

Building Capacity in Peace Operations in Response to Diversified Threats —What Lies Ahead?

Summary of Challenges Annual Forum 2014

The Introductory Remarks emphasized that the Forum took place at a time of ongoing and emerging conflicts and significant uncertainty. International, national and local conflict and friction are challenging various parts of the world, the emergence of extremist organizations, such as the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq and the spreading Ebola virus in West Africa, all ensure that the demand for UN peacekeepers has become greater than ever. Peacekeepers are called upon to handle crises in increasingly fluid, complex and ambiguous environments while the demands to protect fellow human beings are rising.

The recent deadly attacks on UN peacekeepers in the Central African Republic (CAR), Mali and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) reflect the increasingly hostile, violent and non-permissive environment in which UN peacekeeping now operates. The threats are manifold and diverse, from terrorism to transnational organized crime, from corruption to the spread of infectious diseases, from asymmetric warfare to state fragility. These developments might suggest that the operational context for peacekeeping has outpaced both doctrine development and capacity building. Questions that the Challenges Forum Partnership therefore need to address are whether the principles and modus operandi developed in the last decade are sufficient; whether new typologies need to be developed; and to what extent the existing principles are elastic enough to include offensive and counter-terrorist operations?

To help address these issues the Challenges Forum partnership over the last two years have been working on four thematic work strands that make up four chapters in an emerging report on Designing Mandates and Capabilities for Future Peace Operations. The four chapters address: a) Future Conditions for Peace Operations, led by the Indian and German Partners; b) Authority Command and Control, led by the French and Nigerian Partners; c) Comparative Policies, Principles and Guidelines (with a specific focus on gender, transnational organized crime

Challenges Annual Forum 2014

The Challenges Annual Forum for 2014 was held in Beijing on 14-15 October. It was co-hosted by the Peacekeeping Office of the Ministry of National Defence of China and the Chinese Institute for International Strategic Studies in the Peacekeeping Centre in Huairou District, Beijing.

Summary by Challenges Forum Secretariat, Folke Bernadotte Academy, October 2014.


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and protection of civilians), led by the Pakistani and US Partners; and d) Effective Impact Assessment and Evaluation, led by the South African and Canadian Partners. The agenda for the 2014 Annual Forum was based on the findings of this report and its four chapters, namely to: look at the implications of the new conditions for capacity building; explore how to strengthen peacekeepers capacity to address non-traditional threats including such threats against themselves; explore how the associated logistics difficulties might be overcome; and look at how to build stronger partnerships in the face of these challenges. The report in its entirety is foreseen to be presented to the Secretary General in December, along with the Report from the 2014 Annual Forum in Beijing.

It was noted that it was ten years since China hosted its first high-level conference on peacekeeping, which China also then hosted in cooperation with the Challenges Forum Partnership. Since then, China has become a major contributor to UN peacekeeping. Nevertheless the themes of 2004 remain very relevant today: the change in the nature of conflicts; the growing influence of regional organizations; the legitimacy challenges posed by host nation power vacuums; the relationship between the root causes of conflict and the humanitarian needs; the increasing complexity of partnerships and actors; and the apparent lack of consensus in the use of force alongside the applicability of the traditional peacekeeping principles. The major difference was that in 2004 peacekeeping took place in a period of reduced tension among major powers. Sadly, this can no longer be said to hold true at the present time.

Peacekeeping is now in a necessary era of critical self-examination, as it was in the early post-Bosnia, post-Rwanda period that led to the 2000 Brahimi Report. The forthcoming Secretary General's (SG's) Review into peacekeeping is thus seen as a seminal opportunity in which the Challenges Forum looks forward once again to making a positive and capacity-building contribution.



Building Capacity for Peace Operations in Response to Diversified Threat—What Lies Ahead?

In the first keynote address by the Forum's Chinese hosts it was noted that UN peacekeeping remains an important mechanism to promote multilateralism within the international community. Certainly, there are new threats and challenges as already identified, so it is timely to talk about how to best face these diversified threats. Four points for consideration arose from the analysis:

- *The need to improve peacekeeping doctrine and theory while adhering to the core principles of consent, impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate.* These principles are fundamental for the participation and trust of member states. But new concepts of peacekeeping are emerging which are putting strain on these principles and require further discussion.
- *The need to rationalize the authorisation of peacekeeping mandates.* Peacekeeping has become complex, dealing with humanitarian crises, ethnic conflicts and post-conflict reconstruction, while protecting civilians and implementing robust mandates. But peacekeeping has limited resources. It cannot do everything. It is not a universal panacea. A better balance and distinctive relationships between peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding is needed.
- *The need to manage peacekeeping operations more scientifically and efficiently.* This requires better communications between the Security Council (UNSC), the UN Secretariat, the donor states and the troop contributing countries (TCCs) to ensure better logistic support to operations and the optimal and the more focused use of precious resources.
- *The need to improve the safety and security of peacekeepers.* This can be achieved by better use of technology and increased incentivization of member states with the required troop and equipment capabilities. At the same time improved training is needed to enhance peacekeeper's ability to deal with an increasingly complex and hostile environment.

As a measure of China's commitment to UN peacekeeping, the Forum was briefed that China was now overall the sixth largest financial contributor, and within the Security Council, the largest troop contributor. Furthermore China was about to deploy for the first time, a 700 strong infantry battalion to South Sudan (UNMISS) and a helicopter contingent to The Ivory Coast (ONUCI).

The intent of the SG's Review was outlined in the second keynote address by DPKO. The Review will cover both peacekeeping and special political missions. The SG was to appoint a high level multi-disciplinary panel to reflect on changes around the world and the range of tools needed



for future peacekeeping. 'It remains true today that a country has a better chance of emerging from peace when a peace operation has been deployed'. But the conflicts of today, while fewer in number, are the most intractable and are becoming regionalized and internationalized, and as a result, more prolonged and deadly. 'In this global context of fewer but more complex and deep-rooted conflicts, the Security Council had continued to turn to UN peacekeeping'. However, there are significant operational and political challenges to be addressed.

Approximately two thirds of UN personnel are now operating in contexts of significant levels of ongoing violence. This hampers the ability to start new missions and to operate safely once deployed. Partnerships are needed to address transnational crime and terrorism. The UNSC has made it clear that it sees the protection of civilians (PoC) as being at the centre of missions' mandates, but this needed a willingness by the missions and personnel on the ground to be proactive and decisive. A static approach and a mere presence are no longer sufficient. The UN now needs to undertake 'proactive protection' operations, which requires increased mobility and agility, new capabilities and new technologies, deploying critical force multipliers. The priority development areas identified by UNHQ are rapid response (including strategic airlift capabilities) increased tactical mobility, enhanced medical support, improved improvised explosive device (IED) survival measures, improved information and analysis systems and expertise to address transnational threats. However, effective PoC through 'proactive protection' is not just a question of capabilities, it also requires a change in the mindset of all involved in peacekeeping, at every level.

Some of the biggest challenges faced by peacekeeping missions were identified as political in nature. Striking the balance between consent and impartiality is a challenge for a mission deployed to where there is an absence of an agreed political roadmap or a peace process. In these ambiguous environments, where a peacekeeping operation is buttressing an incomplete political process, it is essential that the UNSC stands united behind the peacekeeping operation it has authorized.

A number of critical priorities were identified from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations' (DPKO) perspective:

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However, effective PoC through 'proactive protection' is not just a question of capabilities, it also requires a change in the mindset of all involved in peacekeeping, at every level.

- The base of existing contributors to peacekeeping must be deepened and expanded. Only by a broad cross-section of member state contributions can both a strong political signal and a full array of capabilities be deployed.
- Strengthened cooperation with regional actors is necessary as a way to burden share, to ensure rapid deployment and to optimize niche capabilities.
- A more rapid deployment capability is needed before situations spiral further into violence. The UN struggles to deploy peacekeepers in a timely manner. Critical choke points are the key enabling capabilities of medical support, air and ground transport, and engineering. Partnerships have a role here but it is also vital that member states prepare and train their troops in an effective and timely manner.
- The capabilities of peacekeepers must be modernised in line with the priorities identified for proactive protection.
- The UN should be held to an increasingly high standard of performance, and should be expected to demonstrate consistent success. The Office for Peacekeeping Strategic Partnerships has an important role here to identify gaps and promulgate best practice.
- More must be done to help extend host state authorities and institutions. This requires improved integrated planning and financial arrangements within the UN family, in support of the principle of national and local ownership of the peace process.
- Finally, a common approach and understanding to the most challenging mandate of civilian protection is required.

Given the complexity of the UN system and its diverse membership, the systemic change needed to meet these requirements is a challenge. Meanwhile, the demands on the ground do not heed the pace of international institutions. For the sixth year in row more than 100 peacekeepers have died while serving peace. A collective response is therefore needed to strengthen and renew the principle instrument for international peace and security.

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SESSION 1: Promoting Peacekeepers' Capacity to Address Non-Traditional Threats in Areas of Peace Operations

The presence of non-traditional threats such as transnational organized crime (TOC), corruption, pandemics, terrorism, piracy, asymmetric warfare, cyber insecurity and environmental degradation were identified as increasingly facing peacekeepers. The session tried to focus on the capabilities and skill sets that were needed in this new environment.

Discussion began with a self-confessedly pessimistic view from the Centre on International Cooperation in New York of the current state of peacekeeping, and where it is going, in light of the number and scale of threats it is facing. In the 1990s UN peacekeeping went through “a near death experience”. The comparisons to today are disturbing. Today’s challenges threaten to politically overwhelm the UNSC. Their response has been to load more tasks onto the already overwhelmed and under-resourced missions.

The most serious challenges to peacekeeping today are both systemic and political. Systemic threats have already been outlined but are epitomized by the sheer number of attacks on the UN, which make it impossible for many peacekeeping missions to meet their basic operational goals. These threats largely come from Islamic groups, which see the UN as a valid target. Equally disruptive are the political threats to missions where governments that host UN operations treat them as an annoyance or a threat. In dealing with these threats and the required use of force there is little unity or shared understanding between the UNSC and the TCCs or even within the UNSC. While the situation is not quite as bad as in the 1990s, it is bad enough to anticipate that missions are likely to fail. A palliative is that such failure might be the spur to generate the change that UN peacekeeping requires.

Meanwhile the Secretariat and those engaged member states are trying to innovate, but much depends on the forthcoming SG’s Review. Three immediate areas where action are required include first, the need for a serious rebalancing and conceptual adjustment between civilian crisis management, military crisis management and enforcement. Second, there needs to be a rebalancing of the relationship between the UN and the Arab world. It is unacceptable that the UN has become a target. Third, the bargain between the host nation and UN peacekeeping needs rethinking. The current dysfunction in places such as South Sudan and Darfur is unsurmountable. This is all achievable but the SG’s Review is only the first step. Critical is that every government involved in peacekeeping shows the political will to act, if peacekeeping is not to reprise the failures of the 1990s.

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A Chinese former Force Commander's intervention focused on the model of the People's Liberation Army's (PLA's) first UN infantry deployment to Mali in 2013, when a company of 170 infantry soldiers served as UN force protection. Their tasks were both traditional and non-traditional for peacekeepers but their main challenge was the terrorist and extremist groups who would take any opportunity to attack UN forces. A lesson learned from this experience is the importance of rapid reaction and night operations. 32 per cent of the terrorist attacks took place before the dawn. To deal with these complex threats, the UN military commanders needed good situational awareness and technical information collection capabilities, in order to rapidly discern the hostile intentions and then to react with a gradual escalation of appropriate military force. To turn an infantry company into a peacekeeping force—where there were no enemies to defeat, nor any ground to defend, but only people to protect—required intensive training and induction.

An Indian former Force Commander panellist identified that non-traditional threats have made the landscape more uncertain. These threats are often ill-defined and unpredictable. Vital and effective weapons against them are knowledge and an integrated response. Use of military force alone is unlikely to bring about strategic outcomes. New capabilities and new operational means are required while understanding the operational environment. The distinction between combat and non-combat operations is becoming increasingly difficult. Joint operations must be conducted with the support of the host government. Non-traditional threats have distinct characteristics: they are often quiet and hard to detect; they require a multidimensional not just a military response; and they tend to extend beyond the mission's boundaries.

Turning to specific threats, transnational organized crime (TOC) was brought out as an issue but it needs to be dealt with by the host government with the support of the UN's uniformed components and an augmented intelligence analysis capability. Questions were raised about where peacekeeping operations need to be sent. Additionally, attention must be paid to the damage caused by natural disasters. They often have dire social consequences, especially in fragile and developing states. Peacekeepers need to act swiftly under these circumstances and be capable of undertaking emergency humanitarian assistance roles.

Finally, terrorism was identified as the greatest danger to member states, posing a direct threat to the security of their citizens. Peacekeeping missions should have a counter terrorist capability, with force protection being the most essential consideration. A strong focus should be on intelligence-led operations. Peacekeepers must be trained in counterterrorism and pre-emptive action. Additionally the threat from cyber-attack is rapidly increasing making the protection of critical information systems and command and control networks part of the

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task. All this points to the need to rapidly improve the capacities of peacekeepers.

In the open discussion on the issue of the need for improved intelligence, it was recognized that this sensitive issue was not new, but in an environment of increased threats against peacekeepers the requirement has become more acute. Missions need improved processes on the ground to protect themselves and their mandates. It is a matter of safety and security. But it is possible to distinguish between different levels of intelligence (or information collection). Intelligence at the strategic level can be seen as threatening to the regime and host government, but at the operational and tactical, it can be vital to deal with the non-traditional threats. At the same time some guarantees are necessary to reassure the host government that information will not be used against them. Currently very little is available to the missions at the tactical level. Signals and other electronic technologies do not exist to improve this. It was also recognized that while vital, it is difficult to protect the confidentiality of intelligence driven plans. Better internal information protection mechanisms and more robust protocols are therefore needed within UN peacekeeping.

Host nations often end up feeling threatened by the presence of UN missions for a variety of reasons. This leads to tensions in the needed cooperative effort to deal with these threats. Cultural awareness and understanding of mutual capabilities are important, as are strong coordination efforts and mutual training. But ultimately, the UN needs the right sort of troops and police, able and confident to operate in this complex and hostile environment. At the same time clear command and control systems are needed in which, the uniformed components have confidence. This must come from the strategic level downwards, as troops and field commanders need to know that their interventions against these threats are supported at the highest level within the UN political system. This requires a change of thinking from the present wherein such confidence does not exist.

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SESSION 2: Enhancing Peace Operations' Capacity to Face Threats Against Peacekeepers

The first panellist's intervention for this session considered the issue of safety and security from the perspective of the Secretariat, particularly the UN Department of Safety and Security (DSS). Key points raised with the Forum were:

- Contemporary conflicts tend to be prolonged and involve many actors including host government and anti-government forces, state sponsored militias, armed criminal elements both national and transnational, and other government's forces. Some of these actors operate outside of known political processes and are a direct threat to UN peacekeepers.
- There is an imperative from the UNSC for faster start up, and more robust operations. Increasingly, deployments occur prior to a post-conflict period and in the absence of any political framework. This has shown to heighten the security risk to peacekeepers. (For example in Mali in the last 16 months, there have been 76 hostile acts, killing 27 peacekeepers and seriously injuring an additional 76.)
- Even in established missions the security situation may change (e.g. UNDOF which became engulfed in Syrian civil war). The same thing occurred in South Sudan with the resumption of internal conflict.

The challenge is to match capabilities of civilian, police and military peacekeepers with the existing/new security environment. Three capability areas were briefed where risk might be reduced: conceptual, training and resources.

Within a coherent conceptual security framework, the following is required: a sound political base which removes (or reduces) the intention to commit violence against the UN; realistic guidance that takes into account the security environment; integrated support plans from all mission components; and security risk management policies which identify procedures and standards for all components of the mission and work up techniques and procedures to fit the environment.

Regarding training, there is a need to improve the focus on practical security and risk management. There is a recognized vulnerability in basic training areas, particularly in situational awareness, ground movement, proactive individual and unit force protection measures, and communications and emergency response. Close collaboration is required between the UN Secretariat and member states, to ensure that training is conducted and that it is effective. Senior leadership is also needed to know how to develop systems, including intelligence and information assets, which are fundamental to security.

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Concerning resources, there is a need for specialist personnel and equipment, timely deployment of civilian enablers, higher payload aviation, mobile engineering equipment, readily transportable command and control (C2) systems, and rapidly in-place barrier and physical protective systems. Finally, there is also a need to introduce modern technology for security into UN peace operations, such as unmanned, unarmed aerial vehicles (UUAV) for surveillance, radar direction finders, remote sensors, enhanced physical security systems, mobile building materials and finally improved communication, command and control systems. All of which are readily available on the open market.

In summary the needed strategies to reduce the risk to peacekeepers and which might be included in the SG's Review are:

- A better-informed assessment of the security risks by the UNSC before mandate articulation.
- An enhancement of the Integrated Planning Process (IAP) to integrate security considerations into the planning process.
- The development of force protection policies, guidelines and standards for the uniformed mission components, currently outside the UN's security management system.
- The development of an assessment programme to translate into best practice focused force protection training for all mission components including the mission leadership.
- The establishment of mechanisms to research and procure equipment best suited for high-risk security environments.

The next panellist, a serving Force Commander from MONUSCO, identified that changes on the ground happen faster than changes in doctrine within the UN. Deterrence by presence is no longer sufficient. Deterrence by action is needed. This calls for a review of the principles of peacekeeping, as they are established for a different role and environment. TCCs need to agree, commit and train for the necessary tasks required for mandate implementation, especially the protection tasks which require a changed dynamic, a robust posture and intelligence-led proactive operations. The system is currently not working and credibility is lost. Experience shows that failing to take action encourages aggression against the UN.

The UN information collection mechanisms—IOCC, Joint Operations Centres (JOC) and Joint Mission Analysis Centres (JMAC)—work well for political and civilian actors but they cannot replicate the need for operational intelligence. To counter the emerging threats, more emphasis and resources are needed for human intelligence. Meanwhile, the UN is hampered by the absence of basic technology let alone high technology. The ability to operate at night is not high technology but it is vital. Spoilers must lose the freedom of movement at night, not the UN.

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Technology plays a role but determination, will and the right dynamics are the main success factors. This requires TCCs/police contributing countries (PCCs) to be better prepared for the reality on the ground, and to be confident and at times overwhelming in their use of force against some of these non-traditional threats. Robust action is within the mandate and the legal framework.

The third panellist from the Swedish foreign ministry focused on the improved situational awareness and force protection provided by Sweden's deployment to Mali of a niche and innovative capability of an Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) unit. To optimize its product requires new working methods and secure communications within the UN mission. These needed to be ratified in UN directives. Meanwhile it is necessary to exploit the benefits of partnerships with organizations such as NATO, which have significant experience of non-traditional threats to its personnel, from Iraq and Afghanistan, especially in the field of IEDs. Above all peacekeepers need to create an enabling environment. To do this they need to change attitudes and be more culturally aware. They needed to adapt their procedures and training to the new environment. To this end, missions need to be better designed for purpose with stronger inclusion of non-kinetic components such as gender sensitive civil-military cooperation (CIMIC), which synergise the effect of military activities.

In open Forum discussion key points that arose were that MONUSCO is a specialized mission. Lessons learned from it cannot necessarily be extrapolated across the whole of peacekeeping. The use and management of intelligence (as processed information for decision making) was discussed again. The point was made that if there is wide consent for the peacekeeping operation then only information is needed. When people are trying to kill you, intelligence is needed, plus the secure systems to disseminate it to those who need to take action. The JMAC is not necessarily the organization with which intelligence professionals are comfortable in dealing. New technology (such as UUAVs) brings the need for new secure information systems. Concerning the use of force, there was discussion on the model of the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) in DRC. The shared view was that it is a unique expediency. But a force within a force is not the preferred model. Better that all military components understand their mission and their obligation to protect and then train for it. Armed groups generally avoid confrontation with well-trained, robust peacekeepers. The latest UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) report into PoC within peacekeeping shows major deficiencies in our ability to 'proactively protect'. Finally, at the strategic level, there is an undoubted role for African Quick Reaction Forces as part of the partnership and burden sharing within peacekeeping.

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SESSION 3: Overcoming Logistic Difficulties in Complex and Remote Peace Operations

The Forum was briefed that logistics is the science of planning and carrying out the movement, and of maintenance of an operation's personnel and their equipment. The UN system is dependent on a high degree of self-reliance by contingent contributing states, backstopped by donor states and the UN, and coordinated by the UN mission support system. This has resulted in complexities given the multidimensional and multi-national nature of peacekeeping, compounded by the typical hostility and remoteness of the operating environment.

Some challenges and recommendations were offered for discussion. Rapid deployment needs a pre-emptive approach based on a clear assessment of the logistics needs supported by a UN roster of logistic expertise and host nation capability catalogues. Civilian capacities for logistics and engineering in crises (such as the German Technisches Hilfswerk, THW) are available in member states when rapid deployment is needed and when the UN is overstretched. Currently there are few incentives for member states to have key enablers and units that are self-sustaining. The SG report's recommendations for compensation of key enabling capacities do not go far enough in offering incentives. The effect of separate key enabling capacities and readiness premiums should also be monitored. Reimbursement should be unit-based and reflect capability not just numbers of personnel and equipment. Using the capability should be part of the requirement, not just having the capability. The impact on the host nation of logistics support and procurement should be more closely factored into logistic planning and the wider implementation of the mandate and should guide procurement decisions. Finally the UN needs an expert panel as part of the SG's Review on how technology might improve logistical support to missions.

In response DPKO briefed the Forum on the scale of the logistic challenges that peacekeeping is facing. Since the time of the Brahimi Report in 2000, the field support dependency for the Department of Field Support (DFS) has grown by more than 230 per cent. This nearly reached 300 per cent when AMISOM was included (supported by DFS), amounting to 172,000 personnel (with an additional 4,500 in SPMs). This deployment was over a vast territory (larger than the Roman Empire at its peak) characterised by weak or non-existent logistic infrastructure. The lack of host nation capacity was often exacerbated by strained relations between the UN and host government. Obstructions in customs, flight planning, convoys etc. were compounded by insecure areas of operations. As of 2014, 44 per cent of mission operational areas are considered to be in locations of high, substantial or extreme danger (up from 22 per cent in 2011). This affects the choice of logistics and puts a heavy and expensive dependence on air operations.

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Given the scale of this enterprise and the cost restraints in the over \$8bn peacekeeping budget, DPKO/DFS has been working on their global field support strategy (GFSS). Previously missions managed as stand alone entities. A more global and regional approach is currently implemented. Under GFSS there is now faster access to strategic deployment stocks, new approaches to turnkey enabling contracts (e.g. rations and tented camps), modular infrastructure packages, member state support, regional coordination and sharing of assets, and regional commercial contracts to support the supply chain at the regional level.

Despite this, more needed to be done. The UN struggled to employ key enablers both military and civilian in a timely fashion. Rapidly deployable engineering is a major capability gap. Flexible solutions are needed for in-mission accommodation for rapid deployment as well as in-mission mobility. Medical support to missions need strengthening to meet the golden hour rule. The UN system itself with its underlying rules and authorities for peacekeeping is a significant constraint. The UN needs to consider for the future a regulatory regime for procurement and human resources better suited to the fast field tempo of operations.

The Mali deployment experience was carefully studied in a DPET after action review. Lessons emerged. Improved and early strategic outreach to TCCs and PCCs is needed. The deployment of military enablers should be prioritised, against agreed joint planning requirements and the concept of operations (CONOPS). Force generation need to be reviewed and streamlined. Logistics need enhanced ability to deploy rapidly, to achieve quick operational impact but also more flexibility. To address these issues a review of partnership and burden sharing arrangements is required, with agreed standards and timelines. When talking about rapid deployment, a good UN timeline without obstructions is six months. But that does not qualify as rapid deployment. In reality, only a handful of member states can deploy rapidly. Partnerships with these states need to be worked out in advance, with an emergency set of procedures. The AU and EU could offer a bridging capability. Finally, the reimbursement model needs to be examined to meet these requirements, which is expected to be swept up by the New Technology Panel, due to report in December.

A further intervention from a panellist, identified that, historically, when any campaign had failed it was due to a lack of logistics. UN logistics procedures are rigid and lengthy with a heavy reliance on aviation assets, of which the UN is very short. Moreover there is a systemic dichotomy between the military requirement and the civilian mission and budgetary support system. The logistic supply chain, once established, does not support redeployment and regrouping and there is a shortage of skilled manpower for providing effective engineering and logistics support. Areas of particular concern in this new threatening environment for peacekeepers include: mobility, fuel and food, ammunition scales,



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and defence stores for force protection. This is compounded by the insensitivity of civilian logistic providers at mission level to the contingent priorities at the high tempo tactical level.

Recommendations from these interventions are that the current Department for Field Support model of logistic support should be reviewed, clarifying roles, responsibilities, authority and accountability. Logistics specific to the robust peacekeeping mandate needs to be under the control of the force commander. This would disaggregate the civilian and military logistic functions. All this should be supported by a new logistics doctrine reflecting the reality of robust ground operations.

In open discussion on this session, the increased use of commercial actors was raised. Many Western militaries are embarking on privatisation of some logistics, with built-in responsibility and accountability mechanisms. The UN is thinking about this but need to issue more requests for proposals rather than invitations to bid within the UN system. But heavy penalties are need for non-delivery, especially in regions where there is no host nation capacity. The issue of improved standardisation was discussed. While it carried some advantages in terms of interoperability and efficiency, too much standardisation is often seen as a disincentive for other bidders/providers. The more you standardised the more difficult it is likely to be for countries to contribute.

On the use of improved technology, there is clearly a need to change the narrative on technology. It is often raised as a synonym for better surveillance mechanisms. But technology is so many more things than that. The UN is lagging behind in this field. The results of the technology panel will be instructive even if not necessarily offering easy and immediate solutions. Concerning standby arrangements, UN Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS) so far have not been particularly successful. Member state pledges are often never met ('they were off the menu'). What is needed is a set of special and reliable relationships where some of the discussions are short circuited because they have already been worked out in advance.

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SESSION 4: Building Partnerships for the Capacity Building of Peacekeepers

The Forum was briefed on how DPKO's Integrated Training Service's (ITS) is developing its training needs architecture to adjust to the rapidly changing peacekeeping environment. There are four capacity building partnerships: UN with member states; UN with regional and sub-regional and international organizations; between member states themselves (TCCs and PCC working together); and internal national partnerships.

The basic challenge in the first partnership is that from policy, guidelines and standards agreed in the UN, member states are expected to develop in detail their own training. This level of partnership could be strengthened by a closer focus on pre-deployment training of personnel, on what is being asked of TCCs and PCCs and on what is happening in in-mission training. UN assistance tools could be strengthened by improved communication and dissemination of training materials, more use of mobile training support teams and training of trainers, better recognition and prioritisation of those member states actually contributing to peacekeeping and improved integrated mission training centres within missions. Capacity building third party donors need to harmonise to UN standards, rationalise priorities gaps and overlaps, share resources more efficiently and get more involved at an earlier stage in mission planning to understand better the environment and its specific mission training requirements.

Within the UN and regional and sub-regional and international organizations, relationships vary. There is a need to strengthen existing formal arrangements and add substance to them (a small team in ITS are chasing yesterday's problems). But there is no capacity to actively manage partnerships, particularly not within the AU and EU. There is great value in working with informal training associations such as the International Association for Peacekeeping Training Centres (IAPTC).

Amongst TCCs and PCCs and donors there is a need to focus especially on pre-employment training for contingents and staff officers to get the basics right. Too often staff officers arrive in missions with no understanding of planning, working with intelligence or with other mission components (civilians, police etc) and with little knowledge of specific safety and cultural awareness subjects. Internally at the national level, better coherence can be achieved if more emphasis is put on the multi-dimensionality of modern peace operations with joint and integrated training.

The Forum was then briefed on the role that OIOS plays in capacity building for peacekeeping. It has three divisions: internal audit division; inspection and evaluations division; and investigations division. These

divisions cover most activities of the Secretariat, including peacekeeping and political missions. A recent examples of audits relevant to the topics of the Forum is the audit on the GFSS' enabling capacities to improve the mainstreaming of GFSS tasks. The audit referred to the poor standing capacities with various partnerships including contractors, military support, short-term consultants and rosters of capable experts. Another recent audit of the UN police capacity building in the Ivory Coast focused on whether police officers had met the qualifications required by the UN before their deployment. Few had. And an audit on transportation and movement within the integrated control centre in Entebbe identified the need for improved planning, coordination, and use of wide body long-range aircraft for troop rotation. Finally, equipment audits have noted the deleterious impact of low operational rates of equipment serviceability.

Other recent evaluations include one on the protection of civilians (already mentioned in Session 2); on the sufficiency of tactical level guidance; on leadership within PoC; on task and resources fit including the need for special forces (and their specialized equipment), non-lethal weaponry and improved riverine capacities.

The investigations division have participated and contributed to a DPKO/DFS led working group that will soon make recommendations to enhance the effectiveness of the UN's fight against sexual exploitation and abuse. The division is providing training to mission-based investigators. Recently the division investigated a groundbreaking case that involved DPKO and the host government.

Imminent planned audits germane to the Forum are looking at the security sector reform (SSR) unit in DPKO; the pre-deployment of uniformed personnel; the global supply chain; the effectiveness of Integrated Operations Teams (IOTs); and strategic transportation and deployment stocks. Imminent evaluations are into the results of national police capacity building (in MINUSTAH/UNOCI/MONUSCO); integration between peacekeeping operations and country teams within the same above missions; and senior mission leadership training. A clear message that was left was the relevance and utility of OIOS to drive change, efficiencies and improvement. OIOS reports are relied upon by member states, and most are publicly accessible

The next intervention from the panel was from the perspective of a member state on the UNSC. 'The level of world crises felt as if they are at an all time high'. The humanitarian community face four level three emergencies. 'All hands are on deck'. The sheer scale of emergencies affect peacekeeping in terms of attention and resources. Much is happening simultaneously. Meanwhile peacekeepers are being attacked as well as civilians. It was noted that peacekeeping takes place where there are risks, but the question is whether missions are achieving their goals, despite these costs. The major issue from the perspective of the UNSC is how best

to operationalise UNSC resolutions. The resolutions do matter but they are only the start of a process.

To help this process, the UNSC needs to show a stronger political commitment to the missions it mandates. The UNSC needs to do more to follow up diplomatically. At the tactical level the political areas where missions suffered (such as violations of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and issues of freedom of movement, leading to insecurity) deserve more attention from the UNSC. The lack of rapid response was exemplified in South Sudan last December. It was a revealing moment for all those involved in peacekeeping and showed fundamental capability and enabling gaps, which were critical to mission success. At the same time the UN system needed a larger range of strategic partnerships, and deeper conversation about how vital expertise might be moved from places like Afghanistan and Haiti to where it was now needed.

Major issues need to be flagged for the SG's Review. The UN needs to move the agenda from crisis to opportunity. The Review has to deal with many of the old, mission crippling issues identified at the Forum, such as the lack of mobility. The end state is not a report but a change in behaviour in the field. Above all else this needs will, boldness and good leadership.

DPKO was represented as the respondent panellist to this session. Referring to the training architecture project the key question was, 'now that there is so much regional and national training, are we getting the maximum impact from it?—probably not'. The Peacekeeping Summit chaired by US Vice President Biden pointed to a large number of capacity initiatives, which were echoed in a recent NATO summit in Wales. While some initiatives are not directly related to UN peacekeeping but taken together, they add up to a more interoperable peacekeeping capacity. But there is more chance of interoperability if standards are clearly articulated. Too often some of the policy discussions are too general and do not reflect reality in the field. The UN needs to try and better tailor its training to support what is happening on the ground. Missions are different and therefore require different range of standards and capabilities. This means that simulation and scenario-based training needs a stronger emphasis, especially for deployment to the more challenging environments.

It was well recognized that there are capability gaps within UN peacekeeping (rapid deployment, mobility in theatre, medical support, IED survivability etc). These cannot be filled without the member states. But few member states have the capability in most of these areas. More twinning, through global North/South initiatives might help. Incentives must be offered to help build expertise in these niche areas (such as counter IED). But too often capacity created is not sustainable. Very few countries are able to do expeditionary logistics. An option is to have a list of countries that the UN can go to for logistical support at mission start-up. This calls for more role specialisation among TCCs, particularly new


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TCCs. Finally the partners in UN training are too polite to each other. If units are failing in the field through the lack of appropriate preparation and training, then this needs saying. The virtuous circle of the training cycle is currently broken.

In open discussion, on training and guidance for PoC, the UN has developed, in parallel with the AU, training guidelines and scenario-based training. These are being rolled out through training of trainers exercises. The OIOS report indicated that there is a need for more ‘hip-pocket’ guidance and this is being addressed. Training is being modularized to teach troops and police what they need to know. But ultimately PoC is a leadership issue. Violence against the people undermined the peace process. This is where partnership between the UNSC and the field is needed. The UNSC is very clear—civilians under threat must be protected—whatever the threat is or from wherever it comes. Some of this remains contentious but change takes time. There is no space now for passive neutrality when civilians are under threat. Peacekeepers have responsibilities and need to apply their mandate impartially. This lesson was learned the hard way in Srebrenica and Rwanda.

On the need for civilian capacity development it is a conscious omission, but an important aspect. The UN Police Division is working on a new strategic concept for UN policing (Challenges Forum Partners were involved in this). More broadly, mission activity must be closely aligned with what the UN country team is doing. The UNSC Council has asked to look more closely at the transfer of tasks from DPKO to the UN country teams. But managing transition over time remains a major challenge.



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CONCLUDING SESSION

The Challenges Forum Secretariat concluded that many challenges were laid down in the Forum. During its course participants had discussed how to strengthen UN peacekeepers capacity to address non-traditional threats, transnational organized crimes, terrorists and operating in non-permissive environments. They had elaborated on what capabilities and skills sets are required for peacekeepers to carry out their missions effectively despite the very difficult circumstances into which they were deployed. The presentations made would be on the Challenges Forum website as soon as they had been received, in two weeks' time a Summary Report would be made available and in a few months' time the full report would be published. Occasional Papers and Policy Briefs would be coming out of the work on capacity building. The next Challenges Forum meeting would be held in New York to present findings from the Report on Designing Mandates and Capabilities for Future Peace Operations. Meanwhile the many active participants from around the world were honoured and thanked. Concluding, on behalf of the Challenges Forum Partnership, the Chinese Partners and Hosts were thanked for their commitment to UN peacekeeping and for their generous hosting of an open and frank discussions at the Annual Forum 2014.

DPKO thanked the Chinese government for fruitful exchange of views. Peacekeeping truly is a collective effort—a sign of the international community coming together on one common platform. It is a partnership that brings together the UNSC, the Secretariat and member states, in a struggle to reach a common vision of what success might be. It remains true that we operate in a difficult environment, without a peace to keep, without the consent of all the parties and wherein we are increasingly becoming targets of attack. These are challenges that we face on the ground. At the core peacekeeping is a political tool, but without an international political consensus. DPKO expressed appreciation to the Challenges Forum for once again enabling an inclusive discussion amongst the international peacekeeping community and for enabling all to reflect on the roles of peacekeeping, including important elements that will be taken up in the SG's review.

Future issues to be considered are: how do we find the capabilities to meet mandates? How should we deal with PoC? How to match doctrine to the new environment? What were and how do we supply the critical force multipliers? How do we achieve rapid reaction? How do we operationalize robust mandates? For all this a very strong base of troop contributing countries is needed. It is recognised that China with its farsighted policy over several years has begun to emerge as a key actor in this debate. The UN should now be looking at ways to get a solid base of contributing countries, particularly those in the global North.

The closing words came from the senior Chinese Host. Six points were reviewed:

- Before new missions are authorized all possible means to address traditional and on-traditional threats should be considered.
- Coordination mechanisms between UNSC, TCCs and host countries should be built and improved to strengthen international cooperation on peacekeeping security.
- Security training standards for peacekeepers should be laid out to provide tailor-made training for peacekeepers at all levels with the objective to raise the capability of peacekeepers in operations, emergency response and self-protection.
- Peacekeepers should be equipped with safety devices and protection facilities appropriate to the demands of the specific security environment. New technology and equipment should be introduced to reduce casualties.
- Complementary logistical support systems should be thoroughly improved and built at all levels, from TCCs, regional organizations up to the UN,
- International cooperation should be enhanced.

The Chinese Host thanked participants for their contributions and active engagement during the Annual Forum 2014. China also expressed their continued commitment to UN peacekeeping in general, including its active participation and contribution to the Challenges Forum and the Forum's continued and coming endeavours.

Participants of the Forum came from 30 countries and five continents. It was natural that differences occurred during the discussion. But undoubtedly the Forum would contribute greatly to building the capacity of peacekeepers responding to difficult threats in diversified peacekeeping missions. The final words were: 'Autumn was a season for harvest. After two days of discussion, the Forum had harvested the wisdom of the participants as well as our friendship. Thank you'.



THE INTERNATIONAL FORUM FOR THE CHALLENGES OF PEACE OPERATIONS

The Challenges Forum is a strategic and dynamic platform for constructive dialogue among leading policy-makers, practitioners and academics on key issues and developments in peace operations. The Forum contributes to shaping the debate by identifying critical challenges facing military, police and civilian peace operations, by promoting awareness of emerging issues, and by generating recommendations and solutions for the consideration of the broader international peace operations community. The Challenges Forum is a global endeavor, with its Partnership encompassing Partners from the Global South and North, major Troop and Police Contributing Countries as well as the five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council.

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