account the assessment of the host government and civil society.

³⁸ UN Women, *Global Study*, p. 143.

³⁹ Wibke Hansen, *Interfaces between Peace Operations and Organized Crime*, Challenges Forum Policy Brief 2015:2, September 2015.

The Strategic Guidance Framework for UN Police has been several years in the making. Its top tier was put into effect in 2014 and three of four pieces of operational guidance were signed into effect in 2015 and early 2016. The last operational piece should be put into effect by the end of 2016. For the first time, UN Police will have a single, consistent set of guidance at the operational level that pulls together or replaces disparate segmented guidelines produced over the past 10 to 15 years. More-detailed manuals on critical topics like police intelligence—12 in total—will be written and issued between 2016 and 2018.

Twelve-month rotational cycles for UN Police have been or are being phased in by the Police Division.

Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) are perennial issues for UN operations at large and not just for police. Over a period of years, the Vera Institute and DPKO's Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) developed a Rule of Law Indicators Project (ROLIP) designed to measure mission area progress in policing, judicial, and corrections matters, drawing on a combination of public records and public surveys. While sound in concept, ROLIP has proved too time-consuming to be regularly applied by missions that generally lack M&E budgets or by Headquarters evaluation teams that are too small to execute it or to manage its execution by contractor teams with any regularity. Nonetheless, a mission that cannot tell how well it is doing in either providing public security or training local counterparts to provide it can never know when its job is done. Missions should be able to measure the effectiveness of local police development on a regular (e.g., semi-annual) basis, and be budgeted to do so, with some combination of public safety perception surveys (e.g., using cell-phone surveys), officer competency testing, and trends in crime statistics (consistency in crime reporting and book-keeping being one element evaluated).

Missions should be able to measure the effectiveness of local police development on a regular[...]basis, and be budgeted to do so, with some combination of public safety perception surveys[...], officer competency testing, and trends in crime statistics...

4. Formed police units: expand the base, assist training, improve performance

- UNP-4.1** The Secretariat should expand the base of formed police unit (FPU) contributors and encourage partnership arrangements between potential contributors and donor countries.
- UNP-4.2** The Secretariat should assist police contributing countries in strengthening pre-deployment preparation.
- UNP-4.3** The Secretariat should improve performance and oversight management including adherence to agreed policies and standards.

FPU's constituted 65 per cent of all UN Police (9,000 out of 13,900) deployed at the end of 2015. Unlike IPOs, FPU personnel are always armed, and equipped with armored vehicles. For these reasons, and because FPU's may interact with the population of the host state at times and places of tension, it is critical that FPU personnel be well-trained and

professional. DPKO promulgated a new standard operating procedure for assessing the operational capability of FPUs in 2012, which followed new, temporary training guidelines (2011) and a revised Policy on FPUs in peace operations (2010). The underlying guidance may be strong but the Panel's findings suggested that PCCs need further assistance to meet UN requirements. Since 2013, the base of FPU contributors has grown from 13 to 20 countries, as indicated in Table 3. Many of these PCCs look to third countries for assistance in equipping and training their units. With a record 64 FPUs deployed as of late 2015, demand for such 'triangular' assistance has never been higher. A minimum of 64 units need to be prepared, trained, tested and deployed each year, for as long as demand for FPUs remains high and the UN process for meeting that demand is to pull foreign police units into a mission area.⁴⁰

The 20 FPU contributing countries provided 82 per cent of all police to UN missions (FPU and individual). But on average, 79 per cent of the officers they provided were members of FPUs. Percentages of female FPU officers varied considerably by country, however. The fact that six countries deployed at least 12 per cent female officers suggests that an overall goal of 15 per cent for FPUs by 2020 is not unreasonable. Most of the new contributors' FPUs included female officers and all of the countries with high percentages of women in contributed police ranks in 2015 had improved those percentages since mid-2013.

Table 3: Formed Police Units in UN Peace Operations, with Percentage of Female Officers, as of 31 December 2015

Missions → PCCs ↓									Total FPU Officers, by PCC:	Average Percentage Female Officers in FPUs	
	<i>Darfür</i>	<i>CAR</i>	<i>Haiti</i>	<i>Liberia</i>	<i>Côte d'Ivoire</i>	<i>D.R. Congo</i>	<i>Mali</i>	<i>Sd. Sudan</i>		2015	2013
<i>Jordan</i>	279		319	240	483				1321	0%	0%
<i>Senegal</i>	276	279				268	280		1103	2%	3%
<i>Bangladesh</i>	279		300		180	180	140		1079	16%	11%
<i>India</i>			439	243		270			952	12%	11%
<i>Nepal</i>	139		140	259				319	857	9%	6%
<i>Rwanda</i>		420	160						580	13%	3%
<i>Pakistan</i>	140		140		189				469	0%	0%
<i>Egypt</i>	140					140			280	0%	0%
<i>Mauritania</i>		140			140				280	0%	-
<i>Togo</i>	140						140		280	5%	3%
<i>Burundi</i>		274							274	6%	-
<i>Cameroon</i>		273							273	3%	-
<i>Nigeria</i>				118			140		258	26%	14%
<i>Ghana</i>								167	167	19%	-
<i>Indonesia</i>	154								154	0%	0%
<i>Benin</i>							140		140	0%	-
<i>Burkina Faso</i>	140								140	3%	4%
<i>China</i>				140					140	4%	-
<i>Congo (B)</i>		137							137	6%	-
<i>Congo, DR</i>		118							118	14%	-
Mission total:	1687	1641	1498	1000	992	858	840	486	9002	7%	6%

Note: Italics indicate French, underlining indicates Arabic as an official language of the PCC or mission area. Both English and French are official languages of Rwanda and Cameroon Sources: UN DPKO, *Mission Summary Detailed by Country*, 31 December 2015. Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_official_languages

⁴⁰ For a concept of how the UN can reduce demand for FPUs by enabling missions to build mission-managed public order police capacity locally, see W. Durch and M. Ker, 'Police in UN Peacekeeping: Improving Selection, Recruitment, and Deployment' *Providing for Peace keeping* No. 6, International Peace Institute, October 2013.

5. Review the Police Division

UNP-5 The organizational structure, staffing and capacity of the Police Division should be reviewed to better meet new approaches to supporting national police.

A Panel to review the Police Division as recommended has been created and is working with staff support from the Geneva Center for Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, with a report expected by June 2016.

6. Strengthen consultations with troop and police contributors and accountability in the field

UNP-6.1 The Security Council and Secretariat should strengthen efforts to establish inclusive and meaningful consultations with troop and police contributing countries to ensure unity of effort and a common commitment to the mandate [including] specialized personnel, experts and high-level military officials from capitals as needed.

UNP-6.2 The Secretariat should develop standard transparent approaches to deal with troop and police personnel contributions from countries whose human rights record and performance present challenges. Governments whose forces are listed in the annual reports of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict and on Conflict Related Sexual Violence should be barred from contributing troops to UN missions until de-listed.

UNP-6.3 Member States, in particular troop and police contributors, and the Secretariat should ensure urgent and robust implementation of the recommendations of the recent report of Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) into sexual exploitation and abuse by personnel of peacekeeping operations.

UNP-6.1 reflects a long-standing wish of troop and police contributors; benchmarking its implementation is less a matter of creativity than of observation of Council procedures, in particular. The main difficulties are not ones of principle but of practicality and politics: the Security Council recognizing its own interest in greater consultation, on the one hand, and deciding who among troop contributing countries (TCCs) and PCCs gets a seat at the table, on the other. Alexandra Novosseloff has proposed that about 10 major contributors speak on behalf of the whole group for any given mission, along with six basic principles that should underlie consultations.⁴¹ When mandates are being drawn up for new missions, however, TCCs and PCCs have not yet been decided. There are 108 TCCs and 84 PCCs and having the same top 10 sit in on each

⁴¹ The six principles include regular consultations (informal and private); meetings before mandates (prior to renewals or major changes); experts, not permanent reps; operations, not strategy ('as concrete as possible'); top ten contributors by mission; and presidency before pen-holder (convened by the President of the Council, not the principal drafter of the mandate in question). Alexandra Novosseloff, *Triangular Cooperation – Key to All*, 10 November 2015, <http://peaceoperationsreview.org/thematic-essays/>.

Given the recrudescence of reports about sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeepers[...]the Organization needs to be willing to risk the wrath of some [TCCs and PCCs] in order to save its reputation and credibility with others, with mission area populations, and with its major government funders.

consultation for new mission mandates seem unduly limiting. A more representative approach for new missions—or for thematic discussions pertinent to all missions, such as strategies for civilian protection—might set a threshold for participation of 3 per cent of total currently deployed UN troops or police (about 2,500 troops or 450 police), with assurance that each UN regional group has at least two seats at the table. Such an approach would presently open participation to about 15 TCCs and a further eight PCCs. For thematic meetings, a fraction of participants could be selected by lot from among the larger group of contributors, so that the views of both upper and lower tiers are represented. Lower tier selected to participate in one consultation should rotate out of the eligible ‘pool’ of delegates to the next meeting, to give more T/PCCs periodic seats at the table.

Equally important is implementing the Panel’s recommendation (UNP-6.2) for dealing with countries whose troops or police have records of human rights abuses sufficient for them to be listed in the indicated reports of the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General’s initial response to the HIPPO Report pledged to implement these procedures. Given the recrudescence of reports about sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeepers posted to MINUSCA in the Central African Republic, and elsewhere, the Organization needs to be willing to risk the wrath of some troop and police contributors in order to save its reputation and credibility with others, with mission area populations, and with its major government funders.

UNP-6.3 references six relatively lengthy recommendations made by the UN’s investigative watchdog office, the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), with respect to accountability of troop and police contributors for serious field misconduct by their personnel, especially involving sexual exploitation and abuse. The Panel views two of these as ‘critical’: writing more thorough accountability investigation standards and competency requirements into UN Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) with contributing countries; and improved services and compensation for recognized victims of exploitation or abuse. On average, just 12 per cent of victims identified by the UN’s slow to be implemented ‘victim assistance architecture’ were referred for support or assistance in 2014 but, as OIOS notes, ‘little is known of what assistance, in reality, was provided to them’ from the Organization; a few missions have done better, according to OIOS, but most have done little or nothing.⁴² The recommendations are reproduced in full in Annex I. The Secretary-General’s annual report for 2015 on special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse contained an expanded array of measures to increase the efficacy and reduce the completion time for field investigations into sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) allegations. The Secretary-General sought greater freedom for OIOS to pursue investigations in a timely manner, greater cooperation from

⁴² United Nations, Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), Inspection and Evaluation Division, *Evaluation of the Enforcement and Remedial Assistance Efforts for Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by the United Nations and Related Personnel in Peacekeeping Operations*, Evaluation report OIOS-IED-15-001, May 2015, pp. 24-25.

Member States to ensure that their criminal laws include extraterritorial jurisdiction for sex crimes committed by their nationals abroad, suspension of [UN] payments to units with which an ‘implicated individual’ was assigned if a criminal investigation has not been completed within one year, suspension of deployments to UN operations by units from Member States whose investigations of abuse cases extend beyond one year, and repatriation of units ‘where there is credible evidence of widespread of systemic sexual exploitation and abuse by that unit.’⁴³ The UN has begun to take such steps with the repatriation of units deployed to MINUSCA from the Republic of Congo and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).⁴⁴

...national staff and other locally hired people[...]constitute 75 per cent of UN civilian personnel in the field and bear the brunt of armed violence and criminal acts against UN premises and personnel.

C. Staff Safety and Security

1. Key areas meriting particular attention

UNSEC-1.1 Application of the [staff safety and security] system to military and police contingents.

UNSEC-1.2 Capabilities, technologies and force preparation necessary to cater for asymmetric threat environments in the next five years.

UNSEC-1.3 Provisions for national staff, including administrative constraints and insurance considerations, and the impact on national staff who often bear considerable risk with little recompense and support in emergency situations.

These three items are embedded in text (implicit recommendations). The coverage of the UN Security Management System (UNSMS), which already applies to civilian staff and individual UN Police Officers, should be expanded to cover FPU and smaller static military units as well. UN Police, and FPUs in particular, can be significant risk management and mitigation factors for other mission components and non-mission UN personnel. UNSEC-1.2 would complement the Panel’s recommendations elsewhere to review and fix longstanding constraints on use of military aircraft, including helicopters, to better meet operational and medical emergencies and adapt to the dynamic risk environments of contemporary operations.⁴⁵ Increasingly, that means preparedness to face asymmetric threats, which in some newer missions include repeated raids by armed groups on UN camps, outposts, offices and convoys, and use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) on convoy routes.

UNSEC-1.3 (para. 276) is the HIPPO Report’s only reference to safety and security of national staff and other locally hired people who constitute 75 per cent of UN civilian personnel in the field⁴⁶ and bear the brunt of

⁴³ United Nations, *Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse. Report of the Secretary-General*, A/70/729, 16 February 2016. UN Security Council, S/RES/2272, 11 March 2016, esp. OP1–5

⁴⁴ BBC, *Central African Republic peacekeepers to be sent home over ‘sex abuse’*, 4 February 2016, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35496785>. Aljazeera, *Congo to probe alleged sex abuse by peacekeepers in CAR*, 6 February 2016, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/02/congo-probe-alleged-sex-abuse-peacekeepers-car-160206034927670.html>. [T] the UN said it would repatriate 120 peacekeepers from the Republic of Congo, a month after asking DRC to send home its contingent’

⁴⁵ HIPPO Report, paras. 212–215.

⁴⁶ *Towards a Culture of Security and Accountability*, p. 9. Citing ‘Headcount of Field Staff as of 31 December 2006’, CEB/2007/HLCM/30.

armed violence and criminal acts against UN premises and personnel. The objective of benchmarking here is to ensure that crisis management planning includes considerations of personal security for local staff and contractors and their immediate families and compensation for material loss incurred in consequence of UN employment.

2. Integrate and update security management resources

UNSEC-2.1 The Secretariat should implement expeditiously the recent decision to integrate the security resources of the Department of Safety and Security and of missions under a single integrated management model and implement updated methodologies for security risk assessments and incident reporting.

UNSEC-2.2 The Secretariat should review the implementation of the UN security management system to ascertain that it is 'fit for purpose' for contemporary threat environments and make sure that the programme criticality framework is implemented to help peace operations take decisions on acceptable risk to stay and deliver.

The Secretary-General reported in September 2015 that 'development of a significantly improved security risk management process is nearly complete, along with relevant training and an e-tool module.' Rollout was in December 2015. Development of staff security training modules will continue through 2016.

Benchmarks track the scheduled implementation and availability of funding.

3. Make guard units available to missions

UNSEC-3 Where necessary, missions without military components should be provided with small military or police contingents as guard units.

Budgets of all operations (peacekeeping and special political) should include funds for guard units for environments assessed as 'high risk' or 'very high risk'. Funding guard units would be simplified were the Organization to adopt the Panel's recommended single budget for all peace operations (see BDG-6).

4. Establish a medical performance framework and standards for operations

UNSEC-4 The Secretariat should establish a medical performance framework for UN peace operations, including clear capability standards, minimum standards for all UN medical capabilities, civilian and military.

Medical performance frameworks and capacities feature prominently in the recommendations of the 2008 Independent Panel on Safety and Security;⁴⁷ peacekeeping operations have needed such a framework since more dangerous operations began 25 years ago. It strains credulity that the Organization has not managed to implement such a framework in that time; interviews suggest that a paper on a UN ‘duty of care’ for medical support has been developed but is moving forward slowly.

5. Develop and exercise crisis management plans

UNSEC-5.1 The Secretariat should develop a comprehensive crisis management policy for its peace operations.

UNSEC-5.2 UN Country Team partners should ensure rigorous crisis management plans and procedures, including mass casualty incident plans, are in place and are reviewed and exercised regularly.

Much the same could be said for crisis management within peace operations and the coordination of crisis management policies and plans with UN Country Teams. The need for such policy and planning, together with the lag on medical standards, suggests an Organization that has been deeply reluctant to recognize that it is putting people in harm’s way, while taking inadequate responsibility for that fact, and relying too heavily on the kindness of strangers to fill the gaps.

6. Improve fatalities management and death/disability compensation

UNSEC-6.1 The Secretariat should centralize responsibilities for fatalities management to ensure better information management and oversight of administrative processes in support of the next of kin of the deceased.

UNSEC-6.2 The General Assembly should keep the rates of compensation for death and disability under regular review and adjust accordingly.

There should never be lack of clarity, either inside the system or in its dealings with next of kin, regarding management of fatalities and their consequences, whatever the cause.

7. Host state responsibilities in cases of attacks against the United Nations

UNSEC-7 States hosting UN peace operations must vigorously pursue those responsible for attacks against the United Nations, including through prompt investigation and effective prosecution in accordance with international human rights law, including the right to due process.

⁴⁷ *Towards a Culture of Security and Accountability*, p. 56.

...the UN should write into MOUs with host states a collaborating role in investigating attacks against UN persons or facilities, including power to protect crime scenes, evidence, and testimony.

The HIPPO Panel and the Secretary-General's reports on special measures to combat SEA recognize that the circumstances under which many UN missions deploy are precisely those circumstances in which impartial and effective justice, well-functioning institutions, and commitment to redress wrongs done to outsiders are least likely to be found. Nonetheless, the UN should write into MOUs with host states a collaborating role in investigating attacks against UN persons or facilities, including power to protect crime scenes, evidence, and testimony.

D. Strategic Communication

1. Build and maintain two-way communications at multiple levels

SC-1.1 The Secretariat and missions should put in place at every stage of the mission lifecycle strategies for planning, recruitment, resourcing of mission communications teams aimed at ensuring interactive two-way communications with the local people.

SC-1.2 Each peace operation should work closely with the UN Country Team and the local communities, including civil society actors, to develop strategies for community engagement at various stages of the mission cycle.

SC-1.3 Missions should communicate continuously with host authorities on all threats to civilians, in all dimensions, including child protection, sexual violence, and the full range of protection issues facing women and girls, as well as men and boys.

SC-1.4 Missions must build relationships of trust with local people, leading to more effective delivery of protection of civilians mandates and better protection for peacekeepers.

The four recommendations in this group come from four different parts of the Report but share an emphasis on communication that is two-way: explaining, advocating, listening and learning.

The UN has traditionally dealt with host state authorities and armed opposition groups when mediating peace accords or negotiating terms of reference for a mission, but should also give high priority to other voices, including a wider swath of civil society, for early learning about potential mission areas and their sources of conflict and post-conflict needs. Missions should therefore have civil affairs teams ready to work from an early date with communications specialists. Missions should also work closely with Country Teams to absorb accumulated local knowledge and utilize already-built bridges to civil society.

Effective implementation of civilian protection mandates requires close and continuing communications with host state authorities as well as the public. The Panel points out that effective communications ties with the local people can foster protection of civilians and missions alike. Missions should be capable of gathering community input daily, and of informing communities about mission activities in a tailored fashion on a bi-weekly

basis.

2. Develop key communications tools and techniques

SC-2.1 The strategy should include the creation of fora in which senior mission leadership can participate in structured, regular engagement with local communities, including women, youth, religious and other leaders who can provide feedback to the mission on its work.

SC-2.2 Each mission should have or be able to... identify resources for the regular commissioning of independent surveys of local perceptions of the mission and progress towards mission objectives, linked to strategic communications efforts.

SC-2.3 The Secretariat and missions should [ensure that] UN peace operations use modern and appropriate communication approaches and technologies.

SC-2.4 Local engagement and feedback should be used to measure the impact of the mission and is particularly important to ensure that the mission does no harm or makes immediate course corrections as required.

This grouping emphasizes the how of strategic communications. Senior leadership should arrange to engage on a not less than monthly basis with local communities, including outside the capital, security conditions permitting. Meetings should be supplemented by regular perceptions surveys taking advantage of locally prevalent communications (e.g., cell phones) consistent with personal security of polltakers and participants and validity of results. Radio programming has proven effective in a number of missions, especially as a source of objective news. Non-governmental organizations like Fondation Hironnelle have collaborated successfully with missions to build local broadcast infrastructure and experience. Radio Okapi in the DRC also developed quasi-two-way communications for separated families via call-in programs.

Newer digital communications technologies, including social media, can enhance mission effectiveness if linked to an informed communication policy and strategy.

Effective community relations and communications channels can be used, finally, for early detection of unintended programming consequences.

3. Secretariat-Security Council communications

SC-3 The Secretariat should keep the Security Council informed in a timely manner of new threats and limits imposed on the mission's ability to act at every stage of the operation.

Acute threats to mission performance should be communicated to the

Newer digital communications technologies, including social media, can enhance mission effectiveness if linked to an informed communication policy and strategy.

Security Council within 24 hours and strategic impediments within one week, on the assumption that it is better for the Secretariat to own the message than for Council members to hear it from their own sources or third parties, even if immediate action by the Council is neither needed nor, necessarily, wise. These timelines imply a rapid planning and crisis management capability within the Secretariat that can in turn answer the question, ‘What next?’.

4. Security Council-Host State communications

SC-4 The Security Council must draw upon its individual and collective influence and leverage on the conflict parties to ensure they refrain from targeting civilians directly or indirectly, and swiftly condemn and take steps to bring to justice those who commit or condone such crimes.

No peace operation has the intrinsic political clout needed to twist arms of powerful but recalcitrant local parties. The Security Council should prepare in advance both targeted sanctions and International Criminal Court (ICC) referral cases to deploy, or threaten to deploy, in the face of backsliding on agreements or recourse to violence against civilians.

E. Financing Peace Operations

1. Reinforce UN Secretariat conflict prevention and mediation capabilities

BDG-1.1 Utilize the Regular Budget for the Secretariat’s core prevention and mediation capacities including: (a) monitoring and analysis, (b) support to the Secretary General’s good offices and mediation support, including the standby mediation team, and (c) the deployment of peace and development advisers and small multidisciplinary teams of experts to support the UN Country Team when needed.

BDG-1.2 Access the Peacekeeping Support Account for mediation and electoral support to peacekeeping operations. [Emphasis added.]

This recommendation has a lot going for it, since the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) is already funded primarily by the Regular Budget; prevention and mediation are not high-cost, high-volume endeavors; and they already have a small standby mediation capacity. Consistent crisis intervention for conflict prevention or mediation implies a standing capacity.

Access to the Peacekeeping Support Account for mediation and electoral support functions is a natural extension of the kinds of operational support (e.g., polling place security, or transport of ballots, ballot boxes or elections staff or monitors) that field operations already provide, but with greater flexibility and funding assurance. (DPA’s Electoral Assistance

Division has traditionally functioned largely on the basis of earmarked Member State donations.)

2. To enhance UN financing in support of sustaining peace

BDG-2.1 Scale up the fast track window ('Immediate Response Facility'), of the Peacebuilding Fund, building on a clear UN vision, enhanced flexibility in its implementation partners, and fast-track procedures.

BDG-2.2 Establish pooled country-level UN funds linked to a political roadmap and integrated strategies.

BDG-2.3 Clarify practical aspects of cooperation between missions and UN Country Teams, such as co-location in remote areas, including cost-sharing and reimbursement arrangements for shared services and other aspects of support and administration.

BDG-2.4 Enable the use of assessed contributions by partners based on comparative advantage.

The Peacebuilding Fund emerged from phase one of the PB Architecture Review in better shape than the rest of the architecture. It was 'simply too small to achieve the impact required,' namely, catalyzing larger resource flows for post-conflict investment.⁴⁸ Annual disbursements could usefully be doubled to \$200 million, and a focus on being 'risk-taker of first resort.'

MPTFs can be strategically useful, especially if mission budgets do not receive programmatic funding, but all program stakeholders must have an agreed say in the disbursement of funds. (Past experience has seen voluntary funding of Party A's plans land, of necessity, in Party B's trust fund and then come under Party B's sole control.) A structure and process for multi-stakeholder decision-making should also be created for applying any assessed mission program funds.

3. Build program funding into mission budgets for select mandated tasks

BDG-3 The Secretary-General should include within proposed mission budgets programmatic resources when these are necessary for the effective implementation of mandated tasks. Such programmatic funding should be implemented by the entity capable of most effectively delivering results, whether the mission directly, the UN Country Team or other implementing partners.

Program resources complement a mission's ability to recruit and pay for program managers. But program execution may best be undertaken in collaboration with the UN Country Team. And to minimize resistance

⁴⁸ AGE Report, pp. 40–42.

from major funders, program funds should be ‘first resort’ funds in the first two or three years of mission budgets but allocable to a mission trust fund so that they do not go away if projects are delayed, as often happens in post-conflict settings. The three-year cap on such start-up funding should assuage major funders, and indeed give them enough time to both monitor progress and plan voluntary follow-up funding.

4. Use assessed contributions to fund peace operations partnerships with the African Union

BDG-4.1 The use of United Nations-assessed contributions be provided on a case-by-case basis to support Security Council-authorized African Union peace support operations including the costs associated with deployed uniformed personnel to complement funding from the African Union and/or African Member States.

BDG-4.2 Any African Union peace support operation receiving United Nations assessed contributions should provide regular reports to the Security Council, as well as appropriate financial reporting to the Organization, and comply fully with UN standards, such as the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy, and UN conduct and discipline frameworks.

The first of these propositions essentially regularizes the exceptional arrangements by which the United Nations has funded the African Union (AU) Mission in Somalia.

The high cost in civilian lives of the fight against al Shabaab makes the second proposition essential. The United Nations should deploy military observers empowered to accompany AU forces, observe decision making and operations, and report their observations without interference. UN civilian and police observers should play parallel roles in their respective areas of the operation.

5. Use assessed contributions to launch and to backstop special political missions

BDG-5.1 Establish a special and separate account for the funding of special political missions that would be budgeted, funded and reported upon on an annual basis with a financial period of 1 July to 30 June.

BDG-5.2 Authorize special political missions, with the prior concurrence of the Advisory Committee, to access the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund for up to \$25 million per decision of the General Assembly or the Security Council relating to the start-up or expansion phase of field-based special political missions.

BDG-5.3 Authorize special political missions, with the prior concurrence of the Advisory Committee, to access up to \$25 million in strategic deployment stocks in advance of the corresponding budget appropriation if a decision of the General Assembly or Security Council relating to their start-up or expansion results in the need for expenditure.

BDG-5.4 Make the support account available to all departments and offices to fund their fluctuating back-stopping requirements in relation to field-based special political missions and confirm the responsibility to support special political missions, while maintaining the existing arrangements for the financing of the support account and the Global Service Centre.

If BDG-6—a single peace operations account—were to be realized, then the first and last propositions in this set would be superseded. If not, then the argument is for an account like the peacekeeping budget. One argument for keeping it separate is the sheer number of budget entities that would appear in a combined list (special political missions include envoys and sanctions-investigating Groups of Experts as well as regional field offices and political missions).

It is reasonable to give new special political missions access to the Reserve Fund and strategic deployment stocks; missions repay those advances from their budgets, once appropriated.

Lack of dedicated Headquarters support for SPMs is a long-standing complaint of both DPA and the Department of Field Support. Both have been asked to give support and guidance to SPMs pro-bono. Building SPMs into the Support Account relieves that stress.

6. Develop a single peace operations account

BDG-6 Develop a proposal for a single 'peace operations account' to finance all peace operations and related back-stopping activities in the future.

The 35 elements in the 2016 SPM budget total \$566 million for the year. The 15 elements in the 2016 peacekeeping budget total \$8.26 billion. It would contribute fiscal clarity to have all peace operations under a single

budget, consistent with the Panel's notion of a common continuum for peace operations, from strategic conflict prevention to sustaining peace. On the other hand, it would, from one perspective, drag political operations into the same zone as the heavily militarized and 'securitized' realm of peacekeeping—or whatever it is that peacekeeping has evolved into that lacks a good label. With all such operations under one budget, the rationale for separate Departments of Peacekeeping and of Political Affairs would likely weaken substantially—consistent with the Panel's call for a serious rethink of the UN's peace and security architecture that Secretary-General Ban is presenting to his successor.

On a smaller canvas, this proposal, if implemented, would render a special account for SPMs (BDG-5.1) unnecessary, and would loop SPMs into a common Headquarters support structure for peace operations.

Creation of a single peace operations account would not resolve the question of whether to include funds for field programs in mission budgets. That is, it would not extinguish the debate about what kinds of expenses can or should be treated as organizational 'dues' and what kinds should remain voluntary.

V. Concluding Remarks

The HIPPO Report not only covered a great deal of policy ground but delivered a broad range of advice that was effectively mirrored in many respects by the other major reviews that are feeding into the General Assembly's May 2016 High-level Thematic Debate on Peace and Security. The General Assembly, like the Security Council, has the rare opportunity to consider a set of consistent advice from several different vectors. The reviews all make clear that human rights, and fair treatment and equal opportunities for women, are critically important to creating and sustaining peace everywhere; that rule of law and community-oriented public security is essential to recovery from conflict; and that clear communication with strategic purpose is a critical peace multiplier.

The messages in the HIPPO Report are clear but troubling if one considers that, 17 years after the present surge in UN peace operations began, the United Nations has not been able to get a consistent grip on, let alone eliminate or, even better, prevent the eruptions of political violence that have engaged so many missions and so many peacekeepers over the past decade and a half. In fairness to the United Nations, far more powerful national actors have not had much better luck in state building over the last decade, either. State building is very hard work that takes a long time to bear fruit even if the effort is not under constant threat of armed attack. Of the Panel's four 'essential shifts' in how the UN should approach peace operations, two are straightforward and doable—seeing operations as a single spectrum of engagement and seeing peace and security in terms of global and regional partnerships—and two are more difficult to do right, namely, the primacy of politics and making Headquarters more field-focused and operations more

people-centered.

The Panel was right to urge that ‘politics must drive the design and implementation of peace operations,’ but to a troubling degree, the United Nations gets the mandate for a Mali or a Central African Republic mission, *faute de mieux*, when governmental structures are teetering or have fallen, the region cannot manage the chaos and no more powerful national actors care to step up in a more than peripheral way—for fear of being stuck themselves or of earning a neo-colonial label. That is, the politics that drive mission mandates seem too often the politics of last resort.

In mission areas, the politics of corrupt governments, exploitable natural resources, transnational organized crime, and widespread denials of opportunity to women—whether in education, ownership of property or businesses, or access to reproductive health services—stunt whole societies and divert their wealth into relatively few, well-connected pockets.⁴⁹ There seems to be an underlying assumption that local parties need only see the utility of non-violence to adopt it, even though the places where peacekeepers deploy of late are in shambles because violence works, corruption works, ignoring human rights works, and crime pays for those in charge, those fighting to be in charge, or those using disorder to build their smuggling and trafficking networks. These are the incentive structures that must be dismantled if the politics—and with it the economies—of corruption- and conflict-affected states are to change for the better for their peoples.

So if missions really are committed to helping turn their mission areas right side up, they will energetically take up the Women, Peace and Security agenda and focus their growing strategic communication skills on making it happen on their watch. They will apply the same degree of focus to rebuilding local police and criminal justice institutions and to rooting out the petty corruption that blackens the reputation of governments in the eyes of their citizens and eliminates the trust in government needed to make the UN’s ‘community-oriented policing’ strategy—or a two-way strategic communication strategy—work. Missions must actively solicit, receive, and act upon citizen input; make an effort to keep the public informed of what they are doing and why; and demonstrate how the change that is on the table—in a peace plan or a joint program—will *work better for them* than the long-suffering status quo.

The purpose of this paper was to create a framework for tracking and evaluating the implementation of the HIPPO Report’s recommendations in the five key areas of Women, Peace and Security; UN Police; staff safety and security; strategic communication; and funding. Its framework of benchmarks and implementation scoring should facilitate tracking, rating and comparing the implementation of large numbers of recommendations, including the respective implementation track records of the UN Secretariat, Security Council, General Assembly, regional organizations and Member States. The framework can easily be expanded to accommodate more categories of actors or greater detail within categories. It facilitates

⁴⁹ Carnegie Endowment Working Group on Corruption and Society, *Corruption: The Unrecognized Threat to International Security*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2014.

comparisons of progress within and between sets of recommendations and within and between categories of implementing agent. Is the General Assembly favoring one class of concepts but not another? Is the Secretariat leading on some issues but lagging on others? Have Member States stepped forward in those areas only they can address? In just some of those areas or all of them? It was not the purpose of the paper to evaluate the HIPPO Report's theories of change or to assess the likelihood of its recommendations generating the sorts of outcomes that the Panel was clearly seeking, especially making UN Headquarters more field-oriented and UN missions more people-centered. But it does provide a compact toolkit for tracking the progress the UN is making toward the day when it will find out.

Questions for Discussion

1. How should the UN system organize itself to implement the HIPPO recommendations and who should track implementation?
2. How can attention best be kept focused on implementation?
3. How should the Secretary-General and Member States decide which recommendations should receive the highest policy and/or funding priority?
4. How should the UN system track the outcomes and impact generated by implementing HIPPO recommendations?
5. Should the outcomes and impact of failure to implement priority recommendations also be tracked?