The world of planning and conducting multidimensional peace operations are as challenging as ever. The partner organizations of the Challenges Project decided in 2007 to step up their efforts. The International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations also called the Challenges Forum was established to further enhance the effectiveness of multidimensional peace operations, and to widen and strengthen the international network of actors involved in complex peace operations.

In 2008, France hosted the first Challenges Forum as part of the EU Presidency Agenda. It focused on Partnerships – the UN, the EU and the Regional Dimensions of Peace Operations: Examples of Cooperation within the Framework of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. It addressed the developments, challenges and potentials of relations between the UN and regional organisations primarily through the example of UN-EU cooperation; assessing military and humanitarian aspects, requirements for security sector reform and peace-building. Some 300 representatives from the UN, EU, AU, NATO, permanent representatives, bilateral ambassadors, and academics from every continent participated in the event.

This report contains presentations, discussions and an analysis of the results of the Paris Forum. It also includes presentations at a Challenges Meeting held in New York three months later, which discussed the outcome of the Paris deliberations and its relevance for the UN context.

**Partnerships**

The United Nations, the European Union and Regional Dimensions of Peace Operations: Examples of Cooperation within the Framework of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.
International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations

Challenges Forum Report 2008
International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations

Challenges Forum Report 2008

List of Contents

Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................. 9
Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 11

FORUM PROCEEDINGS

CHAPTER 1

Opening Address and Welcome

Mr. Hervé Morin, Minister of Defence, France, presented by Mr. Michel Miraillet, Director, Policy and Strategic Affairs Department, Ministry of Defence, France (Presentation) .................................................................................................................. 19

International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations – Objectives and Issues

Mr. Henrik Landerholm, Director General, Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden (Speaker) .................................................................................................................. 22

Global Peace Operations in 2008: Status and Issues

Dr. Richard Gowan, Associate Director for Policy, Centre on International Cooperation, New York University, United States (Speaker) ........................................................................ 27

Discussion ................................................................................................................................ 31

CHAPTER 2

The Evolution of the Relations of the United Nations with other International Organizations: Perspectives through the Example of United Nations-European Union Cooperation

Ms. Sylvie-Agnès Bermann, Director, United Nations and International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, France (Chair) ................................................................. 33

Dr. Thierry Tardy, Course Director, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Switzerland (Background paper) .......................................................................................................................... 35
Mr. Pedro Serrano, Head, Liaison Office of the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union with the United Nations (Speaker) .......................................................... 57

Dr. Herman Joseph Kraft, Executive Director, Institute for Strategic Studies, University of the Philippines (Discussant) ........................................................................................................... 62

Dr. Thierry Tardy, Course Director, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Switzerland (Discussant) ...................................................................................................................... 64

Discussion ........................................................................................................................................................................ 69

CHAPTER 3

The Evolution of the Relations of the United Nations with other International Organizations: Perspectives through the Example of the United Nations-African Union Cooperation

Amb. Ramtane Lamamra, Commissioner for Peace and Security, African Union (Speaker) .......................................................................................................................... 77

CHAPTER 4

United Nations – European Union Crisis Management Operations: Lessons Learned from Recent Cooperation

Mr. Michel Miraillet, Director, Policy and Strategic Affairs Department, Ministry of Defence, France (Chair) .................................................................................................................. 85

Mr. Alain Le Roy, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations, presented by Dr. Renata Dwan, Senior Adviser, Division of Policy, Evaluation and Training, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations (Presentation) .................................................................................................................. 86

Ms. Claude-France Arnould, Director of Defence Aspects, General-Secretariat of the Council of the European Union (Speaker) .......................................................................................................... 91

Gen. Martin Agwai, Force Commander, UNAMID (Discussant) ......................................................... 96

Gen. Patrick Nash, Operations Commander, Eufor Chad/CAR (Discussant) ........................................ 100

Discussion ........................................................................................................................................................................ 102

CHAPTER 5

Humanitarian Aspects: A Permanent Need for Coordination

Sir John Holmes, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordination, United Nations (Chair) .............................................................................................. 109

Dr. Gary Troeller, Researcher Associate, Centre for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute for Technology, United States (Background paper) ........................................................................ 113
Ms. Karen Koning Abuzayd, Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (Speaker) ................................................ 140

Mr. Peter Zangl, Director General of the Humanitarian Aid Department of the European Commission, presented by Mr. Michael Curtis, Head of Sector, Humanitarian Aid Department of the European Commission, European Union (Presentation) ........ 150

Dr. Wolf-Dieter Eberwein, President, Voluntary Organizations in Cooperation in Emergencies, Belgium (Discussant) ........................................................................ 155

Dr. Gary Troeller, Research Associate, Centre for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, United States (Discussant) ............................................................................. 156

Discussion................................................................................................................ 162

CHAPTER 6

The Limits of Crisis Management

Mr. Jacques Audibert, Director for Strategic Affairs, Security and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, France (Speaker) ........................................ 171

Discussion................................................................................................................ 176

CHAPTER 7

Development and Peacebuilding:
The Challenges of Consistency and Sustainability

Dr. Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, Senior Lecturer, Paris Institute for Political Studies, France (Chair) ........................................................................................................ 179

Mr. Cedric de Coning, Research Fellow, African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, South Africa, and Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Norway (Background paper) ........................................................................ 181

Mr. Ross Mountain, Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Democratic Republic of the Congo, United Nations (Speaker) ........................................................................ 209

Mr. Marc van Bellinghen, Deputy Head of Unit, Crisis Response and Peacebuilding, DG RELEX, European Commission, European Union (Speaker) ........................................................................ 217

Mr. Cedric de Coning, Research Fellow, African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, South Africa and Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Norway (Discussant) ........................................................................ 226

Discussion................................................................................................................ 230
Chapter 8
Developing Complementary Capacities for Peace Operations and Peace Missions: Challenges of Achieving International Unity of Effort

Mr. Jamie Shea, Director of Policy Planning, Private Office of the Secretary-General, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Speaker) ........................................................... 235
Discussion................................................................................................................ 244

Chapter 9
Security Sector Reform: Realities and Ambitions

Mr. Dmitry Titov, Assistant Secretary-General for Rule of Law and Security Institutions, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations (Chair) ..................... 247
Dr. David Chuter, Independent Consultant, United Kingdom (Background paper) 251
Gen. Pierre-Michel Joana, Special Advisor to EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy for African Peacekeeping Capabilities, European Union (Speaker) ........................................................................................................ 278
Ms. Lauren Hutton, Researcher, Security Sector Governance, Institute for Security Studies, South Africa (Speaker) ................................................................. 283
Dr. David Chuter, Independent Consultant, United Kingdom (Discussant) ........ 290
Mr. Carlos Basombrio Iglesias, International Consultant, Capital Humano y Social S.A., Peru (Discussant) .............................................................................. 293
Discussion................................................................................................................ 297

Chapter 10
Closing Session

Ms. Sylvie-Agnès Bermann, Director, United Nations and International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, France (Chair)............................... 307
Concluding Remarks and Looking Ahead
Ms. Annika Hilding-Norberg, International Coordinator, International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations, Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden (Speaker) 307
Invitation to the 2nd International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations
Amb. Asma Anisa, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan in France, Pakistan (Speaker) .............................................. 313
Closing Remarks
Ms. Sylvie-Agnès Bermann, Director, United Nations and International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, France, made on behalf of Mr. Bernard Kouchner, Minister of Foreign Affairs, France .......................................................... 314

Chapter 11
Challenges Meeting in New York 2009 – Follow up to the Paris Challenges Forum
Amb. Jean-Maurice Ripert, Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations (Speaker)........................................................................................................... 317

Mr. Edmond Mulet, Assistant Secretary-General for Operations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations (Speaker)................................................................. 319
Lt. Gen. Chikadibia Isaak Obiakor, Military Adviser, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations (Speaker) ................................................................. 324

Concluding Remarks
Mr. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Senior Adviser, International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations/Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution and Centre for International Cooperation, New York University, United States (Speaker) ......................................................... 327

Annex 1: Challenges Forum Partner Organizations........................................... 336
Annex 2: List of Participants - Paris Challenges Forum 2008 ........................... 338
Annex 3: List of Participants - New York Challenges Meeting 2009 ............... 346
Annex 4: Acronyms......................................................................................... 350
Acknowledgements

The world of planning, conducting and evaluating multidimensional peace operations is as challenging as ever. The Partner Organizations of the Challenges of Peace Operations: Into the 21st Century Project (1997-2006) decided in 2007 to work on a more long-term basis and develop their cooperation further.

As Mr. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, former United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, and now Challenges Forum Patron, said once as he spoke to the Challenges Forum:

“[At a Challenges meeting], you have men and women from very different countries, different political perspectives, and different levels of wealth. We come from countries that in some cases, if they are not at war with each other, at least do not have the best of relations. They all have one thing in common however, they care about UN peacekeeping.”

The International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations also called the Challenges Forum was established to enhance the effectiveness of multidimensional peace operations, and to widen and strengthen the international network of actors involved in complex peace operations.


We are particularly grateful to our Partners and Hosts of the Challenges Forum 2008. Under the leadership of Ms. Sylvie-Agnès Bermann, Director, United Nations and International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, and Mr. Michel Miraillet, Director, Policy and Strategic Affairs Department, Ministry of Defence, many were involved in the planning and conduct of the Forum. Dr. Alexandra Novosseloff, Senior Adviser at the Ministry of Defence, and assisted by her colleague Mr. Daniel Rysavka, was central to the effort and our point of reference on all issues of relevance for the Forum. Mr. Fabien Pénone and Mr. Frédéric...
Gout at the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, were also key to the effort.

The Challenges Forum 2008 was supported by Le Centre d’études et de recherches internationales - CERI Sciences Po. Dr. Ewa Kulesza, Executive Director, and her team at CERI managed the organization of the Forum and engaged in the sessions.

The present report is a collective effort, both in substance and production. Leading officials, practitioners and academics in the field of multidimensional peace operations generously shared their expertise, experiences and assessments with the Challenges Forum in Paris. The report also contains a selection of presentations at a Challenges Meeting held in New York three months later, which discussed the outcome of the Paris deliberations in the United Nations context. We are grateful to all chairs, speakers, background paper authors, discussants and all participants for their engagement and contributions to the results of the Forum 2008.

The Challenges Partners Organizations are at the centre of all our undertakings. Their commitment to and active engagement in the Challenges Forum initiative is a prerequisite for our common endeavor achieving desired results, and is most appreciated.

Coordinating Challenges, we are thankful to our colleagues supporting the coordination at the Swedish Armed Forces, National Police Board, Prison and Probation Service and National Defence College. Last but not least, we are indeed thankful to the valuable contribution made by Mr. Jonas Alberoth, Deputy Director General of the Folke Bernadotte Academy, Maj. Gen. (Retd) Robert Gordon, Senior Adviser, Ms. Anna-Linn Persson, Project Officer, and Ms. Anna Wiktorsson, Project Assistant.

Thanks to our Hosts and all involved, the Challenges Forum 2008, the first of its kind, did meet the general goals set out at the beginning of the Forum. First, to discuss and elaborate on the challenges of multidimensional peace operations as well as their solutions. Second, the Challenges concept was consolidated as a high-level international platform for a serious dialogue on the planning, conduct and evaluation of modern peace operations.

Mr. Henrik Landerholm
Director General
Folke Bernadotte Academy

Ms. Annika Hilding Norberg
International Coordinator
Challenges Forum
Introduction

From 20-22 October 2008, during its Presidency of the European Union, France was privileged to organise the first high-level international forum on challenges arising from peacekeeping operations. The meeting was organised with an international network of peacekeeping experts and practitioners: the International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations.

The forum was attended by about 300 participants: senior officials from the United Nations, the European Union, the African Union and NATO and other regional organisations, permanent representatives and bilateral ambassadors, along with academics from every continent.

Its theme was “Partnerships – the United Nations, the European Union and the Regional Dimensions of Peace Operations: Examples of Cooperation within the Framework of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter”. In five sessions, the forum addressed the development of relations between the United Nations and regional organisations through the example of UN-EU cooperation, the lessons learned from recent cooperation, the humanitarian aspects, the issues of development and peacebuilding, and the realities and goals of security sector reform.

In suggesting this theme to our partners, we considered that the time had come to hold a debate, using UN-EU cooperation as an example, on the strengthening of partnerships between the United Nations and the other international and regional organisations in the area of peacekeeping and security. Cooperation between the United Nations and the European Union has indeed developed considerably in the area of crisis management over the last dozen or so years, especially since the Joint Declaration signed by the UN and the EU in September 2003. Other partnerships have been put in place and given substance, in particular that between the UN and the African Union. Another Joint Declaration was signed by the UN and NATO in September 2008. Most importantly, those partnerships are not built solely around military crisis management, but also involve civilian crisis management and peacebuilding; they thus cover the entire spectrum of crisis management. The appropriate term is undoubtedly “partnerships” in the plural. Cooperation between the UN and the other international and regional organisations is in fact built on respect for the structures specific to each organisation. Each relationship between the UN and its international and regional partners has its own individual character. In a sense, this is why it is so enriching, with each partner needing to learn from the other. Nevertheless, that does not rule out cooperation at all times in order to avoid overlaps between our activities. Indeed, we have neither time nor
money to lose when the task is to get States, societies, or even whole regions back on their feet. In this context, coordination is very much what is needed to ensure effectiveness and success.

The recommendations that arose from the debates during our forum and from the studies commissioned from selected academics and researchers are not radical. The discussion needs to continue. A process is now under way. Priorities must however be defined. This paper describes those priorities, based as they are on the comments and suggestions made by those participating in the Paris Challenges Forum.

The Current State of UN-EU Cooperation on Crisis Management

Chapter VIII of the Charter stipulates that the United Nations shall work with regional organisations acting within their geographical area. Collaboration between the United Nations and the European Union has developed steadily since the first UN-EU Troika meeting in 2000. The EU is gradually asserting its role as a global player and participates in the maintenance of international peace and security outside its own region in Europe. In this respect, UN-EU cooperation is a special case.

UN-EU cooperation is founded on shared values (human rights, rule of law and democracy) and creates a mutually beneficial relationship: the EU brings to the United Nations the operational capacities, often using high technology, the responsiveness and the flexibility necessary to peace operations. In return, it benefits from the political legitimacy of the United Nations.

UN-EU cooperation takes a range of different forms according to the tasks to be carried out. The working arrangements that have been put in place over time between the two organisations are the outcome of lessons learned on the ground. Following Operation ARTEMIS (2003) and EUFOR DR Congo (2006) which were launched in response to requests by the United Nations Secretary-General to support the action taken by the UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC), the European Union has deployed, since March 2008, and in compliance with resolution 1778 of the Security Council, EUFOR Chad/CAR in eastern Chad and North-Eastern CAR. New forms of cooperation are also possible – in the maritime domain for example. The first operation to combat piracy (ATLANTE) was launched pursuant to Security Council resolutions by the European Union in December 2008 off the Somali coast.

In addition to the launching of ESDP operations, whether civil or military in nature, in support of the United Nations, cooperation between the EU and the
United Nations, in our view, needs to develop both in advance of and after a crisis. One of the recommendations made during the forum was that cooperation between the two institutions could be further, and more specifically, developed in the civilian aspects of crisis management, as well as on the political and diplomatic management of crises. The following particular areas can be cited:

a. **Strengthening of African Peacekeeping Capacities:** the implementation of the European Action Plan to improve African peacekeeping capacities can help in the deployment of African units in United Nations peacekeeping operations. The Euro-RECAMP programme is part of this effort. Similarly, improved coordination between European training assistance programmes, and the networking of African peacekeeping training schools, with the support of the European Union, must be continued in order to support the training programmes of the United Nations.

b. **Training:** more generally, the EU and its Member States can provide their support for the training of military and police contingents provided for United Nations peacekeeping operations.

c. **Conflict prevention and management of post-conflict situations:** In cooperation with the United Nations, the EU is in a position to develop its activities in the area of Security System Reform (SSR). It also plays an active role on the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission. For that purpose, a wide range of EU instruments are available (Community financial resources most notably) and genuine operational experience (ESDP Security System Reform, policing and rule of law missions).

Structural difficulties arising from differences in decision-making and planning procedures (political as much as military) between the United Nations and the EU can be overcome by maintaining close contact and beginning coordination at an earlier stage. Certain mechanisms and practices have demonstrated their effectiveness and are destined for long-term use. Joint missions for evaluation, planning and information-sharing involving the two secretariats, such as logistics support agreements, should be encouraged. Procedures for the exchange of information and intelligence, which have been tested in the field, most notably during the EUFOR Chad/CAR operation, could also be used as models for future joint operations. Liaison officers must be put in place more quickly.

The “lead nation” role, taken on by France for operation ARTEMIS, and by Germany for EUFOR DR Congo, was clearly useful for the coordination of operations and meeting the prerequisite of rapid deployment. Certain speakers supported the creation of a permanent EU operational headquarters in Brussels that
would enhance the effectiveness of planning and cooperation between the two organisations.

It would be possible for the two organisations to put in place a more systematic political dialogue at the point when certain crises erupt, and at other times also. A UN liaison office to the European Union might be established, along the same lines as that created by the Secretary General of the Council of the EU at the United Nations in New York.

And lastly, it should be possible for EU operations to be part of a more general engagement by the international community in a given country (e.g. DRC and Afghanistan).

The humanitarian aspects: a permanent need for cooperation: As many speakers stressed during the forum, the humanitarian landscape is increasingly diverse and complex as non-traditional actors enter the field (civil-military activities and private security firms), and this sometimes results in a degree of confusion about the roles and tasks of humanitarian and military actors. This applies all the more where humanitarian aid workers are intervening in situations of extreme insecurity. At the same time, humanitarian action could less and less be perceived as neutral and impartial, especially by the parties involved in armed conflict, and especially if it is used as a political tool.

Given this, it is important to abide by the nature of the mission of humanitarian actors, which must remain neutral, impartial and independent. In this regard, the European Union acknowledges in the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid that humanitarian action cannot in any circumstances be used as a crisis management tool. It is by avoiding confusion on this point as far as possible, that it will be possible to preserve the space for humanitarian action, this being a necessary condition for humanitarian access to populations in need.

Nevertheless, a pragmatic attitude is necessary in theatres where both types of actors (humanitarian and peacekeeping) are working together. To that end, it is necessary to facilitate exchanges of information between humanitarian and peacekeeping actors with a view to enhancing coordination on the ground. Military planning must also take into account humanitarian and civilian considerations. It ought to be possible to exchange liaison officers; the usual coordination meetings are not sufficient. A relationship of trust must be built by means of a dialogue between all parties, freely entered into. For example in Chad, the commanders of the EUFOR Chad/CAR operation made great efforts to set up an open dialogue on the issue of the security in Eastern Chad with the non-governmental organisations and the agencies active in the area.
Cooperation in the humanitarian field between the UN and the EU appears fairly satisfactory, with liaison and information-sharing components being put in place with the deployed operations. The EU can be an indispensable partner for the promotion of “civil-military directives” to be complied with in order to synchronize the delivery of aid and the protection of aid workers.

Development and peacebuilding: the challenges of consistency and viability: In addition to peacekeeping, the emphasis is now on the prevention of conflicts both upstream (“preventive peacebuilding”) and downstream (“post-conflict peacebuilding”). Leaving to one side disagreements over semantics, a conceptual effort does still need to be made in order to define more effectively when and how one can be sure that the goal of stabilisation has been achieved, and thus to define viable exit strategies. What is the real meaning of peacebuilding as a concept, in terms of actions to be undertaken? To that end, it is important that the activities put in place should take account above all else of local realities and should not be dependent on a predetermined model. This goes back, of course, to the issue of differing conceptions of peace. It is necessary to avoid arriving in a country with a predetermined conception of what peace might be, but rather to be aware of the kind of peace desired by the local stakeholders. The starting point must be an analysis of how interested in making peace the local stakeholders actually are.

If a peacebuilding process is to be a success, it requires a holistic approach that integrates security, diplomacy and development. In this respect, the main challenge is to arrive at greater coherence between the various actors, and especially to reconcile the sometimes antagonistic cultures of security and development personnel and organisations. The difficulty is not in coming up with strategies in this area, but in implementing those that already exist. Furthermore, no “peacebuilding” (an expression to be preferred to “peace consolidation”) can ever last unless the local actors (government, civil society and media) are involved as early as possible in the process. National ownership of the process is indispensable at every point in crisis management.

From an institutional point of view, the most important issue is the strengthening of the links between the Security Council and the Peacebuilding Commission. The intellectual efforts mentioned above should become evident in the work of these two bodies. The debate on conceptions of peace must also be conducted there, or within working groups tied to them.

Security Sector Reform: realities and ambitions: Security Sector Reform (SSR) is now considered as a key element in peacebuilding and is an integral part of the mandate of several peacekeeping operations such as the ones in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, in South Sudan, in Liberia, in Côte d’Ivoire and in Haiti. It also forms part of national transition processes. It has become obvious today that the proper functioning of the security sector is a prerequisite for political stability and economic development. Although this is generally agreed to be true, SSR continues to be a particularly sensitive topic, affecting as it does the prerogatives of the State and good governance, and for that reason it certainly cannot be imposed on governments in the region. In a number of countries, the security sector is a basic mechanism through which an individual, a group or a party can acquire or extend power. If it is to be reformed, account must also be taken of factors such as the ethnic composition of the armed forces and applicable traditions of political influence. It is very far from being just a process of technical reform.

If an SSR process is to succeed, it must involve precise identification at the earliest possible stage of the real needs of the State, in close conjunction with the government of the country, and taking account of the reality of structures of power, in order to arrive at an operational concept that is as well adapted as possible to the reality on the ground. Good knowledge of the local environment is an indispensable prerequisite for any needs analysis where SSR is concerned. Such an analysis must then provide input for work to define a realistic and achievable mandate for an operation.

SSR entails long-term action that the activities of a peacekeeping operation can do no more than initiate. It also entails a multidimensional approach whose effectiveness is largely dependent on synchronisation of the efforts made by the various international actors. It is therefore logical for regional organisations to be more closely associated with the actions of the United Nations in this domain. Joint SSR working groups could be set up, for example. It remains no less essential to encourage local ownership of the SSR process, thus making it possible to envisage the eventual disengagement of the international community. Therefore, it is also absolutely essential to make use of civil society in the State concerned.

This “International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations” was organised at a moment when it could be argued that peacekeeping, by the United Nations in particular, is once again in a state of crisis. It is a crisis of demand in relation to the capacity for supply. In the longer term, is such expansion manageable, not only by the UN but also and above all by its Member States, who provide the forces? The UN is not alone in facing these difficulties; regional organisations are also having to cope with such an increased demand for their peacekeepers to be deployed in countries where there is not always a peace to be kept. Added to that are new factors of uncertainty linked to security in its broadest sense (e.g. the hunger riots in Haiti), to the model exported (must democracy be imposed at any price – and what form of democracy?), to new threats (particularly terrorism) and to the
financial constraints of the contributing States. This situation must lead to a pooling of effort and resources, and to a sharing of the burden. In this regard, the partnership between the UN and the other international and regional organisations must be enhanced and with the objective of a more integrated approach to crisis management. Cooperation between the EU and the United Nations, which has greatly developed in just a few years and which is functioning effectively today, has shown the way.

At the practical level, it is necessary to seek greater coherence between the actors involved in crisis management, these being increasingly numerous in any one theatre. There is a need to develop closer mutual consultation and to put mechanisms in place to ensure improved coordination in order to guarantee that planning is more operational and collaboration is effective and pragmatic on the ground. There is also a need for exchanges of personnel between organisations, and for more informal exchanges of views between the heads of the various international and regional organisations.

Combining security and development is yet another challenge for the implementation of peace operation mandates as well as for preparing their deployment. Going further, there needs to be more emphasis on how crises can be prevented, by emphasising the importance of political processes, and on how their reappearance can be avoided by ensuring sustainable reconstruction. All actors are dependent on each other in carrying out this task and the required coordination essentially amounts to the management of that interdependence. In today’s world, it is essential to share the burden of crisis management in all its dimensions.

Ms. Sylvie-Agnès Bermann
Director
United Nations and International Organizations
Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs
France

Mr. Michel Miraillet
Director
Policy and Strategic Affairs Department
Ministry of Defence
France
Chapter 1

Opening Address and Welcome

Mr. Hervé Morin, Minister of Defence, France, presented by Mr. Michel Miraillet, Director, Policy and Strategic Affairs Department, Ministry of Defence, France

Ambassadors, general officers, representatives of the United Nations Secretariat and of regional organisations and, no doubt, I should say close friends in the case of many of you.

The Minister of Defence was supposed to have opened today’s seminar. Apart from his support for this seminar, Hervé Morin placed great importance on his presence this morning among you. Nevertheless, limitations of government life that arose at the last minute meant that our minister was not able to open this seminar. Therefore, he has given me the role of informing you about his wishes for the five sessions we have scheduled together over the next three days.

First of all, on the behalf of the French authorities, it is my pleasure to welcome you to this compound, in this military academy planned by Louis XV and designed by Gabriel, the final use and raison d’être of which have never been called into question. Indeed, contrary to the initial opinions of its founders, who wished to use the site solely to teach the art of war, this compound has for a number of years helped, and continues to help, train generations of officers in operations to establish peace, or peacekeeping operations, with the benefit of experience acquired by the French armed forces under the United Nations flag and during operations outside the remit of the UN.

This conference which will begin today within the context of the French presidency of the Council of the European Union, comes at an important moment in the cooperation between the United Nations and regional organisations and, in particular, between the United Nations and the European Union. The latter has been visible in theatres of operations for a decade and is still increasing its operations: 18 current missions of the European Union with the civilian monitoring mission in Georgia, perhaps 19 tomorrow with our current plan to combat piracy and provide protection to ships participating in the World Food Programme.

Cooperation between the European Union and the United Nations in the area of crisis management began a little under ten years ago. This cooperation has constantly been strengthened through a process which to date has no equivalent with any regional organisation since the operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the
Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2003. Since the Joint Declaration on cooperation between the United Nations and the European Union on crisis management was signed in September 2003 and which was renewed in 2007, there has been no shortage of occasions for the two sides to work together. Through action in a variety of forms, whether national contributions from Member States of the European Union, missions carried out by the European Union under a United Nations mandate, temporary missions to allow the deployment of a UN operation, missions to support United Nations forces, the sole element required to complete this list of forms of cooperation, is a hybrid mission.

Never has it been so necessary to see the two structures coordinate their efforts on the ground as it is now, from Afghanistan to Chad, and including Georgia and Kosovo. Never have we had so many operations in progress, in such complex situations with such broad mandates and with so much at stake, involving so many different players at the same time, as we do now.

As the only opportunity to bring together so many experts from both structures, this international forum is an exceptional opportunity to reflect on the implications of this situation and on the limits to this cooperation, which in recent years has become more and more extensive. As with many of you, I hope that this forum is also a chance to analyse the terms of this coordination between the United Nations and regional organisations in order to reach relevant recommendations.

This forum aims to illustrate our conception of the presidency of the European Union; the European Security and Defence Policy is one of the fundamental areas of the programme that the French presidency is aiming to implement. Under these circumstances, the relationship between the United Nations and the European Union is a permanent issue. It was at the initiative of France, for example, that the Minister for Foreign Affairs invited his counterparts in the United Nations Security Council and in the European Union, at the opening of the 63rd session of the General Assembly a month ago, to discuss the future of this cooperation. France attaches particular importance to its relationship with these two bodies, due to the fact that it contributes with funds and personnel to missions of these two institutions.

This relationship has always been developed in accordance with the specificities of each of these institutions. While this has not been easy, what is important is that the dialogue between the European Union and the United Nations has been constant since 2003. This dialogue has not been built merely in offices, but also on the ground. A number of operations, both military and civilian, have given rise to such cooperation, from Operation ARTEMIS in Ituri in 2003 to the two most recent operations, Operation EUFOR in Chad and the Central African Republic and the monitoring mission in Georgia. In our opinion, five years of experience in UN-EU coordination is sufficient for an initial report.
Thus, several questions can be asked: can this cooperation serve as a model for other regional organisations? Is it presumptuous to believe in it? Should emphasis be placed instead on the issue of complementarity? What can be done to ensure the continuation of crisis management that includes the prevention of conflicts, peaceful conflict resolution, peacekeeping, the consolidation of peace and post-conflict reconstruction, and retain this complementarity and cooperation between different institutions?

In our opinion, the policy that has been at the heart of the growth in cooperation between the United Nations and the European Union is that of the will expressed by the European Union to help the United Nations keep peace, since the development of a European Security and Defence Policy affects not only Europe. Indeed, although the natural desire of the European Union is to ensure the security of the continent and the stability of its neighbours, the fact remains that at present it puts its resources at the service of the international community, as it has done in Aceh, for example, and as it is preparing to do off the Somali coast. This cooperation is not limited to the military management of crises: as demonstrated by the programme of this international forum, this relationship between the two institutions is developing in a number of areas that affect the coordination of humanitarian efforts, the consolidation of peace and reforms of security systems. This last area has also experienced particular growth in scope in the last two years, and now constitutes an indispensable element of peacekeeping operations.

“Partnerships”, in the plural, is the term that should be highlighted and hammered. The concept does not necessarily require joint decision-making, which would be rather difficult since none of the two organisations have identical decision-making processes. In this sense, each relationship between the United Nations and its regional partners has its own characteristics. For all that, it does not exclude constant cooperation in order to avoid overlapping, that our actions get instrumentalized, that in the end, it affects their overall effectiveness. Indeed, we have neither time nor money to waste when it comes to getting states, societies and even whole regions back on their feet. In this case, coordination is synonymous with efficiency and success. Coordination also means being able to lead from the front several types of programmes with a view to a single objective: stabilisation and peacebuilding.

Ladies and gentlemen,

On behalf of the Minister of Defence, I again express the hope that with the range of talents assembled here today, this International Forum can produce a number of concrete and realistic directions. It is time to thank the organisers. My best wishes to you in this endeavour. I thank you for your attention.
International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations  
– Objectives and Issues  

Mr. Henrik Landerholm, Director General, Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden

Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

We have gathered here today to enter into a new phase of addressing the challenges of peace operations. The world around us is changing rapidly and the international community needs to be particularly proactive and to rise to the challenges as they emerge - and they are not few.

As stated in the background material for this forum, in the 1990s, some 50 countries underwent major transformations. Intra-state conflict, largely driven by ethnic, communal or religious strife, left well over four million dead. Genocide and ethnic cleansing campaigns have deliberately focused on eradicating civilian populations.

Let me start by asking three overarching questions: How do current conflicts impact on the way in which the international community could and should best respond - today, and in the future? Second, what do we need to prepare for as actors involved in the planning, conduct and evaluation of multi-dimensional missions? And finally - at the heart of the matter - how do we coordinate our efforts? The way in which we see and respond to these questions will have an impact on tomorrow’s reality.

The substantive and serious challenges facing us when seeking to address modern conflicts in an effective and systematic manner, are the reasons why we are here today. This is also the fundamental reason why a group of like-minded and progressive institutions, with diverse expertise and experiences, have come together within the Challenges framework with the ambition to raise and discuss our key concerns and to explore possible ways forward.

In 1997, the project ”Challenges of Peace Operations: Into the 21st Century” was initiated. What was first envisioned to become one small workshop with a limited objective, over the years turned into a series of international seminars. These Challenges seminars have been hosted by key organizations from leading peace operations contributing countries around the world. They have raised common and urgent as well as long term challenges as a matter of priority.

Seminar and concluding reports, have been developed. Partners have pursued implementation of recommendations in various ways and fora. We have worked together in an inclusive, open-minded and tolerant manner with respect for each
partner’s often different perspectives. This has created trust, strength and mutual ownership and responsibility. It is, in my opinion, the co-owned nature of the Challenges cooperation that makes it unique, hopefully durable and also productive and relevant.

Some examples of results of the Challenge Cooperation to date includes, the outcome of the Tokyo Challenges Seminar in 2001 on Safety and Security for UN Peace-Keepers and Associated Personnel which was hosted by Japan in cooperation with the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. The seminar findings informed a major part of the UN Secretary-General’s annual report to Member States on peacekeeping, in which he responded to and followed up on some of the recommendations in the Brahimi Report of the previous year.

Further, the Challenges partnership has been actively involved in and supporting doctrine development, and in particular, the UN-led project developing a Principles and Guidelines document for peace operations at the capstone level. Our partnership encourages regional organizations to review such guidance and, where appropriate, adjust and develop their own guidance so as to strengthen their capacity for operations compatible with others. Standardisation and harmonisation are the buzzwords and it is our conviction that they create desirable synergies.

Our focus now is on promoting awareness of the substance and importance of the guidelines document, its effective implementation by the responsible organizations, and by assessing ways in which to continue contributing to doctrine development at different levels and in different fora.

In short, the Challenges partnership seeks to highlight issues that should be addressed as the international community reassesses and further develops different principles, guidelines and doctrine for peace operations. Work on doctrines and guidelines are one aspect. Then there are practical initiatives and outcomes of the Challenges cooperation. Allow me to raise two examples of the Challenges Forum serving as a platform for generating new ideas and initiatives; the first is INPROL, the International Network for Promoting the Rule of Law, which was first discussed in the Challenges framework, and is now a key organization for the effective assessment of rule of law issues at the global level. Second, Dr. Mike Kelly, a long time Challenges Partner and currently Parliamentary Secretary of Defence Support in Australia, mentioned that the need for new tools and institutional frameworks that were elaborated on within the Challenges framework is now being launched in the form of an Asia Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence dedicated to provide for comprehensive solutions to comprehensive problems.
We have done a lot for sure, but we still have a lot to do. In 2006, the UN Special Committee for Peacekeeping Operations (the C-34) welcomed and encouraged the UN to make full use of the work and results of the Challenges Project. Building on the achievements so far, Partners decided to take a significant step forward by establishing this International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations. This brings me to the unique gathering here today. This is not just another conference.

In order to engage and discuss current emerging problems and potential solutions, with all the key organizations, institutions and think tanks, Partners two years ago decided to open the Forum beyond the partnership and to invite colleagues dedicated to improving all of our planning, implementation and evaluation capacities.

What we need now is to rise to the challenges. We have a rather unique gathering here with representatives from almost 80 organizations and 48 countries. The five permanent members of the Security Council are Partners in Challenges, major personnel contributing countries and traditional peacekeepers are involved, discussing challenges with emerging new civilian, military and police peacekeepers in the UN context as well as that of regional organizations.

This is one of the most comprehensive and experienced gatherings addressing the challenges and possibilities of cooperation on crisis management issues to date. Our task is to seize the opportunity! This is why we are here today, together, with old friends and new.

On behalf of all Challenges Partners, I wish to extend our deepest thanks to our French Challenges Partners and Colleagues; the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs and the Ministry of Defence, in cooperation with CERI-Sciences Po, for bringing us together for this first International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations, and doing this as part of the French EU Presidency Agenda. Their generosity and hard work have made it possible.

Key officials, practitioners and experts from around the world are here to discuss ways in which to create common visions, common problem-solving and better synergies of effort, in order to strengthen and develop partnerships between the United Nations and regional organizations, with a particular, but not exclusive focus, on the United Nations-European Union relationship and cooperation.

Before coming to this forum, the Challenges Partners met at a Pre-Forum in New York last autumn. It was the first time responsible officials for peacekeeping from all major organisations actually met at the same time together and with the Challenges Partners, to discuss challenges of peace operations – looking into the future.
Key issues were raised, and background papers were subsequently commissioned to enable a common point of departure and focus for our different subjects here at the first Challenges Forum. The choice and substance of the particular theme for this Forum was addressed by our opening speaker and Host.

The Challenges Partners seek to enable positive change by answering questions such as: How can we as civilian, military and police peacekeepers do things better? How can we cooperate in a more inclusive manner? How can we do what we need to do more cost-effectively? How can we ensure we provide an optimal balance in our peacekeeping capacities, of men and women, with complementary expertise and possibilities for achieving a mission’s mandate? How can we ensure true and lasting change for the better?

By bringing our different expertise, capabilities and concerns to the same table, the aim is to create a common framework for analysis of the challenges that we all face at headquarters, in the field and in training and research institutions. The specific purpose of this first full-fledged Challenges Forum is to focus on the complexities, challenges and opportunities related to the development of international peace operations partnerships. Particular focus will be put on Partnerships: the United Nations, the European Union and the Regional Dimensions of Peace Operations: Examples of Cooperation within the framework of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.

We will assess both achievements and shortcomings in the development of an interlocking system of peacekeeping capacities, trying to identify and propose practical ways ahead. Our common aim is to produce outcomes in relation to United Nations-European Union cooperation and recommendations for best practices, and equally important, to produce output relevant also to other key partnerships.

It is our aim that Forum 2008 should generate a momentum for the international community to move forward on some of the recommendations made in the background papers or other recommendations as suggested by contributing participants during the course of the Forum. The purpose of the background papers is to set the scene for a fruitful and focused discussion, not to “cover all issues” within each subject, but to suggest five to ten key issues that could and should be addressed by the international community.

I would also like to mention that a concluding Challenges Forum Report will be finalized after the end of this forum. The recommendations in the Forum Report are intended for consideration by states, organizations and interested individuals and experts in their preparation for the C-34, and the equivalent bodies or func-
tions of the regional, humanitarian, development and other governmental and non-governmental organizations.

To assist in our work is a Challenges Forum Cooperation Matrix Work Sheet, which is intended to be used as a reference document, and is a work in progress. We do believe it could be very useful in systematizing the different agreements and subjects that the different actors are cooperating on.

Concluding, what should we hope to achieve during our three days together? It is my vision, that we in two years time, when looking back at the Forum in Paris, should be able to identify one, two or possibly three recommendations that came out of the discussions and that found its way into common directives, guidelines or doctrine or national framework of analysis and policy output. Strengthening and even further consolidating the Challenges Partnership and making it even more inclusive is perhaps the second most important goal. That is at least an issue of great importance to the Partners themselves. The collective process and strong engagement by Partners should also be stressed. Only together can the Challenges Forum move forward and produce effective results also in the future.

Let me finally add the critical issue of implementation. Talk the talk is one thing, walk the walk is yet another. Putting policy into practice - turning best practices, and that is really what doctrine should consist of, into general and common practice - is the truly demanding challenge of our day-to-day action in the field, as well as in headquarters and specialised institutions.

Many issues need to be addressed, and we all need to rise to the intellectual as well as practical challenges posed. I therefore look forward to our efforts here in seeking to meet the challenges of today and the crisis of tomorrow. What can we learn from the evolving international peacekeeping landscape and institutional structures? What are the issues that challenge our military, police or civilian peacekeepers most severely? The questions and challenges are daunting. It is our job to address them and to come up with sustainable and effective answers. Something tells me that we will make substantial progress here in Paris.

The Challenges Partners look forward to the days ahead and to continuing our productive cooperation through our common and now finally fully developed International Forum - building and strengthening effective peace operations partnerships, here today - and around the world.
Global Peace Operations in 2008: Status and Issues

Dr. Richard Gowan, Associate Director for Policy, Centre on International Coop-er-ation, New York University, United States

We are facing a crisis with UN peacekeeping that to some extent has a resemblance to the stock market. A radical change for the work of peacekeeping will come very soon as well.

The annual review, which provides the most comprehensive overview of global peacekeeping operations, indicated that the number of peacekeepers is expanding rapidly, and the number of peacekeeping missions is reaching record levels. This would not have been expected in 1997 or 1998 when the first phase of the Challenges project was established. The rise in UN peace operations over the last few years have gone from around 10,000 to 80,000 today. This growth can also be identified within NATO, EU as well as the AU.

The growth can stop, which you can see if you do a comparison with the stock market that was showing a rise for many years. The stock curve was going up for a long period of time, which can be seen as a commitment from people earning from the stock market. But as we have seen, the growth can also stop drastically. The message that I want to deliver today is that peacekeeping is in a crisis, and that the contribution to peacekeeping missions from the member countries can go down.

One can ask if the growth of peacekeeping is sustainable with the growth rate we have had up until today. Current data indicates that the growth of peacekeeping is not sustainable. Darfur, the Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and Afghanistan suggest that while we have an increase in the number of peacekeepers worldwide, their impacts might not be all that we want. Perhaps they are underresourced or in conflicts where there is no peace to keep. In some conflicts, we are facing urgent challenges of peacekeeping through political obstruction, and in other conflicts there is vast violence against peacekeepers. Unless we can find policy solutions that give a reflection of reality, then the level of peacekeeping is in danger of going down rapidly. It may go down in the same way we saw it deteriorating in the mid-1990s.

I believe that we can escape this crisis, but we are in a crisis, and the fact that the number of peacekeepers have gone up should be a source of not only satisfaction but of concern.
The number of NATO peacekeepers has gone up by 19 percent, which is primarily due to the inflow of NATO peacekeepers into Afghanistan. Across the major organizations there has been a significant rate of growth of peacekeeping the last few years, if you compare these numbers to the numbers of peacekeepers in 2003, 2004 and 2005 when there was a real erupt in the growth of UN peacekeeping. As shown above, the numbers of troops keep on rising. Between 2007 and 2008, every major peacekeeping organization grew. The UN, NATO, EU and the AU collectively grew 16 percent. This increase within the peacekeeping organizations is not even around the world. The central fronts of peacekeeping are in Eastern Africa and in Afghanistan, while there is a net reduction in West Africa and in the Western Balkans.

At present, the greatest challenge for international peacekeeping lies in East Africa. Whether one can find a regional solution to the conflicts in the area, will be decisive to whether the UN is a reliable actor in peace operations for the future. West Africa shows evidence of the success of peace operations, which over the last few years have given us many examples of that peace operations do work. In Sierra Leone, the UN currently has twelve people working and the Western Balkans have also had a slight reduction of peacekeepers, a net decline of a few thousands.

The missions in East Africa have substantial deficits in the number of troops on the ground, in comparison to the number of troops that is mandated for the mission. One of the missions where this is the most obvious is in UNAMID, where the mission has a mandate of 26,000 personnel, but as of 30 September 2008, there was only 10,461 personnel on the ground.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Personnel Deficit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mandated</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR Chad/RCA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The above given statistic shows missions with an immense deficit in the amount of personnel they have on the ground, in relation to the mandate. The most obvious mission is UNAMID with only 40 percent of its overall mandate strength. AMISOM, the AU mission in Somalia, shows similar numbers of deficit. The EU mission in Chad, which has been operational for six or seven months, has its full capacity, but the scale of that mission is significantly smaller. Despite this, the EU had challenges of convening the helicopters that were needed for the mission. A question for Eastern Africa is if one can find the assets to establish a mission in the future. The level of peacekeeping in East Africa has changed over the years, going from high level down to nothing, and then it has gradually begun growing again.

Though there are profound numbers of peacekeepers in the field, they are facing a growing amount of challenges and difficulties. The ratio of MONUC troops and police to Internally Displaced Persons in Eastern DRC was one UN peacekeeper for every 80 internally displaced in June 2008, compared to 1:60 in September 2006. The challenge is increasing very rapidly, and the question arises whether the forces that are there now can handle the violence in Eastern Congo. Peacekeeping is now facing a level of violence that the numbers of peacekeepers we have on the ground cannot handle. The type of violence can be broken down into four categories:

a. Afghanistan, DRC and Somalia; peacekeepers are operating in an environment of a constant sustained high level of violence threatening the mission
b. Chad and Darfur; the violence is less sustained but with frequent violence targeted against peacekeepers in a deliberate fashion
c. Haiti, Kosovo and East Timor; significant public disorder and the peacekeepers are the first line of defence. Earlier this year, there were very grave food riots in Haiti, in Kosovo there were riots around the declaration of independence in the beginning of 2008, and in East Timor there was a coup attempt
d. Georgia; conflict between parties to a peace operation

There are high levels of violence against peacekeepers which opens up the question whether peacekeeping is robust enough to meet these challenges. The peacekeeping today is a lot rougher than in the 1990s, but is it robust enough for a place like Eastern DRC? The challenges to peacekeeping are not only about violence, but we are also seeing political challenges to the credibility and legitimacy of peace operations. These can be quite cunning and subtle. Host countries of peace operations are becoming increasingly sophisticated in undermining the work of missions, by interfering with how they behave. One example from this year was the Afghan refusal of Lord Ashdown as UN SRSG, which destabilized a substantial part of the
strategic planning by the UN and its partners in Afghanistan. Another example is the Sudanese obstruction of UNAMID and the Eritrean disruption of UNMEE, which culminated in the closing of the mission this year. The disruption does not always involve heavy violence, but ways to undercut the political or operational credibility of a mission or removing its ability to fly freely.

We are facing divisions at a high level in the international community, which are also undermining missions. This year we have seen divisions between Russia and “the West” in the Security Council that have impacted on peacekeeping in Kosovo and Georgia, and the lack of unity within the Security Council over how peacekeeping should be carried out in Kosovo. We have also seen a split between “the West” and African governments over the indictment of the International Criminal Court of President al-Bashir of Sudan and how that relates to peacekeeping in Darfur. The problem led to a division in the Security Council, with the United States abstaining on the mandate for UNAMID. It is worrying when you see a split between the countries that provide the immensity of funds for UN peacekeeping and the countries that provide the vast majority of troops for peacekeeping. If we see further splits like these it will become difficult to maintain politically credible peace operations.

It is rather worrying with the unexpected challenges that we have seen over the last few years, with new factors of instability where we thought that we were doing rather well. The increase in wheat prices created riots all over the world due to the food crisis. Is there a way to develop a forecast to predict the unexpected challenges, where one can take these considerations and the unexpected chocks to peacekeeping into account? Further, the outburst of violence in Kenya and Zimbabwe following elections is rather worrying. Those are not peacekeeping cases, however, one should highlight that the goal for many of the peacekeeping missions over the years have been to achieve a democratic election, and then the peacekeepers can start to move out of the country. Kenya and Zimbabwe show cases where well-functioning democratic elections have been carried out, but where violence has broken out afterwards. This shows that democracy is not the panacea that we have implicitly portrayed it to be.

The UN is seen as a soft target for terrorists, which was revealed by the bombing of the UN offices in Algeria. The bombing of the UN headquarters in Baghdad will be repeated, and we will see further acts of terrorism against the UN in the future. How can we continue the work of peacekeeping when it is under threat of terrorism? How will the UN peacekeeping be affected by the fall of the world economy? The UN peacekeeping at present costs 80 billion USD, but the financial crisis will lead to funding constrains among the member countries, which could lead to countries contributing less financial means to UN peacekeeping. The consequence
from the funding constrains of the missions might lead to the withdrawal of the mission in, e.g., Liberia to take place more rapidly than what was initially planned for. Could that then lead to a situation similar to what we saw in Timor-Leste, when the mission pulled out rapidly in 2005, and violence broke out shortly afterwards. The financial crisis may possibly have an effect on how much the peacekeepers are capable of doing. Equally, I have heard that the financial crisis is good for UN peacekeeping. With the UN peacekeeping being relatively cheap more countries will turn to the UN during the recession as an option for maintaining peace and security worldwide. At present, we do not know how big the effects of the financial crisis will be on peacekeeping.

Peacekeeping increased exponentially the last decade at a time of major financial growth. The economic boom is now over, and we have to readjust UN peacekeeping to a world where the Security Council is more divided and its members are having a significant reduction in the access to financial means.

Discussion

A general from a major troop contributing country argued that the troop deficit will always remain with the UN. Without the national commitment any intra state conflict is a bottomless barrel, e.g., Iraq and Afghanistan: “You can never have adequate boots on the ground. To make sure that the problem is addressed we need to look at quantity, quality, and the ability to generate intelligence. We need all the three segments of human, electronic and signal intelligence generation. You can then make sure that you have the right amount of people at the right place at the right time and with the right methodology. With the financial implications, the missions are overstaffed which creates a lot of confusion. We need multinational staff at many headquarters and better quality in the staff, which would also reduce the costs. Any mission becomes an industry after some time, especially after elections are held. We need both benchmarks and time related downsizing of the mission. It is deterrent for the host government. We need to be slightly more robust and look more pragmatically at robustness. Robustness is the ability to have exquisite deterrence and be able to create conditions that are required to maintain peace and stability in the area.”

An ambassador to the United Nations of a major peace operations hosting country suggested that the discussion needed to be more forward-looking and that we should avoid trying to address everything. “The growth of peacekeeping operations is nothing to celebrate; it is a symptom of a disease, which is conflict. The UN and the international community is not taking a holistic view on peace and war in our times. Remedies should give equal importance to socioeconomic development as to peacekeeping. We should avoid politicization of peacekeeping, which
is why the functions of peacekeeping are unpopular in many parts of the world. People can go to Darfur, but are very reluctant about going to Somalia.”

One speaker asked about the relevance of democracy for peacekeeping. It was suggested that after 60 years of peacekeeping activities we must be aware of the risks of Western/modern cultural imperialism on the issue of democracy. One of the panelists responded that there are no exact models or structures that should be implemented in all countries, but since 1945 we have the UN Charter as the lowest common denominator. “The UN Charter gives individuals civil and human rights as well as political rights. These fundamental ideas on human and civil rights cannot be compromised. However, patterns, structures and models could perhaps be more sensitively implemented in different countries.”

A journalist from a newspaper in a peace operations hosting country in Africa suggested: “You have listed the difficulties faced by UN forces on the ground, which we all condemn. Unfortunately, you have not given the reasons why these forces very often are facing these difficulties. You also referred to democracy. But what type of democracy? Is “the democracy” mentioned, the type that is imported, or the type that must be sought on the ground? Where can this basis for democracy be found in the culture of Africans? Has the UN set out to see how these societies functioned before the arrival of “democracy” from overseas?”

One of the panelists responding to the comment by the General stated that UN DPKO has identified information and intelligence as one of the major problems, and the speaker was hoping that this conference could help to solve some of the gaps. “This is an area where EU-UN cooperation could be very positive. Satellite and other assets that the EU has seem to overcome the information sharing problems between the EU and the UN. The UN has done some to resolve the information problem, but not as much as it should do. It is correct that peacekeeping does become an industry, which is a challenge that needs to be addressed.” It was also agreed to that development is an essential part of peace and development. In the strategic context, we cannot divide peacekeeping operations from other departments of the UN.
Chapter 2

The Evolution of the Relations of the United Nations with Other International Organizations: Perspectives through the Example of United Nations – European Union Cooperation

Chair: Ms. Sylvie-Agnès Bermann, Director, United Nations and International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, France

On the subject of the evolving relationship between the United Nations and other international organisations, in particular using the example of the cooperation between the United Nations and the European Union, I believe a number of lessons can be drawn from this rather recent cooperation. In particular at a time of global challenges for which the international community is looking for ways to best organise international governance and address security challenges. Indeed, these two organisations were for a long time unaware of each other, with two very different cultures and travelling along parallel paths. I recall an early troika I attended during the French Presidency of 2000, with the Secretary-General of the United Nations and affirmation of a desire for cooperation, which did not translate into action until 2003.

As stated by Michel Miraillet on behalf of the Minister of Defence, it is now time for an assessment after five years of close cooperation. It must be said that at the outset, there were a number of misunderstandings due to the fact that when the ESDP was created, the United Nations, in particular the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, considered it a rival to the United Nations and that this would distance European nations that contributed troops to United Nations operations. This was not in fact the case, since at the time there was already some disaffection among the Europeans. The ESDP was created at this point, but this is in no way a consequence and today we are in a phase of close cooperation between the two organisations.

As you all know, this phase began with Operation ARTEMIS in 2003. What is interesting is that, at the beginning, there were still meetings between the two organisations. The Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations was attending some meetings of the Political and Security Committee in Brussels. There were also meetings between the secretariats of the two organisations. But overall, the two organisations were only slowly finding each other.
Indeed, it is due to a United Nations request for an EU operation in Eastern Congo that this cooperation now has concrete expression, the elements of which you are already familiar with. In the past, there were Operation ARTEMIS and Operation RDC Congo; today, there is the operation in Chad and in the CAR. However, there is also cooperation or complementarity in other countries: in Kosovo; in Afghanistan; in Georgia, with the presence of observers from the European Union; in the DRC, where there has been coexistence between various missions. At present, this may be less well-known, in Guinea-Bissau, where there is an on-going mission in support to the security sector reform, while at the same time the United Nations Support Office is still present.

There is a new form of cooperation, demonstrated by the dynamic nature of this relationship. This new cooperation is maritime, and is intended to protect World Food Programme vessels and to fight piracy off the Somali coast.

On Lebanon and UNIFIL, without any doubt, there will be a discussion afterwards to determine whether this is an aberration or a turning point that will allow Europeans to contribute more to United Nations operations. Be that as it may, however, the United Nations/European Union partnership is developing on broader security issues. Upstream, it is essential and important to prepare for the emergence of new crises. The European Union is training personnel for deployment in peacekeeping operations and to boost Africa’s crisis management capabilities. The aim is to be one step ahead of crises, of course, as they are becoming increasingly common. The issue of democracy was recently raised; it is in the post-conflict period and, in any event, the period of the construction of a state that is most important, the new dimensions of which are security system reform and the DDR process. Then there is the new tool, the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission, which monitors events in this period, which constitutes a gap between the security management of a crisis and development.

For the purposes of being comprehensive, Sir John Holmes, the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs will speak about humanitarian issues in one of the sessions. There is considerable coordination and an allocation of roles during crises, precisely with ECHO, the European Union’s Office for humanitarian aid.

Finally, what is important is that the European Union contributes with new concepts and ideas to address new issues. There is the concept of the responsibility to protect, to provide protection to civilians in conflicts, and new ideas to address the problem of child soldiers, but also new responses to violence against women in armed conflicts. General Cammaert, who led the United Nations operation in Eastern Congo, says that today it is more dangerous to be a woman in armed conflicts than to be a soldier. The Presidency of the European Union will adopt directives on this issue.
Finally, there is the issue of environmental security and the implications of climate change as factors in conflicts and crises. The first UNEP report denounces the consequences of climate change. In Sudan, in particular in Darfur, it should also be presented as a consequence, albeit not the only cause, of climate change.

Today, the European Union is a global player with the full range of instruments, as part of the first pillar with the Commission, and as part of the second pillar with ESDP missions. While there are problems understanding the representation of the European Union, this will be rectified if the Lisbon treaty is adopted.

To conclude this presentation, the UN-EU cooperation is a source of greater legitimacy for both organisations. European Union operations benefit from the political legitimacy conferred by United Nations mandates, while the United Nations benefits from the credibility and operational resources provided by the European Union in complex operations in difficult situations. The European Union has clearly confirmed the priority it has given to cooperation with the United Nations in its security strategy, a priority that will also be apparent in this strategy when it is renewed.

Background Paper I

Dr. Thierry Tardy, Course Director, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Switzerland

Introduction

In the crisis management area, the decade that followed the end of the Cold War was characterised by rising needs for crisis management tools, a fundamental evolution of the United Nations as the main peacekeeper, and the emergence of regional actors, among which was the European Union. The UN-EU relationship started at the intersection of these three trends.

From the very beginning, this relationship has been shaped by a presumption of a mutually-beneficial cooperation between two natural partners on the one hand, and the inherent limitations to cooperation between two security actors on the other hand. Overall, ten years of UN-EU interaction in the crisis management field have led to some substantial cooperation. The UN and the EU have displayed a will to cooperate, have to a certain extent conceptualised and institutionalised their relationship, and have cooperated on a certain number of crisis management issues and operations, mainly in the Balkans and in sub-Saharan Africa.
At the same time, inter-institutional cooperation has been constrained by the two organisations’ own structures or cultures as well as by the effects of implicit competition. Crisis management is a highly politicised and complex activity that the UN and the EU do not necessarily approach with the same vision, know-how and capacities. The two institutions are also going through a period of transition as crisis management actors, leading them to naturally focus on internal reform and performance and to see partnerships as a second-rank priority.

This paper aims to analyse the UN-EU relationship in crisis management, with particular attention paid to the military aspects, for which cooperation has been so far the most visible, as illustrated in the latest operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in Chad/CAR. The paper starts by laying out the political context of the relationship and its specificity given the nature of the two institutions. It then briefly looks at some of the achievements and the extent to which the relationship has been institutionalised. This will lead to the identification of some key political and structural constraints to UN-EU cooperation. Finally, the paper proposes a series of policy recommendations to further improve the UN-EU relationship in crisis management.

Political background of the UN-EU relationship in crisis management

Analysing the relations between the UN and regional organisations has always been difficult, because of the absence of any convincing definition of a regional organisation (whether with reference to Chapter VIII of the UN Charter or not), but also, and maybe primarily, because of the strong heterogeneity of regional organisations, in terms of membership, mandates, and capacities. This makes each regional organisation a particular case, and explains why each UN-regional organisation relationship carries its specificities. As a consequence, generic recommendations about relations between the UN and regional organisations, or comparative analysis of these relations, are uneasy.

A multifaceted relationship. The EU and the UN-EU relationship no doubt illustrate these difficulties. The EU is often described as a *sui generis* organisation, i.e. an organisation with no equivalent (the only example of its kind). Legally speaking, it is not an international organisation (it would have become one under the Lisbon Treaty); it is not formally a regional arrangement in the sense of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter while its regional dimension is increasingly called into question. The EU is also characterised by the complexity of its structure and procedures, the mix of intergovernmental approach (in the CFSP/ESDP field) and supra-national dimension (with the European Commission) making it difficult to work with and to understand for any outsider.
This being said, the UN-EU relationship is multi-layered and multifaceted. It is multi-layered because it involves different sets of actors on both sides, and multifaceted because it implies different sorts of interaction in different sorts of activities. What the European Commission does with the UN Development Programme (UNDP) is one level of relations; what the Secretariat of the Council does with DPKO is another; what the EU Member States do within the UN Security Council is a third. By the same token, inter-institutional cooperation concerns a wide range of activities. UN-EU cooperation in military crisis management is different from cooperation in the civilian sphere. In the latter case, responsibilities are shared by the Commission and the Council Secretariat on the EU side, and by a variety of Secretariat Departments and agencies on the UN side. These various levels of interaction and activities are all of a different nature, they imply different logics and constraints, and offer different prospects of cooperation. They also make it difficult to look at the UN-EU relationship as a two-player game. As a consequence, the UN-EU relationship is difficult to describe, as much as it is difficult to comprehend by UN and EU staff, who often point to the confusion arising from the heterogeneity of actors and activities at stake.

Presumption of mutually-beneficial relationship. The UN and the EU are often presented as “natural partners” in crisis management and there is a presumption of a mutually-beneficial relationship between the two institutions.

For the UN, as noted in the 1992 *Agenda for Peace*, and since then in a series of documents, the rising role of regional organisations is welcomed as these institutions can share the burden of the maintenance of international peace and security. Regional organisations can also be seen as responses to some of the operational challenges with which the UN is confronted. In the early 2000s, the UN was launching the reform of its peace operations through the Brahimi Report process at a time when the EU was laying the foundations of ESDP. This created a theoretical convergence between a form of demand on the UN side and a form of supply on the EU side. The UN lacks some “enabling capacities” for its own peace operations and the EU is developing such capacities, while asserting that “The efforts made will enable Europeans to respond more effectively and more coherently to requests from leading organizations such as the UN”.

In return, the UN is an inevitable partner for the EU in crisis management, in the sense that it provides legality and legitimacy for EU activities. The EU recognizes the centrality of the UN in the international security architecture. The 2003 *European Security Strategy* stated that the “The fundamental framework for international relations is the United Nations Charter” and that “The United Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.” In the same vein, the UN is at the centre of the concept
of “effective multilateralism”, linking the two institutions at the strategic level. For the EU, partnering with the UN can even be seen as a way to assert itself as a security actor.

It follows that the EU accepts its legal subordination to the United Nations in principle and intends to act in accordance with the UN Charter, in particular with the provisions of its chapter VII (regulating the use of force). In the crisis management field, it has been assumed that any EU-led military operation that would imply a chapter VII mandate would have to be legally endorsed by a UN Security Council resolution. Beyond the legal basis provided by the resolution, the EU is also interested in the legitimacy that the association with the UN produces. In places where the EU might be seen as politically biased or simply where the local context is difficult, acting at the request of the UN or on its behalf is of key importance. At the same time, one could note some ambiguity on the propensity of the EU to systematically go to the UN Security Council to legalise its own peace operations. The subordination of EU policy to a Security Council vote potentially gives non-EU members (Russia and China in particular) a veto right over EU operations, which is difficult to square with the EU aspiration to be a full-fledged security actor. Here the EU touches, as does any other security actor, the tension between abiding by international law and asserting its power.

Common features and shared values. Finally, the UN and the EU share some common features that reinforce the presumption of mutually-beneficial relationship. The two organisations are different in terms of membership, general mandate, degree of autonomy vis-à-vis their Member States, internal politics or functioning. They also have different levels of experience, expertise and capabilities in the crisis management field. Yet, they do share some characteristics as security actors: they have similar aspirations to play a wide-ranging and ambitious role in crisis management; they share a common approach to threat assessment, as illustrated in the High-Level Panel Report and in the *European Security Strategy*; they place the same premium on the articulation between security, development and human rights; they can even be seen as sharing certain values, such as the belief in the virtues of international law and multilateralism, a preference for the peaceful settlement of disputes and a related uneasiness with the use of force. As a consequence, there is *prima facie* a compatibility between the two institutions, between the two forms of multilateralism, that derives from the nature of the organisations, their liberal conception of peace and security, and their inclusive approach to crisis management.

Achievements – degree of institutionalization

The UN-EU relationship in crisis management started in earnest less than ten years ago, and has since gone through a process of institutionalisation that has no equiv-
alent with other regional organisations. The first steps took place in the early 2000s, soon after the EU framed ESDP. At this time, apart from the cooperation that the UN and the European Commission had established in the development and humanitarian fields, the two institutions had hardly any contact with each other in the security domain. In 2000/01, a series of documents (mainly initially on the EU side) and meetings between high-ranking EU and UN representatives called for increased communication and cooperation. Some guiding principles for the relationship were laid down, points of contact were established, and a desk-to-desk dialogue was initiated.

A second phase started with the first ESDP operations in 2003, two of them leading to direct inter-institutional cooperation: the EU Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia-Herzegovina taking over the UN International Police Task Force, and operation ARTEMIS in the DRC acting as a ‘bridging operation’ for a reinforced MONUC. These developments led to the September 2003 “Joint Declaration on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management” that welcomed existing cooperation and called for its further institutionalisation. A “joint consultative mechanism” (so-called Steering Committee) was established at the working level, aimed at examining ways to enhance UN-EU cooperation in the four areas of planning, training, communication and best practices. The Steering Committee brings together representatives from DPA, DPKO and OCHA on the UN side, DG-E-IV (America, United Nations), DG-E-V (Africa), DG-E-VIII (Defence), DG-E-IX (Civilian Crisis Management), Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), EU Military Staff, New York Liaison Office (NYLO) and DG-RELEX (European Commission) on the EU side; it meets twice a year to discuss thematic as well as country-specific issues.

In parallel, following the first ESDP operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina (2003) and in the DRC (2003), subsequent EU operations led to significant cooperation with the UN. In 2006, at the request of the UN, the EU launched an operation in the DRC, to assist MONUC during the election process. EUFOR DRC acted as a ‘strategic reserve’ or an ‘over-the-horizon’ force, in support of the MONUC. Furthermore, in 2007-08, the UN and the EU created and deployed simultaneous operations in Chad and the Central African Republic: MINURCAT is a civilian operation mandated to train and monitor national security forces while EUFOR Chad/CAR is a military operation mandated to contribute to protecting civilians (refugees and displaced persons) and UN personnel, and to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid. The EUFOR is a ‘bridging operation’, deployed for one year before the UN takes over (planned for March 2009). In the civilian field, the EU presence in the DRC through different civilian missions (EUPOL Kinshasa, EUSEC RDC and EUPOL RDC) together with the MONUC, as well as the EU takeover of the UN mission in Kosovo, have also led to substantial cooperation between the
two institutions. In June 2007, a second UN-EU joint declaration was signed, at the initiative of the German Presidency of the European Union, and was meant to place the inter-institutional debate at a more political level. The two institutions have also engaged in a joint effort to strengthen the African Union, in a triangular relationship currently in its initial stage, but that offers some potential.

These different cases of UN-EU cooperation cover a wide range of scenarios or interaction patterns. In most cases, the EU acts in support of the UN. These scenarios have been by and large identified by the two organisations, in the military sphere in particular. They are summarised in the table below.

**Scenarios of UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National contributions to a UN operation (possible involvement of the EU through the ‘Clearing House’ mechanism)</td>
<td>UNIFIL 2 (although ‘Clearing House’ not used in this case)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stand alone operation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-&gt; EU-led operation mandated by the UN Security Council with no simultaneous UN deployment</td>
<td>Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridging model</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-&gt; EU-led operation before a UN take over</td>
<td>ARTEMIS DRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stand-by / Over-the-horizon</td>
<td>EUFOR Chad/CAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-&gt; EU-led operation in support of an existing UN operation</td>
<td>EUFOR DRC (2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporting model / focussed support</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-&gt; EU provides capabilities (logistics, air support, etc.) to the UN</td>
<td>EU Assistance Mission to AMIS in Darfur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modular approach</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-&gt; EU component of a UN operation (with the EU component operating under political control and strategic direction of the EU)</td>
<td>No example to date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-&gt; hypothetically, EU component under UN command (more likely in the civilian sphere)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint / Hybrid operation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-&gt; UN and EU running a joint operation (unlikely)</td>
<td>No example to date</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall, a significant amount of measures has been taken to operationalizing and institutionalize the UN-EU relationship in crisis management. The main ones are the following:
• adoption of two UN-EU joint Declarations on Crisis management (2003 and 2007);
• creation of a UN-EU Steering Committee meeting twice a year;
• establishment of points of contact between the UN (DPKO, DPA) and the Secretariat of the Council (DGE-IV, DGE-V, DGE-VIII, DGE-IX, Military Staff, CPCC) and the European Commission (RELEX);
• regular meetings between the UN Secretary-General and EU High Representative for CFSP; between UN Secretary-General and EU troika and PSC; between UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations and High Representative for CFSP;
• agreement on information exchange;
• information exchange on respective operational standards and concepts;
• information exchange between UN and EU missions in the field;
• cross participation in training activities and exercises;
• cooperation between UN and EU Situation Centres;
• cooperation between the UN and the EU Satellite Centre;
• creation of two positions of Liaison Officers within the New York Liaison Office (one for military crisis management, one for civilian crisis management);
• conduct of joint assessment missions in the planning phase of operations;
• posting of a UN Liaison Officer in the OHQ of EUFOR Chad/CAR;
• weekly video-conferences between UN and EU in the planning phase of the Chad mission;
• establishment of ‘education days’ (training sessions to enhance mutual understanding of respective organizations);
• conduct of joint after-action reviews (for DRC-2003, DRC-2006 and Chad-2008); and the
• adoption of “Guidelines for joint UN-EU planning applicable to existing UN field missions” (June 2008), including a ‘Comparative Roadmap of UN and EU planning processes’, ‘Terms of reference for a UN-EU joint coordination group to support cooperation in planning’, ‘Checklist of elements usually included in UN Security Council resolutions authorizing the deployment of an EU operation’, and ‘Checklist of elements included in follow-up technical arrangements between the UN and the EU’.

Key Constraints

In this largely positive context, the UN-EU relationship is shaped by constraints that come into play at different levels and with various impacts. These constraints can be divided into three categories: first there are constraints of a political nature that may impede inter-institutional cooperation at a strategic/systemic level or in a particular case. This is encapsulated by the sentence: “cooperation is difficult
because we diverge”; second, there are constraints that have to do with the two institutions’ respective structures, crisis management cultures and procedures: “cooperation is difficult because we work differently”; third, there is the general constraint coming from a lack of knowledge of the other: “cooperation is difficult because we don’t know each other”.

“Cooperation is difficult because we diverge”

Inter-institutional competition, diverging political agendas, and dependency. The objective of this paper is to analyse the degree of cooperation between the UN and the EU in crisis management and to explore ways to improve such cooperation. Overall, close to ten years of UN-EU interaction in the crisis management field have demonstrated that the two institutions are generally willing to cooperate and have by-and-large cooperated. There is also a large consensus on the fact that inter-institutional cooperation is imperative and the debate is more on how to maximize the benefits of cooperation rather than on questioning whether the benefits exist.

This being said, one key characteristic of inter-institutional interaction, which is also one of its inherent limits, is the fact that institutions do compete with each other, in a way similar to how ministries of a given country or how departments of the same administration will compete.

First, as institutions, international organisations must permanently demonstrate that they fulfil the functions for which they were created, or that they can adapt to the new needs. They must display a certain number of comparative advantages, as well as ensure their visibility and efficacy as security actors. Therefore they develop their own agenda, interests and objectives. These imperatives are not, by nature, conducive to inter-institutional cooperation and may, on the contrary, create conditions for competition between actors struggling for limited resources. Indeed, one aspect of the UN-EU relationship is the fact that the two institutions compete with each other on issues such as positioning, market conquest, visibility and access to information.

As an example, the form that UN-EU cooperation could take was not clear in the early 2000s, and EU efforts to assume a greater role in the security arena initially led to some concerns within the UN Secretariat that EU assets would be reserved for EU-led operations at the expense of UN operations. ESDP was developed at a time when EU Member States had taken their distance from UN-led operations (see below) and the question was raised whether building crisis management capabilities within a regional setting would enhance or weaken UN peacekeeping. Having two institutions doing the same thing may create synergies, but it may also
mean overlap or fewer resources, and therefore competition. As a consequence, if both the UN and the EU seem to be genuinely willing to cooperate, cooperation is not necessarily a natural way to interact, and therefore needs to be induced.

Second, as inter-governmental bodies, international institutions’ policies are defined by their Member States whose agendas may vary from one institution to the other; this is reinforced when institutions have different membership, as in the UN-EU case. Political agendas interfere at several levels. At a strategic level, states that are members of both organisations may want to give priority to one over the other in a particular area, and therefore develop capacities or provide resources to the favoured institution at the expense of the other. Such is the case for most EU Member States that tend to favour the EU as a crisis management channel rather than the UN.

Furthermore, the UN-EU relationship somehow reflects a general polarisation within the ‘international community’ between the North and the South. This polarisation finds an expression in the crisis management field as most UN troop contributing countries (TCCs) come from the South while northern countries are globally absent from UN-led operations (see below). The fact that northern countries are involved in crisis management through other institutions, such as the EU or NATO, tends to accentuate the divide. For the main UN TCCs, though the role of the EU is generally welcomed, it is also viewed with some degree of scepticism, and this directly impacts on UN-EU cooperation. For example, the fact that the UN, i.e. the main TCCs, are supposed to take over the EUFOR in Chad after the one-year bridging operation, and therefore allow for the EU withdrawal on the EU’s own terms, is not always well received by the TCCs. If, to put it bluntly, the EU does crisis management where, when and how it wishes while the UN does what others do not want to do, wherever and whenever, then the UN-EU relationship does not develop on a sound basis.

By the same token, UN-EU cooperation can be hindered by diverging political agendas within the UN Security Council. This has been the case with Kosovo and with Georgia, where the EU-Russia opposition negatively impacted UN-EU cooperation. In the Kosovo case, divergences have delayed the Security Council’s endorsement of the EU-led civilian mission and complicated UN-EU cooperation on the ground as well as the UN handover to the EU. For Georgia, endorsement by a Security Council resolution of the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) was never envisaged (not even a presidential statement), given the civilian nature of the mission and also because of the Russian opposition at the Security Council.

Finally, political agendas come into play as each organisation has its own conception of a particular operation, its mandate or the division of tasks it implies. When
the two organisations are simultaneously deployed, strategic objectives may diverge based on each actor’s conception of its own role. This was illustrated in Chad when the mandates of EUFOR and MINURCAT were initially defined, with the expectation on the UN side that the EUFOR would act as a kind of military component of the UN mission while the EU had a different vision about its own mandate and its position vis-à-vis the UN and MINURCAT. UN-EU cooperation in strategic and operational planning was hampered by these divergences of views.

A third source of tension between the UN and the EU comes from a certain inequality in the relationship. Any relationship between two international organizations implies the idea of primacy, of priority of one over the other; there is inevitably the idea of rank between several institutions that operate in the same field and this may act against the establishment of partnerships between allegedly equal institutions.

For example, the UN wishes to retain a certain degree of primacy in its relations with regional organisations, in the legal field (need to have a UNSC resolution for regional organisations peace operations and to report to the UNSC), but also in the political/operational field (definition of relations with regional organisations, definition of standards, subordination to the UN by the Chapter VIII regional arrangements, etc.). In practice however, the comparative advantages of the UN and the EU lead to a relative unequal relationship, in the sense that the EU tends to dominate and define the agenda while the UN is often on the receiving end, getting what the EU is willing to give. In most scenarios of UN-EU cooperation, it is the EU that supports the UN so as to palliate an alleged or real weakness of the UN (lack of rapid reaction force, difficulty to conduct robust peacekeeping, lack of tactical air support, finance, etc.). In this ‘demand versus supply’ relationship, what the EU is ready to bring is the result of an internal EU decision-making process and does not necessarily match what the UN would like to get.

Conversely, one scenario when the UN finds itself in a position of strength is when the Security Council acts as a mandating body of an EU stand-alone operation. The EU is in this case in a situation of dependence vis-à-vis the UN, in particular the non-EU members of the Security Council. By the same token and paradoxically, the EU is dependent on the UN and the troop contributing countries (TCCs) in the bridging operation scenario, when the exit strategy of the EU lies in the ability and willingness of the UN to take over the EU operation in due course.

EU Member States’ policies and EU autonomy. A second set of political constraints comes from the EU and EU Member States’ policies in relation to the UN. The
The UN-EU relationship is directly shaped by two aspects of the EU and its Member States’ policies vis-à-vis UN-led peace operations. One is the general absence of EU Member States as troop contributing countries to UN-led operation; the other is the importance that the EU gives to its autonomy of decision when it comes to military assets.

The UN-EU relationship has developed on the assumption that EU Member States do not contribute troops to UN-led operations. All scenarios are based on this assumption. Since the mid-1990s, European states (as well as the United States) have by and large ceased to contribute troops to UN-led operations, while financing approximately 40 percent of the peacekeeping operations budget. As of August 2008, EU Member States’ contribution to UN-led operations is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>In 16 ongoing UN operations</th>
<th>In 9 UN operations in Africa</th>
<th>In the MONUC (DRC)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total UN Member States</td>
<td>88.576</td>
<td>61.068</td>
<td>18.389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Member States</td>
<td>10.317</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>11.65 %</td>
<td>0.89 %</td>
<td>0.42 %13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These figures show an absence of EU Member States from UN-led operations in Africa. The percentage is significantly higher when taking the overall figures mainly because of a massive contribution of EU Member States (outside the formal framework of the EU though) to UNIFIL 2 in Lebanon (7,104 out of 12,295). Given the nature of UNIFIL and its command structure (with the establishment of the Strategic Military Cell within DPKO), such a contribution can however not be interpreted as a turning point in EU Member States policies vis-à-vis UN-led operations and is likely to remain an exception. With UNIFIL not counted, the overall percentage of EU Member States troops in UN-led operations goes down to 4.21 percent (3,213 troops out of 76,281)14.

This general absence raises a lot of questions that go beyond the scope of this paper, ranging from the ability of the UN to run complex military operations without the assets of Western states (as the UN mission in Darfur – UNAMID – shows) to the development of the so-called “two-speed crisis management”, with the dichotomy between UN peace operations, mainly run by developing countries, and EU or NATO operations.

The development of the UN-EU relationship has taken place with the assumption that the EU would support UN operations short of contributing to them. The concepts of “bridging operations” or “stand-by model” fall within this approach.
Yet, the UN-EU relationship would be fundamentally modified if EU Member States participated significantly in UN operations in Africa. The very question of the need to create distinct EU operations in the DRC in 2003 (ARTEMIS) and 2006 (EUFOR DRC) and in Chad and CAR in 2007 (EUFOR Chad/CAR) would be posed in very different terms had EU Member States been present in MONUC and MINURCAT. One could even argue that operations ARTEMIS and EUFOR DRC became necessary because of the absence of EU Member States in MONUC.

UN Secretariat representatives often call for an increased contribution from EU Member States to UN-led operations. In the specific cases of bridging operations (ARTEMIS and EUFOR Chad/CAR), EU Member States are also asked to “re-hat” some of their troops by keeping them in the UN take-over operation. While this was refused by EU states contributing to ARTEMIS in 2003, re-hatting appears likely in the transition between EUFOR Chad/CAR and MINURCAT 2 (some EUFOR contributors have expressed their will to stay under MINURCAT 2, with strong pressure on France to do the same). At the operational level, such re-hatting would highly facilitate the UN take-over and therefore the withdrawal of the EU in the spring of 2009. At a more strategic level, it would mark a change in the EU Member States’ policies vis-à-vis UN-led operations.

A related constraint comes from the conception that the EU has of its own role as a security actor, articulated around the concept of autonomy. Autonomy of action and decision is consubstantial to CFSP and the aspiration to be a global player. This imperative finds expressions at different levels: at the institutional level, it explains the reluctance of the EU to be seen as a regional arrangement in the sense of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, as autonomy is difficult to reconcile with the subordination to the UN that a Chapter VIII status implies. At a political-operational level, autonomy is reflected in the necessity to have any EU-led operation put under the political control and strategic direction of the Political and Security Committee (PSC). This explains the impossibility for an EU military operation to be placed under UN command, and therefore to achieve unity of command in a hypothetical UN-EU operation. This imperative is less strict in the civilian sphere, where the idea to have an EU component (police for example) in a larger UN operation is not excluded.

“Cooperation is difficult because we work differently”

Structural differences. At the operational level, a significant constraint on UN-EU cooperation stems from the differences in the structures and functioning of both institutions. Several differences come into play.

To start with, the mix of intergovernmental and supranational approaches within the EU – i.e. the combination of ESDP and Commission activities – tends to com-
plicate cooperation with the UN as it adds to the number of players and confuses UN interlocutors as to what the EU is and how it works. The confusion over how the EU should be represented in the Peacebuilding Commission (by the EU Presidency, by the High Representative for CFSP or by the Commission) is an example of that.

Secondly, different working methods in the areas of financing or logistics have impeded cooperation\textsuperscript{17}, while information sharing has remained a politically and technically difficult issue with inherent limits that can only be addressed on a case-by-case basis.

Thirdly, the operations in the DRC in 2006 and in Chad as of 2007/08 have revealed key differences in the respective decision-making, planning and command processes and structures.

Insofar as decision-making is concerned, although the EU was able to decide upon and deploy in less than a month the operation ARTEMIS in the DRC in 2003, in general terms, the EU process tends to be heavier and more closely supervised by Member States than the UN decision-making process. Within the EU, the intergovernmental approach and the related internal (and parliamentary) debates as well as recurrent interactions among all layers of the EU political-military-civilian structure (states, PSC, military staff, OHQ, CPCC, etc.) tend to politicize and delay decision-making. In contrast, at the UN, Member States are involved at the level of the Security Council and through meetings with the troop contributing countries, but the whole process of establishing a peace operation is largely led by the Secretariat, with less state interference\textsuperscript{18} (with the UN Secretariat being sometimes compared with the European Commission insofar as autonomy is concerned).

This has a direct impact on the way the UN and the EU plan operations. Two differences (and problems) can be identified here. One is reflected in the differences in sequencing during the planning phase, and consequently in the difficulty to synchronise UN and EU planning in the case of parallel mission start-up (as in the case of Chad). At the UN, most of the planning, including operational planning and part of force generation, is done before the decision to launch the operation – i.e. the adoption of a Security Council resolution – is taken, while for the EU operational planning (CONOPS, OPLAN in particular) and force generation can only start after the adoption of a Joint Action by the Council of the EU, which usually follows the UN Security Council resolution. To partially remedy the problem and allow for EU planning to start earlier, the After-Action Review on UN-EU planning for Chad introduces the idea of two UN Security Council resolutions (or at least one UNSC presidential statement to allow for the EU Joint Action to be
adopted). Whether this two-step approach is acceptable to the UN Security Council remains to be seen, since other UN operations are created on the basis of only one resolution, which approves the mandate and operational planning presented by the UN Secretary-General.

In the case of an EU operation in support of an existing UN mission, the problem is less acute as the UN planning related to the adjustment of the mission would take place after the UN Security Council resolution (and in coordination with the simultaneous EU operational planning)\(^\text{19}\).

The second difference stems from the respective planning responsibilities. At the UN, planning is lighter and does not make the clear-cut distinctions between the different layers of the planning process that the EU does. Furthermore, most of the planning is done by the UN Secretariat (DPKO/DFS and other agencies) that hands over to the operation’s leadership at a late stage, once operational planning is completed. Also, the operation leadership is not involved in operational planning as most operations’ leaders are identified relatively late in the process (which poses a problem of continuity within the UN). In contrast, the distinction between strategic and operational planning is very clear at the EU, and operational planning is conducted by the operation leadership (in the Operation Headquarters, OHQ), which reports to Brussels but is physically and functionally separate. This being said, UN planning is much more comprehensive and integrated, due to the multidimensional dimension of most UN operations, while the EU has little experience in planning multidimensional operations thus far.

Finally, the UN and the EU differ on HQ organizational structures, the main difference being in the location and responsibilities of the different layers of command. At the UN, the operation HQ and Force Commander are in the field (in the same entity), with a significant delegation of responsibilities to the field. The chain of command is short, with the Force Commander reporting to the Head of Mission (SRSG). Things are different at the EU where command of the operation at the military strategic level lies in the Operation Headquarters (OHQ), located either in one of the five national OHQs, in SHAPE or within the EU Operations Centre. The EU makes a clear distinction between the OHQ and the Force HQ that commands the operation on the ground with little autonomy given to the Force HQ. The chain of command is also more complex as it involves three levels: the Force HQ in the field, the OHQ, and the PSC in Brussels\(^\text{20}\). In practice, these differences mean that there is no formal equivalent to the EU OHQ in UN operations. By the same token, while all UN operations are placed under the political direction of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG)\(^\text{21}\), the EU does not systematically have Special Representatives or Special Envoys. Furthermore, when the latter exist, they do not have the same level of prerogatives as UN SRSGs.
“Cooperation is difficult because we don’t know each other”

**Lack of mutual knowledge.** The third type of constraints comes from a general lack of communication or mutual understanding of the respective structures, working methods and institutional cultures. As previously stated, the UN and the EU were unfamiliar with each other when they initiated cooperation in 2000. Eight years later, things have changed and through the work of the Steering Committee and field interaction, mutual knowledge and understanding have improved, particularly in the categories of staff that interact. However, given the complexity of the institutions and the amount of information that needs to be digested, mutual knowledge at the working level is still limited.

Furthermore, it is the nature of the dialogue, both within the Steering Committee and at the highest political level that is at stake. Institutional channels exist and discussions take place, but communication does not seem to be as fluid and rich as it should be.

**Lessons Learned and Recommendations**

**Limits to an improved relationship.** When looking at ways to improve the UN-EU relationship in crisis management, one problem comes from the tension between the need to institutionalize the relationship, and the specificity of each situation that makes any standardized approach difficult. All after action reviews recommend the institutionalization of the relationship while admitting that each situation is different from the other. This poses a limit to the identification of lessons learned and best practices. For example, many of the lessons learned from the two operations in the DRC (ARTEMIS-MONUC and EUFOR DRC-MONUC) were of little utility in the case of Chad, which presented a very different situation. By the same token, although useful for guidance, the different typologies of scenarios of UN-EU cooperation (see table above) reflect past situations and may therefore be inappropriate in new situations. At the same time, the two institutions will be all the more equipped to face new situations as they have institutionalized their relationship and learnt from past experience. Institutionalization and standardization have to be compatible with a certain degree of flexibility.

This being said, the operations that have implicated UN-EU cooperation in the last five years have all led, in a more or less systematic manner, to the identification of lessons learned and good practices. In particular, the recent operations in the DRC and Chad have been analysed through joint after-action reviews conducted by the two secretariats, with quite a few recommendations following the DRC case being implemented in the Chad operation.
In general terms, these different exercises point to the three categories of constraints that have been identified earlier in this paper, with particular attention paid to the structural differences. Making the distinction between these three categories is important because it provides possible ways to remedy problems, as addressing political divergences presumably does not require the same tool as addressing a technical obstacle. Improving the UN-EU relationship in crisis management will require that attention be paid to the three levels of issues. In this endeavour, one should stress that given that UN-EU cooperation is less a priority than individual institutional objectives, improvements can only be incremental and relatively little ambitious. Furthermore, in many areas, improved cooperation will be facilitated by better capacity or internal coordination at the level of each institution: for example, the length of the EU force generation processes in both the DRC (2006) and the Chad cases has impacted on UN-EU cooperation but can only be addressed by the EU internally. If addressing internal problems is a sine qua non for an improved cooperation, then there is little that the two institutions can do together to foster the process.

Recommendations. The ten following recommendations are to be taken in conjunction with those made in the joint UN-EU after-action reviews and in other documents, such as the PSC recommendations on EU-UN cooperation.

Strategic level

1. Participation of EU Member States in UN-led operations. Chad could provide an opportunity for EU Member States present in EUFOR to place their troops under UN command (“re-hatting”) when MINURCAT 2 takes over. Beyond this particular case, if one assumes that EU support to the UN is necessary because of UN shortfalls in several key areas, then it makes sense to remedy these problems from the inside. European participation in UN-led operations through national contributions would also help alleviate the North-South divide within the UN. In return for European national contributions, ways should be found within the UN to accommodate command concerns of European states to the extent possible (without replicating the Strategic Military Cell created for Lebanon).

2. Further exploration of the ‘modular approach’. Short of national contributions to UN-led operations, there is a need to further explore the ‘modular approach’, by which the EU could provide one component of a UN operation. Bearing in mind the necessity to have any EU force under the political control and strategic direction of the PSC, scenarios in which the EU would provide ‘enablers’ such as strategic air-lift, planning, or information (satellite images) to a UN operation could be contemplated, and tested in joint
exercises. In this analysis, the role that EUROMARFOR is playing within the UNIFIL, or that SHIRBRIG played within UNMEE in Ethiopia-Eritrea in 2000, could inspire the EU in its relationship with the UN. The civilian sphere could also provide a more conducive terrain for the ‘modular approach’.

3. **Increased political dialogue at the highest level.** To avoid misunderstanding of the strategic objectives of each institution when a cooperation is being initiated, there is a need for increased political dialogue at the highest level and early in the planning phase (in line with the UN-EU Joint Declaration on Crisis Management adopted under the German EU presidency in 2007 and is recommended in the After-Action Review for Chad). By extension, meetings between the UN Security Council and the EU PSC could be envisaged.

4. **Further development of UN-EU cooperation in the civilian field.** In ten years of UN-EU cooperation in crisis management, the military aspects have been predominant in both debates and practical cooperation. However, the civilian sphere offers an important potential for cooperation (financing, experts, training, etc.) beyond what the European Commission and UN agencies have been doing for some time. At the ESDP level, UN-EU cooperation in conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities overall has remained weak. On the EU side, obstacles to cooperation come from internal tensions (between the Commission and the Council Secretariat) and from the fact that the EU has yet to assert itself as a major civilian crisis management actor. The development of the Peacebuilding Commission, the Kosovo operation, the monitoring mission in Georgia, and streamlining of the UN policy in the field of SSR, could provide opportunities for increased UN-EU cooperation in the civilian field (identification of SSR and DDR points of contact in both organisations and joint training programs on SSR or DDR could be a first step). Besides, the political constraints that apply to the military sphere (regarding political control and strategic direction of EU-led operations) do not apply in the same terms in the civilian sphere.

5. **Increased attention paid to perceptions.** On the EU side, increased attention should be paid to the way the EU role is perceived within the UN (countries from the South, UN troop contributing countries). As an example, whether TCCs were sufficiently involved in discussions between the EU and the UN on the Chad ‘bridging operation’ and therefore the need for a UN take-over after one year is not clear (while DPKO was not in a position to guarantee that the UN would take over). In the same vein, the UN-EU relationship needs to be placed in the broader context of the UN-
EU-AU relationship. As an example, the idea proposed in the 2008 ‘UN Secretary-General report on the relationship between the UN and regional organisations, in particular the Africa Union’, to draft a common code of conduct in peace operations, could be pushed forward by the three institutions.

Operational level and mutual knowledge

6. **Review of the mandate of the Steering Committee.** The Steering Committee has played a useful role since its creation, but needs to be adapted to the new challenges (the review is asked by the Steering Committee itself). As it currently operates, the Steering Committee is more about general discussions on a wide variety of themes than about practical efforts to move the UN-EU relationship forward. Both the format and the working methods should be reviewed, with more focused discussions and a problem-solving approach.

7. **Creation of a UN Liaison Office at the EU.** The absence of a permanent representation of DPKO at the EU is an obstacle to cooperation and should be remedied (a DPKO Liaison officer was sent to the EU OHQ for the Chad mission but is not supposed to stay on a permanent basis). The creation three years ago of Liaison officers dedicated to crisis management within the EU New York Liaison Office has proved to be beneficial to the relationship and must be reciprocated. In practical terms, a UN Liaison officer to the EU should spend some time at DPKO before being posted in Brussels.

8. **Need for a forward-looking approach to the UN-EU relationship.** The UN-EU relationship should be approached in a more forward-looking way, for example by identifying possible scenarios of future cooperation in crisis management, rather than looking at past experiences. These scenarios could be the themes of joint exercises, for example; UN-EU joint operation, a UN-EU-AU operation or UN-AU operation with EU support. A simultaneous UN and EU operation in a transition phase, when for example no UN take over allows for an EU withdrawal following a bridging operation, and therefore the obligation for the EU to stay as the UN operation increases in power (this scenario could be illustrated in Chad post March 2009). A UN operation with an EU component placed under UN command (with special command arrangements) or an EU maritime component of a UN operation.

9. **Network of institutions and Intranet.** Policy input should be developed through the establishment of a permanent network of institutions/think
tanks looking at the relationship between the UN and regional organisations, with the EU Institute for Security Studies as the focal point for the EU (the 2006 UN Secretary-General report “Regional-global security partnership” recommended the establishment of a “dedicated research capacity” in the field of conflict prevention). In the same vein, an intranet site dedicated to the UN-EU relationship should be created, with a compilation of official documents and information sheets on the two institutions (structure, decision-making process, planning process, financial rules, lessons learned and good practices, etc.); creation of e-learning modules and organisation of sessions on UN-EU cooperation by the European Security and Defence College.

10. More ‘education days’. There is a need for more information-sharing and familiarisation sessions between the two institutions. The Steering Committee talks about ‘education days’ to be held every two years, which seems too little given the needs for mutual learning and the turnover of staff in both institutions. Furthermore, ‘education days’ need to target senior management.
Road Map for EU Autonomous Operation in Support of a UN Peace Operation

Annex 1

Road Map for EU autonomous operation in support of a UN Peace Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UN</th>
<th>UN-EU Coordination Process</th>
<th>EU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UN request for support</td>
<td>Consideration of UN request</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN-EU Coordination Group</td>
<td>tasking of Secr.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultation &amp; Information sharing</td>
<td>If no - action stops - info UN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e.g. planning requirements, fact finding missions to HQs/field)</td>
<td>If yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Council Resolution (Mandate of EU Force)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN reply to UN request</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop Technical Assistance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; Consult on:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- CONOPS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- OPLAN + ROE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Logistics/support issues</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Media strategy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; Field assessment mission</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; Ongoing exchange of views / information relevant to planning (e.g. SOFA)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Liaison officer arrangements/mechanisms as required)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop TA and Logistics Concept</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exchange of Letters on EUFOR support to UN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN review, inter alia:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- UN CONOPS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Mission Support Plan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- ROE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- FC Directives</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- UN Strategic Guidance to the UN mission in the field</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjustments as necessary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Abbreviations/Symbols

- Key Decisions
- Other Decisions
- CONOPS: Concept of Operations
- IMD: Initiating Military Directive
- OPLAN: Operation Plan
- ROE: Rules of Engagement
- TA: Technical Arrangement

IMD released - formal start of Military Planning CONOPS (Council)

Force Generation (OpCdr) OPLAN and ROE (Council)

Decision to launch operation

Operation begins

UN liaison officer in Brussels as required
Notes


2 A UN report on the ‘partnership’ between the UN and the European Commission starts by stating that “The EU and the UN are natural partners, […] united by the core values laid out in the 1945 Charter of the UN and the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights”; “The Partnership between the UN and the EU. The UN and the European Commission working together in Development and Humanitarian Cooperation”, UN, 2006, p.6.


5 The EU talks about a “Common Assessment of Threat”; see ‘Paper for submission to the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change’, p.12, approved by the GAERC, 17-18 May 2004.


8 The High-Representative for CFSP addressed the UN Security Council for the first time on 23 June 2000 (on the Balkans). Meetings between the UN Secretary-General and the EU troika took place in Sept. 2000 in New York; the UNSG came to Brussels in Oct. 2000; the High-Representative for CFSP met the UNSG in New York in Nov. 2000.


11 As of 31 August 2008, the top ten TCCs were: Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, Nigeria, Nepal, Ghana, Jordan, Rwanda, Italy, Uruguay.

12 Divergences on SSR within the Special Committee on Peacekeeping operations (C-34) is another example.

13 UN website, 31 August 2008.


15 In lieu of re-hatting, the EU has provided MONUC with satellite images issued by the EU Satellite Centre.

16 See “EU-UN Cooperation in Civilian Crisis Management”, Annex IV to the Annex, ESDP Presidency Report, European Council, 13 December 2004, § 14. The document makes it clear that such civilian elements should remain under the EU “own chain of command”, but they may also report to the UN chain of command.


18 These differences are presented in the After-Action Review – UN-EU planning for EUFOR Chad/RCA of April 2008 and in the ‘Guidelines for joint UN-EU planning applicable to existing UN field missions’, UN DPKO, June 2008. See documents in annex of the present paper.

19 See ‘Guidelines for joint UN-EU planning applicable to existing UN field missions’, UN DPKO, June 2008.

20 These differences were illustrated in the Democratic Republic of the Congo with the EUFOR DRC and the MONUC over the summer 2006. See Claudia Major, op.cit.
With the exception of UNIFIL in Lebanon, where the Force Commander acts as Head of Mission.

And also through the recently created ‘education days’.

For example, the lessons learned exercise conducted by the German EU presidency on EUFOR DRC concluded that theoretical models of UN-EU cooperation, such as the “stand-by model”, should be revisited. Also, the After-Action report on EUFOR Chad/CAR stated that the “bridging model” or the “over-the-horizon model” were of little utility in the case of parallel missions as in Chad. By the same token, the ‘Guidelines for joint UN-EU planning applicable to existing UN field missions’ are dealing with one scenario of UN-EU cooperation, i.e. EU-led operations in support of an existing UN mission (therefore excluding the Chad scenario).

In particular the ones dealing with structural differences and working methods, as well as with the institutionalisation of the relationship (through the drafting of framework arrangements for example).


The After-Action Review for Chad mentions the idea of a joint, collocated, UN-EU planning cell in case of parallel mission planning. Such a cell could be envisaged in cases where there is no EU deployment.

Referring to “joint strategic objectives”, the After-Action Review for Chad talks about “joint briefings and exchanges with EU Member States in Brussels and New York to facilitate consistency and coordination”.


These ideas appear in the EU PSC document on the “Recommendations for the implementation of the Joint Statement on EU-UN cooperation in crisis management”, 28 July 2008.

This is also suggested in a CONUN on EU-UN cooperation in July 2008.

“Guidelines for joint UN-EU planning applicable to existing UN field missions”, June 2008.
We are making progress on a very positive basis, and that is what I am here to give a presentation on today: the progress recognized on a process basis with the main propositions. There is a need for the United Nations to receive political and financial support in implementing its mandate, including for the maintenance of international peace and security. The response from the European Union can be identified in the establishment of ESDP in 2003, which constitutes an important contribution to the work of the UN. The EU is today not only a regional organization, but also an important supra-national political actor. Furthermore, there is a need for the two organizations to understand each other, and there is progress between the two organizations. The ESDP has developed its crisis management capabilities over the last six years, and it has proven to be a valuable contribution to the work of the UN, by enabling an enhanced role of the UN on the international scene.

The cooperation in crisis management between the EU and the UN is not defied by profound structural difficulties. The greatest challenge facing the two organizations in its cooperation is the increase in crisis management capabilities as well as the international cooperation in complex crises areas, which has had an increase the last few years. Additionally, it is not only in the area of crisis management that the United Nations in the next few years will need reinforcement from other organizations and institutions that are specialized in various areas. It is not rational for the UN to cover all of the fields.

My first recommendation is that the UN needs support in carrying out its universal mandate, and therefore it needs to work together with specialized organizations and agencies, international financial institutions, regional organizations and other actors, including the civil society. This is the UN way of doing things, and it would not be logical for us to believe that the UN could do everything on its own. The founding fathers acknowledged this, and devoted chapter VIII of the UN Charter to the role of regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and stability.

The regional organizations bring greater local knowledge and in some occasions greater political leverage. By being quicker and having the capacity to be on the ground faster, the regional organisations provide a rapid reaction to the UN. There are also disadvantages such as the risk of political blockage, and, in some cases, the lack of available capabilities among the regional organizations. Not all regional organizations are ready to support the UN in crisis management.
There are very few international global actors in peacekeeping. The main ones are the AU, NATO, OSCE and the EU apart from the UN. ECOWAS is an important sub-regional actor in Africa. The UN has worked with all of these organizations, and certainly with the AU. Recently the UN together with NATO adopted a joint declaration by both Secretary-Generals. Other regional organizations are being more active on the political side, in what we could call crisis management. There are groups of friends developed informally, where some regional organizations, e.g., ASEAN is working very intensely.

My second proposition is the support of the EU to the UN. The principles of the UN are deeply embedded within the EU, and the UN is at the centre of the EU’s security strategy. The two organizations are struggling for the same objectives. The EU is the main adherent to the UN. Close to 40 percent of the UN’s budget is financed by the EU, and more than 50 percent of the international development assistance is given by the EU. The EU is not only acting in parallel with the UN, but it acts within the UN. The EU is also an international partner of the UN acting as a “state-like global actor” in helping the UN. There is a divergence between the regional organizations in relation to Chapter VIII, where the EU does not really assimilate with the structure. One of the reasons why the EU does not fit in the Chapter is because the EU does not see itself as a regional organization. For the EU, one of the areas that the organization will not intervene with is crisis management among its member countries. The EU is not limited to the region but is working all around the world helping the UN in its work. At present, it is only the AU that has aspirations similar to those of the EU.

EU as a partner of the UN in crisis management was not initially well understood or welcomed, and the initial fears came from the UN side. One of the issues mentioned at the time was that the same pool of resources would be used amongst the UN and the EU operations. There was a fear that if we would start develop our resources, we would start detract from the UN resources. This has not been proven true. The EU is acting within the UN, and next to that it has also developed its own ESDP operations. The ESDP has developed into an element of mobilization being able to generate additional resources for crisis management. These resources can be used with other organizations, e.g., the UN.

The partnership between the EU and the UN in crisis management is reflected in essentially two joint declarations, one from 2003 and one from 2007. The 2003 declaration creates the internal mechanism for cooperation between the secretariats, whereas with the 2007 declaration the members states of the European Union come forth with a leading role in the work between the two organizations. A comparison of the EU contributions to crisis management in 2001 and 2008: one of the major changes between these years was the launch of the African operations
in Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia and Sudan. During these years there was a strong military demand on the EU countries with interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, which has to be considered when looking at the whole picture. These numbers will most likely change in the next year when EUFOR Chad will be concluding, and the UN will take over the mission. However, many of the EU countries that are in the mission today will probably continue and be deployed in Chad under the UN flag.

ESDP Missions; the EU is present in the main crisis areas of the world today, and in most locations in direct cooperation with the UN. It is important to notice that EU operations are relatively small in numbers. One of the biggest missions of the EU was operation Althea with a total capacity of 6,000 people. At present, EUFOR Chad is the biggest ongoing operation with over 3,000 people deployed. The numbers deployed in some of the UN missions are close to 20,000 people. The EU currently has twelve ongoing operations, out of which nine are civilian. Out of the total amount of missions launched by the EU since 2003, nine have already been closed down, which means that they met their objectives.

Possible scenarios for an EU deployment in support of the UN could be as follows:

a. Support the UN in a critical moment (ARTEMIS, EUFOR during the election, DRC);
b. deploy where the UN cannot deploy (AMM and EUBAM Rafah). The monitoring mission in Aceh to ensure the implementation of the peace agreement, and other places where the UN has not been able to deploy immediately, e.g., in Rafha with the opening up of the border between Gaza and Egypt;
c. follow-on to a UN mission. The first was the civilian operation launched in 2003 EUPM, as a substitution to IPTF, and EULEX-Bosnia which is being deployed right now;
d. through a bridging operation (EUFOR Chad; there will be a UN mission later);
e. complementing UN or other international action (SSR missions in DRC, Guinea Bissau and Afghanistan);
f. provide an EU component within the UN. There was an EU component with AMIS and it was a successful operation that worked well.

The hybrid operations are a more complex issue, with the importance of a clear chain of command for a crisis mission. The UN is currently experimenting with the AU in UNAMID, which will be good lessons learned for everyone and to see how we can further work along these lines. These operations are small, but they are covering a critical political period in some of these areas.
The added value of ESDP action is political as an ESDP mission brings greater political weight in certain countries at certain moments, e.g., the Balkans. The UN could not deploy in Gaza or Aceh out of political reasons, but the EU could step in to deploy a mission as ESDP has the capacity of rapid reaction. The missions in Aceh, Rafha and Georgia were planned in less than a month. The enabling technical military capabilities the EU provides, as in the DRC and Chad, makes it easier for the UN to take over the mission. The EU has independence of mandate. Even if it always works under UN security mandate, if possible, it can also work under agreement with the involved parties, e.g., in Georgia where Russia and Georgia agreed for the EU to go in, whereas the UN can only deploy if there is a UN Security Council resolution. Lastly, there could be a combination of all mentioned added values of the ESDP actions.

The limitations of the UN in crisis management are to some degree related to the agreement or disagreement of the Security Council. The principle of not interfering in internal affairs and the “peacemaking culture” may limit the actions of the UN in terms of how it can enforce decisions and mandates. There are also limitations when it comes to reform efforts. The autonomy of the EU can be seen as a solution to some of these limitations.

My third proposal is to a large extent a response to Thierry Tardy’s background paper, responding to whether the EU-UN co-operation is difficult. Do we compete or are we natural competitors? I understand the argument that organizations as well as people do compete. Despite this, I cannot imagine an EU operation where there has been this kind of competition. Up until today all the missions have been carried out in cooperation, complementary has been the norm.

Is there a North/South polarization? More troops and uniformed personnel from the South would create a polarization. In my opinion we have to look at the comparative advantages that the UN has in the world. It would be difficult for the EU to compete with the important consolidated troop contributors. The EU will never, in essence, be a major troop contributor to the UN. It further means that there is no North/South polarization between the UN and the EU, but rather a comparative advantage in the resources made available at the disposal of the UN. Is there a diverging political agenda within the UN Security Council? This is a problem for everybody and not only for the EU. The EU members are also members of the Security Council, and the EU can offer to act in cases when there is a divergence within the Security Council.

The EUFOR mission Chad/CAR – MINURCAT can serve as an example of cooperation despite initially different visions. This can be seen as a successful picture of how the EU and the UN can cooperate. When Liaison officers were attached the
outcome was successful. When looking at the equality of the EU-UN relationship one has to differentiate between the UN Security Council decisions and the UN Secretariat and peacekeeping operations management. The UN aims for autonomy of decisions, which is a key element. Furthermore, there has to be a differentiation between the role of the Security Council, and the commanding role. We have to see whether, at some point, at least in the civilian field, we could have an EU component within a UN mission.

The fact that the EU and the UN work differently does make it more difficult. However, the UN will face the same problem with other actors; it will be overcome by knowledge. The demand structure is different, with the EU being more centralized. Member States are seated in Commander seats whereas the Security Council issues a mandate. “Cooperation is difficult because we work differently” as stated by Dr. Thierry Tardy in his background paper. This counts for most international crisis management actors that work differently. The ESDP operations have a command structure that gives the Council a key role through the PSC, this increases the political weight of any ESDP operation. The EU manages operations more centralized, for the reason that the Member States are an integrated part of the conducted work, following the work on a day to day basis. The UN Security Council on the other hand issues a mandate, and then the Secretariat provides reports regularly. The UN operations are more “decentralized” and it would be difficult to carry out the work in another way. In addition, the UN is a more complex organization with several different views within the organization. If the UN would try to conduct operations like the EU does, in a centralized manner, it would meet great problems.

Are the UN procedures better than those of the EU? Despite the heavy procedures within the EU, there is good record of the EU in rapid deployment. The EU procedures can be seen as unwieldy up to now, but they have been able to deploy rapidly within less than a month, from the moment a decision was taken. The difficulties in planning have been resolved through intense cooperation and exchange of Liaison officers between the EU and the UN. The EUFOR Chad-MINURCAT is an example where this has been done. The difficulties as regards to the multidimensional planning are on both sides of the organizations, but progress is being made on the EU side. Furthermore, despite the difficulties and challenges the two organizations might face in their current cooperation, it is an opportunity for the EU and the UN to become familiar with each other.

My conclusion is that we are moving forward in the cooperation between the EU and the UN. There is maintenance of intense contacts at all levels and implementation of joint declarations. Furthermore, the cooperation continues to build on experience and lessons learned from the missions EULEX and EUFOR in Chad.
Moreover, the drawing up of framework papers and model arrangements to facilitate cooperation between the EU and the UN facilitates the missions deployed on the ground, or that will succeed each other. In addition, it includes a formation for the transfer of assets, communications and exchange of information between the two organizations. With the EULEX operation in Kosovo, one of the most intensive civilian operations, the EU was using resources from the UN. With the operation in Chad it will be the other way around, with the EU handing over the mission to the UN. The two organizations continue to develop capabilities and generate the capacities to face the challenges of the future. One of the questions that can be relevant to pose is whether the EU will take a lead actor concept for the international coordination in complex crises. Greater complexity also requires greater reflection. This will sometimes be on the military side, which is more difficult to coordinate. There is an EU office at the UN with the role to facilitate in the coordination between the EU and the UN.

Discussant: Dr. Herman Joseph Kraft, Executive Director, Institute for Strategic Studies, University of the Philippines

The UN needs support to implement its work and this is where the regional organizations are needed. It is relatively easy for the EU to act within the UN context as an independent partner. The same cannot be said about ASEAN. The mandate of ASEAN is in line with the intent of Chapter VIII, i.e. the UN can act in conjunction with regional organizations in the context of regional issues and problems.

The cooperation between ASEAN and the UN has been limited. Until recently ASEAN did not have a legal personality, and the organization does not hold a status within the UN, which will hopefully change in the coming years. The leaders within ASEAN have signed an ASEAN Charter that is currently going through ratification. The Philippines and Indonesia have not signed the ratification yet. The next summit of ASEAN will take place in December this year, and by then all of the countries will hopefully have signed the ratification and make it possible to proceed with the work.

The peacekeeping operations of the UN have never had a need for ASEAN to act as a regional partner with the UN. ASEAN has been successful in being able to manage conflicts within the ASEAN region. Most conflicts in the region are intra-state conflicts and the Member States have managed to isolate the conflicts from spilling over into a regional context. Earlier, ASEAN had not been involved in the conflict, but that has changed now. The Thai Army and the Cambodian Army have since been firing over the border. The two parties have now agreed on bilateral talks, an agreement set without the involvement of ASEAN, but as a bilateral agreement between the two countries.
One of the questions raised by Mr. Pedro Serrano was whether ASEAN is ready to become a partner of the UN, in the form that Mr. Serrano was talking about. Ms. Sylvie-Agnès Bermann spoke about the idea of a common policy of the EU on peacekeeping. The EU acts in a collective manner on security related issues in a broad sense, but you do not find this within ASEAN. The Member States of ASEAN engage their own security concerns as individual states to the organization. This is to say that even if the Charter was ratified and submitted to the summit in December, it will not fundamentally change the nature of ASEAN in the short term; neither will it change how ASEAN can act in conjunction with the UN.

In the 1990s ASEAN was requested by the government to put up a peacekeeping force in the province of Indonesia. The ASEAN countries had to acknowledge that they did not have the capacities to establish a peacekeeping force, which showed how unprepared the organization is to take on the work of a peacekeeping mission. This resulted in an involvement of Australia instead. The challenges have to be taken into consideration; in the case of ASEAN the basic asymmetry and the capabilities. At present an inequality in the doctrine, equipment and training prevails, and you cannot expect from ASEAN to fulfil the requirements, given that the countries in the region simply do not have the same capabilities. Some ASEAN states have been very active in UN cooperation, others have not.

One of the fundamental issues is the institutional culture. If the UN faces difficulties with the issue of non-intervention, the case is even more so with ASEAN. The idea of establishing a peacekeeping force has different forms of connotation in the region, which makes it even more difficult to pursue. One of the main reasons is that the many conflicts in the region are internal. ASEAN has a concern about the idea of inviting external members into their own issues. One basic hesitation is to push the limits of what is considered the common comfort zone, which will make it more difficult later on for the UN to actually come in.

Many institutional capabilities, which allow for decisions and quick mobilization and response to crises, ASEAN does not posses at the moment. ASEAN is a rather weak institution, holding a suspicion of supranational bodies, and a decision making system that goes beyond consensus. Therefore, it is difficult for ASEAN as a regional organization to undertake a mandate that would support the UN mandates.

Despite the picture illustrated of ASEAN, there are also opportunities. ASEAN is currently in the process of filling out the elements of its Charter and once it has been ratified it will hold more opportunities for substance. An increase of the peacekeeping possibilities in the region has already been agreed upon. Further-
more, it will be easier for the UN to cooperate with countries in the region, if not
ASEAN itself, that wants to be engaged in peacekeeping. There are already a few
states that are sympathetic over the cooperation with the UN and international
initiatives and concepts.

The most active groups in South-East Asia trying to promote peace, domestic or
regional, are NGOs. It is not only about identifying countries that the UN can
partner with, but also civil society organizations. The idea to cooperate with
NGOs could be taken into consideration as far as furthering the relationship
between South-East Asia, and maybe later on with ASEAN and the UN.

Discussant: Dr. Thierry Tardy, Course Director, Geneva Centre for Security Pol-
icy, Switzerland

Context

The UN-EU relationship is developing at the intersection of three major trends in
post-Cold War crisis management. The first trend is the immense requirements
that exist in terms of crisis management. The second trend is the evolution of the
United Nations since the end of the Cold War, the recurring crisis of the United
Nations and its weaknesses and shortcomings in crisis management; and a UN
that as a result welcomes the development of regional organisations. The third
major trend is the emergence of regionalism and of the EU in particular as a
prominent player in security and crisis management.

The relationship between the United Nations and the EU is a new one. It began in
2000, less than ten years ago, and is without doubt set to develop and to last since
these major trends are destined to remain.

The second element of context is the complementarity between the two organisa-
tions. There is an a priori complementarity between the two organisations. First
of all, there is the perception of a positive, beneficial relationship between the two
organisations that would be natural partners in crisis management, with the same
liberal approach to crisis management and which, as institutions, act as a vehicle
for the same values: the promotion of human rights, rule of law, links between
security and development and, more recently, the concept of the responsibility to
protect. In addition, there is a convergence of some sort between a form of demand
from the United Nations and a form of supply from the EU. The demand of the
United Nations is in the area of rapid reaction and robust peacekeeping capabili-
ties, for what are known as enablers, strategic enablers and enabling assets. The
European Union, for its part, supplies the ESDP, the ambition of the European
Union to play a role in the civilian and military aspects of crisis management.
These two trends, it would appear, meet in the middle. The two institutions are dependent on each other. The United Nations needs the European Union for its capabilities, while the European Union needs the legitimacy of the United Nations, in particular in the form of Security Council resolutions, when planning military operations. Thus, there is a context that appears to be rather favourable to the relationship between the United Nations and the European Union.

Achievements

The Achievements have been well expressed by the interlocutors and earlier speakers. It must be said that much has been achieved in ten years in the institutionalisation of the relationship and the implementation of cooperation, both between headquarters in New York and Brussels and on the ground. It is important to emphasise that the relationship between the United Nations and the European Union is without doubt the most effective relationship, the one that has been most productive. Of course, analysis tends to be in relative terms, but when it comes to crisis management one can only speak in relative terms.

There is a conceptualisation of the relationship, a strategic, operational conceptual framework that exists with a body of documents that serves as the framework of the relationship. There are mechanisms that have been put in place between the two institutions; there have also been references to tangible examples of cooperation. The first major example of military cooperation was ARTEMIS; however, the EU taking over the operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina from the United Nations was the very first example of UN-EU cooperation. Thus, this cooperation is concrete, something that was not the case ten years ago and which became real five years ago with the first operations of the European Union.

Constraints

I come to my third point on the constraints that hinder cooperation between the two organisations. I distinguish between three types of constraints. The first type of constraints are those that are due to differences in points of view between the two institutions, political constraints; the second consist of constraints that arise from differences in structure and working methods. The third type of constraints are those that result from a lack of mutual knowledge on the structures and working methods of the other organisation. I will only address the first two (political and structural constraints).

In terms of political strategy, I have identified four types of constraints. The first is competition between international organisations that all wish to demonstrate their relevance, their comparative advantages and their ability to adapt to the
new security environment. This challenge is not necessarily conducive to cooperation between institutions, which can be protective of information in their possession when simultaneously present in the same area. Cooperation is not natural, not merely a reflex; it must be encouraged. More often, the natural reflex is non-cooperation. The observation or analysis of the relationship between the European Union and NATO, the European Union and the OSCE and the European Union and the United Nations reveals that competitive attitudes are developing.

The second constraint is the fact that Member States can diverge on policies to be implemented within each institution. Kosovo demonstrated this point since within the UN Security Council European states on the one hand and Russia on the other were at odds on the role to give the European Union. These differences have a direct impact on cooperation on the ground.

Among institutions and secretariats, there are differences on how to handle crises, what approach to adopt. Differences can exist on the mandates of operations when implemented simultaneously. Chad provides one example, where initially the United Nations Secretariat’s idea of the mandate of EUFOR was not the same as that of the European Union and its Member States. This divergence had an initial impact on the planning process. Thus, what we are dealing with here is the issue of political dialogue at the highest level between institutions.

The third constraint is the inequality that exists in the relationship. At the outset I emphasised that the relationship is a partnership, but in reality it must be recognised that the European Union is in a much more dominant position than the United Nations. The EU that is somewhat steadfast on what it is prepared to do for the United Nations, what it is prepared to do to support United Nations operations. It is an EU that emphasises its independence, something that everyone can understand and accept.

The European Union is not a regional arrangement in the sense of Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter for at least two reasons. One is that the European Union does not accept the degree of subordination to the United Nations implied in the regional arrangement statute in the sense of Chapter VIII; the other is that the regional arrangement statute as described in Chapter VIII also means that said such institution operates within the area defined by its Member States although the very principle of the European Union and the ESDP is to project security outside the area, a role not performed by the OSCE or the African Union. In addition, through its activities, one may wonder whether or not the European Union is already more than a regional player. The issue of the relationship between the United Nations and regional players is not dealt with by the mere fact that the
European Union aspires to a global role and, to an extent, has begun to play this
global role.

This unequal relationship means that the European Union does not wish to be too
restricted or constrained by the United Nations. This poses the question of the
choice of each institution, of its policy towards the other institution. My analysis
demonstrates the need to place the resources of the European Union under political
control. Thus, in general terms, it is the EU that dictates the terms of the relation-
ship and the conditions of its support to the United Nations, rather than a coordi-
nated approach involving two equal partners. To put it bluntly, the United Nations
accepts what the EU is prepared to give it in terms of crisis management.

The fourth constraint is the fact that Member States of the European Union are
absent from UN peacekeeping operations. Admittedly, Member States of the EU
are present in UNIFIL 2, constituting the backbone of this operation. However,
without doubt, it could be said that UNIFIL is an exception. It is an exception as
an operation and, no doubt, also in the analysis of the policy of EU Member States
towards United Nations operations. We can have later a debate on this point. The
fact is that peacekeeping operations (other than UNIFIL) account for five to six
percent of total UN peacekeeping operations personnel. I have provided some
figures that reflect operations in Africa, and if one agrees that everything is decided
in Africa when it comes to crisis management, in any case where the United Nations
is concerned. EU Member States account for 0.89 percent of personnel in uniform.
Including MONUC, the largest United Nations operation in Africa, there is a par-
ticipation rate among the 27 EU Member States of 0.42 percent, a total of 77
personnel out of 18,389.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>In the 16 on-going UN operations</th>
<th>In the 9 UN operations in Africa</th>
<th>In the MONUC (DRC)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UN Member States</td>
<td>88,576</td>
<td>61,068</td>
<td>18,389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Member States</td>
<td>10,317</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>11.65%</td>
<td>0.89%</td>
<td>0.42%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This is not without consequences. This absence poses political problems in terms
of polarisation between European countries and the countries in the South, the
main source of troops.

Polarisation is no doubt fuelled by this absence. On an operational level, there is
the ability of the United Nations to provide robust peacekeeping services without
the resources of Europe or the West as a whole. The development of two-speed
peacekeeping operations – UN versus EU or a coalition of states. Paradoxically, one could wonder whether the two EU operations in the DRC (ARTEMIS and EUFOR) have been rendered necessary by the absence of the Europeans from MONUC. Of course, these issues have particular resonance. MINURCAT has expressed its desire for the Europeans to remain. To me, this would be a turning point.

For structural constraints, i.e. constraints due to differences in working methods, I do not propose an appraisal to determine which procedures and structures are most effective. I do not arrive at a value judgement of or advocate one structure or the other. What is important is to identify constraints, as in the two most recent After action reviews prepared jointly by the European Union and the United Nations after the operation in the DRC and the planning of the operation in Chad. These constraints are twofold: differences in the planning process, and differences in the system of command and control. It is important to identify these differences, in order to overcome them or find ways to improve them.

An attempt should be made to deconstruct the problem on three levels that I am now suggesting: a politico-strategic level, a structural level and on a communication level between the two institutions. It is clear that these different problems are not resolved by adopting the same solutions.

To conclude, although I am aware that this proposal is extremely controversial, it appears to me that if what we want in the long-term is a partnership, it is difficult to envisage a balanced relationship if European states remain distant from UN operations as they have done since the 1990s. The relationship risks remaining unbalanced if the support of the European Union continues to be an external one, rather than a direct cooperation. Moreover, it appears to me that the very concept of a bridging operation in itself contains a form of obligation for EU Member States in the United Nations operation that takes over, when it cannot be implemented quickly. No doubt MINURCAT 2 will be a limitation to the concept. This provision is difficult to sustain; European reticence is founded on and explained above all by a series of rational reasons. However, in this context three avenues must be explored. The first is the modular approach whereby the European Union would contribute to United Nations operations via different modules; this was referred to at the outset and warrants further investigation in planning, logistics and in the very sensitive area of information.

The second avenue relates to the whole civilian area. It has been mentioned that cooperation between the European Union and the United Nations in the civilian sphere has greater potential than cooperation in the military sphere. This cooperation still remains too fragmented, more fragmented than cooperation in the mili-
tary sphere. Thus, there is a need for rationalisation within the EU. Therefore, there is a field that must be developed.

The latter point is that which no doubt consists of stating that one of the worst services to render to the analysis of crisis management operations is to consider that these operations are the solution to a conflict; it is as poor an analysis as to see UN-EU relationship through the sole prism of cooperation on the ground in operations. There is an area yet to be developed (cooperation between the two organisations in the political management of conflicts) that is the sole response to conflict in Africa and elsewhere. The prevention of conflicts has been mentioned, but the broad spectrum of political crisis management has yet to be explored. MINURCAT is not the answer to the conflict in Chad. The response is a political one, and on the ground where the European Union and the United Nations must be able to act in synergy.

Discussion

A representative from the Department of Foreign Affairs of a European country made two comments. First, he meant that the EU settles the terms for the cooperation with the UN. “The EU is not a monolith and many Member States need to be convinced that the EU is better able to take on the crisis management than the UN itself. This does not mean that they have a concern about the cooperation between the two. It is rather a concern that the EU should be able to have an added value if it takes on the responsibility of the crisis management for a mission that the UN cannot give.”

The EU Member States have pulled out of UN peacekeeping, which the representative meant suggest a necessity of looking more at commitment. If one took the example of his own country, which was a small country, if it provides 500 peacekeepers under the UN, it will be a large amount of people for the country but not for the UN. “This does not represent a lack of commitment. Many of the EU countries are relatively small countries and the contribution to the UN is therefore in proportion to the population of the country.”

Another representative from a European country’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs made two remarks. He commented on an earlier speaker stating that one need to engage the Member States of ASEAN, rather than ASEAN itself. The background paper author stated that the UN only gets from the EU what the EU is willing to give. “This reflects a general principle of contribution of individuals and countries in decision making processes: if you do not pull them in, they are not going to be willing to contribute. If a contribution is expected from one of the countries in the UN, it is important to have a discussion in the Security Council prior to taking the
decision, which is important to do also in the relationship between the EU and the UN. A lot has been achieved in relation to this in the last few years.” He continued to ask “Is there still room for improvement and what needs to be done to improve the relationship between the EU and the UN when it comes to constitution? Do we need to do more in institutional ways? Is it sufficient if the two secretariats speak to one another, or do we also need to speak to Member States? Even if my own government wants to follow up, we still need agreement from the parliament, which is why it is easier if we get contacted well in advance. Are there further possibilities for improving these contacts at different levels?”

The second remark was related to what the background paper author had said about the EU Member States’ contribution to the missions of the UN. “The EU is making vast contributions in relation to the other contributions that are being made, not speaking on the developmental aspects, when it comes to pure military and police operations. We need to complete the statistics to take account of operations that the EU is undertaking mandated by the UN Security Council but not with UN helmets, e.g., the operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan and now in Georgia. The UN is quite happy that the regional organizations are taking care of the operations. It is a two way street. Sometimes the EU prefers Member States of the EU to take command, and sometimes the UN prefers for the EU to take on the responsibility.”

A senior DPKO official from the Division of Policy, Evaluation and Training put forward two comments to the discussion. The first comment was regarding the background paper and the power imbalance between the UN and the EU. “One could say that this is the process of every request posted by the UN, of accepting what the Member States agree to contribute. This is part of the mutual agreement and process between the Member States and the organization. This is also the constraints of peacekeeping; you take what is on offer. This in turn raises the question of how one can bring up, within the Security Council, that not enough contributions have been made available in order to carry out the mission. This came up during the Brahimi days, as to whether we need a two step procedure for peacekeeping. That there initially will be a call and then an appeal and then we go back to the Security Council presenting what we said was needed and what is available. The UN is always a demandeur and that is the nature of peacekeeping. We need to be more honest of what one can do with peacekeeping, and what can be done with the resources that are available.”

Mr. Pedro Serrano suggested that UN peacekeeping has some limitations in relation to what it is able to undertake, also regarding multidimensional peacekeeping, and the EU is sometimes better suited for the mission. “The UN has developed immensely since the 1990s, both in how to do peacekeeping, and the scope of the
mandates. Nowadays, we have mandates with support of civilians, of reforms, of state authority, and of state building. Today, the UN is requested and mandated to a greater extent to undertake activities that no regional organization would accept with the breadth of mandate, lack of precision and by what is being expected. It is important to move away from the thinking of the 1990s, when we had a more limited nature of UN peacekeeping. One exception to this is the EU measures in the Western Balkans, where the work is carried out with the national actors and a fundamental engagement of the EU, during a substantive reform process. However, this is done in a different context that is not similar to the engagement of the EU elsewhere, as the possibility of an EU membership for the countries in the region is an important aspect of the work that is undertaken.”

The Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN of an East African country had a comment in relation to the discussion about the UN and regional cooperation, and in particular in regards to Chapter VII. In his view “this relationship is very imbalanced, in the sense that the UN and the EU have a relationship that is functioning better than other arrangements. Perhaps it is because there are more funding partners to the UN in Europe, and maybe it is as a result of the Europeans having more influence in the Security Council; the UN is more responsive to areas that are of importance to the EU, compared to other regions”.

“If we take the example of Somalia, we have a country at civil war. There are regional and sub-regional organizations working with peace and stability, and there is a peace process funded and supported by the EU. The government is in negotiations with the African Union peacekeeping force. Due to the lack of resources, the AU cannot provide full deployment in the region, which led them to return to the Security Council and ask it to deploy a UN force. At the same time the EU Member States of the Security Council are reluctant to meet the requests from the AU. The Security Council carried out discussions and deliberations with the AU on the peace and security in the country, trying to move the AU forward into taking its own role and responsibility over the mission.”

“The Security Council is, on the other hand, to a further extent working on the missions in the Ivory Coast, Liberia and Sierra Leone. The Security Council is under the pressure of the international community over certain priorities. The UN is responsive and willing to engage in conflicts, but with certain areas they remain uninvolved, which is the case with Somalia.” In the view of the Ambassador, this shows the imbalance. “The situation with the AU is very difficult when it comes to this specific case. The Security Council has repeatedly asked for contingent planning for Somalia. We, on the other hand, are not reluctant to this.” At the same time, he believed that the DPKO are not being completely honest when it comes to the situation in Somalia. “The DPKO is handling the situation in Soma-
lia different to the situation in Darfur, by pretending that there is no peace to keep in Somalia. Why was the AU force authorized when there is no peace to keep?” The Ambassador believed that this has effects on the fate of Somalia, but also of the international community.

The question of regional arrangements has to be revisited, the Ambassador argued. “The AU cooperates with the UN and the EU in the Security Council to ensure peace and stability for the whole continent. The Security Council, in turn, requests from the AU to engage more actively in peace and security in the region. Even though the AU fulfils its role and work, the DPKO and the Security Council are reluctant towards the situation in Somalia. How did we create an imbalanced partnership like this one, and how can we make it more balanced between the regional organizations? The question that can further be raised is whether this will be done through the EU, AU or elsewhere.”

A researcher from an African think-tank had two questions commenting on the presentation by Mr. Serrano, when he discussed what he believed were value ideas of the actions of ESDP; rapid reaction, enabling capacities, capabilities and independence of mandate. “Given this view, is it in the interest of the EU to support the UN in addressing the capabilities of value issues that the EU brings within the UN system itself? Or does Mr. Serrano see the EU as offering the alternative and continuing to fill the vacuum? Second, the relationship between the regional mechanisms of peace and security and the UN is at its initial stages, at least within the African continent, of a new peace and security architecture. The dimension for the African Stand-by Force is part of this, despite its challenges.” The researcher thought it would be interesting to see how the EU will interact with these mechanisms, if they emerge, given that they will react to some of the mentioned challenges.

A researcher raised a legal question regarding that some speakers were commenting that the EU is moving toward supranational capacity. “Does that mean that you in the future would see a deployment not requiring a national authorization, similar to the one that a German colleague was talking about? In Germany deployment requires authorization by the German Bundestag according to the constitution. How far do you go in the supra-nationality?”

Secondly, he noticed that only Dr. Herman Kraft referred to ASEAN as a grouping that would be conceived as Chapter VIII in the UN Charter (NATO is Chapter VII, Article 51). “The EU is portraying itself as an eventual global actor, but do we have a sound legal basis in the UN Charter for robust peacekeeping, assuming that the UN engages in that too? Or do we move towards some dubious grounds of Chapter VIII or Article 53 and a half operations, compared to Chapter VII and a
half? Judging from what Russia agreed to provide to EUFOR Chad/CAR, that operation seems to be quite robust.”

Dr. Kraft wished to emphasize, when it was mentioned that the UN wants to engage with the Member States of ASEAN that are willing to work with them, that this also assumes that ASEAN in the future will be able to engage more directly with the UN. “For cooperation like this to be established, the UN will presumably have to confirm it with its Member States, and not only with the regional organizations. This also relates to what was mentioned in relation to the mandate of the EU, to see it in a broader context. There is a difference between what the UN represents today compared to in the 1990s, not only in reference to the number of boots on the ground, but also other issues that regional organizations would be in a better position to address.”

Dr. Thierry Tardy, author of the background paper and discussant, suggested that he had come in for much criticism on the issue of the contribution of EU Member States to UN operations. In order to respond to this criticism, he proposed to distinguish two levels of debate. “The debate on one level consists of determining the extent of EU contribution to peacekeeping operations, the extent to which the European Union shares the burden of security management with other institutions, including the United Nations. In this debate, one can admit that the European Union has an increasingly important role, even if sometimes modest and difficult role whether these are civilian operations, political missions or any other EU operations conducted under a UN mandate. I do not question this. I am a fervent supporter of the European Union.”

“Another level of debate is to see what the European Union and its Member States do in relation to the direct role of the United Nations in the current 16 to 18 peacekeeping operations, in which more than 110,000 personnel are deployed. The question that arises is whether or not the absence of EU Member States from these operations poses a problem. Some are of the view that this absence does not pose problems, since EU Member States are active elsewhere in other operations. To me, it seems that this absence does pose problems, the ones I mentioned earlier. It could be that if this debate were being held in Africa or elsewhere, there would be a different response. However, if one studies the problems faced by the United Nations in crisis management in terms of robust peacekeeping, rapid reaction capabilities and logistics, and if one considers that the European Union and/or its Member States have such capabilities, one could conclude that these resources made available to the UN could resolve the problems faced by the UN. Therefore, there is a problem. I understand that this is one question to which one cannot answer by saying it is active elsewhere.”
“Secondly, and in order to attempt to combine responding to two or three questions on the fact that it is the European Union that defines the terms of the relationship. First of all, while this relationship is referred to as a partnership, as is generally the case, it is interesting to see how this partnership is defined and who leads the way, who makes the decisions. In military operations in particular, it is the EU that sets the terms of its participation. The UN is always more or less in a waiting situation, and a little dependent on good will. However, saying this does not necessarily solve our problem as regards the EU. Very often the European Union defines mandates for bridging operations of three months or 100 days’ duration, and considers that the UN and its troop-contributing countries are its exit strategy, as was the case in the DRC in September 2003 and in Chad in March 2009. States that usually contribute troops to UN operations are those that play a role in the exit strategy of the European Union, which stipulates as a condition that it will withdraw and which, in a sense, compels states from the South (the main contributors of UN peacekeeping) to take over. Did all consultations take place at this level? I do not know.”

“There is also the issue of independence. There must be agreement that the independence and resources of the European Union must be placed under the political control and strategic direction of the PSC. There is some support for this idea, but the question raised is whether or not this poses a problem in the analysis of the relationship between the EU and the UN. One could also say that it is important for the EU and at the same time say that it constitutes a constraint on the development of the relationship between the EU and the UN. The two conclusions are not incompatible. My objective is to identify a number of problems. The fact that the German parliament must vote on the deployment of German forces in all operations is one constraint. It is there and it will not disappear because the UN and the EU will discuss and put institutional mechanisms in place. One must merely be aware of these constraints.”

“On the issue of the legal basis of EU operations, a quick answer to this question is that the legal basis of military operations is the Security Council resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In the case of civilian operations, the legal basis is a combination of consent from the host country and the joint action by the Council, as in the case of the operation in Georgia. There is ambiguity with some operations: in the case of the first European operation in Macedonia, Operation Concordia, this military operation was not based on a Security Council resolution. There is indeed a Security Council resolution that supports the actions of the EU in Macedonia, but it can not be said that the legal basis for this operation could be found in a Security Council resolution. The legal basis for this course of action was the consent of the host country.”
Mr. Pedro Serrano meant that there is room for improvement between the UN and the EU and that we have the instruments to carry that work forward. “The mechanism of interaction between secretariats and at the level of ambassadors (political level) is work ongoing with regular exchange of ideas and information in order to improve the cooperation.” He believed that we need to improve the basis of experience and create standardization for the transfer of assets and the support we give each other in the field when deployed together. “The joint declarations from 2003 and 2007 facilitate this work.”

“On the topic of the statement by the UN DPKO representative as to the limits, or rather constraints, of the UN, there has been a tremendous change from the 1990s until now.” Mr. Serrano believed that, in the broader sense, there is development towards a more interventionist nature. “When the Capstone Doctrine was discussed recently, many Member States raised questions and the Capstone has remained a document of the UN Secretariat, which it should. It is true that the UN has a greater capacity than the EU to mobilize resources in most areas.”

Regarding the added value of the EU and the possibilities of transferring those virtues to the UN, he believed that it is an ongoing process within the UN. “The UN has been going over its rapid reaction possibilities for years, enabling capabilities, but always in the hands of Member States. The capabilities are of the Member States and not of the UN. The advantage of the EU is the proximity of the EU to its Member States. There is a big difference in the structures between the EU and the UN, which also enables for the EU to respond rapidly.”

“The African Stand-by Force is a very important initiative that has been supported by the EU from its start, both in terms of development of concepts as well as working with the UN on this. The UN has established a Panel of the Wise for the launch of the Stand-by Force.”

Mr. Serrano’s final comment referred to whether the EU is moving more towards supra-national decision making. Here he would say no, the EU does not. “The EU is more than an international organization. It has developed and has qualifications of supra-national in some of its institutions on some issues. However, decisions on defence and security matters cannot be taken without the consent of the national authorities. When the UN will carry out a mission under Chapter VII, the EU will require approval from the Security Council first. Other types of actions are more flexible but it is always good to have the endorsement of the Security Council.”
The Evolution of the Relations of the United Nations with Other International Organizations: Perspectives through the Example of the United Nations-African Union Cooperation

*Speaker: Amb. Ramtane Lamamra, Commissioner for Peace and Security, African Union*

The Forum will not only help the European Union to develop its own capabilities of peace operations but it will help all of us in the peacekeeping community to learn from each other and find a way forward to maximize the outcome of our efforts.

The African Union is smaller in some aspects, but it is also defiantly younger. In the field of peace and security, we have developed our experience somehow longer than that of the EU, and yet we are still in a learning process in developing our own capacities. At the same time as we are doing this we are fully engaged in conducting some of the more difficult peace support operations that one could think of.

Since 1963, after the independence of most African countries, we established the organization of the African Unity, which had a completely different mandate than the AU, which was established in 2002. The organization of the African Unity was essentially a political organization and, at the time, it was foremost dedicated to the completion of the decolonization of Africa and the struggle against apartheid, as well as to develop some form of solidarity among the African countries. The interventions in areas of peace and security of the organization were modest in scope.

During the first summit in 1964, taking place in Cairo, the leaders of the African Unity adopted an important principle due to have a stabilizing effect in the continent. The principle of sanctity of the borders inherited from the colonial era was the only way the African countries could continue to develop the nation state within the inherited borders. Despite this there have been many conflicts due to the borders but one could ask what could have happened if the document with the guiding principles would not have been adopted.
Still, when we had conflicts and disputes on territorial ground we developed ad-hoc mechanisms. Most of the time these have been committees with heads of states with the mandate to mediate between parties on certain issues. A number of Member States have been convinced to submit some of the territorial disputes that were arising throughout Africa to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). These mechanisms of peaceful disputes, either being domestic or pan-African, which were submitted by some of the Member States to the ICJ, have created an African doctrine on peaceful settlement of disputes. This development has taken place in parallel with the requirement of developing tools for military deployment, either for preventative measures or as an integrated part of a crisis solution or a post conflict component.

The AU has used the EU as well as the UN as a model for the nature of the organization. We are still striving to find the point of balance between supra nationalism and intergovernmentalism. The majority of the programmes of the AU are in the middle of supra-nationalism and intergovernmentalism; they reflect these general trends towards developing the way in the middle that would take whatever delegation is given to us in terms of powers from all Member States and whatever supranational structures could be developed. This is very much a work in progress as our leaders are still tackling the issue with a government of the union and the long-term and long range prospect of the United States of Africa.

As we look at the African agenda, the new commission and the second in the history of AU, the goal should be to develop around a vision encompassing the following four pillars: Peace and Security is not an option, it is a necessary and a general conviction. Without Peace and Security, we cannot invest in development and integration and establish programs for good governance and democracy. Peace and Security comes first out of necessity, but furthermore it will affect the outcome of the peace and security structure. The shared value has to do with good governance, elections, democracy, human rights as well as cultural heritage and solidarity. The aspects of shared value could help tremendously in preventing intra-Africa conflicts. Regarding development and integration of the continent, we have projects and time frames established, including the strive to move forward with the RECs, the Regional Economic Communities, which play an important role in the field of peace and development by strengthening the institutions such as the Pan-African Parliament, the Commission, the executive branch and the judicial court throughout the continent. These, in turn, lay the foundation for supranational structures that will be decided upon by our leaders in the future.

We see peace and security in a comprehensive manner, with a belief that the peace and security architecture is in place. The Peace and Security Council is one of the major components, with a structure similar to the UN Security Council. The Peace
and Security Council has 15 members, all of which are elected to the post. Five of them are elected for a period of three years, and ten are elected for a two years term. Furthermore, all of which are reeligible can be re-elected again. The Peace and Security Council takes the executive decisions on sending peacekeeping operations throughout the continent. The Council also has the authority to impose sanctions if the need arises.

In addition to the Peace and Security Council, the African Stand-by Force is now being developed. It is a small army of 25,000 soldiers, 5,000 per region. The stand-by force constitutes a brigade of pre-positioned troops that can be rapidly deployed throughout the continent when the need arises. We are currently in the course of completing the process. The units from each country are allocated and the training is taking place at various levels. We are also in the process of adding the military unit to a police and civilian unit. There is a real demand of being able to deploy an autonomous force providing all three components.

The African Stand-by Force should be ready to operate by June 2010. Furthermore, we are striving to accumulate the resources, logistical and financial, to be ready to deploy two major operations under certain circumstances. These operations would be able to deploy one mission of 8,000 and a smaller mission with up to 1,000 people on the ground. The prospect is to have the capacity to deploy 20,000 on the ground at the same time. With this, we do not strive to be independent from the UN, but rather to provide the quick reaction, and then consider ways and means to coordinate the work. Furthermore, we do have an early warning mechanism, based on the Regional Economic Communities, as well as the Panel of the Wise. The Panel of the Wise consists of five eminent personalities, two women and three men who are former heads of states. They are called to intervene in non-traditional ways, and to bring influence and prestige to the involved parties and encourage the use of mediation and good offices on domestic issues prior to violence breaking out.

We are currently developing conceptual frameworks and mechanisms with our partners and have a certain number of basic documents with the EU and the UN. We acquire a lot of the experience from the UN when it comes to peacekeeping operations. We believe that the adjustments required are done by the military leaders and the military of defence themselves in order to speed up the process. The ministers of defence and foreign affairs have decided to meet in Addis Ababa once a year in order to oversee the progress made, and make the right decisions among the offers.

The UN has developed a ten-year programme for AU human resources reinforcement and development that is ongoing. In addition to this, together with the UNDP, we have developed a UN joint meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council and the UN Security Council. The two organizations meet once a year and
share views on areas of conflict in Africa. Furthermore, we try to build partnerships and enlighten the members of the UN Security Council on the AU view on peace and security. The comparative advantages of the AU are the cultural and geographical proximity and the flexibility. We are acting with more flexibility than the decision making process in the UN, and that one could talk of complementarity with the UN rather than competition.

The idea of the African Stand-by Force was born out of frustration from the inability of the international community to intervene in Rwanda. The peace support operations of the AU should be mandated by the UN Security Council, but we also want to be able to intervene whenever our standards are different or higher than that of the UN. One example where I can see this taking place is if the AU decides to intervene, in any given country, due to a coup d'état. There is no foundation for the UN Security Council to endorse or to mandate a military intervention where a coup d’état has taken place. Provided that a decision is taken by the heads of state at the summit, the AU could take a decision to intervene in a country where a coup d’état has taken place, e.g., in the Comorian island of Anjouan.

The African Stand-by Force is a change in the culture and practicality of peace support missions on the African continent. We will have units on call and ready for deployment. We will need contributions from the Member States, but also institutional support from the UN and the EU.

Under the ninth European Development Fund (EDF) the AU received 440 million Euros, for the years 2000-2007. If I understood it right, we will be given 300 million Euros for the tenth EDF covering the years 2008-2013. The economic contribution from EDF is an addition to the training and logistical support from the Member States when they individually prepare their units for missions, e.g., Somalia or Darfur. The level of missions will be increasing in the future as our infrastructure will be more efficient and productive.

In the future, if the efforts of preventive diplomacy are successful and we will need to use our rapid deployment, we will also require enablers. With the African Stand-by Force, it is primarily important to deal with the strategic mobility; moving a battalion from one region to another with a short term notice will need tremendous logistical support.

The articulation of cooperation and partnership between the AU and the UN can be seen in the case of Burundi. It was the first country where the AU deployed a peace support operation. The AU achieved its political role in stabilizing the area and then the UN took over from the AU through a “re-hatting” process.
The mission in Darfur is a hybrid force. Experts on peacekeeping operations tend to consider the difficulties for the hybrid force in Darfur to be enough to conclude that it is not a solution to be encouraged for the future. The difficulties do not only relate to the fact that it is a hybrid force, but rather due to a variety of reasons. There are not major differences of use between the AU and the UN in the leadership of the mission and the strategic management. The logistical difficulties or the geographical circumstances, e.g., not sufficient amount of helicopters at place or objectives of the force, are not depending on the hybridity.

If the hybrid force had not been deployed in Darfur, it could have meant a major impediment for the international community and its possibilities of intervening in Darfur. Therefore, the fact that the AU force AMIS was their first was of vital importance. The host country could later on accept international contribution in the country with the prerequisite that the new force would be predominantly African. This, furthermore, illustrates that the UN doctrine is evolving and adjusts to the political requirements and circumstances. The mission is unique in the history of the UN, and we have to assure that it succeeds; a failure is not an option in Darfur or for UNAMID.

The contribution of the AU gives a large number of values added but, as has been mentioned earlier, there are a few political constraints to it as well. The UN and the AU share the responsibility for the success of UNAMID. The strategic responsibility, making strategic decisions of appointments of civilian and military leaders and on the far reaching effects of the success, life and functioning of the mission, is shared between the UN and the AU. The day-to-day decisions are made by the leaders on the ground, with the quality of being joint representatives of the UN and the AU as well as the UN DPKO, under the Secretary-General. The AU gets informed frequently on the decisions taken in the UN, although it does not involve a process of consultation between the two organizations. This sometimes poses problems but the dialogue generally overcomes it.

I would also like to take the opportunity to draw your attention to the problem of the International Criminal Court (ICC). If the ICC were to issue an arrest warrant against a head of state of a host country, one could easily think of a situation where UNAMID could not continue to operate as usual. The AU has taken a very clear position on this; we request the UN Security Council to use its prerogative, activating article 16 of the Rome Statute of the ICC. This has been used in the past, and it is the decision from our political leaders, which is why I would like to bring this message to the UN. If we do not do anything about this now, we can run into difficulties, and that would not have been a joint decision then.
When talking about equal partnerships and involvement in the decision making, it is important for this to be known to everyone, as it will have tremendous effects for the ones on the ground if the recommendation is not respected by the Security Council. When the mandate of UNAMID was to be renewed 31 July this year, the resolution of the Security Council took note of the concerns expressed by the AU on this issue. We are eager to contribute to our joint mission in Darfur, and we are calling for our partners to be mindful of this crucial issue.

In the same category of strategic political constraints, one could mention Somalia. The UN is in charge of the political process through ambassadors and the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General. The AU has four battalions on the ground through AMISOM, out of which all are in the capital. There is not enough strength in the battalions to move outside Mogadishu. The personnel is there poorly equipped and is working under terrible hardships. Despite this, we are there and we are pleading for the UN to take over the mission, and to bring extra African as well as non-African troops on the ground. For a long time the doctrine was that there is no peace to keep in Somalia, but now we have a peace agreement to implement which is the first in twenty years. I would like to stress the importance of providing the strength and capabilities to assure the implementation of the Somali peace agreement, and to help the Somalis to a better life.

The Security Council addressed the issue of piracy, and we are now pleading for our colleagues at the UN to include the mandate for the implementation of the peace agreement in the mandate tackling the problems of piracy, but also for the protection of the territorial waters of Somalia against the dumping of hazardous waste and illegal fishing. Furthermore, I would like to stress the importance of the enforcement of the arms embargo, decided by the UN Security Council. The arms embargo is now violated in favour of the terrorist groups and the spoilers who attempt to break down the peace agreement. We are pleading for the UN and heads of states to meet at a summit and to help Somalia restore peace and stability.

The international justice is posing a problem for the natural relationship that should exist among the UN and regional organizations and between the North and the South. At the moment, two generals from Africa who are working in UN operations are subjected to legal judicial pursuits in European countries. The heads of states in Africa express this as hazardous for the relationship and work together in the future.

It is important to work on the balance of the relationship, and we have a good basis to start working. Along with the development of the AU, the architecture for the political and legal framework is being established and capacities on the ground
are being generated. We will have more to offer in international activities, but as the ambitions rise we will also need more support.

The cases of Sudan and Somalia are a test of the willingness and the ability of the international community to work closely with the AU, and to reach success with peace and stability in the region. Failure is not an alternative. While our resources are limited, our resolve is strong and the willingness to contribute to joint operations is there.
United Nations – European Union Crisis Management Operations: Lessons Learned from Recent Cooperation

Chair: Mr. Michel Miraillet, Director, Policy and Strategic Affairs Department, Ministry of Defence, France

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Following the very interesting address of Amb. Ramtane Lamamra, it is my great pleasure to open the second session of our conference, which focuses on lessons learnt from recent cooperation between the United Nations and the European Union.

This morning, we saw in various addresses that with the development of the European Defence and Security Policy, the European Union has become a privileged partner of the United Nations in crisis management, where things are not simple, as we know. One cannot help but notice that Africa has been one of the main theatres of crisis management operations. In this respect, 2008-2009 should signal a new phase in operational cooperation between the two institutions, with the hand-over in Chad between the EU operation and the UN mission. The anti-piracy operation that the EU is expected to decide upon before the end of the year must also provide an opportunity for significant strengthening of the cooperation between the two institutions. Africa is a continent where still too few European partners intend to become involved, although significant progress has been made. It is surprising to note that ten years ago, no one in Western political-military circles would have imagined that an operation could be deployed in the heart of Africa, in what I would consider the most hostile environment in geographic terms, under Irish, Swedish, French and Austrian command, and the participation of other nations. Behind this movement, which is more than an event, is the sign (for us, in any way) of an ownership by new nations of responsibilities in theatres of operations that affect them, inasmuch as they affect their security and global stability. It is surprising to see countries such as Poland investing in theatres of operation such as Congo and Chad, where Poland, for example, has more than 400 troops and is giving serious consideration to putting its troops under UN command.

Africa is not the only theatre of operations; the EU is now present in Georgia alongside the UN and the OSCE, but for how long, given the current mandates of
the UN and OSCE on the ground? Above all, this cooperation, which we are addressing here today, is not solely of a military nature; ties are being developed in civilian crisis management, as demonstrated by police missions in Bosnia in the past, and in Kosovo now with EULEX, in Georgia and in Afghanistan. We also mentioned development reforms in the area of security, and the development of African peacekeeping capabilities with EURORECAMP.

Today’s discussion must allow us to prepare an assessment not only of the success achieved, but in particular of the shortcomings and even failures. It must also touch on solutions for the future. I wish to retain the question posed by Thierry Tardy this morning; are the lessons we have learnt, the lessons we have drawn on the ground, applicable under all circumstances, and can they be widely used? Does the experience of one operation apply to other operations? In any case, I can count on Gen. Patrick Nash and his frankness to tell us what he thinks. This is what we need; the same is true for our representative of UNAMID. Frankness and honest assessments are the prerogative of the military and, this being the case, I hope that the representatives of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the General Secretariat of the European Council also go to the heart of the problems we face.

Presentation: Dr. Renata Dwan, Senior Adviser, Division of Policy, Evaluation and Training, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations, speaking on behalf of Mr. Alain Le Roy, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations

The fact that many here today know each other illustrates that the community is rich, and it demonstrates the growing interaction. I will start by talking about the scope of United Nations peacekeeping operations. I find it very interesting that in all but two of the present European Union operations, the two operations in Bosnia, the UN and the EU are operating side by side. Every EU operation is somehow along side or jointly with the UN. That indicates the extent of the engagement.

Another factor, also worth bearing in mind, is that most of the operations undertaken by the EU are civilian crisis management operations, although most of the thinking and talking tend to be on the military side of the agenda. Another area that I will not go into today that was talked about this morning, is the advantages of the European Union for the United Nations. As I have understood them there are essentially two; there is the symbol as well as the active political support that EU engagement signals to a crisis context, and the second is the very real enabling capabilities, in particular in terms of logistics, engineering and manpower.

I would like to stress the variation in experience. The way we have operated has varied from case to case, which raises the question of access to capabilities and the
issue of speed, the EU in relation to the UN. If one looks at the UN and the mission in Sudan, for instance, one can particularly point to the speed as a problem for us. When the EU has mobilized and deployed fast, the operations have been very small, e.g., operation ARTEMIS and EUMM in Georgia. With other missions there has been a longer leading time since there was more time and room for extended preparations. EUFOR DRC and Chad have had more regular planning and deployment processes. The mission in Lebanon was not an EU operation, but rather EU Member States participating in a UN operation. This was the first time in many years that the EU deployed a substantial number of people under blue helmets. Furthermore, the EU played an important coordinating role and clearing-house function. As noticed, these are very different kinds of missions, and in addition there are the police and rule of law security sector engagements.

What has not been mentioned here today is the notion of lead states, which is important for the discussion on how we work together and the success of the missions. Many of the operations we define in the EU for the robustness and speed are carried out in the context of a lead state. The mission EUFOR DRC had Germany as a lead state. With ARTEMIS in the DRC France had the function of being the lead state, as now with Chad. The question of a lead state matters for the change of command and speed of the deployment, and because every time we work together we are working with different operational headquarters in different countries.

I will address what I will define as “the seven virtues”. The recent cases of involvement in missions have made it apparent that the EU-UN cooperation is rooted in politics, but it is not a substitution for politics. Every time the EU comes to engage with the UN, it requires a political decision. The decision is worked out from a political context and the political realities, and not out of doctrines, models or matrices. With two secretariats, this can create difficulties. This has a very concrete operational effect and impact on the UN, especially with common strategic objectives.

I will give an example from Chad as a bridging operation. The Security Council resolution calls for a multidimensional international presence with three components: a UN police presence, a Chadian police/humanitarian presence and then the actual military component. In the UN’s understanding, the military component that was being undertaken by the EU was a part of the bigger concept. The EU, by contrast, focused on issues that related to clear-linked protection of refugees, humanitarians and IDPs. The objectives of the EU and the UN were quite different. A lesson learned is that when the EU and the UN work together, it is of vital importance to look at common strategic objectives of the two organizations. In the case of the UN we had to back-track and rethink our CONOPS of that
mission; first we thought that we could simply bring in the EU under that umbrella.

The missions in the DRC and Chad provide us with useful experience. Joint fact finding and assessment missions between the EU and the UN on the ground are critical also in order to define the common objectives of the mission. In Chad, a fact finding mission was carried out and the EU enabled the UN in this work, but the mid-term review was done differently.

The cooperation between the EU and the UN is not a substitute for EU participation in UN peacekeeping. It is important to move away from the belief that it is either or, i.e. that the EU participates under the blue helmets or launches its own mission. The political symbol signals that the EU Member States are concerned about how and where the UN operation will be launched, and are committing themselves behind a peace process. The presence of EU Member States’ forces, police and civilian support enables good operations on the ground. It is of importance for the concepts and doctrines and the training development that we speak the same language and can enable information sharing between the different functions.

The cooperation between the EU and the UN does not take place in a vacuum. The EU and the UN are working side by side but there are several other actors that we need to involve in the process such as the host state, regional actors and, in particular the AU, and NATO. For ARTEMIS it was critical to have the engagement of regional actors, some of the Great Lakes facilitators and the experts on the area, the neighbouring countries as well as the eastern part of the country where the mission was deployed. With EUFOR DRC, we have learnt the importance of the EU-UN cooperation to work closely with the host authorities. There are things that we could have done better, particularly on the UN side to engage the Congolese government. In Chad, a common approach to the host state is important and becomes even more significant as we talk about a transition from the EU to the UN. The handover of EU infrastructure and logistics, which would normally go under the terms of the SOFA, would go through the host state. In my view, the cooperation between the EU and the UN only works when it takes place at a triangular network or with more partners, and in a transparent manner.

The cooperation between the EU and the UN is not natural. The two organizations have different tools and mechanisms and need to find ways of working together, while respecting different chains of command. The experiences from Chad, the DRC and Kosovo demonstrate the importance of joint assessments. Furthermore, the question is how we can develop joint planning mechanisms while not withstanding the need of respecting each other’s autonomous planning proc-
esses. In Chad the regular interaction with Liaison officers in the operational headquarters, has been acknowledged not to be sufficient. An “in place planning team” made out of representatives from the EU and the UN is needed for the work to be adequate.

The information sharing between the EU and the UN leaves the UN with certain challenges. The EU has constraints in terms of meeting certain obligations in order to assure the information intelligence. These are criteria that the UN cannot meet, which calls for a solution of ways to interact on the ground. Regular dialogue, interaction and the presence of Liaison officers in the field as well as in headquarters are critical. Another area is to look at how we can engage on EU satellite capacities, an area where the UN has big deficiencies. There used to be much more sensitivity on the part of UN Member States to those issues of information sharing. You are seeing a gradual move, particularly in some of the discussions with the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, so it is becoming a little bit more open, at least to have the debate.

The structures of the headquarters are different between the two organizations. The UN has one part of its headquarters in New York, and then in the field during the mission. Once the mission has been deployed to the field, the field station has a significant degree of capacity and ability to plan and direct operations. The EU has a strategic headquarters and an operational headquarters. In the context of military operations, this creates a challenge. During the ARTEMIS mission in the DRC Paris was the operational headquarters and during the EUFOR DRC mission Potsdam was the operational headquarters. Paris has the function of operational headquarters for the multinational missions. The different locations of the operational headquarters require a development of making sure that the learning and experiences are kept, in order to continue the work. If the operational headquarters and the EU personnel are not involved in the process, it intricately to gradually build the lesson learned. Therefore, the emphasis should be focused on learning and joint training. Educational awareness is important for the EU and the UN with the shifting nature of personnel and location.

The Achilles’ heel in the EU-UN cooperation in the field is support. This includes issues related to logistics, costs effectiveness in the field. The UN and the EU are confronted with the same constraints with Member States, organizations made up of individual capacities, and rules and regulations. Both the EU and the UN have rules and regulations that do not fit large decentralized organizations working in difficult contexts in the field and at a high speed. I believe in the need to move towards an establishment of standard framework arrangements between the two organizations. These arrangements will be different depending on the operation but the mechanisms for support, logistics and cost recovery, making it possible to
act fast, will be there to facilitate the work progress. The mission EUFOR DRC was deployed to the field without having the logistics framework and the Memorandum of Understanding finalized.

The cooperation between the EU and the UN has developed with a challenge of achieving everything that the EU has set out. The concept behind the establishment of a crisis management function within the EU was to provide something new. It would be multidimensional with a comprehensive approach and include all the pieces of the EU, humanitarian, political, development and security tools. In practice, the engagements are more limited, which is inevitable during the upstart of the crisis management function. EUFOR DRC and Chad are operations in support of the UN operation with different police components working together. This is sufficient at the initial stage where we are now, but how do we move towards working together for a more comprehensive approach of the missions? This was mentioned earlier today by our Sudanese colleague, stressing the importance of having a holistic approach. The UN multidimensional operations are key for the UN, and it is of importance to start working towards a comprehensive approach, bringing together the military, police and civilian spectrums. This further raises the question of the role of the heads of missions. In the UN system, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General is the head of the peacekeeping operation as well as coordinator of the entire mission and over the command and control. The structure is not always successful, but it is an attempt to increase the UN presence in the missions. The UN talks increasingly of the role of the Special Representative not only as the head of the mission but also as the one bringing together the different parts of the UN. The debate on Afghanistan and the international leadership position of the SRSG there raises questions on the role of the EU operations and the specialist nature of police, SSR, and ROL operations that we see in the DRC alongside MONUC.

This opens up for a number of questions for the future. How can we assure for the EU operations of a specialist nature to be a part of the overall planning, while respecting the chain of command? Do we ever think about the pillar structures as being a model that we would like to approach? Do we think of building capacity in the multidimensional areas with, e.g., civilian rosters with common standards for policing and the rule of law?

The EU-UN cooperation cannot be an exit strategy for the EU, and certainly not an exit strategy for the UN. The feeling of the UN as an “institution of last resort” leads to frustration within the UN at times. Multinational forces can come in to a conflict and stay for a relatively long time, and then hand over the mission to the UN. The UN, on the other hand, has no other institution to hand over to after it has finished a mission. We need to be aware of the burden we are laying on the UN,
and what it means for the UN. Handing over a mission to the UN is not an exit strategy in itself but part of a broader international commitment. The mission in Chad and EUFOR Darfur show interesting examples on what the accompanying measures are and how they work together, as well as the role of the EU.

This raises a number of questions. What are the possibilities of “re-hatting” certain troops, e.g., EU troops? Where do the civilian, political, development and humanitarian instruments of the EU come in? How do we align the various instruments to ensure that if a military mission leaves, it is not the end of the story for the EU presence? A more controversial question is where the EU has its commitment to provide a strategic reserve.

Does the EU-UN cooperation serve as a model for other organizations? I do not believe that the EU-UN is a model per se over the cooperation of the UN with other organizations. The sui generis nature of the EU and the different capabilities and resources that the EU Member States contribute do not open up for other regional organization to have the same cooperation. It could be a model to how multilateralism can work, and it is a reflection that both organizations share the commitment to operationalize their cooperation across a range of activities such as prevention, crisis management, peacekeeping and recovery. Furthermore, the EU and the UN have overlapping membership. Every EU member state is also a member of the UN. The consistency in the EU is a reflection of the same strategies, goals and objectives that follow through in the UN.

*Speaker: Ms. Claude-France Arnould, Director of Defence Aspects, General-Secretariat of the Council of the European Union*

The operations that have been implemented in consultation with the United Nations were to a large extent described by Sylvie Bermann this morning and later by Pedro Serrano. I will not return to these. All I would like to say on what characterises this permanent interaction between operations and the nature of our relationship with the UN is that the relationship began by concrete actions. Our first work with the UN essentially began with Operation ARTEMIS, and it was after Operation ARTEMIS that the first declaration was made between the UN and the EU, in the fall of 2003. Later, there were other military and civilian operations that were implemented with cooperation between the UN and the EU. It is also a little on the basis of certain requirements that had been received at the time that the second UN-EU declaration was signed in 2007.

This is what characterises this relationship, and Renata Dwan has illustrated this well. Certainly, there is an institutional element, a political element that is expressed in particular in these two declarations. But there is also a pragmatic, a day-to-day
reality that requires total flexibility on both sides. Thus, I am in full agreement with what was said by Dr. Dwan on the fact that none of this falls neatly into matrices or intellectual diagrams, whether Cartesian or from another culture, and that each time, with each scenario, one must adapt to the type of cooperation required by a given joint operation.

For example, this morning, we talked briefly about the Steering Committee, where all players meet from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and from the General Secretariat of the European Union and the Commission to deal with different issues of interest to both of us. There is a certain regularity imposed by the texts, a compulsory element that provides a framework but which at the same time is complemented on an ongoing basis, based on requirements, by other forms of interaction required by joint operations. Thus, one should not analyse too much whether the Steering Committee should be changed or not. It exists; it provides good service; it has the merit of bringing all players to the table, not only the Secretariat of the Council but also the Commission, on the different areas in which they operate together and on areas where there is a chance of working together.

Other organisations have also been mentioned where flexibility is required. Dr. Dwan mentioned NATO. It is true that during the course of the work on Kosovo, common ground must be found between the UN, the EU and NATO. Appropriate formats have been found to operate together, given the political constraints that existed. In the case of Georgia, there was a format that allowed, first of all in an informal manner, for cooperation between the UN, the EU and the OSCE. In the case of Afghanistan, I support the format in which the United Nations can exercise a full coordination role (that everyone expects around SRSG Kai Eide), on site in Kabul and in head offices, whether in New York or Brussels. I believe that this would generate serious value-added. Therefore, there is a need to adapt our type of cooperation to all the players around the table. Dr. Dwan is correct: we are not alone in a UN-EU tête-à-tête. However, such adaptation should not be based on theoretical models, or political strategies. We must think that we are together in a given theatre in order to face a crisis or a problem together. The lead, meanwhile, depending on whether or not there is a need for a lead, and who sits around the table depend in full on the situation in the theatre.

As demonstrated by Dr. Dwan and raised this morning, that there are differences and cooperation is not at all natural. As a result, cooperation requires an ongoing effort and requirement so that we can work together.

These difficulties are of an institutional nature. I do not know which is the most flexible and cumbersome; this would be descending into prejudices and approxi-
mations. On the one hand, there is a relationship between the Security Council and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations that gives great latitude to the latter, more than that enjoyed by the Secretariat in relation to the PSC. On the other hand, in Brussels there is ongoing interaction between the PSC, the committees that provide it with assistance and, in particular, the military committee and the Civcom. This has certainly meant more “interference”, but there is more immediate interaction from the beginning of an operation with the Member States. It is true that sometimes it can slow down progress and pose problems. The advantage, on the other hand, is that when an operation is launched within the framework of the EU, there are firm commitments in relation to force generation.

Each decision-making processes has advantages and disadvantages. Based on the concept of a battle group and other options for generating forces that can be deployed within a few days (as demonstrated from the outset with ARTEMIS) the EU can act very quickly. This action is an option that the EU can bring to the UN as an entry strategy. Later, I will return to Dr. Dwan’s question on whether the UN is the EU’s exit strategy.

Not long ago we spoke about the issue of chains of command, which vary greatly between the UN and the EU. It is hard to tell who is better off. I recall the debates that occurred in capital cities at the time of the conflict in Lebanon, in which consideration was given to preparations for the operation in Lebanon. There were many advantages of using the UN, and personally I believe that the right choice was made. In some capitals, there were also pleas for an operation by the EU. Why? Among other reasons, because the Union has a chain of command with which our general staff is familiar, since there is great expertise, respect for the military order, military life, military requirements and simplicity in the chain of command. On the other hand, there is what was described by Dr. Dwan. Much thought should be given to what she said, and that analysis continues.

It is true that the location of EU headquarters is always changing, a situation that complicates matters. When one approaches the UN the reaction encountered is that of Dr. Dwan, i.e. to say that both sides must constantly readapt and reinvent joint efforts. This should be an element included in the analysis we are gradually developing on what the best system would be for the EU to adopt on this issue of headquarters.

There are differences in the roles of special representatives. One can analyse the issue from both sides. It might be that our special representatives on site could have an even stronger coordination role. Perhaps on the part of the UN, there could be a little more understanding between intentions at the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and what is said in the theatre by the UN chain of com-
mand. Again, the UN has vast experience in crisis management. Our experience in this area is more recent, but this obligation to work together must also clarify our own analysis on what can lead to changes on each side.

Dr. Dwan raised the difficult point of whether the EU could be the reserve force of the UN. It is not a debate that is up to the Secretariat to resolve. The EU cannot be the reserve force of the United Nations. A reserve force implies automaticity in the decision-making. Therefore, there must already be a form of authority in the chain of command over the reserve force, even for a certain level of reserve there must be a political decision. However, for some operations, given that the EU has the ability to react within a very short time span and on the basis of consciously shared political objectives, there could be forms of insurance that resemble to a reserve force. But as long as this would be a reserve force *stricto sensu*, there will be a deadlock. The same is true of the idea, which has also been part of our dialogue for years, that the European Union can participate as such in a UN peacekeeping operation. It is less of an issue among us; it was a major source of misunderstanding and frustration at the beginning of our dialogue with the UN. It was thought that ESDP would strip the UN of capabilities and would compensate for this malicious act only be contributing to UN operations as the EU.

There is certainly an issue regarding the participation of European countries in UN peacekeeping operations; one should not be hypocritical. But the EU has not taken anything away from the UN. It provides a complement to the UN. We will return to “re-hatting” questions if necessary. However, I do not see how having a module of the EU that fits into a UN chain of command would be positive. Again, if there are EU Member States that wish to be heavily involved in a UN operation: why not. But incorporating a “European Union operation”, again with the inevitable and desired role of the PSC, the military committee, a United Nations chain of command, would only complicate matters. It must also be understood that Europeans’ reaction is not the product of a misreading of the importance of the United Nations. Member States have sufficiently proven this.

Again, it is a requirement for clarity in chains of command. The very painful experiences in the Balkans in the 1990s affected the culture of many of our capitals. Therefore, what is required is clarity in our chains of command. Lebanon is an example of a massive commitment from countries of the EU in a UN operation with strong encouragement given to Brussels. I recall that August meeting when Kofi Annan met the ministers for foreign affairs, during the Finnish presidency. Around Kofi Annan, the ministers confirmed the considerable commitment of several EU Member States. In a sense, the EU helped mobilise some of its Member States politically. This did not mean that an element, a link, of the chain of command was introduced in the UN chain of command.
On Lessons learned, Dr. Dwan has already given interesting examples. Dr. Dwan and her counterpart on our side organised induction days so that people could meet each other. This is not to say that this is the only way to meet, although it is a systematic method and very useful. Both sides put in place standard arrangements to provide logistical support, liaison arrangements and ways to transfer equipment after the end of an EU operation. It is all ready, with adjustments made to each new operation. This system was born out of the operation in the Congo in 2006 and experiments are in progress, as are efforts to refine them to Chad/CAR; finishing touches are being made to areas requiring completion. Dr. Dwan also spoke at length on the exchange of information. The satellite centre works for the UN Secretariat and various UN missions. The Commission also offers access to its own capabilities. An attempt is being made to develop this on both sides. One could perhaps go beyond the satellite.

However, the response of one of the speakers this morning was perfect. Conditions within the UN must also allow the exchange of this information and suitable methods to be found. Great improvements have been made to the key moment, the launch of an operation, i.e. when the UN requests the intervention of the EU, so that it does not arrive like a clap of thunder, plot or diktat. Therefore, there must be a phasing-in process and, for that reason, the dialogue between the UN Secretary-General and Javier Solana is the most comfortable instrument. Such approach was adopted during the German presidency. In other words, the UN Secretary-General indicates to his counterpart in the European Union that there is an intention to request the support of the EU. As for the EU, it remains to be seen whether or not there is a preparedness to do this. In relation to Somalia, this evolution has occurred in the resolutions that also take into account the fact that the UN cannot give orders to the EU without first verifying that Member States are ready in global and political terms. Once the EU has demonstrated its ability to do this, a resolution must indicate and give the required blessing and supervision to the mission of the European Union.

For Chad another enormous joint effort has been made. The hand-over the UN sought on 15 March 2009 is not an “exit strategy”. The EU was, as Dr Dwan just said, part of a multidimensional presence. It may even have been some sort of “entry strategy” for the UN, militarily as well as politically. This was a very important element in the change in spirits in Chad, including at the highest level, finding that it is good to have a multinational force. While there was a prior intention within the UN, which faced difficulties that included those of a political nature, this truly favoured the deployment of the UN. One key element will be “re-hatting”. It is very interesting to note that at a recent informal meeting of ministers of defence in Deauville, the number of Member States that are giving very serious consideration to “re-hat” would be a first in an operation of cooperation between the UN and the EU.
In fact, I wish to stop here and spend time on the notion of comprehensiveness raised by Dr. Dwan. While Dr. Dwan is harsh in her assessment, she is correct when she says that better could be done in using all instruments of the EU. Much progress has been made, and without doubt there are things that can be analysed to ensure greater collaboration between players, including within the Secretariat of the Council. What is very important, and where a great effort is being made within the United Nations, is an effort to bring together what can be done under the ESDP and what can be done with the Commission. Marc Van Bellingen from the Commission, who will be here tomorrow, will talk about all this. Progress has been made at each point; ARTEMIS was a beginning in the DRC, as is Chad, even though the Commission has to a great extent financed part of MINURCAT deployment and finally a part of the salaries of the Chadian policemen. There is also a whole series of projects in the area of development and support to humanitarian work. Thus, it is a key element in cooperation between the UN and the EU that this cooperation on our part is part of a global approach. Secondly, it is this that also leads to a situation where one can end an operation of the EU without saying that the UN is taking over because it is the exit, but that there is a transition to another phase in some cases. I will refer to just one example then stop: Bosnia. I am not saying that this will happen tomorrow, this is a decision that must be made by ministers, but we have clearly arrived at a point where it is possible to end the military operation and go on to something else within a larger, more general framework of relations between this country, where there has been a commitment from the international community, the UN, then NATO and the EU, and now do something else within the context of the evolution of the local situation.


“Stand firm for well you know that hardship and danger are the price of glory.”

Alexander the Great

I base my comment on the previous two speakers. The two organizations, the EU and the UN, should stay firm and work together and in the end, the world will be a glorious place for all of us.

I would like to thank the organizers first of all for inviting me. When I look around this room I feel very humble because of the number of experienced people that are here who have acquired wonderful knowledge about peacekeeping and peace operations. I would like to share my experience with you from the perspective of a commander on the ground. I have been privileged to command the AU troops in Darfur for six months, prior to the transfer of authority of UNAMID that we have today. Moreover, this is the first truly hybrid operation on the ground.
Since I am in France, and I saw the statue of Napoleon, I would like to quote Napoleon:

“Die you and I shall accept your death. But if you have lived without glory, without being useful to your country, without leaving a trace of your existence. For that is not to have lived at all.”

Letter from Napoleon to Jerome in 1802.

There are many areas of challenges we need to look into, especially if the UN and the AU intend to work towards hybrid missions. The greatest challenge I have found within the system of hybrid missions is that of command and control. It is very difficult to serve two masters. For a hybrid operation to function fully, extended planning at the strategic level is fundamental. The hybrid mission is answerable to the UN headquarter in New York and to the headquarter of the AU in Addis Ababa. I am happy that the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, who spoke earlier, has touched on some of these areas. In other missions, the Special Representatives to the Secretary-General are doing the work numerated by the previous speaker. For UNAMID Mr. Adada is the joint special representative being answerable to both the UN headquarter in New York and the AU headquarter in Addis Abeba.

The AU is new to the work of peacekeeping, while the UN is the organization with many years of experience, and sometimes there is a tendency to lean towards the more experienced. From a military point of view, sometimes it is the challenge that is needed, and at other times it is the guidance that is required. With no military officers or others with military background at the headquarter, there is no guidance that can be obtained. We have a challenge to get a balanced opinion when you want to approach the headquarter for guidance.

UNAMID is predominantly an African mission. Having missions solely made up of contributions from African countries can be seen as two sided. Having predominantly African troops means that most of the countries first themselves need support and are then able to contribute to the mission. This leaves a real gap in the strategic lift.

The greatest challenge to the mission in Darfur can be seen as the lack of cooperation from the Government of Sudan. It can be viewed from another angle as well. With the establishment of UNAMID, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1706 in August 2006. With the lack of support from the host government of Resolution 1706, Resolution 1769 was adopted in July 2007. This gives an indication of the challenges the mission have faced since its establishment. The last two or three months the relationship between the mission and the government has changed significantly. It is of highest importance that the stakeholders from the
outside and the mission leadership constructively engage the host nation in order to make certain of progress.

After due consultation and support from the stakeholders, the international community and the AU were able to come up with the SOFA between the Government of Sudan and the UN concerning the status of UNAMID. Personally I do not believe the SOFA between the mission and the Government of Sudan will ever be signed, considering the challenges we are facing at the time. However, progress is being made. Reporting and being answerable to two different organizations in a hybrid mission will be very difficult if the two organizations do not agree on what to do strategically. A predominantly African hybrid force is critical when it comes to access of resources. Most recently we can remember the high demand for military helicopters, and the difficulties of obtaining these for the mission. At present, the helicopters are occupied for a mission somewhere else. The need for helicopters in the mission has increased the last few years. When operating in an area the size of Spain with no infrastructure and no roads, the lack of air capability creates a big challenge for the mission.

The UN, unlike the EU, does not have forces with the planning and the availability on stand-by. After the capacity and the capability the UN requires for a mission have been identified, the UN turns to the member nations for contributions. The UN lacks sufficient information access, or what the military call “intel”, an area where Member States could assist on the ground.

The background papers that were issued for us talked about the culture of organization. Another statement that Count Belis Surnios made when he was admonishing the Persian Generals not to disrupt peace negotiations was

“The first blessing is peace as agreed upon by all men who have even a small share of reason. It followed that if anyone should be a destroyer of it he would be most responsible, not only to those near him but also for the whole nation for the troubles which come. The best General therefore is not one that is able to bring about peace from war.”

Count Belis Surnios 1830

In a statement in one of the background papers, the EU was mentioned as using the UN to assert itself as a security actor. Moreover, others view the EU as using the UN for providing the legitimacy and legality to the work of the EU. With the situation in Darfur, this discussion on the two organizations is not valid. What is of importance is how much peace we can bring about to the suffering women and children. It would help if this would always be the state of mind between the organizations for a mission. Peacekeeping is dangerous even to the peacekeepers themselves, and if those who have the capabilities and the resources can support the mission, we will make great progress.
Following the events in neighbouring Chad, it is fair to say that MINURCAT, EUFOR and UNAMID are all involved in the same situation, in particular with the porous borders between Chad and Sudan and the proxy war going on between the two countries. Dialogue among the forces on the ground and support of the Liaison officers should be of high priority. Furthermore, for a mission like Sudan and in particular Darfur, the issue of capabilities is important to underline, and I am happy that one of our colleagues here today has raised this issue earlier.

The robustness of a mission refers to the capabilities the mission holds, the numbers on the ground and the equipment of the personnel on the ground. Last year the AU had the capacity of deploying 25 battalions in Darfur, however, it is also of importance how much the battalion can bring on and how fast they can be deployed. In Darfur, the reality of today on the ground is that the battalion equipment from Egypt arrived in March 2008, and the equipment from Ethiopia arrived in April 2008. As I am speaking, these two battalions have not been deployed up until now, since there are no resources to move the equipment from Port Sudan and from El Obeid into the deployment area in Darfur. They have not been stopped by the Government of Sudan. At present, there are 3,000 containers in El Obeid that need to be transported to Darfur. The roads from El Obeid into Darfur are of very bad quality. At times it has taken two weeks to move a convoy from El Obeid to El Fasher, a distance of less than 900 km. This is the reality under which we are working. Even if the African countries can generate and train new forces, will they be able to deploy them and sustain them on the ground logistically? Until now, my experience is that it is a challenge deploying the missions from African countries and the international community has to come in.

The lessons learned from Darfur are several. How realistic is the mandate provided to the mission? At times, out of political convenience, we create expectations from the people on the ground. While having created the expectation we know that they cannot be met. With the adoption of Resolution 1769 in July 2007, it was said that the transfer of authority would not be later than 31 December. Already then, I believed it would be impossible to carry it through with the short time frame. In spite of this, the message to the Darfurians was that UNAMID would be on the ground as of 31 December to solve the ongoing problems. The Darfurians now live with the expectation of this, but nine months down the road they believe that AU has failed them, that the UN is failing, and they are now asking for the EU or NATO to come and save them. This problem is due to the expectation we have created from the people on the ground. We have to be honest and realistic about the tasks, and have reasonable time frames for the missions. The missions we have today are being judged in the media by impossible tasks such as protecting civilians. How do you protect civilians? The population of Darfur is six millions, Darfur is half a million square meters and UNAMID constitutes
8,000 people on the ground, including enablers. This is not realistic and this is where we need support.

Darfur is a complex situation and many believe that there is no peace to keep in Darfur. I am optimistic that we will deploy, even if it will take some time. There will be peace if the politicians and the diplomats can reach an agreement with the military and be able to keep the peace. There have been progress and achievements up until today as well, but these have not reached the headlines of the newspapers.

*Discussant: Gen. Patrick Nash, Operations Commander, EUFOR Chad/CAR (European Union)*

Before taking up the post as Operations Commander for EUFOR Chad/CAR, I have over the years assumed a number of posts in UN operations and have watched with interest the developments in UN peacekeeping, including the evolving EU-UN relations. By way of background, I had the privilege of being part of a Senior Management Seminar in 2001, which examined the impact of the Brahimi report on future UN missions. With Operation EUFOR Chad/CAR, I have been honoured to be able to contribute to another important step in EU-UN cooperation in this area.

As mentioned earlier, the emphasis on EU-UN cooperation in the EUFOR Chad has been twofold: EUFOR being a “bridging operation” leading to a more long-term UN follow-on force and EUFOR as part of a wider multidimensional presence that includes a UN component. By way of background, EUFOR’s mandate was set out in the Security Council Resolution 1778 in 2007 and it was adopted 25 September 2007. This resolution reflected the international community’s intention to address the situation in eastern Chad as a result of the spillover from the Darfur crisis through a multidimensional approach, of which one element is EUFOR, an EU-led force and the other being MINURCAT, a UN civilian mission of mainly police. EUFOR is the enabler for MINURCAT in two ways: by providing the safe and secure environment in which MINURCAT can carry out its work and by providing logistical support to MINURCAT within EUFOR’s means and capabilities. These two elements were therefore an integrated part of the planning of EUFOR through all phases. I recall quite long drafting sessions on the CONOPS and OPLAN at our operational headquarter when ensuring that our plans took fully into account the multidimensional approach that was a key priority. On the ground, this approach has been pursued to the extent possible. Keywords for me in all this have been sharing, enabling and liaison.

I have some concrete examples from which lessons can be drawn for future purposes. The aim was to deploy two missions into theatre at the same time, which
required a close cooperation with the UN in the phase of planning for the effective establishment of the two missions on the ground. Through this phase the operational headquarters and DPKO exchanged information on the respective deployment plans. Taking into account the logistical challenges when deploying into a theatre like Chad, as well as having both the EU and the UN achieving a satisfactory level in generating assets, it was not an easy task to try to synchronize deployment. A technical arrangement had to be made in order to frame EUFOR logistical support to MINURCAT, which was key for MINURCAT deployment. It was a major challenge to achieve an interphase between two large international organizations with quite different legal and financial frameworks. We succeeded after months of negotiations on highly technical aspects to enter into an arrangement which is the first of its kind and which can be serving as a blueprint for the future. It constitutes an important contribution to improving the efficiency in the cooperation on the operational level.

Once on the ground, the two missions had to establish close cooperation and coordination, and respect the multidimensional mandate on the operational level. A key component in this regard has been the concept of co-location of MINURCAT in EUFOR camps, which, however, I would note at this point, has not yet been fully achieved. Further, the establishment of liaison between the two missions at all levels has been a cornerstone, and in particular achieved good working relations between the Force Commander and the Special Representative. The deployment of UN military Liaison officers to EUFOR has also proven to be a workable concept. Sharing of information is another key point, at the informal level, e.g., by mutual representation in each other’s Joint Operation Centres and at the formal level most notably by sharing documents and intelligence. As you know, military related information requires a relatively high degree of confidentiality and the present limitations in the level of classification that can be exchanged between the EU and the UN have presented a problem in relation to information sharing with MINURCAT. In the context of handing over to a possible follow-on force it will also be an issue. This is an area where we are developing working procedures in order to facilitate both organizations.

The establishment of liaisons in the two missions has been a cornerstone. The deployment of UN means has been fulfilled. The sharing of information between the EU and the UN has proven to be difficult, and in the context of handing over to a follow-on force these procedures have to be discussed.

The main conclusions I would draw from the experience of EU-UN cooperation in the context are the following: the development of common tested ways of working together and frameworks are an advantage in optimising the efficiency of cooperation. I mentioned the technical arrangement of logistical support but also the
overall arrangements for cooperation are of importance for framing the cooperation as early as possible. Liaison arrangements do work, they could even be enhanced. The possibilities of sharing information should be enhanced as they have a direct impact on the efficiency of operations in theatre. And not the least, having a clear common purpose furthers the focus and efficiency of cooperation.

We are now entering a period in the mandate of EUFOR when the level of coordination between EUFOR and MINURCAT on the ground will be of most importance given the current intense phase of the deployment of MINURCAT. The systems we have put in place for this coordination will be tested. Further, the planning for a hand over to a possible UN follow-on force will be another test for the two organisations’ ability to work together to achieve a common purpose. Obviously, there will be further lessons to be learned during this phase.

Discussion

A Military Advisor from one of the Permanent Missions to the UN had a question related to the unity of command. “If we look at the evolution of peacekeeping over time, at the beginning the Force Commander was the head of the mission but over the years the operations have become multidimensional and integrated and we now have a head of mission who is supposed to command all the components in the mission.” He suggested that now we have a situation in MINURCAT with one UN Security Council resolution for one mission but two different entities to command and control elements on the ground: one SRSG commanding the civilian and police dimension, and one force commander answering back to Brussels on the same theatre of operation. A long proven principle is that when there is one theatre of operation, the one in command is essential; if you have different opinions, i.e. if no one is in command, there might be a disaster.

“If we compare this mission with the other across the border, UNAMID is under one Security Council resolution and has one head of mission, but who answers to the AU and the UN. The Force Commander does not answer to the AU or the UN but to the SRSG, the head of mission. This is not the case in MINURCAT, if there is a security problem you have the police on one side and the military on the other side. We could end up with three different options with command and control in MINURCAT; in the initial phase you could have the EU taking over the mission and appointing a head of mission to take the responsibility or, secondly, the UN taking over the mission and the EU putting in a component, a margin, under the operation of control of the UN, which on the ground answers to the direction which is the head of mission, i.e. the UN. Or, thirdly, the current way which is dysfunctional if there is a crisis.”
“Why is the EU, on the one hand, in UNIFIL willing to put more troops under the command and control of the UN, and on the other hand, with MINURCAT, with a smaller force, not ready to put the commander under the control of the head of mission of the UN?”

Dr. Renata Dwan stressed that the prerequisite for a successful mission is to have a lead nation but there are few countries that can do this. “The lead nation is needed as an area of communication, know how, strategic lift and communication for rapid deployment. Furthermore, the lead nation takes the primary responsibility over the mission.”

As regards to the discussion on bridging forces and exit strategies for the mission and lead nation, she meant that this is guided by the mandate of the mission. “It clearly sets out the stages and an end date, which in fact gives an exit to the mission.” She believed an exit strategy is required, which perhaps should constitute a part of the mandate, and the planning of the mandate from day one. “The discussions on what should be after a mission have always been substantive within the UN. The area facing most challenges is rapid change of personnel in organizations, particularly military; continuity can be a difficulty.”

“Information sharing is difficult, but the difficulties mainly arise at the highest level. The practical pragmatic solutions can be found at the theatre level. One area where “nobody knows” concerns the classification of documents in the military; there are a lot of confusion and unclarity over the procedures and how they should be carried out.” The DPKO representative further said that the criteria of today over information sharing cannot be met, although that does not mean that one should allow the difficulties in sharing information hinder the work progress. Furthermore, she believed that the challenges that we have with the structures of the missions are something that we can overcome, and with good leaders this will be achieved. “The access to resources and material is indeed a serious concern. Even today it takes months to negotiate technical agreements; as we know, there has been a lack of helicopters for UNAMID. The strategic reserve, as the panel brought up in the presentation, is highly sensitive in all areas of planning for forces. Any force that is being planned has a need for strategic reserve, but there also have to be enough forces to go in.”

“The issue of transfer of authority and “re-hatting” of the EUFOR Chad/CAR to MINURCAT 15 March 2009 will not be easy but is an opportunity for the EU to facilitate the UN in a seamless transfer of authority.”

A general from a major troop contributing county suggested that when we talk of lead nation in terms of the cooperation between the EU and the UN it would be
better to talk about lead agency. “When we have operations launched, the UN is there and the EU is coming in. We need to accept the primacy of the UN because the members of the EU and the AU are all in the UN. The EU was, e.g., trying to send extra troops to MONUC, the EU battle group, but if you want to synergize and maximize your resources you need to accept a unity of command.”

The general’s second point had to do with exit strategy, and he thought that the most important component to work with, from the start, in order to meet the timeline, was security sector reform. Concerning the use of strategic reserve, he suggested that we should not mix conventional warfare with the kind that is used within intrastate conflicts. There is no strategic reserve, only capabilities; trying to have strategic reserves is a luxury that no one can afford, according to the general. “The EU is better placed to facilitate the operations by the UN by providing a force multiplier effect. A comprehensive look towards perception management is important when carrying out operations in a joint fashion.”

A researcher had a comment to what the two generals had brought up earlier in relation to the mandate of a mission. In UNAMID, a potential impossibility of fulfilling the mandate has been brought up, and with EUFOR Chad, the precision of the mandate has been addressed as an issue. He believed that it is of great importance to identify the challenges of the mission when this is conferred. The doctrines will not be efficient if there are no clear mandates to work with, and here he believed that the drafting time of the mandate is not effective enough. “Furthermore, the mandates are drafted in the Security Council, which constitutes one third Europeans, and if we are not able to draft the mandates we have a deeper challenge.”

In addition, he wished to stress the need for the Challenges Forum to move from the discussion of doctrines onwards to how we write mandates and how we provide mandates that can be achieved in the field. He hoped this is something that the Challenges Forum will focus on in the future.

Dr. Renata Dwan proposed that a single chain of command in an operation with the participation of the EU will remain politically difficult. Furthermore, she meant that what we need to reflect upon is the chain of command and coordination in non-EU military operations. She went on to say that she found it ironic that the “we”, the European Union and the UN go to a country to promote a holistic approach on Security Sector Reform while the work of the mission is divided between two different organizations doing different parts. “Secondly, these operations are relatively small; how can these missions be effective and reach out to the people in a country that is the size of Western Europe? These operations constitute civilian capabilities and crisis management operations and do not have the same
force protection, logistic capacity and self sufficiency as can be expected from an EU military operation. Who is expected to provide this and what happens in extreme situations?” She believed that it is important that the large multidimensional operations also contribute to a bigger SSR project. “The nature and the focus of the mission require that the command of the mission is thought through in a proper way, with a reference to where the mission intends to go.”

“The area of capacities with a special reference to the airlift capacities of the mission has been mentioned by the panel. Not only the EU has difficulties with airlift capacities, but so has, e.g., NATO in Afghanistan. The issue has to be discussed in fora where the awareness is raised and solutions such as pooling can be addressed.”

Thirdly, she mentioned a point that was raised from the audience earlier on force enablers and in particular perceptions, including the feature of cooperation that was press and common messaging. She suggested that we did not do enough of it, and that the UN is terrible at messaging, terrible in mission and terrible out of mission, constantly on the reactive. “Furthermore, there were all sorts of reasons why and how they could be that, and that if there is an area where they need to grow it is just that. The EU is better, but having its own pressure of needing to be visible and having a visibility dimension that it seeks to, quite rightly, reflect. How these two are married together is critical and we tend to forget the people we are actually trying to reach out to, the local populations and the men and the women and the children that we are trying to engage with.”

Regarding mandates, Dr. Dwan commented that it continues to be an issue. She did not think many regional organizations would accept to deploy under the mandates that the UN have. “Further work on this would be most appreciated.”

Finally, she suggested that everyone needed to be aware of the work that is happening in Chad between the EU and the UN, not just in the specific mission but the basis that it is laying for further cooperation, which is fantastic in some of the logistics and some of the planning. “Some real ground has been broken in certain areas, and it is important to capture that and reflect on that in the subsequent months.”

Commenting on the issue about force enablers raised by the general from a major TCC, Dr. Dwan believed that we do not have enough. “The UN work on messaging is not sufficient; the EU has come much further but also has the pressure of visibility.” She did not agree with the earlier comments related to the support of UN mandates, i.e. that several of the regional organizations would not agree to deploy under UN mandates, but thought that it requires more work.

The Operations Commander of EUFOR Chad/CAR, Gen. Nash, responded to the questions and comments on command and control. He did not see any dichotomy
over the command and control in the situation we were in; the command and control was very specific within the context of MINURCAT. The mission had an exit date from the time of deployment. Furthermore, the undertaking of the mission was to contribute to a safe and secure environment, and that a possible follow-on force was to be determined at the mission’s mid-mandate review. Moreover, he did not believe that there were any challenges in the context of the primacy of the UN. “The EU operations are normally operating under a UN mandate, although there needs to be a primacy who we ultimately report to.”

“The recommendations by the Brahimi Report for regional organizations to be used for rapid deployment in situations where effects on the ground are needed with short notice.” Gen. Nash did not subscribe to the statement that these missions necessarily have to be dysfunctional, rather complementary. Dr. Dwan went on to say that the experience today is very clear in that area. “Perceptions is an extremely important area that DPKO were very keen on.” Gen. Nash went on to say that regardless of the work being carried out, there were difficulties in getting the message out. “It was not only the message to the people of the respective countries, but also to people who are working within theatre like NGOs and other international organizations. One of the key areas at start of any mission was to get rid of the myths that are out there about what you are, what you happen to do and what you hope to achieve. The word leadership is key, as is the whole question of relationship and of liaison, in particular at the start of a mission. We had to work on it and take the lead in some areas and that worked to our tremendous benefit. The UN has also acknowledged this through the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the ground and there is an excellent cooperation as a result.”

“As regards to mandates, I hope nobody will take the message away from here that the diplomatic core were not up to doing their job or that they were dysfunctional in any way, it is certainly not, it is the question of mandates. When mandates are being drafted they must look to the long-term of the mission, be practical, pragmatic, implementable and doable. The mandate also has to take into consideration that those involved can draft concepts of operations and operational plans out of the mandate.”

Ms. Claude-France Arnould wished to address the question of why the system of lead-nation is adopted as a solution in Lebanon and not accepted for Chad and MINURCAT. “As Patrick Nash also said, there is no doubt whatsoever on the part of the EU in recognising the primacy of the United Nations. This is what happened in Lebanon, and that I recalled earlier under which circumstances. In other words, the choice of the Europeans was to join the reinforced UNIFIL. Thus, Brussels served no purpose other than as the place where this solidarity and commitment was expressed, with additional active political encouragement from the level of
mobilisation around Kofi Annan and the ministers who, in his presence, decided to put this support within the framework of the UN. There are other cases in which the European Union has been called on to act. For a whole set of reasons, perhaps in political terms only the European Union can act, just as in Darfur there was a time when only the African Union could act. The merits and disadvantages of both systems have been mentioned. For an operation of the European Union, there are certain standards, methods in which the chain of command works, and that make a different system than the UN one. Therefore, the chain of command is adapted to the way the EU functions. While I will not go into military details, it is true that the original concept devised at the UN for intervention in Chad did not have the same numbers, for example, than that chosen and implemented by the EU, for the time being with success."

“Thus, there are situations with political and operational parameters in which one can conclude that the EU, at that moment in time and in that context, is best-placed to act. With regards to the exit strategy via the security sector reform, this is an important element that personally I should have raised first up, since it is a key element in the cooperation between the UN and the EU. There must come a time when crisis management operations come to a close, when the crisis management element can be reduced and the transition made to the security sector reform. This is what is being attempted together in Congo, and it should be implemented on a larger scale: both the security sector reform and the strengthening of African peacekeeping capabilities. This is certainly an effective manner, together with what can be done in terms of the development and analysis of the development security nexus to emerge from a crisis in a non-artificial manner.”

The Force Commander of UNAMID, Gen. Agwai, wished to clarify that he also sees having a predominant African force in Darfur as good, as long as it is manageable. “The fact that African countries that never before were traditional peacekeepers now are coming to peacekeeping will in itself enhance their capacity and help in the stand-by arrangements that the AU are planning.” He agreed with Gen. Nash regarding the importance of personality; if you get the right people in the right position of leadership it helps a lot.

Mr. Pedro Serrano had a clarification to make. “Dr. Dwan said that I was referring to the fact that cooperation between the UN and the EU was very simple. This was not the case. What I said was that we have the instruments, and that we are working in that direction. Effort is required. Moreover, what I said has been supported by the comments of the other speakers. The work is in progress, we have the conceptual instruments and the political life of both institutions to work in this direction.”
A Parliamentary Secretary for Defence Support raised the challenges of coordinating the multidimensional aspects of peace operations, which have been identified over a few years. “The development of the doctrine of the United Nations in the Integrated Mission Planning Process provided conceptual guidance for everyone in the international sphere.” His understanding was that the work of the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP) has met confrontations, and asked if the panel could provide a state-of-the-art of the implementation of the IMPP.

Dr. Renata Dwan responded that the IMPP is the process by which the political, humanitarian, security and development dimensions are brought in from the very start of the outside planning. “Furthermore, the planning includes everything from the deployment to getting into the field, to the definition of the planning process and approach. The process had been relatively slow because of several reasons. First of all, we have not had the internal capacity for carrying out the work completely. As of October 2008, there is IMPP staff working with the project full time. The second challenge we have faced relates to what the professional military personnel see as planning, and how the amateurs, police and other civilians, view planning. Thirdly, there have been inquiry and hesitation in the UN system over whether we have gone too far with the integrated missions. Some people mean that this has led to an increase in the preoccupation of command of control rather than focusing on what we do and how we can get to where we want to be. Positively, the Secretary-General’s policy committee has reinvigorated integration as an idea of the missions. Furthermore, this will be the guiding principle for UN response to conflict and post-conflict.” Dr. Dwan believed that it is the only way to address comprehensive peacekeeping including SSR and looking at the root cause of conflict. “However, it also needs to be done for the efficiency of resources and to move away from who is in charge. The work with the EU makes the UN a more coherent body and multifaceted when working together in integrated teams. There have been two sets of progress for the IMPP. An integrated mission planning team is being established, and secondly, the new head of DPKO will be chairing a group of senior level professionals in the area. Expectantly these measures will assist in moving away from the obstacles that are blocking the work.”
Chapter 5

Humanitarian Aspects:
A Permanent Need for Coordination

Chair: Sir John Holmes, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordination, United Nations

Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

Let me first of all add my voice to those of previous speakers in commending France for organizing the present event. It is a timely and valuable opportunity to discuss the complex subject of peace operations from a number of different perspectives, including the humanitarian. We are fortunate to have among us several speakers who have to address these issues on a daily basis and can speak from experience in a very practical manner. I am pleased to have with me on the podium Ms. Karen Koning Abuzayd, Commissioner-General of UNRWA, Mr. Peter Zangl Director-General ECHO presented by Mr. Michael Curtis who is Head of Sector. Dr. Wolf Dieter Eberwein, President of VOICE and Dr. Gary Troeller from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. At the outset, let me try to set the context for this panel by outlining some of the principal challenges to humanitarian action today and in particular in our cooperation with peacekeeping and other military actors.

Key Challenges to Humanitarian Action

Humanitarian actors, almost by definition, operate in complex and dangerous environments. Arguably, however, our work has become even more challenging in recent years:

a. a worrying increase in attacks on humanitarian workers and their facilities and assets in conflict areas, due to banditry but also political motivations;
b. a reduction of access to vulnerable populations under serious strain in numerous conflict areas;
c. a larger number of political, military and private sector actors venturing into traditional areas of “humanitarian” work, leading to complex coordination challenges.

Let me give you a few examples

Security of humanitarian actors and limited access. Since January 2008, there have been well over 100 incidents of violence against humanitarian personnel in Soma-
lia, including murder, abduction and other acts of violence. In the last few days two people have died. In Darfur, in the past week alone, four humanitarian vehicles were hijacked, thirteen humanitarian workers were temporarily abducted and eight humanitarian compounds were attacked. So far this year, as of 3 October, a total of 225 humanitarian vehicles have been hijacked (as compared to 137 total in 2007), 170 humanitarians have been abducted (up from 147 in 2007) and 144 attacks on humanitarian premises occurred (compared to 93 in 2007). 41 WFP-contracted drivers remain missing. In Afghanistan, humanitarian personnel continue to be subject to violence. In mid-August, four staff members of the NGO International Rescue Committee were killed and two weeks later two staff members of another international NGO were abducted - one of whom was killed. Another INGO worker was killed this weekend. These incidents have real and dramatic consequences for sometimes hundreds of thousands of beneficiaries, as organizations feel forced to stop some activities or withdraw altogether.

Blurring of distinctions between humanitarian and military or political actors. There can be situations of extreme insecurity where only the military can deliver assistance. Military desires to win hearts and minds can also be understood. However, great care is needed. Some forces are tempted to claim a humanitarian function for themselves. This has posed problems in contexts such as Afghanistan and Iraq. Thus, military units sometimes carry out activities which they claim are humanitarian assistance but which often do not comply with basic humanitarian principles of impartiality and neutrality. This can jeopardize the safety and security of genuine humanitarian staff.

Integrated missions. The discussion on integrated missions or other types of peacekeeping follows similar considerations, within the UN, but increasingly also with EU and AU missions. The need to promote a unified system-wide response is clear. However, the key objective of such unified response must be strategic coherence, and clarity of roles and responsibilities and communication channels, rather than physical absorption into one central structure as an end in itself. We need a model of cooperation with peace operations that takes due account of (i) the need for strategic coordination and planning among all UN actors and its partners, (ii) the comparative advantages and expertise that OCHA has acquired over the years in doing humanitarian coordination, (iii) the strategic necessity to interact not only with UN and most importantly non-UN, humanitarian actors, who are sometimes responsible for up to 80 percent of actual service delivery on the ground, (iii) the perception of the UN in a given context and its impact on the perception of humanitarian actors and the core principles of neutrality and impartiality.

To respond to this challenge, and building on the Capstone doctrine, which is the key policy document for UN peacekeeping, OCHA is developing a policy that is
currently being discussed with partners. I hope that this will turn into a useful doctrine in the future. It will be important that we get consensus on this approach among Member States, and not only their humanitarian sections but also their political and military branches, and that we broaden the UN doctrine to peace operations and conflict management partners like the EU or the AU. Generally speaking, our standard footprint in a peace support operation should be an integrated DSRSG/RC/HC who ensures strategic coherence with the mission’s objectives and a dedicated OCHA office to support the HC function, just as we would in any other humanitarian mission. Under this model, this office should not be structurally integrated into the mission.

There is a connection between these issues. In order to be able to reach persons in need in a manner that is safe for them and for the tens of thousands of humanitarian workers around the world, it matters that humanitarian staff be perceived as neutral, impartial and independent. Why is this important? Because in the 99 per cent of cases when humanitarians go out to the camps or villages affected by conflict, they will be without military to protect them. They depend on the acceptance of the population, and the combatants who come and go in many of these areas, for their lives and the ability to provide assistance.

Necessary interactions with military and political actors – be they the host state, rebel forces, or peace operations – UN sponsored or regional – should not undermine these principles by blurring the lines between politically motivated action and principled humanitarian action. This costs lives, and does not come with any political or security advantage. These are challenges common to both the UN and to EU sponsored peacekeeping and other operations. Let me highlight a few examples.

Examples of cooperation with the EU. Humanitarian actors cooperate with the European Union in responding to humanitarian emergencies in a number of ways. At the political level, for example in New York, the EU and Member States play an active and supportive role in the thematic negotiations of the General Assembly on humanitarian response; as well as in the more focused country-specific discussions of the Security Council. Obviously, these discussions also take place within the EU in Brussels. Recently they have led to the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid and the development of an Action Plan for its implementation. OCHA participated in the discussions relating to both instruments and looks forward to continuing this form of cooperation at the policy level. In 2008, ECHO contributed or committed over 800.000.000 Euros for humanitarian emergencies, and the Commission is an important partner in all major humanitarian issues. We welcome the fact that ECHO has not only been providing the funding but has also been, for example, at the forefront of the Good Humanitarian Donorship initia-
tive to ensure a principled interaction between donors and humanitarian actors. The EU also helps carve out political support for humanitarian principles in complex political and security environments. For example, in Chad, EU member support has helped greatly in strengthening the protection of civilians vis-à-vis the Government of Chad. Finally, we also cooperate with the EU in its role as operational actor on the ground in peace operations. Key examples of this are the ARTEMIS operation in Eastern DRC and most recently, EUFOR in Eastern Chad and CAR. How does our relationship work in these kinds of environments?

Interaction with the EU’s ARTEMIS deployment in the Ituri province of the DRC in 2003 was positive. The immediate deployment by Artemis of a civil-military liaison officer on the ground helped create a good dialogue with humanitarian actors from the outset and helped to strengthen understanding of each other’s point of view. In Chad, the experience has also been mostly good. On the security side, systematic coordination meetings are being held which, among others, serve to promote the safety and security of humanitarian staff. For access, open discussions have enabled EUFOR to understand better humanitarian concerns with the use of armed escorts. As a result, EUFOR has begun to offer more discreet security umbrellas, including by enhancing area security. Examples include cooperating with humanitarians by undertaking regular patrols, which are provided based on information received from humanitarians on their planned movements, while avoiding any perceptions of interaction, especially for the most sensitive actors such as the ICRC. To improve information exchange, there is a direct liaison between the OCHA Civil Military Coordination Officer, representing the humanitarian community, and the EUFOR CIMIC Team. This has allowed for a structured discussion on strategy and doctrine.

These positive practices are the result of sustained and candid dialogue between humanitarian actors and the peace operations. It is essential that this communication and coordination exist among all actors operating in a particular situation of armed conflict. This is clearly one aspect of the permanent need for cooperation.

Adherence to Civil-Military Coordination Guidelines, including the related country specific guidelines such as those developed for Afghanistan and Iraq, is also essential to guiding this delicate interaction. We have to be honest though – humanitarians report that problems do remain in practice. Sometimes there is still insufficient liaison, information sharing and coordination. Sometimes action agreed upon is not undertaken. For example, in one context despite promises to conduct firewood patrols, there were instances when the peacekeeping force did not show up or only carried out extremely short patrols. This resulted in loss of confidence among the local population and the humanitarian community. Often, humanitarians feel that peacekeepers just do not ‘get’ them, that they do not
understand why humanitarian principles are so important for them to stay alive and deliver assistance.

These are examples of shortcomings from humanitarians’ point of view. I have no doubt that our uniformed counterparts would similarly be able to list a number of areas where cooperation could be improved, and where humanitarians would seem not to understand their constraints. More fundamentally, it is essential that we be constantly aware of our respective mandates and roles. And of the very significant risks that may exist if these are blurred.

By way of summary, therefore, and before I give the floor to the other speakers, I would like to highlight two key conclusions about areas where we will have to work together in the months ahead. Respect of humanitarian principles is being undermined in many contexts, and we must act decisively to stop this in practice. In its interaction with humanitarian actors on the ground, the EU has demonstrated its understanding of the importance of principled action. I urge you to remain a committed supporter and advocate of humanitarian principles and to take steps to ensure that all those making decisions that can affect humanitarian operations, are equally aware of their importance – including regional actors who are, or maybe potentially will be, involved in peace support operations.

In the area of humanitarian-military coordination, I encourage the EU to support our efforts to engage with other regional organizations and stakeholders, and to promote the use of the civil-military guidelines developed by the UN and its humanitarian partners as a vital tool in delivering assistance and strengthening protection.

Overall, I am convinced we have made considerable progress in the last few years. Let us keep working at this, and ensure that we are as well placed as possible to face these very complex and dangerous conflicts in the future.

**Background Paper II¹**

*Dr. Gary Troeller, Researcher Associate, Centre for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute for Technology, United States*

**Introduction**

In the 1990s, in the aftermath of the Cold War, some 50 countries underwent major transformations. Intra-state conflict, largely driven by ethnic, communal or religious strife, left well over 4 million dead. Millions who survived these uncivil
civil wars were forced to flee their homes if not their homelands. In many respects refugees became a defining hallmark of civilian victims of the post cold war era. As refugee statistics is an inexact science the precise numbers of forcibly displaced is elusive. Estimates based on government figures have put the total number at certain points as high as 35 million, including refugees who had crossed a border to seek asylum and the internally displaced driven from their homes but remaining in their own countries. Convulsions in Iraq in the beginning of the ‘90s, through Somalia, former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Kosovo and East Timor were arguably only the most dramatic examples of civil strife. There were many others such as Haiti, Colombia, Sierra Leone and Liberia, and the list could be extended.\(^2\)

While civilians have always been victims of conflict, unlike inter-state wars in much of the 20\(^{th}\) century when uniformed soldiers accounted for a high percentage of victims of conflict, in contemporary intra-state conflicts over 90 percent of casualties are civilian, mostly women and children. Indeed, in not a few recent intra-state conflicts genocide and ethnic cleansing campaigns have deliberately focused on eradicating civilian populations. In the most recent, the sixth, “Report on the protection of civilians in armed conflict”, the Secretary-General noted that “... displacement...continues to be one of the principal features of contemporary conflict and arguably the most significant humanitarian challenge that we face”.\(^3\)

While regional threats to international peace and security played an important role in the decisions to deploy peacekeeping forces to deal with these conflicts, it was the humanitarian dimension of such disasters, the magnitude of which was often seen in itself as a threat to peace and security, that triggered UN peace operations of various kinds in the post cold war era. And humanitarian concerns continue to play an important role until today in an attempt to address the situation of failed or fragile states. In the wake of debacles in former Yugoslavia in general, Srebrenica among others, and Rwanda in particular, emphasis turned towards such concepts as human security and individual sovereignty rather than traditional state security and national sovereignty, as well as humanitarian intervention, gained currency.

The concept of humanitarian intervention has fallen into disrepute owing to the controversy surrounding NATO’s actions in Kosovo and their short term results and longer lasting concerns about incursions upon sovereignty. In addition, the concept of humanitarian intervention has been blurred and discredited by various loose invocations of the concept, some perceived to rationalize arguably pure military interventions. However given the growing importance of human rights and good governance in international affairs the need to safeguard civilians is assuming increasing prominence. Today the need to protect civilians is represented by the emerging norm of “The Responsibility to Protect” endorsed at the 2005 UN
World Summit, which is another reflection of the gathering momentum of the human rights movement. Here it is also interesting to note that despite its fall from grace, given the ongoing tragedy in Darfur, the impotence of the UN to appropriately address the issue and recurrent reminders of Rwanda and Srebrenica even the discredited concept of humanitarian intervention, albeit via the UN, is once again being seriously discussed in key policy fora by former senior US ambassadors, including to the UN, and a former head of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, as well as in other recent influential publications.4

Short term outlook to 2015. While the number of conflicts has declined since the ‘90s, current trends and reasonable forecasts indicate that fragile or failed states are not a thing of the past.5 Moreover it is widely acknowledged that between a third to a half of all states that have emerged from conflict fall back into hostilities. Recent events in Georgia would seem to illustrate this point. The World Bank classifies some 34 countries as fragile states.6 And as UNHCR, the refugee agency, has noted “if the past is any guide, the world can expect a big emergency involving human displacement every 16 months—and a massive one every two years. In the past 15 years there have been seven of the latter, each involving the displacement of more than 1.5 million people”.7 Think of Iraq and Darfur, not to mention Zimbabwe. UNHCR responds to manmade emergency displacement. The agency also plays an important role in the civilian dimension of post conflict reconstruction and development, where over the past 18 years UNHCR has undertaken a leadership role in assisting the majority of the some 23 million refugees who have returned home to begin to rebuild their lives. Under the new Peace Building Commission, the civilian dimension of UN operations will be an increasingly important aspect of multilateral endeavours.

Focus of Peace Operations Literature. As has been stated in the UN Capstone Document: “The abuse of human rights is at the heart of most modern conflicts and is a consequence of them.”8 The Security Council now mandates “multi-dimensional peace keeping operations to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence. The protection of civilians requires concerted and coordinated action among the military, police and civilian components of UN peace operations and must be mainstreamed into the planning and conduct of its core activities. UN and NGO partners also undertake a broad range of activities in support of the protection of civilians. Close coordination with these actors is therefore essential.”9

The role of humanitarian agencies in multifaceted peace operations, whether they are emergencies, peace enforcement, peacekeeping or post conflict recovery programmes, and distinctions are often blurred, is a key dimension of such undertakings. Nevertheless, the tendency remains in much of the literature and in the
policy-making community to focus largely on the military dimension. This is perhaps understandable given the absence of a standing UN force and difficulties of raising adequate peace keeping forces from individual countries or deploying troops from regional organisations and effectively coordinating complex operations in inherently complex political situations. While the challenges of peace operations just in the military sphere are formidable and remain a work in progress, their importance must not obscure the equally important work in the humanitarian sphere and processes that could lead to more effective cooperation.

**Focus of paper.** The recently issued UN Capstone Document provides a welcome, overdue and coherent overarching strategic doctrine for peace operations. Taking the Capstone Document with particular reference to the importance of the humanitarian dimension of peace operations as its starting point, this paper will briefly examine doctrinal imperatives, mandates, the principle of “humanitarian space”, institutional arrangements, and constraints of two key UN humanitarian organisations of direct relevance to their counterparts, whether they be regional organisations, NGOs or others, involved in multifaceted peace operations. While there are other major humanitarian organisations within the UN and civil society as indicated in the pages to follow, given limits of space this paper will concentrate on UNHCR, which within the UN has a unique, specific legal mandate to undertake protection work and has been significantly involved in peace operations for many years, and the Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs, (OCHA) the UN custodian of policy and cooperative endeavours in this sector. The paper will also touch upon the emerging norm of “The Responsibility to Protect” and the partnership with the European Union (EU). It will go on to suggest recommendations that should lead to a better understanding of the importance of who does what, and what could be done more effectively to facilitate improved support and interoperability both at the strategic level and most importantly at field level which will have general relevance to the EU, and other regional organisations.

The UN has taken a number steps in the recent past via reform measures to introduce more coherence and coordination in its own operations and those of its partners. Similarly, much has been written in policy and academic circles on the humanitarian level in this regard. The following pages are an attempt to highlight progress, stumbling blocks and issues to be addressed. Given what has already been done, what follows is not intended to be original by way of new information. It is rather aimed at encouraging resolve and implementation of key suggestions that this paper argues would improve our international efforts. The paper will conclude with several recommendations on what could improve interoperability at the strategic as well as the field level.
Doctrine and Mandates

As Robert Gordon has mentioned in his excellent paper “A Comparative Study on Doctrines and Principles for Multidimensional Peace Operations: A Case for Harmonization and Enhanced Interoperability”\textsuperscript{11}, one of the main problems besetting more effective coordination among those involved in peace keeping or “operations other than war” has been the absence of a comprehensive doctrinal framework for peace operations which could provide guidance and serve to coordinate the increasing range of actors involved in multidimensional peace operations. Individual Member States have their own varying military doctrines. Doctrines of regional organisations are still evolving. An over-arching doctrine that would provide strategic guidance to organisations involved in peace operations and help align various specific existing doctrines for such undertakings is required. While not a doctrine as such, The Brahimi Report of 2000, contributed in filling this need focusing on best practices from past experience.\textsuperscript{12} However while guidance was available from disparate sources on specific dimensions of peace operations, a unifying codification of doctrine was still lacking. With the issuance in February 2008 of the UN Capstone document, the UN, which represents the highest level international source of legitimacy for such operations, has published the first UN doctrine for peacekeeping that embraces widening mandates in turning internal conflicts into sustainable peace, including support to related political processes and the protection of civilians. It is to this latter issue that we now turn.

The Capstone provides a political not a military doctrine and limits itself to peacekeeping. It recognizes that given the vagaries of political will and ability to deliver in a peace enforcement role, not to mention the continuing absence of an established UN military capacity, regional organisations such as the EU, NATO and the AU are better positioned than the UN to cover a wider spectrum of conflict. What the Capstone does offer is a comprehensive guide to and set of principles for multidimensional peace operations which partners can follow. It underscores the role and importance of humanitarian organisations, and mandated responsibilities for the protection of civilians and protection and promotion of human rights. This issue becomes all the more important given the rise of the civilian dimension of peace operations over the last decade. For example, it should be borne in mind that UNMIK in Kosovo, UNAMA in Afghanistan and UNAMI in IRAQ are completely civilian although operating alongside UN-mandated military.\textsuperscript{13} The increasing importance of the protection of civilians is also evidenced by recent Security Council Resolutions in particular SCR 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security; SCR 1612 (2005) on children and armed conflict; SCR 1674 (2006) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict\textsuperscript{14} and six successive reports by the Secretary-General since 2000 on “the protection of civilians in armed conflict”. In addi-
tion, there is the principle of the Responsibility to Protect adopted unanimously in the 2005 World Summit which is discussed below.

In differentiating the roles of humanitarian organizations and the military, the Capstone specifies that UN peacekeeping forces, when requested, play a limited supporting role in facilitating the activities of humanitarian agencies in promoting socio-economic recovery and providing humanitarian assistance. In post-conflict situations “provision of humanitarian assistance rests with the relevant UN Specialized Agencies, Funds and Programmes as well as the range of independent, national, and local non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that are usually present along side a UN peacekeeping mission. The primary role of UN peacekeeping operations with regard to the provision of humanitarian assistance is to provide a secure and stable environment within which humanitarian actors may carry out their activities.”

The term “humanitarian” is applied by a number of actors. As suggested by participants in the Challenges Forum, its overuse and misuse, by some academics, policymakers, governments and the media, have distorted its significance. Agencies traditionally involved in humanitarian activities use the term with special meaning. For humanitarian organizations, such as UNHCR, which follow the principles of humanity, impartiality and neutrality, the concept means delivering not only life saving assistance, but also providing international protection to civilians who no longer enjoy national protection. For other agencies, particularly the ICRC, and the Red Cross & Red Crescent Federation with whom UNHCR and other humanitarian agencies work closely, independence is also very important. Together these principles underpin the humanitarian operating environment and are expressed as “humanitarian space”.

While the principle of humanitarian space has been variously defined, it is perhaps useful to refer to a recent UN discussion of the principle. The term “espace humanitaire” was first coined by former Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) President Rony Brauman, who described it in 1990 as: “A space of freedom in which we are free to evaluate needs, free to monitor the distribution and use of relief goods and have a dialogue with the people”. It still lacks a formal definition, which has allowed it to mean different things to different actors and organizations. The various ways in which the term has been used have included the following: a) the denotation of physical locations that are outside the realm of attack by any parties to the conflict; b) the respect for the core humanitarian principles of humanity: independence, impartiality, and neutrality; c) the ability of international aid and protection agencies to mitigate the situation of civilians affected by the conflict; d) the operating environment that is conducive to effective humanitarian action. Interestingly, and despite the absence of a common agreement on its definition, there is wide-
spread understanding that in recent times, there has been a steady and incremental erosion of humanitarian space.”

The doctrinal principle of humanitarian space is especially important for humanitarian actors. Such actors are often present in crisis, or post-conflict situations, before peacekeeping forces arrive, and remain after they depart. The effectiveness of such actors is contingent on the perception of both the host government concerned and the civilian population they serve of their impartiality and lack of attachment to any particular security or political agenda. Confusion in this regard cannot only limit the effectiveness of such organisations, including access to persons of concern, but, in worst case scenarios, endanger the lives of unarmed aid workers as tragically demonstrated in a number of recent attacks on humanitarian staff, the most dramatic example of which was the 2003 attack on the UN mission headquarters in Baghdad which killed 22 UN staff, including the UN Chief of Mission, Sergio Vieira de Mello, who also served as the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.

As a result of banditry or political motivations, since January 2008, there have been well over 100 incidents of violence against humanitarian workers in Somalia, including kidnapping and murder. In Darfur, from January to early October 2008 “225 humanitarian vehicles have been hijacked (as compared to 137 total in 2007) and 170 humanitarians have been abducted (up from 147 in 2007) and 144 attacks on humanitarian premises occurred (compared to 93 in 2007). 41 WFP-contracted drivers remain missing. In Afghanistan ... in mid August 2008 four staff members of the NGO International Rescue Committee were killed and two weeks later two staff members of another international NGO were abducted—one of whom was killed. Another INGO worker was killed this weekend.” EU also stressed the growing threats against humanitarian personnel and the threat to and shrinking of “humanitarian space.”

While practicality requires the recognition that “in operations other than war” military units may be best placed, at certain times, and upon request, to deliver humanitarian aid, this is the job of humanitarian agencies and role confusion can have negative consequences. As illustrated by the foregoing statistics this reality is further underscored by the degree to which humanitarian organisations have in recent years become a target rather than being a shield.

The doctrinal imperatives of OCHA in situations of armed conflict and peacekeeping, which by extension would apply generally to humanitarian agencies, can be summarised as follows. 1) Co-existence and cooperation facilitated through dialogue; 2) respect for above mentioned humanitarian principles of impartiality, neutrality and humanity; 3) safeguarding the security of humanitarian staff through
observance of the foregoing principles; 4) maintaining the distinction between combatants and non-combatants; 5) avoidance of use by the military of the term “humanitarian” for any of its assistance activities, the military should instead employ the term “relief” for such activities carried out for military or political purposes. Its work in this regard should not be confused with civilian humanitarian activities and be carried out by military wearing military uniforms to maintain the distinction between civilians and military; and 6) military assets, armed escorts and any other clear interaction with the military should be “an option of last resort” and humanitarian workers should avoid reliance on military” (see below under “constraints” for development of this issue).

Given the magnitude of forced displacement as a result of manmade disasters since the end of the cold war, at the operational level, UNHCR has long been associated with peace operations, from complex emergencies to post conflict reconstruction in connection with repatriation. Its basis of operations or doctrine relating to the humanitarian nature of its mandate which includes providing assistance and international legal protection of refugees is summarized in the Statute of the office as follows:

“The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, acting under the authority of the General Assembly, shall assume the function of providing international protection, under the auspices of the United Nations, to refugees who fall within the scope of the present statute and of seeking permanent solutions for the problems of refugees by assisting Governments concerned, and, subject to the approval of the Governments concerned, private organizations to facilitate the voluntary repatriation of such refugees, or their assimilation within new national communities. ... The work of the High Commissioner shall be of an entirely non-political character; it shall be humanitarian and social, and shall relate, as a rule, to groups and categories of refugees”.

The legal basis of UNHCR’s work is further underscored by its responsibility to promote and supervise the implementation of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Since HCR’s establishment in 1951, its mandate has been expanded through successive Security Council resolutions to cover the protection of and assistance to additional groups of people including asylum seekers, stateless persons, returnees, persons in a refugee-like situation, and certain populations of the internally displaced worldwide. Regarding the latter, in September 2005 UNHCR was assigned responsibility by the UN Inter-agency Standing Committee (IASC) as lead agency for the protection of IDPs generally, along with specific responsibility for camp management and emergency shelter for most of the world’s IDPs. This raised the number of persons worldwide under UNHCR’s mandate from approximately 20 million to 31.7 million.

In its dealings with the military UNHCR would generally follow the precepts of OCHA, but given operational realities and long experience of working with the
military be guided as well by operational requirements on the ground and its mandate.

**Institutional Arrangements.** Since the turn of the millennium, the increasing complexity of global multilateral challenges including the widening nature of peace operations, and lessons learned from the 1990s, has given added impetus to UN reform initiatives. This process has been driven by both UN internal initiatives as well as pressure from a number of Member States. Given the multiplicity of agencies involved within the UN and competition among them, coordination and coherence in UN activities has long been an issue, not least in the humanitarian sphere. To avoid overlap and duplication of work a number of structural improvements have been introduced in the humanitarian sector of the UN. At headquarters level in 1996, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs was changed to the Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the incumbent of the post also designated Emergency Relief Coordinator. OCHA coordinates the formulation of humanitarian policy and functions as the custodian of such policy in the UN. To further rationalize coordination, early warning and inter-agency cooperation, in 2001 under the chairmanship of OCHA, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) was established including as Full Members OHCA, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, FAO, WHO, UNDP, and as Standing Invitees the ICRC, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, IOM, the World Bank, OHCHR, the Office of Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Human Rights of IDPs, and three umbrella organisations of three different consortia of NGOs: Inter-Action, International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) and Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR).

With specific regard to military coordination OCHA has Military Coordination Section in New York as well a Military and Civil Defence Unit (MCDU) in Geneva tasked with advising on policy and developing guidelines and training on civil and military coordination (CMCoord) for all UN humanitarian staff. MCDU also provides a strategic level interface with Member States to obtain military and civil defence assets for use in humanitarian emergencies. By way of guidance on civilian military relations OHCA has issued a series of guidelines or guidance on civil-military relations for humanitarian action in complex emergencies.22

To further enhance coordination among various humanitarian actors, in 2005 OCHA introduced the cooperative or “cluster approach” in dealing with internally displaced populations. This initiative involves the assignment of sectoral responsibility for various assistance areas to different agencies within the IASC. This initiative is all the more important as the EU, OCHA and others have noted, given the rising number of organisations involved in relief work not all necessarily humanitarian in nature or coordinating their activities with the UN. As mentioned
above, UNHCR has the global protection lead for IDPs and affected populations in complex emergencies but as appropriate UNICEF or UNHCHR could assume this role of cluster lead. To further streamline coordination funding appeals have also been consolidated and since early 2000 a re-invigorated integrated mission planning process (IMPP) within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has been introduced. Among other innovations DPKO has also improved its systems and procedures for identifying and disseminating best practices and has introduced Joint Military Analysis Centers at field level to centralize gathering, analysis and sharing of key intelligence on medium and long term threats to the peace operations.

A more coherent approach at the strategic level at UN Headquarters in New York is expressed at field level by the introduction of the practice of integrated missions (IMs) under the overall leadership of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), “to establish the political framework for and provide over-arching leadership to the UN team in the country” with a Deputy SRSG (DSRSG) increasingly assuming the “triple-hatted” responsibilities of Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator. The DSRSG is responsible for the overall coordination of all development and humanitarian activities of the UN and “for maintaining links with other parties, governments, donors and the broader humanitarian and development communities for this purpose.” Human rights have now been mainstreamed into the work of IMs and peace operations with human rights units attached to such management structures reporting to the UNHCHR. In post peacekeeping situations dealing with transition and recovery such as Burundi and Liberia an Executive Representative of the Secretary-General (ERSG) has been appointed with overall coordination responsibilities.

Interoperability at field level. While considerable formal advances in terms of structure and intended integration have taken place, much still depends on the pro-activeness and basic willingness of agencies involved in cooperative efforts, communication at all levels, and the quality of those in senior leadership positions. The importance of communication, facilitated, inter alia, by exchange of liaison staff cannot be over emphasized, not least given the frequent turnover of staff in peace operations. And the latter should be seen in terms of providing a base for understanding and respecting the interface between the military and humanitarian organizations, their differing roles, institutional ethos, management cultures, agendas and operating imperatives. The process of selecting senior leadership for DSRSG has been improved by a collective appointment mechanism. Formally channels of communications exist. UNHCR as well as other UN humanitarian agencies have designated structural focal points, e.g. Civilian-Military Coordination Units (Cmcoord), and civilian-police liaison officers and military liaison officers. Having said this, coordination is still a work in progress.
The lineage of UNHCR-military cooperation can be traced to the successful work that UNHCR carried out with the repatriation of Iraqi refugees in 1991 in conjunction with the military and the Sarajevo airlift providing vital aid to sustain the besieged city, when the organisation had a military unit in its Headquarters coordinating the airlift—an exercise that surpassed the Berlin Airlift of 1948 in magnitude—and a military advisor attached to the High Commissioner’s office in Geneva. In the DRC in 1995 HCR again recognizing the need for assistance from the military and police forces called for UN peacekeeping assistance to address problems related to misuse of aid, exploitation of refugee camps for the staging of hostilities and the intimidation of camp populations.

Regrettably these calls went unheeded. It is instructive to note given the present situation in the DRC that at the time of the exodus of over a million refugees to camps in Zaire in the mid 1990s when the then High Commissioner and the UN Secretary-General called for the deployment of peace keeping troops to ensure the integrity of camps and protect real refugees and humanitarian resources, none were made available. Calls were then made to the OAU who were willing to assist, but lacked equipment and transport which they in turn asked industrialised countries to provide but their request was not honoured. UHNC finally had to employ local police, an option not without its own challenges. Today the situation has much improved with inter alia the deployment of international police in coordination with regional organisations such as the EU and/or its Member States.

UNHCR has issued extensive Guidelines on Civilian-Military Relations and produced a series of papers on the work of the agency geared towards the military. Its Guidelines also pay particular attention to elucidating the differing vocabularies of the UN and the military with a view a bridging the communication gap. HCR guiding principles on collaboration with the military can be summarised as “Understand, Communicate and Negotiate”. In this connection the need for understanding and communication is all the more important, as the Capstone makes clear as “Many civilian organisations and government departments involved in peace operations routinely function with a high degree of tolerance for ambiguity and highly flexible management models” in contrast with the structured, clear chain of command that marks the military. Mission leaders have to “reconcile... differing ‘institutional cultures.’”

It should be emphasized that integration does not necessarily mean that all UN actors on the ground should be physically integrated or subsumed under a single structure....” (although) under the overall authority of the SRSG/Head of Mission, in reality, they are governed by mandates, decision-making structures and funding arrangements that are quite distinct from a UN peacekeeping operation. As a result, integration among the broader members of the UN family cannot simply be
imposed by edict from above and can only be achieved by a process of constant dialogue and negotiation between the actors concerned”.27 The SRSG “... must ensure, to the extent possible that activities undertaken in one area do not undermine other aspects of the mandate”.28 In some instances when an OHCA office is present it may opt to be partly outside the IM in order to better coordinate within the broader humanitarian community.29

It should be noted that the degree and merits of integration are still a matter of considerable debate. Given differing mandates, operational imperatives and priorities among the different actors involved in the political, developmental, military and humanitarian sectors too much integration and amalgamation within the “unified command” of a central structure is thought by many as counterproductive and to the detriment of humanitarian work. Many on the humanitarian side, including the vast majority of NGOs, would argue in favour of complementarity, strategic coherence, clarity of roles and responsibilities, enhanced communication, and joint strategic planning rather than a one-size-fits-all management-driven submerging of institutionalised independence, identities and comparative advantages.

It is also important to emphasize that a very large numbers of NGOs are involved in most forms of UN operations as implementing partners providing invaluable services and aid in partnership with UN agencies or on their own. As OCHA has made clear: “non-UN humanitarian actors are sometimes responsible for up to 80 percent of service delivery on the ground.”30 UNHCR alone works with some 500 NGOs and around a quarter of its budget, approximately $300 million, goes to projects implemented by NGOs. NGOs play a key role, both those working closely with the UN and those working more on their own, have their own operating culture, are not infrequently suspicious of UN management reform initiatives, regard themselves as independent, and add to the complex multiplicity of coordination challenges.

Advantages of, and constraints on, coordination. The advantages of coherent multidimensional peace operations are clear. The experience of the 1990s has amply demonstrated that piecemeal and uncoordinated involvement of UN actors and others at various times during a crisis or in the reconstruction phase does not work. For example, widespread manipulation of aid in Goma following the Rwandan exodus produced a crisis of confidence in the larger humanitarian community. Only a holistic approach, under, preferably an enlightened, competent, unified but flexible management aware of differing roles, mandates and responsibilities of team members, permits appropriate conflict resolution and peace building with the shared goal of sustainable development and good governance, meeting larger social and human security concerns, not to mention achieving sustainable peace.
For UNHCR almost completely dependent on voluntary contributions, with a limited budget and programme cycle, and less than one staff member for every 4,800 persons of its concern, the refugee agency has long recognized the need to collaborate effectively with the military and civil defence forces from individual countries or regional organisations to provide security for refugees and others of concern under its mandate, its own staff and by extension to numerous NGOs with whom it collaborates as implementing partners, and for the provision of logistical support. This necessity has been demonstrated both in complex emergencies and in the repatriation and reintegration of many of the some 23 million returnees, with whom UNHCR has been involved, to a greater or lesser extent, since the end of the cold war. This latter exercise it should be noted reflects the close nexus between humanitarian and development activities, a reality sometimes not appropriately understood given the artificial divide between the two in donor funding structures. In many instances UNHCR has experienced difficulties obtaining funding for its programmes for refugee repatriation as donors either do not appropriately factor returnees into their development planning or if they do, they reserve such funding for conventional development agencies or bilateral or regional organisations who should be involved but who may not yet be established on the ground or fully operational, as was the case with the shelter sector, along with other pillars, for which UNHCR assumed responsibility in the aftermath of the Kosovo operation until the EU could take over.

While there are clear advantages in IMs in peace operations, problems relating to humanitarian space remain. In addition to the dangers of too close an association with the military mentioned above in terms of humanitarian and security agendas, there is often a tension between apolitical humanitarian goals and the inherent political processes of peace building. Similarly tension exists between longer term development goals involving close collaboration with the central government and humanitarian imperatives of dealing with victims and vulnerable groups irrespective of politics. Humanitarian and development goals are not infrequently incompatible with each other in certain areas. In the circumstances one will naturally be given precedence over the other and in such situations the humanitarian imperative may be subordinated to long term political goals. Similar to the challenges often involved in a real or perceived too close an association with the military, as development actors often need to work closely with government to build capacity this may negatively impact the perception of UNHCR as well as other humanitarian actors as a neutral and impartial humanitarian actors and interfere with the ability of the latter to access affected populations.

In complex emergencies as well as post conflict reconstruction situations where both the humanitarian and development responsibilities, not to mention the political processes, are combined in one post, such as a DSRSG as is increasingly
the case, unless the incumbent understands that humanitarian space is more than a messianic ideology but a modus operandi with tangible benefits for humanitarian actors and their beneficiaries, humanitarian space may be significantly diminished. One tragic example of this diminution of humanitarian space is evidenced by the aforementioned attacks on unarmed humanitarian aid workers. Hence the need for communication, understanding and negotiation at the highest levels is all the more important. Here it is worth repeating as the Capstone Document makes clear “The SRSG must ensure, to the extent possible, that activities undertaken in one area do not undermine other aspects of the mandate.” UNHCR is currently engaged in an internal review of its involvement in IMs.

To guard against further pressures on humanitarian space, OCHA is working on a policy, and attempting to reach consensus with members states, including their political and military branches, that UN doctrine, including the humanitarian dimension, be extended to conflict management partners like the AU and the EU that “our standard footprint in a peace support operation should be an integrated mission DSRSG/RC/HC who ensures strategic coherence with the mission’s objectives and a dedicated OCHA office to support the HC function, just as would be the case in any other humanitarian mission. Under this model, this office should not be structurally integrated into the mission.” The raison d’être for this approach is that for some 40,000 UN humanitarian personnel around the world, it is important that they and their work be recognized as impartial, neutral and independent. Why? “Because in the 99 percent of cases when humanitarians go out to the camps, or villages affected by conflict, they will be without the military to protect them. They depend on the acceptance of the population, and the combatants who come and go in many of these areas, for their lives and the ability to provide assistance.”

If interactions with the military and political actors blur the distinction between politically motivated action and principled humanitarian action, this “can cost lives and the ability to provide assistance”, and in the case of UNHCR to provide some degree of international protection to refugees and IDPs. As noted by OCHA “often humanitarians feel that peacekeepers just do not “get them”, that they do not understand why humanitarian principles are so important for them to stay alive and deliver assistance.” ECHO has also noted problems with IMs and from the NGO side, Voice emphasized the importance of complementarity of humanitarian agencies and the military and defined roles rather than submerging all actors in one structure.

Turning to military-humanitarian cooperation per se while the provision of security for humanitarian work is fundamental, problems persist, and not necessarily the
fault of the military. In Liberia, while coordination has much improved the UN operations in that country were long viewed as a far cry from best practices. In Sierra Leone lack of access to resources from an integrated mission resulted in a situation where UNHCR had to use Pakistani military vehicles driven by armed soldiers to return refugees. This complicated HCR’s collaboration with one its key partners in this operation, Medicine Sans Frontiers (MSF), another Nobel peace laureate, which had to travel with returnees back to their area but had strict policies on interaction with armed actors which complicated the agency’s accompanying convoys. In Afghanistan military in civilian clothing in an effort to win hearts and minds have delivered what they called humanitarian aid thus potentially endangering the activities of humanitarian actors whose effectiveness relies on them being seen as impartial and neutral. Similar events have occurred in Iraq and the increasing presence of security contractors has made the situation more challenging. As has been noted when the military dispenses aid on an ad hoc basis as a goodwill gesture, it can trivialize humanitarian assistance as “a side project”. Humanitarian aid is an international responsibility and the victims’ right as recognized under international law.

In the DRC, MONUC functions well where the military works discreetly with humanitarian agencies, liaising closely with them in information sharing and securing access to vulnerable populations. But there remains a danger to humanitarian actors again relating to impartiality as the UN works with a government and an EU force that undertake robust combined military actions against opposing forces operating in an often anarchic, and recently deteriorating situation. It is perhaps worth mentioning that in the DRC, MSF, which usually painted its vehicles white as does the UN, changed the colour to pink after being attacked by anti-government villagers in some areas. The virtues of maintaining the image of impartiality is perhaps evidenced by the fact that in Ivory Coast in 2006 when UN and NGO compounds were being attacked in some areas, MSF was spared because of it being perceived as neutral.

The Increasing Importance of Civilian Protection – Responsibility to Protect

It would be difficult to discuss the work of humanitarian organisations without reference to the important if fraught principle of the “Responsibility to Protect or R2P. Endorsed by the 2005 World Summit, R2P has replaced “humanitarian intervention”. As former Secretary General Kofi Annan, who was instrumental in developing the concept put it: “states are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples, and not vice versa... when we read the (UN) Charter today we are more than ever conscious that its aim is to protect individual human beings, not to protect those who abuse them”. 
R2P projects back upon states one of their principle state responsibilities, a responsibility that traces its origins back to the formation of the modern state system several hundred years ago: guaranteeing the protection of its own citizens rather than being agent of, or incapable entity when witnessing, the grave victimization of its own people. The ‘responsibility to protect’ concept, refers to the responsibility of states and the international community to protect civilians from mass atrocities. It entails (a) reacting effectively in situations where genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity are occurring or imminent; (b) preventing such situations from arising; and (c) rebuilding societies shattered by such catastrophes to ensure they do not recur. It is conceived to prevent human rights violations. If the state cannot meet its responsibilities it then becomes the responsibility of the international community to step in and protect people, rather than standing by as it did in Rwanda and in effect for a number of years as wars in the Balkans raged. Unfortunately, as the international community is doing also today in Darfur and elsewhere.

Regarding the longstanding principle of sovereignty, taking into consideration the evolution of the concept over the past 60 years since the UN Charter was signed, set against the background of increasing focus on human rights and more recently human security, or individual sovereignty as expressed by former Kofi Annan, R2P emphasizes state “responsibility” rather than “control” and the limits of sovereignty. While emphasizing prevention, in extremis, it countenances military intervention according to the following criteria: just cause, right intentions, last resort, proportional means, reasonable prospects and right authority. R2P while acknowledged as important has run up against several barriers since its inception in 2000. One is September 11th which altered the international landscape, and the US invasion of Iraq which reinforced misgivings against “humanitarian intervention” when this concept was invoked as a rationale by the US at one juncture following the discovery that there were no weapons of mass destruction Iraq. The other barrier is the suspicion among many countries that R2P is a vehicle for breaching sovereignty ostensibly to protect human rights but in effect to pursue “neo-imperialist agendas.”

Notwithstanding the opposition of its detractors this concept, now often described as an “emerging norm” illustrating opposition to it, is here to stay. As a sign of its importance, although the framers of the concept did not envisage the criteria for its application in natural disasters, the possible application of the R2P principle was mentioned by the French Minister of Foreign and European Affairs in the early stages of the catastrophic cyclone that struck Myanmar in May 2008 when the government not only was slow to respond but initially blocked foreign assistance for several weeks. Whether R2P is honoured more in the breech (Darfur, Zimbabwe) than in positive practice the Secretary-General has appointed a Special
Advisor for the Responsibility to Protect, who works with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities (SRPGMA). Both officials are tasked to launch constituency building with Member States, civil society and regional and sub-regional organisations. They are also responsible for ensuring that any internal gaps and synergies among UN agencies are addressed and that UN agencies review their practices to ensure that the norm is mainstreamed in their work and that public information campaigns are undertaken to promote the concept.

A recent successful application of R2P took place in Kenya where election troubles had the potential to spiral into international tragedy. In the case of Kenya, Gareth Evans, one of the architects of R2P, described events in the country as a “classic R2P situation...” noting further...that the international response was ‘very swift’ and the dispatch of former Secretary General Kofi Annan and other such efforts resulted in a ‘good clear, crisp example of something that worked ‘to resolve the situation.”

In addition to UN attempts to mainstream R2P in its various departments and agencies, in course of 2008, a Global Center for the Responsibility to Protect has been established at the City University of New York. Its purpose is to pursue research in the field, function as an information centre and undertake advocacy activities to promote the principle. The principle of R2P is also receiving a further boost by recurrent media emphasis on recent genocides in Cambodia, Rwanda, and elsewhere, for example in CNN’s current documentary series on the subject “Cry Bloody Murder” hosted by the cable network’s Chief International Correspondent, Christine Amanpour. As mentioned above, R2P in a different way is being bolstered indirectly by the rehabilitation of “humanitarian intervention”, albeit via the UN, which has been highlighted in 2008 in key policy fora and acclaimed publications. While translating the ”emerging norm” of R2P into practice will not happen tomorrow, it further signals an increasing emphasis on protection of civilians and related pressure for appropriate institutional response in peace operations involving both military and humanitarian players. It is also consistent with the advance of, and emphasis on, the human rights movement since the end of the Second World War evidenced by the establishment of 25 international human rights conventions underscoring the importance of individual human rights since 1945, the mainstreaming of human security into the foreign policies of several major industrialised countries, the establishment of The International Criminal Court in Rome, and the Hague and Arusha Tribunals for Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.

The challenges of coordination and cooperation in wider partnership. The preceding sections have briefly outlined the multi-dimensional and complex set of chal-
Challenges faced by humanitarian agencies. It will be obvious in such circumstances that cooperation with a number of partners is indispensable to carry out mandates to protect and assist civilians who have been uprooted by persecution or conflict. In the case of UNHCR, a highly operational agency, challenges are further magnified by limited and unpredictable resources, donor dependency, the need to raise over 98 percent of its annual budget through voluntary contributions and a short programme cycle in which to raise its funds, carry out its programmes in often very insecure operating environments, and report back to demanding donors on its achievements.

UNHCR also faces the challenge, that “comes with the territory” of its mandate that it is tasked, under the 1951 Convention to supervise the implementation of the 1951 Convention, remind governments of their shortcomings, in not a few instances to criticise governments where it has key operations and must function and in other cases criticise its major donors on whom it is dependent for voluntary contributions which account for over 98 percent of its annual budget. In the latter case, put simply, it has “to bite the hand that feeds it”. Given the circumstances cooperation and understanding with a number of partners is increasingly necessary.

Against this background such collaboration between the UN and regional organisations has developed considerably in recent years. An example of this growing collaboration is the EU-UN partnership since the turn of the millennium given the importance that the EU accords to multilateralism. Following difficult times for peace operations in the 1990s, at the beginning of the decade two convergent developments brought the UN and EU closer together as they reviewed regional and international crisis management issues. On the UN side increasing demands upon the institution for involvement in peace operations without the resources to meet them, commonly termed overstretch, led the Secretary-General, under Chapter 8 of the Charter, to request more cooperation from regional organisations to assist the UN in complex peace operations. The Brahimi Report and moves for UN reform provided further momentum in this regard. In brief there was an increasing recognition that regionalism was an important component of multilateralism.

On the EU side, in 2000 at the Nice Council meeting, the EU embarked on the development of an European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) which foresaw the creation of a crisis management and conflict prevention capacity, rapid reaction forces and the establishment of related management structure - what the UN lacked - and urged cooperation with the UN in the further development of its own capacities in this regard. In 2004, the deployment of 6000 peacekeepers in Bosnia (EUFOR Althea) signified increasing collaboration. In the DRC, UN- EU collabo-
ration under UNSC mandate was further developed and improved with two military (“surge”) operations, one in 2003 (ARTEMIS) and one in 2005 (EUFOR DRC) in support of the UN. Presently the multi-dimensional EU-UN mission to Chad and Central African Republic under Security Council mandate carries further this involvement in support of UN operations. The purpose of EU support to the UN in Chad and the Central African Republic is to inter alia protect refugees and IDPs, facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance and free movement of personnel concerned, provide security in their field of operations and contribute to the protection of UN and associated personnel facilities, equipment and installations. EU operations in both the DRC and Chad are considered positive examples of UN-EU collaboration and EU member support has helped greatly in strengthening the protection of civilians vis a vis the government of Chad. “In the case of the latter “...there is a direct liaison between the OCHA Civil Military Coordination Officer, representing the humanitarian community, and the EUFOR CIMIC Team. This has allowed for a structured discussion on strategy and doctrine.”

Process and institutionalisation of cooperation. Following a number of contacts at the beginning of the decade, in September 2003, the EU and the UN formalised their cooperation through the Joint Declaration on EU-UN Cooperation in Crisis Management, building on the success of Operation ARTEMIS. A Steering Committee was established involving regular annual meetings co-chaired by the European Secretariat General and DPKO along with desk to desk collaboration. The Joint Declaration identified four areas for further cooperation: planning, training, communication and best practices. Progress has been made on all these fronts. Work on a document on civilian aspects of EU-UN cooperation in crisis management was also initiated by the European Council.

On July 16, 2007 the EU and the UN issued a new joint declaration on cooperation in crisis management calling for stronger cooperation in the following fields: strengthening the capacity of the AU for peacekeeping, cooperation in such aspects of peacekeeping as law enforcement, rule of law, security sector reform; information sharing between the UN and EU situation centres; and cooperation with the EU Satellite Center in Madrid. In its 2010 Goal, the EU plans have available a Battle Group for rapid deployment.

All these options are in various stages of development. On the UN side given its limitations and related overstretch and the formidable resources of the EU, the UN would like to see more cooperation from the EU, within UN operations, not limited to before, after or alongside UN operations. The EU has considerably increased its collaboration with the UN but their remains some reluctance in the EU and among some of its members states to place military and assets under UN com-
mand owing to issues of political autonomy, visibility, agenda, capabilities and in some cases the vagaries of rigid bureaucracies. And a rapidly deployable EU military force, much needed, still remains in the development stage. Both institutions confront major challenges, the UN in its reform programmes and the EU with its treaty. In the civilian sphere, particularly in policing operations and in the provision of civilian experts, collaborative arrangements and chains of command are more easily dealt with. Cooperation with humanitarian organisations in this sector could be more easily facilitated. Notwithstanding constraints, the EU is unique in its vast resources, its holistic approach, and its combination of civilian-military capacity, not to mention its international prestige. UNRWA has underlined the importance of the EU when it focuses on a particular operation. Given these attributes, the EU can serve as a model for other regional and sub-regional organisations.50

Despite constraints both institutions have made considerable progress since the beginning of the decade. However as the Secretary-General has noted and this observation could apply generally there remains a need “to replace the improvised, at times selective, resource skewed approach with a more planned, consistent and reliable arrangements.”51

The importance of ECHO. As mentioned above the EU and UN have institutionalized their cooperation via their joint Steering Committee and UN-EU Desk-to-Desk Dialogue. As OCHA has noted, at the political level the EU and its Member States “play an active and supportive role in the thematic negotiations of the General Assembly on humanitarian response, as well as in the more focused country-specific discussions of the Security Council and in Brussels”. These deliberations are further facilitated by EU delegations in various capitals including where regional organisations are headquartered and further enhanced by the number of EU units in conflict-prone regions around the world. As regards, inter-regional organisation collaboration the EU has also undertaken to support the AU in its efforts for the prevention and resolution of crises, and sub-regional organisations, through a common Partnership for Peace and Security, as decided at the Second EU-Africa Lisbon Summit in December 2007. OCHA has encouraged the EU and AU to play a larger role in humanitarian missions, and capitalize on the Capstone doctrine development by using it as a basis for further developing humanitarian doctrine as required.

Since the focus of this paper is the humanitarian side of peace operations it is important to highlight the key work of the European Humanitarian Aid Department or ECHO, the humanitarian arm of the EU. Complementing the peace operations dimension of the EU, ECHO provides almost Euro 800 million in humanitarian aid annually which is further complemented by donations from individual
Member States, which double this figure. Combined contributions make the EU Commission and its Member States the world’s largest humanitarian aid donor, and a major donor to UNHCR, as well as other humanitarian organisations. As highlighted by OCHA, ECHO “has been at the forefront of the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative to ensure a principled interaction between donors and humanitarian actors”. The EU is an “active donor.” A third of ECHO’s staff is in crisis zones for liaison with implementing partners of its humanitarian aid. ECHO is also a very demanding donor with stringent formats for funding requests as well as reporting requirements. In common with bilateral assistance from many governments, there is also a structural tendency to artificially separate humanitarian assistance from development assistance when the two are often closely linked not least in repatriation and (re)integration of the forcibly displaced.

The implications of this type of approach within the UN was also made by which noted coordination challenges in operations and financing that UNHCR had encountered over the years with UNDP and other development agencies in the transition from emergency and care and maintenance of refugees in asylum countries to repatation and reintegation, i.e. recovery and development, in their countries of origin. Voice also noted with reference to bilateral financing that political considerations in allocations of resources often play a role which can militate against the principles of the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative. As acknowledged by EU officials, EU procedures are “heavy”. All these issues must be addressed and more flexibility built into EU funding structures.

ECHO shares the concerns mentioned in the first part of this paper in recognizing the increasing constraints on humanitarian operations underscored by growing dangers faced by humanitarian agencies. Noting the challenges posed to humanitarians owing to poor governance/failed states, ignoring or in direct violation of humanitarian and international law, “encroachment on humanitarian space”, threats and attacks against humanitarian aid workers, an increasingly complex humanitarian environment, e.g. in Iraq, Afghanistan and Darfur, and the presence of other actors, “not necessarily humanitarian, but with a mandate to assist,” in December 2007 ECHO called for a European Consensus to boost its collective response to humanitarian crises “and to achieve greater efficiency and coherence in delivering humanitarian aid.”

The European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid sees the objective of humanitarian aid “as saving lives, alleviating suffering and maintaining human dignity based on assessed needs” underpinned by the observance of humanitarian principles. It does not see such aid as a “crisis management tool” and adopts the same cautious approach to collaboration with the military as OCHA, as mentioned above. While ECHO recognizes successful examples of collaboration with the military in exer-
cises such as Operation ARTEMIS in the DRC, the Aceh Monitoring Mission in Indonesia, and Lebanon in 2006, given clearly defined roles, responsibilities and mandates, and requisite communication among actors, it also pointed to problems in other theatres such collaboration in Iraq and Afghanistan.\(^{56}\)

Acknowledging the multifunctional character of contemporary peace operations, and the need in certain situations to secure the operational environment, ECHO has noted that from the humanitarian perspective tensions existed between the inherent partiality of the political transition process vis-à-vis the impartiality required to safeguard humanitarian space for the delivery of assistance. Against this background and given the competing agendas within missions when the political impetus takes precedence over the humanitarian relief component, the EU had observed that the integrated approach entailed fundamental risks of undermining the basic principles of humanitarian actors which provide them necessary access to affected populations and limits the extent to which humanitarian agencies can integrate into the more political activities of peace-building missions. Given these realities, ECHO has stressed the importance of dialogue and coordination take place from the outset of the planning process to avoid role confusion. This process could be facilitated by establishing liaison functions, especially on the ground.\(^ {57}\)

Conclusion and Recommendations

The civilian dimension of peace operations, already prominent, is likely to increase over the coming years. However problematic in execution the protection of civilians may be in various situations at certain times, as illustrated by the slow progress of the R2P principle, its importance is likely to grow given incorporation of defence of human rights, humanitarian norms and the promotion of good governance in peace operations. To remain relevant in the post cold war era and appropriately address global challenges the UN is compelled to move closer to the “Deliver as One”\(^ {58}\) concept, whether mounting its own peace operation or working with a regional organisation, or a UN mandated group of partners. Given the many faceted dimensions of complex emergencies and post conflict reconstruction exercises, practical coordination is indispensable. It is also true that many developmental and humanitarian activities shade into one another, in the case of UNHCR for example, in preparing the ground for repatriation and continuing to contribute to this dimension of reconstruction and sustainable development through reintegration of the displaced. Appropriate holistic and coherent approaches are necessary. Flexible and adequate funding is important in this regard, just as predictable funding in general is important.

In respect of involvement in political processes, it can be argued that the UN, its humanitarian agencies and the broader humanitarian community are usually
involved in this sphere from the outset of an operation as they normally need government permission to operate in a country. Moreover, the movement towards multi-dimensional peace operations working towards stability and long term peace inherently means, to a greater or lesser degree, involvement in the political process. Nevertheless, points of contention remain. One is the concern that the UN and governments subordinate the humanitarian imperative to long-term peace, security, development and political goals and thus diminish “humanitarian space”, which along with actual or perceived close association with the military can and does hinder access to affected populations and endangers unarmed aid workers.

This concern, underscored by OCHA, ECHO and Voice, is shared within the wider humanitarian community of NGOs involved in peace operations. And it should be recalled, as acknowledged by OCHA, that in a number of UN operations up to 80 percent of field delivery of assistance is carried out by NGOs. Another point of contention is the feeling among NGOs that they are treated as contract help and kept out of the planning process. Without contesting the validity of these sentiments, it has also been persuasively argued that in the broader sense, humanitarian aid and peace keeping “are no longer separate concepts.” Compromise is necessary on a daily basis and there needs to be a structure of some sort that unifies them hence the likely continuation in some form of integrated missions.

Given the fact that humanitarian assistance and military action are ideological opposites, the humanitarian imperative can easily be put in jeopardy. Nevertheless, on humanitarian-military cooperation, a stable and secure operating environment is obviously important to humanitarian agencies. Moreover, the logistic support and other services that the military can provide are often equally important. The point is for each player to understand and communicate the realities of their respective operating environments to one another, especially with regard to “humanitarian space” and defined respective roles. The necessity for a pragmatic approach, recognition of inter-dependability and compromise is facilitated by closer cooperation, training, exchange of staff and communication. The importance of liaison and exchange of staff to facilitate communication, not least given the turnover of personnel, cannot be overestimated. While pragmatism may be challenged by those favouring emphasis on normative imperatives, it is fair to note that while voices in the Forum were keen to point out the importance of humanitarian space and the need to avoid total absorption in centralised management structures, they also acknowledged the importance of military cooperation and assistance in certain instances and the need for communication and liaison to facilitate planning and appropriate interaction in this connection.

“In the words of Maj. Gen. William Nash, a veteran of the Balkan Wars, (Quoted in UNHCR’s State of the World’s Refugees, Humanitarian Displacement in The
New Millennium) ‘Although the demand for independent humanitarian action is admirable, more important is an effective strategy to assist those in need.’” From a practical operational standpoint this statement need not be viewed as sacrificing the humanitarian imperative to political expediency. The importance of humanitarian and military actors working together has led UN agencies and a number of NGOs to call for better communication with military partners including sharing of information, joint planning and strategizing. The UN through IMs, Capstone and other initiatives has moved forward to meet this challenge. Closer collaboration with regional organisations in the recent past is also a welcome development. But much needs to be done at the field and delivery level to translate these initiatives into effective practice. Coherence in management approaches is important. However, the advantages of a unified management structures in IMs at one level should not be mechanistic, and should definitely not come at the cost of the comparative advantage, mandates, principled operating ethos and the security of humanitarian actors and those whom they are charged to assist.

Recognition of the need for multidimensional, interdependent approaches to peace operations is perhaps usefully summarised by former UNHCR High Commissioner Sadako Ogata’s observation: “there are no humanitarian solutions to humanitarian crises”.

The origins of man made humanitarian problems are political and require political solutions. And as remarked by UNRWA at the Forum while coordination is important so is political decisiveness.

Key recommendations that would facilitate both strategic and field level military-civil defence-humanitarian- as well as collaboration in the political and development spheres are as follows:

While acknowledging the importance of coherence and coordination that appropriately integrated missions can provide in emergency as well as post-conflict peace operations, on humanitarian matters in general and when refugees and IDPs are involved in particular, the principles of humanitarian space - the operating environment underpinned by impartiality, neutrality and humanity - must be respected. In this regard differing roles, responsibilities of actors must be clarified and understood both at the outset of, and respected throughout, operations in order for humanitarian agencies involved to appropriately function given their mandates. In this way access to vulnerable groups and the security of humanitarian personnel will be facilitated. The growth in violence directed against humanitarian staff and their operations and the increasing threats to humanitarian space makes this recommendation more valid than ever.

In hybrid/multifunctional/integrated missions, where a Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General or similar senior official subsumes humanitarian
responsibilities, depending on the nature or phase of the operation UNHCR and/or other humanitarian agencies must have a staff member(s) working closely with him/her in the coordinator’s office. Such an arrangement would facilitate communication and understanding among the political, military, and development sectors of Integrated Missions. It would also help to ensure, in line with Capstone principles, that in planning and determining priorities the humanitarian imperative is not subordinated to political, developmental and/or military priorities.

While accountability and transparency are self-evidently important, efforts should be made to appropriately simplify requirements for humanitarian funding and reporting, and the often close relationship between humanitarian and development programmes should be appreciated.

Rigid bureaucratic requirements for funding within the EU, from project formulation, through monitoring to reporting, can work at a variance with effective action in complex peace operations conducted in often highly challenging environments. Systems must be streamlined to match operational exigencies. In the same manner, the humanitarian dimension often overlaps with development in the rebuilding fragile states, particularly in repatriation and reintegration of forcibly displaced people. The compartmentalized and artificial divide between humanitarian and development funding departments in donor organisations and countries must be bridged.

Exchange of experienced liaison staff with regional organisations need to be further developed and institutionalized to facilitate early warning, conflict prevention, understanding of doctrine, operational interface, training. The importance of the exchange of staff between regional organisations has been acknowledged from a variety of points of view, e.g., facilitating communication, understanding of differing doctrines, training, joint planning, capacity development, and fostering cooperation. It has also been highlighted by OCHA, ECHO and the EU that such exchanges are all the more important given the rapid turnover of personnel in various sectors of peace operations. Such exchanges help to mitigate the impact of such personnel turnover and maintain continuity.

Notes

1 A Commissioned Background Paper for the International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations 2008 by Dr Gary Troeller, Co-Director, UN University Alchemy Project on “Protracted Refugee Situations”; Recent Visiting Lecturer, Dept. of Political Science and Research Fellow, Human Rights and Justice and Co-Chair, Inter-University Committee on International Migration, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Advisor UN Global Commission on International Migration /Former senior UNHCR official.

2 Preventing Deadly Conflict Final Report, (Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1997), p.3.


9 Ibid.

10 UNHCR has twice won the Nobel Peace Prize. While several other UN agencies provide protection to civilians, and UNRWA has specific responsibility for providing humanitarian relief and development assistance to Palestinian refugees in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, HCR is unique in that from its creation in 1950, its Statute mandates its international protection role, which is underpinned by the General Assembly. Moreover Article 35 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees expressly mentions UNHCR as the implementing agency for the provision of international protection to refugees and the responsible entity for supervising the Convention’s state signatories in this regard. Article 11 of the 1961 Convention Relating to the Reduction of Statelessness also mandates UNHCR responsibility for claims in this regard.


13 Capstone p. 16.


15 Ibid. p.30.


17 For the growing security risks for unarmed humanitarian workers see Samantha Powers editorial in the August 19, 2008 edition of the New York Times, on the fifth anniversary of attack on the UN Headquarters in Baghdad, entitled, “For Terrorists, a War on Aid Groups.”


19 Ibid.

20 Bessler & Seki, p.6.


23 Capstone, p. 69.


25 Capstone, p.71.

26 Ibid p.72.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid p.71.

29 Ibid p. 91.


31 Ibid 72.


34 UNHCR and Integrated Missions, p.19. In effect a compromise was reached with MSF’s vehicles travelling 300 meters behind UNHCR’s convoy. For a review of IMs see, Eide, Kaspertson, Kent, v Hipple, “Report on Integrated
See the monograph by Erin A. Weir, “Conflict and Compromise: UN Integrated Missions and the Humanitarian Imperative”, Kofi Annan International Peace Training Center, KAITPC, Monograph 4, June 2006. p. 53. Hereafter Weir. Weir’s paper provides a useful overview of the evolution of humanitarianism, definitions, manipulations of the principle by governments, military and policy makers and tensions within the UN in IMs when humanitarian goals are subordinated to political processes. See also Bessler & Seki, p.2


A common theme in UN reform over the past eight years has been the emphasis on UN cooperation with regional organisations. This theme was highlighted inter alia in the Secretary-General’s “In larger freedom—towards development, security and human rights for all”, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, A/59/2005, 21 Mar. 2005, paras. 111 -13 and 213-15).


"EU-UN cooperation in crisis management", Remarks made by Ambassador of France to Singapore on behalf of the EU at 2nd ARF Peacekeeping Experts Meeting, Singapore 4-6 March 2008, available online:http://www.ambafrance-sg.org/article.php3id_article=1129 hereafter Remarks


“EU Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, European Commission on Humanitarian Aid http://ec.europa.eu/echo/policies/consensus_en.htm and EUROPA Press Releases. “Humanitarian Aid Frequently Asked Questions”, p.3, http://www.europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/07/238&format=H . In a broadcast on 6 December, 2008 CNN reported in connection with the indictment of several members of of the Blackwater security firm’s involvement in a deadly incident in which a number Iraqi civilians died that there were around 200,000 contractors in Iraq, a number exceeding all foreign troops deployed to the country


Ibid.


Secretary General’s High Level Panel on System-Wide Coherence, Delivering as One, United Nations, New York, 9 Nov., 2006.

Weir. p.56.

SOWR. p.173.

I thank the organizers of this Seminar – the French Ministry of Defence and Foreign Affairs and the Ecole Militaire - for asking me to contribute to this discussion. This is an opportunity to speak to issues of humanitarian coordination from UNRWA’s institutional standpoint. It is, as well, an occasion to draw on my own experience in the humanitarian arena generally and in particular, from my eight years of living in the occupied Palestinian territory, working with UNRWA to assist and protect Palestine refugees in the Middle East.

As several speakers have explained, the concept of humanitarian coordination is simple. Its rationales are as obvious as they are unexceptional. In every situation where multiple actors with varied mandates converge to address human and development needs, it becomes essential to seek ways to harmonize approaches and to maximize the combined impact of distinct players, as they strive to achieve common goals.

My remarks will outline two lines of reasoning that validate this panel’s headline: “a permanent need for coordination”; one is at the global level while the other flows from the nature and context of UNRWA’s work. I will describe several defining features of UNRWA’s operational profile and seek to draw from them some reflections on their implications for humanitarian coordination. I will conclude with a few reflections on the particular lessons of the occupied Palestinian territory.

At the global level, a “permanent need for coordination” is most clearly and authoritatively articulated in the United Nations Charter. The grand title for this forum makes reference – and appropriately so - to Chapter VIII of the Charter, which sets out a framework within which UN Member States may pursue their own initiatives to promote international peace and security, using as their instruments agencies or regional arrangements established between them. As pertinent as this is, it is in Article I, the classic statement of the purposes of the United Nations, that we find the Charter’s pre-eminent affirmation of the obligatory nature of coordination in the service of humanitarian goals. According to Article I, the United Nations is established to “...take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to peace...” Its purposes include the achievement of “...international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character...” Article I closes with a concise statement of the United Nations’ mission namely, “...to be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of common goals”.
The key concepts embedded in the purposes of the United Nations; collective measures, international cooperation, harmonization and common goals illustrate the necessity and centrality of coordination in every endeavour undertaken by United Nations agencies. An allied and perhaps even more fundamental observation is that the concepts encapsulated in the UN’s purposes are also intrinsic to a system of global governance whose defining premise is the imperative of multilateral engagement among States of disparate size, wealth, power and interests. If the devastating conflicts in the decades preceding 1945 were triggered by the unilateral pursuit of national interests parochially defined, then it follows that averting a repeat of those tragic experiences required a global commitment to a new set of shared values. It called for a recasting of security, including national security, in human terms that transcend the tallying of military hardware; and it also demanded the subordination of individual national interests to the overarching aspirations of humanity.

The point I am making is that the need for coordination derives its permanence from the very nature of international multilateral governance, which lies at the heart of what the United Nations delivered in 1945 and continues to represent to this day. Acknowledging the association between multilateralism and coordination helps us to see the need for coordination as resting on a much more substantial footing than the allocation of roles among multiple actors. That association underlines the value of coordination as an approach to addressing and resolving problems, especially those that include a regional or international dimension.

This brings me to the nature and context of UNRWA’s work, which, as I indicated earlier, itself affirms the validity of “the permanent need for coordination”. As you will know, UNRWA conducts its humanitarian and human development operations for the benefit of a Palestinian refugee population of some 4.6 million in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, the West Bank and Gaza. We also maintain representative and liaison offices in Cairo, New York, Brussels and Geneva. As the United Nations agency with a mandate for Palestine refugees, UNRWA’s work is defined by the Palestine refugee condition, which is in turn governed by the complex regional and international context within which the Palestinian question is situated.

The coordination challenges we face also take the shape and content from the factors that influence UNRWA’s work and the situation of Palestine refugees. To illustrate this interrelationship, I will refer now to certain key features of UNRWA’s operational environment and outline how they affirm the need for – as well as the limitations of - coordination. This will set the stage for suggesting some areas where the EU and the international community as a whole could do more to enhance the impact of humanitarian coordination.
Three features impart to UNRWA its particular operational profile and determine its coordination challenges. These are the UNRWA’s field presence and the public character of its programmes and services, the experience of recurrent armed conflict in Gaza, the West Bank, and to a lesser extent Lebanon, and the need to address underlying political issues.

I will briefly discuss each of these features in turn, beginning with an outline of UNRWA’s field presence.

**UNRWA’s field presence.** Throughout its areas of operation, over the course of its fifty-nine year history, UNRWA has been and continues to be a substantial presence in the lives of Palestine refugees and in the communities in which they live. The combination of some 28,000 staff, the majority of whom are refugees and hundreds of facilities, schools, primary health clinics, homes and social infrastructure, makes for a regionally prominent Agency that in physical and relationship terms is close to and part of the community it serves.

UNRWA’s programmes in primary education, comprehensive primary health care, emergency relief, social services, shelter provision, camp improvement, infrastructure and microfinance – address needs that would normally be tackled by governments. This, and the fact that UNRWA uniquely delivers its programmes directly to refugees rather than through implementing partners, gives UNRWA’s humanitarian and human development work a public quality, albeit one blended with the particular attributes of the United Nations. The Agency is an institution very much in the eye and the consciousness of refugee and local communities.

That the Palestinian condition has remained unresolved for so long has itself influenced the tenor of UNRWA’s relationship with Palestine refugees. As generations of refugee families have availed themselves of UNRWA’s services over decades, the Agency has acquired a firm standing as a tangible manifestation of the benign face of the international community, one that can be trusted to keep faith with the people of Palestine. With this trust comes high, fairly rigid expectations - that UNRWA’s services will address refugee needs and be of high quality and that the Agency should continue to function as long as a just and lasting solution to the refugee condition remains elusive.

This outline of UNRWA’s field profile suggests several levels at which “a permanent need for coordination” could be illustrated. The public character of UNRWA’s work makes close cooperation with local authorities essential and inevitable. It stood to reason, for example, that when in 2004 UNRWA begun work on a Medium Term Plan, we liaised with the Palestinian Authority’s Ministry of Planning, which was at the time also developing a Medium Term Development Plan.
The common goal was to ensure that between the two planning documents, the needs of Palestinians - refugees and non-refugees – would be covered, with similar benefits to both.

To cite another example from the education sector, the curricula used in UNRWA’s primary schools incorporate UNRWA-initiated innovations such as modules for human rights, conflict resolution and tolerance. Yet, if refugee children are to be able to apply the skills they acquire in our schools in the wider society, it is essential that UNRWA’s curricula and standards are coordinated with those of the particular host country or authority. Also, the size of UNRWA’s education and health programmes mean that coordination with sister agencies with expertise in these areas – UNESCO UNICEF, and WHO – is necessary as well as beneficial to the Agency and to Palestine refugees.

These are some rather obvious, straightforward examples of the opportunities for coordination presented by the context of UNRWA’s work. There are other aspects of UNRWA’s operations, which make coordination indispensable. One of these is the diverse nature of the Agency’s operational milieu, ranging from Syria and Jordan which offer refugees a stable, welcoming environment free from conflict, to Lebanon and the occupied territory, where threats to refugee lives and freedom, particularly from armed conflict, have been frequent over the years. This varied operational setting poses an assortment of dynamic challenges and it is through responding to them, in coordination with others, that UNRWA’s mission has acquired its distinctive blend of human development activities and humanitarian action. This has entailed building up significant practice in addressing many of the classic operational questions and issues facing humanitarian actors in other parts of the world.

These include the ensuring of an effective transition from relief to development; achieving consistency between co-existent emergency action and regular programmes; identifying the point at which funding for emergency appeals may be deployed to support regular programmes; and the extent to which protracted emergencies, such as we have in Gaza and the West Bank, still deserve to be characterized as such. Coordination with sister UN agencies, non-governmental actors and host authorities and governments has played a part in UNRWA’s approach to addressing these questions. Over the last two years, we have come to acknowledge the need to enhance coordination, for example, through enhanced engagement with global coordination mechanisms like the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) and the UNDG. There is much potential for mutual gain if UNRWA and its partners would share information and experiences more actively.

Armed conflict in Gaza, the West Bank and Lebanon. I will now speak to the challenges of humanitarian coordination in fields where grave human rights violations
and recurrent armed conflict are a part of the operational landscape. In Gaza and the West Bank, Palestinians and Palestine refugees have endured - and continue to confront - a range of severe hardships and deprived conditions. These are directly attributable to the persistence of Palestinian-Israeli conflict since 1948 and to an entrenched military occupation that refuses to relent. As with all long-standing conflicts, this one has seen wide fluctuations in intensity.

In Gaza over the years, the high points of conflict activity have been marked by military operations with imaginative codenames; “Defensive Shield” conducted in Jenin in June 2002; “Operation Rainbow” in Rafah in May 2004; “Summer Rains” in central and northern Gaza in June 2006, and Autumn Clouds in Beit Hanoun in November 2006. And so it has continued until the informal ceasefire brokered six months ago. The code-named operations I mentioned are only the points of high drama. Interspersed between them have been hundreds of sporadic engagements with consequences no less dire for the civilian population.

While each of these has been motivated by stated military objectives such as the halting of suicide bombers and Qassam rocket fire or the release of Israeli Corporal Gilad Shalit, I dare say the achievement of military aims has never been an outcome of armed conflict in the occupied Palestinian territory. On the contrary, military operations have been marked less by military victory for any side than by gross disregard for human rights, flagrant violations of international humanitarian law and by extreme suffering for Palestinians.

Now, there is a welcome lull in the live-fire dimension of the Gaza theatre of the conflict. The informal ceasefire brokered with the help of Egypt is mercifully holding. However, contrary to the understandings of that agreement, the silence of guns, shells, rockets and missiles is yet to yield any significant relaxation in the closure of Gaza’s borders. As a consequence, the economy of Gaza still lies prostrate. Inflexible, arbitrary and comprehensive, the restrictions on the passage of people and goods ensure that Gazans are denied the ability to sustain themselves and their families through the functioning of a normal economy. UNRWA and its sister Agencies are thus preoccupied with mitigating the serious humanitarian consequences of poverty and unemployment, themselves a direct result of the siege of Gaza.

In the West Bank, which is not covered by the Gaza ceasefire, live-fire incidents, armed incursions and search and arrest raids into Palestinian communities occur frequently, bringing with them death, injury and severe distress to civilians on a daily scale that is destructive enough to the affected communities and yet often below the radar of the international media. There are also frequent demolitions of Palestinian homes and structures, including those belonging to impoverished Bedouin communities living on the outskirts of Jerusalem. Palestinians also endure
the continuous expansion of Israeli settlements on Palestinian land and violent attacks by settlers.

Furthermore, Palestinians are subjected to multiple layers of rigid administrative and physical movement restrictions. The West Bank separation barrier and its associated regime is allied to over 600 obstacles to Palestinian movement - checkpoints, earth mounds, security zones. These severely restrictive measures, imposed in the name of Israel’s security, affect not only Palestinians, but also the humanitarian agencies that seek to assist them. UNRWA staff and other humanitarian workers confront myriad obstructions in their travel to and from work and in reaching refugees who need help. As a result, our operations have become more costly less efficient and in some cases, less effective.

What I have outlined so far are the main dimensions of an oppressive occupation, the cumulative impact of which is to confine Palestinians into tightly controlled compartments incapable of enabling normal social interaction or supporting meaningful economic growth. Worst of all, the occupation and its measures, all of them tragically effective, threaten the unity of the Palestinian community and risk destroying, many fear irrevocably, the physical integrity of the putative Palestinian State.

Allow me to make brief mention of Lebanon, which experienced large-scale armed conflict during the successive summers of 2006 and 2007. The country is no stranger to periods of tension and the occasional eruption of simmering feuds into armed clashes. Here, the vulnerability of the Palestine refugee population is subsumed within the flux of insecurity with which the entire nation continues to grapple. Refugees also contend with a degree of confinement in the 12 camps and with exclusion from the mainstream of educational, employment and economic opportunities. The government’s stated intention to reverse these restrictions is yet to bear fruit.

What reflections on and lessons of humanitarian coordination might UNRWA share from our experience in Gaza, the West Bank and Lebanon? An initial observation is that in an environment so steeped in conflict, the term “peace operations”, as used in the background paper, is awkward if not entirely inappropriate as a characterization of humanitarian and human development work in Lebanon and the occupied Palestinian territory. As I pointed out earlier, Palestine refugees remain refugees because the conflict which dispossessed them in 1948 remains unresolved and very much alive. Not even the informal ceasefire currently holding in Gaza can lull us into denying that the threat of renewed violence is ever-present.

For all Palestine refugees, including those residing in Jordan and Syria who are fortunate to be spared the experience of war, the unresolved conflict remains the
essence of their vulnerability and the reference point of their unwanted status as refugees. And so it will remain until a negotiated settlement delivers a viable Palestinian State in which Palestinians can live secure and normal lives. In these circumstances, to refer to humanitarian work as “peace operations” risks appearing to belittle the Palestinian struggle to cope with a situation that is anything but peaceful. The term also blurs the lines between the humanitarian mandate of UNRWA and its partners and that of political actors whose primary responsibility it is to achieve a negotiated peace.

UNRWA’s work in the occupied Palestinian territory and in Lebanon illustrates the intimate relationship between protection and assistance and the need for coordination strategies to ensure adequate attention to both of these convergent aspects of humanitarian work. UNRWA is aware that its programmes of assistance are powerful vehicles for safeguarding a number of rights for Palestine refugees. Primary education, comprehensive primary health, relief and shelter provision are related to several of the fundamental human rights enshrined in international instruments. As such, our activities give concrete meaning to these rights for Palestine refugees, including those caught up in conflict. It is also worth mentioning that our extensive field operations contribute to safeguarding rights and delivering protection to refugees. The widespread presence of our staff translates into opportunities to observe, to record, to report and whenever possible, to act to prevent or remedy violations occurring in our areas of operations.

We at UNRWA also acknowledge that our efforts to blend assistance with protection need to be made more effective through enhanced and more systematic coordination with sister UN agencies, relevant international bodies, international experts, and the International Committee of the Red Cross. I should mention that in March this year, we commissioned an internal study – available on our website – to help us improve UNRWA’s protection response in coordination with others.

A further consideration from UNRWA’s experience is the centrality of advocacy to the coordination of humanitarian action and the inseparable connection between the integrity of advocacy and staff safety. Advocacy, identified as one of OCHA’s institutional roles, is also included in the terms of reference for each agency designated as a sector or cluster lead. UNRWA’s own experience affirms that combining humanitarian work and coordination with consistent public advocacy cultivates trust with refugees and cements the Agency’s legitimacy, thus providing it with greater leverage with which to achieve its goals. Palestine refugees are acutely perceptive of institutional positions on the broad issues affecting their situation. They are highly sensitive to questions of neutrality and inclined to take a grave view whenever they perceive that the public statements of the United Nations entities
are slanted in favour of Israel. You will recall that the 2007 Brahimi Report pointed
to a clear link between such perceptions and the safety and security of United
Nations staff in the Arab world.

The need to address underlying rights issues and political questions. This brings
me to my final observation on the aspect of humanitarian coordination which,
above all others, is laid bare by the Palestine refugee condition. I am referring here
to the need for coordination in the humanitarian sphere to be supported and com-
plemented by decisive, principled and concerted action to safeguard the rights of
‘beneficiaries,’ in this case Palestinians, and to help them and Israelis towards a
negotiated settlement.

In 2009, UNRWA will mark its 60th anniversary of service to Palestine refugees.
We have served with pride and dedication alongside our partners, rendering dedi-
cated help across the spectrum of assistance, from emergency relief to human
development. UNRWA’s achievements would not have been possible without the
contributions of donors and host countries, notably the European Union, our larg-
est donor. For this, we are sincerely grateful. For all our sincere striving, we har-
bour no illusions that the absence of progress on underlying political questions
seriously disables humanitarian work. Humanitarian action, however well-coor-
dinated, cannot substitute for real (political) solutions to the causes of the Pales-
tine refugee condition (or, for that matter, any humanitarian crisis).

In Gaza and the West Bank, we witness constant reminders of this truism, not least
on occasions when our own staff and programmes become ensnared by the clo-
sure regime, or when unemployment and a moribund economy prevents youthful
Palestinians from utilizing the education and skills they have received to lift them-
selves and their families out of destitution. Immense frustration is generated by an
almost total absence of opportunity, particularly among the youth who comprise
nearly half of the Palestinian population. We are particularly worried when we
sense the depth of these frustrations and see how easily militancy and violent ten-
dencies breed in the bitterness it engenders.

Successive emergency programmes have alleviated the most acute human suffering
often contributing to the ability of refugees to preserve a modicum of dignity ena-
bling them survive the worst effects of armed conflict. Yet, as there is no escaping
the reality, in Palestine as elsewhere, that conflict is the antithesis of human secu-
rity and human development. Humanitarian assistance valued at many hundreds
of millions of USD has not - and will not - transform the lives of Palestinians in
any substantive, self-sustaining way, unless repeated violations of their rights are
checked, unless their human security is safeguarded and unless the social and eco-
nomic foundations of the West Bank and Gaza are transformed by allowing free
movement and open borders. Such a transformation will be possible only with a political settlement which is acceptable to ordinary Palestinians and which delivers a viable Palestinian state.

Our role as humanitarian actors includes the obligation to remind States and regional organizations such as the EU of the need to address outstanding political matters that lie at the root of challenges we face in our work. The obligation to speak to political actors is grounded in the advocacy and protection functions that underpin humanitarian work. In Gaza and the West Bank, that obligation is all the more compelling because the need for humanitarian, political and security issues to be resolved, in tandem, is so powerfully evident – and has been so for many years.

Consider, for example what has transpired in instances where the humanitarian community in the occupied Palestinian territory has shied away from calling urgent attention to political questions. A good illustration is how we grapple with questions of humanitarian access for humanitarian personnel and goods into and out of Gaza and within the West Bank.

When tackling this intractable issue, there have been occasions when we unwittingly compensate for the failure of political actors by “over-coordinating” in our humanitarian work. We avoid confronting the possibility that the choices Israel makes with regard to its security may well be impossible to reconcile with its international obligations as regards humanitarian access and the privileges and immunities of the United Nations. In the result, we confine our actions to our humanitarian colleagues, tending to expend significant energy and resources on an array of overlapping coordination mechanisms with little tangible result. Perhaps we should adopt a more forthright approach that draws attention to the underlying security and political questions and calls for assistance from the European Union and other political actors that are able to exert real influence on Israel.

Another salutary example of the all-encompassing importance of political solutions is the experience of the European Union Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM). As you will know, the authority for this mission was based on the November 2005 Agreement on Movement and Access (AMA) between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, which aimed to “promote peaceful economic development and improve the humanitarian situation”. The EU Border Assistance Mission was mandated to support the Palestinian Authority’s border management and customs regime at the Rafah border and to “act with authority” to ensure the PA’s compliance with the “Agreed Principles for the Rafah Crossing”. The mission played a constructive, stabilizing role, helping professionally to manage the Rafah crossing as long as security conditions allowed. In the face of frequent conflict and insecure conditions, its presence – and therefore its impact – was sporadic at best. As the Mis-
sion’s website candidly states, it temporarily suspended its presence at Rafah in June 2007, “awaiting a political solution”. It is telling that the Agreement on Movement refers to the Quartet Special Envoy and the United States Security Coordinator as the parties to assist its implementation.

The moral of this story is clear and it is one which resonates with our discussion this afternoon. The European Union is well placed to contribute in a positive and powerful way to efforts to resolve this conflict. Given the magnitude of political and military resources it could deploy to any situation globally, the size and consistency of its contributions as a humanitarian and development donor in the Middle East and the its growing stature on the world stage, it is no accident that the EU was the natural choice to play a role as “the third party” in the AMA. The colossal potential of Europe does not lie only in its physical resources and political influence. Its most commanding – and as yet underutilized – asset is Europe’s own experience of emergence from decades of internecine distrust, tensions and armed conflict to an era of multilateral accommodation and shared ideals of justice, the rule of law, human rights and prosperity for all.

Over the past several months, the bold diplomacy of the French EU presidency on Lebanon and Syrian issues has given the world a glimpse of the potential of which I speak. For many decades, Palestinians and Palestine refugees in UNRWA’s areas of operations have benefited from generous humanitarian donations. What they are yet to see are consistent efforts by the European Union (among others) to protect its humanitarian investments through action to safeguard Palestinian rights and to secure for them a reasonable prospect - if not the realization – of a negotiated settlement. What we are yet to see is a European Union which holds on an equal balance the interests of Israelis and Palestinians, and which summons the courage to take independent, principled, inclusive positions on all key issues. Our fear, as humanitarian actors, is that until this potential is realized, the experience of the EU Border Assistance Mission will risk being replicated in other laudable actions that are inevitably thwarted by this overpowering conflict.

Allow me to conclude on the note on which I began, by invoking the authority of the United Nations Charter as our ultimate guide to the rationales of humanitarian coordination. As I said in my introduction, a core purpose of the United Nations is to be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of common goals. Paramount among those goals is the preservation and promotion of human rights and human dignity for all without distinction. Palestinians have carried for far too long the adverse distinction of enduring the triple-yoke of dispossession, suffering and occupation. Their quest for a solution to their plight, now in its sixtieth year and epic by any measure, is at odds with our professed allegiance to the principles enshrined in the UN Charter.
Given these considerations, and in spite of its inherent value, humanitarian coordination cannot be regarded as an end in itself. We must recognize individually and as humanitarian partners that our work will come to fruition only when a just and lasting solution is negotiated – a solution which delivers a viable State of Palestine and answers the Palestinian cry for justice.

Chair: Sir John Holmes, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordination, United Nations

I believe Ms. Karen Koning Abuzayd reminded us of primarily two important things; UNRWA has been helping the Palestinian refugees for 60 years but I think people tend to forget what the UN does there, and secondly, that the international community has a responsibility to act on the humanitarian side in Palestine and to advocate political solutions. Humanitarian coordination cannot be seen as an end in itself because it will not solve the underlying challenges.

Presentation: Mr. Peter Zangl, Director General of the Humanitarian Aid Department of the European Commission, presented by Mr. Michael Curtis, Head of Sector, Humanitarian Aid Department of the European Commission, European Union

Dear Ladies and Gentlemen, it is a pleasure to be here today and to take part in this discussion. I would like to thank the organisers for giving me the opportunity to address what is a very important issue for humanitarian actors. Indeed, not just for humanitarians but also for policy makers and military personnel. What I particularly appreciate about your initiative is that it provides a forum for us to talk to one another because it is something we do not do enough, especially in a serene non emergency setting such as this.

I will first recall the mandate and rules that we as humanitarians are obliged to respect. This will be followed by a few examples that indicate which factors must be in place in order to ensure that the military and the humanitarians can successfully achieve their different missions side by side. In the final part of my presentation I will turn to the question of integrated missions.

Allow me to briefly cover some very basic ground, namely how we in the EU define and see humanitarian aid. This should help to better understand the logic of the rest of my presentation. The European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, adopted in December last year, defines the objective of humanitarian aid as saving lives, alleviating suffering and maintaining human dignity based on assessed needs. In order to guarantee that we focus on needs only, we must observe the humanitarian principles of neutrality and impartiality. We must not favour any side in an
armed conflict or other dispute, and we must not discriminate on any basis between or within affected populations.

Respecting all this leads to a logical conclusion in the consensus that “EU’s humanitarian aid is not a crisis management tool”. However, this also means: not every operation that is called “humanitarian” – because this label helps to get political support for it – is indeed genuinely humanitarian in the sense that it is guided exclusively by beneficiary need and humanitarian principles. This raises a particularly important issue on the need to respect one another’s mandates, but equally one’s own mandate. Humanitarians do not attempt to substitute for the military and I would contend that the military should not try to play the role of humanitarians. A strategy of winning hearts and minds must not be confused with humanitarian aid, because it is not.

The multiplication of different actors and the growing complexity of humanitarian crises threaten the respect for international humanitarian law, fundamental humanitarian principles and the humanitarian space. It is essential that the involvement of the military in humanitarian emergencies is the exception rather than the rule. As such, we do not seek a formalised, structured relationship as this would go against the fundamental principles of independence and impartiality of humanitarian action. As it is foreseen in the Oslo and MCDA guidelines, in specific and well-defined situations and only as a last resort in responding to a humanitarian emergency, specific support or action of military forces may be considered. In any case, dialogue and interaction are essential between civilian and military actors.

Indirectly linked to the issue of ‘humanitarian security’ is of course the question on when or in which situation it is appropriate to use armed escorts. Due to changes in the nature of conflict, military or armed escorts may be, in a limited number of cases, deemed necessary to protect humanitarian convoys. In this respect, I would like to refer to the UN Guidelines on the use of military or armed escorts for humanitarian convoys of 2001. These clearly stipulate that as a general rule, humanitarian convoys will not use armed or military escorts. However, in exceptional circumstances and – once again – as a last resort, humanitarian organisations may use military or armed convoys under certain conditions and when a number of criteria are met. We all know that at the same time some organisations – for reasons of broader principle – will not use military or armed escorts to protect their convoys.

I could go on and on recalling the various commitments and obligations our governments have signed up to. However, if all these policy papers, rules and guidelines exist, one might ask why there is a problem. As we say in German: “paper is patient” and it is clear that in hostile environments rules tend to be adopted, and
long-term objectives often become less important than short-term gains. This is human and understandable, but it is also the reason that we must engage in more frequent and structured dialogue.

There are examples where interaction between humanitarian and military actors has worked well, namely Operation ARTEMIS in the DRC and the Aceh Monitoring Mission in Indonesia. This is due to the fact that both actors had clearly defined mandates, played their respective roles accordingly and communicated well with one another. However, there are also examples of a negative impact in conflict situations due to the blurring of lines between humanitarian and military tasks. When military forces that have the clear objective of securing territory or of hunting down armed elements, switch temporarily into a humanitarian role, all parties to a conflict will understandably come to regard genuine humanitarian action as part of a military strategy. When and where this happens, real humanitarian aid cannot be delivered without running often unacceptable risks. The experiences of Afghanistan and Iraq are particularly apparent in this respect. Lessons should be drawn from both the good and the bad experiences so we can address the contentious issues together in a constructive manner.

One concrete case from a humanitarian perspective, that demonstrates the importance of dialogue and coordination from a humanitarian perspective, is that of Lebanon in July 2006. The interface with the military played an important role in two respects: use of military assets in support of the humanitarian intervention, and liaison with one of the forces on the ground to guarantee access. The deployment of a Liaison Officer of DG ECHO was a first case for a donor doing this and proved to have a real added value in ensuring the safe movement of staff in Lebanon and secure implementation of an EC funded operation. The Liaison Officer sensitised the IDF and the Israeli Centre for Coordination and Humanitarian Relief to the mandate of ECHO and to the needs and operational modalities of humanitarian agencies, especially NGOs.

Unfortunately some, if not many, of today’s armed conflicts are characterised by active and deliberate targeting of civilians and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people. The suffering inflicted on innocent civilians is often aggravated by restrictions on humanitarian access and attacks and harassment of humanitarian workers. This is sometimes part of a deliberate effort to obstruct the delivery of humanitarian aid to affected populations and/or because humanitarian organisations are no longer perceived as impartial, neutral and independent. Sometimes these are just acts of common criminality often linked to the absence of any authority.

In such specific and well-defined situations, support of military forces and peacekeepers may be considered in order to create a safe and secure environment for
humanitarians to carry out their work. It is evident that in such scenarios, it is vital to establish dialogue and coordination between civilian and military actors from the outset of the planning process, in order to avoid confusion of roles. Respect of one another’s mandates and professionalism is again crucial. Other elements defining the success or failure of such operations are; whether or not each actor has a well-defined role, the awareness of the principles that govern humanitarian aid in complex crises, and the availability of dedicated and properly trained staff in the missions.

This brings me to the last issue I want to address: the humanitarian challenges with regards to peacekeeping operations and integrated missions. We have all seen how peacekeeping operations have become multifunctional and more robust operations with the international community increasingly taking a stance in both ongoing conflicts and post-conflict settings. Mandates range from immediate stabilisation and protection of civilians to supporting humanitarian assistance, organising elections, laying the foundations for a lasting peace and so on. However, from a humanitarian perspective, we observe a certain tension between the partiality involved in supporting the political transition process and the impartiality needed to protect the humanitarian space and deliver assistance. Armed forces operating within a peace keeping and peace building operation in third countries clearly pursue political-military objectives set by the authorities of their country of origin, the UN Security Council or some other mandate. These are perfectly legitimate goals. However, one has to bear in mind that peace-making or peace-building are not and should not become the primary aims of humanitarian organisations. Their aim is to act to save and preserve lives on the basis of need, guided by the fundamental humanitarian principles.

Thus, the integrated approach inherently entails a risk of undermining the fundamental humanitarian principles that are a prerequisite for providing access and protection for humanitarian workers. In my opinion, these principles limit the extent to which humanitarian actors can integrate into the more “political” activities of peace building missions. Unfortunately, ongoing crises such as Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrate the tension between the activities of the military and humanitarian principles. This tends to be intensified by the competing agendas within missions in which the political impetus rapidly takes precedence over the humanitarian relief component. We should not forget that humanitarian aid workers are often on the ground long before the military and almost always there after the military have left.

I therefore see that one of the main risks of any humanitarian action is its integration into a political and military strategy and thus the subordination of humanitarian operations to political goals where aid is used as a tool for policy and poli-
tics. Insurgents or parts of the population may perceive the humanitarian agencies as instruments of a foreign policy agenda, which will trigger security risks for expatriates and local staff working with international organisations. A blurring of the lines between political/military action and humanitarian activities therefore has consequences for the lives and safety of many groups and individuals. I think that for instance in Chad, we once again run the risk of this blurring of lines. If the foreign military operations there implement so-called humanitarian “quick impact projects”, they might once again contribute to confusion between military and humanitarian work.

However, we must also be realistic and pragmatic and therefore acknowledge that there may be situations in which an integrated mission can assist humanitarian action without compromising humanitarian impartiality and neutrality. For instance, when insecurity prevails in areas where vulnerable communities are in need of immediate assistance, it may be that only the armed forces of a peacekeeping/building operation have the readily available capacity to provide relief until others are able to step in, in line with their obligations under the Geneva Convention.

In a number of situations such as in the case of the hurricanes in Haiti, peacekeeping operations have been providing valuable logistic assets (trucks, etc.) in support of humanitarian relief operations. Indeed, humanitarian actors may face situations of dramatic humanitarian need to which they are unable to respond due to severe logistical constraints. In such situations, humanitarian actors may make use of military forces, including peacekeeping forces, to provide logistic assets and assistance in support of the humanitarian operation.

With regard to scenarios in which the humanitarian community calls upon the military to support their response or to secure the operational environment, but also in situations in which a peacekeeping force is deployed as a political imperative, it is essential that dialogue and coordination between civilian and military actors is established from the outset of the planning process in order to avoid confusion of roles. As mentioned earlier, this is a shared responsibility that can be facilitated by putting into place liaison functions at Headquarters and especially on the ground.

Ladies and Gentlemen, to sum up, I would like to reiterate the commitment of the European Commission to work together more closely with others to learn more about and respect the roles and mandates of different actors working in peacekeeping operations. Let us reflect on how we can take this dialogue forward in a positive manner. In this regard, we also acknowledge and appreciate the role that Sir John Holmes and OCHA play in advocating and coordinating humanitarian
aid. I would like to thank you for your attention and I look forward to discussing these issues in more detail with you in the ensuing debate and in the future in other fora.

Discussant: Dr. Wolf-Dieter Eberwein, President, Voluntary Organizations in Cooperation in Emergencies

The issue of coordination on the humanitarian aspects has to be discussed in conjunction with the issue of complimentarity. If coordination was merely a managerial issue the allocation of resources optimizing the coordination would be resolved. The humanitarian domain and the specified framework of peacekeeping operations define the conditions for how cooperation should take place, what complimentarity is and what it should not be.

The legally constraining framework around this is the humanitarian law, which is politically binding. The EU, which has the European consensus on the humanitarian aid, emphasizes a clear demarcation between the military and the civilian activities. The cooperation between the three pillars of the international humanitarian assistance, the Red Cross and other NGOs is non-binding, as defined in 2006. Furthermore, the regulations over the military and the humanitarian cooperation are defined in the Oslo guidelines and the MDCA guidelines.

Gen. Patrick Nash cited from the background paper by Dr. Gary Troeller that the independent humanitarian action is admirable although a clear strategy is more valuable. I find this to be a very pragmatic component to the discussion, although pragmatism should not be the theme. I believe the problem to be the number of regulations and handbooks filled with theories that do not correspond with practice. Is the independence of NGOs challenged? The NGOs are acting within a predetermined normative framework. Furthermore, integrated missions or peace missions have a structural tension, which is inevitable. On the one hand, there is the military side that has a clear political and military mandate. The civilian side, on the other hand, has to be independent and impartial. While the perception of the military side might not be that central, the perception of the humanitarian organizations is vital.

When it comes to complimentarity and coordination the civilian sector has problems. The High Commissioner for Refugees has tried to find a solution of reintegration and resettlement for refugees, but it has taken ten years for UNHCR to find a partner for this. The UNDP did not think it was on its table, but after a few years, with a mutual understanding of the need, an agreement was reached with the ILO over what was needed covering everything from emergency relief to resettlement programmes for the refugees.
The partnership still requires improvements. Initially, the donors did not fully support the initiative. However, the NGOs are carrying out 60-80 percent of the operative work on the ground, which means that they have the experience. The major challenge for the coordination of the humanitarian aspects today is that the humanitarian coordinating system is based on consensus. The structure of authority is horizontal with different organizations, which in turn have different mandates, responsibilities and structures of responsibility. Afghanistan is an example of the major problems for humanitarian coordination that we are facing today. The result of this is the loss of independence of the humanitarian sector. The EU, however, is with a new humanitarian consensus trying to do something that might be a solution to civil-military relations. It is trying to coordinate at the field level with the help of civil-military officers.

The challenges we are facing are as follows; our first experience of coordination of the humanitarian aspects has demonstrated that humanitarian aid is not a useful tool for achieving the objective of peace missions. On the contrary, given evidence show that integrated missions are dangerous to the humanitarian community. Even though some may be willing to sacrifice, the political price this has breaks down the humanitarian order that has been built during more than a century and a half. The coordination is too top-down oriented; more focus needs to be on bottom-up of the coordination. Coordination and complimentarity are necessary but we should not try to coordinate everything. Legitimacy, credibility and effectiveness of peace missions can only be achieved if clear division of labour is retained. The military and the humanitarian actors need to reconsider the existing practice.

*Discussant: Dr. Gary Troeller, Research Associate, Centre for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, United States*

Since the end of the Cold War we have seen transformational changes to the international landscape. 50 states have gone through major transformations and four million people have died. Vast displacements of people have occurred due to man-made disasters. Human rights violations, persecution and war has reached about 35 million people, other numbers would say 50 millions. Why do I mention this? Most of these people were civilians, they were not products of armed combatants fighting other armed combatants, they were not products of inter-state wars, they were the products of intrastate war as we know, civil wars.

The work of the UNHCR and other NGOs has not been exponentially, and it was difficult for us to function without the proper support. The involvement of the military in peacekeeping operations, where perhaps there was no peace to keep, but what was called peacekeeping operations, got involved largely as a result of the magnitude of civilian casualties. It has been said that in contemporary conflicts...
90 percent of the victims that die are civilians, and the lucky ones get to be refugees or IDPs. They either cross a border or they are refugees in their own country and they are called IDPs. Perhaps it is not out of place to deal with the importance of humanitarian organizations and the need for coordination.

I will highlight a few areas during my discussion today; doctrinal imperatives, mandates, the very important issue of humanitarian space and the relevance of regional organizations to humanitarian organizations where I will put focus on the EU and ECHO as important partners in joint humanitarian endeavours.

I start with the Capstone Doctrine. As Robert Gordon has said in his useful paper many of you may be familiar with, what the UN lacked in the past was an overarching doctrine that embraced all the players and defined who should do what. They finally came up with the Capstone Doctrine, and as is the nature of the UN, it did take some time. The document is a rather important document because it is both a political doctrine, not a military operational doctrine, that is left to regional organizations and individual states simply because of the nature of the UN. As a political doctrine, among the many things it does is to highlight the roles of the involved actors in multidimensional operations, including the humanitarian side. It makes it quite clear that humanitarian organizations tend to march to a different drummer, they have the humanitarian imperatives of neutrality, impartiality, humanity and especially IRCR and the Red Cross movements independence. The Capstone Doctrine provides a clear distinction over who does what and who should be doing what, but it also clarifies the need for collaboration and that the different roles should be understood. In my concluding remarks I will focus on a few recommendations which I think will bring us a bit closer to where we would like to be and perhaps with a new point of departure for the Challenges Forum.

What does the international landscape look like? In a Challenges paper produced by Dr. Bruce Jones, the head of the Center on International Cooperation, NYU, Dr. Jones said that at least in the short term horizon, up until 2015 we can expect to see more intra-state conflict. Not wishing to be a dooms day proponent, and also acknowledging that the number of conflicts has gone down since the 1990s, most reports including a World Bank report, talks about some 34 to 35 countries to be vulnerable, facing a collapse or undergoing a major problem. Other journals recognize some 50 countries to be fragile. The UNHCR 2006 report “State of the World's Refugees”, says that we can expect a major refugee movement of 1.5 million refugees every several years. We hope that we are wrong. It is not the kind of prognosis where one hope to prove right. In terms of intrastate conflict, in terms of civil disturbances, we have unresolved issues like Darfur and Afghanistan. Who could imagine the events in Georgia that recently occurred would occur? So there is going to be forced displacement. In what I have written I have focused on the
issue of refugees not only because that is what I know best, but because in many respects you might say, as a Secretary-General said recently, they are probably the most obvious example of civilian suffering and human rights violations, and one has to address the issue.

Literature on peace operations normally focuses on doctrines, interoperability of different militaries and regional organizations. But essentially at the same time you see a trend from human security to individual sovereignty, Kofi Annan’s expression. Today having replaced humanitarian intervention, which fell into disrepute, you have Responsibility to Protect. When you talk to people off the record they say “oh my gosh, the responsibility to protect is inoperable”. Events of September 11 and the invasion of Iraq killed that, but it is still there and it is going to come back but it may take much longer time. The most important thing is what it focuses on – it focuses on a need to protect civilians and I think Karen has very eloquently talked about the challenges her organisation faces in this respect, the longest standing protracted refugee situation.

Now we have the Capstone Doctrine, and one of the things it says is that the primary role of UN peacekeeping operations, with regard the provision of humanitarian assistance, is to provide a secure and stable environment within which humanitarian actors may carry out their activities. One of the problems that has been highlighted by one of my colleagues, even yesterday but more in particular today, is that humanitarian and humanitarianism has become a very vague term used. It is too loosely used by the media, policy makers, academics, the military and if we blur that distinction we will have a problem. For humanitarian organizations what is important are the basic principles of the humanitarian movement as has been said already; humanity, impartiality and neutrality. This means delivering not only life saving assistance, but also providing international assistance to civilians who no longer enjoy national protection. For the ICRC and the Red Cross Movement its independence is very essential.

Humanitarian space as a concept can be vague. Let us say that the principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence underpin what we call humanitarian space. Humanitarian space briefly sums up that area in which humanitarian organizations, without political agendas, without being aligned with one side or another, can do their work and protect to the extent possible and assist to the extent possible persons of concern. There are a number of UN humanitarian agencies, they are all exemplary. If I have focused on UNHCR and OCHA it is because we have a certain limit of space and because they complement each other. We have OCHA as the custodian of humanitarian policy and also as a most important coordinator and we have UNHCR at the operational level which for many years has been involved in protecting civilians.
I am often asked what is the connection between peacekeeping and refugees, and I guess that is a legitimate question, that people forget that UNHCR has won two Nobel Peace Prices, so I guess there is a connection, at least in the minds of the people in Oslo. The refugee side is really what gives an indication that something is not right in a country, when you are dividing people on the face of the earth, forcing them to flee their home if not their homeland, because of human rights violations or conflict.

Over the years the UN has undertaken, by UN standards, prodigious efforts to try to reorganize, streamline and introduce better management. OCHA has played a very important role in this. It has brought together all the agencies under the Inter-Agency Standing Committee. It has come up with a number of very important publications outlining who should do what and given a very high profile to the humanitarian side. UNHCR is a key partner together with other humanitarian agencies in OCHA’s work.

What we have seen over the last few years are attempts from, partied DPKO, to vastly improve what was already pretty good, but vastly improve information gathering, sharing and training etc. OCHA has quite an impressive ray of coordinating units in New York, Geneva and on the ground. One of the latest developments is the integrated mission. As was said yesterday by one of our colleagues in the audience, the integrated mission planning process perhaps is not working all that well. It is probably true but it is still early days and to be frank there has been some resistance on the part of agencies thinking as was mentioned earlier, are we not being coordinated to death? There is a need for one UN and one UN delivery, but with certain caveats.

The interoperability at the field level is very important. Perhaps what I say will seem provocative to some. Not for one minute wishing to underplay the importance of the humanitarian space, UNHCR for example found out with the Iraqi-Kurdish exudes in 1991 that it was indispensible to work with the military, and this continued with the Sarajevo airlift with the land bridge to Sarajevo, which actually in terms of tonnage exceeded the Berlin airlift. We had seven military officers at our headquarters coordinating this airlift and we had a military advisor in the High Commissioners office.

In Goma in 1995 when you had “genocidaire” intermixed with refugee populations in the camps in the DRC, we called for international police to come in, that did not work. We called for peacekeeping to come in, that did not work. The Canadians came forward and said that they would lead something, but we are still looking for troops. We could not get troops. We turned to the OAU, the OAU could provide people but they did not have the logistics or equipment. We ended
up hiring our own local police which was perhaps not the best and not the usual thing we do to supply security because security, is normally the responsibility of a government. I mention these things because we have and we are compelled to work with the military. At the same time we have our own guidelines with an understanding of the differentiation of roles and the importance of keeping to those roles.

In the integrated missions we have special representatives and deputy special representatives of the Secretary-General, which I believe to be positive. In complex situations you do need a unity of command. At the same time, as the Capstone Doctrine makes clear, and as Sir John Holmes has mentioned, there is a need to be outside, and a requirement for complimentarity rather than total coordination of the mission that is necessary. A few examples have been addressed today of what it is like if there is too much confusion over the roles, or if the military handles the work of the humanitarians or the other way around. If we pay attention to the Capstone Doctrine, we might be able to avoid that in the future.

The tremendous number of people involved in the relief activities today, not all are under the UN or conventional NGOs. Some of them work independently, and there is a need for coordination. If we do not have that coordination, I mentioned as an example MSF in the DRC decided to paint their cars pink instead of white, as they were being shot at while driving white cars and could not carry out their work. The example from the DRC shows how important it is to understand the differentiation between the military and civilian or humanitarian roles.

With the responsibility to protect, I hope this takes off. I realize that the dice is loaded against us in the near future, for the reasons I have mentioned. As a concept it is important and as a principle it is important, and probably as a trend it is not going to go away we can only hope that it is effectively operationalised.

**Challenges of coordination and cooperation in a wider partnership.** We are moving towards very important collaboration with the EU and other regional organizations. UNHCR with a staff of about 6.500, depending on how you are looking at the statistics, has one staff member for every 4.800 internally displaced people. It is directly or indirectly irresponsible. We work with up to 500 NGOs. They account for when we contract for parts of our budget for specific activities because we have so few staff. Around 300 million USD might go to NGOs. NGOs are a key component of relief activities. Some have said that they are up to 80 percent in delivery. Some of them are a little suspicious of UN integrated missions and new management models. We obviously have to take into consideration the wider humanitarian community, which is what OCHA does when it has one foot in one foot out inside an integrated mission, because these people deliver.
With the EU, around 800 million USD come from ECHO, which in turn can be doubled with the contributions from the individual Member States of the EU. This makes the EU the largest donor, together with the member countries, to humanitarian and development activities. It is important that they have come up with the humanitarian consensus which makes it very clear that they understand the dangers faced by humanitarian workers and the need for differentiation of roles between the military and humanitarians. If there is too close of an association, if independence is not there, it can have horrible consequences, e.g., you might have heard the news from Afghanistan yesterday night about the humanitarian workers of the WFP. There has to be proper attention paid to humanitarian space.

ECHO recognizes this. It is an active donor and a demanding donor. One of the issues UNHCR faces having to raise over 90 percent of the funding by itself per year, is that it is sometimes difficult to get the funding needed due to complicated application processes and the recording process. Sometimes we have trouble using what we have got because it took a long time to get it and then we report on it. At the same time we should not lose sight of the fact that over 23 million refugees have gone home after the 1990s. When they go home, they need help reintegrating; that is development. It has for a long time been, an artificial divide between humanitarian funding and development funding; they come from separate departments and ministries. This creates problem on the ground and in the donor community. We should take a look at this artificial distinction if we are trying to build long lasting peace.

I have some recommendations in my paper, a few of them are the following. The humanitarian sector is affected by the turnover in personnel in peace operations. A closer liaison in exchange of staff between the organizations could aid this problem, and gain further understanding of the interface between humanitarian operations and peacekeeping and military operations. In the integrated missions, it is important to keep one foot in and one foot out. What works and what helps the wider community in the humanitarian area to actually do its work. My last recommendation is to provide training at the beginning of a mission and follow up with continued training during the turnover.

Finally, I would like to stress the importance of remembering why we had so big numbers of militaries involved in the 1990s, and why it is so important today. You do need pragmatism, but you also need the balance of principles. You have to understand that many humanitarian workers who used to be a shield during conflicts are now a target, which has become an additional concern. The primary objective is to help the people in need and to have access to them in need, but this cannot be done, if they are seen to be part of a wider political side.
Discussion

The Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for the DRC meant that the most important aspect of the humanitarian principles is that we deliver assistance to people in need impartially and neutrally. There has been a longstanding debate regarding the integrated mission and that there are risks on all sides for the involved. He did not agree with the thesis that the political impetus necessarily takes precedence over the humanitarian. He believed that we need to step away from the thought of always being manipulated, and instead believe in that if we organize ourselves, which to some extent has been done in the DRC, that the humanitarians can use the integrated mission, and that the political and military aspect of the mission in fact can further our agenda. “A mission of 18,000 militaries with an important political section that is advocating for the principle discussed here today, you have a reasonably good allied at your side, which we need to take full advantage of.”

It was suggested that, in the DRC we have tried to translate what is the most important military chapter of MONUC, Chapter VII of the UN Charter and the protection of civilians, into means of providing protection of civilians. “ARTEMIS, which had a similar mandate, came in at a very crucial time and secured Bunia airport and IDP camps around. At present time, the MONUC forces in Ituri alone, are in 24 different places providing support, and in the North Kivu the forces are in 43 different places. Half of these are there on request by the humanitarians to provide protection to the IDPs, but the MONUC forces still cannot be everywhere and that is in fact a problem. The corollary of the dependence on an external force is that if MONUC is unable to prevent something from happening, or if the forces do not provide sufficient security to stop the continuing violation, which in the DRC is often carried out by the national military or by armed groups in a particular area, the UN will be blamed for being there, but not doing anything.”

“In the DRC we have evolved a process where MONUC works with the humanitarians to provide protection. However, it should not be seen as the military providing assistance. Rather, it is a protection function carried out by the military, and that is what the military is supposed to do. This should not be mixed with what the humanitarians are doing, which is delivering humanitarian aid and what Sir John Holmes was talking about regarding Iraq. Nevertheless, the issue and the dialogue is of importance. It is important to distinguish a UN mission under blue helmets and an EU mission from the national military that may well have less training and understanding of the roles.”

A general from a major TCC made a point regarding the security of humanitarians. “Whether it is military personnel, a representative of the UN or other inter-
national organization, in a foreign land the greatest rule of security is the Code of Conduct. I think that the incidents that have occurred in the world where humanitarians or peacekeepers have been targeted, are in situations where they have violated the Code of Conduct, and that is why they have been targeted. While carrying out our work in a country suffering from conflict, we need to respect the religious, political and ethnic sensitivities. If a humanitarian organization is transparent, delivers on time and carries out the work it is expected to do, in return it would gain the respect of the population, which is the greatest security in itself. In any intrastate conflict the population constitutes the central gravity and provides your security.”

“Further, there is the issue of sensitivity of the humanitarians to coups and civic actions undertaken by the military. It is important for all to understand why these are undertaken. Along with the iron fist, there is a need to show a velvet glove for the military in UN missions, to compensate for the deprivation and hardship the locals face when the military operation is carried out. Why do we not consider this as a part of an overall development plan by the humanitarians? It could serve as a foundation from which humanitarians could continue their work. If we can identify how the military means can be factored into the overall scheme of development and the activities of the humanitarians, we have partially found a solution to the problem.”

Moreover, a comment was made on the importance of perception management, information operations, communication strategy and communication operations, which needs to be carried out in an integrated fashion in order to achieve the ends. At present, when these mechanisms are not in place, the UN as well as the humanitarians follow a policy of “fait accompli”, rather than showing pro-activeness. It was suggested that examples from the DRC show that most of the IDPs are manipulated in the environment either by the local military or by the negative forces, which within very short time can lead to 500 new IDPs. If the humanitarian organizations can, e.g., provide one radio to the villages, the population can be informed of what is happening, which would help manage the perceptions, address the aspiration of the population and avoid getting more IDPs.

Finally, it was suggested to be a necessity for the humanitarians to coordinate their work more, plan it into different days and weeks, as well as understanding how the military works and carries out its mission. “For instance, an agreement could be settled between the military and the humanitarians that protection could be provided on a weekly bases at a certain time.”

A Senior Adviser to the Challenges Forum and former UN Force Commander thought that the challenges are about looking forward and not backwards. “We
know about the problems with humanitarian space; it is well documented in the Capstone Doctrine. The inverse relationship between integration and the level of consensus in the environment is more difficult to integrate in an environment with less consensus. Our greatest challenge is that humanitarian assistance increasingly is seen as not neutral. We have seen a shift of paradigm where aid is now seen as a political weapon. The spoilers working against the peace are aware that aid is about winning the hearts and minds of people, and that our challenge today is that the humanitarians are being targeted with the background of political reasons. What can we do to face these problems in the future? If the humanitarian space is not working, we need to find a solution to how we operate in this new paradigm where humanitarians are targeted because of the political character of aid.”

A representative from the EU Council Secretariat on Defence Issues made a comment regarding the comprehensive approach. He fully appreciated the tension between the comprehensive approach, respect for humanitarian principles and need to avoid a subordinate relationship. “The military can create a secure environment, which can be seen in Afghanistan, but unless the secure environment is followed by development, access and humanitarian aid, the local population will turn to the military and you will lose control over the situation. The backside from compromising humanitarian principles and thus putting humanitarians at risk is that if the military creates security but is not included in the coordinated effort, there is a risk of losing military lives.”

“One solution to the problem could be to consider integration at different levels, for instance, integration at the strategic level in Brussels or New York. Furthermore, missions that include several actors require an integrated strategy that addresses the crisis in the specific theatre. Moreover, the integrated strategy should tentatively bring together development, security and humanitarians at a sequential manner in a commonly agreed end state.” The representative called for coordination at the operational level as well as the theatre level. “Furthermore, at the local and tactical levels focus should be on de-confliction, while respecting humanitarian space and principles at the local level. In order for us to be effective we need an overall strategy that is commonly agreed with multidimensional strategies and actors involved.”

The Permanent Representative to the UN of a peace operations hosting country stated that it was surprising to know that after 60 years of existence, UNRWA had not created a dependency syndrome of the Palestinians. “Rather, the call for solutions to their problems remains at forefront for all stakeholders. The UN, with its impartial and neutral stand, is in favour of an integrated approach for all missions, including the humanitarian. All parts of the planning and implementation
process should be neutral, including the humanitarian aspect. The UN should not enforce peace and the humanitarian actors should provide humanitarian assistance without using aid as a political weapon. We run the risk of differentiating actors unnecessarily, because the overall mission objective should be neutral and not to take sides. That is why the Code of Conduct referred to earlier is so important because many of those NGOs or humanitarian actors are playing political, and issue political statements, in different countries. This will undermine the work of the humanitarian actors. The real security for the humanitarian actors should be managed by the people themselves. Otherwise no peacekeeping operation can protect them, only the people. If they deal in a neutral, impartial and humanitarian manner they will feel no negative revenge against them. We need an integrated approach of missions including the humanitarian to maintain the nature of the UN missions as neutral without taking sides and by helping people.”

A Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations of another peace operations hosting country had the experience that there is an issue of selectivity when it comes to what humanitarian emergencies the international community should assist in. “It picks and chooses, and is forgetting some conflicts such as in Somalia.” He argued that there needs to be humanitarian aid for all that needs it and not just for a few countries. “Further, the humanitarian agencies always seem to want to distance themselves for various reasons from the host government. They prefer, because of neutrality and impartiality, to hire their own security forces to protect them, and once you do that you will face the risk of being attacked. Once attacked, the humanitarian agencies will probably blame the host government for not protecting them. You have the case in Somalia. The local population appreciate the help of the humanitarian agencies. They do not want security forces from the Somali Government but depend more on private security. Ultimately it might create a situation where the government needs to live alongside because it will otherwise later be criticized for not providing security. There are many examples where humanitarian agencies have been targeted, killed and assassinated and at the end of the day the government must share the blame.”

“Additionally, in Somalia, the humanitarian agencies asked private security militias, mainly businesspersons, powerful warlords to protect them for an amount of money. What happened to that money? That militia leader will use the money to buy more arms and will ship in a future power struggle in the country. Most humanitarian agencies the last 16 years hired a private businessperson in Somalia for protection, he becomes rich and has a vested interest of chaos and anarchy and becomes an important obstacle for the peace and instability in Somalia. It is a unique case from experience. I was active in the peace process and the main obstacle to peace and stability for this government was those businesspersons, who are not paying taxes and making loads of money from the humanitarian agencies.”
“There is no doubt that the Somali population appreciate the work the humanitarian organizations are doing in the country to help them to the life that they deserve to have. But we have the experience that some of the agencies when seeking protection for themselves contribute to the instability in the country.”

A researcher made a reflection on the comments made by Sir John Holmes on the need for an understanding between the military and the NGO community over the roles and their boundaries, the constraints of those involved as well as the need for more frequent and constructed dialogue. “After the invasion in Afghanistan the dialogue among the donor community has ended up in a contentious situation and the dialogue among the actors has gone down. United States Institute of Peace have managed a project developing guidelines that will take into account the principles for humanitarians as well as the requirements of the military finding what the boundary is between them which then allows for a discussion on what the procedures are to guide their relationship. They were about to review implementation of the guidelines and needed to broaden the discussion to international partners with regional organizations. We have continued to have discussions between our NGO community and Pentagon, which led to a revision of the field manual that was just produced on stability operations 3-07. These guidelines are now incorporated into doctrine for the US military. We continue to have this dialogue on other issues such as development assistance where one of the contentious areas of AFRICOM now, for instance, is playing a role. We will take another step where we develop guidelines for the military in development assistance in more permissive environments. We welcome everyone to take part in that discussion.”

A military officer suggested that as regards to the relationship with humanitarian organisations, he was a veteran from the conflicts in Kosovo and Bosnia; while everything has been well said, it is necessary to recall a number of fundamental points. “Soldiers and humanitarian organisations adhere to cultures that are totally different, and that this problem of culture is very important. Nevertheless, they are forced, in a given theatre of operations, to act together. When someone reaches out, when someone needs help, the person who comes to their aid, whether they are a soldier or a humanitarian, provides them with assistance, and it is this that is important. This being the case, the military has attempted to prepare documents, doctrines and regulations, which has not been the case among humanitarians. However, I believe that the need to cooperate on the ground is admittedly in response to high order principles, but is a question addressed on a case-by-case basis and, at a given time and at a given place, cooperation between humanitarians and the military works perfectly well. Later, as a result of mutations and end of stays, other players arrived on the scene and it worked less well. It may be that in the area of humanitarian operations, it is not judicious to codify everything.”
A representative of a think tank for conflict resolution and peacekeeping in Africa proposed that they were about to start training peacekeepers who would be deployed for missions in Africa. The focus of these missions would be on integrated missions, and primarily on the military, police, NGOs, relief agencies and the local population. He would like for the panel to comment on the difficulties mentioned to coordinate and protect. He wanted their comments on the concept that they were going to train those bridge builders who are going to be interacting with the local people. “The problem could be two things. First, the sharing of information between those who have the mandate, the military, and those who do not have the information. There is a good incentive for everybody to work together to share the information. Second, concerning the responsibility to protect, who are going to protect these people if they are going to be part of the integrated mission?”

Ms. Koning Abuzayd started to comment on what the general from a major TCC had said regarding the Code of Conduct and that the right perception protects people. “What do not protect people in the Middle East are the political actors and policies made far away by larger actors. If the perception by the people locally is that there are biases in the policy making, then those that are representing the UN will find themselves in danger.”

The Ambassador from a major peace operations hosting country spoke about the Palestinians not being dependent from the aid that has been provided over the years. “Out of one third of the people living in refugee camps only six percent receive any welfare help from UNRWA. These are people who want to work, and who could work and manage their own economy and lives, if they were able to move freely. The emergency in Palestine is in the news every day and is not one of the forgotten emergencies as the Representative from Somalia brought up. However, political actions are needed next to the humanitarian assistance. Humanitarian assistance is often used by governments as a substitute for taking political action. This cleans their consciousness and leaves the work to the humanitarian organizations, which is not sufficient.”

Mr. Michael Curtis from ECHO agreed with the Deputy Special Representative for the DRC that the DRC is an excellent example of how military and humanitarians can work together. “By working together with the military, the humanitarians can take advantage of the increased accessibility to the population provided by the military. In the DG ECHO special focus is given to forgotten emergencies. In these situations money is not always what hinders the work, but rather the possibility to gain access on the ground and reach out to the people. With partners, the UN and, e.g., the Red Cross, the amount of money that can be spent is usually limited by the fact that work on the ground cannot be done due to the security situation.”
“A security with a foundation in the local population is of importance, but there are also situations with attacks on humanitarian workers that are not coming from the local population, but from armed militias and non-state actors. Furthermore, the proliferation of small arms in some countries is extremely damaging to the humanitarian work. The cultures are very different in the various countries, but the experiences from the DRC show that military and humanitarians can work together, and this is why we need to focus on an increased dialogue.”

Dr. Eberwein from VOICE argued that crises confronted with peacekeeping activities are principally political, and the humanitarians come in to try to bring some remedy to the situation. “Next to the different cultures of the crises, the missions are also different with tasks and underlying norms that need to be taken into consideration. I do not believe that only by looking at the situation in pragmatic terms the challenges will be dealt with. It is clear that the UN is not neutral in peacekeeping missions, which includes the humanitarian agencies of the UN. I would agree that there are challenges in the financial sector, but this is within the political responsibility of the states, and for this I believe we have to look at the Capstone Doctrine. Finally, I would like to stress the need of planning, including integrated planning at the strategic level. Coordination at the state and local level is required, and I believe this is where the problem lies today. By simply relying on individuals you will not establish a long-term sustainability. A structural condition that allows the system to function properly is needed for the long-term of a mission, as well as the willingness and ability of the involved actors to coordinate the work and respect the complementarities.”

Dr. Troeller agreed to what the Deputy Special Representative for the DRC said about MONUC and the successful work with the appropriate coordination convergence between the military and the humanitarians. Furthermore, he agree with the Challenges Forum Senior Adviser saying that aid can be perceived as political, aid can be political, and this is something we will have to manage. “The military can create a secure environment but if the development does not come in fast enough the security will be at risk, which creates a complex situation for the humanitarian organizations to work in. The Commanding General for NATO in Afghanistan has said that what is needed in Afghanistan and at the moment is not another siege but schools, hospitals and development in the cities outside Kabul. This serves as a good example of the need for development not to risk the security environment.”

Furthermore, he believed that aid can be selective, but it is a work in progress. Normally, this pertains to the long-standing refugee problems. “Essentially, there is a need for complementarity. Pragmatism is not an irrelevant concept, but it also requires principles and communication with definition of roles, exchange of staff,
liaison and training. This is even more so important with the rapid change of personnel that we are seeing in the missions.”

Sir Holmes commenting on the suggestion by the general from a major TCC proposing the usefulness of humanitarian response as part of the quick impact projects, underlined that it is important to define the role of the humanitarians and include them in the planning. “If this is carried out separately, there is a danger of blurring the roles of the various actors. The question of having access to the exposed areas has been brought up, where helicopters have been mentioned as a means of gaining access instead of opening the roads. This has been done in the DRC, Somalia and Darfur when air access has been the only possible way of reaching out to the people. However, this only gives us a particle solution to the problem, as heavy loads cannot be carried with helicopter.”

The Ambassador of a major peace operations hosting country raised the question of why humanitarian partners should be more neutral or impartial than other actors of the UN: “I believe everyone working for the UN should be respecting their mandates and be impartial in dealing with all actors. However, UN peacekeeping mandates are not always neutral. The peacekeeping mandate in Sudan and in Somalia are in support of the government or government action, but the humanitarian aid cannot or should not be given to those that support that objective, but it should rather be given to everyone in need for the humanitarian aid, and therefore I believe the need for neutrality and impartiality is even greater on the humanitarian side. We need to distinguish humanitarian actors saying things about abuses and playing politics in a more political sense. The distinction is hard to do. They are unfairly characterized for playing politics but what they are doing is rather to draw attention to a certain problem with abuses, etc.”

Ms. Koning Abuzayd suggested that some conflicts are neglected from a political point of view rather than a humanitarian point of view. “In the case of Somalia it is our third biggest humanitarian operation in the world, and majority funded by the donors. We are trying to focus on the humanitarian aspects even if the politics do not seem to work as well as they should in finding a solution.”

“Regarding private militias, humanitarian organizations should not be paying off militias for their security, but sometimes have to use particular companies to provide services. That is why we need code of conduct for particularly difficult, sensitive and complicated contexts like Somalia to make sure that there are rules that are being respected.”

“The question of culture has been raised by many speakers, and yes there are many different cultures, which is why we need a lot of communication and liaison.
Training is vital for both sides, so people can understand and communicate and build bridges. It cannot be as pragmatic as everybody said, it needs to be a mixture of pragmatism built on principles, but it does need to be pragmatic to work in the real world and that is why the training and education is so important and it does require a lot of effort on both sides. It is not a one-way business, we need to know constrains and roles.”

Sir John Holmes suggested that the conclusion to draw from today’s discussion is that everybody seems to accept that there needs to be that close working together and communication and effort to understand each other. “We must not give up even though some are tempted to lump humanitarians in with the others as all part of the same international effort or Western idea. This is not a reason to give up the struggle to distinguish the humanitarian work and its basic principles of impartiality and independence. It is a reason to step up those efforts and to work even harder to gain understanding of the local population and get their support which is one of the most important things as others have said here today.”
The Limits of Crisis Management

Speaker: Mr. Jacques Audibert, Director for Strategic Affairs, Security and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, France

Mr. President, Mr. Ambassador, Madam, Ladies, Gentlemen, Dear Friends, General Officers and Director,

I have been asked to talk about the limits of crisis management, which, for a diplomat who has spent much of his career obtaining resources for crisis management, it is a little frustrating. I will twist the subject a little to consider it in the most dynamic manner, conducting a brief examination at the limits and examining the ways to overcome them.

I would like to begin with a fact: expectations from the international community are on the rise. This international community, as it is called, must respond to crises in a rapid, credible and effective manner. For us as nations, it is a question of assuming a specific responsibility, that of moving away from this excessively vague and easy concept of “international community”, in which no one is responsible for anything, to assuming our responsibilities as nations within the United Nations, the European Union, NATO and organisations able to act in crisis management. There has been a multiplication of various types of crises: conflicts between states, humanitarian crises, human rights violations, food crises and natural disasters.

Faced with these crises, the public opinion of our countries no longer accepts inaction or mere rhetorical condemnation. One of the problems we must face is that this public opinion no longer allows the financial sacrifices required or sacrifices in terms of human engagement to play a role in the resolution and management of these crises. The emergence of a true collective international responsibility in fact requires intervention to protect populations under threat. This bears witness to the recent evolution in international law, the responsibility to protect, and the emergence of international criminal law. Finally, it is a truism that globalisation creates greater interdependence, including in terms of security as well. Thus, we must intervene and manage crises in an effective manner. And yet, managing a crisis is to act under constraints. One must act both early and long enough while being accepted on the ground. One must have the patience to wait for results that, in general terms, only come in the medium-term, whereas crisis management calls for considerable human, financial and material resources in the short-term.
Finally, one must engage in political and legal grounds that can at times be challenged by some, including public opinion in our own countries. Limits are both constraints on our action – whether they are related to human, material, financial resources or legal and political ones – but also the borders between crisis management tools and other ones that are at our disposal. While not all of these limits can be eliminated, we should, and do, work every day to push them back so that international action achieves the desired results. I will raise the most frequent difficulties and share the most pragmatic ways to address them with you.

Limitations to crisis management are essentially twofold in nature. Those common to different individual organisations that are now key players in this debate, and those that affect interaction between these organisations. In this respect, one could use four types of situations in which these limits reduce our scope of action. First and foremost, when objectives are poorly defined in this regard (for example, for the political situation or resources available), this makes things more difficult and clearly compromises the achievement of objectives.

Of course, all practitioners of crisis management know that there is nothing more difficult than defining objectives. Let us take one of the most important missions in progress in Afghanistan, ISAF. Here is a mission extremely difficult to define. We all know that we all went into Afghanistan with a very specific objective, to show to a government that gave refuge to terrorists and helped them attack one of our numbers that it could lose this power if it were to do so. We had good reason to do this, we have a reason for being in Afghanistan. However, at present we face the problem of defining our objectives, a problem which is almost inherent to crisis management but in particular in the case of Afghanistan, something which does not call into question the legitimacy of our engagement in the service of our alliances, values and security.

The second problem arises when the operation is dependent on external players to the point where it does not have control over its action. Apart from cases of enforced actions under the robust mandate of the UN Security Council, one cannot impose crisis management against the will of the local population. Crisis management must have support on the ground, something for which there is no substitute.

The third problem is that when the unsuitability of methods becomes a brake on our effectiveness, whether in terms of strategic decision-making, operational planning (clearly a critical issue) or the implementation of mandates on the ground, even for the European Union, which has demonstrated its ability to combine civilian and military capabilities. These efforts, such coordination between civilian and military, remain limited and better articulation is necessary. Finally, and this is a fundamental point, capabilities must be adapted to the conduct of crisis manage-
ment operations. We all know it is extremely difficult to deploy civilian personnel in particular in dangerous theatres, but also in other theatres. Clearly, this contributes to the imbalance seen in civilian and military efforts and the militarization of crisis management in the most hazardous theatres. This is a political reality that all of our leaders must face.

The reason is that by definition, a soldier deployed is a soldier who improves, as he or she acquires experience. Armed forces deployed are armed forces who become more valuable, gaining from experience in the theatre of operations, whereas the opposite occurs when legal officials, police or gendarmes are deployed, they also come up short in performing their duty of public service in their own country. Therefore, public opinion is more reluctant to see them leave, even though it is often this type of force and competence we need most on the ground.

Clearly, a similar problem has been noted for the deployment of military personnel. Conferences for the generation of forces multiply in number to obtain sufficient personnel, and there is also difficulty in obtaining suitable equipment. Here, we have a classic problem of planning. Just as we wish to deploy the smallest number of troops possible due to economic and political reasons, we require more and more of what is the most expensive and difficult to obtain, such as tactical transport, helicopters, and which also present us with a real problem of bottleneck. Therefore, crisis management operations are also expensive. This is one of the main limitations on the development of crisis management, whether within NATO or the EU, in the context of national budgetary constraints in which peace operations constitute heavy investment that is not attractive from a purely financial perspective. However, limitations over crisis management concern also the methods of cooperation between the different international organisations, that are all represented here.

The diversity of players is not in itself an obvious problem. It leads to duplication and even divisions in the action of the international community. For example, in Kosovo, as you are aware, we were faced with the diversity and legitimacy of different international players, but with a different perception of the players used by adversaries beyond the case of Kosovo. There is a trend towards the demultiplication of representatives from different international organisations, with the difficulty to ensure the efficiency of double-hatted or triple-hatted systems.

Specific situations of transitions or handover between the EU and the UN requires a planning that is as far ahead as possible, including in relation to its material aspects, and for the two organisations to reach pragmatic arrangements to manage ongoing situations of coexistence in a given theatre.

I would like to quickly outline with you a number of possibilities for the future. First, we will develop productive relationships between organisations active in crisis
management, in particular the UN and the EU. The UN-EU relationship would benefit from even greater closeness. To this end, the joint declarations of 2003 and 2007 provide for a steering committee, which would be accompanied by informal meetings as required. Progress must be made in terms of planning. Relations between the UN and the EU will continue to require pragmatism and flexibility, while at the same time preserving the specificity of each theatre.

Within the context of our Presidency, we presented concrete proposals for strengthening the UN-EU partnership: early warning, training and exchange of personnel, the development of a generic planning for EU short-term support to UN missions. It would be useful to cooperate further on broader security issues. Upstream of crises, it is a question of the training of personnel of the United Nations, boosting African crisis management capabilities or upstream the security sector reform, the process of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration and, finally, the support of the Peacebuilding Commission, in order to establish as much as possible a shared culture of crisis management to ensure greater automatic effectiveness from the initial stages of crises.

Wherever it is engaged, the EU must in short reinforce the role of the UN to facilitate the coordination of the civilian and military efforts of the international community. Again, this leads one to think of Afghanistan. Each must of course reinforce their own ability to manage crises. This is the meaning of our priorities of our Presidency of the EU for ESDP. I wish to emphasise that these proposals aim to boost the civilian and military capabilities available to Europeans through all organisations in which Europeans engage their capabilities, since they draw on the same reserve of force. It should be pointed out here that 21 countries are Member States of both NATO and the European Union.

This boost of our capabilities must enable us to face the threats that could degenerate into crises. These threats have been identified within the framework of the update of European Security Strategy, which is one of the key points of the programme of the French Presidency. To achieve this, we must resolve the dispersion of forces. The least Europe can do is to collectively enhance these capabilities to its technological and economic potential at the service of crisis management. And yet, we are far from achieving this objective. At this stage, unfortunately, the United Kingdom and France account for almost half the projection capability of the European Union, while their relative economic and demographic importance is less than this. Defence expenditures by other European countries must increase as soon and effectively as possible to around 2 percent of GDP. However, another crisis that has been discussed at length on television and radio shows us that it is not realistic to believe that this objective will be achieved in the months or years to come.
Therefore, we have set ourselves concrete projects in terms of capabilities in order to address the shortcomings found during crisis management operations conducted to date by the European Union. One of the main proposals relates to strategic and tactical transport, the helicopters. We also propose a strengthening of the EU’s civilian capabilities, considering that one of the strengths of the Union is its ability to mobilise and combine coordinated civilian and military resources in an intelligent manner. The EU must boost its capacity for deployment in civilian missions in coordination with military operations, where required. We propose that a civilian EDSP feedback system be put in place to identify limits to the actions of the Union in civilian crisis management, and to propose improvements in order to push back these limits.

I would like to emphasise the importance of the main limitation to crisis management: the political will. All of the capabilities, procedures and organisation discussed are related to the decisions of our leaders, choices made at the time of the acquisition of these capabilities. Our forces must be restructured. Their format, their training and their equipment must be adapted to new crisis management missions. It is a reform that has been adopted in earnest here in France. This requires sacrifices, and has a political cost. We must all resolve to do what is required to ensure that our forces are more operational, more credible.

Second, the need for political courage in the discussion and progress in putting in train joint efforts in terms of force, command, projection and information. Great courage is required in management over the long-term, inasmuch as our adversaries know perfectly well how to take advantage of the classic asymmetry that exists between democracies, which observe principles and which must take public opinion into account, and organisations and states that respect none of our values and have no hesitation in using human lives as assets.

Finally, political courage is required in the decision to act, to mobilise, to force the doors. Such was the determination of the presidency of the European Union this summer, in Georgia, allowing a contribution to be made to the resolution of crises. All of this requires great unity, both within the European Union and the Security Council. Strong consensus of opinion, a broad sharing of responsibilities and the political will to act. In my opinion, no obstacle cannot be overcome when democracies are united and courageous and have the will. As far as we are concerned, our role as officials and diplomats consists of providing our leaders with all of the options possible to be able to exercise this responsibility. Thank you.
Discussion

A question was posed regarding the suggestion that NATO was to develop deployable civilian capacities. “In recent time, the Civilian Headline Goal Programme was meant to reach its finality in 2008, but it has been extended now to 2010 and a kind of parallel Programme with the Military Headline Goal Programme had been created within the ESDP process. What is the progress on those programmes and what is being revealed from the experience today?”

The Director General of a humanitarian NGO suggested that for them, impartiality means access to populations on the sole basis of their needs, with no political conditions attached whatsoever. “We believe that preserving the lives of populations is a priority, and is our mandate. We have no other mandate. Regarding peacekeeping operations, in particular in the case of Afghanistan. We are not responsible for peace in Afghanistan; we want it but do not ask ourselves whether or not international operations are sometimes part of the problem. Seven years later in Afghanistan, what is the assessment and what lessons can be learnt? What is the feedback on Afghanistan? Is there a belief that the difficulties we face are merely an issue of coordination? Is there a problem in design from the outset? While we speak of our own values, are Afghan values also not of importance? When there is a view that all insurgents are terrorists, is there a view that this is a way of engaging a policy of reconciliation while those on the ground know too well that not all insurgents are terrorists. Perhaps it was a way of reinforcing it, rather than stating and confirming it. We talk about winning over hearts and minds. The questions I have raised are not about marketing. Populations are at the heart of conflicts, and without the support and participation of populations what can be achieved? More war? Or to secure peace? Peace will never be won without the participation of populations, or a significant proportion of populations.”

“The issue of means and resources. We, in the humanitarian sector and NGOs, can confirm the inadequacy of resources compared with the needs of populations. At present, we face a financial crisis. The United States will mobilise 700 billion USD and the Europeans 1,300 billion euros. This is very good and necessary. However, we face a poverty that gives rise to despair, a food crisis that affects a billion people, a situation where 1.2 billion people have no access to potable water and where 2.8 billion do not have access to sanitation. It is said that war results in 500,000 deaths each year, that 8 million people die from waterborne diseases because they do not have access to potable water, and that more than 5 million people die from hunger-related causes. Is this not a major source of insecurity in the world today? Does the risk not exist that this insecurity, this despair, this poverty, will create the conflicts we fear? Must the international community and politicians not have the courage to mobilise the resources required to combat this insecurity that is killing so many people around us?”
Mr. Jacques Audibert responded by suggesting that the problems raised are more closely related to development policy and the allocation of resources than to the issue of crisis management. “Going back to Afghanistan, it is like all theatres of operations in which things could have, and should have, been more organised and where we should have means better suited to our missions, where there should have been a joint analysis on how to handle our missions there. The main thing is to know what can be done now. We are there. What is essential is to show the unity that exists not within the international community (again, I find this notion too vague), but that which exists among members of the coalition on the ground in the theatre of operations.”

“As regards the values we defend, this is absolutely correct. Are we there to export our values? We all believe that access to health care, education and minimum security are consensual values also shared by Afghans themselves, despite our different cultures. And if one wonders about the purpose of our presence there, we have stepped up our involvement there, a move called for by all partners. Today, I believe there is consensus on this but no one is of the view that military means alone will bring victory in Afghanistan. Everyone believes that it is through an as-yet undiscovered combination of measures to ensure security, putting this security into the hands of Afghans and helping Afghanistan emerge from its current situation through development, since the situation there represents a danger both to its population and its stability. It is through “afghanisation” (to use this less-than-impressive neologism) i.e. the return of responsibility for security and the development of life in Afghanistan, to Afghan authorities as quickly and as effectively as possible - that a solution will be found. For now, however, I understand perfectly your questions, your indignation, and the indignation felt by those who pose these questions. My response to them is that the unity of the coalition in Afghanistan is our main weapon, and everyone knows that our efforts and their effectiveness in advancing our values, alliance and interests will be apparent only in the long-term. This must be said, since it is from Afghanistan that the threats of terrorism and drug trafficking of direct interest to us emerge.”

A researcher inquired about possible cooperation between one of the young organizations in the area of security, i.e. the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) which was established by seven countries of the former Soviet Union, and NATO. “Cooperation between Russia and NATO would help resolve the Afghanistan crisis.” The researcher further commented that NATO concentrates on cooperation with individual countries of the former Soviet Union but that CSTO is eager to establish former relations with NATO that could lead the way to possible cooperation in the peacekeeping area, including Afghanistan.
Chapter 7

Development and Peacebuilding: The Challenges of Consistency and Sustainability

Chair: Dr. Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, Senior Lecturer, Paris Institute of Political Studies, France

Since the end of the Cold War we have had more attention on the context of changes in conflict, changes that have more or less to do with intra-state conflict, rather than inter-state conflicts. There has been more interest in quantifying and qualifying why countries go to war, on civil wars as opposed to wars between countries. Over the last few years, more research has been carried out on the causes of war.

We have seen a change from causes due to political leadership, to more economic and socio-economic causes, greed and grievance that we see today. At the same time, the understanding of the conflict trap has improved, as well as the history of a conflict that dams a country to fall into a conflict again 10-15 years after they have exited from a conflict. The implications from all this research is that all stages now are considered more or less as a pre-conflict situation. If you used to have one pre-conflict-conflict and post-conflict, today a post-conflict is possibly also seen as a pre-conflict situation. Another implication is that the stages of the conflict are no longer clear. In all kinds of conflict situations, post- and pre-conflict, the number of different actors involved has changed over the last ten years.

We have had situations where the military, the diplomats, humanitarian actors, development actors and the international financial institutions coming into the field leads to a collapse of the coordination role, which furthermore gives a good explanation to the stage we are at. Within the financial institutions, units for dealing with conflicts have been created and bringing the World Bank into political areas of governance in conflicts situations, which is new. Furthermore, the military has become involved in situations that are more or less the domain of humanitarian actors. Finally, a new trend we have seen since the post-cold war, which also muddles the waters, is the entrance of the private sector in the post-conflict situation or in the conflict, which creates more challenges for coordination between the different actors in the intervention into a conflict situation. This means that the concepts have changed. If peacemaking used to be about the status quo, peacebuilding is now the concept that is being used, especially in the model of the post-war which requires more attention to the question of coordination. Furthermore, it opens up the question over where development comes in and where security ends, and where war and peace is starting to be built.
The Peace Building Commission is the institutional framework that the UN has created in order to answer to the gap that exists, and to help countries address the transition from war to peace. The Peace Building Commission is one of the concrete agreements for new institutional measures that were accepted by the UN at the 2005 UN World Summit that followed the recommendation from the high level panel. The Peace Building Commission consists of an intergovernmental organization committee with 31 members, secretariat, Peacebuilding Support Office, and a multi-year peace building fund. It works through an organizational committee meeting, country specific meetings and working groups on lessons learnt. So far the peace building committee has worked with Sierra Leone, Burundi and Guinea Bissau as cases.

The four purposes the commission has set out for itself to deal with is to create integrated strategies for post-conflict peace building, support the predictability and the sustainability of financing in post-conflict situations, extend the pier of attention of the international community in post-conflict situations and to act as knowledge management, and share best practices on issues.

The UN Peace Building Commission is going through treading problems and during the first three years of operation they have faced a number of different challenges. Regarding the mandate, the commission could have at least another four types of mandates, advisory role, set priorities, monitoring commitment and coordinating. The taking up of new functions by the Peace Building Commission is hampered by a number of challenges. Some of these can be clustered as follows; the function of the Peace Building Commission in terms of the role in international peace building architecture. How to work out the coherence vis-à-vis the actors involved in peace building and vis-à-vis the UN General Assembly and the Security Council. Another set of challenges that the Peace Building Commission has to deal with are the operational issues that have to do more or less with finances, the institutional teaching problem, capacity, turnover and the added value of its office.

Choosing the cases of Sierra Leone, Burundi and Guinea Bissau are far from the controversial cases that the peace building commission could have chosen. The reason behind choosing these was because they were able to solidify the reputation through dealing with these countries and at the same time avoid the controversies. However, this furthermore raises the question over how the countries are chosen and which countries that will be chosen after these.

Politically, I think the major problems for the Peace Building Commission is the entrance of non-traditional members in the debate around the question of peace-building. The Peace Building Commission is one of the few UN organizations working under the situations that actually have brought in a number of Southern
countries. On the other hand, it means that the debate have opened up to much more inclusive discussions, while at the same time the Peace Building Commission has faced quite a lot of problems of moving forward due to the North/South debate that exists within the UN.

Background Paper III

Mr. Cedric de Coning, Research Fellow, African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, South Africa, and Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Norway

Introduction

In the post-Cold War era, the focus of international conflict management has increasingly shifted from peacekeeping, which was then understood to be about maintaining an agreed status quo, to peacebuilding, which has to do with managing transitions. The nexus between development, governance and security have become the central focus of the international effort to manage transitions, and peacebuilding is increasingly seen as the collective framework under which the dimensions of conflict management, security, humanitarian action, governance, rule of law, human rights and development can be brought together under one common strategic framework. The international debate about the need for, and appropriate role of, peacebuilding culminated, as the centrepiece of the UN reform proposals of the 2005 World Summit, in the establishment of the UN Peacebuilding Commission.

It is challenging to make a meaningful assessment of the utility of peacebuilding as a policy concept and operational model as it has been used as an umbrella term for a range of loosely connected actions rather than for a specific policy directed action or operational construct. Initial indications have been mixed, and should serve as further motivation to invest in more significant and systematic efforts at organizational learning. We need to further improve our understanding of what it is we want peacebuilding to do. What has been done in the name of peacebuilding to date? And perhaps most importantly, what impacts have been generated by undertaking these series of inter-related actions we describe collectively as peacebuilding? This paper is a modest attempt to take stock of what we know about peacebuilding, and to suggest some priority areas for future action.

In the background section, this paper will make an attempt to take stock of our current understanding of peacebuilding. It will then focus on five challenges that have the potential to significantly improve our peacebuilding practice. These five areas for future action are:
a. Improving our collective conceptual understanding of the peacebuilding concept through encouraging formal and informal debate, and the institutionalization of a specific peacebuilding doctrine in the United Nations;
b. Further developing our understanding of the practical application of the concepts of Preventative- and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding;
c. Significantly stepping-up efforts to pursue agency-, whole-of-government-, external- and internal/external coherence, including our understanding of the limits of coherence;
d. Meaningfully operationalizing the principle of local ownership; and
e. Generating a clearly articulated overall peacebuilding framework that can provide the various peacebuilding agents with a common frame of reference.

Taken together, these five challenges represent opportunities for policy action that have the potential to enhance our collective ability to undertake more effective and sustainable peacebuilding action.

Background

The emergence of peacebuilding should be understood in the context of an increasingly complex and interdependent international conflict management system. During the Cold War period, the United Nations, regional organisations and independent agencies were called upon to undertake humanitarian relief, peacemaking and peacekeeping actions at a scale usually manageable within the scope of the independent capabilities of these organisations, or at a level that could be managed with limited cooperative arrangements. The scale and complexity of the crisis faced by the international community in the post Cold War era was of a different magnitude, and as a result, it has often been the case that no single agency, government or international organization could manage them on their own. These organisations were ill prepared to deal with the complexity of the challenges posed by the emerging post-conflict reconstruction challenges of the post-Cold War era.4

The international community’s experiences in El Salvador, Cambodia, Namibia, Nicaragua, and Mozambique in the late 1980s and early 1990s required a major shift in focus.5 The question was no longer how we can stabilise a situation in order to maintain the precarious Cold War balance. Instead the focus shifted to a new agenda: how can we collectively, as the international community, better facilitate and support the implementation of comprehensive peace agreements in countries emerging from violent conflict and civil-war?

In response, a wide-range of agencies (governmental and non-governmental, regional and international) have independently started to developed specialized capacities to manage different aspects of what we today recognise as an overall
peacebuilding system, and together they have been able to respond with a broad range of interlinked activities. The distributed nature of this multi-dimensional and multi-disciplinary response was able to manage some of these highly dynamic crisis environments reasonably well. In many others, however the degree to which the international peacebuilding system lacked coherence resulted in, amongst others, inter-agency rivalry, working at cross-purposes, competition for funding, duplication of effort and less than optimal economies of scale.\(^6\) Taken together, and combined with a range of other factors, such as the role of the belligerent parties\(^7\) and the internal dynamics of post-conflict settlements\(^8\), the challenges of coordinating the international response significantly contributed to the overall poor success rate of peacebuilding to date, as measured in the sustainability of the systems that came about as a result of these international interventions.\(^9\)

In order to address these shortcomings and improve the overall success rate of the international conflict management system, various agencies, governments and organizations have started exploring, sometimes independently from each other and at times collectively, with a range of models and mechanisms aimed at improving the overall coherence, cooperation and coordination of their conflict management systems. All these initiatives have broadly similar aims, namely to achieve greater harmonization and synchronization among the activities of the different international/external\(^10\) and local/internal\(^11\) actors, and across the analysis, planning, implementation, management and evaluation aspects of a programme or engagement cycle. In the context of these developments, peacebuilding is increasingly seen as the collective framework under which the political, security, rule of law, governance, human rights and development dimensions of these international interventions can be brought together under one common strategic framework.\(^12\)

Whilst there is no one common definition, approach or model for peacebuilding that is widely accepted, there are some common characteristics that have emerged over the last decade and a half of peacebuilding practise\(^13\). The first is that peacebuilding is primarily concerned with securing or consolidating the peace. It is concerned with preventing a lapse, or relapse, into violent conflict. Peacebuilding is aimed at consolidating the peace by addressing those conflict factors that may, in the short to medium term threaten a lapse, or relapse into conflict, as well as addressing the root causes of conflicts, that may threaten the peace over the long term. In Liberia, for instance, such short term conflict factors may be land disputes, youth expectations, political polarisation, and weak justice systems, whilst the root causes are related to the structural inequalities inherent in society.\(^14\) There is thus a difference in the way we would, for instance, approach Security Sector Reform in a peacebuilding vs. development context. Reforming the security forces may form part of the long term development goals of, for instance Ghana, but that is different from pursuing similar goals in, for instance Liberia, in that the former
is motivated by issues of effectiveness and efficiency whilst the latter, whilst certainly also informed by such considerations, are primarily motivated by consolidating the peace and preventing a relapse into conflict. There is thus a conflict prevention and management aspect that is central to our understanding of peacebuilding.

The second is that peacebuilding is a multi-dimensional or system-wide undertaking that spans several dimensions. There are different models or approaches, but most range from differentiating between three core dimensions to the more elaborate that list six to eight different dimensions. The UN Secretary-General’s report *No Exit without Strategy* argues that peacebuilding should be understood as fostering the capacity to resolve future conflicts by: (1) consolidating security, (2) strengthening political institutions and (3) promoting economic and social reconstruction. Barnett et al refer to the same three dimensions as: (1) stability creation, (2) restoration of state institutions and (3) socioeconomic recovery. The President of the World Bank refers to security, governance and development and links it, in the Afghanistan context, to the counterinsurgency principles of clear, hold and build. And these are the same three dimensions reflected in the so-called 3D (diplomacy, development and defence) Whole-of-Government approach. The UN’s Integrated Approach opts for a more elaborate list that includes: political, development, humanitarian, human rights, rule of law, social and security aspects. The African Union’s *Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Framework* comprises of five similar constitutive elements, but it also adds gender as a self-standing element. There is thus broad convergence around the core peacebuilding dimensions listed in Table 1.

Humanitarian assistance should be highlighted as one function that is treated differently in the various models. There is widespread recognition that it is independent from the other functions in that it does not share peacebuilding’s essential conflict prevention objective. Some models, including the UN’s Integrated Approach, nevertheless include humanitarian assistance within peacebuilding as a function that takes place independently, but parallel to, the other peacebuilding dimensions. The UN approach argues that it needs to be included in the overall framework in order to be factored into planning and coordination mechanisms.

The third aspect relates to the tension that exists between independence and interdependence. The various peacebuilding actors exist as independent agents with their own mandates, programmes and resources, and yet they are also interdependent on each other to achieve their respective objectives, and that of the overall peacebuilding undertaking. Most peacebuilding related programmes only make sense as part of a larger system of related programmes. Disarmament and demobilization programmes, for instance, rely on the assumption that others will pro-
vide a series of reintegration programmes, and they all rely on the assumption that there are other programs in place that will create security, improve opportunities for education and healthcare, and create employment for ex-combatants or alternative opportunities for sustainable livelihoods. Such a network of programmes exist both as independent programmes with their own sources of funding and separate implementing arrangements, and as a network of interdependent programmes whose combined output produce an outcome that their individual efforts could not have achieved independently.

The fourth aspect relates to our time perspective. Again there is no widely accepted model but a general convergence, within one school in the literature around an understanding of a progression from violent conflict to sustainable peace that

Table 1: The Dimensions of Peacebuilding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security &amp; Rule of Law</th>
<th>Providing a Safe and Secure Environment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Protection of Civilians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disarmament &amp; Demobilization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Police, Corrections &amp; the Judicial Reform (Rule of Law)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support the Peace Process &amp; Oversee the Political Transition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political Participation, National Dialogue &amp; Reconciliation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Government institutions &amp; Civil Service Capacity Building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Governance)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Extend State Authority Throughout the Territory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conflict Management Capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-economic Recovery</td>
<td>Physical Infrastructure: Roads, Ports, Airports; Electricity; Telecommunications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social Services: Health, Education, Social Welfare, Population Registration, Civil Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stimulating and Facilitating Economic Growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Rights</td>
<td>Human Rights Education, Advocacy and Monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Assistance</td>
<td>Emergency and Early Recovery Services in the areas of Food, Water &amp; Sanitation, Shelter, Health, Refugees/IDPs and Protection</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
moves through various stages. In this broader context, there are a few phases that take place within the peacebuilding stage, including perhaps a stabilization phase, a transitional phase, and a consolidation phase. The peacebuilding stage ends when a country emerging out of conflict has reached the ability to sustain its peace process without external support, after which it returns to, or enters a normal development stage.

There is, however, another school of thought that represents a deep-seated scepticism towards understanding peacebuilding as naturally following any specific progression. There are many different paths to sustainable peace. Not all require a violent conflict phase, and those that do experience violent conflict are not all subject to external intervention. Some are resolved internally, others lead to the victory of one side over another. Many experience relapse.

However, broad agreement does seem to have emerged on two other time-related issues. The first is recognition that post-conflict peacebuilding is a long-term process, and that a longer and more sustained international commitment is necessary than was understood a decade ago. This longer-term time frame for post-conflict peacebuilding was agreed on at the World Summit in 2005 and resulted in the establishment of the UN Peacebuilding Commission, with the aim of ensuring that the international community in general, and the UN in particular, remains engaged in countries in the post-conflict peacebuilding stage.

This was regarded as necessary because the UN Security Council’s attention tends to be focussed on those crises where the UN has a direct stake, usually in the form of a UN peacekeeping operation. When such operations came to an end, the post-conflict countries in question tended to move off the Security Council agenda. The UN Peacebuilding Commission now represents not only a specific focus on peacebuilding, but it also helps to keep countries where there are no longer a UN peacekeeping presence, but where the peace is still fragile and reversible, on the UN agenda.

The second is recognition that although post-conflict peacebuilding requires a long-term commitment, there is also a need for immediate and short-term gains to solidify the peace, build confidence in the peace process and stimulate a vision of a better future. This has resulted in practices such as the now standard inclusion of funds for quick impact projects in UN peacekeeping budgets, and an acceptance that some aspects of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), Rule of Law (RoL) and Security Sector Reform (SSR) should be funded out of the assessed contributions to the UN peacekeeping operations budget. However, this is an area that still leaves room for significant improvement.
The problematic record of peacebuilding over the last decade and a half reminds us, however, that there still are more questions than answers, and that we need to give urgent and focussed attention to a number of critical aspects of international peacebuilding, if we want to improve the success rate and overall impact of our efforts. The next sections will focus in on five such aspects that deserve the focussed attention of the international community. These five challenges are presented as recommended areas for immediate and urgent policy action. Once addressed, they have the potential to significantly improve the impact, and therefore, sustainability of international peacebuilding.

Conceptual and Theoretical Models

The term peacebuilding was introduced in 1992 by then UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in *An Agenda for Peace*, as “action to identify and support structures which tend to strengthen and solidify peace to avoid a relapse into conflict”. Peacebuilding was explained as “the counterpart of preventive diplomacy”, where preventive diplomacy is seen as action aimed a avoiding a crisis whilst peacebuilding is aimed at preventing a recurrence. In the *Agenda for Peace*, conflict prevention and peacebuilding was thus juxtaposed at the opposite ends of the conflict management spectrum, with preventive diplomacy representing the first or opening stage of an intervention and peacebuilding the last or closing stage.

According to this model, the UN response to conflict, in its simplest form, is first to prevent conflict (preventive diplomacy); if that fails the next step is to make peace (peacemaking) by gathering all the parties around the negotiation table; if a cease-fire or an agreement is reached, the UN could deploy a peacekeeping mission to monitor the cease-fire and to otherwise assist with the implementation of the agreement; and lastly, the UN will assist to rebuild the country with a specific focus on addressing the root causes of the conflict so as to ensure that the conflict does not re-occur again (peacebuilding).

This original conceptualization and modelling have an enduring impact and many people at the policy, funding and operational level still have these original concepts in mind when working with conflict prevention and peacebuilding issues. However, over the past decade and a half our understanding of the peace instruments highlighted in the *Agenda for Peace* have been refined through practise and analysis, and they are now broadly understood to be interdependent and interlinked aspects of the same process, rather than chronological steps or stages in a linear conflict management continuum. Prevention, for instance, is now understood as something that needs to be proactively present throughout the life-cycle of conflict management, not just something we do before violent conflict breaks out. Prevention is also now
understood to be an essential element of peacebuilding. As most conflicts do not emerge anew, but usually have a long history, including previous cycles of peaceful coexistence interspersed with outbreaks of violent conflict, the question whether a certain action is pre- or post-conflict becomes an arbitrary matter of perspective. In fact, as the root causes of conflict are typically linked to deep-seated and centuries-old patterns of exclusivity, inequality and privilege, addressing the root causes of a conflict is bound to stir up further tensions and require pro-active conflict prevention. In practise these instruments have thus proven to be interchangeable and interlinked, to the extent that the original prevention to peacebuilding continuum envisaged in the Agenda for Peace is no longer a useful frame of reference.

In this context there is a need to revisit and clarify exactly what it is the various actors, and especially the United Nations, understand with the peacebuilding concept. This is not merely of academic interest. Conceptual confusion leads to policy vagueness, duplication, omission and competition. It complicates resource mobilization and causes budgetary confusion, and at the operational level it contributes to inefficiency and ineffectiveness, and thus ultimately to loss of impact and sustainability.

We should also not shy away from the fact that the way peacebuilding is understood is not only a technical debate, but also a political issue. The debate should thus not be confined to those professionally engaged in peacebuilding. It should first and foremost be actively pursued as an international diplomatic debate. When the peacebuilding concept was introduced in Agenda for Peace, it reflected an optimism that existed in the immediate post-Cold War period for collective third party intervention.31 There was a sense in the period between the end of the Cold War and before 9/11, that collective third party peacebuilding could represent a new era of benevolent international intervention.

The sense of optimism has since evaporated and has been replaced by a largely divided perception of peacebuilding. Some in the North, for instance the G8, view peacebuilding as a tool for managing failed or failing states, and assisting them with establishing the values and structures that typify liberal-market democracies, which those in the North view as synonymous with responsible and stable sovereignty.32 Some in the South, for instance those leading the Non-Aligned Movement and the G-77, is sceptical and view peacebuilding as having the potential to harbour a new form of colonialism, which if unchecked, can result in the neo-imperialist and neo-capitalist exploitation of vulnerable post-conflict societies33. It is important not to shy away from this debate, but to create forums where those with opposing views can shape each other’s understanding of peacebuilding, and where the different schools of thought can develop a better understanding of the interests and issues that drive their respective approaches to peacebuilding.
The international community in general, and the UN in particular, will find it difficult to develop a coherent peacebuilding system in the context of a deeply divided international diplomatic community. At worse, the UN may find itself back in the Cold War context where contradictory interests and disagreement over the concept, content and process of peacebuilding, for instance among member of the UN Security Council and the Peacebuilding Commission, prevents the international community, and especially the UN, from taking coherent action.

Recommendations

Recommendation 1: The international community, and in particular the UN, should take proactive steps to facilitate debate that is aimed at improving our collective understanding of peacebuilding, including encouraging formal and informal debates about the concept and its application, encouraging and supporting research, and promoting a culture of organizational learning within those institutions responsible for peacebuilding action. The Peacebuilding Commission should play a leading role in seeking to develop a UN peacebuilding doctrine that captures the current definition, approaches and models that the UN system applies when it undertakes peacebuilding action.

Peacebuilding defined. The UN Policy Committee, in its May 2007 deliberations, approved a useful working definition of peacebuilding: “Peacebuilding involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict, to strengthen national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding strategies must be coherent and tailored to the specific needs of the country concerned, based on national ownership, and should comprise a carefully prioritised, sequenced, and therefore relatively narrow set of activities aimed at achieving the above objectives”.34

Peacebuilding aims to consolidate and institutionalise peace by undertaking a range of actions that go beyond preventing violence (negative peace).35 It aims to address the underlying root causes of conflict and to create the conditions for a just social order (positive peace).36 In this context, it may be useful to revisit the distinction between preventative peacebuilding and post-conflict peacebuilding, as much of the conceptual confusion comes about when these two distinct perspectives of peacebuilding are muddled together.

Preventative Peacebuilding. Preventative Peacebuilding refers to activities aimed at addressing urgent or imminent risks to the peace process, and it usually takes the form of specific time-bound activities aimed at addressing a particular need or
risk. These can be identified as short- to medium-term conflict factors that may potentially impact negatively on the peace process, and that can be addressed through specific targeted programme responses. Some donors now have funds specifically earmarked for peacebuilding, as does the UN’s Peacebuilding Fund, and those funds would most likely be used to fund specific programmes in this category. The time-frame for Preventative Peacebuilding is necessarily short- to medium-term, because it is focussed on immediate or imminent threats to the peace process. Examples of Preventative Peacebuilding programmes include conflict resolution training and capacity building, the development of institutional capabilities needed for conflict prevention, such as the Peace Commission in southern Sudan or the Ituri Pacification Commission, support for civil society or women’s groups to participate in peacemaking initiatives, and support for national reconciliation initiatives, including aspects of transitional justice. Some donors would also include support for specific programme activities that form part of, or support, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), Rule of Law (RoL) and Security Sector Reform (SSR) in this peacebuilding category.

Some donors do not earmark funds specifically for peacebuilding, but prefer to encourage a Conflict Sensitive Development approach when working in conflict affected countries. Conflict Sensitive Development programmes have a developmental objective, for example, poverty reduction, but is sensitive to the conflict environment within which they operate, in that specific steps are taken in the design and management of the programme to either avoid aggravating the situation, or to proactively support conflict prevention efforts.37

An important pre-requisite for a Preventative Peacebuilding approach is an understanding of the risks to the peace process, and the conflict factors that characterise the conflict system. A Post-Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) is, or should be, typically undertaken as part of the process leading up to the design of appropriate Preventative Peacebuilding programmes. It is thus important to work towards a common understanding of what the conflict factors in a particular context are, from the earliest planning stages and continuously throughout the life-cycle of the peacebuilding system.38 Funding for, and capacity building towards, effective participation in a PCIA approach could also be regarded as a Preventative Peacebuilding activity.

Post-Conflict Peacebuilding. Post-conflict peacebuilding on the other hand, emerges out of the total combined effort of the activities undertaken under the various peacebuilding dimensions introduced earlier (see Table 1), and thus exists in the form of a system-wide process. This overall effort may sometimes be described as a strategy or vision, for example, in an integrated strategic framework or Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS). There may be specific processes and structures that
facilitate the development, management and monitoring of such peacebuilding frameworks, and these may be specifically funded. In general, however, support for post-conflict peacebuilding occurs in a highly fragmented manner in that the various agencies that participates in, and contribute to, the overall process, each independently design, manage, monitor and evaluate and secure funding for their programmes. These activities are not necessarily identified as, or funded as, peacebuilding at the programme level, although some of the programmes discussed in the preventative peacebuilding section may be. Instead, they would, be considered and funded as, for instance, development, human rights, or Rule of Law activities. It is when these activities are considered together, in the context of their combined and cumulative effect, over time, that their Post-Conflict Peacebuilding identity emerges.

A strategic or integrated framework, that is aimed at an overall strategic vision for the post-conflict peacebuilding process, such as a conflict sensitive PRS, maps out the overall priorities and objectives of the post-conflict peacebuilding strategy for a particular country. Recent examples include the Results Focussed Transitional Framework (RFTF), interim IRSP and RSP in Liberia and the Integrated Peacebuilding Framework in Burundi. Such individual programmes become part of the post-conflict peacebuilding process when they contribute to, and are considered as part of the overall effort directed towards achieving the objectives set out in the strategic vision. In some cases the individual agencies and activities may be conscious of their role in the overall framework, but in some cases this linkage is drawn only at the systemic level, for instance in strategic evaluations or in annual PRS reports. This does not imply that the connections are artificial, but rather that those at the programme level are not always aware of the degree to which their individual activities contribute to an overall post-conflict peacebuilding framework.

There is debate over the extent to which a development activity such as poverty reduction or infrastructure development, e.g. the construction of a road, can be regarded as having a conflict prevention objective, and thus be considered to be part of a peacebuilding framework. The confusion lies in the perspective and context. An individual donor or implementing agent may not think of, or categorise the funding of, for example, the construction of a road, as peacebuilding, from the programme level perspective. However, from a systemic perspective, e.g. in the context of an integrated peacebuilding framework, the construction of roads may be regarded as an important element of a larger Post-Conflict Peacebuilding framework. It may create work, including for ex-combatants, it may stimulate local economies and improve livelihoods by providing access to markets, it may stimulate local contractor capacity, it may open up outlying areas previously marginalised because of their inaccessibility, and assist in the extension of the authority of
the state into those territories, and it may contribute to overall economic growth, all of which are important aspects of an environment conducive to a successful peace process and thus preventing a relapse into conflict.

To conclude this conceptual discussion, the paper has highlighted the distinction and inter-relationship between Preventative Peacebuilding and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding. Preventative Peacebuilding is about individual programmes that have a peacebuilding objective, whilst Post-Conflict Peacebuilding is about the overall, or systemic, effect and the strategic framework processes that direct the individual activities towards common goals and objectives. The former is only present at the activity level whilst the latter can only be identified at the systemic level, and many of its constituting elements may be unaware, at the activity or programme level, that they are considered to be part of a larger peacebuilding effort. In most cases the distinction between Preventative and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding would not be explicitly stated, and it may thus be easier to think in terms of all programme or activity-level peacebuilding activities, for example all peacebuilding programmes funded by the Peacebuilding Fund, as Preventative Peacebuilding, and all systemic-level peacebuilding efforts and processes, as Post-Conflict Peacebuilding.

Recommendation 2: The peacebuilding community should make a concerted attempt to distinguish, conceptually, programmatically and financially, between those activities that have an immediate peacebuilding objective, and those that contribute to an overall peacebuilding framework. Such a distinction will greatly assist peacebuilding agents at all levels (planning, funding, coordination, implementation, evaluation) from confusing the specific and the systemic. This should contribute to increased clarity, and therefore relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and impact.

The Coherence Dilemma. A large number of evaluation reports and research studies that have analyzed the record of post-Cold War peacebuilding efforts have identified significant problems with coherence and coordination, and have found that this has contributed to the poor rate of sustainability of these operations to date. It is estimated that approximately a quarter of all peace processes fail within the first five-years. For example, the Joint Utstein Study of peacebuilding, that analyzed 336 peacebuilding projects implemented by Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Norway over the last decade, has identified a lack of coherence at the strategic level, what it terms a strategic deficit, as the most significant obstacle to sustainable peacebuilding. The Utstein study found that more than 55 percent of the programmes it evaluated did not show any link to a larger country strategy.
The need for, and benefits of, improved coherence is widely accepted today in the international multilateral governance context. There is now broad consensus that inconsistent policies and fragmented programmes entail a higher risk of duplication, inefficient spending, a lower quality of service, difficulty in meeting goals and, ultimately, of a reduced capacity for delivery, and thus impact.\textsuperscript{46} In this paper ‘coherence’ is understood as the effort to direct the wide range of activities undertaken in the political, governance, development, human rights, humanitarian, rule of law and security dimensions of a peacebuilding system towards common strategic objectives.\textsuperscript{47}

There is a widely held assumption that a more coherent approach, that manages to produce a comprehensive and coordinated system-wide effort, will have a more relevant, effective, efficient and sustainable impact on any given peacebuilding process. It is important to recognize, however, that the highly dynamic and non-linear nature of complex systems implies that coherence can never be fully attained\textsuperscript{48}. It is possible, however to distinguish between systems where there is less, or more, coherence, and pursuing coherence should thus be understood as an aspiration that can be measured only in degree, not in end states.

Coherence also needs to be understood in the context of the natural tensions and inherent contradictions between the various peacebuilding dimensions and among the different peacebuilding actors.\textsuperscript{49} The agencies that are responsible for programmes and campaigns may often have to settle for ‘second best’ or ‘partially coherent’ solutions in order to establish a workable foundation for cooperation.\textsuperscript{50}

This paper distinguishes between four elements of coherence\textsuperscript{51} in the peacebuilding context, namely: (1) agency coherence, i.e. consistency among the policies and actions of an individual agency, including the internal consistency of a specific policy or programme; (2) whole-of-government coherence, i.e. consistency among the policies and actions of the different government agencies of a country; (3) external coherence, i.e. consistency among the policies pursued by the various international actors in a given country context (harmonization); and (4) internal/external coherence, i.e. consistency between the policies of the local and international actors in a given country context (alignment).

Agency Coherence. Agency coherence refers to consistency among the policies and actions of an individual agency, including the internal consistency of a specific policy or programme. Consistency in this context refers to one agency working at cross-purposes with itself. This does not imply that there is no room for differences and debate during the policy formulation and review process, but once a policy or intervention has been agreed on it needs to be implemented in such a way
that all the different elements of the agency contribute to the overall objective in a complementary fashion.

The way in which the UN Secretariat bureaucratically separates conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding between the political, peacekeeping, and field service departments and the peacebuilding support office, and the way in which the responsibility for a given country in crisis is shifted back and forth between departments, depending on whether it is considered to be a case for prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping or peacebuilding, have implications for the way in which the overall UN peacebuilding effect remains fragmented and incoherent. The role of the UN Security Council and the way in which the assessed contribution system favours UN peacekeeping operations, and therefore an expansion of this tool in order to make use of the resources that come with it, further contributes to the problems the UN Secretariat experiences in its attempts to improve agency coherence. Expanding the assessed contribution system to include all peace and security related actions authorised by the UN Security Council may be one of the ways in which the UN can ensure that its own structural arrangements does not favour peacekeeping to the detriment of prevention, peacemaking and peacebuilding.

Recommendation 3: The UN should give serious consideration to how it can improve the way its Secretariat currently manages and finances prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities across the various departments. The division of work appears to be based on the outdated Agenda for Peace categorization of the stages of peace, and it may be a factor in the way the UN Secretariat is perceived to be fragmented and incoherent.

Whole-of-Government Coherence. Whole-of-government coherence refers to consistency among the policies and actions of different departments and agencies of the same government or multi-lateral institution. The Canadian Government’s so-called 3D (diplomacy, development and defence) concept is the classical example, and is aimed at ensuring that its peacebuilding interventions are supported coherently by all the relevant arms of government. The United Kingdom created an inter-agency unit, first called the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU) and later re-named the Stabilization Unit. It brings together the departments of defence, international development (DFID) and the foreign ministry, and manages a joint funding pool. The United States of America created the Office for the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) in the State Department, and various other Governments such as the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden have their own national coherence initiatives. One common driving factor in all these examples is their respective engagements in Afghanistan, where they each lead or participate in Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) that are military led, but usually
include police and border control officers, as well as justice, development and political advisors.

At the multilateral level the United Nations, European Union, African Union and NATO are each engaged in various initiatives aimed at improving their whole-of-government coherence. The United Nations (UN) system has responded to the coherence challenge by commissioning, and considering, the reports of a series of high-level panels and working groups. It is now busy implementing these reports in two parallel processes. On the one hand the UN system is piloting – under the slogan ‘Delivering as One’ - recommendations by the high-level panel on system-wide coherence that has looked into coherence among those members of the UN family working in the humanitarian, development and environmental areas. On the other hand, the UN has developed an internal mechanism and process to integrate the UN’s political, security, developmental, human rights and humanitarian agencies under an Integrated Approach when the UN deploys a peacekeeping operation.

Integration was one of the central themes of the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, the so-called Brahimi Report. The Secretary-General, in his comments on the Report, called for a plan that can help the different parts of the UN system to work together to develop country-specific peacebuilding strategies that are coherent, flexible and field driven. The UN’s Integrated Approach, that has subsequently been developed, refers to a specific type of operational process and design, where the planning and coordination processes of the different elements of the UN family is integrated into a single country-level UN system, when it undertakes complex peacekeeping operations. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has reaffirmed an Integrated Approach as the guiding principle for all conflict and post-conflict situations where the UN has a Country Team and a multidimensional peacekeeping operation, or a political or peacebuilding office, regardless of whether these missions are structurally integrated or not.

Recommendation 4: The UN needs to harmonize and integrate the two parallel, but poorly connected, coherence processes currently underway, namely the integrated approach and system-wide coherence initiative. It is unclear, for instance, to what degree the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP) is accepted as a system-wide planning tool that can facilitate meaningful UN system coherence in a peacebuilding context?

External Coherence. External coherence refers to the harmonization of policies and actions among the external actors in a given country context. It relates to all types of external actor relationships, such as the civil-military interface already mentioned above. One area which is particularly relevant is the relationship
among donors, both bilateral and multilateral, and addresses the need for donors to harmonize their policies and practises so as to limit the transaction costs associated with their support. The Rome Declaration on Harmonization captures the commitment of donors to improve coherence among them. At the country-level donors will usually establish a series of coordination mechanisms and processes that will assist them to coordinate among themselves, and that is meant to ease the interaction between the host Government, as well as civil society and other internal stakeholders, and the donors. The donor community is a relatively small family, with largely similar values and world views, and despite the fact that they have several coordinating bodies, including the G8+ at the political-strategic level and the OECD at the technical one, they are finding it extremely difficult to achieve a satisfactory level of external coherence, especially in places like Afghanistan. This is because even within this micro-cosmos of the larger peacebuilding family we find the same fault lines: different values, incompatible principles, contradictory theories of change, and in this particular case, competing national interests.

Internal/External Coherence. Internal/External coherence refers to the alignment of the policies and actions between internal and external actors, especially at the strategic framework level, in a given country context. This paper will focus on two areas where the lack of internal/external coherence has had the most damaging effect on achieving sustainability, and which, correspondingly, hold the most promise for improving peacebuilding coherence.

The first is the need to meaningfully operationalise the principle of local ownership. The inability of the internal and external actors to realize this aspect of their stated policies and principles of alignment is one of the most significant shortcomings in the context of peacebuilding coherence. The second is the need to generate a clearly articulated overall peacebuilding framework that can provide the various peacebuilding agents with a common frame of reference that can be used as a benchmark for coherence. It is inconceivable that a peacebuilding system can achieve sustainability if either of these two aspects – an overarching peacebuilding framework and local ownership - are lacking.

Local Ownership. There is wide recognition that externally driven post-conflict peacebuilding processes are unsustainable. Whilst some argue for autonomous recovery, most developing and developed countries favour peacebuilding systems that are internationally assisted but locally led. Peacebuilding activities should be needs-based, and the priorities, sequencing and pace of delivery need to be informed by the dynamics of the host system, not by those providing assistance and support, through local ownership and meaningful internal/external coordination. Achieving a balanced and meaningful partnership between internal and
external peacebuilding agents is thus one of the most important success factors for any post-conflict peacebuilding system. It is also one of the most difficult to achieve.

External actors find it difficult to identify credible internal actors with whom they can enter into a meaningful partnership, especially in the stabilization and transitional phases before elections are held.\textsuperscript{64} The internal actors also typically lack the resources, technical expertise and support systems to engage meaningfully with the external actors. In fact, the concept of fragile states was initially developed in the donor context to refer to countries where the Government is unable or unwilling to establish a meaningful relationship with bilateral and multilateral donors.\textsuperscript{65} Mc Candless recommends that capacity assessments should play a key role in guiding peacebuilding planning.\textsuperscript{66} She stresses that the existence of internal capacity to design and manage a peacebuilding process cannot be assumed, and that there is usually a need for training and capacity building of the different actors, including on the conceptual and process aspects of peacebuilding. Capacity analysis can also be a key tool in identifying crucial areas for investment in capacity building, in order to avoid last minute rushed, and thus typically ineffective, attempts to build capacity immediately preceding periods of handover of responsibility from external to internal actors.

The internal peacebuilding agents report that they typically feel intimidated by the momentum, scope and depth of the external intervention. They are overwhelmed by the pressure to engage with all the assessments, proposals and plans generated by the sudden influx of external actors, and they are frustrated that despite all this activity there is typically little to show, in terms of short-to medium term peace dividends, for their time and effort. Whilst this is especially the case in the stabilization and transitional phases, before or whilst the necessary capacities have been developed, it remains a problem long thereafter. The work of the Peacebuilding Commission in Burundi is a case in point. The development of the integrated peacebuilding strategy for Burundi put considerable additional strain on the Government of Burundi, and in June 2007 the UN Country Team had to ask the Peacebuilding Commission not to further burden the Government of Burundi, and as a result the Commission decided to postpone the work on monitoring mechanisms.\textsuperscript{67}

External actors also point to the dysfunction caused by their own institutional cultures that emphasize output rather than impact. The pressure to rapidly respond, achieve planned outputs and to disburse funds within fixed time-frames (external budget cycles) often result in external actors compromising on the time and resources needed to invest in identifying credible internal counterparts, generate consultative processes and develop meaningful local ownership. Consultations undertaken under pressure, for instance during rapid needs assessments or poorly planned and
rushed evaluations, often serve to legitimize pre-conceived perceptions rather than add value by generating independent and objective opinions and analysis, and thus fail to reflect the true needs and priorities of the internal actors. Under pressure from the internal/external power imbalance, internal actor representatives make the common mistake of telling the external actors what they think the external agents would like to hear, rather than sharing with them their own perceptions and opinions of what kind of support they think they need, and the priorities as they perceive them. As Campbell points out, “strategic plans developed by the entire UN system in the country tend to be driven by the mandates and priorities of each subunit more than by the needs of the country emerging from violent conflict”.

Meaningful sustainability requires that the internal actors should not just own the problem, but also the solutions. The body of evidenced-based research and field-based evaluations sited in this paper are unforgiving and clear on this point: peace-building cannot achieve sustainable impact without meaningful local ownership.

Recommendation 5: An extraordinary initiative is needed to move local ownership from slogan to reality. Internal and External Actors need to work together to identify the principles that should govern local ownership, and identify ways in which it can be meaningfully operationalised.

Strategic Frameworks. The need for overall strategic frameworks are widely recognized and accepted but poorly applied in practice. As the Utstein and other recent studies sited have pointed out, the lack of a clearly articulated overall strategy is, in fact, a critical shortcoming in most past and contemporary peacebuilding systems. The first prerequisite for coherence in any peacebuilding system is the development of an overall strategic framework. Without it the various peacebuilding agents have no benchmark against which they can judge the degree to which they are coherent with each other in the context of an overall strategic framework.

A strategic framework should reflect a common understanding of the problem, i.e. the root causes of the conflict and the more immediate triggers that have caused the outbreak of violent conflict, and that may continue to be a factor that is undermining the peace process. It should be grounded in a shared long-term vision of the future path the country or conflict system wish to realize, and it should contain a clearly articulated multi-dimensional and integrated strategy for the short, medium and long term future direction of the peace process.

Unfortunately, we have few examples of successfully applied strategic frameworks to date. Instead we have numerous parallel and computing processes, and most of them mature in the late consolidation phase. What is lacking is a commonly agreed to peacebuilding framework process that can be utilised from the earliest

One option, in the context of the UN Integrated Approach is the Integrated Missions Planning Process (IMPP). However, in its current form it is primarily a UN Integrated Mission planning tool, and its acceptance in the wider UN system, and its linkages with an overall strategic framework that goes beyond the UN family is still unclear. It could become the catalyst for such a larger strategic process, but there is also a danger that it may generate such internal momentum, and becomes so wrapped-up in its own internal planning processes, benchmarking and reporting, that is neglects the need to connect the UN integrated mission planning process with a wider peacebuilding strategic framework process.

Another option could be the Poverty Strategy (PRS) process, facilitated by the World Bank and aimed at aligning the overall development strategy of the external actors and the host Government. The PRS process was, however, developed in the development context and tends to focus on macroeconomic and financial issues. It was not designed specifically for managing post-conflict transitions in fragile states.\(^{73}\) The conflict sensitive PRSs that have been developed in Sierra Leone and Liberia seem to be the most pervasive system-wide strategic frameworks that have been developed to date, but in both cases this has only been achieved well into the consolidation phase of the peace process.

A third option could be the UN Peacebuilding Commission’s integrated peacebuilding strategies. According to the Commission’s first report the purpose of an integrated peacebuilding strategy is ‘to ensure coherent, prioritized approaches that involve international donors and agencies’.\(^{74}\) It is perhaps too early to judge these Peacebuilding Commission facilitated integrated peacebuilding strategies, but whilst they look promising on the grounds that they are clearly focused on those areas that could threaten the consolidation of peace, they are also limited by the particularities of the Peacebuilding Fund, which results in an emphasis on specific peacebuilding programmes rather than on the overall peacebuilding effect. The Peacebuilding Commission’s mandate and structural relationship with the Security Council, which results in it becoming engaged in any given situation only in the late consolidation stage, also results in its integrated peacebuilding strate-
gies being designed around the demands of the late consolidation phase of peace-
building systems. It thus finds itself in the same crowded space as the UNDAFs
and the conflict sensitive PRSs. In addition, the Peacebuilding Commission’s work
in the countries where it is active is determined by the size of the Peacebuilding
Fund allocations, and in reality, this relegates the Peacebuilding Commission to
playing a limited, but meaningful role in the overall peacebuilding process.

The lessons learned from these initiatives are that peacebuilding frameworks need
to be firmly grounded, from the earliest opportunity, in support of the peace proc-
cess that lies at the core of the international conflict management intervention, i.e.
it should focus on securing and consolidating the peace process. This does not
mean that the developmental, humanitarian, human rights, and rule of law dimen-
sions should be subsumed to the political and security dimensions, but rather that
the overall effect of the peacebuilding framework needs to facilitate and support
the consolidation of the peace process. Ensuring an alternative livelihood for an
ex-combatant may be just, if not more important, than to take away her gun and
give her the opportunity to freely support a political party of her choice. It is the
focus on the system-wide investment in avoiding a relapse into violent conflict that
gives the peacebuilding framework its unique identity, and the overall strategy
needs to reflect this emphasis on supporting the peace process. The degree to which
such strategic frameworks are currently absent goes a long way to explaining the
lack of coherence evident in past and present peacebuilding systems.

Recommendation 6: There is an urgent need to develop a peacebuilding framework
that can be utilised from the earliest possible stages of a peacebuilding intervention,
and that can serve as a tool to rationalize and harmonize the numerous parallel
strategic planning and resource mobilization processes currently being used.

Limits to Coherence. It would appear as if most initiatives aimed at improved
coherence and an integrated peacebuilding framework, share the following broad,
although not always explicitly stated, assumptions:

a. The broadest possible integrated approach will result in more efficient and
more effective interventions, with a more sustainable outcome;
b. It is possible to integrate the political, security, human rights, developmen-
tal and humanitarian dimensions of peacebuilding in a comprehensive
approach because ultimately all the agencies are working towards the same
goal – sustainable peace and development;
c. There is sufficient commonality, in the form of basic shared principles, val-
ues and objectives, amongst the different agencies and actors, to work
together to achieve a comprehensive approach; and

d. There is sufficient structural and organizational flexibility to allow the dif-
different agencies to work together, and where obstacles are identified, there is a willingness to address any such impediments.

Persistent evidence-based feedback from the field is indicative, however, that at the operational and tactical levels, many of these assumptions are, at best challenged, and at worse, flawed. The persistent lack of coherence among activities in the humanitarian relief, development, political and security spheres, despite numerous attempts to improve coordination, have been well documented in a number of evaluation reports and studies sited earlier in this paper. The research and evaluation data indicated that peacebuilding efforts appear to be challenged by enduring and deep-rooted coherence and coordination dilemmas. It would appear as if there are pervasive fundamental differences in the mandates, value systems and core principles of some of the peacebuilding actors that cannot be resolved, only managed. Paris and Sisk argue that peacebuilding should be viewed as inherently contradictory, with competing imperatives facing the internal and external actors, both between and among themselves, that constitute “vexing policy dilemmas”, that requires tradeoffs between multiple mandates, needs and priorities without any obvious solutions.  

Recommendation 7: More research and analysis should be directed towards what appears to be inherent contradictions among some peacebuilding actors and agents, so as to improve our understanding of the dynamics causing these coherence dilemmas. There is a need for more clarity as to the parts of the peacebuilding system that is potentially compatible, and those that are not.

Conclusion and Summary of Recommendations

This paper has identified five challenges to peacebuilding coherence, that represent opportunities for policy action and that have the potential to enhance our collective ability to undertake more effective and sustainable peacebuilding action. These four areas for future action were:

a. Improving our collective conceptual understanding of the peacebuilding concept through encouraging formal and informal debate, and the institutionalization of a specific peacebuilding doctrine in the United Nations;

b. Further developing our understanding of the practical application of the concepts of Preventative- and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding;
c. Significantly stepping-up efforts to pursue agency-, whole-of-government-, external- and internal/external coherence, including our understanding of the limits of coherence;
d. Meaningfully operationalizing the principle of local ownership; and
e. Generating a clearly articulated overall peacebuilding framework that can provide the various peacebuilding agents with a common frame of reference.

The emergence of peacebuilding should be understood in the context of an increasingly complex and interdependent international conflict management system. In order to address the shortcomings and improve the overall success rate of the international conflict management system, various agencies, governments and organizations have started exploring, sometimes independently from each other and at times collectively, with a range of models and mechanisms aimed at improving the overall coherence, cooperation and coordination of their conflict management systems. In the context of these developments, peacebuilding is increasingly seen as the collective framework under which the political, security, rule of law, governance, human rights and development dimensions of these international interventions can be brought together under one common strategic framework.

Whilst there is no one common definition, approach or model for peacebuilding that is widely accepted, there are some common characteristics that have emerged over the last decade and a half of peacebuilding practise. The paper identified four such characteristics:

a. The original and enduring notion of peacebuilding is its focus on preventing a lapse into violent conflict and securing the peace;
b. Peacebuilding is a multi-dimensional or system-wide undertaking that spans several dimensions, including three core dimensions, namely: political/governance, development and security;
c. The various peacebuilding actors exist as independent agents with their own mandates, programmes and resources, and yet they are also interdependent on each other to achieve their respective objectives; and
d. Successful peacebuilding requires a progression from violent conflict to sustainable peace that moves through various stages, including typically a stabilization phase, a transitional phase, and a consolidation phase. Peacebuilding is a long-term process, but there is also a need for immediate and short-term gains to solidify the peace, build confidence in the peace process and stimulate a vision of a better future.

The problematic record of peacebuilding over the last decade and a half reminds us, however, that there still are more questions than answers, and that we need to
give urgent and focussed attention to a number of critical aspects of international peacebuilding, if we want to improve the success rate and overall impact of peacebuilding.

There is a need to revisit and clarify exactly what it is the various actors, and especially the United Nations, understands with the peacebuilding concept. We should also not shy away from the fact that the way peacebuilding is understood is not only a technical debate, but also a political issue. The debate should thus not be confined to those professionally engaged in peacebuilding. It should first and foremost be actively pursued as an international diplomatic debate. The international community in general, and the UN in particular, will find it difficult to develop a coherent peacebuilding system in the context of a deeply divided international diplomatic community.

Recommendation 1: The international community, and in particular the UN, should take proactive steps to facilitate debate that is aimed at improving our collective understanding of peacebuilding, including encouraging formal and informal debates about the concept and its application, encouraging and supporting research, and promoting a culture of organizational learning within those institutions responsible for peacebuilding action. The Peacebuilding Commission should play a leading role in seeking to develop a UN peacebuilding doctrine that captures the current definition, approaches and models that the UN system applies when it undertakes peacebuilding action.

Peacebuilding aims to consolidate and institutionalise peace by undertaking a range of actions that go beyond preventing violence. It aims to address the underlying root causes of conflict and to create the conditions for a just social order. In this context the paper has highlighted the distinction and inter-relationship between Preventative Peacebuilding and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding. Preventative Peacebuilding is about individual programmes that have a peacebuilding objective, whilst Post-Conflict Peacebuilding is about the overall, or systemic, effect and the strategic framework processes that direct the individual activities towards common goals and objectives. The former is present at the programme level whilst the latter can only be identified at the systemic level.

Recommendation 2: The peacebuilding community should make a concerted attempt to distinguish, conceptually, programmatically and financially, between those activities that have an immediate peacebuilding objective, and those that contribute to an overall peacebuilding framework. Such a distinction will greatly assist peacebuilding agents at all levels (planning, funding, coordination, implementation, evaluation) from confusing the specific and the systemic. This should contribute to increased clarity, and therefore relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and impact.
A large number of evaluation reports and research studies that have analyzed the record of post-Cold War peacebuilding efforts have identified significant problems with coherence and coordination, and have found that this has contributed to the poor rate of sustainability of these operations to date. The paper discussed coherence in the context of: (1) Agency Coherence; (2) Whole-of-Government Coherence; (3) External Coherence (harmonization), and (4) Internal/External Coherence (alignment).

**Recommendation 3:** The UN should give serious consideration to how it can improve the way its Secretariat currently manages and finances prevention, peace-making, peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities across the various departments. The division of work appears to be based on the outdated *Agenda for Peace* categorization of the stages of peace, and it may be a factor in the way the UN Secretariat is perceived to be fragmented and incoherent.

**Recommendation 4:** The UN needs to harmonize and integrate the two parallel, but poorly connected, coherence processes currently underway, namely the integrated approach and system-wide coherence initiative. It is unclear, for instance, to what degree the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP) is a system-wide planning tool that can facilitate meaningful UN system coherence in a peacebuilding context, or whether it remains a DPKO initiative?

**Recommendation 5:** An extraordinary initiative is needed to move local ownership from slogan to reality. Internal and External Actors need to work together to identify the principles that should govern local ownership, and identify ways in which it can be meaningfully operationalized.

As is clear from the Liberia and other examples, there is an over concentration of framework processes in the consolidation phase, and a lack of such processes earlier in the peacebuilding life-cycle that can give the various internal and external actors a more coherent strategic framework for their work from an early on in the process as possible.

**Recommendation 6:** There is an urgent need to develop a peacebuilding framework that can be utilised from the earliest possible stages of a peacebuilding intervention, and that can serve as a tool to rationalize and harmonize the numerous parallel strategic planning and resource mobilization processes currently being used.

Most initiatives aimed at improved coherence and an integrated peacebuilding framework share a number of underlying assumptions. Persistent evidenced-based feedback from the field is indicative, however, that at the operational and tactical
levels, many of these assumptions are, at best challenged, and at worse, flawed. The research and evaluation data indicated that peacebuilding efforts appear to be challenged by enduring and deep-rooted coherence and coordination dilemmas. It would appear as if there are pervasive fundamental differences in the mandates, value systems and core principles of some of the peacebuilding actors that cannot be resolved, only managed. Our understanding of peacebuilding as a system that requires integration in order to achieve coherence needs to be modified to allow for a system that is inherently contradictory, and where multiple internal and external actors are motivated by sometimes competing and irreconcilable interests.

Recommendation 7: More research and analysis should be directed towards what appears to be inherent contradictions among some peacebuilding actors and agents, so as to improve our understanding of the dynamics causing these coherence dilemmas. There is a need for more clarity as to the parts of the peacebuilding system that is potentially compatible, and those that are not.

It is challenging to make a meaningful assessment of the utility of peacebuilding as a policy concept and operational model, as it has been used as an umbrella term for a broad range of loosely connected actions, rather than for a specific policy directed action or operational construct. Initial indications have been mixed, and should serve as further motivation to invest in more significant and systematic efforts at organizational learning. This paper has generated a number of action orientated recommendations that represent opportunities for policy action, and once addressed, have the potential to enhance our collective ability to undertake more effective and sustainable peacebuilding action.

Notes

10 External actors are all international actors engaged in undertaking peacebuilding activities in a given country or conflict system.
11 External actors are all internal actors in the country or conflict system where peacebuilding activities take place.


21 Various models, such as: The Utstein Report (D. Smith, Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: Getting Their Act Together, Overview Report of the Joint Utstein Study on Peacebuilding, Evaluation Report 1/2004 (Oslo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004), the UN’s Integrated Approach (Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions) and NEPAD’s Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework for Africa include humanitarian assistance. Many in the humanitarian community argue, however, that humanitarian assistance falls outside the scope of peacebuilding, and should not be included in peacebuilding models. See for instance E.A. Wein, Conflict and Compromise: UN Integrated Missions and the Humanitarian Imperative, Monograph No. 4, (Accra: KAIPTC, May 2006). The humanitarian dimension is included as part of the larger peacebuilding framework throughout this paper and in Table 1, as per the UN concept, with due regard for the principle of the independence of humanitarian action, as recognized in paragraph 10 of the Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions.


23 There are a number of different interpretations of these phases, but most convey the same essential progression. See for instance CSIS, Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Task Framework (Washington D.C: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Association of the United States Army (AUSA), 2002), in which they identify three stages, namely: the initial response, transformation and fostering sustainability. For a more detailed explanation of the three stages referred to here, namely stabilization, transitional and consolidation, see C.H. de Coning, “Civil-Military Coordination and UN Peacebuilding Operations”, in H. Langholtz, B. Kondoch & A. Wells (eds), International Peacekeeping: The Yearbook of International Peace Operations, Volume 11 (Koninklijke Brill N.V. Brussels, 2007).


27 Ibid., para. 57.


29 Ibid., para. 21.


31 Ibid., para. 15.


33 Quoted in E. McCandless, Lessons from Liberia: Integrated Approaches to Peacebuilding in Transitional Settings, 2.

34 C. Call, The Problem of Peacebuilding: How UN Thinking has Evolved in Recent Years (New York: DPA, 2004).


36 M.B. Anderson, Do No Harm, How Aid can Support Peace or War (Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1999).

37 E. McCandless, Lessons from Liberia: Integrated Approaches to Peacebuilding in Transitional Settings, p.15.

38 For instance, the Implementation and Monitoring Committee (RIMCO) of the Results Focussed Transitional Framework in Liberia (C.H. de Coning, Civil-Military Coordination in United Nations and African Peace Operations (Durban: ACCORD, 2007), p.60, or the more recent Joint UN and Government of Liberia Joint Steering
Committee that manages the Peacebuilding Funds’ $15 million grant for Liberia (E. McCandless, Lessons from Liberia: Integrated Approaches to Peacebuilding in Transitional Settings, p.7).


As sited in the next section, the Utstein Study found that more than 55% of the programs it evaluated did not show any link to a larger country strategy (D. Smith, Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: Getting Their Act Together, p.16).


See Collier et al, Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil Wars and Development Policy, but note that the approximately 50% figure sited generally has been questioned by A. Suhrke & I. Samset, “What’s in a Figure? Estimating Recurrence of Civil War”, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 14 No. 2, (May 2007), 195-203. They argue that the Collier et al study finding is closer to 25%.

D. Smith, Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: Getting Their Act Together, p.16.


C.H. de Coning, Coherence and Coordination in United Nations Peacebuilding and Integrated Missions: A Norwegian Perspective, p.4


UN, Delivering as One.

UN, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations


UN, Decision Number 2008/24 – Integration.

UN, Decision Number 2008/24 – Integration.


Note in this context the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness of 2 March 2005, and the outcome document of the mid-term review of the implementation of the Paris Declaration, the Accra High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness of September 2008.


As evidenced by the parties to and content of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.


OECD, Whole of Government Approaches to Fragile States (Paris: OECD, 2006)

E. McCandless, Lessons from Liberia: Integrated Approaches to Peacebuilding in Transitional Settings, p.15.


74 Annual report of the Peacebuilding Commission.


Perhaps before I start I should admit to having schizophrenic personality as I am not only a DSRSG but also Resident Coordinator, Humanitarian Coordinator and UNDP Representative. I also do something on security and staff.

Talking about complexity one has to handle this different personas, which can cause some challenges. I am both pleased and humble to be amongst academics because my comments will be largely utilitarian from the experience that I have gathered in the field, a more practical approach which I hope fits in to some of the theories presented.

All countries are different, which requires different approaches. One can learn lessons, and one must, but I am skeptical to having models and matrixes established that might be rather more predictive of approaches to be adopted. One of my theses is that the form follows the function. We have to focus on what has to be done in the country and then work back from that. For the overall strategy and structuring of a UN mission, I will first and foremost provide examples from the DRC, which is sufficiently complex in terms of peacebuilding commission occupation. The mission in the DRC has managed to move together all these moving parts and it does have a significant involvement of the EU and the European Commission.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo. The DRC is a country the size of Western Europe, 2.4 million square km with essentially no roads and with a total population of 60 million people. The DRC is neighbouring nine countries. Six years ago a war that was named “Africa’s World War” took place in the DRC, where six armies competed for the resources and all the richness that one can find above and below the soil in the DRC. The DRC becomes birth of watch-world for corruption where everything has been broken down. 1.500 people die every day unnecessarily. Out of the 45.000 people that die every month, half of them are under 5 years and most of them die due to dirty water and malnutrition and other kinds of problems that could be readily addressed. There has been a lot of attention on the ongoing conflict in the North Kivu lately. At the moment North Kivu alone has 900.000 IDPs, and there are 22 armed groups.

Over the last couple of years about one and half million people have gone back to Katanga and Ituri. The election taking place in 2006, with substantial support from the EU and the EU Commission, was the first election in 40 years. Nearly 26 million people registered and the turnout was close to 70 percent. The election can be seen as a contributing factor for the people to return to their homes.
The UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC, MONUC, has around 18,000 troops on the ground, which is the largest UN mission in the world. This is the largest peacekeeping mission, but we need to understand the context. During the NATO invasion in Kosovo 40,000 troops were sent into the country, which is the size of the province of Kinshasa.

The EU has been very much involved in DRC and during the last two days many references has been made to the ARTEMIS mission in 2003, which was very important in allowing for the regrouping of the humanitarian support in Ituri.

In 2006 we benefited from EUFOR. A EUFOR contingent came in to backstop MONUC at the request of the UN force as a kind of insurance backstop for the elections that were taking place at the time, they were very useful both as dissuasion and for the brief difficulty we had at the time. The EU involved through EUSEC, a military assistance mission and EUPOL which is police training mission in DRC as well as a very major development programme through ECHO with their development programme.

I want to specifically mention the role of the European Union Envoy. Previously Mr. Aldo Aielo and now Roland van der Geer have played very important roles throughout the transition and peace building process. Roland van der Geer was a co-signature of the Nairobi Communiqué and the Goma Act. The AU, UN, the United States and the EU have backstopped the agreement as witnesses of the ongoing processes in the East. Mr. Cedric de Coning’s paper is broad, and I have chosen to focus on one of the major aspects, the importance of a holistic approach. A strategic plan that makes sense even in the extraordinary situations you have to deal with in the DRC. I will also touch on the aspect of local ownership.

Neither of these concepts are easy or self evident. What is apparent, and part of the approach we attempt to adopt, is that the UN in its ensemble, different parts, needs to work with all its partners to meet the results that are indispensable for this country to move ahead and continue to move ahead. What complicates life a little bit is dealing with different contexts in different parts of the country. If we talk about the Kivus, which is the most mediatized and the strife for the front pages, that covers maybe six of the eight territories of a country that has 169 territories. In the other parts there is relative peace, and so yes, attention is necessarily focused on that sore, but we cannot forget the rest of the country if we are talking about moving ahead.

The UN has recognized the need to reform its approach and understand its interlocking dimensions and where we need to go with a country like the DRC, a post-conflict country (almost). We have moved towards integrated missions. One thinks
of integrated missions essentially as integrating the peacekeeping mission with the UN programmes and agencies. Indeed programmes and agencies in a country like the DRC or anywhere else, were there before the peacekeeping mission arrived and will stay there after. It is important to try even within the integrated peace missions, which are so often structured in stove pipes, the military, the different civilian pieces and indeed the administration.

It is imperative that one gets the maximum benefit from the synergies that are possible when all these bits work together. One of the striking examples I can give is the elections. Not only within the mission did it require a substantial electoral section, but it also required the support from the military, police, civilians, human rights, security etc, and indeed we were able to integrate the UNDP support for that, in support of a national elections commission (independent). One needs to focus less on structures and more on what you are trying to achieve and try to structure it accordingly. If you spend half your time trying to deal with different structures you are not going to have a lot of time left for achieving what you are actually all about.

It is simply not just a mechanistic relationship where you are mating different parts of the bureaucracy together towards a great goal. It seems to be a truism that if you do not know where you are going it is difficult to get there, but sometimes we do fall into that particular trap.

I come back to where I started, the form of putting things together must follow function. If this kind of consideration applies to the UN, it obviously has wider application to the wider community, and national and local authorities more generally. Perhaps to note, the distinction between a humanitarian operation and a reconstruction development operation is that with the humanitarian operation it is absolutely fundamental that what you are doing has an immediate impact for the population. It is possible to utilize the government. One looks at the government structures to be involved, but it is not acceptable under any circumstances to say “well you asked us to do this, but we worked through the ministry of health and they have a bit of a problem this year”. That is not how you can run a humanitarian programme. If there is a use of governmental mechanisms, they have to be able to deliver and held responsible.

An essential ingredient of any kind of reconstruction dimension has to be the full involvement of the government. It is about extending the state authority, so the governments is in a much more leadership capacity, which is a vital dimension. In the past we have regarded this domestically, looking at how these things develop as the military concerns for the international community is being handled essentially by MONUC. We have had regular reviews by the Security Council, not only
in New York but through visits. Moreover, during the transition part of the Sun-City Agreement, which is rather unique, there was the establishment of an entity called CIAT, which was the International Committee for Accompanying the Transition. This was a body composed of international actors, chaired by the Special Representative, but including the EU, the EU Commission, the AU and the AU Commission Representatives plus the Permanent Five and a number of the regional actors, that was given the mandate by the agreement signed by the different parties to follow the transition and support it. When we got to the point of an elected government this was the first of the transitional authorities to be discarded. The elected government and even the transitional government was terribly comfortable with repeating its weaknesses. But none the less, this was put in place by the parties at the time. There is now a whole network of relationships with not only national political actors but preventative actors to take the dialogue on political and development programmes forward.

What we have tried to do in the immediate aftermath, as the transition was moving ahead, was to focus on the importance of a peace dividend. The population and the reasons why they were voting was for a better life. Therefore, the elected members of the parliaments both at the national and at the local level recognize the importance of making sure that their constitutes are going to be better off. When the parliamenarians finish their terms than, when they started. They recognize that they are now accountable to the population and if they now wish to stay on we need to do better. One of the things we managed to do at the time, the UN has a planning structure called the UNDAF (United Nations Development Assistance Framework) and the World Bank has a similar mechanism. What did not seem like rocket science at the time, was that we started working together. We were immediately joined by the UK, Belgium and the EU. Now this has involved 19 total owners, the UN being one, to look at how we could combine efforts to tackle strategic benefits to the population that could be delivered. In a country the size of Congo, a billion USD can be like a handful of sand in the sea if you do not try to work on the synergies. In most of our countries coordination assistance people say “well no, we are doing it differently and we are doing it in another part of the country”. That is not working in a country like the DRC, it might work on small countries. If you do not actually see how you can reinforce each other you are not going to be able to have an impact, but only have a lot of small projects. This was worked out in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). Out of that, those 19 donors came up. The PRSP endorsed by the transitional government included a set of agreed measures dealing with security, health, governance, education etc. They agreed to focus on the overall strategies set by the authorities. Donors have re-oriented their programmes to try and work together and get these kinds of results.
We have also, subsequently as the new government came in to power, worked with them on setting up a priority action plan which turned into a mutual accountability framework. The mutual accountability framework, voluntary obviously, included a governance compact and was highly ambitious dealing with reforms of the military, SSR, public administration, corruption etc. In a sense it was almost a trade-off reform of support from the international community, reaching what we would call perhaps the Millenium Development Goals (MDG) in key areas, but pay-off for the population.

This has developed into a set of thematic groups chaired by ministers and co-secretariats being either a UN Agency or donors who have been driving forward some of these. Progress? Slow! Planning is one thing and implementation is another, but we have in fact a strategic framework. We have even been able to come together to recognize it was going slow, and we recently had a meeting that brought up a fast track version of these measures.

The imperative here is the mutual accountability of working together and trying to find ways forward to provide benefits to the country. The point that Mr. Cedric de Coning made in his paper on Strategic Framework is in my point extremely important. Nationally, you need to fit in other initiatives, rather than to say “ah, we also have this” and that will be linked, even if it requires some mental abilities to do it.

I would like to underline in particular that this is a dynamic process and it is obviously not a short-term process. However you do need short-term process and short-term benefits. If you are pulling a country like the DRC, unfortunately there are a lot of countries in the same position, out of the morass it is in, this has to be recognized as a long term exercise. Donors have and I must commend them for going back and re-designing their programmes to fit with the overall framework. This is again moving away from what we all know is a tendency for each UN Agency or country want a nice compact coherent little programme of its own, instead of contributing importantly to an overall aspect in the country. I would therefore strike a note of caution on this whole of government approach. Unless the whole of government happen to be the country you are operating in, not the country that is actually sending the assistance, which is so often the case there, and which is the result of very heavy negotiations. Often they may not quite fit when you apply it to a recipient.

We have made an effort to bring together all the four components; the military, the political, the extension of state authority and return and reintegration in the East. The genesis of this was recognizing that MONUC will have to leave at one point, but that will be in the hand of the Security Council and the DRC government to
decide. When we are to leave we will hope that the area that is the most unstable will be stabilized. In the DRC this is an area in the East; the Kivus, North of Katanga, Ituri and Maniema. We have focused on how we can bring all bits together in the area. It started off as a UN initiative, with the other partners in the political community and building on the political Process of Amani, how we could provide a coherent approach which could support an overall effort to stabilize Eastern DRC. It was a fairly tall order, but we felt it would be important to try and pull together the bits and make the links with the various partners to that end.

We have endeavoured to do a comprehensive approach, political of course, talking to the different groups (22 in Kivu) and to the neighbours in trying to restore diplomatic links. On the security side it is about either trying to encourage by persuasion the preferred means or through the application of some military pressure, to get the armed groups and spoilers to back off and then see how the state authority can be restored. We focuses the plan by looking at various axis into areas that are contested. I will not name everything, but you can notice that I have mentioned the Goma process (the domestic armed groups in the Kivus) and the Nairobi Communiqué which was about dealing with the FDLR armed groups.

The four components for stabilization looks at see how to allow those 900,000 in North Kivu alone to return to their homes and re-establish life. While there are dimensions of that that are of concern to the humanitarians, this is not the humanitarian action plan. That link is made, but there is no suggestions that the humanitarians should be bound by this approach in so far as their mandate to try to address human suffering where it might be. We are, as you will notice shortly, focusing on a number of axes in the strategic areas that I just enumerated.

We are looking at essentially six axes that include road building. Not only fixing the roads to allow access where government has little control, but to roll out along those axes the state administration, territorial administration, put up courts and police stations. It is important to sequence the interventions. The approach has won support not only in the international community but also the EU, the European Commission, but also in the national and local governments who lead the coordination in these areas.

We are currently trying to separate the different armed groups to avoid cease fire break down and armed conflict. These clashes between the military typically and not uniquely, cause very few military casualties and very many civilian casualties, of all kinds. Over the recent weeks of renewed clashes we have seen another 100,000 IDPs in the areas of the clashes, and an increase in sexual violence. The disengagement plan constituted of phase 1 – separation of forces. Phase 2 – movement of armed groups towards regroupment centres, garrisons of the FARDC and
deployment of the National Congolese Police (PNC) and Phase 3 – DDR/Brassage Process. On the DDR side the issue is complex. It is not just a matter of taking arms from someone not keen to give up, but it is also a question of subsequently reintegrating them into a community, in a community where the residents may well have suffered the combatants during the time in the military. In the North Kivu, an estimated 80 percent of the combatants are without weapons or they have an arrow or a few bullets, but they still regard themselves as combatants. There need to be a programme for their reintegration as well, which benefits the community and not only the individuals.

An update on the roads and infrastructure rehabilitation. We already have two axes in progress. The Sake-Masisi road is rehabilitated at 60 percent and work will start on three other roads by early October. MONUC is engineering companies that provide mechanized support. The construction of police infrastructure is to start in early October and the border police training centre has been completed with 32 border posts to be established before November. One of the interesting dimensions of this is that it is essential to move the army out of a role of so called keeping law and order. It is not the role of armies to do law and order, which is true to the order in the DRC, rather more on the side of committing them then preventing them. The idea is to support the national army for returning to barracks, create barracks, and then train police to take over on those axes. I am pleased to say that the Folke Bernadotte Academy is playing an important role together with other donors and a wide range of others.

These are some of the targets that we are working for the restoration of the six axes; building 20 police stations, deployment of 2,700 PNC officers, inclusion of the Sexual Gender-Based Violence Units (SGBV) units in the police, deployment of 7 Joint Monitoring Teams, rehabilitation and construction of 25 administrative buildings, construction of five courts, rehabilitation of five prisons and construct and equip 32 police border posts, 8 police hosts at the sectoral level and two provincial Head Quarters.

Some of the challenges and constraints are the political and security environment, the post-conflict environment, organizational and institutional capacities and the critical issue of funding gaps. The funding overview as it is at the moment is an estimated total cost of USD 491 million, out of which USD 207 million is covered. This leaves a gap of USD 284 million, and the main gaps are key security, state infrastructure and urgent peace-building interventions.

Three or four issues that may be of use and worth discussing more in detail is the national ownership and the local ownership, which is assumable indispensable. One should not think this is easily done. If you are dealing with a transitional
authority then you need to decide the extent to which they reflect the voice of the population. The importance of holding election to get the true voice. You need to get certain amount of retro-fitting. Rather than waiting until you have an elected government, as we did with the overall work plan on basis of priorities established by the interim government. We went back afterwards to them and presented our plan in conjunction with their priorities. We were successful to say that the minister of planning saw the valuable of this.

The Security and Stabilization Support Strategy for Eastern DRC, dated September 2008, includes “Help stabilize Eastern DRC and protect civilians by improving the security environment and extending basic state authority through a combination of integrated political, military, development and humanitarian initiatives”. The existence of adequate government mechanisms to carry out programmes is a question. The Paris Declaration seems to have funding going through mechanisms highly desirable, but if these mechanisms are full of holes, it makes it difficult and so you need to find fall back approaches. When we talk about national ownership we cannot talk only about the government, the parliament and the provisional authorities, civil society and indeed even the media.

On the self evident importance of security, SSR in a country like the DRC is regarded by all; the humanitarians, politicians, the military etc. as a priority when it is the military carrying out many of these actions. The police play an extremely important role, and in most peacekeeping missions they probably do not receive adequate attention for the importance that they bring in terms of law and order. It should not be the military keeping the law and order, it is a role for the police and the justice system. After 40 years of mal-administration the justice system has obviously failed very badly, and in addition we have had to deal with the International Criminal Court (ICC). Four Congolese are currently in the Hague. It raises a debate that you will perhaps have tomorrow, on the peace-justice priority balance that is one that is a daily occurance. We have had some comments made on the nature of peacekeeping forces and the importance and role they can play in encouraging a political solution. This is obviously the most desired outcome, and indeed providing protection for civilians. It is evident that you need to have a peacekeeping force that is properly equipped, sufficiently strong and adequately robust and willing to proof its robustness in order to have the credibility. Otherwise you are wasting your money. That has meant in the case of the Congo, the preparedness to take casualties, not enormous over the range of time and so on, but nonetheless, they do occur in peacekeeping.

As we have heard from Sir John Holmes, humanitarian operations are not for the faint hearted. You will be aware that the sizes of the peacekeeping forces are not only determined by the need. The budgetary pressures particularly, at the level of
New York, are extremely important. My colleague Mr. Alan Doss has recently asked the Security Council for additional resources that we would require to live up to the demands that we are facing in the Eastern DRC at present time. It is true that the UN peacekeeping budget has gone up to around USD 8 billion now, that is a fraction of what it costs for a bailout for one of the firms that have become a little bit affected by the recent downturns. I unfortunately fear that the existence of the latter, will affect the former.

Finally, I would like to endorse the whole business of the importance of dealing with public information and perceptions. One of the benefits we had with EUFOR, apart from its operational side, was that it had 21 countries that came out in its 2,000 people that were involved, and each of these countries that sent somebody, sent in a journalist in advance to find out where the DRC was, how you spelt it and whether the capital existed and so on, which was very beneficial for the future of sustained international support of the demands of this country. Dialogue, analysis, shared goals and substance must have the pre-eminence over structures. Structures should follow the needs and the substance over what we are trying to achieve.

I will round up with a truism for the sustainability i.e. for our peacekeeping missions to leave, full governance involvement and leaderships need to be attained. This is however not a short term exercise. Thank you.

Chair: Dr. Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, Senior Lecturer, Paris Institute for Political Science, France

Thank you for that very detailed experience from Congo and the raterance that if we know where we are going the structure will follow, which is an argument from case by, and type of dealing with situations, and in this case of the DRC the dilemma is not only of harmonizing among the sectors but also about geography, and then harmonizing among the different tools available and agencies and putting them around the strategic framework. This stabilization programme that you showed us is a pre-peace building of stabilization, if I am correct. Thank you also for your discussion on local ownership and explaining who is the local and who represents the best interests of the locals.

Speaker: Mr. Marc van Bellinghen, Deputy Head of Unit, Crisis Response and Peacebuilding, DG RELEX, European Commission

The concept and its challenges. The United Nations has been the undisputed custodian of expertise in peacebuilding and peacekeeping world-wide for 60 years. The contribution of the EU to peace in the world is more recent and more modest,
and in the wake of the reunification of Europe and the crisis in the Balkans. Like that of the UN, the contribution of the EU is global or holistic in nature and calls on all of its dimensions, policies and instruments: diplomatic action from the CFSP and its crisis management dimension through the ESDP on the one hand and, on the other, action from the European Commission via humanitarian action, development, external action (in particular trade and macro-financial assistance) and external elements of internal policies of the EU (action on external borders, the fight against organised crime and terrorism, the environment, in particular the coordination of civilian protection intervention).

The action of the EU manifests itself in its various forms and at all stages of the conflict cycle, conflict prevention and crisis management through to peacebuilding. As a result, I prefer the term “peacebuilding” to the term “peace consolidation” to discern the concept of peacebuilding, as per the approach recommended in the excellent discussion paper by Mr. Cedric de Coning. In this paper, he defines peacebuilding as a long-term process that spans the period before and the period after the conflict. I willingly subscribe to his definition of the concept: a multidimensional, long-term approach that encompasses all dimensions of governance, development and security but with visible gains (peace dividends) in the short-term.

This being said, I will answer the five challenges identified by our debater: collective support (from the international community) for the concept; the practical application of this concept in the preventive and conflict consolidation phases; coherence at all levels (agency, government, international and interface with local authorities); how to successfully implement local ownership; and the appropriate structure for drafting and implementing peacebuilding strategies.

Thus, I will attempt to demonstrate that the steps taken by the EU are already implemented with this objective, that there is still room to improve them and that when it comes to peacebuilding, modesty and humility are the order of the day.

The holistic approach of the EU to conflict prevention and peacebuilding. In 2001, the European Union adopted the Göteborg programme (confirmed by the European Security Strategy in 2003), which sanctions a multi-dimensional or holistic approach to conflict prevention and peacebuilding based on instruments for development and crisis management (in particular the ESDP). Seven years later (2008), the Göteborg annual follow-up report included the following assessment of the efforts of the EU aimed at short-term prevention. In particular, its actions of political nature consisted of preventive diplomacy conducted by special CFSP representatives or EU heads of missions on site; preventive action under the ESDP (EU observers in Georgia, for example) and under instruments of the European Com-
mission, in particular the Instrument for Stability (facilitators of dialogue/mediators, transitional justice/reconciliation, technical assistance/emergency expertise or emergency non-humanitarian programmes) and the African Peace Facility (support for African peacekeeping initiatives).

There is an even more structural prevention. Based on the security-development partnership/nexus, we systemically include in our development initiatives and, on occasions, in our crisis management missions, measures for the disarmament-demobilisation-reintegration (DDR) of combatants, security sector reform (SSR/army, police, justice system), democratisation and human rights, with a particular emphasis on the preventative role of electoral monitors (international, regional and local) and steps to re-establish the constitutional state and justice (in particular transitional), framed within a partnership for governance (political and economic).

Systemic prevention. The systemic connection between natural resources management and conflict prevention has prompted us to increase our involvement on this front (in particular in relation to blood diamonds/Kimberley Process and Forests/FLEGT) and include it in our development initiatives. This, together with the fight against organised crime, human trafficking, drug trafficking, proliferation of small arms and light weapons, and the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, has become an integral part of our political dialogue and is followed by co-operation, in particular under the Instrument for Stability and Instruments for Development.

Provisional conclusion. In reference to EU exercises in progress since 2007 in “fragile states” and the security-development partnership, which contains the following recommendations: the search for greater coherence between players (development and crisis management, in both directions), joint evaluations and analyses, flexibility in development procedures and recourse to budgetary assistance (also in difficult macroeconomic environments), the reinforcement of political dialogues of ambassadors of the EU on the ground with relevant local representatives. I would add that our approach, even if it contains an element of subsidiarity (first identify the most suitable player for each peace initiative), always involves close dialogue and co-operation with the United Nations, regional organisations (AU, Arab League, ASEAN), national and local authorities and civil society. Last but not least, prevention and peace must be part of the joint analysis of the root causes of conflicts, which are often many and complex. These causes must be identified and be the object of dialogue with local players and be incorporated, with common agreement, in long-term measures for co-operation. This is a very drawn-out process that affects the very basis of societies, their cultural identities, access to water and land ownership. We should be modest in our expectations.
European tool for development to support peacebuilding efforts. This tool, part of the external action of the European Union, is handled by the European Commission and recognised in numerous international agreements (of association, partnership and/or co-operation) on the basis of which the EU engages in political dialogue with partner countries and regions.

Although not officially part of the external efforts of the EU handled by the European Commission, civilian crisis management initiatives implemented within the framework of the ESDP (monitors in Georgia, police and magistrates in Kosovo and the Congo, for example) are funded out of the external action budget and, as a consequence, certain aspects are handled by the Commission. The annual budget of all external instruments of the EU amounts to some EURO 8 billion. Regional and national strategies that govern these instruments are long-term in nature, engage both parties and are guaranteed by our Member States, which have participated in the creation of those instruments (coherence of development policies).

The Commission and the Council are responsible for ensuring the ongoing coherence of efforts of the EU (in particular CFSP/ESDP and actions implemented by the Commission). While this coherence is a success, it has reached the limits of its effectiveness, hence the major innovation planned under the Lisbon Treaty to attribute to one person the current separate responsibilities of the Vice-Chairman of the Commission responsible for co-ordinating external action, the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Council and the High Representative for the CFSP/ESDP. To do this, this individual will have an external action department (yet to be established) that will be created at the beginning from the Services of the Commission and the SG Council, with the support from Member States officials. The appointment of a number of Heads of Delegations from the Commission as EU Special Representatives under the CFSP (FYROM and Addis Ababa/AU) in recent years undoubtedly constitutes a benchmark in this quest for coherence.

The Instrument for Stability (IS) is an instrument for peacebuilding in dialogue with the United Nations and at the intersection of development and the ESDP. This new horizontal, thematic (non-geographical) instrument has considerably enhanced our ability to anticipate and manage political crises and major disasters. In addition to geographical instruments for development (such as the European Development Fund), the Instrument for Stability only intervenes if the geographical instrument cannot respond in an adequate manner or within the required timeframe (from a few weeks to a few months). It does not have a humanitarian (ECHO) or military focus (military ESDP); rather, its focus is the anticipation of/ response to political/security crises. Often, it is involved in the preparation of longer-term action within the context of geographical instruments.
The most common triggers for intervention under the Instrument for Stability include: political crises and major disasters that require rapid multidimensional intervention, the opening of a window of opportunity for the resolution of a conflict, a contribution necessary for re-establishing conditions for co-operation with a partner, and significant support for an initiative under ESDP. Its emergency measures element is predominant, accounting for more than 70 percent of the budget (130 million out of 175 million in 2008; 195 million out of 260 million in 2009). These are non-programmed actions of between 18 and 24 months’ duration, often before longer-term intervention as part of large geographic instruments, such as the European Development Fund for ACP countries.

The programmed dimension of the Instrument for Stability (+25 percent) is designed to support long-term actions in the areas of non-proliferation and trans-regional threats (trafficking, terrorism), its main objective being to reinforce local capabilities (centres of excellence, security sector administrations). To this can be added a component for programmable long-term initiatives to reinforce capabilities to manage crises, primarily in support of players from civil society (early warning, mediation, etc.) and international organisations, such as the development of a methodology by the United Nations to assess post-conflict and post-disaster reconstruction requirements, and equipment and training requirements on open sources (the internet) in the situation room of the African Union, that accounts for 5 percent of the budget (8 million in 2008).

Modus operandi of the Instrument for Stability: coherence within the EU and dialogue with partners. The identification of programmes relies on close co-operation between the field (European Union/European Commission delegation), the geographical service concerned and the Instrument for Stability team. On a regular basis we find that the idea and/or stage of implementation of the programme has its origins in the United Nations system, NGOs or national or local agencies. At the key moment of the decision to develop a proposal into a programme we inform our Member States within the PSC, which verifies potential synergies with the CFSP/ESDP and bilateral actions of Member States. The growing association of the Commission from the initial stages of the planning of ESDP operations could give rise to truly multidimensional European initiatives concomitant to crisis management.

In the case of EUFOR Chad, the financial support provided by the Instrument for Stability for the training of Chadian police under MINURCAT and the identification of local justice programmes in progress in the Eastern Chad under the European Development Fund are clear evidence that it is possible to mobilise development initiatives in smaller timeframes. The intervention of the crisis component of the IS consists essentially of peacebuilding efforts, either to support mediation (such as the joint African Union/United Nations mediation team in Darfur,
Sant’Egidio in Sri Lanka, Ibrahim Gambari in Myanmar), reconciliation initiatives (northern Uganda) and provisional justice (Special Court for Sierra Leone, Special Court for Lebanon), electoral processes in difficult environments (Lebanon, Chad, Zimbabwe, Zambia) or to support the reestablishment of the constitutional state (ombudsman in CAR) and, in particular, security sector reform (police reform in Lebanon and the Democratic Republic of Congo and advisors in Guinea-Bissau and the Central African Republic).

Mr. de Coning is right to emphasise the importance of including a mix of visible peace dividends for the population and peacebuilding. In Eastern Congo, at the express suggestion of MONUC, we have included the training of forest wardens and police in a programme for supporting the AMANI process, a highly labour-intensive component intended to rehabilitate roads in agricultural areas in the Kivus and which can be expected to produce a number of stabilising effects. A project to rehabilitate the working-class district of Martrissant in Port-au-Prince is a product of the same approach, in the wake of the efforts of MINUSTAH. This year, the Instrument for Stability will invest in the joint UN/WB/EU development of a common UN/WB/EU methodology for assessing post-conflict and post-disaster rehabilitation and reconstruction requirements (PCNA/PDNA in progress for Haiti) and has lent support to post-disaster reconstruction efforts (Myanmar, Nicaragua, Bangladesh). A similar evolution is in progress in post-conflict theatres of operations (support for reconstruction for displaced persons in Georgia).

The partnership with the United Nations is particularly relevant in this sector, combining peacebuilding with disaster response and manifesting itself in 1/3 of our budget, which is contracted with the UN system. However, at the same time, it is the product of growing co-operation with the UN system, in particular with UNDP and its Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Early Response, the UN Departments of Political Affairs and of Peacekeeping Operations. As for the local ownership of programmes, I see this as largely a function of the identification that took place at the outset, the choice of local partner, in particular the use of local operators for implementation and, last but not least, the anchoring of action in an area considered essential by the authorities and the local population and which has the long-term support of the central government and/or donors. This aspect is a real challenge for all programmes; hence the benefit of attempting to use these programmes and revisions of documents to influence development strategies in progress, and even to propose strategies.

The African Peace Facility. Last but not least, albeit very briefly, in the reinforcement of African peacekeeping capabilities and of regional organisations in particular, emphasis must be given to the essential role of the African Peace Facility within the framework of the African architecture for peace and security. Financed
by a development instrument (EDF: more than €400 million in 2004/07 and €300 million projected for 2008/10), the Facility is based on the principle of African ownership and is supervised by our joint Europe/Africa strategy. Projects under the African Peace Facility are implemented in the most difficult theatres of operations (Darfur/AMIS, Somalia/AMISOM, CAR/FOMUC-MICOPAX) and to a large extent, have facilitated the deployment of African crisis management operations. The Peace Facility contributes in particular to the networking of sub-regional organisations and the African Union and boosting capabilities in terms of peace and security, in particular in terms of early-warning systems. This is one of the clearest examples of the security-development partnership, so much so that the Facility has become the preferred channel of finance used by bilateral donors to support African peace operations. Thus, it is no coincidence that former European Commission Chairman Romano Prodi, who was instrumental in creating this facility, is now chairman of the United Nations panel on the predictable, flexible and viable financing of African peacekeeping operations.

### Conclusion/areas for analysis

Peacebuilding initiatives are more effective when articulated as part of a holistic, multidimensional approach that brings together political, security and developmental dimensions. This holistic approach imposes itself gradually in all of our initiatives, whether they be joint identification missions (SEC/COM/EM) that often bring together the United Nations/IFI and regional organisations (AU, ASEAN, Arab League, etc.) or crisis management operations/responses to crises (such as in Chad: EUFOR, MINURCAT, COM/troika, political dialogue) implemented around a natural leader (mediator/facilitator in the mould of Matti Ahtisaari in Aceh in 2005 and Kofi Annan in Kenya in 2008), able to include as many relevant players as possible from the international community, regional and local players and, in particular, civil society, whose substantial role in the success of conflict prevention and management processes warrants to be mentioned.

**Chair: Dr. Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, Senior Lecturer, Paris Institute for International Politics, France**

Thank you for this very clear explanation of both the instruments and the definitions within the EC on these issues, and the example from the DRC.

The background paper by Mr. Cedric de Coning provides five recommendations about future areas in peacebuilding. Discussions on the improvement of peacebuilding are focusing on prevention and post-conflict, local ownership and an overall framework for coherence. In order to be efficient we need commitment, resources, correct coordination, no rivalries, doctrines and know how. However, I suggest to address the legitimacy questions. What is the legitimacy of these instruments to build peace? Is peacebuilding, at the end of the day, the last means avail-
able, or is it the goal that we are pursuing? I will address the legitimacy around peacebuilding, peace itself and peacebuilding as a means to achieve that peace; Why peace? Which peace? Who’s peace? And how peace?

**Why peace.** This is related to Mr. de Coning’s understanding of the concept of peacebuilding; the need for the UN to debate it and come up with definitions to understand it. There are different motivations why the international community wants to do peacebuilding. From a realist point of view we need peacebuilding because of failed states. The liberals would say that failing states have weak institutions and we need peacebuilding in order to ensure that the institutions of the state foster and continue to exist. A third group would argue that we need peacebuilding because individuals need dignity and welfare.

There is a difference between whether we see peacebuilding as an ethical issue or as an instrumentalized issue. Is peacebuilding an exit or an entrance strategy? Is peacebuilding a means or an end? It is important to be frank about why we are doing peacebuilding.

**Which peace.** It is not a technical but a political question. There are very different definitions of what peacebuilding means as a method. The World Bank would talk about security, governance and development. The military would talk about clear hole and build. The EU would talk about the nexus between security and development. Are these all different phases of peacebuilding? Are there different mandates of the different institutions?

What end are we looking for and what is the ultimate end of peacebuilding? The minimal would be that it is an end of violence and fighting. That is the end of the peacebuilding scene by a lot of militaries and politicians today. Others would say that the structure of a state would be in a way that the state will not relapse into conflict. Many of the development actors would argue that. Others would use the definitions that peace would have been achieved when the institutions of democracy are there, when the state is able to function and allow for the market to function.

We all come to the realization that the state matters, that when you do have a state you hand over to the state to provide for development, welfare and security. But what is that type of state that is in the mind of the peace builder? Is it a minimum state that does not do state violence to its own and to others, or is it a liberal democratic state or is it one where the people decide for themselves what type of state and social contract that they want? I think there is a difference between a peace in the vision of the peacebuilder, around institutions and politics, and what you would call a bottomless peace, the peace where individuals themselves decide on those ends that we are trying to reach.
Who’s peace. In Mr. de Coning’s paper this concerns the local ownership discussion. We can have three types of beneficiaries. One is the political peace, those who would like to have peace in a region for ulterior reasons. The other group is the actual peace-builders peace.

This morning Mr. Alain Bonet made a statement about the fact that the agencies in Afghanistan would pride themselves in actually coordinating. The coordination and working together is really the way many peacebuilders would define their ultimate end. Alignment is really the ultimate end we are reaching for, therefore when I say “who’s peace” I would say the peace builder’s peace, either in the way they are coordinating or even in the types of state that they would want to be created. The third group would be the co-opted elites’ peace. When we refer to the local population, are we talking about the elites, the institutions that we help them set up, those are supposed to be co-opted elites, or the everyday man’s peace?

How peace. There are different actors who see different methods of reaching that peace. You can reach peace through security, development or diplomacy. The traditional way of peacemaking and not necessarily peacebuilding. These three used to be different phases, then they became different phrases but they run into each other. There is not either security, development or diplomacy, but it is really a combination of all three.

The paper of Mr. de Coning talks about how peacebuilding should be achieved ideally. We discussed the need for strategic framework, and Mr. Ross Mountain just gave an example from an unstable area in the Eastern Congo, but the reality is that there are very different doctrines, tools and strategies available at the field level, at the headquarters and in the different ministries. Are we really going to be able to live with multiple types of doctrines and strategies or are we going to have to redesign? The Afghanistan Compact, and all documents that were created before that one, have the various pillars over security, development, governance and human rights. Are they not really related and can we continue talking about three different pillars? I think we need to redesign and think about integration of coherence. In my work I have thought about two ways. Peacebuilders need vertical integration which means the integration between actors whether they are in the field, at headquarters or in the local population. The horizontal integration is among sectors. I have worked as development practitioner in Tajikistan for many years, and done many projects that have been good in one area but have had negative externalities in other areas. How do we do no harm by pretending there are no linkages and that linkages are just functionary issues that have to do the way that bureaucracies and institutions are set up?
Discussant: Mr. Cedric de Coning, Research Fellow, African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, South Africa and Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Norway

I will identify five challenges to peacebuilding coherence that represent opportunities for policy actions and that have the potential to enhance our collective ability to undertake more effective and sustainable peacebuilding actions. These are actions for improving our collective conceptual understanding of peacebuilding, through encouraging formal and informal debate, and the institutionalization of a specific peacebuilding doctrine in the UN. Secondly, they serve to develop our understanding of the practical application of the concept of preventive and post-conflict peacebuilding. Thirdly, we need to step up our efforts to pursue agency, whole of government, external and internal coherence, including our understanding of the limits of coherence. Fourthly, the aim is to meaningfully operationalizing the principles of local ownership, and, fifthly, the recommendations is to generate a clearly articulated overall peacebuilding framework, that can provide the various peacebuilding agents with a common frame of reference.

Regarding the concepts, while there is no common definition, approach or model for peacebuilding that is widely accepted, there are some common characteristics that have emerged over the last decade and a half of peacebuilding practice. I have identified four such characteristics. The first is the original and enduring notion of peacebuilding with the focus on preventing an elapse or relapse into conflict, and securing or consolidating the peace. This is the goal of why we are doing peacebuilding. The other three relates more to the reason how and why we undertake peacebuilding missions. Secondly, peacebuilding is a multidimensional or system-wide undertaking that spans several dimensions, including the three core dimensions development, governance and security. The humanitarian assistance is part of the larger framework but separate, recognizing its independence and impartiality. There has been a fairly large convergence developing amongst the different communities, the whole of governance approach.

From what the UN has taken out in the Secretary-General’s report “No exit without strategy” (2001), you will see that there is a broad convergence among the three core dimensions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Comprehensive Approach</th>
<th>World Bank</th>
<th>UN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada 3D</td>
<td>Defence</td>
<td>Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>Diplomacy</td>
<td>Governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence</td>
<td>Development</td>
<td>Economic and Social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diplomacy</td>
<td></td>
<td>Reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The third common characteristics is that the various peacebuilding actors exist as independent agents with their own mandates, programmes and resources and yet they are also dependent on each other to achieve the respective objective. In this context one of the definitions of coordination is that “coordination is the management of our interdependencies”. The fourth common characteristics relates to our time perspective. Successful peacebuilding requires a progression from violent conflict to sustainable peace that moves through various stages, including typically stabilization phase, a transitional phase and a consolidated phase. There is a lot of discussion about these phases. Peacebuilding is a long term process but there is also a need for medium and short term gains to solidify the peace, build confidence in the peace process and stimulate a vision of a better future. The problematic record of peacebuilding in the last decade and a half reminds us that there are more questions than answers and that we need to give urgent and focused attention to a number of aspects of international peacebuilding if we want to improve the success rate and the overall impact of peacebuilding.

Peacebuilding aims to consolidate and institutionalize peace by undertaking a range of actions that go beyond preventing violence. It aims to address the underlying root causes of conflict and to create the conditions for a just social order. In this context I wish to highlight the distinctions between the preventive peacebuilding and post-conflict peacebuilding. Preventive peacebuilding is about individual programmes aimed at addressing conflict factors that pose a risk to the peace process in short- to medium term, while the post-conflict peacebuilding is about the overall system-wide effect of the strategic framework process that directs the individual activities towards common goals and objectives. The former is thus present at the programme level, whilst the latter can only be identified at systemic level. The former would for instance be the kind of amount that was potentially available for the peacebuilding fund for the next 18 months in Liberia. Specific programmes are designed based on the conflict factors that need to be addressed and that have a clear specific time frame.

A large number of reports and evaluation studies that have analyzed the objectives of Post-Cold War peacebuilding have identified significant problems with coherence and coordination, and have found that this has contributed to the poorer rate of sustainability of peace operations and peace building systems to date. In the paper I discuss coherence in the context of agency coherence, whole of governance coherence, and external coherence or harmonization in the donor context. Internal refers to the local actors and the external refers to the international actors. Let me touch on agency coherence and use the example of the UN Secretariat. The way in which the UN Secretariat bureaucratically separates conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, between different departments and in which the responsibility for a given country in a crisis is shifted back and
forth between these departments, have implications for the way in which the overall UN peacebuilding remains fragmented and incoherent.

The role of the UN Security Council, and the way in which the assess contributions favours UN peacekeeping and therefore an expansion of this tool in order to make use of the resources that come with it, adds to the problems the UN Security Council experiences in its attempts to improve agency coherence.

The whole of governance coherence traditionally refers to the consistency among the policies and actions among the partners and agencies of the same government or multilateral institution, e.g. the Canadian Government’s 3D. The UN has responded to this coherence, challenged by commissioning and considering the reports of a series of high-level panels and working groups, and it is now busy implementing these reports in two parallel processes. On the one hand the UN system in piloting under the slogan “delivering as one” recommendations by the high-level panel on the system-wide coherence, that has looked into coherence among those members of the UN family working in the humanitarian, development and/or environmental areas (UNCT (RC/HC), delivering at once and DOCO). On the other hand the UN has developed an internal mechanism and process to integrate the UN’s political, security, developmental, human rights and humanitarian agencies under an integrated approach when the UN deploys a peacekeeping operation. The UN needs to further harmonize and integrate these two parallel, but poorly connected coherent processes, namely the integrated approach and the system-wide coherence approach. It is unclear for instance to what degree the integrated missions planning process, that was raised yesterday, is accepted as a system wide planning tool that can facilitate meaningful UN system coherence or to what degree it is still regarded as something limited to the peacekeeping operations context.

Internal/external coherence refers to the alignment of the policies and actions between the internal and external actors, the local and international actors, especially at the strategic framework level, in a given country context. I will focus on two areas where the lack of internal/external coherence has had the most damaging effect on achieving sustainability and which correspondingly hold the best promise for improving peacebuilding coherence. The first is to meaningfully operationalizing the principle of local ownership. The inability of the internal and external actors to realize this aspect of their stated policies and principles of alignment is one of the most significant shortcomings in the context of peacebuilding coherence. The local ownership need to move from slogan to reality. The second is the need to generate a clearly articulated overall peacebuilding framework that can provide the various peacebuilding agents with a common frame of reference that can be used as a benchmark for coherence. It is inconceivable that a peace-
building system can achieve sustainability if either of these two aspects and over-
arching framework or local framework are lacking.

Let me touch on our limits to coherence. It would appear as if most of the initia-
tives aimed at improving coherence and integrated peacebuilding framework, and here we can go as broad as speaking about the comprehensive approach in the EU or NATO context, share a number of broad but not always explicitly stated assumptions. The first being that perhaps the broadest possible integrated approach will result in a more efficient and effective intervention, with more sustain-
able outcomes. The second being that perhaps it is possible to integrate the political, security, human rights, development and humanitarians dimensions of a peacebuilding system, in a comprehensive approach because ultimately all these agencies are working towards the same goal; sustainable peace and development. The third, that there is sufficient commonality, in the form or basic shared principles, values and objectives amongst the different agencies and actors to work together to achieve a comprehensive approach. And lastly, that there are sufficient structures and organizations flexibility to allow different agencies to work together, and where obstacles are identified and that there is a willingness to address such impediments. Persistent evident based feedback from the field is indicative, however at the operational and tactical levels many of these assump-
tions are at best challenged and at worst flawed. The research and evaluation data indicate that building efforts seem to be challenged by enduring and deep rooted coherence and coordination dilemmas. It would appear as if there are pervasive fundamental differences in the mandates, value systems and core prin-
ciples of some of the peacebuilding actors that cannot be resolved, only managed. It has been argued that peacebuilding should be viewed as inherently contradic-
tory, with competing imperatives facing the internal and external actors both between and among themselves that constitute vexing policy dilemmas that require tradeoffs of these multiple mandates, needs and priorities without there being any obvious solutions. If we accept that some parts of the peacebuilding system may be incompatible, then new questions arise such as which parts can then be meaningfully integrated or directed under a common strategic frame-
work? What is the possibilities of and means available to influence the behaviour of other parts of the system, so as to steer the overall system behaviour towards a more desired outcome.

In conclusion, it is challenging to make a meaningful assessment of the utility of peacebuilding as a policy, concept and operational model, as it has been used as an umbrella term for such broad range of loosely connected actions, rather than for a specific policy directed action or operational construct. Initial indications have been mixed however, and should serve as further motivation, to invest in more significant and systematic efforts at organizational level.
Discussion

A participant raised a question for Mr. Ross Mountain. “You presented a very important diagnosis of the Congolese situation. The association with the UN in Congo is very old. Dag Hammarskjöld died in the early 1960s when he was trying to solve the Congolese crisis. It was the regime of Mobutu, who allied itself with “the West” during the Cold War, that sold the seat from many of the legacies that Mr. Mountain and the leadership in Congo now is trying to solve. What is the exit strategy now for MONUC and what is the time frame for that? Second, much has been talked about regarding the sexual abuse cases by the soldiers in the DRC peacekeeping, what happened to these? What did the investigation reveal to that effect? The LRA dimension, how does it impact on the overall situation in the Congo? I would also like to make a comment on the Peacebuilding Commission. We at the UN consider that it does not carry any hope for the countries concerned or the holistic approach that will address the root causes of underdevelopment. It is only the peace of the donors that they would like to establish, so far nothing was produced in Sierra Leone, Liberia or Guinea Bissau. The UN is investing about seven billion in peacekeeping and maybe less than a billion in developmental activities; this is a very alarming ratio that should be ratified. We have to put more resources to development in order to avert conflicts.”

There was another question for Mr. Ross Mountain from the audience. The participant had been very impressed by the presentation of the strategic vision for DRC and settling the problems including the ones in Eastern Congo. “I wonder whether it is possible to solve the problems in Eastern Congo without considering the regional situation, not only the national prospect. I disagree with the previous speaker, we among members of the OECD-DAC do not think, that the peacebuilding commission and the PBSO are useless. I think it is a step forward which has to be confirmed.”

A participant raised a question regarding sustainability in peacebuilding. “What would we want to see in the ideal sense, regarding sustainability in peacebuilding? Can we refer to a best practice case in sustainability in peacebuilding anywhere around the world that we can refer to and what does it mean in the actual sense?”

A researcher from a think tank in South Africa wished to know of the role of the AU and the PCRD strategy. “The second question is regarding the DRC and reconstruction and the roads issue. How much coordination is there with the massive Chinese investment in infrastructure in terms of the development? In our own rhetoric when we speak about local ownership we often also speak about handing over. You wonder if there was local ownership at the start, is there a need to hand over? When do these lines become blurred?”
Mr. Ross Mountain addressed the question by the participants. “The exit strategy for MONUC was perceived as the stability plan for the East, to try with our partners to bring stability to the key source of insecurity in the country. Whether that will be allowed to take its full effect is left to be seen. We try to get to the point where disagreements can be handled by the country without resort to armed conflict. This is a long process. A mission like MONUC costs what is seen for many of us as “big money”, however, in comparison to some figures that have been thrown around these last few days it does not look like “big money” anymore. A mission like MONUC costs several billion USD per year, peacekeeping is not cheap, but compared to war peacekeeping is quite cheap.”

On the issue of sexual exploitation and abuse was something that had the mission very much in the news, more a couple of years ago and perhaps a little bit last year. There were indeed unfortunately cases where this had happened. We have a code of conduct that does not accept prostitution, and regards even consenting sexual relations under eighteen as against it. Many of the cases that we had fell into that category, while others did not and were clearly worse than those broad categories. One case we regard as one too many, but we have a no tolerance policy. Does that mean that we have no cases? No, it means that we have no tolerance. We have a community of around 23,000, essentially young men, and these events do unfortunately occur. There are a range of measures put in place for it. Perhaps it is important that I reflect on this in the context of the Congo. As serious as indeed we all regard this and continue to, and take measures against it. Domestically, this raised hardly a ripple because unfortunately, as many of you know who have read the newspaper, Congo has a dreadful record of sexual violence against women, where it has been used in war. I think we had in MONUC confirmed cases were under 50, once they were investigated, over the three years. In the country, sexual violence against women, where much worse things than rape occur, is in the tens and possibly hundreds of thousands. That is a major challenge for us with the authorities; we must lead this in the international effort. This is indeed where we are putting major effort as well.”

“The LRA involvement. The LRA has come back across the border in the North; they have in fact attacked several villages in the Orientale province, and kidnapped children. This is a major problem. They have come over from South Sudan and from Central African Republic essentially. I know there is an effort where the government of Sudan is very much involved with President Chissano. We are concerned that this is another front that we are certainly not equipped to handle with the resources we have at our disposal. We are putting limited numbers of the troops that we have in conjunction with superior troops from the national side, to try to protect villages that are otherwise affected by this incursion.”
“I obviously cannot speak on behalf of the Peacebuilding Commission, regarding the question on sustainability. The PBC is supporting Sierra Leone and Burundi. With Liberia where one has moved the next phase forward from a peacekeeping mission to peacebuilding, progress is indeed being made. The resources that are at their disposal are of course rather limited.”

“Concerning the holistic approach and the interplay between development and security, I fully agree with you. I think you are being a little unkind if you are looking at a figure of eight billion, which is a number that is being spent on peacekeeping, as against one billion on development. If you add together what UNDP, WFP, UNICEF, etc. are doing you will be well over that figure. Not in saying that is adequate either, or indeed we are spending enough money on peacekeeping, compared to other figures.”

“The question about a solution in relation to the regional situation. The strategy that I endeavoured to show does cover following up on the Nairobi communiqué, which is an agreement between the government of Rwanda and the government of the DRC, and dealing specifically with the FDLR. Though it also enjoins the parties to provide support to other militia groups, including those that are alleged to have support from across the DRC border. The political plan does promote the exchange of diplomatic representatives. Some progress seems to be on the way in respect of Uganda, but there seems to be delays at the moment.”

“I think I touched on the sustainability side. This does not happen by osmosis, it is hard work and it is transferring of authority. Yes there are often not local ownership at the beginning of these processes. That is why it is a process, that is often the hallmark of a failed state and where the UN and others are required to come in. But there is a process of assuming that full responsibility that needs to be properly managed.”

“In respect of the AU role, the AU was one of the witnesses of the Goma Pact, their part of the consultative mechanisms in Congo. We have just had a senior official from the AU out in Kinshasa, who is an indication that the AU will be playing a greater role in relation to settling the problems that continue.”

“Just a final comment on the DRC and the question that rose about the roads. It so happens that China is one of the 19 countries that does talk and work together on the Country Assistance Framework that I described. That is not to say that each and every measure that is being taken is fully consulted with others, but this is an ongoing discussion between the government of the DRC and the government of China. What is clear is that the government of the DRC is seeking early evidence that there is a value in having an elected government, and therefore evidence
on the ground that a number of things are happening. The next round of elections, which are scheduled for the middle of next year, and the population there will be looking to see what have been achieved since the national elections were held, like in any other country. I guess the leadership is very keen to be able to demonstrate that there is progress, there are issues here about the consessionalism, which I perhaps should not go into at the moment. Even in our own countries perhaps, but I can certainly speak of the Congo, things do take time, and they take more time than many of us and the people in power would wish. That includes the population. Delays are the nature of an administration that has not been functional for over 40 years, but needs all the help it can to fulfill the responsibilities, and indeed the expectations of a population that as we have heard and as we know have suffered for far too long.”

Mr. Marc van Bellinghen picked up on two questions. One was the sustainability issue. “You asked if there are cases where one can say that after a peacekeeping operation you really have stable conditions, and then “who’s peace” and “what peace”. I would say stable conditions of development in the hands of the people and their government. I could see two cases which seems to me as responding to what have been set out, it is FYROM here in Europe and the second is still to be tested, which was not really peacekeeping but civilian monitoring and that was Aceh. I think these could be looked into as success stories.”

“As regards the role of the AU in peacebuilding, I assume that you were asking, what our views are on the role of the AU beyond its role in the DRC. Indeed I did not mention the AU. I was intending to mention the African peace facility with which the EU is indeed in partnership. It is clear that the AU has a wide agenda. The AU has shown that it is at least willing and able to, but needed to be supported in AMIS. AMISOM is a problematic issue but they are doing a job that no one else is ready to do. It is a pretty interesting job with the Comores, where it is not only a matter of peacekeeping but it is also a matter of holding elections, of civilian administration. I think the AU is really defiantly equipping itself in regard to the Panel of the Wise and conflict prevention in what I could call elite peace-making at the right moment. I think we will see the AU move more into that domain. Definably, there is a major role for the AU. Currently President Prodi, the former President of the Commission, is looking, with quite a large number of Member States of the UN, to see how predictable funding in a flexible way can be found to top up what the EU is currently doing.”

Regarding local ownership, Mr. Cedric de Coning thought it is one of those things that we can easily take as a slogan, but it is up to us to make it more meaningful than that. “I do not think we have many rules or natural laws in our type of work, but we have one that I can think of and that is that we cannot have sustainability
without local ownership. So it is an absolute prerequisite and we need to find ways of dealing with the complexity and find ways of making it meaningful.”

Dr. Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh wished to add three points. “In the Peacebuilding Commission we do have the grand bargain in resources for development coming from the North and then insurance for security coming from the South, which has always been the dialogue within the UN between the North and South and means that the whole nexus between development and security and the fact that they are basically together, all of that have proven to be just slogan. The fact is that development and security in terms of expenditures are different and separate, and they become a trade off, and there is still a “gun and butter” debate despite what we think.”

“Secondly, I would like to pick up on the question raised on a good case for sustainability, a best practice for peacekeeping or peacebuilding. If you say good peacekeeping practice, then we can give you a list of countries where they have not relapsed into war. The only case I can come to think of which is a good example of peacebuilding is Europe because of the Marshall Plan. Other than that, another country that is not only at war but developed, is a bit more difficult to find.”

“On the question of the handover to the local ownership, remember that it was at a time when the UN did its own administration. We came from Kosovo and East Timor where the UN was actually the government, to Afghanistan where Brahimi said that on this one we are going to go on “a light footnote”. Local ownership also has to be seen in the context of how much do UN move forward, and then have to move back.”

“Finally, I would recommend to the conveners to continue studying the role of China in peacebuilding because of the way in which the OECD discussions have to include the questions of the challenges that China has posed with its funding outside of the OECD guidelines of the funding of countries in development regions.”
Chapter 8

Developing Complementary Capacities for Peace Operations and Peacebuilding Missions: Challenges of Achieving International Unity of Effort

*Speaker: Mr. Jamie Shea, Director of Policy Planning, Private Office of the Secretary-General, North Atlantic Treaty Organization*

What Alexandra Novosseloff said earlier gratified me, she said it was natural for NATO to have its place in a conference which is devoted to peacekeeping, stabilization missions, reconstruction and peace-building. A few years ago, the idea would be surreal. That NATO as an organization would not be identified with the Cold War, but seen as a natural participant in this type of context. I think this shows how far NATO has come in transforming itself to take on a new role but also how far all of the other actors have come. The transformation at times have been as incredible on the non-NATO side as within NATO itself, because there is no service for which there is no demand or to which there is no degree of acceptance.

When I go together with the Secretary-General of NATO to the UN General Assembly in September each year, I am struck by the number of people that want to meet and discuss with us. It has also grown over the years. A few years ago the idea that the Gulf countries would be offering us spaces to facilitate our operation in Afghanistan or wish to hold meetings with us, would seem incredible. The idea that the AU would have turned to us as well as the EU to get help with airlifts into Somalia, or Darfur for the AMIS two operations, that would have been incredible, or that we would have bases in Central Asia to facilitate our transit into Afghanistan. It is not only the whole world that directly participates in our operations, but it is the whole world that now accepts us as a natural partner.

A few days ago in New York, on the margins of the General Assembly, we signed a NATO-UN declaration, which pledges both our organizations to closer cooperation and not just over the essential stabilization operations, but on a whole range of endeavours such as SSR, dealing with issues of terrorism and piracy and so on. I believe that NATO is not only increasing the relevance of this agency, but we will be even more relevant in the future. Over the last few years, the range of different missions is according to me relatively impressive. We have had a UN mandated naval embargo in the Adriatic’s, there has been a UN mandated no-fly-zone over Bosnia. We have protected UN forces on the ground with close air sup-
port in the Balkans. We have run two air campaigns, the first in 1995 over Bosnia to lift the siege of Sarajevo at the time. The Dayton Agreement was then signed 60 days later. The other campaign, which still today is a controversial one, was the allied forces in Kosovo in 1999, without UN mandate. Although we tried very hard to get a UN mandate and I do not believe that we could have done that operation if it had not been endorsed by our own members that were convinced that it was legal to do so, nor had not been supported by the broader international community. NATO considers the Kosovo air campaign as an exception to a general pattern of operating under the authority of the UN Security Council and under a UN mandate.

NATO has carried out several large scale stabilization operations. We had a mission in Bosnia during nine years, before we handed over the mission to the European Union in 2004. We have been in Kosovo since 1999, and we are still there today with 16,000 troops. We had a short but successful operation in the Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia in 2002, to disarm ethnic Albanian fighters at that time. NATO and the UN effectively managed the crisis together and brought the parties to the negotiating table. Since 2003 we have had a major force in Afghanistan, which today is about 50,000 troops, out of which one third are Americans and two thirds are Canadians and Europeans. At the same time, NATO has carried out naval operations. During eight years, NATO has had an operation in the Mediterranean, which is there to protect commercial shipping. Every shipper I have spoken to is very glad that he has managed to reduce his insurance premium, because NATO has that mission. Now we are starting out with a new venture, which I think will be here for quite some time, and that is to combat the problem of piracy in the Gulf of Aden, off the coast of Somalia. Only a few days ago we took a decision to deploy a NATO Standing Naval Task Force, with nine ships to deal with the problem that is creating even more challenges for the international community. No fewer than 67 ships have been attacked by pirates off the cost of Somalia this year, 23 have been high-jacked and 11 are still in the custody of pirates. So far, the pirates have obtained around 100 million USDs in ransom money. I think we need to remember that this is a part of the world where four percent of the globe’s daily oil supplies floats, and 12 percent of the world’s trade. 22,000 ships go along the coast of Somalia every year.

One might ask what this has to do with stabilization missions. We have not been asked by the UN, but the World Food Programme (WFP), to provide escort to the WFP ships that are currently feeding 2 million Somalis, 50 percent of the population of the country. Stabilization is not only about the land of the various countries, but we are increasingly finding that stabilization is also an issue of policing the seas, and having a naval presence to deal with counter terrorism, illegal migration flows, keeping the routes of the world oil and trade open. If ships start going
around the Cape of Good Hope, because they can no longer use the Suez Canal, this would mean 6,500 extra miles that every ship has to travel in delivering its cargo. Stabilization comes in different forms, and I believe that NATO will be as important on the seas in the future as to what we have tried to be on land.

We have provided assistance to others e.g. after the earthquake in Kashmir a few years ago upon a request from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. We have provided training to the Iraqi armed forces and we have tried to facilitate the EU mission in Kosovo. This indicates the great range of services that NATO is able to provide to the international community. However, NATO is not a toolbox. If we do these operations it is in our interest to do so for our own security interests. Our security stretches beyond our own security frontiers.

“If we do not go to Afghanistan, Afghanistan will come to us”
Lord Robertson

We have reinterpreted Article V, of collective defence and collective security commitment, not only to wait to be attacked, but as a mission to defend ourselves outside Europe where it is necessary to do so. When NATO launches a mission it tends to stick to it. So far, no allies has ever left a mission, however it does not mean that everyone has always been pleased with the missions that we have carried out. Afghanistan is putting a lot of strain on NATO at present time, but everyone has a seat at the table and is able to actively take part in the collective decision making.

What are the lessons we have learnt from this over what we are doing well, and where we are not doing well and improvements are needed. The positive side. Versatility – the military today are doing things that they only a few years ago could never believe they would be doing e.g. running provincial reconstruction teams in Afghanistan, and training 134,000 Afghans, which is the goal for the new Afghan national army. Handling the drug problems along the borders and the chemicals needed to manufacture heroin that is flowing in to Afghanistan. We have delivered turbins to Southern Afghanistan trying to get electricity up and running, as well as rebuilding roads and schools. Mission creep is something that might have been a dirty word a few years ago, but we have since long recognized that if there is nobody else doing it, at least on a provisional basis, the military have to fill that vacuum. One of the messages that I want to leave here today is that the transformation on the military side has been more impressive than the transformation on the political side, of running these stabilization missions.

Second, we have done well in having been able to involve a wide number of partners. One example is that the tenth largest contributor to the mission in Afghanistan is Australia, and they are taking risks that some of our allies are not doing at
present time. Countries like Japan, that for well known constitutional reasons cannot put combat forces into Afghanistan, are assisting us by donating money for humanitarian relief programmes to our PRTs. Other countries, like New Zealand, have for a long time been running a provisional reconstruction team. About 15 percent of all of the forces on NATO missions today come from non-NATO countries. I think the reason behind their contribution is that we have been able to build a climate of trust. They see that NATO is a cost effective way of contributing to a mission in a way that commensurate to their possibilities, in a way that helps to share the financial burdens. We have increasingly involved these partners in our command structures, in headquarters roles and in elaborating our plans. Today there is no going back for NATO to only working together with the 26 allies alone. NATO today serves as a hub for a broader international community of countries that are willing to share the burdens of operations.

One of the greatest challenges that we will be facing in the 21st century, and I am not referring to a league of democracies, but to keep the network of partners together, which bridges cultural divides. For example, we have an Istanbul Cooperation Initiative with the Gulf countries, training in dialogue with the North African countries, a Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council with the Central Asians and the Caucasus. We want to keep these partnerships together, not as an institution, but rather as an informal network of partners working together.

Turning to the areas where we have not had as much success. The main focus of NATO is in the military field and I believe that we need to do better in this area. The military transformation of NATO has been held up. Our level of ambition is to be able to do two major operations and six smaller operations simultaneously, and there is an international demand on us to increasingly support peace support missions.

To give you some statistics over NATO: NATO has 2.4 million soldiers on our books, but according to calculations only 300,000 of those are usable soldiers. Still today, we do not know where the others are that are included in the books. At the moment, if you include the UN in Iraq, all of the countries in NATO, UN, and EU missions and coalitions, we have a total capacity of 290,000 soldiers. This means that if there would be another break out similar to what we have in Afghanistan, it would be difficult for the international community to deal with it, if we could do it at all. There are only 10,000 soldiers in reserve. That means that within the alliance we are accepting a usability rate of 40 percent and a deployability rate, the number of soldiers in missions, to 8 percent out of the 40 percent. That means that we are accepting that 95 percent of our forces are unusable for the type of tasks for which we need to use them. We need to improve the work within the alliance of getting the level of usability and deployability up. It is better
to have smaller armies, but armies that can be used, that are trained and equipped for the operations rather than the large Cold War static forces that you are still spending money on, but that you cannot deploy for international missions, and that are not cost-effective.

The other thing is that we have a shortage of critical enablers that makes the difference, especially in areas like Afghanistan, which is larger than Iraq, with a bigger population and where you have to move people around. Why is it that we have 7,500 helicopters in the NATO inventory, but at the moment we are unable to get 200 helicopters to Afghanistan? We need to gather the various issues that are behind the difficulties of getting e.g. the helicopters to Afghanistan. The common capabilities of the alliance are of importance if the future is going to have expeditionary missions. We need to be able to deploy our forces and today we lack the strategic lift and transport aircrafts that are required for these missions. 80 percent of the militaries go by sea in NATO operations. We are making progress though. A few days ago we launched a new NATO Strategic Lift Command, based around three C17s, which also can be used by the UN and the EU for their missions upon request. We need faster progress with these kinds of developments. Furthermore, we need more common funding. The problem at the moment is that lots of the countries have the capabilities, but they do not have the money to deploy.

We need an extension of common funding so the countries that do not have capability do not get punished twice. In order for us to be more active on the seas, we have to stop the decline of our naval forces. 50 percent of the navies in NATO are essentially dedicated to operations on land, supporting forces on land or contributing with forces and material to land operations. In order to be successful in the future, we have to generate political will. It is not good to deploy forces into a stabilization mission, if you cannot use them properly. One example is that there are currently 70 restrictions or caveats on the use of our forces in Afghanistan. This is because countries take a sector and claim it to be their sector which they are responsible for, while not being responsible for the whole of Afghanistan. In Afghanistan we will only be able to succeed if all the allies take responsibility individually for all of the country and are prepared to be flexible on how they use their forces.

Furthermore, in order to be successful we need to develop our strategy before we deploy our forces. In a peace supporting operation there is always a tendency of putting the troops in before you have actually done a very good analysis over what the mission will be like. That also means that if the missions changes in a way that the mission in Afghanistan has changed for the worse over the last few years, with the insurgency proving to be resilient, and if you are in a peacekeeping mode with very lightly armed forces, vehicles that cannot take roadside bombs and with no
air support, you will be in trouble if the mission suddenly changes and you will have to try to find more forces. We developed a Political-Military Strategy for Afghanistan in 2008, but this should have been done in 2003 when we first went in. It is important to get the right political framework before you deploy the troops, rather than deploying the troops and then retro fit the political framework around it.

One important factor is the comprehensive approach, which is the civil-military relation. NATO is well aware of our benefits, but we are also aware of our limits. NATO has a big strength and that is the military, but NATO also has a big weakness and that is the military. In other words we are aware that you can spend billions of USD, but if there is no curable governance, if there is no economic development and if there is no police to deal with local security issues, all of the money is effectively wasted. One of the problems in Afghanistan at the moment, which we within the NATO feel, is that we are rather alone. The other organizations that are there, such as the EU with a judicial police mission, and the UN, but there is still a perception at the headquarter of NATO that this mission is more important for NATO than it is for the other organizations, or that there is a perception that the huge force that NATO has deployed in the country serves to be enough. However, mass does not equal success, you also need to have the right strategy in order to achieve success of a mission. Therefore, we need better coordination between the military effort and the civilian effort. We have far too many military operations in Afghanistan, with a clear territory, but then we cannot hold the territory either because there is an absence of local security forces, or because there is an absence of a follow on civilian development programme. The comprehensive approach is something that everybody accepts in principle but it is not so easy to make it work in practice. One of the reasons is that in complex military environments like Afghanistan, there could be a sense that the military side is taking over from the civilian side, and that it is all about the military and not so much about development. I do not think this is true. However, we have seen from the attacks on the aid workers in the last few weeks, that if you cannot organize the security first and foremost, it is difficult to start development programmes.

If there is more security it probably corresponds to the reality on the ground, rather than a desire by NATO to have an essentially military operation. There is also a cultural problem and I believe that the military have found it easier to reach out to civilians and work together with NGO’s and civilian agencies. To understand their needs, we need more cultural dialogue.

The third reason is that international organizations do not have the same strategic priorities. Every international organization today are running a lot of different operations and getting the strategic convergence where one or two are more important
than the others, this is where we need to increase our efforts. If we could have a strategic convergence among the major international organizations, so the military side is planned with the civilian side, we would save a lot of time. We tend to get it right in the end, but we spend a lot of time to reach that point. One example is that we could have started the governance programmes, the training programmes for the police and the military much earlier than we did in Afghanistan.

Another reason is that the nations are not always well joined up. The American Defence Secretary at a NATO meeting a few months ago complained that he tried to give money from the Pentagon to the State Department, because he recognized what Afghanistan needed was not so much more soldiers, even if they will need that as well, but rather more civilian administrators. However, by American law he was unable to give the State Department resources. The budget of the State Department is 8 billion USD for all the reconstruction tasks and the Pentagon this year has around 621 billion USD, according to what was signed into law by President Bush last week. This kind of disproportion at home will also be reflected at the international level. George Robertson, during his time as UK Defence Secretary, told me about his efforts to persuade DFID, the UK Department for International Development, to be more active in Afghanistan alongside British soldiers.

Having said this, we need more coherence at the national levels, and we will have to invest more in robust civilian capabilities. I believe that our nations and international organizations in the future will have to form a civil equivalent to the military, that are trained with civilian experts. People in retirement are often good for this job, prepared and paid to be deployed in dangerous areas. We have to put more thought into how we deploy these robust forces, that will not just go for a couple of weeks or months, but rather forces like the military that will go for a couple of years. One option to this could be to use military reserves with civilian skills.

We will need a better political structure in order to be successful in these operations. One problem is that we often introduce forces on the ground, to then we wait for those forces to stabilize the country, and then wait for the trickle up effect to make the politics easier to manage. From my experience this does not work. You cannot deploy military forces and then stop the politics. In Kosovo we discovered what happens in terms of stagnation and deterioration when you believe that military forces by themselves have stabilized the situation. You forget about it and turn to the next crisis. This only works when the political leaders implement the right management structures. We had a contact group, for instance, that was very successful in handling the politics of the Balkans, and we have a quartet in the Middle East Peace Process.
The people in the theatre needs to be supported by proper political management structures that are constantly delivering consistent messages to the local parties, and constantly put them under pressure to live up to their commitments. I believe that too often in these operations we tend to find a disproportion between the effort on the ground and the international political environment supporting that effort on the ground. It takes an enormous effort to keep the place stable, and for modern political leaders to devote that time and effort to a political region is difficult. At the end of the day, that sustained political commitment is the condition for success. Too many missions today are decentralized or deputized to the ground level and that does not work.

Recommendations on what needs to be done; we need to join up the major international organizations better. It is a beginning. I mentioned the EU-UN declaration, the assistance that we are currently giving to the AU upon request from them, alongside the EU with the African Stand-by Force, the Peacekeeping Academy of the AU and so on. NATO and the EU, under the courtesy of the French Presidency, have been very helpful in this respect, and they are now talking about constituting a high level group between the NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana and our operational commanders to talk more about cooperation in operations. One example of this could be piracy along the coast of Somalia, where the EU will also deploy a task force later this year. This could serve as a good example to start this work. NATO also needs to work vis-à-vis the Arab League and other organizations which are important for regional stability. If we could get many more of the Arab Countries more focused on Afghanistan and aid to Afghanistan, this would be excellent. Furthermore, we need a culture of making the organizations more accessible to each other. What is helping is that in Kosovo at the moment between NATO and the EU, is the fact that the EU commander of the EULEX police force happens to be the person that commanded the NATO force, KFOR, during a long period of time. The person that is running the EU civilians affairs office was the director of crisis management at NATO during five years, and the person that currently is our senior civilian representative in Afghanistan worked in the EU Council for a long time. The best thing we can have is the gradual culture with people who do not spend their entire career in NATO or the humanitarians’ affairs council at the UN and develop the tunnel vision along with that, but people that have moved around. We need more exchange of people between the organizations. The Secretary-Generals of the major organizations should have the same video conferences that our Heads of States have with each other several times a week, in terms of coordinating a policy. I believe that our Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), which is a planning organization of 3000 colonels, could take on the task of helping other organizations, including the UN, to do effective civil-military planning for the missions. Furthermore, we have an Allied Command Transformation in Norfolk, Virginia, which is responsible for training forces for
mission preparation. It is an underutilized headquarters which could be put to good use in terms of providing lessons learnt, best practice and training for other organizations as well.

The financial crisis has drained 1.36 billion USD from the NATO countries treasuries to bail out the banks over the last couple of weeks. The US stock market in the last few weeks has lost 1.4 trillion USD. This financial crisis is not going to make it any easier for our governments to spend money on military forces to deploy them on missions. We are going to be much more in the preventive mode, than we have been before. In our own financial interests we are going to have to be much more involved in helping others to help themselves through training, equipment and SSR programmes. I think that is an area where NATO can fill a role.

Finally, before I conclude, I would like to mention international law. I am not an international lawyer, but what I do know is that if international lawyers do not keep up with the practical evolution of missions we are going to have a problem. Not only in terms of international legitimacy, but also our own ability to participate and for participants to be able to approve their own rules of engagements. For instance on piracy, NATO is willing to send the ships, but what do we do if we catch the pirates? We do not know. Do we give them to the Somalis? Do we keep them, and if we keep them, do we have to grant them asylum? One NATO country a few weeks ago handed over the pirates to Somalia, because there was no legal clarification as to what should be done with them. Of course, it is not good that the military forces go in, if the status of forces agreement is not cleared.

We sent the NATO Response Force to Pakistan, and when they arrived, we could not go up to the earthquake area immediately to begin relief because we had legal problems regarding the status of the troops, whether they required visas, juridiction if they committed any crimes and whether they were allowed to carry any weapons or not. The lessons we learnt was that the first person to go on an operation should be the legal advisor and not the commanding officers. We need to look at this to see that we respect the international law but also that international law evolves in helping us to have clarity in some of the new tasks that we are taking on. The willingness of the UN Security Council, looking at Resolution 1816 in mandating these missions is very helpful, but at the same time, this is an area which will need much more attention than it has been getting so far.

What I have tried to give you is a NATO perspective, and to show that we have in fact quite good answers to many of the problems we are confronting today. Every day I get another thick report from a think tank or from a government on civil-military operations, joined-up operations and the comprehensive approach.
There are millions of god strategies around, and if a problem occurs the first thing that people tend to do, including myself, is to say let us have a new strategy to deal with the problem. The new strategy, when you have written it, is a carbon copy of the previous strategy, because at the end of the day, the answers are pretty much common-sense. The problem we have today is implementing those strategies, not producing them. If we spent more time implementing strategies rather than re-writing strategies we would be a lot further forward in our stabilization operations. My plea today is to de-ideologise this debate, to try understand each other better and to try establish a better relationship between the civilian side and the military side. The civilian side in the more dangerous operations cannot possibly succeed without some kind of effective military presence. The military is becoming more aware that there are only exit strategies at the end of the day, to be there to assist a credible civilian effort. If NATO fails, you will fail on the civilian side. The comprehensive approach is not only a problem for NATO it is a problem for the Americans in Iraq, it is a problem for the UN in Darfur, it is a problem for EU in Chad, this is a problem for all of us everywhere. This is not just something that is NATO’s problem.

“We either all hang together or we all hang separately.”
Benjamin Franklin

Discussion

A representative of a European Ministry of Foreign Affairs recalled that NATO and the EU have 21 countries that are members of both organizations. “The anti-piracy operation that NATO is planning in Somalia waters, would be reinforced by the EU, which is also planning on starting such an operation. In the light of that 21 nations belongs to both organizations, would it be silly for both organizations to start doing the same thing?”

Mr. Jamie Shea responded by stating that duplication makes no sense, and there is enough work today to keep both actively occupied. “We are not competing for a declining market share, in fact, the market share is going up. There are things that NATO can do better than the EU, particularly if you have a major military involvement like the one in Afghanistan, where clearly you need the United States involved. If the United States is going to be involved in a major military way, NATO would be the obvious instrument of choice. I also have to say that there are a lot of things that the EU can do better than NATO. One example is Georgia. NATO could not have done that operation because Russia would never have accepted a NATO monitoring presence on the boarder of Abkhazia and Ossetia, or at least in Georgia. The EU was an acceptable partner both to Georgia and to Russia, so there are political realities that we have to face. NATO does the more
heavy military side - that is our specialization. The EU has a much broader range of civilian capabilities with police, judiciary and so on, which means that it can deploy the full spectrum of assets within a single mission in a way that NATO cannot.”

“The EU and NATO should not always be doing everything together. There will always be things that NATO does but not the EU and vice versa. We need a common denominator of issues that we both agree are fundamental to our joint security. The security of France in the EU is not different to the security of France in NATO. The Balkans is an obvious example. We have realized that together we need to manage the Balkans. We have done this successfully, and Afghanistan is an area which cries out for that joint type of approach. It will be interesting to see, when the new US president comes calling next January, with the prospect of a surge, at least from an American perspective in Afghanistan, how much Europe itself is willing to do. The EU has a helicopter problem in Chad, the Russians have offered four helicopters. We have a big helicopter problem in Afghanistan. The EU has a strategic lift problem, and so does NATO. When you look at the EU force planning and the NATO force planning it is the same problems that occur, so we need to do two things; first, to put out research and development efforts together, so that we are not duplicating costly programmes. Secondly, we shall have what the French call “reservoir de force” i.e. a common pool of forces, which are potentially available to either organization. For examples, we have used the EU core in the Balkans and in Afghanistan very successfully. I have mentioned that our C17 aircraft can potentially be available to EU operations. Sweden and Finland are EU countries that are not members of NATO, but they participate in our C17 operation, so clearly they have the right to use those aircrafts for EU operations. There is a certain degree of flexibility together in the planning and generation of forces. A couple of missions that we agree are fundamentally in our interest that we try to do more together, and then there are inevitably a range of different operations where we will not be together.”

A representative from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of a NATO member (not member of EU) started by thanking Mr. Shea for the informative and dynamic presentation. “The way you have presented the comprehensive approach seems to be it represents or mirrors the enthusiasm of NATO to work with other international organizations, but we should not lose sight of the fact that comprehensive is something that functions in a two way street. In order to have comprehensive approach function in a healthy and sound way, this enthusiasm should also be reciprocated by other organizations. It seems to me that comprehensive approach is something which is interpreted differently in NATO and EU and other organizations. I think there should be a convergence of this interpretation to have it function in a better way.”
Mr. Jamie Shea responded by saying he thinks we are getting there: “The politics is just trying to speed up the process, but my sense is that e.g. in the UN now, there is a sense that we cannot come to NATO as the UN has done, and ask NATO on an ad-hoc basis to do things for us. For instance with the earthquake in Pakistan, or to provide helicopter transport for personnel inside Iraq. Iraq is not a NATO mission, but we do have a presence with training and WFP. Ban Ki-moon a few days ago asked for our assistance on piracy. We cannot come to NATO when we basically need their help and then not recognize NATO as a political partner at the strategic headquarters level. I think Ban Ki-moon understood, despite concerns with the UN at the staff level where people were saying that “NATO, do we really want to sign a declaration with those people”. Ban Ki-moon showed great visions in saying if we want to cooperate with NATO when we need them, we have to acknowledge them as a legitimate partner. I think the UN declaration is a breakthrough for us because not only will it help our relations inside the UN, and with the other UN agencies that we could be called on to help e.g. we worked the refugee agency in Albania and Macedonia back in 1999, but it will also help the international community to see that if the UN recognizes NATO it is ok for us as well. It takes personal political leadership to do those kinds of things, because in any bureaucracy there will always be someone saying “no let us not do this”.”

“Regarding the EU, the fact now that we have this good proposal from France to establish a high level group with Javier Solana, NATO Secretary-General and the military commanders to meet more often, this will also help over time to develop a common sort of view and a common political culture. Given the demands on us, people are becoming even more pragmatic about these things, the old barriers are coming down. As I said, if we can make it go a little bit faster, it is going to be in everybody’s interest.”
Chapter 9

Security Sector Reform: Realities and Ambitions

Chair: Mr. Dmitry Titov, Assistant Secretary-General for Rule of Law and Security Institutions, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations

Mesdames et Messieurs,

It is a great pleasure for me to join you today and I am grateful to the French Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence for this opportunity to exchange views on the UN-EU relationship and cooperation. I would like to praise the French Presidency of the EU for sponsoring this event, but also for making SSR one of its program priorities. We also pay tribute to the French Government effort to produce its paper on security sector reform. Many of its elements, on the strategic importance of the issue, the need to combine professionalization with governance issues, the need to strengthen national and international capacities in this vital area and create an international network – resonate to a considerable degree with the UN Secretary-General’s report on “Securing Peace and Development: the Role of the United Nations in Supporting Security Sector Reform.” In hindsight, I would rather call it the security sector system. Each country in the post-conflict setting needs a reliable, sustainable and efficient security system, which is rooted into the rule of law context.

I am Dmitry Titov, Assistant Secretary-General for Rule of Law and Security Institutions with UN DPKO, and I am glad to be chairing this morning’s session on Security Sector Reform: Realities and Ambitions. I represent a new office, created about a year ago within DPKO, which brings together our Police Division, Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Section, DDR Section, Mine Action Service, and SSR team. We are part of the large and proud system, the Department of Peacekeeping Operation, which is currently involved in 18 field operations with a total strength of around 100.000 military, police and civilian personnel.

From the onset I would like to pose some provocative questions, asking who’s ambitions, and who’s reality. When discussing SSR, it can be too easy to focus only on the donors or the implementing agencies but at the end of the day, should we not focus mainly on the end recipients of SSR, i.e. the population, the societies and governments living in insecurity? Should it not be their ambitions and vision driving SSR efforts? How the donor community best can fit into this process?

As Dr. Chuter rightly mentions in his background paper, the security sector is the foundation of the stability of any State. In fact, some studies indicate that a USD
invested in a well-structured and comprehensive security system and reform may bring up to four or five USD into savings for intervening nations or institutions.

UN’s Approach to SSR. With this in mind, I would like to briefly present to you the UN’s emerging approach to SSR. UN activities that fall under the overall description of SSR are not new, they date back decades, and involve a number of technical activities, from the training of police to recreating justice, rebuilding prisons and putting all of the above into the context of accountability and prosperity. In fact, since 1989, 29 peacekeeping operations have provided SSR-related support to national authorities. Such experience has confirmed that SSR is an extremely important undertaking that lies – or rather should lie – at the core of mandates of UN peacekeeping or any multilateral operations, to help national actors restore security and put in place viable mechanisms to ensure it. SSR is critical to the consolidation of peace and stability, promoting poverty reduction, rule of law and good governance, extending legitimate state authority, and preventing countries from relapsing into conflict, and ultimately ensuring the responsibility to protect which is first and foremost a state prerogative. The direct link between SSR and broader, long-term development and good governance is obvious, and this is uncontestedly a vital element of the peacekeeping exit strategy. This allows Member States to exit quicker from the expensive peacekeeping phase, not to mention the benefits for the local population and authorities. Unquestionably, Member States and their organizations remain central providers of security and international assistance in this area. This is their sovereign right and responsibility. How the UN can assist Member States in delivering this responsibility has become a core issue for us.

Despite the importance of SSR, the UN has remained, until most recently, an ad hoc partner in this area. At the same time, while the UN is increasingly being mandated to undertake SSR, its field operations still lack capacities and resources to implement such mandates, with no general policy, methodology or guidance on SSR existing within the UN. To start bridging this gap, a small SSR Team was established in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations last year. But its resources are still modest.

After broad, and admittedly difficult consultations, inside and outside the UN system, the Report of the Secretary-General on SSR was released in February of this year, outlining the UN’s approach. That report highlights a number of priorities for the UN as we see it, including:

a. Development of UN policies and guidelines;
b. modestly strengthening advisory and specialist capacities at the Headquarters;
c. strengthening field capacity for SSR, when requested and mandated;
d. assessing gaps and resource requirements of requesting nations;
e. enhancing the coordination with donors—bilateral and multilateral—and delivery of focused, more effective support; and
f. building partnerships, as well as adequate resources to national SSR processes.

Geographically, we intend to focus at the initial stage on support to field missions with explicit SSR mandates (the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Burundi, Timor-Leste, and Haiti). The priorities have been approved by the Inter-Agency Task Force established by the Secretary-General that brings together a wide range of UN actors and is chaired by our office. The responsibility for coordinating the Task Force rests with the recently-created SSR team led by Mr. Adedeji Ebo. We invite all of you to liaise and cooperate with the team. I should stress that lessons learned have demonstrated that ensuring local ownership of SSR processes still remains a major challenge. To ensure that SSR strategies and their implementation adequately take into account the specific local contexts, the design and implementation of SSR programmes must be locally-owned, based on history, traditions and public consultations. They should be steered by local needs and context, and must engage local actors at both the strategic and practical levels. However, SSR models are too often imposed by external actors. To be frank, these models are little understood on the ground and may not be linked to the peace process or be properly tailored and sequenced.

UN’s Cooperation with the EU and others. While the UN is still small but a growing player, a number of intergovernmental bodies, such as the EU, as well as multiple bilateral donors, and even international NGOs are engaged in this area. Here comes the crucial issue of cooperation, which can be the decisive factor between success and failure. The UN is, by its very nature, open to such cooperation, coordination and partnerships. Experiences in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kosovo, Haiti, Timor-Leste, and even in the Middle East, demonstrate that the collective impact of the wider international community is far greater if we conduct SSR in a synchronized and synergized manner. In so doing, we share knowledge, reduce duplication, prioritize and make better use of scarce resources.

For example, the level of cooperation on SSR between the UN and the EU in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is quite remarkable, albeit not without problems. Frankly much more needs to be done to help the country to achieve self-sustainment in the security area, after almost ten years of a massive UN presence, which has cost the organization between eighth to ten billion USD of direct peace-keeping expenses alone.
We have also learned from our experiences in Burundi that for coordination to be successful, national actors need to play a role in developing and coordinating international assistance. We are committed to strengthening our partnerships with key regional organizations, such as the EU, the African Union, ECOWAS, SADC and others. We hope that we can learn from the EU experience but we also hope both organizations could serve as a mutual resource multiplier to develop technical guidance, training and other SSR tools. In this connection, we welcome the development, in 2005-2006, of an EU holistic approach to SSR and are prepared to work together on the ground, if recipient governments are ready for that.

How to make UN-EU cooperation work better:

a. We have to learn to develop common strategic objectives and planning assumptions. In Chad we made an important step in this direction by jointly assessing the need in the area of justice and corrections;

b. once a decision to undertake a joint operation is made, it is critical that the EU and the UN maintain active dialogue synchronized with the peace process, coordinating our approach with local stakeholders;

c. if need be we should establish country-specific mechanisms, procedures, frameworks and funding streams;

d. together, we face a global shortage of SSR experts possessing the desired range of skills and who are readily deployable. The two organizations could cooperate much more closely on special rosters for such experts, their training as well as capacity building of important regional organizations, such as the African Union;

e. we should also look pragmatically at how we could maximize capacities in the field including through joint pillars dealing with SSR;

f. the UN and the EU could even take a practical step in the immediate future by establishing an exploratory joint working group on SSR and then consider associating others with such a group. For that the EU would benefit from bringing together its own relevant components in Brussels that could serve as the focal point of interaction with others; and

g. lastly, together with other interested parties we could contribute to the development of UN SSR norms, standards practices, and practical tools, and start focusing together on new challenges, such as Guinea-Bissau, Central African Republic, and in the future, Somalia.

As a conclusion, altogether, we all have to convince our Member States and implementing partners of the need to mainstream SSR as an integral element of post conflict, peacekeeping and even peacebuilding. Creation of viable SSR systems should be woven into every stage of conflict management and should become part of the UN Integrated Mission Planning Process conducted system-wide at the UN.
In the conclusion of his paper, Dr. Chuter suggests to answer challenges facing SSR programmes with proper strategy and prioritization, solid understanding of the local context, selection of personnel with the relevant experience, adequate training, and modesty of objectives. As you have seen from my presentation, we fully support these recommendations. We should always remember that SSR is so close to the heart of power and governance. That is why any solutions should be grounded in local initiative, local buy-in, local resources and personnel and local vision.

Background paper IV

Dr. David Chuter, Independent Consultant, United Kingdom

Background

Security Sector Reform programmes have increasingly become part of Peace Operations in recent years. Like these operations as a whole, SSR interventions are often characterised in ambitious terms, but it is not clear how successful they have actually been, nor, indeed, if there is any way of measuring what success they may have had in specific cases.

This paper deals with the challenges typically posed to SSR interventions as part of Peace Operations, and what further challenges may arise in the future, and tries to shed some light on the questions of why evaluating their success is difficult, and how they may be performed better. It deals with two sets of challenges; those that flow from conceptual difficulties and confusion with other disciplines and types of intervention on the one hand, and those that flow from the complexities of the situation on the ground on the other. Having described these challenges, and argued for a modest and focused type of SSR programme when such interventions are judged necessary, the paper attempts to provide some practical recommendations, together with suggestions for following them up. It is important to stress that there are occasions when SSR initiatives might be conducted in the absence of an international peace mission. This will typically be during a period of transition from an authoritarian to a multiparty political system, and can involve delicate changes in the relationship of the security forces to the civil population as well as the civil power. Because it is not impossible that such issues might arise during a peace mission also, they are briefly referred to in the text. But this is really another subject, which requires special treatment of its own.

Although many of the challenges posed to SSR interventions are generic, and can apply irrespective of the number of nations and institutions involved, there are obviously special considerations involved when different organisations are involved
in handling the same crisis. The European Union, with its capacity to provide a wide spectrum of military and civilian assistance is a partner in many international operations in the world today. As part of its European Defence and Security Policy, the European Union is increasingly conducting SSR interventions in the context of wider international attempts at post-conflict stabilisation, and often in association with the missions of the United Nations. A particular example of this cooperation is the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Relationships between the EU and the UN are well established and continue to develop. This paper therefore also considers issues of coordination between international organisations.

The security sector is the foundation of the stability of any state, and security in daily life is a precondition for economic and political development. A well-functioning security sector is therefore fundamental. If a security sector is incapable of performing its functions, because of lack of resources or because it has lost legitimacy with parts of the population, then any existing political crisis will be exacerbated and potential new crises created. History suggests that, after a crisis, and especially after an armed conflict, rebuilding the security forces is an urgent priority for the recovery of stability. Sometimes, this involves no more than the orderly return of the security forces to a peacetime footing, and to a size and with a budget appropriate to their peacetime functions. But on other occasions it can involve the integration of former combatants, and even policemen from different backgrounds, into a new security apparatus designed to serve an entire community. In other cases, the crisis itself can be one of democratic transition, or sudden political evolution. The security forces of a state may not require rebuilding as such, but their political status may have to change. The security forces may have been part of an authoritarian regime, or they may have acted to enforce the domination of a political party or an ethnic or religious group. They may have been exploited and politicised by a former regime, or they may have been kept in a position of subordination and weakness lest they became a threat.

The security forces are also the most basic means of gaining and maintaining political power. In many societies, control of the security forces is literally a matter of life and death, and their control comes before any considerations of effectiveness or public acceptability. In many other societies, there is a tradition of the politicisation of the security forces and their use for political advantage and the harassment of opponents. In still other societies, the very importance of the security forces requires a careful balance of senior appointments between communities to avoid political problems. This can mean, for example, a security sector which is unnecessarily large and inefficient, but which is important in helping to provide political stability. Numerous local police forces might be more expensive than a single national one, for example, but might also be more politically acceptable in a divided society.
It follows from the above that, if a well-functioning security sector is essential for the running of a state, then great care needs to be taken in making changes to it, lest careful political balances be upset. In particular, it is important to be clear whether or not there are fundamental problems with the security sector itself, and if so what they are. It is generally better to err on the side of caution when considering possible SSR activities in societies which are themselves already unstable or have only recently emerged from conflict.

Finally, it is crucial to appreciate that there are many different traditions and experiences in the security sectors of the world. The developed world ideal (if often not the reality) of politically neutral, functionally differentiated, professional security forces acting under the law for the common good is very far indeed from the reality of how most security forces in the world have functioned for most of history. A system in which justice is used as an instrument of political control and the intelligence services spy on enemies of the government may well need changing, but this change cannot come about quickly or easily, and must be handled with great discretion.

These difficult issues provide many challenges to the successful implementation of SSR programmes. As indicated, some of these challenges are primarily conceptual, and others are practical. They are discussed in turn, and recommendations are offered to address them.

Conceptual Challenges

Problems of Meaning and Definition

The Nature of SSR itself. Given the lack of an agreed definition of the security sector, that SSR itself is “an ill-defined concept,” and finally the lack of consensus on the meanings of key words and ideas employed, the first and most important challenge is in deciding what the objectives of an SSR intervention actually are, and ensuring that there is a common understanding of them among all participants.

But the problem here is less one of theoretical confusion, important as that is, than of the disparity between the theoretical debate, with its uncertainties and contradictions, and the situations that an SSR team might actually find on the ground. For example, several scholars have studied the changes made in the former Warsaw Pact security sectors in the 1990s, and have concluded that the pursuit of “formal indicators” such as the number of civilians in a defence ministry, drawn from theoretical writings, hindered rather than helped the transformation process. These changes were brought about by the need to bring the ex Warsaw Pact
nations into the Partnership for Peace programme (and in some cases later into NATO itself) and there was little time or inclination to take account of the specifics of the countries concerned. Existing SSR publications and doctrine, however, provide little assistance in such situations.

The disparity between theory and practice begins in the most basic fashion – in the definition of the security sector itself. The divergent views on its nature are not, fundamentally, doctrinal or conceptual, rather they are political. SSR itself has been described, in a recent report by the UN Secretary General as a “highly political process”,9 and this reflects the extreme sensitivity of the issues it encompasses, at the heart of the very existence of any state and government. Access to the security sector of a state provides an unparalleled opportunity for political influence, and it is not surprising that many groups, domestic and international, seek to acquire it. Moreover, since classical security issues themselves are complex and sensitive, some organisations will compete to define the security sector in broader ways, which then give them the possibility of acquiring influence over it. There is therefore no possibility of a true definitional consensus emerging, since different, and often conflicting, political objectives are involved. The result of all this is that consensus descriptions of the security sector (they are not really definitions) are frequently anthologies of different interpretations, containing something for all tastes. A typical result (from the same document just cited) is as follows:

“Security sector” is a broad term often used to describe the structures, institutions and personnel responsible for the management, provision and oversight of security in a country. It is generally accepted that the security sector includes defence, law enforcement institutions, corrections, intelligence services, and institutions responsible for border management, customs, and civil emergencies. Elements of the judicial sector responsible for the adjudication of cases of alleged criminal conduct and misuse of force are, in many instances, also included. The security sector also includes actors that play a role in managing and overseeing the design and implementation of security, such as ministries, legislative bodies and civil society groups. Other non-State actors that could be considered as part of the security sector include customary or informal authorities and private security services.10

This kind of tentative formulation is appropriate to a political consensus document, collectively drafted, which has to suit many interests. But clearly an operational SSR activity has to make some key practical judgements about what and what not to include in the consideration of the security sector of a particular country in the absence of concepts, or even a vocabulary, which is widely shared and understood. How is this, in practice, to be done? Two observations may be helpful here.

First, there is no Security Sector as such, but only the Security Sectors of different countries, and these vary enormously, in size, scope, organisation, effectiveness and many other things. Moreover, every security sector is placed in a very particu-
lar historical, social and political context which needs to be respected. The issue is thus the identification of the nature and extent of the task in a specific country context.

Secondly, the fundamental distinction, often lost sight of, is, broadly, between the government and everything else. The apparatus of government, including operational security forces, courts and prisons and their mechanisms for political direction and management, reports to a Prime Minister or President who has the legitimacy which comes from the electoral process. This is the executive security sector, and the area where most SSR work is actually concentrated. There are then other parts of the government and political apparatus of the country (such as parliament and a constitutional court) who are consulted or involved as necessary, according to the provisions of the Constitution, and must acquiesce to the proposals of the government, in defence as in other areas, before they can be implemented. Their relationship with the executive part of the security sector is one of the most difficult issues in SSR. There are then many external organisations who aspire to influence the government, but have no constitutional or legal status. And of course parliament, and sometimes the judiciary, will have political agendas which they will seek to impose on a government in addition to their constitutional role. More is said about these issues below.

These problems of definition are all the more acute when different organisations are involved. The UN and EU, as well as many other organisations, have produced their own SSR policies and doctrines, for internal and external readerships. All are consensus documents produced by large committees of non-specialists, looking for compromise wording which everyone can accept. This, of course, is how international texts are normally negotiated, but the results, given their circumstances of production, are not necessarily of much practical operational value. Moreover, different organisations will see SSR very differently. The OECD, for example, is essentially concerned with the development aspects of SSR, whilst NATO sees it as about political transformation of former Communist states.

Naturally, SSR interventions on the ground often proceed pragmatically, and the lack of a properly elaborated theory does not have to be a crippling handicap. But it is unsatisfactory if something as complex and sensitive as SSR does not have a robust body of theory and principles to support it. What happens, for example, if an SSR team deploys into a country recently at war, where the Defence Minister is a serving General, and where the security sector, including the intelligence departments, are heavily militarised. Most SSR concepts stress the need for something called “civilian control” without specifying what it is, or which civilians are to control what. The team will face immediate practical problems. Does this mean a civilian Minister? If so, could he or she be a retired General? Where can qualify
civilian staff be obtained? What will their relationship to the military be? Who will do which jobs? To what level are political appointees necessary and acceptable? Can the civilians give the military orders, or overrule them? There are partial answers, at least, to all these questions, but there is little extant authoritative guidance for SSR teams to fall back on. Given that international organisations will increasingly cooperate on SSR operations in the future, there is a clear requirement for a standardised technical vocabulary and set of concepts which can be used by all. This should not be a consensus drafted document, but more of a discussion paper, which should also describe trends in security sector development in different political and cultural contexts, and illustrate choices which may have to be made. Work on such a document needs to begin promptly, and involve the major institutional actors.

**Relationship to wider objectives.** One pragmatic solution to the problem of definitions is to look at what needs to be done, by way of security-related initiatives, to support the objectives of the Peace Mission as a whole. Such objectives will obviously vary from mission to mission, but typically will involve returning the country to a situation of stability, such that the mission itself can more readily withdraw. The areas of the “security sector” however defined, where initiatives need to be carried out, will depend on judgements about what the threats to stability are, and how they should be addressed. This implies that SSR programmes should generally only be conducted when at least one of the following criteria is met:

a. There are weaknesses or defects in the current security arrangements which materially provoked the crisis or are materially obstructing a return to stability, or

b. even if the above is not the case, initiatives can be undertaken to improve the security arrangements of the country which will themselves substantially assist in the restoration of stability.

In turn, these criteria imply that an order of priorities should be established. There are many security-related areas where initiatives could be undertaken which might in theory contribute to stability, but an SSR intervention should really be limited to those initiatives which demonstrably should have a major impact on the stability of the country. Theoretical writing on SSR, and also practice in certain cases, have both supported the idea of wide-ranging transformational change in the security sector, to be conducted simultaneously. Whilst this may be theoretically attractive, it is difficult to do in practice, and can often lead to initiatives managed by different organisations in conflict with each other. In this way, it is not really necessary to have a theoretical debate over definitions, and the practice, for once, is less complex than the theory.
Generic Situations. Whilst every SSR intervention will be different, it is important to bear in mind the difference between two generic types of situation, which will have a great influence on how such an intervention can be conducted.

Transition to democracy. This may have been largely or even entirely peaceful. Security forces and the government apparatus as a whole may have a high level of technical competence, but a history of identifying with a political party, regime or ethnic/religious group. They may also have been part of the government itself.

Post-war. The war may have been an international conflict, or a civil war, or a mixture of both. The security forces may themselves need reconstruction, and security policy will have to be adapted to a peacetime environment.

These two cases can, of course, be linked in whole or in part, but by no means always.

Components of the Security Sector

Components of Security. The following paragraphs look at some of the bodies which have been proposed as elements of the security sector. The purpose is not to ask whether, in some theoretical sense, they should be allowed membership, but rather to ask how likely it is, in practice, that they would be part of an SSR initiative aimed at contributing to the stabilisation of a country.

The Security Forces. In practice, this refers to the military (including paramilitary forces if any), the police, the justice system and the intelligence services. In spite of what is sometimes assumed, threats to the stability of a state rarely come from the security services in themselves. The idea that an “unreformed” security sector will spontaneously engage in wars or oppress the population is not borne out by experience. Rather, part or all of the security forces may involve itself in politics, usually on the side of one political party or tendency, or of a particular group. Even where the military seizes strategic control of the nation, it does not rule alone, and indeed probably could not do so. Most so-called “military regimes” are in fact civilian regimes with a number of military officers included, but relying on the support of the existing apparatus of the state to govern. In very few cases do “the military” act as a whole; political tensions and even open conflict between factions can occur during what are described as “military governments”.

The same is even truer of the police and intelligence services. The former, and even more the latter, do not have the organisation necessary to play a dominant political role – though of course they may seek influence where they can. A “police state” is a state where the police are used by the regime to suppress opposition, not
a state run by the police. Likewise, judges may have been selected for political pliability or sympathy with the regime, but are unlikely themselves to take steps spontaneously to put innocent people in prison.

There is an argument for including such bodies as the Coastguard and civil emergency services in the definition of the security sector for certain purposes. Whilst SSR interventions may involve these bodies in certain cases (rationalisation between the Navy and the Coastguard, for example), it is very unlikely that the issues would be important enough by themselves to be part of an SSR intervention as part of a Peace Mission.

Finally, the criminal justice system (as opposed to the police) may need help. Restoring public confidence in the state, as is sometimes necessary, means not simply that presumed criminals are arrested, but also that they are prosecuted promptly and, if they are found guilty, there are prisons to send them to, from which they cannot easily escape. In the absence of these factors, law and order is in jeopardy, and the growth of vigilantism is always a risk.

It will be clear that, collectively, the institutions listed above have to do their jobs properly if the country is to enjoy stability and the Mission is to conclude satisfactorily. They are therefore the main targets of any SSR intervention. How this should be done is considered in more detail below.

**Ministries.** There is a confusing tendency to talk about government ministries (defence, interior, justice) as though they were somehow responsible for “overseeing” the operational security forces of a country (cf above, p3). As usual, it is unclear what precisely is meant here, but it needs to be stressed that Ministries are not responsible for “control” of the security forces in the oppositional or coercive sense of that term; the two are distinct, but closely related elements of the security sector.12 Indeed, it is easier to look at the relationship from the other direction. Governments come to power with a series of policies, which they can only implement with the help of experts – the staff of a Ministry – who also advise them, provide ideas, manage programmes and help to explain and defend their policies. In a Health Ministry, some expert advice will come from doctors and other health specialists; in a security ministry, some of this technical advice will come from the military or the police – as well, of course as civilian specialists. As an education policy is pointless without schools and teachers, so a security policy requires operational security forces if it is actually to be implemented. But there has to be an effective management of the security sector if stability is to be regained, and the sector itself needs to function as a coherent entity. For this reason, the organisation and function of the Ministries, as well as the relations between them, are very central to an SSR initiative. More is said on this below.
Parliament. Parliament intersects with the security sector even though it is not strictly part of it, and attempts at parliamentary reform will certainly have a security element to them. What, if any, attention is given to parliament as part of an SSR initiative will depend on the circumstances. A new democracy with a new and inexperienced parliament will require all sorts of assistance, and it may well be sensible to devote some effort to working with parliamentarians and their advisers to educate them on security issues. Such issues are complex, after all, and parliament cannot play a useful role if it does not understand what it is doing. On the other hand, the problem may be more the corruption of the political system of which parliament is part, and the solution (which goes wider, of course, than just the security sector) will include stronger oversight of the financial affairs of the parliamentarians themselves, especially where they have an influence over procurement issues. In neither case, however, is work with parliament likely to be a major factor in the reintroduction of stability. In certain cases, however, new political forces at odds with the security sector can control parliament, and may be looking for confrontation with the security sector or unable to avoid it. This, by contrast, is a situation which requires an urgent remedy.

Civil Society. Even in an area where definitional problems are the norm, the concept of civil society is especially confused and opaque, and the term is often used in different or contradictory senses in the SSR debate. As the Centre for Civil Society at the London School of Economics notes, the concept itself is “contested historically and in contemporary debates.” It is held to include “a diversity of spaces, actors and institutional forms, varying in their degree of formality, autonomy and power. Civil societies are often populated by organisations such as registered charities, development non-governmental organisations, community groups, women’s organisations, faith-based organisations, professional associations, trades unions, self-help groups, social movements, business associations, coalitions and advocacy groups.” In theory, such groups represent “shared interests, purposes and values” and should be distinct from the state, as well as from the family and from economic markets, although in practice such boundaries “are often complex, blurred and negotiated.”

This definition – one among many – is sufficiently elastic that it includes almost everything, but two points are worthy of mention. First, even if “civil society” can be said to exist, it cannot have any political influence as an abstraction, but only through the activities of groups. Secondly, such groups cannot, by definition, have “a role” in the management of the security sector in the sense that parliament or the courts have a constitutional role, since they are self appointed, and, in practice, the agendas of the different groups are often in conflict with each other. There are some severe practical problems with the involvement of civil society groups in SSR, as discussed later, but, even at the conceptual level, it is probable that the
Western idea of “civil society” is understood differently in different parts of the world.14

In practical terms, the debate is somewhat different. There are essentially two civil-society-related issues which Peace Missions may face. First, given the politically-sensitive nature of most SSR projects, all sorts of groups outside the security sector will wish to be involved in them. Some may seek influence, others may fear losing it, some may hope to benefit financially or politically, others may feel they have a special right to be consulted. Such groups may well be involved in discussions about changes to the security sector, although not in SSR programmes as such. Consulting them publicly is often good politics, and demonstrates a willingness for dialogue which may be politically useful, although this does not necessarily mean that what they say is always valuable in itself.

A more difficult issue is the involvement of civil-society groups in the SSR process itself, because of some special skills or experience they may possess. Whilst this is unlikely, it is not impossible in certain special circumstances. In both South Africa and Ghana, civil society groups actively assisted defence transitions by acting as intermediaries and facilitators. Groups with a recognised social and moral position – churches, for example – can act in this way if the circumstances are right. It is important, though, that any such group has the confidence of both sides, and does not just issue moral lectures. It is also possible that, in a transitional situation, special expertise might be available in civil society that is not available to a government; this happened to a degree in South Africa after 1994, but has since largely corrected itself as the new government gained experience and confidence.15 On the other hand, expertise about justice issues, as well as ideas for constitutional change, laws on privacy etc. will be much more common in civil society groups, many of whose members will themselves have legal training. With due regard to the problem of elite-group domination, discussed below, civil society organisations such as legal reform groups can often be of value.

The Aims of Security Sector Reform

The next question to explore is that of the aims of any SSR programme. If the restoration of stability in the country is the strategic objective of the Mission as a whole, then what specific activities need to be undertaken with the security sector itself in support of that objective, and which can come under the heading of SSR? The last qualification is important, because it is common for activities to be carried out in the security sector which are not part of SSR, but are often believed to be so. This can lead to confusion about what SSR actually is. In particular, SSR is a long-term process, whose success or failure is generally measured in decades. It is not an instant solution to problems of instability, still less a quick fix to enable peace
operations to conclude sooner. Two particular areas of confusion may be noted here.

Retraining of the Security Forces. Clearly, the security forces of a country will not be able to do their jobs unless they are properly trained in their technical skills. The training of the military, in particular, has been going on for decades, notably by ex-imperial powers, the United States, the former Soviet Union and now China. The motivations were a mixture of altruism, enlightened self-interest and the desire for political influence. It is therefore not uncommon to be told by military colleagues that “we have been doing SSR for years.” But this is not really true. The technical capability of the security forces is only one of the necessary conditions. Depending on the context, quite profound organisational and political changes may also be necessary, and of course SSR itself, as the term implies, is much more concerned with the organisation and functioning of the security sector as a whole than it is with the expertise of its individual members. A Peace Mission may therefore include a large retraining element for the security forces, but this has to be distinguished from SSR as such.

Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR). The question of the relationship, if any, between DDR and SSR cannot be resolved finally, since either process can be defined so as to resemble, or not resemble, the other. The real issue is not one of terminology but of practice; whether procedures for the demobilisation of former combatants are going to be undertaken during a Peace Mission in the timescale of an SSR initiative, and, if so, what the interrelationship between the two processes will be. Obviously, SSR programmes are often undertaken in situations where there has been no war, and therefore there are no former combatants. Where DDR processes are taking place, they need to be kept conceptually, and to some extent practically, separate from SSR.

The Need for Precision and Control. Any SSR intervention undertaken during a Peace Mission has to be focused on those elements which will increase stability. There are two particular dangers which need to be guarded against.

The first is the temptation towards a kind of fussy perfectionism. There are few organisations, from police services to human rights NGOs, which are organisationally perfect, and which absolutely reflect desired ethical and political norms. But there is a limit to the amount and speed of change that any organisation can accept without becoming dysfunctional. The risk of what Gavin Cawthra has described as “transformation fatigue” is always present.\(^\text{16}\)

The second is competition between actors to define an SSR programme. Frequently this takes the form of a competition between funders, and in the end an SSR pro-
gramme can amount simply to an anthology of initiatives for which finance is available, irrespective of internal coherence or even requirement. This is a particular risk when international organisations with very different outlooks are involved.

**Defining Stability.** Although it is common to talk of “Peace” Operations, stability is an easier objective both to understand and to achieve. (A formal state of peace can co-exist, of course, with great insecurity and even violence). Although the local population may not conceive of stability in organised and structured terms, in practice, it is convenient, perhaps, to imagine it operating at three levels, adopting classic military terminology:

The Strategic level of stability implies peace in the region and among neighbours, but also freedom from foreign interference, from the indirect effects of conflict elsewhere, and from such problems as smuggling, illegal fishing and theft of natural resources. Some of this will be the responsibility of the military, but many other actors – foreign ministries, intelligence services, customs and frontier guards – will also be involved.

The Operational level is concerned with the stability of the country as a whole, and with threats from nationally-organised crime, ethnic or regional tensions and violent dissidence, either political or separatist in nature. The police and, in certain cases the military, will be involved.

Finally, there is the Tactical level, which is stability in daily life. This is the ability to go about one’s life free from crime and the threat of violence. It is essentially the responsibility of the police, but of course an efficient justice system is also important.

It will be seen that, at each of these levels, there is a need for coordination between services and ministries; this is the essence of security sector reform, and why, indeed, it is so called. It is not possible to carry out these functions properly unless the system as a whole operates effectively.

**Why is Stability Important?** Stability is obviously not an end in itself. Its importance is that it permits other things to happen, notably economic growth and political progress. However, it is important to appreciate that, whilst stability permits both of these things, it does not cause them. There are many other factors which can undermine political and economic life, and so cause instability which even a perfectly-functioning security sector may be unable to cope with. Similarly, any SSR programme has to take into account countervailing pressures from elsewhere; for example, in the absence of economic growth and tax revenues, it may simply not be possible to pay the salaries of the police and army.
Stability and the Economy. It is often argued that “there is no development without security and no security without development.” This is an understandable politically-balanced formulation, but of course only the first half is observably true. History rather disproves the second half – in many parts of the world, for much of history, there were stable states without development. Indeed, development itself (with the problems of urbanisation, for example) can be a cause of insecurity, notably in encouraging crime. Conversely, renewed stability does not necessarily produce economic recovery, as has been demonstrated in Bosnia in recent years. What does seem to be true is that sudden economic changes for the worse can help to undermine political stability, especially when a government seems incapable of responding to them. Thus, the economic woes of both Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia in the 1980s helped to pave the way (assisted, it must be admitted, by the activities of economic donors) for the violence which followed. Yet in both those cases, it was the political polarisation of divided societies, brought about by western demands for competitive elections that probably made a violent solution inevitable.

It is therefore essential to understand that SSR interventions are not conducted in a technical vacuum, but rather in a sensitive and often very difficult political and economic context. These latter two factors may between them swamp any positive impact an SSR programme may have, and, in turn, SSR activities themselves can further destabilise an already delicate situation, as happened in Rwanda with the 1993 Arusha Peace Agreement, for example. In general, therefore, prudence is to be encouraged in the pursuit of SSR activities.

Public Acceptability. The word “accountability” is often employed when describing the results of SSR interventions, although not always consistently. In some cases, the kind of accountability described is to “civil authorities” (itself an ambiguous term);17 in other cases, accountability to parliaments, the public, or even to civil society seems to be implied. There are, in fact, three or four quite separate ideas here, and it is convenient to take them one by one, since they have major implications for how the SSR component of a Peace Mission might be carried out. At its simplest, it can be said that the security forces of a country depend on a certain measure of public support if they are to function effectively. The security forces of a country will never be large enough to physically coerce entire populations, and even the most brutal dictatorship only survives with at least the passive acquiescence of much of the population. But for the security forces to be effective, more is required. Candidates have to come forward to join, parliaments have to pass laws and vote money, non-uniformed individuals have to apply for jobs alongside uniformed security services, and, most importantly, members of the public have to actively support the investigation and prosecution of suspected criminals.
The nature of this support varies from society to society, from sullen acquiescence to enthusiastic cooperation, and depends on a range of factors. The most basic is technical competence. Nobody will be enthusiastic about joining an Army which is poorly trained and badly equipped, and few taxpayers will want to fund it. A police force which has no vehicles or radios (a common situation in parts of the world) and which is useless at catching criminals, will not have any public support, and thus will be even less able to do its job. In addition, of course, security forces which are untrained and unpaid frequently resort to corruption and brutality, both as a way of surviving, and of trying to do their job. A judicial system which takes years to bring people to trial, and where cases are dismissed for lack of evidence, positively invites public disdain and recourse to vigilante methods.

The Wider Background. Security forces are not corrupt, incompetent or brutal because it is in their nature to be so. There are societies where people join the security forces because of opportunities for corruption, but that is a problem of the society itself before it is a problem of the security sector. Likewise, police and soldiers who are not paid may prey off the local population, but would be less likely to do so if they were paid properly. Unskilled police officers pressurised to reduce levels of street crime may resort to brutal tactics because they are not actually trained in professional investigative techniques. It is therefore misleading to think that one can reform a security sector in isolation from the rest of a society, or that public acceptability depends on no more than changes in the sector itself. In many cases, disenchantment with the security forces is only a special case of estrangement from the government and the political system as a whole, which such forces support.

In this sense, accountability implies that the security forces of a country are seen as responsive to the needs of the population. That population expects to be protected against crime and civil disorder, as well as foreign interference and instability. It also expects that the security forces themselves will act in a professional and ethical manner. The latter means, among many other things, that suppliers of goods to the military are paid promptly, that visitors to police stations are received with courtesy, that crimes reported are professionally investigated and that trials are fairly conducted.

There is often a tendency to draw too stark a contrast between the functions of “reformed” and “unreformed” security forces. Very few such forces were ever devoted exclusively to “regime protection” and “external threats”. Few regimes themselves, indeed, have ever considered that they are illegitimate and are acting against the interests of the people. Security forces themselves have often been viewed as legitimate even in non-democratic societies, provided they performed effectively. External defence may be as big a priority for a “reformed” military as
it was in the bad old days, and a “reformed” police force may spend its time investigating much the same crimes as it always did. It is the political context, and the behaviour of the security forces themselves, which have changed. Even in a democracy, there are threats to the state, which the public will demand should be met. What has changed is not, in general, the tasks implied in meeting these threats, but rather basis on which the state claims legitimacy in protecting itself.

In addition, the public has a right to expect that the security forces in a democracy are as transparent as possible; the taxpayers want to know where their money is going, and also that the security forces themselves are acting within the law at all times. One should not over-stress this second point, however. In most democracies, citizens are more concerned about their own rights than the rights of others, especially those they disagree with or think dangerous. The security forces are much more likely to be criticised, by public and media, for being too restrained than for being too vigorous.

There are special problems in societies divided by ethnicity or religion, especially where the security forces have been used to institutionalise the control of one group over another. In societies like the Former Yugoslavia, where the security forces and their targets were both multi-ethnic, they were tolerated, if not necessarily liked. But once that country began to fragment, elections produced national and local governments that were often mono-ethnic, and purged the security forces to ensure ethnic control. This often created insecurity among other ethnic groups, who responded by forming militias for “self-protection”.

Broadly, we can say that, in a democracy, accountability means that the security forces act with general public support, with missions and methods of operation approved of by most of the population. There is then the question of whether formal structures of accountability are necessary and if so what priority they should have. The answer obviously depends on the specifics of the experience of the country concerned.

There are certain characteristics of a democratic system which apply generally and therefore to the security forces as well. Governments should explain and defend their policies, parliament should be entitled to ask questions and receive answers, as well as pass legislation and vote on budgets, the public and the media should be informed and have a chance to ask questions as well. These are fundamental features of a democracy, and they should be incorporated without question into any new arrangements for the security sector. (Obviously there are differences between the sensitivity of, say, intelligence documents and documents on education, but these are differences of degree, not of type.) Why should the security forces be thought different?
Part of the problem is the assumption (not borne out by experience) that the security sector is inherently uncontrollable, and is likely at any moment to start oppressing the population. It must therefore be “controlled” and “accountable”. Peace Missions will rarely encounter such situations on the ground, however. The real issue is the way in which the security forces fit into the structure of the country’s political system. The most obvious priority, especially in transitional situations, is that the government should control the apparatus of the state, including the security forces. It is then free to make use of those forces for its policies, within the limits of the constitution and law, as voted by parliament, and as enforced by a court if necessary. Parliament usually has ultimate control of the finances, and has the right to question ministers and officials. In principle, this is the same as for any other area of government policy.

In some cases, a political transition from a dictatorship or authoritarian state will be taking place during the mission. Such a transition is delicate, especially as regards the security forces, which almost always act as a pillar of states of this kind. Even if, as is normal, the regime itself has some political support within the population, large elements will necessarily be excluded, and confidence-building gestures are often useful and important. So the constitution of a parliamentary defence committee, whilst in itself not of overwhelming significance, can be a useful symbolic move, to demonstrate a new relationship between the military and the democratic process.

This concludes a brief examination of the main conceptual problems which SSR interventions might face as part of Peace Missions. The concluding part of this study is devoted to the more practical problems.

Practical Problems and Possible Solutions

Imbalance of Power. SSR interventions usually take place in weaker, poorer states and are organised by states which are stronger and richer. Money is normally on offer. Whilst the current emphasis on “ownership” of SSR programmes by locals is in itself praiseworthy, the fact is that SSR interventions generally take place, not in isolation, but in a wider political and economic context which strongly influences how the programme is seen. In Latin America, SSR initiatives were part of a move to democracy after the Cold War. In Eastern Europe they were part of the price demanded for the possibility of closer relations with the EU and NATO. In Africa, where Peace Operations have mostly been conducted, they are often part of wide-spectrum, very expensive, interventions, involving many national and international actors. Few governments offered a foreign-funded SSR programme in such circumstances will feel able to turn it down. If “ownership” is essential therefore, it is also likely to be readily conceded, and, in the end, may not mean
very much. Much more work needs to be done on the concept of ownership, and its practical implications. In particular, it has to be acknowledged that what local communities or governments want cannot necessarily be assumed to be the same as what donors think they should want. The recent OECD “Whose Ownership?” initiative may well prove to be useful in this context.

**Manipulation.** It is increasingly recognised that local actors are capable of using – and abusing – SSR programmes for their own benefit. In particular, in any kind of divided society, changes in the roles and powers of the security forces will necessarily have implications for the relationship between various political forces. A government drawn from one faction or factions may be very happy to approve an SSR me for an army largely drawn from other factions. The smaller and weaker the army becomes, the stronger is the government’s position and the larger will be the role played by other parts of the security apparatus which it does control, or militias which it might sponsor. Conversely, SSR interventions should not scruple to use personal ambition and careerism as ways of encouraging forward-thinking individuals into positions of influence. Manipulation is also possible using the very confusion of SSR terminology as a weapon. SSR theory often refers to both “depoliticising the military” and “putting the military under political control”, sometimes in the same document. These two notions are not necessarily in opposition to each other, but they are both complex and subtle ideas, easily misused. So a new government intending to use the security forces against its political opponents may dismiss uniformed professionals from positions of influence and replace them with its political appointees, all the while claiming to be following good SSR principles. Likewise, it can be noted that assumptions of functionally-differentiated professional security forces does not exist everywhere. Not only may security forces be linked to political parties, they may overlap with organised crime, and indeed engage in criminal acts themselves. The security forces one sees may not be the only ones, or even the most effective. Ethno-criminal militias may be as powerful as the security forces if not more so, and the distinction between such forces and the overt security forces of the state is often not clear.

**Stability.** Whilst it is often argued that “one cannot overemphasize the crucial role of Security Sector Reform for stability and consolidation of peace,” in fact it is important to understand that what is really meant here is that a *well-functioning security system* is essential for these purposes. SSR as a process is not necessarily stabilising, especially when it is still under way, and can indeed be very negative for stability and political progress. This is easy enough to understand. Not only do SSR programmes create losers as well as winners (and often more of the former) but in many countries control of the security forces is a matter of political survival, and sometimes literally a matter of life and death. Especially in divided societies, control of the security forces can be part of a complicated balancing act which
ensures the overall stability of the country. As already noted, this can result in many different and overlapping security organisations, employing between them more people than are strictly necessary. But an efficiency-driven reorganisation may undermine the stability of the nation, even if it saves money.

Part of the problem is that SSR initiatives often do not take enough account of what the security sector is actually for. Too often, liberal Anglo-Saxon assumptions about peace and security, mixed with the traditional suspicion and distrust of the security sector displayed by civil-military relations and development experts, leads to a technocratic management-style exercise (strengthen this, weaken that) which can miss the point. For example, in the abstract, most people would agree that the military should not have a political role. In practice, the military may be a force for stability, as the only genuinely multi-ethnic force in a country, and reflexive demands to place it “under political control” may not be heeded locally. Most people in most countries will put stability ahead of all other concerns, and SSR programmes need to take account of this. “First, do no harm” is an injunction taught to doctors throughout history, and might be the motto of the prudent SSR practitioner as well.

The Wider Context. As the above example suggests, the preservation of the stability of a state can involve the security forces in functions for which they were not intended, and which they do not necessarily want. In theory, the military should not have to warn the political leadership against what it sees as irresponsible behaviour. In principle, the police should not have to be carefully ethnically balanced in different parts of the country. No-one would deliberately design a system with these weaknesses, or retain it if a better one was available. As a rule, examples like the above occur, not because the security forces want them, but because of weaknesses in the political and economic system itself. The problem is that these weaknesses may be so profound that attempts to reform the security sector, laudable as they may be, will not actually change anything of importance. Consider two simple examples.

In many countries, the police are paid poorly if at all, because the funds to do so are not available. It is assumed that they will make money by extorting it and by accepting bribes. Obviously, this is unacceptable, not simply for moral reasons, but also because such a police force can never be effective. Yet what can be done? Anti-corruption campaigns are themselves instrumentalized for domestic political purposes (often to get rid of opponents), and, in the end, it is questionable whether it is really fair to expect public officials to work for nothing. Yet if the money is not available, what is the answer? Even in a wealthier political system, where some money is available, the level of corruption may be such that the temptation to dishonesty is always there, and few policemen can be blamed if they occasionally succumb. Likewise, a justice system may be so completely overwhelmed that
even routine cases can take years to be processes, and supplicants may have little option but to pay if they want their case be heard.

In many other countries, there is a tradition of the manipulation of the security forces for political advantage. It can be as limited as harassment or eavesdropping; it can be as extreme as assassination. But of course it is a problem of the political culture of the country, not the security sector itself, and stopping it requires a change in that political system. That may not be easy; politicians famously change their opinions when they get into power and discover its advantages, and, of course, the worry remains, if I behave responsibly, how do I know that my opponent, when his or her time comes, will do the same?

**Elites and the Security Sector.** Different social and economic groups in a country will see security problems – and hence the security sector – differently. It is unavoidable that an SSR programme will deal primarily with local elites. These elites may be divided among themselves on various issues, but their common feature will be that they lead a different life from the life of ordinary people. There is nothing strange about this: it happens in every society. The danger is that the perceptions and objectives of such elites will be different from, and even opposed to, those of ordinary people.

It is difficult for those in an SSR programme to interact with ordinary people. There will be problems of language and communication in any event, but ordinary people may well not have the education in the sophisticated concepts in which the security sector is often discussed, nor necessarily the experience of articulating them. The temptation to work with elites who speak a foreign language (normally, English, French or Portuguese), who have worked or studied abroad and who understand and can reproduce the specialist vocabulary of SSR, can be irresistible, especially when time is short. Moreover many elite groups (security sector officials and politicians in particular) will by definition be involved in SSR activities. Others, like the media and NGOs, will have the skills and experience, and in some cases the funding, to influence the debate as well.

Ordinary people have their own security concerns, and are often capable of expressing them clearly. But they inevitably live in a different world from that of the elites. The latter’s view of crime, for example, will be of expensive security precautions, private guards and fear of car-jackings. They will be impatient, perhaps, with an under-trained and corrupt police force, and will press for restraints on police powers and better protection for citizens. Ordinary people are more likely to suffer from the direct effects of crime, such as petty theft and assault, fear of walking the streets, and exploitation by local gangs. They may have no confidence in the police anyway, and put their trust in vigilante groups, or even criminals themselves. Likewise, in
many countries the middle classes manage to avoid military service, and would never contemplate a career in the military for their children. Their view of military issues will therefore be very different from that of the economically less fortunate.

It does not follow, of course, that the interests of elites, even if different from ordinary people, are necessarily always opposed to them. But experience suggests that SSR programmes risk being elite bargains between teams of foreign practitioners, under pressure to demonstrate results and with money to spend, and local groups and individuals happy to make use of the team for their own purposes and to help them spend their money. One example would be increased transparency and freedom of information – worthy causes, but in most countries an objective restricted to small elites. In an SSR intervention, there will be pressure from such groups – the media, opposition politicians, campaigning organisations – who would benefit professionally from more transparency, even though ordinary people may not find the subject of much interest.

The Christmas Tree Effect. As has already been noted, SSR programmes always run the risk of degenerating into a collection of initiatives which someone is prepared to fund, irrespective of their inherent importance. At the theoretical level, this problem has been recognised, and some efforts are usually made to coordinate the work of different groups. But this is unlikely ever to be fully effective. Actors now include, not merely different UN agencies (who generally refuse to subordinate themselves to each other) but institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF, increasingly the European Union, sometimes NATO, often sub-regional organisations, and various international NGOs working either for the one of the above or for individual nations, themselves often represented directly, either singly or in groups. The difficulties of this kind of situation go beyond mere lack of coordination; there is a risk of different and conflicting agendas, where more and more elements are added to an SSR programme until it resembles an overburdened Christmas tree that collapses finally under its own weight.

As has already been noted, different organisations will arrive with different ideas about what SSR is and how it should be implemented, different objectives for their presence in the country and indeed different ideas about the country itself. They will also have different motives. Even if these motives are entirely altruistic, SSR programmes involve spending money, and this has to be justified to national and international audiences. So it is tempting to focus on politically-safe, cheap programmes which can be completed quickly, irrespective of whether the right issues are addressed. It is easier, cheaper and more attractive to fund workshops for parliamentarians than provide investigative skills training for policemen with a reputation for brutality. But not all interventions are altruistic; the potential influence of SSR programmes is such that they are attractive opportunities for political lev-
average, as well as ways of demonstrating, relatively cheaply, political interest in a country and the will to be involved.

The Risk of Neo-colonialism. SSR practitioners are surprised if their efforts are not always welcomed in the countries in which they work. But this is not hard to understand. As well as the risks of upsetting stability and creating large numbers of losers, SSR directly affects the most sensitive functions of a state – what the French call the “regalian” functions. For small, poor countries these functions may be almost all that the state has left, and foreigners, no matter how well-meaning, may be treated with suspicion. At its simplest, SSR interventions arise because foreigners, usually white and wealthy, arrive in a country believing that they can reform its government and security apparatus, because their own ideas and practices are superior. The fact that, fairly often, the government and security apparatus is based on one bequeathed by a colonial power in the first case does not make the situation any easier. It is not surprising, therefore, that some critics of SSR argue that it is essentially a third stage of colonialism – after the direct stage, in which colonial defence forces were often raised, and then arming and training of military forces of new states during the Cold War. However this may be, it is undeniable that the basic rich powerful foreigner/poor weak native dichotomy exists in almost all SSR interventions.

From the Romans onward, empires created local elites to help them rule. This was as true of the Ottoman Empire as of western colonial ones, and it leaves its traces in a political system even after nominal independence. SSR interventions today frequently take place in states where foreigners have most of the economic and political power, and where political influence derives from being as close to these centres of power as possible, and serving them well. Learning English (or to a lesser extent French or Portuguese), attending universities and training courses abroad and being careful to have the right opinions on various subjects, are recognised stepping stones to a political career, irrespective of the individual’s competence, or even honesty. Prospering in such a political career means being seen as “moderate” “pro-western” “reasonable” or some other circumlocution, and accepting foreign initiatives, such as SSR, when they are offered.

In turn, non-governmental elites can also be created in think-tanks, NGOs, university centres and organised civil-society groups. Even in relatively wealthy and stable Third World societies, such institutions are almost always funded by foreign governments, directly or indirectly, and are able to pay their personnel decent wages in hard currency. So the head of the local branch of a human rights NGO based in an African state may quite possibly earn more money, and be as influential, than the Interior Minister of that country, without being elected to anything. It is not surprising that, in some African countries, security-related NGOs are dis-
trusted as agents of foreign powers. In strict logic, it has to be admitted that this is a role some of them sometimes perform.

Practical Solutions

Strategy. The first requirement of an SSR programme conducted as part of a Peace Mission should be that it must support the objectives of that mission, not at a general or declaratory level, but in detail. As indicated above, there is a tendency to confuse the objectives of SSR – a better and more effective security sector – with the process of SSR itself. Not all SSR interventions are successful, of course, and individual initiatives can themselves be destabilising. As a general rule, therefore, SSR programmes should only be conducted where a clear link can be demonstrated to the Mission’s primary objectives. In addition, the two questions posed in paragraph 7 above – what specifically is wrong with the security sector, and what specifically could be done to it to improve stability – need clear answers before the programme is undertaken. This requirement needs to be incorporated in peace operations doctrine, both generally and also in specific cases.

Prioritisation. Not everything can be done at once and it is often dangerous to try. There needs to be a sophisticated analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the security sector, and identification of which, if any, initiatives will have the practical effect of improving stability and assisting overall Mission objectives. Other initiatives, whatever their attractions, will have to wait. It is also important that the set of initiatives chosen should have an internal consistency. For example, improving capacity in an MoD and strengthening local security think-tanks may be initiatives at cross-purposes with each other unless the pool of local experts is sufficiently large to avoid competition between the two. SSR interventions should not begin without an established order of priority, subscribed to by all.

Local Understanding. In theory, SSR practitioners increasingly understand the need to pay attention to local conditions and specifics of local cultures. There are two problems, however. The first is that many SSR programmes are driven by external factors – availability of funding, political interest, self-image of institutions, involvement in the country for other reasons etc. There is often no time, and sometimes no interest, in a detailed country analysis, especially if the conclusions are equivocal or negative. But secondly, there are limits to depth of analysis which can be carried out, not only for reasons of time, but also because beyond a certain point added complexity becomes self-defeating. What is needed, rather, is a clear and relatively straightforward analysis which sets out the main elements of the situation in terms of a typology which is sophisticated enough to be useful, without being too complex. It is not the same as an evaluation mission. Examples might include:
a. Context: Post-conflict, political transition, fragile state?

b. Political System: Electoral, one-party, authoritarian, ethnic/religious?

c. Security Sector: Fragmented, politically-divided, controlled by political party, disputed between political parties, involved in politics, politicised, degree of competence?

d. Strategic Context: Domestic security problems, organised crime, insurrection, regional security problems, involvement of neighbouring states?

e. Parliament: Influential, weak, corrupt?

f. Government System: Presidential with appointees, parliamentary with prime minister, hybrid, involvement of President/Prime Minister in security sector?

And obviously many others. These are not entirely separate issues, and they are not mutually exclusive either. Few situations will merit a “yes/no” answer. The idea is to construct a political topography of the security sector, such that sensible decisions can be taken about what, if any, SSR initiatives to pursue. In principle, SSR interventions should not take place without this kind of prior analysis. A template illustrating how it might be conducted should be developed and circulated for comment.

**Choice of Personnel.** This is perhaps the main determinant of success for an SSR mission, and involves a range of factors, not only at the individual level but in terms of the construction of the team as a whole. It goes without saying that, however chosen, the team must work collectively in the strategic fashion described above, and according to a list of priorities reflecting the overall aims of the Mission.

**Experience and Expertise.** The baseline qualification for membership of an SSR team should be experience in the security sector itself. Although in some cases significant experience of working together with the security sector may be an acceptable substitute, the team as a whole should have a level of experience allowing them to talk on equal professional terms with their local equivalents. This is not just a matter of expertise; it is also a matter of credibility. A suspicious senior military officer confronted with the possibility, for the first time, of a civilian politician as Minister, will pay much more attention to the opinions of a fellow officer on the subject than to an expert in political science. Similarly, human rights training for the police is better given by policemen with the appropriate training than by human rights experts as such; the point is not the technical content (which can be learned from a book) but rather how police forces apply such concepts in doing their job.

On the other hand, security sector professionals may lack the intellectual training to analyse problems and give convincing advice. Outside experts may well have a wider comparative knowledge of how problems are addressed in different coun-
tries, as well as a better understanding of wider political contexts. It is important to understand that experience in the security sector does not, of itself, qualify someone to be an SSR practitioner. At a minimum, that experience has to be broad and general enough to be useful, and deep experts may not always be the right people. For example, someone whose entire career has been with people trafficking in their own country may be less useful that an alternative expert with a great deal of experience of dealing with organised crime in different countries. Deep experts can always be brought in to make targeted interventions. Practitioners should also have the right intellectual and personal skills. In particular it is very easy to fall into the trap of arrogantly suggesting “this is how we do things, you should copy us.” With a multinational team proposing different solutions, chaos can easily result. Ideally, the team should have a wide experience between them not only of their own countries but of others. Language can be an insoluble problem: at least some of the team should speak the local language, but it is very hard, outside a few major languages (English, French, Spanish, Portuguese) to demand that all team members have linguistic skills in addition to all the other qualifications.

**Training.** Training can make up for some of these deficiencies. An SSR team should not deploy, even briefly, without a good understanding of the environment of its host country. But in addition, there is a set of more technical issues – structure and development of the security sector, history, culture and political system of the country – with which the team needs to be familiar before it deploys. More generally, some of the more conceptual issues addressed earlier in this paper, to do with the place of the security sector in the political system of the country, and the roles of different actors, probably need to be formally taught at some point. Training courses for SSR practitioners exist already in some cases. As a priority, a standardised syllabus should be developed, to be complemented by a series of modules aimed at specific regions or cultures. An outline of such a standardised course should be developed urgently.

**Modesty of Objectives.** For rather more than a decade now, donor countries and international organisations have set themselves extremely ambitious objectives in post-crisis and post-conflict states. They have frequently aimed at nothing less than state reconstruction, or even state building *ab initio*. SSR interventions have been an integral part of these objectives, and have themselves often been very ambitious in scope. After the evident over-enthusiasm of the 1990s for wide-spectrum nation-building, there has recently been something of a reaction, as the results of interventions start to be evaluated. A number of studies have looked at the equivocal effect of UN operations on the local population, and on the difficulties actually encountered in nation-building on the ground. In a closely related area, the World Bank has recently commissioned a report on factors behind economic growth which takes a similarly cool view of the success of neo-liberal poli-
cies recommended to developing states, and proposes a more modest policy based on historical evidence and sensitive to local circumstances.\textsuperscript{22}

There is nothing in any of this literature to suggest that, in itself, intervention in states after crisis and conflict is unwise or necessarily ineffective. But it is clear that ambitions for the future will have to be scaled back to more reasonable proportions, and more attention will have to be paid to practical difficulties and local conditions. This is as true of SSR as of other elements of intervention. But such is the centrality of the security sector to the health and even the survival of a nation in crisis, that security sector interventions in particular must be approached in a spirit of modesty and pragmatism, recognising that improving the operation of security sectors is not an easy task, but that, by contrast, undermining them is simple to do. This reinforces the need to think carefully, prioritise, and conduct interventions only when it is clear that they will enhance the objective of increased stability.

Summary of Recommendations

a. So central is a well-functioning security sector to the stability and prosperity of a country, especially after a crisis, that great caution is needed in making changes to it.

b. It needs to be clearly understood that whereas a well-functioning security sector is an aid to stabilisation, the process of the reform of the security sector itself can be destabilising and dangerous, and so needs to be carefully managed.

c. The content of SSR programmes should faithfully reflect the strategic objectives of the mission as a whole, and peace operations doctrine should reflect this.

d. A system of priorities needs to be established before each operation, based on an evaluation of which measures are most likely to assist with the stability of the country in the short term., in turn reflecting overall mission objectives. Guidance on how to establish these priorities should be developed.

e. A major effort is required to better understand and define concepts and objectives of SSR interventions, using agreed terminology, as well as to develop a common understanding of different types of security sectors and their problems. This is especially important given that multiple actors are often involved in the same operation. An early start should be made on developing such a document, to be used by major international organisations, institutions and states.

f. It is critical to construct a coherent SSR programme which is more than just a collection of initiatives which donors are willing to fund.

g. The particular circumstances of each country are so important that there
should be a careful analysis of them before the programme is approved, let alone undertaken. Guidance on how to do this is lacking at the moment, and a suitable document should be developed.

h. SSR programmes should be carefully distinguished from other initiatives, like DDR or military retraining, which may be taking place at the same time. This needs to be reflected in documents defining the mission and its objectives.

i. It should be recognised that SSR programmes are always open to instrumentalization by governments, and manipulation by local elites, whose interests may not be identical with those of the population as a whole. By contrast, “ownership” may not mean much in a context where the receiving state is weak and poor. Much more thought needs to be given to the concept of “ownership”.

j. Experience of the security sector is a necessary criterion for membership of an SSR mission, but not a sufficient one. Wide experience and good personal qualities are more important than deep technical knowledge. Guidelines for the selection of personnel should be developed.

Notes


3 On 8 June 2005, the EU launched a Security Sector Reform mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, known as “EUSEC DR Congo”. Its task is to provide advice and assistance to the Congolese authorities in charge of security. On 1 July 2007, a new EU ESDP SSR Police Mission took over from the EU Police Mission in Kinshasa (EUPOL RD Congo), which was successfully concluded on 30 June 2007. The aim of the mission is to assist the Congolese authorities in reforming and restructuring the National Congolese Police and improving the overall functioning of the criminal justice system.

4 This problem is not unknown in western societies where politics is about language and culture – Belgium, for example.


7 The concepts and vocabulary of SSR are largely imported from the study of civil-military relations in Latin America, a discipline where, as one distinguished scholar writes ”The lack of even minimal consensus on seemingly basic questions undermines our authority as scholars to speak on policy issues that are crucial.” J Samuel Fitch, ”Military Attitudes Towards Democracy: How Do We Know if Anything Has Changed?” in David Pion-Berlin (ed), Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: New Analytical Perspectives, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 2001, p.60.


SSR initiatives undertaken outside the limited case of UN interventions might, of course, reach different conclusions, especially where the issue of stability is less significant.

Following Samuel P Huntingdon, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Practice of Civil Military Relations*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1957, civil-military relations theorists conceptualised everyday life in the security sector as a zero-sum game, in which the purpose of the civilians was to “control” the military, and stop them staging coups, by the “minimisation of military power.”

See [http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CCS/](http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CCS/)


Governments do consult outside experts all the time on complex subjects, but that is really another issue.


Remarks by Jan Kubiš, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, Geneva 4 March 2008.

Although the involvement of western elites is necessary if they are to be heard. See for example the famous World Bank study *Voices of the Poor*, available at [web.worldbank.org](http://web.worldbank.org).


The title of this round table meeting is “Ambitions and Realities”. I propose to address this theme from the perspective of the difficulties associated with the gap between ambitions and reality. I spent three years attempting to implement security sector reform in the DRC, my focus being on the army, while the European Union also focussed on police reform, with another ESDP mission, EUPOL, and projects managed by the European Commission. The Commission also supports projects aimed at justice reform.

This work ran from May 2005 to February 2008, with the Congolese Government failing to really express how it planned to organise the security sector. In February 2008, the new government, which by then had been in place for about a year and was under significant pressure from the international community, finally organised a round table meeting on the security sector reform. The international community emerged rather disappointed from this meeting, which did not clearly indicate what the government wanted. After that, little progress was made. In early 2008, the police carried out particularly violent repression in Bas-Congo against the sectarian movement of Bundu dia Congo. At present, the army is again attempting to resolve the situation in the East using military means. Its success is far from assured.

Five months ago, the former Congolese Minister for Defence, with whom we had embarked on army reform a year-and-a-half earlier during the transition, was himself seriously injured during a villainous extortion racket organised by the Republican Guard that had got out of hand. All of this demonstrates how far ambitions are from reality, despite more than three years of effort at reform. Therefore, one could objectively ask where it is all heading. It even seems necessary to wonder whether the international community ever had a clear idea of what it wanted to achieve.

To me, it seemed futile to repeat the main principles of the reform of the security sector or system, which is now a very “sexy” issue on which every think-tank and government speaks with grandiloquence at numerous seminars. A number of concept documents now exist and objectives are generally common, constituting an undisputed, coherent theoretical framework.

Referring to an a posteriori analysis of the DRC experience, I would like to define the steps to be taken prior to any attempt at security sector reform, then show how the reality is different from ambition, before wrapping up with a few recommendations for the future.
Four steps must be taken before any attempt at security sector reform

1. A very accurate analysis of the conditions that have resulted in the need for this reform. The purpose of this analysis is to answer the following questions: what are the root causes of the collapse of the security system?

Often these causes have their roots deep in the past that have created the crisis of which we try to emerge from, and led to behaviours, and even deep cultural traits, in security bodies and the population: the practice of arbitrary power, adaptation to lawlessness, the appropriations by individuals of the regalian functions of the state, the spread of survival instincts and the disappearance of numerous moral reference points.

What is the nature and scope of disputes between individuals, and the greater or lesser need for reconciliation. Surprisingly, there is still no correlation between the scale of human damage and the scope of resentment between the authors of this damage. What are the country’s new security requirements? A civil war or military defeat that has its origins in the conduct of the security forces must nevertheless end in the reconstitution of the security forces, including a large section of the forces “responsible” for the disaster, one cannot deny a state the right to a security system.

What is the reality of power relations within the security system? The persistence of “command” relationships inherited from the period is a cause for concern, and does not correspond to what appears in official organisation charts. This is to be taken into consideration, since what is most important is invisible to the eye. To what financial, human, technical and conceptual resources does the state receiving support have access in objective terms to implement this reform? And what resources are partners prepared to allocate to this reform in terms of finance, human support and time?

2. A veritable ownership by local authorities that responds to the following questions.

There must be a true demand from local authorities, and not an acceptance (under pressure) of proposals that are incomplete or badly formulated. Is the local conception of the security system comparable to that described in numerous documents disseminated by international organisations? Are there objective factors that hinder the implementation of in-depth reform (persistence of a state of emergency, persistence of serious internal problems, residual external threats and contrary methods of governance)?
3. The preparation of a strategic international support plan for the security sector reform that answers the following questions;

a. Which of the partners is the “leader” responsible for co-ordinating reform?
b. What level of priority is given to security sector reform in relation to other elements of reconstruction?
c. How is the articulation between the DDR process and the SSR process organised?
d. Is it possible to comply with the level of priority attached to the process with the resources available?
e. Is the strategic plan really aimed at reform, and not merely cosmetic measures and actions of influence?
f. Are there divergent visions among partners?
g. Is there competition among partners?
h. Have the different partners and the government decided to make a sincere commitment to cooperation?

4. The sharing of tasks

Once these three steps have been taken, it is necessary to share out the roles of partners to support, based on a clear scenario (matrix) approved sincerely by local authorities who remain project managers, the following processes; the implementation of government policy aimed at security sector reform: regular meetings to be organised with partners to follow the roadmap. The role of parliament: cooperation between the local parliament and the parliament of one or more partners, technical support for the functioning of commissions. The role of civil society: a support plan for civil society organisations, avoiding the pitfalls of for-profit NGOs, political organisations (pro- or anti-government) and targeting local think-tanks. The functioning of the ministries concerned: the respective roles of ministers, vice-ministers (or secretaries of state), the Secretary-General, the Chief of Staff or National Director, the Inspectorate. The functioning of the central administrations concerned: human resources management (inventory, recruitment, training, retirements), management of infrastructure, social aspects, regulations, organisation of command, finances and payments and audits. The resumption of the work of subordinate organisations: equipment plan, infrastructure planning programme, personnel training programme, unit training plan, organisation of logistical support.

It is theoretically once these prior steps have been completed, when it becomes apparent that it can only be realised under the responsibility of local authorities, but with strong methodological, human and financial support from partners, that security sector reform can commence. Bilateral donors, international financial
institutions, parliaments and civil society in partner countries, the UN missions and its agencies, local ESDP missions and projects of the European Commission can thus become part of this process under the coordination of the “leader” and with local authorities.

Why is the reality so different from the ambition?

Admittedly, it is not an issue in such a complex question, faced with such delicate situations, to expect to apply such a marvellous scheme to the letter. Theories are one thing: reality is determined to put them to the test, and the individuals who must apply them remain first and foremost people with their own ambitions and interests and those of the countries they represent, as well as their weaknesses and perceptions. Nevertheless, a number of errors uncovered in the DRC warrant examination, in order to prevent them from being repeated;

a. A poor analysis of local conditions at the outset, leading to the adoption of unproven principles. Yet these errors directed the whole DDR process, which was based on the free choice of individuals and refused to take into consideration the need to rebuild a national army, going so far as to almost deny the country the right to defend itself. The consequence was the very limited involvement of political and military leaders, who were marginalised by these principles, and reticence among loyalist military leaders, who were discredited by this process and whose passivity for security sector reform is still a surprise.

b. A process to integrate the army based on a need for reconciliation that in the end was not evident, but which resulted in an extremely complex logistical manoeuvre (intermingling) that is very costly for a state with no resources, and which in the end cannot be realised by disorganised chiefs of staff.

c. The categorisation of the electoral process as the top priority. This led to the SSR being implemented after the election, resulting in consequences for security which are in the public domain. This is a classic problem of strategy, where insufficient or inadequate savings have not allowed efforts to be concentrated over a period of time. Perhaps it would have been preferable to add the resources required to complete the DDR process and the integration of security before the beginning of the election, i.e. 30 June 2006, as had been planned.

d. A very poor allocation of roles between international players, who were more preoccupied with exploiting gaps that correspond to their expertise or
which they considered to be “productive”, rather than pooling resources in the interests of reform and good will towards each other. The consequence of this approach of an unfinished patchwork of reform, with each piece sewn on without any regard for its place in the overall scheme of things, was revealed in a marketing approach for the benefit of who implemented it. It is also significant that each partner describes their efforts in terms of millions of USD spent or number of personnel trained, rather than in terms of their effect on the improvement of the security system.

As a consequence of the above, a troubled, discordant and incomprehensible message vis-à-vis local authorities, at times accompanied by manoeuvres intended to denigrate other partners is revealed before the Congolese authorities. The latter, not without malice, have attempted to exploit these divergences, either to benefit twice over or to slow down reform.

What lies ahead?

The multiplication of seminars and conferences and the preparation of innovative concepts for security sector reform by numerous international organisations and several states will in the end bear fruit. Progress is being made on the identification of the problems encountered and the search for solutions.

Thus, the SSR operations launched in recent months show that things are changing. This is the case in Guinea-Bissau, e.g. where the EU has adopted a more global approach that includes defence, police and justice under the authority of a single head of mission, after having ensured closer co-ordination with the actions of the European Commission. This is also the case in the Central African Republic, where the government prepared a global strategy for security sector reform at a seminar that ran between 14 and 17 April 2008, before partners put their technical support in place. Support for reform, therefore, can begin as part of a more constructive dialogue between the European Commission, UNDP and other bilateral partners. At present, the EU is in the process of identifying and training teams of experts in SSR who can be deployed at short notice and, where required, made available to the UN.

I now see five major steps to be implemented. Clearly and unambiguously appoint the leader for each targeted country concerned. In my opinion, this should be someone who promises to support the process in the long-term (10 or 15 years). Systemically seek out the support of international and, in particular, local civil society, less as a means to pressure the authorities receiving support than as a way of understanding local problems. These clarify which path to follow. Seek in an honest manner for the participation of local authorities, who too often are seen,
perhaps rightly, as responsible for the situation of their country. Nothing is done without their positive and active complicity, even if it means bringing them under control. Continue to reconcile the objectives of development experts with those of SSR experts. Seek to concentrate their efforts geographically, to create sectors of visible progress and high-profile beacons of hope, to demonstrate that the future still has purpose. The populations of countries devastated under the watchful eye of the international community, lost armies, racketeering police and corrupt magistrates need to rediscover pride in living together, rather than in seeking to survive at each other’s expense. And analyse the conduct of SSR missions for the benefit of states that have not yet completely collapsed in crisis. Indeed, richer, better-equipped armed gangs clearly more capable of carrying out sophisticated operations far from their bases than security forces in their home countries are becoming more and more common. This is the case in the Gulf of Guinea, the Horn of Africa and the Sahel, to mention a few such places in Africa.

While reality is not as rosy as the stated ambitions, there is no sense in sanitising it. Persisting with security reform is both a remarkable process for learning humility and a requirement for peacebuilding.

Speaker: Ms. Lauren Hutton, Researcher, Security Sector Governance, Institute for Security Studies, South Africa

I would like to put two caveats on this presentation; first, I am not really diplomatic, so excuse me if some comments are a bit pointed. I do think that our job here is to interrogate the things that we are saying on SSR. Second, a lot of what has been said over the last two days has been the perspective of the international community and the donors. I will attempt to give more of a perspective from Africa and recipient countries. I have made many presentations on SSR over the last year. Almost every week there is a conference somewhere in the world on SSR. I have tried to gather some of those perspectives and what we have been speaking about.

UNDP (2003) SSR process was designed as a means “to strengthen the ability of the sector as a whole and each of its individual part to provide an accountable, equitable, and effective and rights respecting service.”

OECD-DAC is people-centered, locally owned and based on democratic norms, human rights principles, rule of law and seeking to provide freedom from fear and measurable reductions in armed violence and crime. It is a framework to structure the thinking about how to address security challenges through more integrated development and security policies and through greater civilian involvement and oversight. It involves multi-sectoral strategies based upon broad assessment of
security and justice needs of the people and state. It adheres to basic government principles and implement through clear processes and policies that aim to enhance institutional and human capacity.

Interestingly according to UNDP, SSR is a process. Much of the rhetoric on SSR seems to believe that SSR has a starting point and an ending point, and that also relates to some of the comments that we have heard of SSR as an exit strategy that you can tick off. I do not think SSR is a post-conflict activity only, I think the entire concept of SSR is a natural reform process that the country finds itself in. That said, in the post-conflict reform process, there are more comprehensive and fundamental reforms for the security functions in a state. The ambitions of the initiatives are quite high. Asking a state to fulfill those ambitions is a very big task, asking a post-conflict state to fulfil these ambitions is an even greater task. The bar has been set quite high through these various principles.

What you mostly hear at SSR conferences in Africa is that it is a waste in concept and that it is a donor driven process about reforming the security in Africa. Some argue SSR was invented in Africa, and that we have been doing SSR for a longer time than the international community has been talking about it.

Ambition versus Reality

a. SSR is a “Western” concept driven by donor invention
   – Normative basis for SSR in Africa
b. Simplification of SSR through models, handbooks and guides
   – Unrealistic expectation (Perception management)
   – Complex and long term
c. SSR within a political context (power and control)
   – Conflict hangover
   – Power relations within the PC state
   – Conflict resolution mechanisms
d. SSR is actually about governance – systematic changes in the conceptualization, management, implementation of security functions.

It is important to develop a normative basis for SSR in Africa to achieve more local and regional legitimacy, something that has to be led by the AU. There is a need to create a position paper of sort on SSR. That said it is also important to create more investment within the emerging security architecture in Africa, the AU and the regional economic organizations for them to play a much more active role in SSR.

Second, we like to simplify things and say these are the things we need to do in order for SSR to happen, such as developing handbooks and manuals. We need to
guard from simplifying SSR – it is not a short term or a simple thing to do. SSR is a part of the DDR experience as well, with unrealistic expectations that come along with it. Someone mentioned “perception management” and that is a useful way of describing SSR. More communication is required about what SSR really is. We have seen in South Africa, which is one of the successful examples of SSR, that 14 years down the line, we still do not have neither an efficient police nor defence force. So the perceptions of what you can achieve with SSR are quite different.

Third, it is important not to forget the political context in which SSR is taking place, especially in a post-conflict environment, this will be a highly complex political context. What you will find is that most focus is on what occurred during the conflict and not a concern with the reform process that lie ahead.

What we have seen in Kenya and Zimbabwe is the emergence of a trend towards post-election power-sharing arrangements. The nature of which those conflicts are being resolved under a political stalemate of sort, is where both countries desperately require SSR, but neither country will probably see SSR. In Kenya for instance, the focus is on what political position can you get in the next election being held in 2012, and not much attention is being paid to the fact that they might need a new constitution and that it would be nice to have a functioning police force that respects Human Rights etc.

Security Sector Reform is essentially about governance, how decision are made and implemented and related to security. Those are the concrete facts. We are talking about systematic changes in the conceptualization of security, the management and implementation of security functions. We need to move towards thinking more in detail about what kind of security that is needed. What kind of defence force does the DRC need? We talk about a potential SSR in Somalia, one has to wonder if we will ever get an agreement on what kind of security is needed in Somalia. We have to start thinking about what kind of security service is required by states. In the Africa context, how much of the security will be devoted to a pure defence function. You are creating quite a large defence force for some of these countries, which are in most probability going to be used internally at one point in time. We need to be realistic about what we are creating for people. The same applies to the intelligence service. Not much focus is put on this, but what kind of intelligence are you creating besides something that is going to be used by the executive for oppression.

Moving on to reality check, let us do a mental exercise. Look at those key points that are put out there by OECD-DAC, compared with what we find in reality. I have clustered them slightly.

285
### Reality Check

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ambition</th>
<th>Reality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>People centered</td>
<td>Lack of institutional capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locally owned</td>
<td>Resources and skills deficiencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian involvement (implies coherence in security policy between state and international community)</td>
<td>Weak civil society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No legacy of non-partisan participatory security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legitimacy deficits of local actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Informal” security arrangements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Access to information restrictions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Impact of outsourcing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lack of communication and information sharing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lack of public dialogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Personalities and leadership matter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Expediency as the prime determination of partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measurable reductions in violence and crime</td>
<td>Possibility of short term security gains (?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>When do we start SSR?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Numbers vs. governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gaps between legality and legitimacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrated development and security policies</td>
<td>Mostly military involvement in SSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Expense of SSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Potential for corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Infrastructural requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multisectoral strategies</td>
<td>Politically determined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Funding based (USD vs. vision)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lack of coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dominated by military and police reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Time constraints</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lack of overall vision and leadership (lead nation/agency)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance principles</td>
<td>Improving governance long term process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional and human capacity</td>
<td>Parallel (SSR) processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deficiencies in legitimacy and credibility of institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>More focus on training police and military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Corruption and financial management</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
We talk about civilian involvement in SSR. One of the first issues we have to think about is that it largely implies coherence between the security policy of the state and the security desires of the international community. In the DRC for instance, there are plans drawn up and then shown to the DRC. It implied that those were the things that were required by the people. What has been spoken about earlier is the institutional capacity which we kind of get anxious about in the African context, where there is always a lack of capacity, lack of resources and skills deficiencies. What we need to think about when it comes to resource deficiencies in conducting governance through the formal state institutional governance structures, is that it might not be skills deficiencies in running things in other ways. It is just not fitting into the institutional structure, the way we want them to fit in.

In a weak civil society, there is a lack of space for the voices of civil society, especially within the security debate. There is not generally a legacy of non-partisan participation security. Security is generally an executive function, where you will not find much role for the judiciary or the legislator of any judicial oversight. Suddenly we want to create fundamentally different ways in which people react and interact with the security policy environment.

There is also a legitimacy deficit of some of the local actors. We naturally assume that once parliaments have gone through a national election, the democratic requirements you have in a parliamentary country is no longer necessary. They are now legitimate actors. You often find some strange characters that end up as legislators in post-conflict situations. You also have people representing local needs and civil society actors that may not be the most legitimate people to actually do so. Another part of the local reality is that in a conflict situation we assume that we come into a post-conflict situation with no security structures. We very often, especially in the justice sector, find the informal justice sectors that were operating during the conflict. We got to pay attention to how those informal structures will fit in to and how the formalized structures will be.

We expect public participation in security policy, and one of the things we have looked at is access to information restrictions. We want people to have open debates but there is actually no flow of information between the government and between the international community and civil society. The three SSR plans for the DRC have been developed by different people that and floating around but no one is really bothered about them, or open them for society engagement. Generally there is a lack of information, communication and a lack of public dialogue.

We need to look at future trends and the impact of outsourcing SSR, especially when it raises certain legitimacy questions, when international actors will use private firms to implement certain SSR activities. The recipient state cannot hold that
private company accountable for anything because they are not backed up by the international master as has been highlighted in Liberia.

Furthermore, personalities and leadership really do matter. The local involvement, engagement and dialogue is usually very much dependent on the people that are involved in the process.

In reality the choice of partners is often not so much based on getting local ownership, but rather getting expediency and getting something up and running. I have two other points I would like to make here; ethnicity often complicates SSR. Local ownership and involvement of local people. It has become common to talk about gender and SSR but often what we find is that gender is so mainstream so that you cannot really see it at all. There are issues to ask also about the concept of local ownership broader than just the state concept of local ownership in Africa, and actually more reliance on expertise from Africa working in Africa. An example I thought of here is the South-Sudanese process; although the funding came from the international community the development of the White Paper on defence was developed together with other African experts. Interestingly enough it was done in consultation with African experts. It was done by the SPLA with a few of the parliamentarians. We wonder if we can actually call that local ownership with the participation when they themselves said “well we cannot talk to the people about these kind of things because the people do not know anything about these kind of things”.

The second point in terms of ambitions is measurable reductions in violence and crime, and I wonder about that really. I think SSR is more about governance, what kind of possibilities you have of short term security gains. Another point is, when do we actually start SSR? This is a nice contentious issue which can be debated forever. Is it worth starting at a point of negotiation? Do you start thinking about your security strategy right after elections? When do we actually start SSR? Is it about getting boots on the ground and then we can all walk away as an exit strategy. Is that whole number vs. governance debate, and the gaps that inevitably develop between legality and legitimacy of those actors?

One of the things that have been spoken about in principle is that we should have integrated development and security policies. I think this is actually something that we need to think about a lot more as well as the relationship between SSR and development. Generally what you see is that military involvement in SSR, gives it a certain ideological slant, and it is often used consultants or ex-military people. No offense about that but it does create a certain thing over how problems are solved.

SSR is going to be an expensive project, defence reform in particular is going to be a highly expensive project and we really have to think if that is where the money
should go in at that certain time. SSR is big business, not to shy away for that, and the potential for corruption is huge, we all know about that. Ghost soldiers and all of that kind of thing, it does open up that.

Another thing that need to be further thought about and it has come up in terms of the relationship between SSR and development, is the infrastructural requirements that go along with it. A ministry of defence was built in a beautiful building that had no electricity supply. The next thing they would be getting was an electronic pay-roll system computer. We need to think these things through.

In terms of the multi-sectoral holistic approach, I do not know if this will ever exist in practical reality. You find that the reforms that are pursued are generally politically determined in terms of what is palatable in that particular context at that particular time. I would argue one of the reasons the process in the DRC has stalled is because the president will not give up its presidential guard, as he has personal reasons not to want to give up his personal security guards.

The reform that can take place will much be dependent on the political leadership at that particular point in time and is often determined by what money is available for what. You will find that prison reforms are not very popular on the international agenda, police and military is often done. Intelligence is not popular either. Sometimes you find situations where people are funding projects all over the show, but at the end of the day we do not really know what we are doing. There is a general lack of coordination!

The debate is dominated by police and military reforms, we might as well accept that. If we are going to talk about multi-sectoral strategies, we need to accept that we need to change our focus.

There is a lack of communication and a lack of overall vision and leadership, I like the idea of lead agency/nation that has been spoken about in different contexts over the days. We need to figure out who takes the lead in the coordination of the SSR. I would argue, when we talk about SSR in Africa, we should start investing in African capacity to play that role.

Governance is about improving governance in the long term, related to institutional capacity. You often have parallel processes of funding and budgeting. The investment really needs to be done in the recipient country.

Can SSR be undertaken in a security vacuum or in an insecure situation? When pursuing national reforms in the regional security complex we need to take into account the regional contexts in which SSR is taking place. There are certain push
and pull factors associated with the regional security complex. The African Stand-by Force and the regional brigades should be seen as a push for a graded defence reform in Africa and the alignment of our security function. There is also the push with the regional security architecture that is being created in other sectors such as the police and intelligence. Then you have the other factors within the regional complex that could potentially have a negative impact on SSR such as the way in which all of DRC’s neighbours will respond when they have a big defence sector with thousands of soldiers.

Managing competing interests, domestic, foreign and donor-recipient relations. Power relations between donor and recipient nations, it is part of the complex reality. It was from the Liberian example someone actually said “well we cannot say that is what we want, that is what the Americans are paying for so that is what we will take”. It is more about politics than security. In the African context is it really about limiting the autonomy of the security services or limiting the power of the executive? SSR as an exit strategy assumes an end state, what is the end state of SSR? Examples of “holistic people-centered approaches to security” in a post 9/11 world?

There are three basic principles we should focus on when we talk about SSR, legitimacy, professionalism and accountability. That is really all we require from our services.

**Discussant: Dr. David Chuter, Independent Consultant, United Kingdom**

I will try to tackle a few complementaries, and revert to a few of the things that my predecessors have talked about. The first thing is that as someone who has been involved in SSR before it was called that for some 15 years, I find that the discipline, the intellectual framework or the intellectual document on doctrine of SSR has expanded, but it has not developed. We do not know anything more about SSR today than we knew 15 years ago. I got off a plane in South Africa and someone asked me “why do you need a ministry of defence?”. I was asked the same question in South Sudan last year. We have not developed. It has not changed or developed, but it has expanded. I will offer you two reasons why that is so, which goes to the politics of the issue. I suggested in my paper one of the reasons is the gap between ambition and reality, and that the ambition in itself is confused and does not know what it wants.

SSR is a contested subject, it is a kind of code. What it amounts to is that it influences on and access to the most sensitive apparatus of any state and state of power. If I was giving this presentation in French I would talk about “regaling function”, which means traditional function of king/state. The ability to conduct a SSR pro-
gramme in a country may give you influence and control over the regaling function of the state. And there were probably few appraisals in the international context which are more valuable than that, even more valuable than controlling someone’s economy. What this means is that there is a competition between institutions to define SSR as something that they can do. Development organizations, although important to salute the work of OECD-DAC in recent years, the development organizations see SSR as being about development and post conflict. As they generally do not have a lot of expertise in the security sector, they emphasize all the other non-security sectors such as the civil society, and they try to construct SSR in that sense. By contrast people involved in military training for 20 years, they would say that SSR is all about military training, HR lawyers see SSR as legal limitations on the power of the security sector. Civil society see SSR as involvement of civil society, and parliamentarians see SSR about increasing power of parliament. Since there is political competition, there is no prospect for final consensus among actors. We are therefore bound to approach recipients in a variety of different ways and we are going to tell the poor recipients that SSR is about different things.

The second problem as hinted to before, is SSR turned into a normative doctrine. The big absence in SSR principles, as opposed to practice on the ground, the biggest absence is experience, concrete examples what we have learnt and how we have changed things. The curious thing about SSR doctrine is that it does not change because as an ideology it cannot incorporate experience, because to change normative framework implies that the one you had before was wrong.

It is a doctrine that does not develop because it is inhibited intellectually by taking account of experience. So if we accept all of the things my colleagues have said about importance of SSR, we need to go beyond that and we need to go in the direction of doctrines and practices which reflects reality and which responds to reality. What would a system look like? What initial conclusions can we begin by drawing? Firstly, SSR is potentially extremely dangerous. Not a point made before. Fundamental confusion between SSR as a process and the state of having an effective security sector. The second of those is fundamental to the security of the country and lives of the people. The process of SSR can be directly dangerous, why? It is highly sensitive, the control of the security forces can be a matter of life and death, embedded in the domestic political structure. You meddle with the security sector of a country, and sometimes disastrous things have happened.

Second point, the time these things take, is worth underlining. I have been involved in the progress in South Africa since 1993, and yes, there has been progress, but I have always assumed it would take 25 years. I am starting to believe that was a little bit optimistic from last lectures given. All of this means that we need to do
something urgently about the intellectual confusion that surrounds SSR. Different international organizations and experts are involved, arriving in the same place and using different words but meaning similar things. Trying to understand what it is that they are supposed to do. I was asked the following question from a Minister of Defence recently “I can not quite understand, can you explain to me, in a hierarchy does the Minister come over the Chief of Defence, or does the Chief of Defence come over the Minister.” I sat down a few minutes to try to explain. We are partly responsible for this confusion, and I think something has to be done about it urgently.

What we need is a SSR concept that is operational rather than theoretical, and takes account of the real world and the experience in the explicit fashion. It needs to be intellectually rigorous. It needs to be well thought through and it needs to be logical and coherent. A problem with a lot of the concepts and documents offered to us is that they are consensus drafted by committees and many of you will have laboured in those fields. The result is rarely helpful. Everyone get their own paragraph into the document, but the end result is not very successful. For that reason I am against attempts to create lists of best practices, because that is too much of ideology and less about the situation on the ground. There is a different issue with the best way to behave on the ground.

I will provide you with a few recommendations. The importance about the security sector for the stability of the country needs to be reflected in centrality in SSR programmes, for the mission and mission objectives. SSR programmes should support the wider political objectives of the mission – explicitly and not just at the rhetorical level. It should be a clear and direct link, otherwise they should not be carried out. This appears to call for new type of document. There is a huge deficiency which in an operational manual would not be called SSR, but something like “dealing with the local security sector in peace operations”. That is a rather different thing and moves away from the theoretical normative baggage of SSR. It would need to be firmly based on reality, and describe Security Sector as you are likely to find it. It would promote ideas for dealing with the local security sector on the basis of what has worked and what has not worked depending on the context. Intellectual rigour in a setting of concepts and definitions which we desperately lack. It would take full account of the problems and dangers, and that people can get killed. It would provide guidance on “how to” understand the historical, cultural and religious background which every security sector has. That would be my principle recommendations.

Briefly to conclude, let us be clear about what the problem is. The way you reform depends on what the problem is. You should start by asking what is wrong with the security sector in a country, and not just presuming that there has to be a SSR.
This also means that privatization is essential, and a holistic approach does not mean that you do everything at one time. You only do things when there is a clear need given dangers involved. SSR has to be conducted as part of the strategic plan, central to the mission and should not obstruct the objective of the mission, which it can often do, but instead, reflect the objective of the mission.

When I was a student, many of my friends were medical students, and they told me one of the lessons medical students learn is “do no harm”. There is a very important element, and perhaps the motto of SSR programmes should be just this. The point that has not been covered so far is making use of what we rather clumsily refer to as “south-south experiences”. There is in Africa now for instance a fair amount of experience on SSR in different countries. One way of getting around problem of acceptability and dealing with local positions is to bring people from the region in. This can often also have a very solitude effect.

Discussant: Mr. Carlos Basombrio Iglesias, International Consultant, Capital Humano y Social S.A., Peru

Latin America is not the focus of the forum as such, however, I assume the purpose of inviting someone from Latin America is to be able to draw on SSR experience from a region where the idea was developed and from where lessons can be learnt.

I will focus my remarks on two things during my discussion. First, I will discuss what the goals for SSR are or should be. Secondly, I will focus on what I believe are new and huge challenges to SSR that are emerging rapidly in Latin America and that I am sure will be relevant in the future when developing a structure for SSR for all the regions of the world.

First, what is the main goal for promoting and implementing SSR? David Chuter correctly stresses in his background paper the important goal of stability. He said that the security sector is the stability of any state and security in daily life is a precondition for economic and political development. Well functioning security sector is therefore fundamental. Yet, when he comes back to the issue of stability later in paper, there is something more important. He question the assumption that security forces are necessarily a threat to stability. I quote “in spite of what is sometimes assumed to be a threat to the stability of a state rarely comes from the security services themselves. The idea that the security sector is willing spontaneously to engage in war or oppress the population is not born out by experience. Rather a part or all of the security forces may involve themselves in the politics, usually on the side of one political party, tendency or political group. Even when they seize an area they do not rule alone, most so when they are called military.
regimes, there are actually civilian regimes with a number of militaries involved, but relying on the apparatus of the state to govern”.

In its history, Latin America has had plenty of situations as described, where unreformed security forces ally with undemocratic fractions of civil society, which could guarantee stability for a long period of time. This particular problem is at the origin of the whole net of security reform in Latin America, so due to our particular experiences and history. If the goal of stability is present in Latin American discussions, it is much more related to the way we use SSR for the democratic consolidation rather than for stability alone.

SSR in Latin America has been triggered by two overlapping processes; on the one hand, the transition from dictatorship to democracy. Most Latin American countries have been ruled by military regimes. The new democratic governments faced the paramount challenge of reigning in the military and of transforming them into institutions acting within the democratic framework. Brazil, Uruguay and Chile are the ones that have faced the most intense processes with this purpose.

The second set of events that launched SSR was the peace negotiations and/or internal wars in El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Peru. In these cases, the security forces of the war have to become the security forces for the times of peace and democracy building. This sometimes meant not only to be subjects of profound reforms, but to build entirely new security forces to include older sergeants within them.

So with the particularity of every given country, the main goal of SSR has been to find the role of our services and for them to perform under the rules of democracy and not to become politically involved in supporting one side of the society against the other. In other words, SSR in Latin America is mainly based on the idea of approaching the developed world ideal, defined in David Chuter’s paper, to have political neutral functionally differentiated professional security forces acting under the law for the common good.

A significant period of time has passed since the first efforts of SSR started in Argentina a generation ago. Even if it is still an ongoing process in the region, the question for results to contrast ambitions with today’s realities is paramount and the results are mixed. On the bright side Latin America is a region where military regimes are non-existent and almost un-imaginable. Also in some countries the roles of security forces have been clearly limited and the political role diminished to the minimum. Many steps forward have been taken to develop civilian expertise and an objective, rather than subjective subordination to legitimate government. But at the same time, in many countries the advances are less relevant. Mis-
sion and roles of the military and police are not clearly separated and well defined. News of political intervention of security forces have changed but not disappeared. Many times the civilian authorities prepare not to assume their obligation on defining security policies and let the security forces on their own do what they can or think suitable.

This leads to my second point, even if we have not fulfilled all the goals yet for SSR, posed by transition to democracies and peace processes, we are experiencing huge new challenges, in the region which are redefining the basic assumptions that we have of SSR. Today the challenges in Latin America to stability and democratic consolidation come from very different sources than in the past. International conflicts between bordering countries poses a problem. Latin America is a de-nuclearized region with neither involvement in the main contemporary conflicts nor is it a target for international terrorism. Even the challenge of internal military insurgencies, with the notorious and hopefully declining exception of Colombia, is almost non-existent. Yet new huge security challenges have developed. I am referring to the widespread violence linked to common and organized crime that is heavily affecting most Latin-American countries. I am talking about assaults, robberies, burglaries, youth gang activities, vandalism, strategic killing, drug dealing, rapes and homicides. The problem is so acute that in many Latin American cities we may even find free territories for crime, poor neighbourhoods where police and military are completely banded and where drug traffickers and other criminals have almost absolute control over social life.

Latin American governments have not been prepared to face this new threat. They entrusted the task to the old police forces which lack proper capacity, training or doctrine. Therefore police abuse, when facing crime, became a common practice in many countries at different degrees. All measures including death squads applied. Not only did this fail, but the police became part of the problem and the abuse and inefficiency. Even if some of the worst forms of state abuse are now not as common, the state still fails in action or misguided ways to offer fair and equal access to security and justice. At the same time the perpetrators impunity lead to a multiplication of events. This leads to the widespread sensation of being at serious risk, aggravating therefore the feeling of insecurity, seeing reality and driving sectors of the population into the belief that they are more exposed to violence than actual facts indicate. In this context, a dangerous association has emerged between the new democracies and human rights and escalation of crime. Nowadays it is quite widespread in the peoples’ imaginary that liberty is an excessive consideration to the delinquency that the states and police forces has when dealing with the problem.

It is relevant to say that this perception is frequently amplified in the media and turned into doctrine by many politicians. What is making things worse is that in
the last ten years, the violence is more and more linked to organized transnational crime. Everyday crime is getting even more explained by and linked to major criminal activities such as drug trafficking, smuggling and illegal trafficking. Even traditionally local problems like the youth guns have today international dimensions, where they are connected to their counter-parts in neighbouring countries, but also in Mexico, the United States and Canada.

From my point of view, all these developments that are extremely important in Latin America, are probably not unfamiliar in other areas, and poses challenges to the efforts of SSR. E.g. how to deal with urgent demand of security at any cost from terrified populations. Is a trade off between security and freedom acceptable under the new circumstances? Would it be effective? How do you deal with powerful crime organizations that usually have much more resources than the security forces in a poor country? Is there any way to impede organized crime? The new situation also opens and re-frames the old debate on police and armed forces specific roles. How and with which tools do you deal with security problems which have at the same time strong local roots and transnational links and manifestation. Due to international dimensions of crime, do we have to involve military forces in internal security again? To what extent? Only as an emergency response or do we have to redefine the doctrine and training to be prepared for long time commitment? Should we maybe redefine it to something that should only be dealt with by police and transnational bodies of different countries? In such a case, we need to consider the threat to sovereignty and security. What should be the role of armed forces? What about the money spent on armed forces in poor countries?

These are questions of today which I think are very relevant for people involved in SSR in Latin America. More than that, I think they will be increasingly important for other regions of the world as well, and the international community should take them into consideration when reforming the SSR worldwide. Thank you.

Chair: Mr. Dmitry Titov, Assistant Secretary-General for Rule of Law and Security Institutions, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations

Thank you for reminding us about basics, that SSR is normally not donor driven and a growing issue. It is a nexus between securities, good governance, democracy and long terms stability for a country. Second, I was struck by the mentioning of organized crime as a new phenomenon, and a possible link to neglected and poorly maintained security, and that it becomes a real threat for long term stability of countries. The last remark on participation around security sector in peacekeeping operations, I can tell that for us in the United Nations, well maintained, well equipped, trained and formed, security sectors becomes major provider of peace and security. It is heartening to see earlier this year, Latin America was contribut-
ing to the stability in e.g. Haiti and the Caribbean. Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay are very actively involved together with North American colleagues, EU and France trying to stabilize the situation in Haiti and trying to move the issue forward.

Discussion

A participant raised the importance of the French booklet on its approach to SSR, which he suggested precisely described the French approach to this important issue on SSR. “The first requirement on reform of SSR is, that all SSR activities should come as a response to a request from the partner country. Indeed we know that it is a paramount responsibility of national governments to reform or establish their security sector, and that the UN and international actors could act only in supplementary forms in supporting those reforms and activities of national governments. The mentality of such support, in particular UN PKOs, must be elaborated on the basis of the explicit request of national governments, and/or as a response from the Security Council or G8 mandates. They also need to be defined at early stages of PKO planning and envisage measures for strengthening operational, technical and financial capacities and efficient operations in the field and at HQs. SSR support should be clearly written into the mandates of UN PKOs, providing the rational division of labour with regional organization, and utilizing their experience in that field.”

A researcher wanted to return to the issues discussed yesterday. “I would like to comment on the agreement between NATO and UN on cooperation. Surely, the growing scale and complexity of contemporary peacekeeping tasks calls for active interaction between the UN and regional organizations. Chapter VIII of the Charter clearly sets the principles for what basis such collaboration should be based on. The key requirement is transparency. In this regard, a signing between the UN and NATO deserves a closer assessment. The way it was done behind the backs of Member States raised considerable concerns of the expert community in my country [Russian Federation]. To our view the Secretary-General should have consulted with Member States, prior to this agreement. There is a growing suspicion among experts that such agreements for cooperation is not made on the basis of the UN Charter, but on the basis of international directives, unilateral deliberated by NATO states, and for the obvious reasons aimed at promoting the interests of this organization. Therefore these facts raise questions of the propriety of such an initiative by UN and NATO.”

A general from a major troop contributing country shared comments on the presentations given. “When does SSR finish? We need to look at SSR in two stages; the first stage is the informal and the second is the formal. Formal could be the more institutionalized. When the UN or EU or the international community get involved
militarily or in a more comprehensive fashion in a multi-dimensional mission you start your military operation together with the host country. In the second informal stage, you start by giving the basic values of democracy, the basic principles of discipline, democratizing the institutions telling them the rule of law of state authority, telling them to respect human rights. This is what has been done in MONUC, carrying out training for FARDC. This is part of the informal stage and had to be undertaken because the UN SC resolution 1756, stipulated that operations had to be led by FARDC and supported by MONUC. Therefore, to create the basic minimum capacity of FARDC we had to start training the battalions that were near training stations. We started training the battalions and by the time I left MONUC we had trained ten battalions. It is better than nothing. They at least had the basic knowledge of mandate tactics and there were somewhat cohesive units that could undertake defensive/offensive operations. It was difficult, people who were out in the bush trying to get them together to carry out proper operations, it takes time. I agree with the General that SSR takes a lot of time, at least 10-15 years. It is virtually about taking out the old blood and bringing in new blood making sure that the military component, or the basic three components of SSR; regional reforms, the police and the military, develop into one constitution.”

“The second part, the formal stage, hinges on the constitution of the country. Now the constitution defines the role of military, the police division and therefore this particular formal phase has to be coordinated internationally, which is why we are sitting here together today, to see how this phase can be carried out in a more pragmatic way. Sitting in Kisangani and then in Goma there was virtually an influx of international personnel each one was on its own trying to commence bilateral negotiations and relationships on the military front in the DRC and start off by undertaking various enterprises which were not as well thought out the holistic approach. A holistic approach has to commence from the constitution and there has to be a national security strategy where we as the international community should assist the host government in national security strategy. Whether the framework of SSR must be undertaken, everything has to go into a collective manner including judiciary, finance, diplomacy etc. The starting point is the national security strategy where we should all chip in to enable the country to achieve this. It must be done at the earliest, because my experience is that the more you wait, the more the government get strengthened, the more it starts underscore its sovereignty and the more it stops listening to the international community. We have to make sure that SSR starts and the strategy needs to be there at the earliest!”

“The next point, regarding the African states, DRC and Central America. Border management is something that is being ignored in a very broad way. As part of SSR let us start looking at border management of various countries to make sure
at least the conflict remains certain areas, and you use your initiatives both at the
domestic levels with the national government and internationally to take stock of
the situation. You have to isolate the arena, and that can only be done if you iso-
late borders well, which has not been done. The porous borders in Africa, and
borders all over the world have been exploited in a manner that safe havens pro-
vided in the neighbouring countries.”

“Regarding DDR. Should DDR be undertaken for individuals or for groups or
should it be for individual enterprise or should it be for the groups? Let it be for
the individuals because from the moment you talk about groups, while it should
be open to groups, you are encouraging groups to have their own political agenda
and reinforce the political agendas. For example in DRC, out of the 22 groups
there were only three groups that matter. Only CNDP and FDLR have political or
ideological basis or a political agenda, others have none. I think we should have
DDR coming in to place the moment the military is deployed.”

A representative from the EU Council Secretariat raised three points for the panel.
“First, how do we deal with external spoiling factors for SSR in the DRC when
there is an ongoing conflict in the East. In Guinea Bissau drugs, criminality and
drug money are trying to prevent SSR because they have no vested interest in a
stable Guinea Bissau. How do we deal with it? SSR cannot be seen in isolation, it
must be part of the wider country strategy that we talked about yesterday. It tends
to be a different subfield for people dealing with it, and often it tends to be an
isolated sub-pillar, but it has got to be part of the comprehensive strategy and
sequenced as such.”

“Secondly, regarding the flow of resources. In Guinea Bissau we are attempting to
give a detailed implementation plan for SSR and they need assessment for equip-
ment of resources. But that is meaningless if it is not followed up by the resources
from the international community. It is not only about following up, it is also
about matching the resources to where the needs are. Everybody wants to have the
high visibility tasks and nobody wants the low visibility ones which are often high
resource intensive. How do we better corall the international community and our
Member States to deliver the SSR needs? Is it through groups of friends or is it
through a lead nation if we can find one?”

“The final point relates to the dichotomy between local ownership and getting
progress. Local ownership is a good principle, but as Ms. Lauren Hutton men-
sioned we are asking a weak state, often with corruption, inefficient resources,
poor management, poor administration and frankly inexperienced in what it is
trying to create, to lead on SSR. Therefore, do we support, do we steer or do we
manage? Do we manage with the blessing of local ownership in inverted commas?
Finally, do we need to get tougher with our partners? Yes it takes time to deliver SSR, but do we need to get a bit tougher with SSR and set conditionality rather than in some cases continuing to pour money and resources into a country where frankly in some cases we are not seeing the deliverables that we need to see. Do we need to be more conditional?”

Another participant raised that SSR is indeed an important component of peace operations. “The difficulties are that they are taken increasingly to be a substitute for peacekeeping operations. In the words of Ms. Lauren Hutton it is about governance, so this is a difficulty. Because this applies in all conflict situations and the root causes are the same. SSR should be based on the assumption that no size fits all, that is an important criteria. It should be part of a comprehensive national strategy, because if there is any priority sector in Africa, it should be the sector reform. Most of our problems in Africa are poverty driven. People tend to concentrate on the state operators, ignoring the major root cause for us in the continent of Africa, which is economic sector reform.”

“As Mr. Titov said, it should be nationally owned as it should not be imposed from above without any cultural or political superiority. How do we employ Security Sector Reform in the fair and informal manner as referred to by the General is one, the second thing is that it should be part of the peace negotiations. Third, it should be monitored through the implementation mechanism of a peace agreement and lastly it should be part of the constitution.”

A researcher raised a question on what is the difference between SSR in a developmental context and a peace mission. “We need to come to grips with challenges that lie in the enforcement of mandates. Often SSR is essentially part of a peace settlement in itself. There is a formula in many peace settlements about the way that the security sector should be structured, but the problem with that is, we talk about local ownership as if the locals are a monolith. In fact some will win and some will lose. The losers often resort to violent means. Some of the more tragic cases, are The Arusha Accords in Rwanda, which called for the Tutsi involvement in the army that provoked Hutu extremists to plot genocide. Of course the mission learnt of this, but was unable to respond. The incidents in Somalia contributed to that, and the US did not support a reaction either. How do we enforce our mandates against violent challenges? The same thing happened in Sierra Leone with the RUF in control of the diamonds. Economic reform is one of the critical issues as conflict pays. The putative members of the security sector profiting from conflict resist. It was the implementation of DDR in Sierra Leone that caused 500 UN peacekeepers to be taken hostage. How do we enforce our mandates? I would call it peace enforcement, except for the fact that the Capstone Doctrine does not use that term, but the challenge does not go away.”
A participant suggested that in Bosnia, the third entity movement would have prevailed in separating Hersnig Bosnov from Bosnia if assertive action had not been taken. “A police station was raided in Mostar, and we discovered the linkages between the Croat intelligence office, the police and organized crime. That was the structure that needed to be broken before SSR could succeed. The United States got it wrong in Iraq. One of the statistics that I recall was that in Basra 75 percent of the police that we trained were working for the dark side. Our efforts to build the security sector of the police were actually self defeating; they were working on behalf of sectarian violence.”

“We need to get professional in shaping the environment, so that our efforts to build these institutions can succeed. We need to create the conditions for success and we need to be able to enforce our mandates against violent challenges. Local ownership is a dangerous concept when put in tandem with an exit strategy. We failed in Haiti. We created a fairly proficient police force but when we exited, RSD came into power, politicised it, criminalized it e.g. organized crime, and brought us back to a failed state and the need for intervention. In East Timor we had an exit strategy. Administral Advato politicized the police force and then you had a war between the army and the police. The case of Kosovo as local ownership formula, should we be exiting? Should Kosovo-Albanians own the security sector without the involvement of the Serbs? There needs to be continuing international oversight to prevent a politicisation of the security sector and taking us back to conflict where NATO is engaged. What is the formula I would suggest? Not an exit strategy, but a transition strategy. When we go from peacekeeping to peace-building we need to embed some kind of safeguards in the security sector to prevent politicization and criminalization, which would otherwise take us right back to conflict.”

Mr. Dmitry Titov wished to express their particular appreciation to the government of Slovakia in leading the group of friends on SSR at the UN. “They have been doing a marvellous job in supporting us politically and rallying Member States around the idea and also in advocacy around this important task.”

A representative of a humanitarian non-governmental organisation suggested that everyone had insisted that the doctrine is pretty much developed, but it is still very much on a case by case basis. “I would ask you what would be your main recommendation for Chad, drawing from your lessons, maybe mostly from the DRC. Is there a need for SSR in Chad and what should be its timing? Do we need to have an election first, or should we get a cease fire according to the CRT process first? Should it include only the eastern part of the country, or is it possible to include SSR only in parts of the country? What should be the actors involved? Here we are talking about EU-UN collaboration, should there be a specific added value or role
for these ones? I think this is a very actual debate with the whole MINURCAT mandate to be revised in the coming month.”

A Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN referred to what had been raised earlier by a Representative of a Permanent Mission to the UN in New York. “You have already mentioned the UN Group of Friends on SSR that Slovakia initiated during our membership in the Security Council, which we now chair. We see it as a very important interface between the UN Secretariat and Member States. It currently comprises of 30 Member States. We are observing very carefully the geographical balance as well as the equal representation of donors and implementing states. Secondly, we have recently devoted a lot of energy to regional and sub-regional approaches and to ensuring that the UN support to SSR and UN strategies reflect needs and expectations of regions. It is probably well known that South Africa and Slovakia in November 2007 organized a very successful workshop devoted to UN support to SSR in Africa. We are now working closely with other partner countries, in particular in South East Asia and Latin America, where we are hoping to organize similar events in those regions.”

“Regarding the key issue of the seminar organized by the French Presidency, which is strengthening EU-UN support, including the area of SSR. We fully support the French Presidency in concentrating on the issue of SSR in the context of better UN-EU cooperation. For that reason Slovakia also works closely with the up coming presidency of Czech Republic. This will be one of the issues that we will be concentrating on in order to best capitalize on the positive synergies on the EU-UN cooperation the area of SSR in particular.”

Dr. David Chuter, commented that ownership is an unsolvable problem. “In effect we say to people “tell us what you want” and they say “tell us what you think we need”. There is actually no answer to this. There are certain things that one can do, and the most important thing that one can do is to approach partners, local partners, in a spirit of genuine humility.”

“In many cases I have found that informal conversations, to pick up a point that was made several times, can be extremely helpful in simply alerting people in these countries to what the possibilities are. This is an extremely important stage. You do not need a tactical SSR squad deployed immediately with parachutes from an aircraft and say we have the answers. Quiet conversations in informal circumstances have often been very productive, in simply outlining to people what options are available, how things are done elsewhere in the world. Options that they might want to consider.

“I agree fundamentally with our colleague from the United States to the question of who’s ownership. Behavioural economics tells us that people resent loss much
more than they appreciate gains, and there is always a lot of loss in the SSR pro-
grammes. That is one of the reasons why I said they are dangerous.”

“It is interesting that the Balkans came up, an area where I have worked exten-
sively. What that demonstrates, as certain parts of Africa demonstrate, is that
there are many societies where the assumed society distinction for example between
the security forces and organized crime and civil society simply does not exist.
They are all aspects of the same thing. Ten years ago we were asked by ministers
if there were any links between the Kosovo Liberation Army and Albanian organ-
ized crime. As some of you will remember the answer is that they are actually the
same thing, they are just different manifestations of the same thing. Doing Security
Sector Reform in a situation like that seems to be next to impossible. There are
also a number of parts of the world, Balkans is one of them, with parallel and
 occult security structures that you do not see but that can be very powerful. We
had to destroy them all over the place in Bosnia. We destroyed an illegal television
radar based over Mostar, which was also involved in crime, because it was expected
to finance itself and it could not be financed from Zagreb. It financed itself by sell-
ing stolen credit cards and similar activities like that. There is a whole dimension
that needs to be taken into account in planning, and I do not think that nearly
enough attention is given to it.”

“Finally, a lot of people have mentioned the French paper on Security Sector
Reform. I no longer work for the French government but I guess on behalf of the
French government I should say thank you for the kind words, do pick up a
copy. I was involved in the drafting and I was also involved in polishing the Eng-
ish.”

Gen. Pierre-Michel Joana, responded by stating that: “We are there to help people
solve a problem that they are not able to solve themselves. I agree with what the
general from MONUC said at the outset. One should offer support to the country
to receive assistance, with the message that: we will focus on putting you in a situa-
tion of relative stability, that is, we will protect your borders and help you solve
any remaining security problems. Meanwhile you tell us what you want to build
and what assistance you want from us. Later, with dialogue, we will attempt to
provide you with this support, taking into account that when you arrive early in
the crisis, you are dealing with people who have a (somewhat limited) legitimacy
in situations of cohabitation or transition. It is rather difficult to obtain a decision
that is not a compromise, or even a manoeuvre, towards others. One must never-
thless assume these responsibilities. If you are there to help the people, you are
not there to lecture them or to tell them: “Sort yourselves out on your own, and
when you have found the solution we will tell you if it is a good or bad solu-
tion”.”
“I believe that one must be involved. It is an extremely sensitive exercise and requires more taming from people with good intentions, but who are extremely bitter and who have had rather dramatic experiences, more than a system in which we contribute our know-how in an ideal world in which everyone will be fine.”

“As regards the call to the group, what I would like to say is that under the circumstances, taming is the correct course of action. It is beneficial that leaders who are potential spoilers, leaders from different places, to be part of the team of individuals who implement reform rather than those who hinder it, even if they never adhere to the process. And by systemically bringing them aside, one does not encourage their spontaneous participation in progress.”

Ms. Lauren Hutton wondered about a national security strategy and the practicalities of that. “14 years down the line in South Africa we still do not have a national security strategy. The one that was written somehow disappeared in the drawers of someone of the coordinating committee and the intelligence services, because they were charged with the task of doing it. We must be careful in what we are demanding of people when we are asking for an overall national security strategy, and whether or not it is actually necessary.”

“The point on boards of management was very important, and that links up to the main issue of relevance for SSR in Africa. We have to consider the regional dimensions of security in conflicts and the importance of transnational security threats. Related to that, is the issue of local ownership. Local ownership is really only becoming important because of what David was saying, the sensitivity of security, donor-recipient relations and the historical relations between Africa and the West. One of the ways in actually getting around the issues of local ownership is to invest in more regional and sub-regional ownership, so that it is not always viewed to be this western intervention in Africa. You get stuck in that discourse which does not help anybody really."

“The last one on the terms of the recommendations for Chad, SSR in Chad is going to have to be a regional initiative up there as well. Thank you.”

Mr. Dmitry Titov whished to make two or three comments about the needs to instill conditionality and stay involved and sometimes questioning local ownership. “Yes there are cases in post-conflict situations where you have to reconstruct a state that requires considerable capacity building. I would put it through that angle. You have to invest in capacity building because in the end we are all aiming at transition, transition to a national ownership, to a national authority and to national processes. If there is none, and that is why we have to emphasizes from the beginning that it is a national enterprise and it is your security, your future.
National authority, civil society, parliaments have to be associated with that process from the very beginning. It is difficult, it is tedious, it is time consuming and it requires a lot of energy, but I think it has to be done. Most probably from the very beginning it has to be seen as a compact between national authorities and donors, and each stream has to bring something major into the process."

“My second comment is on how to link everything strategically. I have been thinking a lot and I think we have found at least a very pragmatic answer, which was alerted in yesterday’s presentation of Ross Mountain; there should be a stability and stabilization plan, which would accompany and Security Council mandate. We still do not know who will be in charge and what will be the nexus between SRSG and other players, but that plan should emerge at the planning stage of any peace intervention, peace operations or any others. For myself, after 17 years in peacekeeping, I have this doubt, and I was very glad that Mr. Mountain highlighted that.”

“My final comment to the distinguished Ambassador of Sudan, definitely no cooky cutter approach. In some peacekeeping operations per definition we will never have any security sector activity. In Kashmir we will not, in Cyprus we do not, but even in the case of Sudan we have a smaller element. We do not call it perhaps as such, but we are very actively interacting in Cartoon with the Ministry of Interior providing basic training at the request of the Minister of Interior and conducting some specialized courses for the Sudanese police. It is part of the overall mentality of the peace agreement, from what I understand. It has been quite an interesting experience and quite rewarding for both parties, despite all the political criticism about some aspects of the peace process."

“Finally a comment on Chad, whether there should be SSR or whether there will be SSR. I think there is a way of SSR already by trading 850 Chadian police under the overall labour of DIS (déctachement intégré de sécurité) integrated security. This is what is already happening, but it is a first step and it is not part of the overall broader picture which much probably will come when there is a political process in the country, when there is a lasting national reconciliation and when the Chadians themselves will realize that they need to create new security structures, new architecture and to professionalize their service.”

“Once again thank you very much all. It has been an extremely exciting session. I think those who has survived the first two grueling days of presentations have been rewarded by extremely interesting discussions. I am grateful to our host, to the European Union, to Folke Bernadotette Academy for putting this item on the agenda, because this is a strategic item. The topic is interesting, it is sexy, and it is of strategic importance. It will remain on the international agenda, I am confident
in that. There are many things to de-conflict, to clarify but first and foremost we have to professionalize this trade and operationalizing it as much as possible.”

“Once again this session serves for me to remind that it is primarily an internal transformation with national aspirations in charge, that is why it is so vital for international organizations, regional and global. We all have to create special capacities in order to assist nations in that transformation and operationalisation, and that is why we have to learn from our experiences and we have to learn to cooperate much better and much closer at various levels. That is why, once again, as an advertisement for peace, I would appeal to all of you to cooperate very closely with DPKO with our office, because we will be trying to develop certain tools that could be of help to the international community. Thank you.”
Chapter 10

Closing Session

Chair: Ms. Sylvie-Agnès Bermann, Director, United Nations and International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, France

Thank you very much. After these two-and-a-half days of intense discussions, the time has come to draw conclusions from these discussions. I will now hand you over to Annika Hilding-Norberg.

Concluding Remarks and Looking Ahead


Ladies and Gentlemen, Partners, Colleagues and Friends, Bonjour,

Ross Mountain suggested yesterday ”If you do not know where you are going, it is very difficult to get there”. I have some good news – we know where we are going. I also have some possibly bad news. We now have to put in the hard yards to get there. To get where? What was our desired end-state in the beginning of the week? The opening speakers challenged us to rise to the occasion and seek to identify a limited number of solutions or possibilities for action and implementation. We have had two and a half days of intensive, dynamic and productive discussions. We were confronted with an exclusive preview based on the data of next years Annual Review of Global Peace Operations, which provided us with a solid, if deeply troublesome, analysis and statistical platform, from which our discussions could depart. I will not go through the programme, session by session, commenting on the presentations and interventions. However, I would like to make a few general remarks on the discussions and how we intend to take the issues and our work forward in order to promote more effective and efficient multinational and multidimensional peace operations.

Today, the world is a very different place compared with when the Challenges initiative was launched in the mid-1990s. Then, the international community was disorientated after our failures to stop atrocities and mass killings taking place in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia and Rwanda. The credibility of the UN was severely damaged. The African Union did not exist, and a pan-African peacekeeping capacity was almost unthinkable. NATO had reluctantly been pulled into the
Balkans, but was still not particularly enthusiastic about moving further in the peacekeeping direction. The OSCE was only slowly expanding its peacebuilding activities. CIS had rushed into stabilizing conflicts in the former Soviet Union, and stayed put.

In the wake of the debacles of the early 1990’s, EU Member States began to think in terms of a need to develop European capacities for peacekeeping. As Renata Dwan reminded us, the impetus for developing a EU Crisis Management capacity was to a large extent guided by the very strategic and sound imperative of doing “something” not only that, it had to be “different”, different from others and from what was before.

If I may para-phrase Ross Mountain this time. Describing the EU crisis management capacity development, it seems not too far fetched to say ”You may not have known where you were going, but you definitely got there”. EU capacities and capabilities today are both substantive and operationalized. Pedro Serrano outlined six actual and one possible scenario or type of missions for which the EU does or could deploy its forces. Our deliberations here have clearly illuminated the range of possibilites –and of course some challenges- that the EU in its new undertaking, is faced with. As Sylvie Bermann pointed out, it is important to differentiate between types of missions that forms part of a new trend evolving, as opposed to, when there is just a mission undertaken as an exception to the rule. Overall, one thing is clear, EU’s extensive engagement in different conflict resolution and / or stabilization efforts around the world, is indeed an amazing achievement.

Parallel to these European developments, other organizations have also transformed themselves in remarkable and different ways and directions. The UN is a completely different organization today than it was in the dark ages of the early 1990’s. I hope you have read the four page UN Peacekeeping fact sheet enclosed in your folders. Equally, as highlighted by Ramtane Lamamra and Jamie Shea, both the African Union and NATO have developed substantive capacities and are undertaking a broad range of missions, which was very difficult to imagine a decade ago.

The development of peace operations and crisis management mechanisms outside the UN system and on a broad front, took off in the latter half of the 1990’s. Given our stark failures to act effectively in the post-Cold War conflict environments, it was probably a logical outcome that the architecture of the new European peacekeeping capacity, focused on “something different”. Thus, new terminology and structures were developed that were “different” from the peacekeeping capacities of the “old world order”.

308
As has been discussed, some of the challenges we face in the cooperation between organizations stem from the fact that the corresponding functions in the various organizations are deliberately structured and named differently.

The way in which the European crisis management capacities were initially developed may have made sense at the time – but we are all still dealing with the results of it when we are trying to strengthen cooperation and develop more comprehensive approaches today.

So, how is this relevant for our discussion on the evolving peace operations architecture and the interlocking system of peacekeeping capacities, which is in the making? As we have learned over the course of the past few days, we have come a very long way since the mid-1990’s. Much water has passed under the bridge. A vast amount of human, financial and intellectual resources, have gone into reforming and developing our total capacities and capabilities for the planning and conduct of multidimensional and multinational peace operations. When we talk of holistic solutions, this is what we need to focus on. How do we develop the most effective, efficient and legitimate – total – system of peacekeeping capacities? We need to accelerate our move from a differentiation mentality towards a resolute effort of enhancing harmonization of effort, mechanisms and guidelines for increased interoperability. We owe it to the people and countries that need our combined assistance. There is not enough of us. We cannot afford being delayed or ineffective. Together - is the key word.

One contribution to this effort has been made by the Challenges Partners and others through their work on doctrine development. We all, now have, for the first time a strategic level document – guidelines- for the planning, conduct and training for UN-led peace operations. It is multidimensional in its outlook. The principles and guidelines document will provide the basis not only for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, and the 200,000 peacekeepers passing through the UN system in a year. As stated yesterday by the Chief of United Nations Humanitarian Coordination Sir John Holmes, it will also form the basis for the further development of guidelines for the humanitarian community. This would be another milestone. Who could have envisioned, only five years ago, that this across the spectrum sincere and determined effort of developing truly holistic approaches to addressing the imaginary civil-military-police and humanitarian divide, is now materializing. The Challenges Partners contribution to the UN principles and guidelines work has been followed up by promoting a harmonization of efforts across organizations, beginning here in Paris with a focus on the UN and EU relationship and cooperation. Promoting harmonization is our guiding light.
You have all seen the first draft of a Challenge Forum Cooperation Matrix Work Sheet. We welcome all the useful input provided during the past few days by both the UN DPKO, by our Russian Partners providing facts for the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) section of the work sheet, and by our Turkish Partners highlighting the need to include subjects for cooperation and related agreements also between the different regional organizations. I would like to challenge all of you to provide further input, comments, critique and suggestions.

Inspired by encouraging words from the UN Secretariat, the Partners are discussing the need to continue and intensify our sharing of best practices, looking at the operational strands of principles and guidelines development. We understand it would be welcomed if the Challenges Partnership, in our open and transparent manner together with colleagues around the world, would consider elaborating on the three core functions of multi-dimensional UN-led operations as stated in the principles and guidelines document. They include: first, to create a secure and stable environment while strengthening the State’s ability to provide security, with full respect for the rule of law and human rights. Second, to facilitate the political process by promoting dialogue and reconciliation and supporting the establishment of legitimate and effective institutions of governance. Third, to provide a framework for ensuring that all United Nations and other international actors pursue their activities at the country-level in a coherent and coordinated manner. Building on the doctrine development work undertaken so far, a proposal to look at the linkages to, and importance of, effective and realistic mandates, have also been raised.

The Challenges Partnership continue to be a balanced group reflecting the different facets of modern peace operations; half of the Partners are civilian organizations, half are military. Many are in some way governmental, but we also have non-governmental think tanks and peacekeeping centres. There is strong and equal representation from both the so called North and South. Our two most recent Partners from France and Pakistan confirm and strengthen also the geographical balance that we seek. And as of now, beginning at the first full International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations here in Paris, you are all most welcome to join our effort.

It is our aim that the Forum 2008 should generate a momentum for the international community to move forward on some of the recommendations made in the background papers or other recommendations as suggested by chairs, speakers, discussants or participants during the course of the Forum. A Challenges Forum 2008 Report will be finalized after the conclusion of this forum. Its recommendations are intended for consideration by states, organizations and interested individuals and experts in their preparation for relevant political and expert fora, such
as the UN Special Committee for Peacekeeping Operations, and the equivalent bodies or functions of the EU, and other regional, humanitarian, development, governmental and non-governmental organizations.

As Mr. Henrik Landerholm stated in the opening session, we would like to be able to look back at the Paris Forum and say that two or three recommendations or ideas found their way into common directives, guidelines, doctrine or national frameworks of analysis, policy output and not least education and training, if so, our mission will have been accomplished. The substance, issues and recommendations are there, now it is -only- a matter of attention to detail, a sense of purpose and determination and some political will - that can make things happen. We have all those ingredients gathered in this hall here in Paris. On behalf of the Partners, I invite us all to rise to the challenges and mobilize our will and resources to improve the way in which we plan and conduct our peace operations!

Before concluding, allow me to mention some supporting activities discussed among the Partnership. Partners are considering a proposal from our American partners regarding a substantive development of the Challenges Web-site into an Interactive web-site, including and in particular, a web-forum for principles and doctrine development. We are also discussing a proposal from our Russian Partners to meet more often to address specific issues that would inform the Annual Forums as and when applicable.

We are pleased that the adopted Challenges Forum concept has proven to be successful. The concept ensures co-ownership and continuity and functions as a foundation for the planning and execution of Challenges Forums. It is also intended to preserve a clearly recognisable Challenges profile and further guide us in our joint strive to be regarded as one of the most relevant and useful platforms and meeting places for the international peace operations community - a broad-based, action-oriented, collaborative effort to address and overcome current and emerging challenges.

Looking to the future, the second International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations will be hosted by our Challenges Partners and colleagues in Pakistan. Pakistan is a key contributor to UN peacekeeping and one of a handful of the top troop contributors from South Asia that make up about 65 percent of all peacekeepers contributing to UN peace operations. Pakistan represents one of many countries that contribute to peace operations, while not belonging to an operational regional organization for peace operations. Politically, Pakistan brings in the important Non Aligned Movement perspective on the issues. Pakistan is also situated in one of the most challenged regions today, next door to Afghanistan, and brings with it, important perspectives on the challenges that the region faces,
that we all no doubt, can learn much from. We are indeed very much looking forward to next year’s forum, and it is a pleasure and a privilege to, in a few minutes, hand over the word to the Ambassador of Pakistan to extend the formal invitation to next year’s forum.

It is rewarding to note that an interest in hosting future Challenges Forums have been put forward over the past few days by several organizations and countries from different continents, representing different civilian, military and police organizations and institutions. This is of course most welcomed!

At the wonderful cocktail reception on Monday evening we, on behalf of all Forum participants and Challenges Partners, expressed our wholehearted thanks to our French hosts, the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, the Ministry of Defence and CERI-Sciences Po, for their extensive planning efforts and professional hosting and management of the Forum. I would also like to express our sincere thanks to the authors of the background papers, which set us not only on track for this meeting, but who will contribute to our effort as we analyse the results of our deliberations. Our speakers have held the highest standards, providing insightful analysis and shared experiences and recommendations of a unique nature. The discussants have given us valuable food for thought, bringing complementary perspectives on the subjects concerned. At the centre of the Forum, is of course all of us, the participants, bringing the practitioners, diplomats, academics, and trainers perspectives to our deliberations. Finally, there is one additional component in the Challenges machinery that I simply must mention, and that is our Forum desk officer, Ms. Anna-Linn Persson, who is invaluable to me, to the coordinating secretariat and to the Challenges Forum. Dear colleague, thank you for everything.

I would like to finish by recalling our long term vision in the Challenges Forum, which is a comprehensive and more effective international capacity to undertake multinational and multidimensional peace operations. It is my hope that in the not too distant future, the international community has developed its capacities to the extent that we will be able to address crisis and conflict when and where they emerge, in a professional and predictable manner. It is our vision that we should all be able one day to give peoples in peril and in open conflict, a solid response and provide an effective multidimensional engagement. Without the ”ifs” and ”buts” to accompany the offer.

The Challenges Partners look forward to continuing our fruitful cooperation in the “International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations” framework – building and strengthening effective peace operations partnerships, as we all move forward – together. Thank you and see you next year.
Invitation to the 2nd International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations

Speaker: Amb. Asma Anisa, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan to France

Ladies and Gentlemen, Madame Chair, with your permission let me take the chance to make some very brief comments.

First of all, on behalf of Pakistan I would like to thank the government of France for hosting this first meeting of the International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations, and also Folke Bernadotte Academy of Sweden for being the engine behind the concept. We have had thought-provoking and fruitful discussions over the last two days, and we are sure as just mentioned by Annika, that the cumulative results of this forum will be utterly and duly reflected in the annual report.

Ladies and Gentlemen, Pakistan is committed to peace and stability in the world. This is reflected by our active participation in UN peacekeeping operations over the years. With more than 10,500 personnel in 12 missions, we are the largest troop contributor to UN peacekeeping operations. We are also among the top providers of police and military observers, and it is worth noting, that Pakistan also deployed women in its peacekeeping contingents. Pakistan has been in the vanguard of peacekeeping efforts in Africa. 95 percent of peacekeepers are currently deployed in 8 missions in Africa, 4 integrated missions in DRC, Sudan, Liberia and Cote d’Ivoire. Earlier Pakistani troops played a major role in the success of UN missions in Sierra Leone and Burundi. The UN peacekeeping operations in recent years have faced complex and major challenges. The increasing demands on the conduct of peace operations are not only a testimony to their usefulness, but also indicative of a need to align these operations with the growing requirements.

Since many experts have already given valuable views on the issues, it might not be appropriate for me to say anything, nevertheless, I would wish to give a few humble comments. First of all it must be recognized that sustained effort, additional resources and greater political will, are needed for the success of peace operations over a long term. A truly comprehensive and strategic vision of peace operations spanning from conflict to peacekeeping to post conflict peace building should be operationalized. Strategies, based on objective and comprehensive diagnosis of the ground realities are more likely to succeed. Since the majority of the conflicts are happening in the developing world, there must be a greater effort to
promote sustainable development as a means to preventing and managing conflicts.

We also need a sustainable response to the growing requirement for professional and well equipped peace makers. Other areas that need an increased focus is training, capacity building, lessons learnt and best practices.

While we may discuss peace operations in forums like this one, the maintenance of peace and security in the world, actually depends on the professionalism, dedication and devotions of the peacekeepers serving around the world. I take this opportunity to pay our tribute to the peacemakers for their services for the cause of peace. Concluding, I would like to extend an invitation, on behalf of the government of Pakistan, to the second meeting of the International Forum for Challenges of Peace Operations, which will be hosted by Pakistan 7-9 of July 2009 in Islamabad. We hope that the Islamabad meeting of the Challenges Forum will build on the progress we have achieved in this first meeting.

Looking forward to seeing you all in Islamabad. Thank you very much.

Closing Remarks

Chair: Ms. Sylvie-Agnès Bermann, Director, United Nations and International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, France

Just a few words to again thank all participants who have been very active and the co-organisers of the forum, the Ministry of Defence, the Folke Bernadotte Academy and Sciences-Po’s CERI. I would also like to thank and congratulate Pakistan for its offer to host the next forum meeting, and we would be delighted to meet there next time. By hosting this first International Forum on the Challenges of Peace Operations, we hoped under the French Presidency of the European Union to emphasise cooperation between the United Nations and the European Union in the area of crisis management in order to examine its contribution, and to study new avenues for cooperation. Using this cooperation as an example, we also sought to examine in broader terms the evolution in the relationship between the United Nations and other regional and international organisations in security, peacekeeping and the maintenance of security. In this respect, the participation of numerous actors representing other geographical regions and the main organisations competent in the area of security and peace enriched the quality of the debate. In my opinion, the main purpose of the Challenges Forum is to allow the unhindered exchange of experiences and analyses between the different actors involved in peacekeeping and the maintenance of security.
A few comments on the various sessions. First of all, to confirm the rapid development in a few years time of the actions by the European Union in partnership with the United Nations. The debate showed that this cooperation is now structured and very reactive. While this cooperation is in particular in the management of peacekeeping operations, it must, as it has also been said, also be developed in the pre- and post-conflict phases. In this respect, the European Union has a vast array of instruments at its disposal that serves as encouragement for cooperation between the UN and other regional organisations.

A word on the session on humanitarian issues. The diversity of participants in this session enriched the debate on a difficult subject. However, NGOs, civilians, the military and civil society itself as a whole are finding it easier to come together on the ground. There are risks that have been mentioned in relation to neutrality, impartiality and independence. At the same time, it is evident that we will increasingly occupy the same ground, all the more so since intervention is increasingly in response to humanitarian objectives and the wish to preserve populations, to come to the aid of populations, and had Minister Bernard Kouchner been here, he would clearly have said so in a much more eloquent manner. He regrets not being able to be here, as was said yesterday, his absence due to the fact that as Chairman of the Council of the European Union he had to chair the meeting of donors on Georgia. Therefore, in the humanitarian dimension, one must above all be pragmatic so that everyone can be effective in their own area and to ensure coordination, so as to work as effectively as possible.

The two other points raised were peacebuilding and security sector reform. As Dimitri Titov said at the outset, these are strategic items, since peace and security are to an increasing extent won through military intervention. However, it is also won when one is better prepared and much earlier in advance. The issue of appropriation was raised. Here, too, it was Dimitri Titov who called it a national enterprise, and other participants have referred to it in the same terms. I, too, believe that it is an important element in ensuring the success of strategies to emerge from crises.

Finally, a comment on the growing number and complexity of peacekeeping operations by the European Union, the United Nations and the African Union. I believe that consideration should also be given to ways of obtaining new contributions, new contributors. In this respect, efforts are required in order to reinforce Africa’s peacekeeping capabilities and the role of regional organisations in general. Missions must also be made more effective. Asma Anisa described to us the competence of Pakistani UN troops who have long been at the heart of peacekeeping operations, and it is important that there be a true professionalisation of PKO and men on the ground. We congratulate ourselves in this respect on the measures
taken by the UN Secretariat to boost planning and monitoring capabilities. In particular, developing the role of the Office of Military Affairs is essential.

In short, to conclude the most important requirement is clearly the political will to participate. However, the resolution of crises is also, first and foremost, a political solution. Sometimes, it is a case of succumbing to the ease of launching a peacekeeping operation with no apparent political solution. This is the role of this international community and a collective responsibility. I will finish now by again thanking you all.
Chapter 11

Challenges Meeting in New York 2009

Opening and Welcome – Objectives and Issues

Speaker: H.E. Mr. Jean-Maurice Ripert, Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations

Mr. Director General, Dear Colleagues, Dear Friends, this meeting is important as a follow-up to the first International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations, which was held in October in Paris. It is essential to keep the momentum on Peacekeeping, an activity which is at the core of the UN’s role in collective security. I will use the few minutes ahead to give you the prospect of the UN Security Council that France is presiding for the month of January.

The challenges of peacekeeping operations, indeed, are daunting. We are clearly overstretched, for a series of well-known reasons. We face a steadily increasing number of, and demand for, operations, with increasingly complex mandates. The environment in which we operate has become tougher, and often cruel, with less host country support, and horrific attacks against civilians, and in particular UN personnel. I will be chairing this morning a (first) meeting of the UN Security Council on the need for strict respect of the International Humanitarian Law and the necessity for the Council to act in this regard. Recent cases evidence capability overstretch at all levels, with a tremendous burden on the Headquarters, reduced ability to generate forces, insufficient key enablers and even basic equipment. All this occurs at a time when the economic crisis increases the effects of budget crisis.

This situation is sometimes fuelled by the Security Council’s decisions that lack consistency. Political decisions are made without clear commitment to support them with adequate resources, or assurance that sufficient forces and financial means will be available. Mandates are often renewed without all the Security Council members benefitting from sufficient military information on what is actually undertaken. We have not thought out how to integrate early enough in our mandates the peacebuilding component and our mandates frequently lack clarity on the eventual objectives to attain the related exit strategy.

We face difficulties in the conduct and monitoring of operations. There can sometimes be a disconnect between planning and the actual situation on the ground.
Our planning documents have not always been regularly updated while the situation was evolving rapidly, our implementation of mandates is selective and frequently uneven, including on human rights, protection of civilians, international justice. Caveats hamper mission implementation and many a time such caveats, which are a fact of military life, lack transparency and predictability. We also hear from the ground a rising frustration at the UN’s weighty administrative procedures. They hamper swift and effective action. They limit availability of field decision-makers to focus on strategic thinking. The Security Council has a crucial role in monitoring implementation. But its ability to do so is limited by lack of military information at each important juncture. Insufficient use is made of the existing military structure, especially the Military Staff Committee. SRSG reports and mandate renewal insufficiently based on an analysis of whether objectives assigned in the first place have been reached.

Several of these difficulties are difficult to address because they have a structural component. They are related to the UN system of split responsibilities across different sets of actors, with some deciding on the creation of PKOs, others planning them, others validating resource requirements, others providing the resources, and yet others providing the troops and conducting the operation. They are therefore very difficult to address, all the more so as we do not want the Security Council to micromanage operations from New York.

Yet we absolutely must make progress. France and the UK have proposed a way forward in the Council. Much has already been said in the Brahimi report, but the circumstances have changed, and above all, large parts of the Brahimi report have not been implemented. It is time to move now. France and the UK have therefore circulated a joint non-paper which identifies three clusters of issues to address as a matter of priority:

a. Effective strategic oversight: preparation, planning, oversight and evaluation of operations. To improve information flow between Security Council, the Secretariat, and TCCs; to improve Council’s military expertise, risk analysis, and transparency; to improve resolution drafting, including on benchmarks and exit strategies.

b. Resource constraints: address the six ways in which we can tackle them: (1) rigorously assessing new commitments (2) substituting civilian activities for military activities (3) “outsourcing” activities to third parties and sharing the burden with other organizations (4) closing existing operations (5) downsizing existing operations (6) increasing our cost-efficiency, including on the logistics and sourcing side.

c. Lessons from implementation: assess mandate provisions that are under-implemented, including human rights, protection of civilians, and judicial
issues. Draw lessons for resolution drafters, for the composition of the mis-
sion and for dialogue with TCCs.

On that basis we have organized last week a brainstorming seminar with Security Council members and top representatives of the Secretariat and Jean-Marie Guéhenno. Subsequently, we organized a broader Security Council debate to listen to important views from large TCCs, NAM countries, and other stakeholders. From this very productive and sometimes even eager debate, we have drawn several lessons. We will circulate soon as an official document of the Council a slightly revised version of our non-paper. Our plan is to carry forward work on those three clusters of ideas during the coming months. France and the UK will ensure a kind of informal secretariat, but it is essential that this initiative should be appropriated by Council Members and closely discussed with the Secretariat, TCCs and other main stakeholders. There will be decisions and deliverables all along the way, but we want to take stock of our progress in August, under the UK presidency of the Council. A Presidential statement could be adopted on this occa-
sion.

We are therefore grateful for all initiatives, like the Challenges, or like the series of events that will be organized by Canada, that keep Peacekeeping high on the agenda. We will need awareness if we are to make any progress.

We count on all of you who are present to support this process, to enrich it, and to make it a success. Thank you.

Issues and Challenges

*Speaker: Mr. Edmond Mulet, Assistant Secretary-General for Operations, United Nations*

Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, thank you for the opportunity to speak today. The continuing relationship between the Challenges Forum and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations is a most welcome partnership. It has spanned more than a decade serving as a mechanism to bridge an age-old dilemma: that of the practitioners being too busy to think deeply about the longer term, and of the deep thinkers being too distant from the realities of practitioners.

The Challenges Forum is as an entity, a partnership I should say, that is striving to find that elusive middle ground bringing the two closer together. Bringing onboard uniquely qualified senior advisers such as Jean-Marie [Guéhenno] and former
Force Commanders such as Robert Gordon is testament to your desire to help the world of research and ideas to intersect with the world of day-to-day planning and implementation in peacekeeping.

Challenges Programme 2008: Partnerships. 2008 was clearly another important and productive year for the Challenges group. You tackled yet another complex issue in peacekeeping, the complex world of partnerships, and generated an important dialogue among key players.

Effective partnership is essential in this business. No single organization can presently conduct all of the multifaceted tasks required to support and consolidate peace processes. The growing involvement of regional agencies and arrangements in the maintenance of international peace and security was envisaged in Chapter VIII of the Charter, and today we have new opportunities for combining the capabilities of United Nations and non-United Nations actors to manage complex crises across the globe.

In several instances, troops and police deployed as part of a regional organization-led peace operation have been “re-hatted” into the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation. As in West Africa, in Burundi and even, to a lesser extent, in Chad and the Central African Republic today. Other times, the UN hands over its role to a regional organisation – such as in Bosnia-Herzegovina and planned for Kosovo.

Then, there is parallel deployment. In Kosovo and Afghanistan, United Nations peacekeeping operations consisting only of civilian and police personnel are deployed alongside military forces under the command of a regional organization or a coalition. And finally, with Darfur, the Security Council authorized the deployment of a “hybrid” peacekeeping operation, in which elements from the United Nations and a regional organization are deployed as part of the same mission under joint leadership.

The complexity of managing these arrangements requires constant dialogue - such as the dialogue organized by Challenges in 2008. By meeting each other in less formal settings, and discussing difficult challenges, we can build a platform for future dialogue on the official track. Equally important, this sort of dialogue builds familiarity among those individuals who actually make things happen on the ground or in our various headquarters. The human contacts and understandings built through this sort of dialogue are so often the key to making things work between our respective organizations. It facilitates the real work often being done on the end of a phone late at night – and far away from the name plates, the flags and the grand policy statements of formal meetings between our different organisations.
Challenges Work Programme 2009: Concepts and Doctrine. This year, I am happy to hear that the Challenges Forum will again reprise its close ties with DPKO. We welcome the inputs of your research on the concepts and doctrine that may be needed to support modern multidimensional UN peacekeeping. I have every confidence it will be a useful effort. Without your support through 2007, we would have struggled to run the consultation and expert group sessions that were so necessary to build the DPKO ‘capstone’ doctrine. The generosity of challenges partners to share ideas and to host workshops among peacekeeping experts was an invaluable support.

Focused research that explores the complexities of implementing modern UN mandates and that considers the critical concepts and possible doctrinal approaches for peacekeeping will be a great intellectual contribution. I trust your deliberations in Pennsylvania this week helped to map out a useful research agenda for the coming year and for the upcoming High Level Challenges Forum Meeting in Islamabad in July.

Thank you to the National Defence University in Islamabad for agreeing to host this important event. I am very happy that DPKO will have the opportunity to join Pakistan and the Challenges group this summer in the capital city of our single largest troop contributing partner.

Context. The current operational and political context will of course shape the research agenda. I will provide just some of this backdrop. General Obiakor and later Dmitry Titov and Izumi Nakamitsu will no doubt provide you with additional information of the ongoing and upcoming policy processes here in New York that may relate to your work.

Even though UN peacekeeping has enjoyed a good measure of success in recent years, it has also weathered real setbacks too. We cannot be complacent about the challenges ahead and we must be ready to act on opportunities to improve our collective efforts.

2009 will be a particularly tough year – I have no doubt. We face operational strains across the planet. In the DRC we remain on the brink. In Darfur and Chad we are still scrambling to find the resources to deploy and to overcome the serious impediments in our way. Challenging times lie ahead in Sudan’s North-South peace process. And in Afghanistan, the challenges continue to build. We also face the daunting proposition of an ambitious operation in Somalia where, in and around Mogadishu, we see every day the absence of a peace to keep and a political process still struggling to get traction among the parties. Each of these situations will require constant attention, deft political manoeuvring and determined implementation on the ground.
With the current tempo of our operations worldwide, we fear that a major disaster in any one mission could send shockwaves through other missions - and badly damage the credibility of the UN peacekeeping instrument. The events in DRC late last year have starkly illustrated once more the fragility of our enterprise and the burden of often unrealistic expectations that the UN bears.

But much is going very well also, and we need to build on and protect our successes and find ways to prepare for the future. In 2009, as in years gone by, we have no choice but to continue to sail the boat while we are still building it – even despite entering the more dangerous waters. In saying this, I am borrowing a nautical turn of phrase much used by Jean-Marie Guéhenno to describe the challenge of improving UN peacekeeping while still running it full time at its fastest pace in history.

A time for ideas. Ladies and Gentlemen, last week, before the Security Council, Alain Le Roy said: “2009 needs to be a year of ideas as much as operational success and it needs to be a year of cooperation and problem-solving. The time to begin a revitalized peacekeeping partnership is now.”

Mid-2010 will be the decade anniversary of the Brahimi Report and as such there will surely be a call for a renewed momentum for strengthening UN peacekeeping for future challenges. And we welcome that. We hope that the truly global coalition that makes UN peacekeeping possible will coalesce again around a way to make UN peacekeeping stronger for the challenges that lie ahead. The importance of a global coalition or partnership emerged as a major theme at the Security Council debate last week. It was recognized that for UN peacekeeping to move forward, it must travel with the support and the hard work of four main actors – the Security Council that sets the mandates, the General Assembly that helps define peacekeeping policy and resources the missions, the Troop and police contributors who provide personnel and the UN Secretariat. If these four elements that support peacekeeping do not stand in unison, then we may stumble and even fall.

As we mobilize this support, we need new ideas to strengthen the institution and to form a common vision for modern UN peacekeeping operations. We must be asking where peacekeeping works and where it does not? What is our core business and our comparative advantage? And how do we do our part as best we can? And this is where you come in - by helping to generating the new research and new ideas about how to build that future vision for effective and resilient UN peacekeeping.

Today, we have many dozens of mandate tasks assigned to our modern operations. Some would argue perhaps too many. As a department, we must find ways to face the implementation challenges of those mandates. Through our doctrine
and training efforts, through our mission planning processes and through the selection of the best possible senior leaders we hope to provide useful strategic level support to our operations.

But – very importantly – we then seek to provide our colleagues in the field with the operational space and the necessary political support to deal with their fast moving challenges in the field. Every mission will of course respond differently based on the unique context it finds itself in and based on the constellation of leadership personalities and resources that it is provided.

At headquarters, we must therefore tread a fine line to balance as we draw on past and current knowledge to learn lessons and find good practices. We must do so without ordaining how things must be in fundamentally different settings. What we call peacekeeping doctrine must at all times remain useful and flexible for our field personnel. The doctrinal starting point for DPKO is the Principles and Guidelines for UN Peacekeeping document, which I know you are all familiar with. This was our effort to establish a common vision for ourselves in the Secretariat. It is a document that we use to help prepare our personnel preparing for the field and it presents lessons and principles that help guide us toward more effective UN peacekeeping. Our doctrine feeds training for the new generation of peacekeepers and it provides us with a point of departure for our operations. But we must always recall that, once deployed, it is the team of field based commanders who will carry the day.

I should note that in collecting the lessons of the past and the present, and in laying down plans for the future, DPKO has no monopoly on ideas. Far from it. Your access to research methodologies, your access to diverse academic and policy opinion, and your convening power and resources to bring together experts from the field helps feed into our own thinking forward and enrich it. These are some of the reasons that make the Challenges partnership so important to DPKO.

The Challenges Forum is a unique resource for DPKO to draw upon. It brings together supportive colleagues so that we can engage in open and frank debate about how to make Peacekeeping better. It is a forum that brings researchers and practitioners together. It brings government actors and non-government actors together. It brings a diversity of opinions together. And it does this in a much less political space than the official world we live in here in New York. This is a formula for lively debate and for creativity.

In DPKO, we look forward to hearing from you all as your work progresses into 2010. I have no doubt it will be another stimulating year of research and discus-
It is indeed an honour to be invited to address this international forum on the challenges facing United Nations peace operations in an ever complex and changing world. Let me start by making a reference to the July 1992 report on “Agenda for Peace”. In that report, the then Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali gave the first indications on the future of United Nations Peacekeeping. He highlighted “the global transition of peacekeeping operation marked by uniquely contradictory trends. Social peace is challenged on the one hand by new assertions of discrimination and exclusion and, on the other, by acts of terrorism seeking to undermine evolution and change through democratic means”.

This statement cannot be more appropriate than now. We have gone through a period of marked departure from traditional peacekeeping, a technique that expands the possibilities for both prevention of conflict and making of peace, to a more complex dimension of peacekeeping, with no peace to keep at all and more often, with no consent of belligerents involved.

In the first four decades of peacekeeping until 1988, UN deployed 18 traditional peacekeeping missions under Chapter VI of the UN Charter which were guided by the core doctrinal values including consent of parties, impartiality and non-use of force except in self defence. The peacekeeping, before the end of cold war, thus focused on containment to provide space and conducive environment for negotiations to seek resolution of conflicts through political mediation, helped by third parties where possible.

The mid 1990s were the years of internal reflection for the UN to understand peacekeeping and its complex political, humanitarian and military dimensions. This period also witnessed the departure of some developed and developing countries from UN peacekeeping, and therefore the departure of some of the valuable capacities to launch and sustain complex military-centric peacekeeping operations.

In the context of the August 2000 report of the High Level Panel on UN Peace Operations, recommendations were made for wide ranging structural reforms including call for troops to be deployed more rapidly in peace enforcement opera-
tions and underlined that “No amount of good intentions can substitute for the fundamental ability to project credible force”.

This report actually laid the basis for consideration of UN robust peacekeeping operations. Robustness, in generic terms, can be defined as credible military actions and where necessary the use of applicable force, by well equipped troops, to fulfil missions mandate and defend themselves against armed spoilers. The necessity of a robust mandate has been born out of increasing atrocities and mass killing of civilians by parties to a conflict. This more muscular form of peace operations can however not be effective without a robust mandate translating into robust concept of operations and rules of engagement for operational commanders on the ground. Most mandates are quite ambiguous in interpretation and not until recently.

While it is true that several missions operate on the UN Chapter VII mandate, the mandate partly defines what task should be carried out but a lot depends on how that mandate is actively interpreted on the ground. It is said, that capability plus clear direction synthesized from the concept of operations translate into actualization of the mandate.

Many challenges lie ahead. This morning, I would like to highlight just a few. The Security Council has been tasking the UN to deploy where there is “no peace to keep” as in Darfur and likely Somalia; to deal robustly with spoilers as in the DRC and aggressively protect civilians and humanitarian workers. What are the implications of this robust mandate? Capability and capacities – quality of troops and application of necessary technologies; but we have an out-dated procedure of inducting peacekeeping troops – concerning logistics support; and there is a magnitude of expectations.

We are facing an increasing demand to provide protection to civilians in mission areas. I am certain that you are aware that we are often constrained in our resources, which makes this task a major challenge. First and foremost, this task - the protection of civilians - must be understood by all stakeholders. How much can and should we do given the resource allocation, robustness, mobility, training, etc.

We would like to develop a concept that will allow us to act in a more convincing and collective manner. This could be of particular interest to the Challenge Group and perhaps it would consider contributing to our formulation of concepts by providing documents and a forum for discussion.

Ladies and Gentlemen, all these tasks require certain capabilities in terms of early warning mechanisms, ability to react or respond swiftly and as appropriate and
the willingness of Member States to commit troops and resources. We need to understand the requirements of modern peacekeeping, the doctrine to ensure common approach and the pre-deployment education and training associated with modern peacekeeping. Has our training kept pace with the increasing demand of modern peacekeeping?

In this context, identifying new contributors, building on existing contributors capacity in terms of force enablers and multipliers backed by a sound training and logistics support is the greatest means of delivering effective operations. The protection of civilian task is hugely daunting as experience in the DRC has shown. It is a collective responsibility that can only be achieved by maximizing partnership capacities amongst Member States to strengthen international peace and security.

Finally, I cannot but ask whether all Member States clearly understood what the Security Council wants the UN force to do. If they do, have they thought through the implications of engagement in robust peacekeeping. For a UN force to operate effectively, the political will must exist to contribute the necessary force requirement, to avoid caveats on deployments and force usage, and to allow flexibility on the employment of troops to actualize the robust mandate.

I commend the initiative of the organizers and sponsors of this forum; my office, DPKO’s Office of Military Affairs, has already been thinking of what to expect when implementing robust mandates from the Security Council. Indeed, we have approached some countries for support and by May this year – provided we succeed in securing the required funds from donors - we will hold a conference aimed at discussing robust peacekeeping.

The focus will be on military aspects, including conceptual and operational issues, as well as equipment and training. How do we conceptualise a military doctrine to move this forward; and how do we overcome the challenge of inter-operability in the areas of communication and intelligence.

In an attempt to prevent national caveats from affecting the utilization of resources placed at the disposal of a Force Commander in a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation, our intention is to target the real players concerned with the implementation of a mandate to execute specific tasks. We are planning to invite high level military experts from TCCs entrusted with great responsibilities, key personnel from selected peacekeeping missions, experts, and, possibly, organizations that may be able and willing to contribute their views and experiences.

I am very pleased to learn that, over the past few days at the workshop in Carlisle, the Challenge Group, one of our most valuable supporting structures, has in fact
expressed an interest to engage in work that would assist us in overcoming some of the key challenges we face today. I understand that you have even developed a draft roadmap to ensure that certain deadlines are met this summer and next year.

This initiative is indeed welcome and I look forward to examining your proposals to strengthen peacekeeping. I also look forward to continuing this fruitful and constructive dialogue, and would like to take this opportunity to emphasize the importance of an ongoing exchange with OMA Policy and Doctrine Team, which could be further strengthened. Thank you.

Concluding Remarks

Speaker: Mr. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Senior Adviser, International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations / Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution and Centre on International Cooperation

A meeting like the one we are having today is important because it reflects the best of peacekeeping. When you look around this table, you have men and women from very different countries, different political perspectives, and different levels of wealth. We come from countries that in some cases, if they are not at war with each other, at least do not have the best of relations. They all have one thing in common, however, they care about UN peacekeeping. For me, UN peacekeeping represents the one activity in the world where the world comes together, at a time when you increasingly see countries wanting to be with likeminded countries, and where diversity is being paid tribute to in a rhetorical manner, but not always in practice. This is one of the great assets of UN peacekeeping in addition to all the other qualities, including the fundamental aspect of legitimacy that universality brings with it. Legitimacy is a major part of a success in any political process after a conflict and especially a civil conflict. If we want that consensus around this table to go beyond rhetoric, we have to address hard substantive issues in order to forge a truly common understanding of what we can expect of UN peacekeeping.

Recently I reread the Brahimi Report and I was struck by how this document stands the test of time. There are of course some parts of the Report, which have been overtaken by events; for example, this morning we discussed issues of police and rule of law. There is still much to be done, but at the same time, we have gone beyond the vision and the recommendations of the Brahimi Report.

In other areas this is not the case. You recall for instance, the Brahimi Panel proposed that the Security Council should adopt resolutions in two steps: first a
framework resolution, and then the empowering resolution, once the troops have been lined up. In the Report, we have the sentence “to deploy a partial force, incapable of solidifying a fragile peace would first raise and then dash the hopes of a population engulfed in conflict or recovering from war, and damage the credibility of the United Nations as a whole”. I can think of a couple of situations, in the past two years or recently, where that sentence applies. So the Brahimi Panel Report is not overtaken by events in this regard. The issues of how to take decisions and what are the limits of peacekeeping are very much the background of the Brahimi Report. Frankly, I sometimes feel that we are going backward rather than forward with these issues. The trends and the challenges identified by the Brahimi Report, are very much there. There has been a huge effort by the United Nations with the support of the Member States, with your support, to strengthen the instruments of peacekeeping, but the political issues that underpin the success of peacekeeping are still with us and have become, if anything, more complex.

As our colleague from South Africa was saying a moment ago, we are more and more confronted with conflict where there is no peace to keep. We work in a grey area where conflicts in principle have subsided. There is a peace agreement, but it is a fragile peace agreement, and so the missions become more complex, more dangerous and politically more ambitious. As Rupert Smith, a British General who wrote a book that I think everyone interested in peacekeeping should read, stated about the utility of force: more and more force is not there “to produce a clear end state” as the military like to say, but to create the condition that would lead to an end state, which is very different and much more complex.

I would first like to say a few words on this evolving context, which is the background to the situation in which we operate. There has been an important increase in risks. I was very glad to hear my compatriot, the French Ambassador, stressing the importance of decision making in the Council. I was thinking of the present public discussion that exists in an area very different from peacekeeping, the financial area, where everyone wonders today how we got into the colossal mess of world economic crisis. In finance as in peacekeeping, when something goes wrong, it is easy to focus on technicalities such as rating agencies or prudential ratios, but in the financial crisis, it is striking that the single most important factor is not technical but structural: the banks that were making the loans stopped carrying those loans on their books. They passed them on to various vehicles, and that made the banks more relaxed under the conditions which they would make loans.

I would not want the Security Council to become a victim of a similar structural flaw, by following the practice that has led banks to bankruptcy. When a mission is authorized it has to be carried on the book, it has to be followed up by the
Council. It is a very dangerous situation if mandates that are riskier and riskier are decided upon without participating in the risk, which is what happened to banks, with great damage. You do not want that to happen in the field of peace and security.

We have a structural issue regarding how the burden of peacekeeping is shared, and that is an area where this Forum is very important, because if one cares about UN peacekeeping one has to be comfortable in UN peacekeeping. Let us discuss the conditions under which countries, all countries, including the ones that have the most resources, are comfortable to be involved in UN peacekeeping. Nothing is new there, I quote not from the Brahimi Report, but from the Implementation Report that the Secretary General issued in October 2000, which says that “the performance of the United Nations in peacekeeping will not improve unless Member States, and in particularly those possessing the greatest capacity and means to do so, are ready to participate with soldiers, police officers and civilian experts”. The reference to armies from countries possessing the greatest capacities is often mention in connection with the traditional slowness of UN deployments. It is quite true that there are a handful of armies in the world that can deploy troops at short notice. That is how the reinforcement of the Lebanese operation could happen very quickly under the UN flag. Most armies do not have that capacity, however, and combining support and troops is an extremely complex endeavor, where rules and regulations can be improved. I think a lot can be done but at the end of the day you have the fundamental issue of the capacities of the contributing nations, including the capacities to deploy quickly. At the same time, the participation of armies from countries with the greatest capacities has broader political implications.

The issue of risk, and how you factor in risk in the decision to authorize a mission, is more than a technical issue; it is a question of how you share the burden. There is nothing that focuses the mind on risk more than knowing that you will be the one taking the risk. For the troop contributors it is not easy to explain to the public opinion at home that they are taking casualties in a place, which is far away and where the strategic necessity is not necessarily self-evident. If we are deploying missions with greater risk, we have to be convinced that the risks are worth taking otherwise we should not deploy those missions. We should not think that there will be a set of countries that will be prepared to take the risks while others will not. The real issue is how much risk you are prepared to take, and be honest about it.

In the new complex operations, the end state is not clear and many of the missions are no longer about patrolling a cease fire line, or about separating two well-formed and accountable armies; it is what Rupert Smith called “the war amongst people”. For the host country, it raises a whole set of political questions. Peace-
keeping today is a much more intrusive concept, and that is another reason why it is important to have a united international community. Selective engagement raises a suspicion that it is not a UN agenda, but rather an agenda of a particular set of countries.

UN peace operations would be in a much stronger position, politically and operationally, if all continents were represented in most operations. We need to recognize that we currently have a context that raises unprecedented challenges. If we are not prepared to work hard for a unity of visions and then a unity in sharing the risks of that vision, the present deal that underpins peacekeeping will not endure and will leave us with more and more problems.

Now let us turn to some practical considerations of the implications of this new phase that we have entered as far as peacekeeping operations are concerned. I will focus on two sets of issues, one is the implications for what I would call, for a lack of a better word, “the orchestration”. That is if we recognize that a peacekeeping operation today is about harnessing a range of instruments: the military, the police, the political ingenuity, development instruments in support of a political strategy to consolidate peace where the military is an instrument among others of that strategy, which raises all sort of issues. For example, how to orchestrate that effort to maximize effectiveness? Frankly, this is an issue for the UN but is also an issue for the world. When you see the discussions in NATO on how to operate in Afghanistan, you see that this is a problem that is before us, it is not a problem of only one particular organization, but of every country in the world involved in peace operations.

Let me say a few words on the military side of the issue. I was happy that the question on the chain of command was raised this morning. It is a very difficult question which has several aspects to it. It is a question of the balance between what you need to do at the strategic level and what you need to do at the theatre level, and the answer is not self evident. I personally think that the UN, by having to reconcile at the theatre level, the political and the military, is closer to the right answer than NATO or the EU. I would certainly not say that the UN has all the answers, far from it. This is an area where much more work needs to be done.

I would like to come back to the question of the strategic level and the theatre level. I was listening very carefully to the discussion this morning and what is striking is that in the very fluid situations in which now peacekeeping operations are deployed you need a very strong strategic vision. The guidance that is coming from the Security Council is often based on political expediency: at times there are real differences within the international community, or merely intellectual laziness.
The political guidance may not have the clarity required. When I talk about the political vision, one must not, again in relation to the military, make the mistake of just saying that the military planning was not detailed enough. The reality is that the military response is as good as the political questions that the political side asks the military to answer. What is often lacking is a clear question: what do we expect in a particular situation from the military force? When the question is unclear, because the political side is unclear on what it really wants, it becomes very difficult for the military to provide a good answer.

The “protection of civilians” is a nice concept, developed in reaction to the tragedies of the 1990s, but it is not a strategic guidance if you are serious about it. In a shaky place you need resources that not just the UN but that the world cannot usually afford. You need to prioritize, you need to have a strategy and eventually, to really protect civilians. It is not strategic guidance to say “protect civilians in danger”, and mitigate it with all sorts of caveats that recognize the reality that you cannot give any kind of blanket protection. If one wants to make progress at the strategic level, the progress is not just in beefing up military headquarters at the strategic level, it is rather in strengthening the interaction between the military and the political side. We are gravely mistaken to think otherwise, in my personal view.

At the same time, as one looks at that issue, one has to be honest about it. And I was pleased to see an experienced general like Rupert Smith recognizing this. A lot of tactical decisions today have strategic implications. A lot of decisions made at the company level, if not at the platoon level, may have strategic implications.

When you are challenged at a checkpoint established by militia, do you force your way through or not? It depends on the circumstances – sometimes it would be the right thing to do, sometimes it would not be. It is not going to be in the concept of operations. If a village has been burnt, is it good to go right after those who have burnt that village, or is it better to hit hard at the headquarters of the militia that is behind the group that hit the village? Sometimes it is better to go after those who destroyed the village; sometimes it is better to go at another target. It is a complicated issue, which is not going to be managed at the strategic level, which is not going to be managed at some intermediate operations headquarters, which has to be managed in the field, with proper consideration of the political guidance given in theatre.

This brings me to the other very difficult issue in command and control, which is the interaction between the military and the civilian elements of the mission. I am deeply convinced that it is very dangerous when the civilians begin to pretend to be Generals. I am also very happy to hear someone like Rupert Smith, again an
impeccable General, saying: “What I lacked when I was in Bosnia was that I did not have enough political guidance”. There is a cliché that all the politicians are going to meddle with the military operations. The military is in fact too much on its own, “do your best” is the motto. That is asking too much. We have to think through those delicate issues. The balance needs to be found between, what comes from the strategic level, with more clarity on the strategic vision. And the recognition that a host of very critical issues will have to be managed at the theatre level, that the military and the police interface with the political leadership need to be part of a political strategy. Do we have the answers to that?

We have the beginning of answers. I am one who believes that empowering the head of a mission is a good format. You need to have the right person in that position, with the right preparation, and with the right team but having said that, you have not answered the whole question. It is necessary to be much more specific and precise on the chain of command, how for instance a head of office in a remote part of Congo will interact with the military element deployed in the area. All those things and details need to be sorted out. You see an organization like NATO trying to sort it out in Afghanistan. The UN has to sort it out. I think the UN is closer to the answer, but I recognize that it is tricky and it involves a lot of hard work.

I have not mentioned an issue that was discussed this morning, and is very pertinent for the orchestration of the military effort, the whole question of caveats. One needs to find a balance, where the effort of the international community is not a juxtaposition of national efforts. On the military side it can lead to a dramatic weakening of the effectiveness of force, and it is a weakening of the effort more generally. At the same time, Member States do not want UN headquarters to be a black box that they do not understand. It is important to find the right balance between a measure of ownership of the mission, so that the Member States when they contribute to a mission have a sense that it is their mission, but at the same time that the UN does not lose its grip on the mission. It is a delicate balance to strike, but a fundamental one.

On the civilian side, there are also enormous issues when it comes to orchestration. We do not like to define priorities. Too often, the resolutions of the Security Council look like Christmas trees with a whole set of issues. The reality is that there are not resources for everything, and how do you prioritize, how do you integrate perspectives that follow different logic? As was said this morning, the logic of development is not a political logic. But if you don’t have political success, I mean if you do not have shorter mid-term success, you will not have long term development either. So you need to fix short term if you want to be able to have long term. And so you need to harness the resources for that, and we are not par-
particularly good at that. In the UN system, and among Member States, it is a collection of efforts rather than really a truly integrated effort, because it requires a discipline that does not exist, and where the leaders of the discipline do not exist. Orchestration is enormously difficult.

Now, what are the implications of the new situation in which we find ourselves, on resources? I would say there are implications for the military forces, the police and the civilian capacities. For the military, as we reflect on the application of force, I think we have to go for more mobility. We need more situational awareness, more intelligence and we have to make strategic use of force, when force is used. We have inherited, from earlier phases of peacekeeping, a very static way of deploying forces, which is partly habit and partly necessity.

To be mobile you have to have the assets of mobility, which are in short supply. Certainly one has to think of more mobile force, quick reaction forces that can apply force in a very fluid manner, depending on the evolution of a fluid situation. The question of logistics is there. How do you combine the civilian logistics with the high tempo of a military operation? This is why you need the measure of military assets and procedures that prioritize military operations in situations that are warranted. There has been some progress made in the DPKO but more can be done. At the end of the day it requires a range of forces that is presently not made available at the UN. We find on the operational side the same conclusions that I reach from a political- and risk management angle when I look at what decisions are made.

On police and rule of law, and in a way it is a good transition to civilian capacities, we see how difficult it is to get the right quality as our tasks become more complex. You can be a good police officer in your own national setting; it is quite another challenge to transfer knowledge and to help others build structures. It is a much greater challenge for which you need to be prepared, trained and vetted. How does the UN reinforce its capacity to identify the right people, and then to prepare them for the job? This is a considerable challenge where much more needs to be done.

This brings me to the issue of civilian capacities. Here, frankly, I think that the UN Secretariat has bitten off probably more than it could chew, in the sense that with the enormous expansion of peacekeeping, the United Nations Secretariat has had to recruit thousands of staff in an ever-increasing range of specialties. It is not just the traditional specialties with logistics, administration, but also rule of law offices, a variety of civil affairs, a variety of capacities, for which it is very difficult to identify the right profile. And this is typically an area where we probably need to see how we can strike again the right balance between the ownership by Member States, and at the same time the solid authority of the United Nations.
I do not think it is a good formula to delegate whole sectors of actions to Member States. You would lose the coherence of the mission and you take some risks if things do not work out well. At the same time you need to create a greater sense of responsibilities in the provision of expertise to the United Nations. One part of it is to create a cadre of professionals, and I am glad that some progress has been made in that direction. Additionally you can enter into partnerships with Member States, and develop more solid vetting procedures, of training centres and courses.

At the end of the day, I would say that when peacekeeping was first developed, the strategic challenge for most Member States was the possibility of war on their soil. They could be attacked, and so the whole country was geared with reserves and with capacity to mobilize forces. This was seen as a fundamental strategic issue.

If we recognize that helping consolidate fragile peace in states that have been broken by conflict is a strategic issue, then we have to think through how the internal organization of our Member States and the contributing nations, has to be affected. If we say that it is important to help those broken countries get back up on their feet, it cannot be an afterthought. You have to review the internal organization of the civil service and you have to provide for the possibility that some civil servants will spend maybe a year in their career doing precisely that kind of work. I was struck, when I was running DPKO, at how good the international community is at sending experts, but you need more than experts. Let us say you have a broken customs post in Congo, you do not need an expert on customs to write a report on customs, you need someone who can spend six months or a year, transferring knowledge to make it work. That person has to have the experience in doing it, not writing on it. A person with those skills can be very difficult to find because we are not organized for that. I take that little example, but it is the typical weakness we face with the very ambitious task that we have given ourselves.

Let me conclude on one critical point, which in a way sums up everything that I have said. We are committing, we the Member States of the UN, tens of thousands of people to UN missions. That is a lot of people. Sometimes we are committing them to fairly risky environments. We are trying to make a difference for millions of people, tens of millions of people, when you think of the many missions that the UN has deployed. This is a huge effort that is being made and it costs several billion USD. I come back to what we were discussing earlier with regards to UN peacekeeping or no UN peacekeeping. That effort is considerable, in human terms, in financial terms, and in reputation terms for the United Nations. We have to be serious about it. Either we are doing it because we think it is important to be seen to be doing something, or we do it because we think it is strategic to make a difference in the places where we are deployed. If it is the first answer, then I have not
much to say because it would be more for public relations people than for substantive people to deal with the issue. If it is the second answer, if we really want to make a difference, then we have to ask the hard questions. We have to recognize that this is going to be very tough, it is going to cost money, it will involve valuable people, valuable troops and valuable assets. If we do it half way, we will fail. I would rather see the Security Council authorizing fewer missions, but if it authorizes a mission, see the full implications of that authorization. Just like a bank when it makes a loan, should see through that the loan is paid, and not pass the loan to some special investment vehicle hoping for the best and booking the short-term profit. That is a dangerous way to run business; it has led us to disasters in the economic sphere.

In the area of peace and security, it is essential, if we recognize the importance of the instrument of peacekeeping, that we measure the risk, measure the magnitude of the involvement and size our involvement to the capacities that we are prepared to put behind that involvement. If we do not, we will be in trouble. This is why I look forward to having a discussion in Islamabad, because it is very important for a key troop contributor like Pakistan, that we come to terms on those fundamental issues. I have mentioned a number of very practical things. If some Member States are not comfortable with peacekeeping, we have to discuss honestly our concerns, but not pretend that we are going to continue peacekeeping and just hide the real issues under the table. Thank you.
Annex 1

Partner Organizations

Argentina: The Argentine Armed Forces Joint Staff and CAECOPAZ (in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
CAECOPAZ, Puerta 4 – Campo de Mayo, 1659 Buenos Aires, Argentina
Phone/Fax: +54 11 4666 3448

Australia: Asia Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence (in cooperation with Australian Defence Organization)
Level 1, 34 Lowe St, 2620, Queanbeyan, NSW, Australia
Phone: +61 2 6160 2201, Fax: +61 2 6297 9072

Canada: Pearson Peacekeeping Centre
P.O. Box 100, Clementsport, Nova Scotia, B0S 1E0, Canada
Phone: +1902 638 8040, Fax: +1902 638 3344

China: China Institute for International Strategic Studies (in cooperation with the Ministry of National Defence)
No. 6 Hua Yan Bei Li, Chaoyang District, Beijing 100029, P.O Box 9812, China
Phone: +86 10 62916943, Fax: +86 10 62021048

France: Ministry of Defence, Policy and Strategic Affairs Department
1, place Saint-Thomas d’Aquin, 75007, Paris, France
Phone: +33 1 42 19 38 02, Fax: +33 1 42 19 45 26
Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, United Nations and International Organizations Department: 37, Quai d’Orsay, 75700 Paris 07 SP, Paris, France
Phone: +33 1 43 17 53 53, Fax : +33 1 47 05 27 39

India: United Service Institution of India
Tula Ram marg, Post Bag 6, Vasant Vihar, 110057 New Delhi, India
Phone: +11 91 11 614 6849, Fax: +11 91 11 614 9773

Japan: Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Kasumigaseki 2 2 1, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo, 100 8919, Japan
Phone: +81 3 3580 3311, Fax: +81 33591 4914

Jordan: Institute of Diplomacy
P.O. Box 850 747, Amman, 111 85, Jordan
Phone: +9626 593 4400, Fax: +9626 593 4408
Nigeria: National Defence College (in cooperation with Nigerian Army, Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
Herberg Macaulay Way (North) Central Area, PMB 323 Abuja, Nigeria
Phone: +234 09 234 0644, Fax: +234-9-2345939

Pakistan: National Defence University (in cooperation with Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence)
Sector E-9, 44200 Islamabad, Pakistan
Phone: +92 51 926 0651, Fax: +92 51 926 1040

Russian Federation: Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
119992, Moscow, Ostozhenka street, 53/2, Russian Federation
Phone: +7 495 246 1844, Fax: +7 495 244 1878

South Africa: Institute for Security Studies
P.O. Box 1787, Brooklyn Sq, 0075 Pretoria, South Africa
Phone: +27 12 346 9500, Fax: +27 12 460 998

Sweden: Folke Bernadotte Academy (coordinators and in cooperation with the Armed Forces, National Police Board, National Prison and Probation Service and National Defence College)
Drottning Kristinas Väg 37/Box 270 68 S-102 51 Stockholm, Sweden
Phone: +46 612 823 00, Fax: +46 612 823 99

Turkey: Centre for Strategic Research of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (in cooperation with National Police Force, Armed Forces and the University of Bilkent)
Kirçiçegi Sk. 8/3 06700, G.O.P., Ankara, Turkey
Phone: +90 312 446 04 35, Fax: +90 312 445 05 84

United Kingdom: Foreign and Commonwealth Office (in cooperation with the Ministry of Defence and the Department for International Development)
King Charles Street, London UK, SW1A2AH, UK
Phone: +44 20 7008 1500, Fax: +44 207 008 3910

United States: United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (in cooperation with United States Institute of Peace)
Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA 17013-5049, USA
Phone: +1 717 245 3722, Fax: +1 717 245 3279
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family Name</th>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abd Alaziz</td>
<td>Alaa</td>
<td>Head of Program</td>
<td>FFE, CCPA</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdalhaleem</td>
<td>Mohammad</td>
<td>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aga</td>
<td>Naim</td>
<td>Force Commander</td>
<td>Polish Mission to the UN</td>
<td>Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anderes</td>
<td>Jonas</td>
<td>Colleague Air Force</td>
<td>Facility Mission of the Republic of the Sudan</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azzam</td>
<td>David</td>
<td>Military Advisor</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of the Ivory Coast to the UN</td>
<td>Ivory Coast to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmad</td>
<td>Jacques</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation</td>
<td>Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Axellson</td>
<td>Bengt</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boconi</td>
<td>Jean</td>
<td>Head</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baudoin</td>
<td>Carlos</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>International Consultant</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bavaud</td>
<td>Caroline</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the UN</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belhov</td>
<td>Serge-Alexandre</td>
<td>Military Adviser</td>
<td>Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Federation</td>
<td>Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berganil</td>
<td>Yves</td>
<td>Advisor</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bergman</td>
<td>Krystina</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biglar</td>
<td>Sylvie</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bitel</td>
<td>Rosal</td>
<td>Deputy-in-Charge of Relations with Armed Forces</td>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boullet</td>
<td>Alain</td>
<td>Director-General</td>
<td>Embassy of Bulgaria in France</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boulva</td>
<td>Corine</td>
<td>Head, International Relations</td>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bourlet</td>
<td>Pierre</td>
<td>Head, International Relations</td>
<td>Conference Bureau</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brache de Caula</td>
<td>Juan</td>
<td>Head, International Relations</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Briquen</td>
<td>Rudi</td>
<td>Director, Strategic Affairs and Security</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brius</td>
<td>Carmen</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carlsson</td>
<td>Martin</td>
<td>Head</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catana</td>
<td>Vincen</td>
<td>Head</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catena</td>
<td>Marina</td>
<td>Head</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

List of Participants Paris Challenges Forum 2008

Challenges of Peace   338

09-10-14   10.53.20
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chantal</td>
<td>Chastenay</td>
<td>Political Counsellor</td>
<td>Embassy of Canada in France</td>
<td>Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David</td>
<td>Chuter</td>
<td>Independent Consultant</td>
<td>United States Institute of Peace</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard</td>
<td>Coleman</td>
<td>Director Doctrine Development</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yvan</td>
<td>Conoir</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Peace Operations Training Institute</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hélène</td>
<td>Dieck</td>
<td>Project Director, CICDE</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghislaine</td>
<td>Doucet</td>
<td>Legal Advisor</td>
<td>ACCORD and NUIP</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emmanuelle</td>
<td>De Coning</td>
<td>Senior Military Advisor</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Ireland to the UN</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael</td>
<td>de Bustamante</td>
<td>Desk of United Nations Issues, DGE-I</td>
<td>General Secretariat of the European Union</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cedric</td>
<td>De Carvalho</td>
<td>Research Fellow</td>
<td>Norwegian peace Institute (NUPI)</td>
<td>Norway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sophie</td>
<td>De Daruval</td>
<td>Research Assistant</td>
<td>United States Institute of Peace</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rafael</td>
<td>De Ducarme</td>
<td>Research Fellow</td>
<td>Organization for Security Studies (ISS)</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Codic</td>
<td>De Haynin de bry</td>
<td>Senior Research Fellow</td>
<td>Embassy of the United Kingdom in France</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gay</td>
<td>De Korne</td>
<td>External Relations DG</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krisin</td>
<td>De Leonordv</td>
<td>Deputy Director, Policy and Strategic Affairs</td>
<td>United States Institute of Peace</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Julius</td>
<td>Desjardins</td>
<td>Head, External Relations</td>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrick</td>
<td>Deck</td>
<td>Project Director, CICDE</td>
<td>United Nations Peacekeeping Operations</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilene</td>
<td>Dusset</td>
<td>Legal Advisor</td>
<td>United States Institute of Peace</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renata</td>
<td>Dwan</td>
<td>Program Officer</td>
<td>United Nations Peacekeeping Operations</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael</td>
<td>Drdzic</td>
<td>Political Adviser</td>
<td>Voice</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael</td>
<td>El Banhawy</td>
<td>Security Advisor</td>
<td>Embassy of the United Kingdom in France</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xavier</td>
<td>Eloyi</td>
<td>Researcher</td>
<td>Embassy of the United Kingdom to the UN</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohamed</td>
<td>El Bannawy</td>
<td>Ambassador (ret.)</td>
<td>United States Institute of Peace</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stig</td>
<td>Elvanor</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>United States Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean-Marie</td>
<td>Fardou</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>United States Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert</td>
<td>Fendler</td>
<td>First Secretary</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Ireland to the UN</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William</td>
<td>Flavin</td>
<td>Director, Doctrine and Training</td>
<td>United States Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Name</td>
<td>First Name</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ford</td>
<td>Elise</td>
<td>Humanitarian Policy Advisor</td>
<td>OXFAM International</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frias</td>
<td>Julio</td>
<td>Military Attaché</td>
<td>Embassy of Chile in France</td>
<td>Chile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Froholm</td>
<td>Anne Kjersti</td>
<td>Senior Adviser</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>Norway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furio</td>
<td>Aldine</td>
<td>Head, Campaigns</td>
<td>Crisis Action</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gallien</td>
<td>Pierre</td>
<td>Director, Missions</td>
<td>Solidarités</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gasparic</td>
<td>Jure</td>
<td>Minister Plenipotentiary</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>Slovenia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgiou</td>
<td>Charis</td>
<td>Military Attaché</td>
<td>Embassy of Cyprus in France</td>
<td>Cyprus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgiou</td>
<td>Christakis</td>
<td>Officer, Defence Policy Department</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
<td>Cyprus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giacomini</td>
<td>Marc</td>
<td>Deputy Director, United Nations and International Organizations Department</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gislesen</td>
<td>Kirsten</td>
<td>Policy Advisor</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
<td>Norway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gordon</td>
<td>Robert</td>
<td>Fmr Force Commander, UNMEE / Senior Adviser</td>
<td>Folke Bernadotte Academy</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gorenc</td>
<td>Pavlina</td>
<td>Senior Adviser, ESDP</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
<td>Slovenia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gour</td>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>Political Affairs Attaché</td>
<td>Embassy of Canada in France</td>
<td>Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gourlay</td>
<td>Catriona</td>
<td>Research Fellow</td>
<td>UNIDIR</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gout</td>
<td>Frédéric</td>
<td>Desk Officer, United Nations and International Organizations Department</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gowan</td>
<td>Richard</td>
<td>Associate Director for Policy</td>
<td>Centre on International Cooperation, New York University</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grousselas</td>
<td>Camille</td>
<td>Desk Officer, Department for International Cooperation</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guillon</td>
<td>Raphaëlle</td>
<td>Officer, Civilian Crisis Management</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinard</td>
<td>Nicolas</td>
<td>Consultant</td>
<td>International Centre for Transitional Justice</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hadman</td>
<td>Elise</td>
<td>Chargée de Mission Coopération Extérieure</td>
<td>European Inter-Regional Space</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hart</td>
<td>Kate</td>
<td>First Secretary</td>
<td>Embassy of the United Kingdom in France</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haugevik</td>
<td>Kristin M.</td>
<td>Research Fellow</td>
<td>NUP</td>
<td>Norway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hayashi</td>
<td>Tatsuro</td>
<td>Deputy Director, International Peace Cooperation Division</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilhelm</td>
<td>Heintz</td>
<td>Political Counsellor</td>
<td>Embassy of Germany in France</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heiss</td>
<td>Hubert</td>
<td>Ambassador</td>
<td>Embassy of Austria in France</td>
<td>Austria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heller</td>
<td>Claude</td>
<td>Head</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Mexico to the UN</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hilding Norberg</td>
<td>Annika</td>
<td>International Coordinator, Challenges Forum</td>
<td>Folke Bernadotte Academy</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holmes</td>
<td>John</td>
<td>Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holmlund</td>
<td>Jörgen</td>
<td>Head of International Missions</td>
<td>Swedish Police</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunter</td>
<td>Gill</td>
<td>Research Analyst</td>
<td>Embassy of the United Kingdom in France</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hutton</td>
<td>Lauren</td>
<td>Researcher, Security Sector Governance</td>
<td>Institute for Security Studies</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huynen</td>
<td>Paul</td>
<td>Deputy Chief, Mission/Minister Plenipotentiary</td>
<td>Embassy of Belgium in France</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Name</td>
<td>First Name</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iwama</td>
<td>Takaya</td>
<td>Second Secretary</td>
<td>Embassy of Japan in France</td>
<td>Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacob</td>
<td>Margarete</td>
<td>Policy Analysis Trainee</td>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>OECD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jardin</td>
<td>Alice</td>
<td>Project Officer</td>
<td>Handicap International</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joana</td>
<td>Pierre-Michel</td>
<td>Special Advisor of the EU Secretary-General High Representative for African peacekeeping capabilities / Fmr Commander of EUSEC in the DRC</td>
<td>General Secretariat of the European Council</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johansson</td>
<td>Ulf R</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, Doctrine and Concepts</td>
<td>Swedish Armed Forces</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson</td>
<td>Agneta</td>
<td>Project Manager, European Union and United Nations Affairs</td>
<td>Swedish Prison and Probation Service</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnston</td>
<td>Alexander</td>
<td>AD European Union and France, Directorate for Policy, International Organizations</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kanerva</td>
<td>Heli</td>
<td>Deputy Director, Security Policy and Crisis Management</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>Finland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kardos</td>
<td>John</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>United States Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keane</td>
<td>Rory</td>
<td>Administrator</td>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>OECD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kelly</td>
<td>Mike</td>
<td>Parliamentary Secretary for Defence Support</td>
<td>Parliament of Australia</td>
<td>Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kissam</td>
<td>Elizabeth</td>
<td>Special Assistant of the Assistant Secretary-General Rule of Law and Security Institutions</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klucky</td>
<td>Pavel</td>
<td>Head, Non Proliferation Unit</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kolb</td>
<td>Gisela</td>
<td>Policy Adviser</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kouzmanov</td>
<td>Krassi</td>
<td>Chief Expert</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kraft</td>
<td>Herman Joseph</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
<td>Institute for Strategic Studies, University of the Philippines</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krawinkler</td>
<td>Franz</td>
<td>Head, United Nations Department</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
<td>Austria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krill</td>
<td>Françoise</td>
<td>Head, ICRC Delegation</td>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuberski</td>
<td>Marek</td>
<td>Deputy Director, United Nations Department</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuehne</td>
<td>Winrich</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Centre for International Peace Operations</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kulesza</td>
<td>Ewa</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
<td>CERI-Sciences Po</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lacroix</td>
<td>Jean-Pierre</td>
<td>Deputy Permanent Representative</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of France to the UN</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lamamra</td>
<td>Ramtane</td>
<td>Commissioner for Peace and Security</td>
<td>African Union</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lancaric</td>
<td>Ivan</td>
<td>Head, Task Force on SSR</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>Slovakia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landeholm</td>
<td>Henrik</td>
<td>Director General</td>
<td>Folke Bernadotte Academy</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laurent</td>
<td>Jean-Marc</td>
<td>Director, CES</td>
<td>Ecole Militaire</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
342

Family Name
Lesellier
Levy
Liswi
Livingstone
Löfquist
Lopez Aroca
Lund
Lundberg
Madara
Malec
Mancini
Manton
Martin
Michal
Michalec
Michel
Milders
Millar
Miraillet
Miribel
Mlinar
Monaghan
Monge
Moore
Morneau
Mountain
Munoz Castresana
Nagelhus Schia
Nash
Nearkou
Neritani
Ngubane
Nieto
Nijssen
Nikicser

First Name
Laurent
Pierre
Rania
Ann
Lisa
Miguel
Gunnar
Liza
Limba
Bohumil
Francesco
Bob
Patrick
Jan
Andrej
Pierre
R
Michael
Michel
Benoît
Michal
Suzanne
Ignacio
Michael
Jacques
Ross
José J.
Niels
Patrick
Périclès
Adrian
Lawrance
Leonor
Joop
Laszlo

Position
Head, United Nations Affairs Section
Head, Forecasting Analysis Centre
Third Secretary
Vice-President
Peacekeeping Expert
Military Attaché
Ambassador
Desk Officer
Deputy European Correspondent, Political Director's Office
Director, Defence Policy Department
Associate
Military Adviser
Deputy Head, Military Mission
Director, United Nations Department
Third Secretary
Policy Advisor
Representative to the Political and Security Committee
Military Adviser
Director for Policy and Strategic Affairs Department
Director-General
Permanent Representative
President
Counsellor
Head, Development Division
Military Adviser
Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General
Deputy Director General, Defence Policy
Research Fellow
Operations Commander
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
Deputy Commandant
Deputy Head, DG ECO Unit
Deputy Head Crisis Management Operation
Ambassador

Organization
Ministry of Defence
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Embassy of Jordan in France
Pearson Peacekeeping Centre
Swedish Police
Embassy of Spain in France
Embassy of Sweden in France
Swedish Armed Forces
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Defence
International Peace Institute
Permanent Mission of Australia to the UN
Permanent Mission of France to the UN
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Embassy of Slovakia in France
ICRC
Permanent Mission of the Netherlands to the EU
Permanent Mission of New Zealand to the UN
Ministry of Defence
Foundation Mérieux
Permanent Mission of Slovakia to the UN
Pearson Peacekeeping Centre
Embassy of Spain in France
Swedish Armed Forces
Permanent Mission of Canada to the UN
MONUC
Ministry of Defence
NUPI
EUFOR Chad/CAR
Embassy of Cyprus in France
Permanent Mission of Albania to the UN
National Defence College
European Commission
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Embassy of Hungary in France

Country
France
France
Jordan
Canada
Sweden
Spain
Sweden
Sweden
Latvia
Czech Republic
United States
Australia
France
Czech Republic
Slovakia
Belgium
The Netherlands
New Zealand
France
France
Slovakia
Canada
Spain
Sweden
Canada
United Nations
Spain
Norway
European Union
Cyprus
Albania
Nigeria
European Union
The Netherlands
Hungary


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family Name</th>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Noblet</td>
<td>Eddy</td>
<td>Joint Staff</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masaki</td>
<td>Normand</td>
<td>Head, Political Affairs</td>
<td>Embassy of Japan in France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexander</td>
<td>Olszewska</td>
<td>Political Adviser, United Nations Policy and Strategic Affairs</td>
<td>Embassy of Canada in France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aguas</td>
<td>Margaret</td>
<td>European Affairs Coordinator</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djeddja</td>
<td>Olary</td>
<td>Military Adviser</td>
<td>Embassy of Hungary in France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Onahama</td>
<td>Olena</td>
<td>Research Fellow</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Sweden to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okelo</td>
<td>Olga</td>
<td>Deputy Director, Military Policy Division</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Otomo</td>
<td>Osa</td>
<td>Defense Attache</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Otomo</td>
<td>Osa</td>
<td>Head of Program</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fabbian</td>
<td>Pedersen</td>
<td>Head, Humanitarian Diplomacy Unit</td>
<td>United Nations Program Office (UNDP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penone</td>
<td>Pelletti</td>
<td>Director, Policy Division, United Nations and International Organizations Department</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Person</td>
<td>Person</td>
<td>Head, Security Group</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of South Africa to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pelpitte</td>
<td>Nick</td>
<td>Head, International Missions and Conflict Prevention</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pampilnio</td>
<td>Mohamad</td>
<td>Head, Security Group</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of South Africa to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persson</td>
<td>Anna</td>
<td>Project Officer</td>
<td>Challenges Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persson</td>
<td>Anna</td>
<td>Project Officer</td>
<td>Challenges Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poppe</td>
<td>Nick</td>
<td>Head, Security Group</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of South Africa to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pope</td>
<td>Nick</td>
<td>Head, Security Group</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of South Africa to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pospisilova</td>
<td>Magda</td>
<td>Head, Crisis Management and Operations</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pruunmer</td>
<td>Karl</td>
<td>Head, European Security Policy Unit</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qwabe</td>
<td>Bonigwe</td>
<td>Minister Counsellor</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of South Africa to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qwabe</td>
<td>Bonigwe</td>
<td>Minister Counsellor</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of South Africa to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radzimirski</td>
<td>Leic</td>
<td>First Secretary</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of South Africa to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rassimou</td>
<td>Tanya</td>
<td>Permanent Representative</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of South Africa to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratna</td>
<td>Liliantha</td>
<td>Permanent Representative</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of South Africa to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rava</td>
<td>Margus</td>
<td>Ambassador</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of South Africa to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ravel</td>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>Deputy Head, ARAC</td>
<td>Defence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roussea</td>
<td>Petra</td>
<td>Secretary for Strategic Affairs</td>
<td>Embassy of Canada in France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruhlman</td>
<td>Chryssoph</td>
<td>Policy Adviser</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rysavka</td>
<td>Daniel</td>
<td>Desk Officer, Division of European Affairs, Policy and Strategic Affairs Department</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Name</td>
<td>First Name</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salome</td>
<td>Bernard</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Director</td>
<td>Bibliotheca Alexandrina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scaramaglia</td>
<td>Tizana</td>
<td>Researcher</td>
<td>United Nations University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schneider</td>
<td>Wolfgang</td>
<td>Policy Advisor, Policy and Strategic Affairs Department</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scott</td>
<td>Joanna</td>
<td>Deputy Head, Policy and Strategic Affairs Department</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serrano</td>
<td>Pedro</td>
<td>Ambassador and Head, Liaison Office</td>
<td>General Secretariat of the European Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shalaby</td>
<td>Soad</td>
<td>Ambassador and Director, CCCCCA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shea</td>
<td>Jamie</td>
<td>Director, Policy Planning, Office of the Secretary-General</td>
<td>NATO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shepherd</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>First Secretary</td>
<td>Embassy of the United Kingdom in France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siblesz</td>
<td>Hugo H.</td>
<td>Ambassador</td>
<td>Embassy of the Netherlands in France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simon</td>
<td>Kinga</td>
<td>Director, International Organizations and Human Rights</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soler-Torrijos</td>
<td>Giancarlo</td>
<td>Deputy Permanent Representative</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Panama to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spielgelberg</td>
<td>Arturo</td>
<td>Ambassador for Peacekeeping</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steinke</td>
<td>David</td>
<td>Third Secretary</td>
<td>Embasssy of the Czech Republic in France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stockhausen</td>
<td>Dirk H.</td>
<td>Desk Officer, United Nations Security Council Division</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stoidis</td>
<td>Dimosthenis</td>
<td>Director General, National Defence Policy and International Relations</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Svensson</td>
<td>Charlotte</td>
<td>Desk Officer</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swarttouw</td>
<td>Henk</td>
<td>Deputy Director, Security Policy Department</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syed Hussain Shah</td>
<td>Kausar</td>
<td>DS Army</td>
<td>National Defence University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tadjibakhsh</td>
<td>Shahranou</td>
<td>Senior Lecturer</td>
<td>Institute for Political Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taquet</td>
<td>Colette</td>
<td>European Correspondent for the CFSP</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tardy</td>
<td>Thierry</td>
<td>Course Director</td>
<td>Geneva Centre for Security Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Titov</td>
<td>Dmitry</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary-General for Rule of Law and Security Institutions</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinquand</td>
<td>Dominique</td>
<td>Program Officer</td>
<td>CEMAT, Chief of Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troepler</td>
<td>Gary</td>
<td>Co-Director</td>
<td>United Nations University Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tudor</td>
<td>Cristian</td>
<td>DG Strategic Affairs Security Policies Directorate</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tudor</td>
<td>Marian</td>
<td>Defence Attaché</td>
<td>Embassy of Romania in France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuzmukhamedov</td>
<td>Bakhtiyar</td>
<td>Professor</td>
<td>Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uesugi</td>
<td>Yuji</td>
<td>Program Officer</td>
<td>Hiroshima Peacebuilders Centre (HPC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ulutefkin</td>
<td>Gulhan</td>
<td>Head, NATO and Euro-Atlantic Security, Political Affairs Department</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Van Bellinghen</td>
<td>Marc</td>
<td>Deputy Head, Crisis Response and Peacebuilding</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vantini</td>
<td>Marianne</td>
<td>Research Assistant</td>
<td>Crisis Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Var</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>CESAT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Name</td>
<td>First Name</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vercken</td>
<td>Nicolas</td>
<td>Conflicts Advocacy Officer</td>
<td>Oxfam France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verschuur</td>
<td>Marc</td>
<td>Senior Policy Adviser, United Nations Affairs</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Von Ungern-Sternberg</td>
<td>Michael</td>
<td>Deputy Director-General</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waligora</td>
<td>Ziemowit</td>
<td>Head, International Security Policy Department</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weissman</td>
<td>Fabrice</td>
<td>Research Director</td>
<td>Médecins Sans Frontières</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westmacott</td>
<td>Peter</td>
<td>Ambassador</td>
<td>Embassy of the United Kingdom in France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willmot</td>
<td>Haidi</td>
<td>Defence Policy Officer</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Australia to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woods</td>
<td>Matt</td>
<td>Policy Advisor, Civilian Crisis Management</td>
<td>Foreign and Commonwealth Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yamamoto</td>
<td>Yuji</td>
<td>Counsellor</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Japan to the EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zabadi</td>
<td>Istifanus</td>
<td>Dean, African Centre for Strategic Research and Studies</td>
<td>National Defence College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaharia</td>
<td>Cristina</td>
<td>Third Secretary</td>
<td>Embassy of Romania in France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zangl</td>
<td>Peter</td>
<td>Director-General</td>
<td>Humanitarian Aid Department (ECHO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zasova</td>
<td>Svetlana</td>
<td>Researcher</td>
<td>University Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zore</td>
<td>Gregor</td>
<td>Senior Diplomatic Advisor</td>
<td>DCAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zorko</td>
<td>Uros</td>
<td>Senior Advisor</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Name</td>
<td>First Name</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdalaziz</td>
<td>Alaa</td>
<td>Head of Programs</td>
<td>CCCPA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Allaf</td>
<td>Mohammed</td>
<td>Permanent Representative</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Jordan to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Beroth</td>
<td>Jonas</td>
<td>Deputy Director General</td>
<td>Folke Bernadotte Academy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Otmi</td>
<td>Mohammed</td>
<td>Military and Police Adviser</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Yemen to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amil</td>
<td>Farukh</td>
<td>Acting Permanent Representative</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Pakistan to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anastasopoulos</td>
<td>Achilleas</td>
<td>Head, Policy, Doctrine and Liaison, Office of Military Affairs</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aniz</td>
<td>Kumar</td>
<td>Police Adviser</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of India to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayi-Bente</td>
<td>George</td>
<td>Military Adviser</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Ghana to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachi</td>
<td>David</td>
<td>Deputy Director, Centre for Concept Development, Doctrine and Experimentation</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Austria to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baillaud</td>
<td>Jean</td>
<td>Counsellor</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Belgium to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baikov</td>
<td>Oleksandr</td>
<td>Military Adviser</td>
<td>Institute for Security Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Babishvili</td>
<td>David</td>
<td>Military Adviser</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Malaysia to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bajwa</td>
<td>Anis</td>
<td>Director for Change Management</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bajwa</td>
<td>Jean-Luc</td>
<td>Military Adviser</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baghda</td>
<td>Serhiy</td>
<td>Military Adviser, Counsellor</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basile</td>
<td>Hermann</td>
<td>Military Adviser</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Armenia to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bashoff</td>
<td>はじ磨</td>
<td>Military Adviser</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Turkey to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boscovich</td>
<td>wrapping</td>
<td>Military Adviser, Major</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Poland to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boulton</td>
<td>Andrew</td>
<td>Police Adviser</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Turkey to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carpenter</td>
<td>Andrew</td>
<td>Chief, Strategic Policy and Development</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohen</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>First Secretary</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of India to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooney</td>
<td>Anna</td>
<td>Delegate</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of India to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooper</td>
<td>Hansmaan</td>
<td>Military Adviser</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of India to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drzdzic</td>
<td>Michael</td>
<td>Counselor</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Sweden to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ekedlund</td>
<td>Bjorga</td>
<td>Political Counsellor</td>
<td>International Peace Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Alasawi</td>
<td>Elad</td>
<td>Senator Fellow</td>
<td>International Peace Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Name</td>
<td>First Name</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farquhar</td>
<td>Colin</td>
<td>Police Adviser</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Canada to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fedorov</td>
<td>Andrey</td>
<td>Second Secretary</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Russia to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ferrari</td>
<td>Giuliano</td>
<td>Military Adviser</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Italy to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fitzgerald</td>
<td>Bob</td>
<td>Military Adviser</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Ireland to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flavin</td>
<td>William</td>
<td>Director, Doctrine and Training</td>
<td>Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Franco</td>
<td>Julio</td>
<td>International Fellow</td>
<td>Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giertli</td>
<td>Miroslav</td>
<td>Military Adviser</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Slovakia to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gordon</td>
<td>Robert</td>
<td>Senior Adviser, Challenges Forum / Fmr UN</td>
<td>Folke Bernadotte Academy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Force Commander</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gowen</td>
<td>Richard</td>
<td>Associate Director for Policy</td>
<td>Centre on International Cooperation, New York University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guéhenno</td>
<td>Jean-Marie</td>
<td>Senior Fellow / Senior Adviser</td>
<td>Brookings Institution and Centre on International Cooperation / Challenges Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hansen</td>
<td>Andreas</td>
<td>First Secretary</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Denmark to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heissel</td>
<td>Jürgen</td>
<td>First Secretary</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Austria to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hemrá</td>
<td>Staffan</td>
<td>Counsellor Political Affairs</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Sweden to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hernández</td>
<td>Rebeca</td>
<td>First Secretary</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Cuba to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hilding Norberg</td>
<td>Annika</td>
<td>International Coordinator, Challenges Forum</td>
<td>Folke Bernadotte Academy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holmlund</td>
<td>Jörgen</td>
<td>Deputy Commissioner</td>
<td>Swedish Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iversen</td>
<td>Kenn</td>
<td>Military Adviser</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Denmark to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johansson</td>
<td>Ulf R</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, Doctrine and Concepts</td>
<td>Swedish Armed Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson</td>
<td>Agneta</td>
<td>Project Manager, European Union and United Nations Affairs</td>
<td>Swedish Prison and Probation Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaarelson</td>
<td>Kai</td>
<td>Deputy Permanent Representative</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Estonia to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabage</td>
<td>Robert</td>
<td>Defence Adviser</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Kenya to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karadeniz</td>
<td>Bulet</td>
<td>Head, Department, Acting Chairman</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kardos</td>
<td>John</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaszynski</td>
<td>Tomasz</td>
<td>Counsellor, Senior Military Adviser</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Poland to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keating</td>
<td>Paul</td>
<td>Acting Deputy Chief</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khasbazar</td>
<td>Boldbat</td>
<td>Military Adviser</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Mongolia to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kimura</td>
<td>Tetsuya</td>
<td>Deputy Chief</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Japan to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kinnunen</td>
<td>Mikko</td>
<td>Head, Political Section, Minister Counsellor</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Finland to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kotil</td>
<td>Rostislav</td>
<td>Military Adviser</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of the Czech Republic to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kui</td>
<td>Yan Wei</td>
<td>Deputy Director, Peacekeeping Affairs Office</td>
<td>Ministry of National Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kulima</td>
<td>Bob Davison</td>
<td>Military Adviser</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Zambia to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Name</td>
<td>First Name</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landerholm</td>
<td>Henrik</td>
<td>Director-General</td>
<td>Folke Bernadotte Academy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lidén</td>
<td>Anders</td>
<td>Permanent Representative</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Sweden to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lerotic</td>
<td>Davorka</td>
<td>Assistant Military Adviser</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of the Republic of Croatia to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livingstone</td>
<td>Ann</td>
<td>Vice-President</td>
<td>Pearson Peacekeeping Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Löfquist</td>
<td>Lisa</td>
<td>Desk Officer</td>
<td>Swedish Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loulichki</td>
<td>Mohammad</td>
<td>Permanent Representative</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Morocco to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lubenik</td>
<td>Bernd</td>
<td>Military Adviser</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Austria to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manton</td>
<td>Rob</td>
<td>Military Adviser</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Australia to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Millar</td>
<td>Michael</td>
<td>Military Adviser</td>
<td>New Zealand Defence Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monaghan</td>
<td>Suzanne</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>Pearson Peacekeeping Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morneau</td>
<td>Jacques</td>
<td>Military Adviser</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Canada to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monedero-Linan</td>
<td>Francisco</td>
<td>Police Adviser, Counsellor</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Spain to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mulet</td>
<td>Edmond</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary-General for Operations</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mungkalaton</td>
<td>Nopadon</td>
<td>Military Adviser</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Thailand to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nakamitsu</td>
<td>Izumi</td>
<td>Director, Policy, Evaluation and Training</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Novosseloff</td>
<td>Alexandra</td>
<td>Political Adviser, United Nations Policy and</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Strategic Affairs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obiakor</td>
<td>Chikadibia</td>
<td>Military Adviser for Peacekeeping Operations</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Isaac</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olesen</td>
<td>Staffan</td>
<td>Military Adviser</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Sweden to the United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Onuoha</td>
<td>Freedom</td>
<td>Assistant Research Fellow</td>
<td>National Defence College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panichini</td>
<td>Juan Pablo</td>
<td>Military Adviser</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Argentina to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraiba</td>
<td>Florbela</td>
<td>Counsellor</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Portugal to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persson</td>
<td>Anna-Linn</td>
<td>Project Officer, Challenges Forum</td>
<td>Folke Bernadotte Academy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qwabe</td>
<td>Bongiwe</td>
<td>Minister Counsellor</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of South Africa to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raychev</td>
<td>Rayko</td>
<td>Permanent Representative</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Bulgaria to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redondo</td>
<td>Jaime</td>
<td>Deputy Military Adviser</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Spain to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ripert</td>
<td>Jean-Maurice</td>
<td>Permanent Representative</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of France to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scholz</td>
<td>Ralph Bernd</td>
<td>Military Adviser</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Germany to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serrano</td>
<td>Pedro</td>
<td>Ambassador and Head, Liaison Office</td>
<td>General Secretariat of the Council of the EU with the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seymour</td>
<td>Nick</td>
<td>Senior Political Officer</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shalaby</td>
<td>Soad</td>
<td>Ambassador and Director, CCCPA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Name</td>
<td>First Name</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sherman</td>
<td>Jake</td>
<td>Associate Director</td>
<td>Centre on International Cooperation, New York University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shilongfo</td>
<td>Solomon</td>
<td>Military Adviser</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Namibia to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shitong</td>
<td>Janez</td>
<td>Military Adviser</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Slovenia to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shon</td>
<td>Michael</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Singapore to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith</td>
<td>Mason</td>
<td>Deputy Permanent Representative</td>
<td>Asia Pacific Civil Military Centre of Excellence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith</td>
<td>Michael</td>
<td>Deputy Permanent Representative</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of the Netherlands to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith</td>
<td>Rob</td>
<td>Deputy Permanent Representative</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Germany to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith</td>
<td>Mason</td>
<td>Deputy Permanent Representative</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of China to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith</td>
<td>Mason</td>
<td>Deputy Permanent Representative</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Fiji to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith</td>
<td>Mason</td>
<td>Deputy Permanent Representative</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Poland to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith</td>
<td>Michael</td>
<td>Deputy Permanent Representative</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Portugal to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith</td>
<td>Michael</td>
<td>Deputy Permanent Representative</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Brazil to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith</td>
<td>Michael</td>
<td>Deputy Permanent Representative</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith</td>
<td>Mason</td>
<td>Deputy Permanent Representative</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Japan to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith</td>
<td>Mason</td>
<td>Deputy Permanent Representative</td>
<td>Centre on International Cooperation, New York University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith</td>
<td>Mason</td>
<td>Deputy Permanent Representative</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Sierra Leone to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith</td>
<td>Mason</td>
<td>Deputy Permanent Representative</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith</td>
<td>Mason</td>
<td>Deputy Permanent Representative</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith</td>
<td>Mason</td>
<td>Deputy Permanent Representative</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of China to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith</td>
<td>Mason</td>
<td>Deputy Permanent Representative</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith</td>
<td>Mason</td>
<td>Deputy Permanent Representative</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Bolivia to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith</td>
<td>Mason</td>
<td>Deputy Permanent Representative</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith</td>
<td>Mason</td>
<td>Deputy Permanent Representative</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Sweden to the UN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Challenges of Peace**

09-10-14   10.53.38
### List of Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFRICOM</td>
<td>United States Africa Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMA</td>
<td>Agreement on Movement and Access</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMIS</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMM</td>
<td>EU-led Aceh Monitoring Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARTEMIS</td>
<td>EU Military Operation in Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of South-East Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASF</td>
<td>African Stand-by Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUSA</td>
<td>Association of the United States Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-34</td>
<td>United Nations Special Committee for Peacekeeping Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIAT</td>
<td>International Committee Accompanying the Transition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civil-Military Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cmcoord</td>
<td>Civilian-Military Coordination Units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNDP</td>
<td>National Congress for the Defence of the People</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONOPS</td>
<td>Concept of Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONUN</td>
<td>European Council Working Group on United Nations Matters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPCC</td>
<td>Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRT</td>
<td>Civilian Response Teams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSIS</td>
<td>Centre for Strategic and International Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSTO</td>
<td>Collective Security Treaty Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFS</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Field Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG</td>
<td>Director General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG</td>
<td>Directorate General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIS</td>
<td>Département Intégré de Sécurité</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOCO</td>
<td>Director Of Commissary Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPA</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Political Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPKO</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSRSG</td>
<td>Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECHO</td>
<td>European Community Humanitarian Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecowas</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDF</td>
<td>European Development Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERSG</td>
<td>Executive Representative of the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUBAM</td>
<td>European Union Border Assistance Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR</td>
<td>European Union Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR Chad/RCA</td>
<td>EU Military Operation in Eastern Chad and North Eastern Central African Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EULEX</td>
<td>The European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUMM</td>
<td>European Union Monitoring Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPM</td>
<td>European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPOL</td>
<td>European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUROMARFOR</td>
<td>European Maritime Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUSEC</td>
<td>European Communications Security and Evaluation Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUSEC RDC</td>
<td>European Union Security Sector Reform Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARDIC</td>
<td>Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDLR</td>
<td>Democratic Forces for the Democratic Liberation of Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLEGT</td>
<td>Forest Law Enforcement Government and Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FYROM</td>
<td>Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IASC</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Standing Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICJ</td>
<td>International Court of Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICVA</td>
<td>International Council of Voluntary Agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDF</td>
<td>Integrated Demand Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFI</td>
<td>International Financial Institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>Intelligence Liaison Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IM</td>
<td>Integrated Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMD</td>
<td>Initiating Military Directive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMPP</td>
<td>Integrated Mission Planning Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMTF</td>
<td>Integrated Mission Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Non-Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INPROM</td>
<td>International Network to Promote the Rule of Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organisation for Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPA</td>
<td>International Peace Academy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPTF</td>
<td>International Police Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRA</td>
<td>Lord's Resistance Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCDA</td>
<td>Military and Civil Defence Assets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCDU</td>
<td>Military and Civil Defence Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINURCAT</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSF</td>
<td>Médecins Sans Frontières</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAM</td>
<td>Non-Aligned Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa's Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NYLO</td>
<td>New York Liaison Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD-DAC</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development - Development Assistance Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHCHR</td>
<td>Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHQ</td>
<td>Operational Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>Operation Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBC</td>
<td>Peacebuilding Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCIA</td>
<td>Post-Conflict Impact Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCRCD</td>
<td>Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKO</td>
<td>Peace Keeping Operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNC</td>
<td>Congolese National Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRS</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRSP</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRT</td>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Political and Security Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2P</td>
<td>Responsibility to Protect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REC</td>
<td>Regional Economic Communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RELEX</td>
<td>Directorate-General for External Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RFTF</td>
<td>Results Focused Transitional Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>Rules of Engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROL</td>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RUF</td>
<td>Revolutionary United Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCHR</td>
<td>Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCR</td>
<td>Security Council Resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGBV</td>
<td>Sexual and Gender-Based Violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHAPE</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHIRBRIG</td>
<td>United Nations Standby High Readiness Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMC</td>
<td>Strategic Military Cell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOFA</td>
<td>Status of Forces Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOWR</td>
<td>State of the World's Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRG</td>
<td>Strategic Reconnaissance Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRPGMA</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Prevention of Genocide of Mass Atrocities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRSG</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TA</td>
<td>Technical Arrangement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCC</td>
<td>Troop Contributing Country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMA</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMI</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>United Nations - African Union Hybrid Mission in Darfur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCT</td>
<td>United Nations Country Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDAF</td>
<td>United Nations Development Assistance Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDG</td>
<td>United Nations Development Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCHR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIASC</td>
<td>United Nations Inter-agency Standing Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children's Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMEE</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Kosovo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNRWA</td>
<td>United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSG</td>
<td>United Nations Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>