CHALLENGES FORUM REPORT 2011

Peace Operations Beyond the Horizon – Enabling Contributing Countries for the Future
International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations

Challenges Forum Report 2011

Peace Operations Beyond the Horizon – Enabling Contributing Countries for the Future
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The aim of the Challenges Forum is to contribute to the global dialogue on the analysis, preparation, implementation and evaluation of multidimensional peace operations, to raise awareness, and to generate practical recommendations and encourage action for their effective implementation. The Challenges Forum also seeks to broaden and strengthen the international network of actors involved in multidimensional peace operations. The Challenges Forum consists of Partner Organizations from a balanced and inclusive group of members that reflects a global and representative background and spectrum of expertise, all focused on contributing to and enhancing peace operations.

The Arab Republic of Egypt is a major global and regional political actor in peacekeeping, currently chairing and coordinating the Non-Aligned Movement. Egypt is also the Rapporteur of the United Nations Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and Host of the Arab League Headquarters, which during the past year has made an historical transition into becoming a peacekeeping actor in the Middle East. The Cairo Regional Centre for Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA) is one of the leading actors on the African continent dealing with the study, education and training for peacekeeping and peace-building.

In 2011, the Challenges Partnership was invited to Egypt to hold deliberations on the theme Peace Operations Beyond the Horizon – Enabling Contributing Countries for the Future. During that year, developments in North Africa, the broader Middle East, but also on the African Continent, shaped much of the international and local peace and security agendas. Our common preparations for the Seminar in Egypt continued, if in a fluid environment, without interruption and integrating emerging peacekeeping and peace-building developments in the planning process, while the Seminar was decided to be hosted in early 2012. The purpose of the Seminar was essentially to explore how we all in our different ways and with our various comparative advantages can support and enable effective and inclusive multidimensional missions and what would be required for the international community to be able to develop a true unity of purpose, effort, operations and achievements. In short, to enable the peacekeepers and peace-builders sent out to protect people in peril.

Many organizations and individuals in Egypt contributed to the planning and conduct of the Challenges Strategic Seminar and Partners Meeting in Sharm El-Sheikh, 15-17 February 2012. On behalf of the Challenges Partnership, I would
like to express our sincere appreciation in particular to H.E. Mr Mohamed Kamel Amr, Minister of Foreign Affairs; H.E. Mr Ahmed Fathallah, First Under-Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; H.E. Mr Maged A Abdel-Aziz, Permanent Representative of Egypt to the United Nations; H.E. Ms Soad Shalaby, Director, CCCPA; H.E. Mr Mahmoud Farghal, Director, Training Programmes, CCCPA; Mr Amr El-Sherbini, Director, UN Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; H.E. Mr Alaa Abdalaziz, Head of Programme, CCCPA; Mr Amr Aljowaily, Minister Plenipotentiary, Permanent Mission of Egypt to United Nations; Maj. Gen. Amir Yehia Eldamhougy, Ministry of Defense; Brig. Gen. Ihab Khedr, Ministry of Defence; Col. Hatem Khedr, Ministry of Interior; Ms Effat El-Shooky, Member of the Board, CCCPA; Ms Yasmeen Khattab, Third Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ms Hazel Haddon, Researcher, CCCPA; and Ms Iman Keira, Executive Secretary, CCCPA.

In the week following the Sharm El-Sheikh Seminar, its key findings were briefed to the Members of the United Nations Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations during the Opening day, 21 February 2012, of the Committees’ Annual Session in New York. The Chair of the Committee, Ambassador Joy Ogwu of Nigeria, invited Members of the Committee to the briefing, which was then chaired by the Permanent Representative of Sweden, Ambassador Mårten Grunditz. The issues and results of the Sharm El-Sheikh Seminar was presented by Mr Amr El-Sherbini, Director of the UN Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Egypt, and Ms Annika Hilding Norberg, Director of the Challenges Partnership Secretariat.

The present Annual Report 2011, also include the substantive discussions held between the Challenges Partnership, the International Community and key officials of the United Nations at a senior-level Seminar and Challenges Police Forum in New York on 15-17 February 2011. The Seminar focused on the Challenges of Multidimensional Peacekeeping: Considerations for Mission Leadership in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in Managing Consent and Bridging the Peacekeeping-Peacebuilding Nexus. The Protection of Civilians; and the New Horizon for Enabling Peacekeeping Capabilities for the Future were also addressed. A first Challenges Police Forum was co-hosted in cooperation with the UN Police Division with the aim to identify the most Critical Police Peacekeeping Challenges for the Future and how to address them. The Challenges Police Forum provided a unique opportunity for the Challenges Partnership and the International Community to engage with all the Heads of Police Components of the UN Missions deployed at the time. A particularly relevant exchange and dialogue was hosted on 17 February 2011 as the Police Commissioners and Advisers gathered in New York.
The support from and engagement by the Senior United Nations Leadership in the Challenges Forum is critical to the relevance and outcome of the Challenges work. We are therefore particularly grateful for the contributions made to the Challenges Seminar in New York and/or Challenges Strategic Seminar in Sharm El-Sheikh by the Under-Secretaries-General for Peacekeeping Operations Mr Alain Le Roy (-2011) and Mr Hervé Ladsous (2011-); the Under-Secretary-General for Field Support, Ms Susanna Malcorra; Assistant Secretary-General for Rule of Law and Security Institutions, Mr Dmitry Titov; Assistant Secretary-General and Director of the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, Mr Jordan Ryan; Lt. Gen. Babacar Gaye, UN Military Adviser; Commissioner Ann-Marie Orler, UN Police Adviser; Ms Izumi Nakamitsu, Director of Division for Policy, Evaluation and Training; Mr David Haeri, Chief Peacekeeping Best Practices and Mr Andrew Carpenter, UN Police Division.

We are also most thankful for the frank and insightful advice the Challenges Forum Patron, Mr Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Former Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations (2000-2008) generously shares with the Challenges Partnership and Secretariat.

The New York Seminar 2011 was the product of close and positive cooperation between the Hosting Challenges Partners of that event. Our Egyptian Partners and their critical contribution have been thanked above. In addition, our appreciation goes to the Permanent Representative H.E. Mr Gary Quinlan and his staff at the Permanent Mission of Australia to the United Nations; including Col Brian Walsh and Ms Lisa Sharland; and to the Australian Civil-Military Centre of Excellence, including Maj Gen (Retd.) Michael Smith and Professor Jim Rolfe; Our Pakistani Partners made important contributions to the Seminar through the Acting Permanent Representative H.E. Mr Amjad Hussain B. Sial and his staff of the Permanent Mission of Pakistan to the United Nations, including Col Hammad A. Dogar, and Mr Ahamad Farooq. The National Defence University of Pakistan supported the event through Lt. Gen. Muhammed Umer Farooq and Brig. Gen. Kamran Zia. We would also like to thank the Permanent Representative of Sweden to the United Nations, H.E. Mårten Grunditz, and his staff, including Ms Signe Burgstaller, Mr Gunnar Alden, Col. Anders B. Svensson, Mr Staffan Occusto, Ms Anna Pettersson, and at the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in particular, the Minister for International Development Cooperation, H.E. Ms Gunilla Carlsson, Ambassador Malin Kärre, Ambassador Stig Elvemar, Mr Peter Ericsson, Mr Johan Frisell and Ms Sophie Olsson. Important contributions have also been made by Challenges Partners at the Swedish Armed Forces, including Gen. Sverker Göransson, Supreme Commander, Brig. Gen. Dennis Gyllensporre, Brig. Gen. Mats Engman and Col. Bengt Carlsson; the Criminal Investigation Department, including Mr Häkan Wall, Mr Peter Sjögren and Ms Lisa Löfquist; the National...
Prison and Probation Service, including Ms Agneta Johnson and Mr Jaques Mwepu. Colleagues at the Folke Bernadotte Academy, making specific contributions in 2011 included Mr Henrik Landerholm, Mr Jonas Alberoth, Ms Ann Bernes, Maj. Gen. (Retd.) Robert Gordon, Ms Anna Wiktorsson, and Ms Anna-Linn Persson.

Concluding, I wish to express our thanks to our Egyptian Partners once again, whom have made a priority of contributing in a very substantive way to peacekeeping efforts in various conflicts around the world as well as to the peacekeeping policy and education development. For example, the CCCPA was a Co-Chair of the development of the Challenges Study on Considerations for Mission Leaders in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (2009-2011). The Study was translated into the six official languages of the United Nations thanks to Challenges Partners at the CCCPA (Arabic), the Pearson Centre in Canada (French), the Peacekeeping Academy of the Chinese MND (Chinese), CAECOPAZ of Argentina (Spanish), and East-West Services (Russian). The Considerations Study is currently used as core education material for the United Nations Senior Mission Leadership Courses held around the world. It is also used for similar purposes by the African Union, national training centers and courses. The Considerations Study fed into the development of the first European Union course for its Senior Mission Leaders.

The present report, the Challenges Annual Report 2011, has been produced thanks to Ambassador Soad Shalaby and Ms Annika Hilding Norberg (main editors), Mr Amr El-Sherbini, Mr Henrik Stiernblad, Ms Anna Wiktorsson, Ms Anjali Wijesooriya, Ms Iman Keira, Ms Andrea Rabus, Ms Johanna Ström and Ms Malin Andrén.

On behalf of the Challenges Partnership, I wish to thank all that have contributed to the Challenges effort over the past year, many too many to be able to be listed in these pages. We are most grateful for your dedication and focus on tackling our common challenges for peace operations together.

If you as a reader find the substance of this Challenges Annual Report 2011 of practical use in your own work; possibly triggering a new line of thought, an alternative action or an effective solution; our contribution through this report, however small, will have indeed been worth the effort.

Ms Annika Hilding Norberg
Director
Challenges Forum Secretariat /
Folke Bernadotte Academy
Introduction

In 2011, the Challenges Partnership convened a meeting for senior level deliberations with the international peacekeeping community in New York on critical peace operations challenges. The seminar was held in the week prior to the opening of the UN Special Committee of Peacekeeping Operations and was prepared by the Australian, Pakistan, Swedish and Egyptian Challenges Partners and their Permanent Missions to the United Nations. The aim was to report back on findings of the Challenges Partnership and to invite issues for coming work of the Partnership, in particular the Challenges Strategic Partners Meeting and Seminar in Egypt.

In cooperation with the UN Police Division, the Challenges Partnership hosted the Challenges Police Forum on the theme “What are the Most Critical Police Peacekeeping Challenges for the Future?”. Other themes explored included an update and dialogue with the Under-Secretaries-General for Peacekeeping and Field Support respectively on the Peacekeeping Partnership: Progress and Prospects. The Challenges Partnership presented the findings of their study on “Considerations for Mission Leadership in UN Peacekeeping Operations” which was subsequently translated into the six official UN languages. The following challenges were also addressed; Rule of Law and Security issues, the protection of civilians, as well as sexual violence in conflict. The presentations and discussions held in New York are reported in this volume.

Due to the Egyptian revolution culminating on 25 January 2011, the Challenges Strategic Partners Meeting and Seminar in Egypt was postponed to February 2012. I appreciate our close and flexible cooperation and constant contact with the Coordinators of the Challenges Forum throughout that eventful year. This helped to ensure a particularly productive and timely outcome of our Challenges Strategic Seminar and Partners Meeting. The Seminar was hosted by the Cairo Centre for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA) in cooperation with the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and gathered a record number of Partners in Sharm El-Sheikh. The Seminar was hosted in Sharm El-Sheikh 15–17 February 2012 and focused on Peace Operations Beyond the Horizon – Enabling Contributing Countries for the Future. The Sharm El-Sheikh Seminar addressed the challenges of contemporary multidimensional peacekeeping operations and offered an opportunity to enrich the ongoing dialogue and partnership between all relevant stakeholders, in order to
strengthen peacekeeping operations, either implemented by the United Nations, or regional organizations.

The Seminar contributed to the enhancement of the planning, conduct and evaluation of multidimensional peacekeeping operations. It also served to encourage a much broader sharing of views and ideas to assist in ensuring the unity of vision that the Challenges Forum Partnership works for. The Seminar examined ways that the United Nations and the International Community could assist in enabling peacekeeping contributing countries in the future. In particular, time was devoted to consider the enabling issue in four distinct areas: leadership, military, civilian, and police contributions. Further, special attention was given to the peacekeeping challenges in the African context.

The Sharm El-Sheikh Seminar discussed the current and future environment for peacekeeping, where a number of participants raised the following areas of concern: financial constraints and scarce resources; a need for more effective peacekeeping and peace-building; an increasing focus on rule of law and peace-building issues; and an increased need for civilians in peacekeeping operations. In addition, complex mandates and operations will continue, and the rate of change in this environment is likely to continue to be dynamic. In summarizing the considerations, observations and reflections of the Seminar, the following areas of discussion were elaborated upon:

First, Enabling Leadership. The Seminar considered the need to continue to build on recent progress with respect to mission leadership. The involvement of Troop and Police Contributing Countries in the planning process and relations with the UN Secretariat was expressed as a key factor. Further, the Seminar underscored the relevance of the Senior Missions Leaders Course (SML) as an important tool in preparing future mission leaders. Additionally, and in light of the work on the New Horizon initiative and the peacekeeping /peace-building nexus, there was recognition that several areas needed to be strengthened. They include the need to strengthen coordination of efforts, within the United Nations family, within the donor community, through the United Nations’ integrated mission concept and an enhanced understanding of the roles of the various actors and the transition environment.

Second, Enabling Military Contributions. The demand for military resources will continue to challenge the international community. The participants debated the need to not only enhance the capabilities of currently willing contributors, but to seek new and potential contributors, including countries with
significantly developed military capabilities. For the latter, as a minimum, there’s a need to consider the possibilities of providing certain advanced military specialized capabilities from these countries, such as helicopters, medical equipment, communications, engineering etc.. For countries receiving reimbursement for their military contributions, several views expressed support for the high level advisory group reviewing the entire process, with a view to making it simpler, more responsive, and with greater incentives for specialized capabilities and equipment. In addition, the participants reflected on the need to make military contribution process more efficient, including developing capability standards and training to support contributing countries. The idea was to increase the quality of training and the various ways of its delivery through creativity and adaptability, depending on the target audience and circumstances. Enhanced efficiency in the process also requires realistic mandates, developed with appropriate inputs from the contributing Member States.

Third, Enabling Civilian Contributions. As previously mentioned in the review of the near to mid-term environment for peacekeeping, the participants addressed the increased need for a range of civilian capabilities in missions. A number of missions have significant gaps at present. Moreover, in addition to the supply/demand gap, a major problem area appears to be the gap between those trained and their deployment. A further possibility with respect to education and training might be to try to determine which capabilities can be surged and which require longer term preparation.

Fourth, Enabling Police and Corrections Contributions. In view of the increasing emphasis on rule of law issues and the growing influence on relevant crisis situations, the participants reflected on the need for more attention to the ‘Rule-of-Law’ triad – police corrections and justice, including the gender area by providing more female contributions. In addition, for both police and corrections staff, there is a recruitment, assessment and placement challenge, when planning and conducting missions.

Fifth, Requirements for Africa. At a strategic level, efforts to create an effective partnership between the United Nations and the African Union should be enhanced, in order to contribute to addressing common peace and security challenges, including conflict prevention, mediation support, peacekeeping and post conflict reconstruction. The African Union is currently working to operationalize its Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The African Union, and other regional organizations, will have an increased role to play in future crises due to the political environment in which some peacekeeping operations are carried
out. Capacity building in Africa is likely to be affected by the growing financial constraints and will require an emphasis on coordination of programs and efforts, as well as other efficiencies. At the same time, in order to be effective and efficient, capacity building and finances need to be predictable, coherent and sustainable. A focus on a capability-driven approach was urged and the issue of lack of adequate equipment in some areas was noted.

In conclusion, I want to underscore the political commitment and the great importance that we attach in Egypt to peacekeeping and its role as a key political instrument to maintain international peace and security. Peacekeeping remains in our view a cost-efficient mean to avert conflicts and represents a genuine expression of the principle of collective security. Thus, peacekeeping, as the flagship activity of the United Nations, needs to continue developing as a partnership and burden sharing between all relevant partners. We are confident that our work in the Challenges Partnership will strive to find an inclusive middle ground that bring us all together for the interest of better planning and implementation of peacekeeping and peace-building.

It is my hope that the present report, the Challenges Annual Report 2011, will contribute to a better understanding of the complexities of modern international peacekeeping and peace-building, and that you in this report will find solutions to the challenges facing our peacekeeping community as well as the inspiration, to address them.

Ambassador Soad Shalaby
Director
Cairo Regional Centre for Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA)
Arab Republic of Egypt
Part I –
Challenges Forum Strategic Seminar
in Egypt
Chapter 1

Challenges Forum Studies

Challenges Facing UN Peace Operations in Africa:
The Cases of South Sudan and Libya

Dr Yasser Sabra, Challenges Forum Research Adviser, Former Head of Office of the United Nations SRSG in Cyprus

Introduction

Over the last few years, United Nations peace operations, a large number of which are deployed in Africa, have come under increased scrutiny, leading to calls for leaner and more effective operations.

This trend can be explained by a combination of factors. One major impetus has been the global financial crisis, which has made the major financial contributors wary of the large, open-ended operations that marked the early part of the century. Another consideration is the mixed track record of some peace operations: many were given ambitious mandates that did not match their limited resources and expertise, leading to overstretch and a limited capacity to deliver. In other cases, the conditions for their deployment (consent and a viable political process) were not met, or they had a lack of flexibility and capacity to tailor their assistance to specific situations on the ground.

Changes in the nature of conflicts have presented additional challenges, pressing the UN and its peace operations (peacekeeping and special political missions) to change their approach. While civil wars still pose threats, their number has declined in the last twenty-five years. Yet many countries that have emerged from civil war have either relapsed into conflict or experienced continued violence. What these countries need goes beyond monitoring ceasefire agreements, providing basic security or even overseeing the negotiation of a peace agreement and organizing elections. They also require sustainable and legitimate institutions – a larger and more difficult challenge that requires time and resources. As highlighted in the UN report A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping, while some peace operations have managed to
make progress in providing security and stability, they have faced greater difficulties when it comes to designing and implementing peace-building strategies.

Against this backdrop of greater scrutiny of UN peace operations, two historical political developments have recently taken place in Africa – first, the creation of the Republic of South Sudan, and second, the fall of the regime in Libya. The present paper provides background for a discussion on the challenges facing recent peace operations in Africa. It focuses on recent developments in South Sudan and Libya that led to the establishment of UNMISS and UNSMIL, and discusses some of the challenges facing the two missions.

Political developments in Libya and South Sudan are discussed in part II. Despite uncertainty regarding the future of peace operations and the various challenges and constraints they are facing, it was clear early on that the international response to the new developments in these countries would be led by the United Nations. In designing its response in each case, the UN was eager to draw on key lessons of past operations. The design and mandates of the two missions are addressed in Part III. While these lessons may have been internalized by the UN, it remains an enormous challenge to heed them in implementation. Part IV of this paper focuses on the following key challenges faced by these missions: 1) the UN operation’s relationship with the government; 2) the viability of the political process; 3) how to give teeth to the principle of national ownership; 5) how well-equipped the UN is to carry out long-term statebuilding, particularly when this is added on to other mandates; and finally, 6) whether the UN’s resources are adequate to the task.

Political developments in South Sudan and Libya

South Sudan. In South Sudan, more than 98 percent of voters in a referendum that took place in January 2011 voted for separation from the North and the creation of the Republic of South Sudan. This ushered in a new era for the South Sudanese, full of promises but also important challenges. Years of armed struggle and political neglect by the centre had resulted in very weak political and administrative institutions, poverty, underdevelopment, high illiteracy and mortality rates, and a practically nonexistent infrastructure. The availability of funds from the oil sector and other sources had, in the absence of proper scrutiny, generated corruption and created resentment. In 2010, elections were held that were contested by some but gave the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) a majority in Parliament. Today, while the SPLM Government still derives legitimacy from its history of armed struggle, it has been criticized for monopolizing power and resources. The Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), the armed branch of the SPLM, has also been accused of behaving like
a rebel group, by taking sides in some inter-communal conflicts, which not only persist but also have generated increasing casualties in recent months. In addition to these internal problems, the new Government of South Sudan will have to deal with tensions on its northern and southern borders.

The challenges facing South Sudan are enormous: in addition to addressing security and humanitarian problems, there is a need to build institutional capacity at all levels, and strengthen the political process by converting the SPLA from a rebel group into a national army.

**Libya.** In mid-February, just as the results of the referendum in South Sudan were being announced, the popular unrest that had been sweeping the Arab World since the beginning of 2011 reached Libya. Unlike Egypt and Tunisia, where the violence had been relatively contained, the confrontation between demonstrators and the regime in Libya turned violent early on, taking on aspects of a civil war soon after the first demonstrations. After more than forty years of a dictatorship that believed in “statelessness” and was suspicious of “modern state structures”, there were no credible institutions, such as an army, political parties or civil society organizations, to play a mediating role or channel the demonstrators’ anger and demands. There was also deep distrust of the Government.

As a result, an eight-month internal conflict pitted well-armed militias, led by the National Transitional Council (NTC), against loyalist forces, ending with the death of Qaddafi in October 2011. Since then, the NTC has been in charge, following recognition by the international community. Among the challenges facing the NTC are the enormous one of replacing the defunct “Jamahiriya” with a viable entity in the longer term, and creating the minimum conditions for stability in the shorter term. At this early stage of its life, tensions within the NTC (between Islamists and secularists, as well as based on tribal allegiance) and between the NTC and external rebels groups could, if not contained, cripple its short term capacity to stabilize the country and prevent relapse into civil war. To succeed, it will need to pacify and integrate Qaddafi’s loyalists collect arms, unify rebel groups, rebuild the economy – particularly the oil sector – and organize fair and transparent elections. In this connection, the NTC constitutional declaration (of October 2011) sets a tight timetable: interim Government within 30 days, electoral law within 90 days, and elections within 240 days.

The challenges facing Libya are as daunting as those in South Sudan. Although Libya can count on greater and more readily available wealth, a much more developed infrastructure, high literacy rates and high income per capita, the NTC has to lead the transition to democracy on much shakier political grounds.
than the Government of South Sudan and does not enjoy the same legitimacy as the SPLM. Leading an eight-month insurgency against a dictator does not compare with the SPLM’s years of struggle against “occupation” and the fact that the ballots have already confirmed the SPLM’s accession to power.

UNSMIL and UNMISS

At the request of the two Governments, respectively, the UN deployed the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) in July 2011 and the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) in September 2011. While UNMISS is a large peacekeeping operation with a significant military component, UNSMIL is a special political mission. UNSMIL was deployed for an initial period of three months, essentially to scope, assess and advise on what it should be doing in support of the Libyan government while providing some urgent assistance. UNMISS was established for an initial one-year, renewable period, with clearly identified priorities. Both missions are deployed under Chapter 7.

In designing the mandates of these two missions, there has been a clear effort to draw on the lessons of past peace operations. One key lesson is that to consolidate the peace, it is necessary to start addressing peace-building priorities immediately. The mandates of both missions are, therefore, broadly centered on peace-building. While UNSMIL’s mandate has not yet fully taken shape, it has been asked to provide urgent advice and assistance to the Libyans in areas identified by the Libyan government, coordinate the efforts of the international community, and, in consultation with the Libyans, to lay the ground for a future mandate. The mission’s focus is on the following immediate peace-building priorities: security and rule of law; inclusive political dialogue, national reconciliation, constitution-making and electoral processes; extension of state authority, including through strengthening emerging accountable institutions and the restoration of public services; human rights; and economic recovery. UNSMIL has 250 authorized staff, 50 of which had been deployed at the time of writing.

The mandate of UNMISS sets out the Mission’s principal objective as helping the Government strengthen its capacity “to govern effectively and democratically” and “foster longer-term state-building and economic development”. UNMISS is tasked with providing advice and support on: political transition, governance, establishment of state authority, inclusive constitutional process, elections, etc. The two main priorities in this area are to convert the SPLA into a national army and to extend the State’s presence and legitimacy throughout the territory. In addition to state building, the protection of civilians is an
important feature of UNMISS’s mandate. The Security Council has authorized 7000 military and 900 civilian police personnel for UNMISS, in addition to “an appropriate civilian component”.

Another key lesson from past operations relates to the need to prioritize national ownership. For this reason, the UN planning process in each case placed great emphasis on the need for the UN to follow the national lead. In-depth planning took place in the field rather than at Headquarters, ensuring that Headquarters-based planners did not prejudice the needs on the ground from a distance. The Libyan planning process has been phased, beginning with a pre-assessment process at Headquarters and followed by a three-month deployment of UNSMIL, whose main task is to plan for the future UN role. In the case of UNMISS, a planning mission was deployed on the ground for a significantly longer period than the customary several-week Technical Assessment Mission. The mission’s mandate placed peace-building at centre stage and set out certain general peace-building objectives, but it called for UNMISS to work with the Government, the UN system and other international stakeholders to develop a more specific plan for UN System support for peace-building tasks.

Challenges Ahead

Regardless of how well past lessons have been taken into account, UNSMIL and UNMISS are each likely to encounter a number of key challenges. Some of these are discussed below.

The UN’s Relationship with the Government. The first challenge is the UN’s ability to strengthen the political process, in a situation where the government does not owe its legitimacy to a UN-sponsored peace process, or owes it only in part. The UN has a solid track record in several aspects of the early stages of peace-building, such as helping to put in place an all-inclusive political process and supporting the drafting of a constitution and the organization of elections. More often than not, the UN’s support has been effective because: 1) it has been based on a peace agreement that it had helped negotiate; 2) the UN has subsequently dealt with a transitional government that was pieced together as a result of that agreement and owed its legitimacy to it; and 3) the UN was able to reach out to key stakeholders and civil society organizations directly or indirectly involved in the implementation of that agreement. This, naturally, has enhanced the UN’s credibility and legitimacy and ensured, at least in the early stages, that it has the trust of the parties and the capacity to persuade them to comply with international standards.
The situation may be somehow different in Libya and South Sudan and may affect the dynamics between the two governments and the UN. The UN has the consent of the two governments, both of which requested its presence. It is also appreciated in Libya (for its role in supporting independence in 1951 and, more recently, for authorizing a no-fly zone) and in South Sudan (for its long involvement and recent role in organizing the referendum). At the same time, in both countries there is a homegrown transitional process and the two nascent governments do not suffer from an intrinsic legitimacy deficit, as has been the case in other contexts where the UN has been deployed. Both governments already have a high degree of legitimacy, which they gained mainly by defending a national cause – the NTC for having led the struggle against an oppressor, and the SPLM Government for having led a liberation movement. It remains to be seen how this reality will shape these governments’ relationships with the UN in the coming months and whether they will be ready to cooperate fully on all aspects of their respective mandates.

In Libya, for example, the NTC’s decision to hold elections in eight months goes against the lesson the UN has learned the hard way in the last twenty years, namely that elections have a greater chance of success if they are well prepared and not rushed. It is not clear if the United Nations was consulted on this matter, but this decision points to a Libyan determination to chart its own course, without seeking advice, on at least some critical issues in the transition.

In view of the above, how can the UN maximize its role and advice in the months ahead? Will these governments heed, or even seek, the UN’s advice with regard to sensitive issues such as human rights monitoring, governance reform, compliance with international standards, promotion of an inclusive process, and the running of the transition? Or will they resist this in the name of national ownership? How should the Organization posture itself to maximize the chances that these governments strike a balance between national ownership and compliance with international standards?

Viability of the political process. A second challenge is that the UN may find itself in a difficult position if the government, which it is meant to help, is not representative enough to rally popular support behind the transitional process. The risk in this case is the creation of fertile ground for spoilers, who could undermine the whole process. This is a challenge that the UN may face at one stage in Libya, but also in South Sudan, if it turns out that the transitional government, which may have enough autonomy to prevent UNSMIL implement certain aspects of its mandate, does not have enough legitimacy to rally popular support behind the process.
How can the UN play a role in helping to broaden the political settlement and make it more representative? How can it do so while fully respecting national ownership and without giving the impression that it is interfering in the political process?

**National ownership.** A third challenge concerns the issue of national ownership. This principle has been part of the UN’s rhetoric for some time, and is a stated goal of all peace operations. In the case of Libya and South Sudan where, as discussed above, the issue of the government’s legitimacy is distinct from other contexts, and where the bulk of the UN’s efforts will be directed at sensitive tasks such as state-building and building democracy, it will be more critical than ever to ensure that mere lip service is not paid to this goal. Both nations will need to move their respective countries forward, at their own pace, without pressure and interference from the outside. International actors who see their interests as being at stake will have high expectations for speedy delivery, and will have their own views of priorities and how things should be done. UNMISS and UNSMIL will need to constantly underscore that it will take time for these processes to bring about sustainable results – i.e. hold these actors back from pushing prematurely for “results” – while maintaining the interest and engagement of the international community. How, and for how long, will the two missions manage to achieve this, especially as the inevitable flood of national and regional envoys arrive on the scene? Are the usual mechanisms (Groups of Friends, Contact Group, etc.) equipped to deal adequately with this challenge?

**Long-term state-building.** Another challenge relates to the ability of the UN to implement its peace-building mandate. UN peace operations have accumulated significant experience in establishing transitional governments, organizing elections and, in some cases, constitution-making. They are less well equipped, however, and have thus far had more of a more mixed record, when it comes to building effective institutions. Much of the UN’s thinking in terms of peace-building focuses on the “immediate aftermath of conflict” and less on long-term state-building, even if the UN has drawn some general lessons from its limited state-building experience. One lesson is that the prescriptive approach adopted in contexts such as the Balkans does not work and that national ownership is a fundamental aspect of state-building. Another lesson is that the UN has a comparative advantage when it comes to “preparing the ground” for state-building by relying on the support of partners and coordinating their efforts, rather than actually carrying out peace-building tasks. A third lesson is that it is important to start addressing long-term peace-building priorities immediately after the end of a conflict. But it is still not clear how effective the UN can be at “preparing the ground” for state-building.
In South Sudan, the UN is being asked to play a greater peace-building role, notably by helping build a national army. Yet, the experience in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and elsewhere has shown how difficult a task this can be, even when bilateral donors are actively involved and when national ownership is given due importance. Why would the chances of success in peace building be greater this time? How effective can UN support to a locally-driven peace-building strategy be if the host government does not have the capacity to deliver?

**Achieving multiple objectives.** Yet another challenge is how the multiplicity of tasks required in these countries can be achieved. One solution is to give the UN multiple mandates, as in the case of UNMISS: its focus is mainly on peace-building while, at the same time, the mission has a key military role and protection of civilians mandate. But how can the mission ensure that the capacity (not to mention the resources, at a time of financial restraint) is in place to carry out these multiple, complex responsibilities satisfactorily – i.e. such that one aspect of the mandate does not take capacity and energy away from the others? Is a single mission, no matter how large, capable of focusing effectively on these disparate issues at the same time?

An alternative approach is to narrow the scope of the UN mandate. UNSMIL, for example, was initially tasked with providing urgent support in a number of different areas over a short period of time (security, transitional process, elections, governance, human rights, early recovery, and so on). It could end up having a much narrower, more achievable mandate, but the question will still remain as to how all the other needs that fall outside of UNSMIL’s mandated will be achieved. Will the government have the capacity to do all these things on its own? Can it count on bilateral support, and will this support be coordinated and effective? What role can regional organizations play in this regard, and how can the UN support their role?

**Resources.** Finally, in the current environment of financial restraint, another challenge that must be raised is how to fulfill peace-building mandates at a time when funds for peace-building are limited. UNMISS, which is a peacekeeping mission, has the advantage of being funded through assessed contributions. Nevertheless, is concern over resources hampering its activities? UNSMIL, which is a special political mission, faces the additional challenge of securing funding through the regular budget. Is this issue influencing the design of the mission’s future mandate?
Conclusion

In this climate of greater scrutiny of peace operations, the effectiveness and, ultimately, success of UNMISS and UNSMIL will have important implications for the United Nations. More important will be the impact of these operations on the democratic wave that has been spreading in the wider Middle East, and in North and Sub-Saharan Africa. There is no question that if democracy were to take hold in South Sudan this would have an important impact on Sudan and the surrounding countries. Equally, the outcome of events in Libya will undoubtedly influence the future of the Arab Spring. At a time when the UN is trying to reshape its response to ever-evolving conflicts, these two missions are important test cases for its capacity to respond to new challenges.
Enabling United Nations and Regional Organisations Partnerships in Africa – Priorities for the Future

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The Context – Peacekeeping Overstretch

Today, all organisations engaged in peace operations are suffering from overstretch. This strain is the result of the dramatic expansion of worldwide peace operations during the last decade. At the end of the 1990s, the United Nations deployed some 20,000 peacekeepers and had a peacekeeping budget of ca. US$ 1 billion per year. Ten years later, it fields ca. 120,000 personnel at a cost of ca. US$ 7 billion per year. These increases were caused partly by the growth of the number of operations deployed and partly because operations have grown in scope from purely military tasks to include large police and civilian components and thus consumed more time, personnel and funds than originally foreseen. The operational capacities of other organisations such as the AU, EU, and NATO are under similar strains.

As a consequence, political pressure from both troop and police contributing countries and those nations bearing the financial burden is mounting to slow this growth or even scale back deployments. The recent discussions about the future of the missions in Sudan, Liberia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Timor-Leste, and Afghanistan provide evidence of this development. The world financial crisis will surely have an additional negative impact on the international willingness to enter into new commitments. At the same time, the demand for peace operations is unlikely to decrease in the near future.

Peacekeeping Partnerships to the Rescue?

Numerous ideas to tackle peacekeeping overstretch are currently being discussed. They include the accelerated drawing down (or closing) of seemingly successful operations; the realization of savings from streamlined procurement and logistics systems; and a shift from substantial military operations towards light political missions. Another approach that has attracted much attention is the possibility to utilize scarce resources more efficiently by improving the cooperation between different organisations. These so-called peacekeeping partnerships are not new. On the contrary, they have become the norm: roughly
half of UN missions, over two-thirds of EU operations and all NATO ground-based operations are deployed with at least one partner organisation.

The legal basis for peacekeeping partnerships is to be found in the UN Charter. Chapter VIII acknowledges, particularly in Article 52(1) and (3), the scope for contribution of regional organisations to conflict resolution. But it also makes clear in Article 53(1) that this role is meant to be a supplement to UN capacities, not a substitute. This primacy of the UN and its Security Council in the global peace and security architecture has been recognized – at least in principle – by all other actors.

In the past, many of these inter-organisational cooperations were the result of (sometimes questionable) political considerations. Little thought was given to costs or practicability. In the current political and financial climate, this will certainly change. The future of existing joint operations and the authorisation of additional ones will depend on demonstrating that they can be both cost-effective and viable. At least in regard to costs, the UN and the AU individually already enjoy an advantage. Several studies have found evidence that their operations, while not cheap, are a bargain compared to those of other actors such as NATO or the EU. But can the UN and the AU work together efficiently?

The Advantages of Asymmetry: United Nations and African Union

That the two organisations need each other is beyond dispute. For two decades, African conflicts have been at the centre of the UN’s attention: about three-quarters of UN military, police and civilian personnel are deployed in peace operations on this continent. These missions also account for three-quarters of the UN peacekeeping budget. Promoting peace and security as a prerequisite for development is of course also a primary concern of the AU. But the UN/AU partnership is not only based on common interests. It is also founded on shared values, mutually reinforcing legitimacy – and dependency on each other’s resources. The two sides also show strengths and weaknesses that lead to distinct comparative advantages that have proven very fruitful in the past and could be even more productive in the future.

The AU possesses unrivalled local knowledge and legitimacy. Its member states have also shown the political will to authorise operations in high-risk environments. There exists, however, a considerable gap between the organisation’s willingness and its ability to act. The AU has neither a predictable funding mechanism nor the capacities to independently sustain its missions. The UN, on the other hand, has unique experience and abilities to plan, deploy, and support
large-scale peace operations. Crucially, it also has access to a reliable source of funding in the form of its assessed contributions. What it lacks is the political will to intervene in ongoing conflicts: UN peacekeepers can only go where there is “a peace to keep”.

Patterns of Peacekeeping Partnerships in Africa

As a result of these strengths and weaknesses, a noticeable pattern has developed for peace operations in Africa: the AU specialises in the role as first responder, deploying risky “no-peace-to-keep” operations. The UN then either joins or takes over to concentrate on long-term peacekeeping and peacebuilding. This division of labour was first apparent in Burundi, when an AU mission (AMIB) established in 2003 was replaced by a UN operation (ONUB) one year later. It was repeated in Darfur where AMIS, deployed by the AU in 2005, was first supported logistically by the UN (and also the EU and bilateral donors) and then in 2008 transformed into the UN/AU hybrid mission UNAMID. The case of Somalia is slightly different. The situation in this country has remained so volatile that the UN has so far been unable to deploy more than a small political office, UNPOS, operating from Nairobi. However, the AU operation in Somalia (AMISOM) receives vital financial, logistical and management support from the UN through a specialised support mission, the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA, also located in Nairobi).

Several lessons have emerged from these experiences, particularly from the two ongoing operations in Darfur and Somalia. First, it is clear that the AU remains dependent on external support to sustain its missions. Second, the AU and the UN have proven to be capable of devising new models of cooperation based on political necessities and the realities on the ground. Third, the process of setting up and the daily management of the joint efforts in UNAMID and AMISOM have led to considerable frictions between the two partners. These strains demonstrate that significant efforts still need to be made by both sides to improve their cooperation both on the political and strategic, and particularly on the management and operational level. The good news is that the UN and the AU acknowledge the gaps and are willing to work towards closing them and thus develop the full potential of their partnership.

Identifying the Challenges

Although UN/AU interaction started with the latter’s establishment in 2002, the central pillar of their operational partnership has become the “Ten-Year Capacity Building Programme for the AU”, endorsed by the UN General
Assembly in November 2006 1. It was conceived to improve the coherence of the engagement of the entire UN system with the AU and also African Regional Economic Communities (RECs) across a wide range of subject areas, from peace operations to food security and environmental protection. Currently exactly at its midpoint, the programme was the subject of two recent reports by the Secretary-General2 and a report by the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS)3.

Together, the three reports provide not only an overview of past and ongoing activities, but, more importantly, they also list the shortcomings of the collective effort. The following (severely condensed) catalogue can serve as a useful starting point for a discussion of challenges and possible solutions:

- No over-all strategic vision for the programme was developed.
- There remains a lack of clarity as to the channels of interaction and proper counterparts on the AU side.
- The assessment of AU needs was insufficient.
- An uncoordinated glut of actors has caused duplication of efforts and an overloading of limited AU human capacities.
- A focus on delivering project goals led to “capacity substitution” instead of capacity building.

Headquarters Level/Strategic Challenges

The Secretary-General has stated that “without a truly strategic relationship and clear guidance, our efforts to work together will continue to be short-term, ad hoc, more complicated and often more costly” 4. This strategic relationship and guidance can only be achieved through constructive interactions of the UN Security Council and its counterpart in the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)5, the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC). The importance the UN attaches to African security can be gauged from the fact that the PSC is the only political body with which members of the Security Council hold annual meetings, which started in 2007. However, these meetings have so far largely focused on procedural rather than substantive matters. There have been lengthy discussions, for instance, on the question of whether the PSC is meeting with the UN Security Council or rather just the members of the UN Security Council.

1 A/61/630, 16.11.2006,
3 A/65/762, 28.02.2011
4 A/65/510–S/2010/514, para 55
5 The other elements of APSA are the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS); the Panel of the Wise; the African Standby Force (ASF); and the Peace Fund.
The issues of primacy and subsidiarity underlying this disagreement are serious and need to be worked out if the annual meetings are to promote a common strategic vision. What is needed is a framework that answers the questions of why, when, and how the UN and AU will work together in peace operations. It remains to be seen what the added value of the UN-AU Joint Task Force on Peace and Security (JTF) in this context will be. As in other venues of UN/AU cooperation, the three JTF meetings so far held have suffered from a lack of senior AU participants, caused by human resource bottlenecks.

An important step to improve the relationship between two other key bodies, the UN Secretariat and the AU Commission, was recently taken with the inauguration in February 2011 of the UN Office to the African Union (UNOAU). It integrates four formerly separate UN presences in Addis Ababa: the UN Liaison Office; the AU Peace and Support Team; the UN Planning Team for the AU Mission in Somalia; and the administrative functions of the Joint Support and Coordination Mechanism for the AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur. Even at this early stage of its existence, it appears that UNOAU has already made interactions between New York and Addis Ababa considerably smoother.

**Field Level/Operational Challenges**

On the operational level, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Field Support (DFS) have for several years assisted the operationalization of the African Standby Force (ASF), a critical component of APSA. The military units constituting the ASF are to be provided by AU member states and to be trained and deployed in brigade-size units by five RECs. A significant amount of training, supported by DPKO and DSF, has been conducted in the regions, and the AU as well as the regional planning elements are now functional. Full operational readiness of at least some brigades is expected for 2015.

Key challenges remain, however: the degree of advancement differs sharply between member states and from region to region; a rapid deployment capability as well as regional and AU management and support capacities are still missing; and the police and civilian components necessary for multidimensional peace operations lag far behind. Here is an opportunity for DPKO and DFS as

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6 JTF was established in September 2010, see A/64/359/S/2009/470
7 The UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) mentioned above remains a separate entity.
8 The units are: the East African Standby Force (EASF); the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Standby Force (ESF); the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) Standby Force; the North African Regional Capability (NARC) Standby Force; and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Standby Force (SSF).
they have unique experience in recruiting, training and supporting police and civilian elements in peace operations. Steps should be taken to tailor their activities to the actual needs of the AU and the RECs and in particular to coordinate them with those of other actors engaged in this area.

Another crucial requirement of the AU is enhanced logistics capabilities. DFS continues to share its knowledge in this field with AU Commission staff in preparation for the establishment of an AU logistics base at an undetermined point in the future. Until this becomes operational, some form of bridging mechanism is clearly needed. The UN is currently exploring the possibility of giving the AU access to facilities at the UN Logistics Base in Brindisi, Italy; to UN strategic deployment stocks; to existing UN system procurement contracts; to strategic airlift capacities; and to a surge capacity in the form of a small team of UN logistics experts for the critical mission start-up phase. These measures were in part already included in the recommendations of the report of the Joint UN/AU panel (the so-called “Prodi Report”) of December 2008 ⁹ and should be implemented as soon as possible.

DPKO has also scaled up its training activities in support of the AU and the RECs. These focus on expanding planning capacities, specific functional areas such as logistics and police operations, and preparing potential mission leaders for future deployments. In addition, DPKO is strengthening African capacities by working with African training centres and conducting train-the-trainers courses. The UN is also aware, however, that in the medium term the AU will need an in-house training facility. Hopefully, it will act on this insight and fully support its implementation.

Challenges to African Union Capabilities

Any discussion of AU capabilities must unfortunately start with money. To again quote the Secretary-General: “The issue of securing sustainable, predictable and flexible financing ... remains a key challenge”¹⁰. Although the AU in 2009 made the decision to increase assessments on member states to the African Peace Fund, it is clear that for the foreseeable future it will remain dependent on outside funding. This takes the form of voluntary, case-by-case contributions by international partners, in particular by the EU’s African Peace Facility and by UN assessed contributions. Although of course welcome, voluntary contributions have obvious drawbacks. They are volatile by nature and their acquisition channels AU staff time and energy into fund-raising activities.

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¹⁰ A/65/510–S/2010/514, para 42
In consequence, the AU PSC has repeatedly called on the UN to approve a general authorization of the use of UN assessed contributions for AU peace operations authorised by the Security Council. A similar recommendation was also included in the Prodi Report. The Security Council has on several occasions “recognized the need” for sufficient and predictable funding and agreed to “keep all options under considerations”. All parties agree that this is a highly unsatisfactory state of affairs but no one has been able to find a way forward. Given current – and probable future – global financial constraints, the deadlock will probably not go away soon. Yet it is imperative that the international community keeps exploring ways to secure “sustainable, predictable and flexible” financing for AU operations.

The second key stumbling block to improving AU readiness for peace operations lies in the limits of its human capital. Staff numbers, internal organisations and professional expertise all leave room for improvement. Practitioners on both sides are aware of this problem, in fact AU staff has in many different forums highlighted the “absorptive capacity” of AU institutions as a primary area of concern. It must also be mentioned, however, that the uncoordinated approach to capacity building by a plethora of competing international actors has not helped. It appears that at least in some cases, highly qualified AU staff spend more time liaising and being mentored than actually doing their job. This is not a criticism of liaison and mentoring activities as such. Both are valuable tools for capacity building – but they need to be used in a coherent and targeted manner.

In some instances, the form of UN engagement has also raised the question of ownership. The OIOS report admits: “there were cases where their [DPKO and DSF] support to the African Union Commission was to function as a substitute capacity. This support was much valued and met the immediate needs of the current field missions; it did not, however, necessarily lead to a sustained incremental improvement in the capacity of the Union” 11. This dilemma is, of course, familiar to all practitioners in the field of peace operations and development cooperation. There are cases when it cannot be completely resolved. However, designing support activities with an explicit focus on local ownership and training UN staff in mentoring and advising techniques are possible remedies.

Finally, it is important to note that the AU has recently undertaken a comprehensive reform effort, targeting its financial department and staffing. As a result, financial management, accountability and reporting have significantly improved. The AU is also tackling its endemic personnel problems. Over the last five years Commission staff has grown to about 1.500 (at the AU’s estab-

11 A/65/762, para 72
lishment in 2002, staff size was set at 675). A review is now underway to ensure that staffing structures are better aligned with core Commission tasks and also the structures of key partner organisations.

The examples given above illustrate two things: on the one hand, many intractable, systemic obstacles have to be overcome before the UN/AU partnership in peace operation in Africa can become truly effective. On the other, political will from above and a daily commitment to finding workable solutions at the working level make it possible to clear them away, one by one. Political will in multi-lateral organisations, however, can only ever be as strong as their member states allow it to be. Member states, therefore, also need to put their weight behind strengthening the UN/AU partnership.

Recommendations

**Strategic level**
1. Create a strategic framework or common vision for cooperation ("why, when and how?") and a *detailed roadmap* for implementation

**Field level**
2. Provide coherent, well-coordinated support to ASF, particularly its *police* and *civilian* components
3. Establish in-house AU *training* capacities
4. Improve AU *logistics* capabilities by providing access to UN logistics infrastructure and experience

**Capacity building**
5. Keep exploring ways to secure “sustainable, predictable and flexible” *financing* for AU operations, either through UN assessed contributions or some alternative mechanism
6. Streamline capacity building measures by improving needs assessment and *coordination* between different providers (UN, EU, NATO, bilateral actors), including at the sub-regional and member state level
7. Promote understanding of the inner workings and organisational culture of the partner through staff exchanges and “learning days”
Enabling Military Contributions

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Introduction

Over the past decade, the mandates of United Nations peacekeeping missions have become increasingly ambitious; most are multidimensional missions authorised under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. They frequently take place in logistically challenging environments, like the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan, where even “large” UN missions – in terms of troops and police – are thin on the ground. The emphasis on protection of civilians, among other mandated tasks, has also placed a premium on rapid responsiveness, forward deployment, and proactive presence patrolling that challenge traditional static deployments of infantry troops that make up the bulk of UN peacekeepers. Moreover, peacekeepers are frequently called upon to use force in self-defence or in defence of a mandate, whether against well-armed rebel groups, or organised security forces.

These trends have necessitated increasing reliance on force enabling and force multiplying capabilities like helicopters for troop deployment, rotation, resupply, and patrols; on armoured personnel carriers and field hospitals to mitigate and respond to casualties; and surveillance and information-collection technologies like communications monitoring, infrared radar, and night vision capabilities.

Such capabilities are often in short supply in UN-led missions, however. In part, this shortage is due to another shift in peacekeeping over the past decade: the growth in troop contributions from the global South and the withdrawal of large-scale Western contributions to UN-commanded operations. In 2010, for example, the top ten troop contributors to UN peacekeeping were all middle- or low-income countries, nine from Asia and Africa. Of course, many current troop-contributing countries (TCCs) are extremely capable. Some, however,

12 The authors wish to thank Hazel Haddon for her contribution to the paper.
15 Uruguay, ranked ninth, is the exception. ARGPO 2011.
struggle to deploy with minimum standards of equipment or arrive in mission with limited access to realistic pre-deployment training, let alone to more sophisticated force multipliers and enablers.

Meanwhile, amid the current financial crisis, heated debates in New York over troop reimbursement rates (and, indeed, mission mandates and force requirements) this past year have worsened tensions between Western countries that pay the bulk of the UN’s assessed budget and those countries that provide most of the troops, further fraying the “grand bargain” under which peacekeeping has surged over the past decade.

In short, the mismatch between mandates and resources – a problem identified in the Brahimi Report over a decade ago – remains current. Many good political solutions have been tabled to improve the contribution of TCCs to Security Council mandates, as well as to communicate the impact on missions of insufficient capabilities. This paper looks at options to enhance military contributions for UN peacekeeping. It offers two sets of suggestions – the first set is how to deepen and/or strengthen the capabilities of TCCs that are currently willingly to deploy troops to UN-led peace operations\textsuperscript{16}; the second is how to incentivise those countries that largely deploy peacekeepers through platforms other than the UN.

### Options for Enabling Military Contributions

**Strengthening Existing TCCs.** There are numerous existing bilateral and multilateral initiatives aimed at enabling military contributions to peacekeeping, from providing training\textsuperscript{17} and planning assistance\textsuperscript{18} to logistics\textsuperscript{19} and intelligence support.

At UN Headquarters, much emphasis has been placed on increasing consultations between the Security Council and TCCs on mission mandates. This is a particular concern for troop contributors, who wish to see mandates drafted in a clear and implementable way. After initial progress in early 2009, the initiative faltered, but may have new momentum after the Security Council’s thematic debate on peacekeeping during India’s presidency in August 2011. The session recommended that Reports of the Secretary-General provide “realistic assessment[s] of current capabilities and logistical planning, and how they affected implementation of various mandate elements”, as well as that the prac-

\textsuperscript{16} This distinction, of course, is an oversimplification. Indeed, several European countries, including Italy, France, and Spain are significant providers of troops, albeit to specific missions like UNIFIL.

\textsuperscript{17} E.g., the United States’ Global Peace Operations Initiative and the G8 “Action Plan”.

\textsuperscript{18} E.g. the Strategic Military Cell established for UNIFIL.

\textsuperscript{19} US support to Nigerian peacekeepers in Liberia during the ECOWAS intervention.
TROOP CONTRIBUTORS ARE CONCERNED THAT THEY SHOULD BE INVOLVED IN THE PLANNING STAGES OF THE PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS TO WHICH THEIR FORCES ARE DEPLOYED. Mandate drafting is a vital area for this kind of consultation, but broader cooperation throughout the planning process between TCCs, the Security Council and the UN Secretariat would be received positively by troop contributors. Troop contributors cite the pre-deployment stage, the drafting of rules of engagement, and the planning of a peacebuilding strategy as critical points at which their involvement should be sought.

The shortage of military utility and attack helicopters has operational consequences, as noted above, in terms of logistics, medical evacuation, reconnaissance, air and ground support, and deterrence. Providing a guaranteed minimum reimbursement to helicopter providers would help ensure the sustainability of their deployments and potential encourage additional deployments. Increasing bilateral support to pilot training and refurbishment could also increase the pool of helicopter providers to UN peacekeeping.

Another option is the use of “support packages” of material and equipment like those provided to the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The light support package to AMIS, for example, included 36 armored personnel carriers. Support packages could be provided either directly by the UN (for example, through modification of the Strategic Deployment Stocks) regional organizations, or bilaterally. UN support packages, however, would have consequences for the assessed budget.

The electoral crisis in Cote d’Ivoire in early 2011 points to another recent innovation – intermission asset sharing. The transfer, in November 2010, of Ukrainian utility helicopters and, in April, of Ukrainian attack helicopters from the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) to the UN Operation in Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI) provided the latter with surge air assets at a turning point in country’s security situation, enabling UN and French peacekeepers to defeat forces loyal to former president Gbagbo. Similar sharing of other units across regionally proximate missions could be envisioned – for example, sharing of military field hospitals.

Relationships with existing troop contributors must also be strengthened, and their concerns addressed. TCCs stress the importance of continued bilateral and

20 Security Council (SC/10368), 26 August 2011.
multilateral cooperation, particularly in providing logistical resources and training for countries which contribute large contingents. They also raise technical points that should be addressed if relationships are to be sustained, including reviewing the compensation procedures for loss of military equipment, whereby some agreements limit compensation to cases where equipment has received damage worth more than 10 per cent of its total value. In the case of high value equipment, damage that is lower than this percentage may represent a significant loss, and may deter troop contributors from deploying expensive force multipliers. These agreements should therefore be reviewed.

Other technical issues could be resolved in order to support and encourage existing troop contributors, such as speeding up the payment system of financial entitlements in case of the death or injury of troops, in order to allow the quick dispersal of compensation, and maintaining ongoing cooperation between DPKO, the TCCs and the host country when peacekeeping missions draw to a close, in order that the troops and equipment deployed on mission may be quickly discharged.

The first set of options outlined above should help remove caveats that some troop contributors have at times imposed on their units, and strengthen their effectiveness against spoilers. These options, however, do not address questions of individual leadership – which often prove decisive, whether in protecting civilians or standing up to armed aggressors.

Encouraging More Western Military Involvement

The drawdown of Western militaries in Afghanistan has prompted speculation, if not hope, that Western militaries may return to UN peacekeeping. Yet, debates in capitals are likely to hinge on three factors. First, despite improvements in UN command and control and operational support over the past decade, these systems are still significantly lighter than Western militaries in NATO and the EU have come to expect. Second, Western countries will insist on faster casualty evacuation and better medical support than typically available within UN peacekeeping operations. Third, governments replacing military equipment damaged in Afghanistan, Libya, and elsewhere will have to justify the expenditure for peacekeeping domestically – and in a much constrained financial environment. If the UN is able to overcome these issues, it will lower obstacles to reentry. In principle, strengthened mechanisms for UN command and control, and better medical response, and better communication by the UN of its successes in the field would benefit all troop contributors.22

Nonetheless, even without a return to UN peacekeeping, there are partnership models whereby countries or other regional organizations, like the European Union, could support UN peace operations outside of UN command and control through “green-blue” or inter-institutional partnerships. From a UN perspective, such a model is not ideal, as it can lead to fragmentation and reinforce perceptions of a two-tier system. Nonetheless, countries that currently prefer deploying through NATO or the European Union could deploy units – including specialised assets like attack helicopters and maritime units – as an “add-on” mission to the UN’s peacekeepers. The advantage of this model was amply demonstrated during the Cote d’Ivoire election crisis, when the relatively small French Operation Licorne significantly multiplied the UN’s own military capabilities.

This model may be particularly valuable in two contexts: first, in transition environments, like Timor-Leste and Haiti, where peacekeeping missions are in the process of drawdown. Second, in environments where a civilian or unarmed military mission may be more appropriate than a heavy peacekeeping presence, like Libya. In both cases, smaller, rapidly deployable, highly mobile forces – located either in-country or “over the horizon” – could provide protection, extraction, and crisis management to civilian or unarmed military/police missions. Examples include the vanguard of US Marines deployed to Monrovia in 1999 ahead of ECOWAS forces, and the UK’s joint rapid reaction force in Sierra Leone in 2000. The World Development Report 2011 has called for a joint UN-World Bank study on the feasibility and practical arrangements for long-term security guarantees, including rapid reaction forces.23

Finally, it is worth noting that while some of the most notable examples of rapid reaction capabilities exist outside of the UN, there are examples within the UN – for example, the Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) (ultimately terminated), and the surge military capacity deployed to Haiti after the January 2010 earthquake. A recent article in International Peacekeeping also calls for the establishment of two “Standing High Readiness Battalions” (SHIRBATS), with wide regional composition, to provide rapidly deployable mission-planning and “lead deployment elements” for UN missions.24

Conclusion

As United Nations peacekeeping operations become more complex and face new challenges, the demands placed on military contributors become greater.

Existing troop contributors, mainly from the global South, need support from other countries, for example by providing equipment or assets via multilateral or bilateral partnerships, or by providing logistical assistance and training. Strong relationships between troop contributors and key UN actors such as DPKO and the Security Council, must be maintained, and planning stages of peacekeeping operations must necessarily involve consultation and cooperation with troop contributors, particularly at the critical stages of drafting and renewing mandates, establishing rules of engagement, and pre-deployment. Troop contributors’ concerns about technical issues such as compensation for lost equipment and repatriation of troops at the end of operations must be addressed in order to maintain good relationships and encourage confidence.

Encouraging Western countries to return to peacekeeping operations as troop contributors would also strengthen the military capacities of UN operations. Improving mechanisms for command and control and providing better medical responses, as requested by these countries, would in fact benefit all contributors.

In addition, there may be possibilities for inter-institutional cooperation, whereby troops deployed to regional organisations such as the European Union or NATO could be used to support UN missions. This kind of mechanism offers new possibilities for rapidly deployed, mobile forces, which may be particularly appropriate for certain conflict situations.
Enabling Police and Corrections Contributions

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Introduction

This background paper aims to examine the enabling police and corrections contributions to multi-dimensional, integrated peace operations. By reviewing mandates, roles, recruitment practices and pre-deployment training, this paper will highlight current bottlenecks and identify ways that impact on the effective and efficient contributions from corrections and police personnel.

As peace operations have evolved from traditional military monitoring operations to the multi-dimensional, integrated operations the UN engages in today, the need for the rule of law capacities, in addition to the military contributions, has become increasingly obvious. The number of uniformed personnel serving in peace operations has doubled since 2001, reaching a high point of more than 101,000 early last year. While military troops remain the backbone of peace operations, the widely recognized need for police and corrections officers has been met with an increase in authorized police deployments from 2,400 in 1999 to the current 17,239 as of November 2011 and for corrections officers an increase in the same period from 2 to 250.

The Challenges Forum has focused on rule of law issues by insisting on the inclusion of police and corrections perspectives in its seminars, forums and publications. The Challenges Police Forum, held in cooperation with the United Nations Police Division in New York in February 2011, brought together the Police Commissioners and Police Advisers from current UN missions to discuss the challenges of rule of law in contemporary peace operations. In the plenary discussions, main issues identified were: (1) the growing need for larger numbers of police officers including those with specific skill sets to serve in peace operations, (2) the increasing complexity of tasks for UN police, including how to address the emerging issues of transnational organized crime as a spoiler to any peace process and (3) the lack of sufficient number of women police and corrections officers. Also discussed was the need for integrating police activities with those in the broader justice chain, including the often marginalized area of corrections.

Addressing the need for all aspects of the justice chain to be included in peace operations is not a new idea. The Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations\(^{26}\) (also known as the “Brahimi report”) is often referenced as the starting point for including justice and corrections as an integral part to rule of law in peace operations. It stated that a greater effectiveness among the host country’s police may, in fact, be diminished if there is not a correspondingly enhanced capacity in the associated areas of the judiciary and corrections.

A much needed focus on these issues has been given by the subsequent establishment of the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) within DPKO. At the same time, the Security Council has included justice and corrections aspects in all new peace operations. Currently, there are almost 260 corrections officers deployed in peace operations and Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous described corrections as one of the specialized support areas for which there is growing demand.\(^{27}\)

While this paper recognizes the need for all aspects of the justice chain to be included in peace operations, and that challenges to rule of law benefit from a comprehensive approach, the focus of this paper will be on enabling police and corrections contributions.

Enabling Contributions: Police and Corrections as Peacekeepers and Early Peace-Builders

Traditional duties and responsibilities of UNPOL included monitoring, observing and reporting. When equipped with executive powers (e.g. East Timor and Kosovo), UNPOL were responsible for upholding and enforcing the law. Multi-dimensional peace operations have expanded the demands on UNPOL and wider range of duties and responsibilities are structured along three priority areas: interim policing and law enforcement; operational support; and reform, restructuring and (re)building. Specific mandated tasks include:

- Protection of Civilians (PoC);
- Local capacity building through training;
- Community-Oriented Policing and Problem-Solving (COPPS) (also known as Community Policing);
- Elections support;
- Technical assistance (e.g. staffing, selection, recruitment, planning, processes); and
- Mentoring and advising.

\(^{26}\) A/55/305–S/2000/809
\(^{27}\) USG for Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous speech on Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects (24 October, 2011)
In addition, emerging duties and responsibilities include dealing with issues of international policing, transnational and organised crime that fuel conflict or impact the safety and security of conflict and post-conflict societies.\(^{28}\)

However, the work of UN police and corrections does not take place in a vacuum. As has been widely recognized, peacekeeping is fundamentally political in nature and profile.\(^{29}\) Supporting the political process, creating a secure and stable environment and strengthening local institutions are essentially political tasks and it is crucial that mission components recognize their role as primarily political, rather than technical.\(^{30}\) As has been seen in numerous places, lack of attention to political realities may often result in failed reform efforts.

Deployed police and corrections officers work alongside national counterparts to build sustainable peace through strengthening host countries institutions and organizations. While their numbers are drawn from active services in respective Member States, the role which they are expected to fill in UN missions may be vastly different from the duties they have at home. In their UN duties, they will find that in strengthening host countries capacities they are not only acting as police or corrections officers, UN peacekeepers or mentors, but they are also early peace builders, undertaking activities that lay the groundwork for longer term institutional reform.

As recently stated by the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous, the reforms the UN supports must be seen within the broader framework of peace, security and development.\(^{31}\) The World Development Report on conflict, security and development states that countries with the weakest institutional legitimacy and governance are the most vulnerable to violence and instability.\(^ {32}\) New forms of violence link local political conflicts, transnational and organized crime, and internationalized disputes. Moreover, high levels of organized criminal violence hold back economic development.\(^ {33}\) As such, international support and national efforts must address the challenges of infiltration of transnational and organized crime and trafficking networks lest they risk spoiling efforts of establishing security and rule of law, as well as hampering

\(^{28}\) To increase the effectiveness of UN Police peacekeeping through more consistent harmonized provision of public safety, police reform and support to local Police, the UN Police Division is developing a strategic doctrinal framework for international police peacekeeping.


\(^{31}\) USG for Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous speech on Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects (24 October, 2011)


\(^{33}\) The World Bank, p5.
economic development. The emerging partnership between the DPKO and Interpol will help to strengthen the ability to manage these complex challenges.

While peacekeepers can assist in peacekeeping and early peace building, it must be recognized that the national counterparts hold the ultimate responsibility for providing security and developing effective and accountable security sectors. Experience shows that peace operations are most effective in supporting reforms when they do not focus too narrowly on their own role of service provision. Too often, the emphasis in rule of law assistance has been on foreign experts, externally constructed models and foreign-conceived solutions, leading to lack of sustainable improvements. Needs and priorities of police services and other rule of law actors will reflect the particular histories and political developments of their country, and therefore so should any reform. Thus, peace operations must, as is stated by the UN Secretary-General, become better at assisting national stakeholders in developing their own reform vision and should respect and support local ownership.

Recognizing that the role of UN police is as much about peace and capacity-building as it is about policing and that it is as much political as it is technical, it stands to reason that seconded officers need more than just policing skills to be able to perform their tasks. Additional skill sets, such as ability to work in partnerships with host countries’ ministries, police authorities, courts, prisons, prosecutions, civil society and donors in developing a shared understanding of needs and proposed manners to meet them, are in high demand. Analytical skills are needed to study current constraints of effective policing in its broader legislative and political framework as well as assessing political will for change. As most officers will work in a mentoring or advisory capacity, aptitude and ability to mentor and advise are often essential skills. Above and beyond these general skill sets sought by the UN, is the need to second more specialized officers for deployments to mission police capacities and to focus more on quality rather than quantity. Desired competencies include, inter alia, experts on transnational and organized crime; community-based policing; sexual and gender-based crimes; strategic and operational planning; criminal intelligence; human trafficking and border policing.

34 The World Bank, p. 15.
37 OECD DAC, p. 170.
Similarly, corrections officers are requested to possess not only general knowledge on prison management matters on both an operational and strategic level, but also an in-depth knowledge of international standards governing prisons, including issues related to prison security. In its call for Member States contributions, the UN has asked for corrections officers with background and experience from agricultural projects, prison infrastructure, perimeter control and security experts, training officers, medical planners, health and sanitation specialists and even probation officers.

In sum, it can be said that the profile of officers to be considered for deployment as UN police or corrections is three-fold. First, it needs to include experience and knowledge of technical, specialist functions; second, it needs to include an ability to see the role of its service as a supporting one in the larger political framework and an understanding of the political nature of peace operations; and third, it needs to include an in-depth knowledge of international standards and instruments governing the respective fields of work. Some, but not all, challenges emanating from this expanded role can be addressed by enhancing training and recruitment.

Enabling Contributions: Training

For Member States identifying and nominating officers to UN missions, one emerging challenge is that of providing adequate training for staff, taking into consideration the three-tiered profile the officer at hand must fit. While each mission provides brief induction training for new staff, the responsibility for providing pre-deployment training rests with the Member State. In light of the increasingly complex and multi-layered role played by police and corrections as peacekeepers and early peace-builders, issues related to the preparation phase of deployment have multiplied.

In its report on strategic peacekeeping training needs assessment\(^\text{41}\) (2008), DPKO ITS examined pre-deployment training programs and found that out of almost 6000 respondents from 17 peace operations and HQ surveyed, approximately only 67% of police and 19% of civilians had received any peacekeeping role training prior to deployment. For military, the number was somewhat higher, with 76% having received training.

Progress has been made by DPKO Integrated Training Service (ITS) in developing standardized guidance materials that Member States can draw upon in their pre-deployment trainings, such as Core Pre-Deployment Training Materials (CPTMs) and Specialized Training Materials (STMs). While more and more

\(^{41}\) For full report see www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/ITS.shtml
contributors and training centres are basing their training on the CPTMs and the STMs, the application is inconsistent and incoherent. Moreover, some countries’ police contributions are being undermined by a disconnect between training and deployment. Too many instances remain where those who receive training do not necessarily deploy and those who deploy have not necessarily received training.

As the CPTM represents the “essential knowledge required by all peacekeeping personnel – military, police or civilian to function effectively in a UN peacekeeping operation” 42, it is clearly a problem for the effectiveness of a peace operation if only some of those deployed receive this mission-essential knowledge.

Points for Consideration

a. Some contributing countries continue to lack the capacity to prepare their police officers in a self-sustaining manner. This includes the development of training curricula, the delivery of training courses as well as the management of training plans. Regional training centres can bridge some of these gaps, but some training centres are entirely reliant on external financial and professional support. Stronger coordination between DPKO and the regional organizations, and the national and regional training centres could alleviate some of these concerns;

b. DPKO’s ITS should clarify the level of support available to contributors in applying the pre-deployment training standards to their curriculum. This should be complemented with improved articulation by DPKO Police Division of the specialized training needs and by disseminating information about the regulatory framework (Concept of Operations, Directives on the Use of Force, strategic planning documents). It is evident that contributors of Formed Police Units (FPUs) are often not clear about the training standards for their units and rely heavily on the support of the Centre of Excellence for Stability Police Units (COESPU);

c. While the importance of pre-deployment training is indisputable and the responsibility of providing such training remains with each seconding Member State, it is worth mentioning that induction training also plays a significant role in preparing officers for their tasks. As all officers receive induction training, this training is an opportunity to provide 100% of officers with a clear message of their role and responsibilities in the specific mission. It is widely understood that it takes a couple of months in mission for officers to understand their role and to become effective. While some time to get adjusted to a new environment is

expected, the adjustment time is a high percentage of lost capacity in a six-month or twelve-month deployment. If induction training focused on the actual role and tasks of officers in the particular mission, it is likely that these officers would be ready to be effective much sooner. Moreover, inclusion of local officers in induction training would be a way to forge strong relationships between UN officers and local counterparts; this is also an opportunity to underline that local actors are in the lead and that the UN are there to support the needs of the local counterparts and their process of change;

d. Currently, a corrections specific pre-deployment training manual is being validated by DPKO, which consists of core pre-deployment training modules and specialized training modules articulating the role of corrections officers as mentors with expertise in not only daily prison management skills, but also the international standards and methods to implement these in post-conflict settings. A course based on this manual\textsuperscript{43} is regularly organized by the Swedish Prison and Probation Service and has also been organized by SADC and the Kenyan Prison Service, and officers from Ghana, Kenya, Namibia, Uganda, Zambia and all other SADC countries have participated in it. Such practice might become standard for all pre-deployment training of correction officers;

e. How can Challenges partners and participants enable contributing countries’ pre-deployment training to ensure that they maximize the outputs in terms of providing the officer with relevant knowledge, not only in international standards governing his or her participation in the mission, but also ensuring that each trained officer is well aware of the role of peacekeepers and early peace builders?

f. Could partner countries conduct joint pre-deployment training courses? Would regional training centers be interested in hosting such multi-national training programs? A remaining challenge related to pre-deployment training for both police and corrections officers is that there appears to be a disconnect between training and actual deployment. How can partners contribute to closing this gap?

Enabling Contributions: Increasing the number of Women Officers

The most obvious gap in recruitment for UN peacekeeping is the lack of women. The United Nations Police Division believes that police and corrections services should represent the societies they serve given the significant role they

\textsuperscript{43} For more information contact the Swedish Prison and Probation Service at utlandsgruppen@kriminalvarden.se
play in their communities. Women’s participation in police and corrections peacekeeping empowers the communities in restoring peace and security and in reconstructing not only their police services, but also their societies. One of the UN Police Division’s current priorities is to increase the number of female UN police to 20% by 2014. In 2010 there were 1,215 female UNPOL officers, representing 9% of total police deployments. For corrections, 31 out of 152 seconded corrections officers in October 2011 were female.

However, merely increasing the number of women police and corrections officers is not enough. They must have qualitative tasks and be able to compete for all positions. Moreover, in order to empower local communities, women officers must also be deployed to work closely with these communities. Thus, efforts to increase the number of women must also look at where and in what roles women police and corrections officers are deployed.

In their on-going consultations with police and corrections contributing countries, the UN has highlighted the need to raise awareness of the work of female police officers in peacekeeping missions. Awareness-raising of top decision-makers on the legal imperatives and operational requirements of having both female and male officers participate in peacekeeping missions is also critical to ensure that countries integrate gender considerations as part of peace building policies.

Points for Consideration

a. Efforts to increase knowledge of international norms for gender participation in peace operations and of the challenges faced by women in missions could improve through greater numbers of nominations of female officers to peacekeeping. What steps do Challenges partners and participants suggest should be taken that would enable contributing police and corrections countries to nominate more women police and corrections candidates?

b. Activities that target women officers specifically, including all-female pre-deployment training and capacity building workshops for women police and corrections officers, could provide a unique opportunity for them to acquire new knowledge and skills. Women-only learning environments can also provide the context for the facilitation team to focus on weaknesses and strengths specific to women, who often are not provided the same opportunities for regular training as their male colleagues. Working with networks or associations of women police and corrections officers also encourages the sharing of experience and best practices within and among police services.

Enabling Contributions: Specific Mandates for Corrections

The United Nations Principles and Guidelines notes that a successful peace operation depends on a clear and achievable mandate, supported by appropriate financing and political will. This is as applicable in the field of corrections as in any other substantive element of a peacekeeping mission. However, while military and police components are identified in terms of authorized strengths and tasks in Security Council Resolutions (SCR), this is not the case for corrections. A cursory review of existing mandates governing UN missions with corrections units illustrates that correction officers are typically named in the broader context of “within rule of law” and/or with the addendum “…including corrections”. In some mandates, such as Resolution 1925 (2010) for the UN Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), the mission is tasked to “[...] develop the criminal justice chain, the police, the judiciary and prisons...” Only one resolution45 (authorizing MINUSTAH through S/RES 1702 on 15 August 2006), clearly defines the strengths of corrections officers to be deployed by stating that it: “Authorizes MINUSTAH to deploy 16 corrections officers seconded from Member States in support of the Government of Haiti to address the shortcomings of the prison system” (p.8; see Text Box 1).

Corrections Example: The case of MINUSTAH

The original mandate for MINUSTAH in 2004 emphasized the need to develop a national strategy for rule of law reform and to work towards institutional strengthening of the judiciary.

SCR 1702 (2006) authorized the deployment of 16 corrections officers.

During the RBB process of 2009/2010, the number of corrections officers was increased to 24 officers. Following the 2010 earthquake, DPKO allotted 100 of the increased posts for UNPOL to Corrections, giving the Corrections Unit up to 124 corrections posts of which 108 were not reflected in the SCR. Following more recent budgetary processes, the number has now been adjusted to 100.

This case illustrates that where a mandate requires that support should be given to national authorities in establishing rule of law functions, there should be some identification of the strength and nature of the required experts to avoid ambiguity in tasking. Such ambiguity also leads to uncertainty in where the corrections element should be placed within the mission. In the absence of clear guidance on strengths and corrections specific responsibilities, missions deal with providing support in different ways.

Corrections Snapshot

UN corrections officers, as well as UN Police (UNPOL) are “experts on mission” seconded by Member States at the request of the Secretary-General. Current data indicates that of the eighty-three Member States contributing police to the UN, twenty-two Member States also second corrections officers; in addition, another eight Member States have expressed interest in doing so and are currently processing candidates for nomination.

Within a mission, corrections officers report to and are under the authority and direction of a Head of Corrections Unit, who is responsible for the conduct and performance of corrections officer’s duties. S/he is always contracted as a UN professional civilian and is considered as part of the international civilian staff component.

However, the posts on which seconded corrections officers are recruited are in some missions, part of the police component’s staffing table and budget. This has caused confusion in some missions as the seconded corrections officers are treated administratively as part of UNPOL, despite having no reporting line to the Police Commissioner. They are, however, administered by the police component in terms of check-in/check-out procedures, assignment of UN assets, compensatory time off, annual leave, sick leave, Mission Subsistence Allowance (MSA), disciplinary matters and performance review (which is not based on the corrections specific duties they perform).

Hence, in addition to the challenges that corrections officers have in common with the police, they face an ambiguous organizational placement. Should they be considered uniformed or civilian staff? Corrections organizations are in most—if not all countries—considered to be a uniformed service. Seconded officers wear the uniforms of their respective countries and so are deployed under the same conditions as the UN Police.

The above example indicates that while mandates mention tasks related to rule of law, justice and corrections, how the tasks are actually to be implemented, and in what sequence, is generally left to interpretation, with varying results in terms of effectiveness and efficiency.

An additional complication is the absence of a clear organisational identity for corrections officers. In organizational discussions, such as in the C-34 and ACABQ, corrections officers have been identified as “Government Provided Personnel”. While this may be procedurally convenient, it is indicative of a failure to recognize organizational identity. Many actors, both within and external to the UN, remain unaware that corrections officers are seconded to UN mis-

46 For instance in MONUSCO
sions to assist national authorities in the establishing of functioning, safe and secure prisons that are compliant with human rights and operated in a humane manner by professional staff. As a response to this reality, UN DPKO OROLSI and its Corrections team continue to work to inform partners and collaborators about corrections activities in the field and the importance of including corrections as an integral part of the justice chain in peace operations.

The relationship between the deploying of well-trained and efficient UNPOL and the need for equally well trained and efficient corrections officers should be self-evident. When the number of deployed police officers is increased and the national authorities’ police services are enhanced, the numbers of criminal cases leading to arrests multiply; subsequently, the number of persons detained and imprisoned also increases. This in turn leads to overcrowding of prisons that can trigger volatile incidents, such as riots or mass escapes. Examples of such incidents (in Cote d’Ivoire, Liberia, and Haiti) exacerbate security concerns for the host government, as well as the mission. Ensuring that incarcerated individuals are being held for criminal activities, and not arbitrary reasons, working to prevent violent factions within prisons to become spoilers to the peace process, and to lessen or eliminate corruption-based release of dangerous persons requires the attention of the whole justice chain, including corrections officers.

Progress has been made in briefing Member States on corrections issues, and the number of countries contributing corrections officers has doubled since 2009. However, there is much that remains to be done. While it is understandable that UN SCR mandates or recommendations made by the Secretary-General or the General Assembly cannot always include the minute details of each actor within a mission, there would be value in creating a category of “other uniformed officers” that would be included in relevant Security Council resolutions, and other normative frameworks guiding peace operations. This would have two benefits: first, corrections officers would be recognized as a separate uniformed service not to be confused with police during critical, as well as non-critical times. Second, resources allocated to police would de facto stay with the police.

Points for Consideration

a. How should corrections be administered under current mandates?
b. How should the tasking of Corrections Units in UN SCR mandates be strengthened? Should there be specific mention in terms of numerical strengths of corrections needed in the mission? If the current mechanism for the administration of Corrections Units and corrections officers is not effective or efficient, what improvements should be made to the current system that would positively impact the utilization of corrections officers?
c. In order to have a higher profile, how can Member States and other partners influence future mandates to include other uniformed personnel needed in a peace operation?

d. In terms of organisational placement/identity, where should Corrections Units be represented or placed? Should there be a distinct category which identifies specific “other uniformed services”, such as corrections, border control, and customs agents, under one category?

e. If the organisational identity and tasking issues are not clarified, the larger question for Member States is: what is the value of seconding corrections officers if their role is not clearly identified in the mandates that govern a UN peace operation? Given the gap in information regarding the role and responsibilities of Corrections Units and corrections officers, what can be done to improve the general understanding of the role of corrections in peace operations? What factors would enable contributing countries to provide greater support to this often neglected field of work?

In sum, as challenges to rule of law benefit from a comprehensive approach, corrections should be seen as a substantive and vital part of the rule of law component that needs a discrete and clear mandate with the appropriate resourcing. Moreover, supporting the rule of law is a complex endeavour. Training and recruitment practices must recognize the multifaceted and intricate role of UN police and corrections officers to enable effective police and corrections contributions to peace operations.
The Partnership of the International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations (henceforth the Challenges Forum) worked throughout 2009 and 2010 in developing and writing a study on the theme “Considerations for Mission Leadership in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations”. Eventually published in December 2010, its development was the work of a partnership between the Challenges Partners and the Secretariat of the United Nations. This partnership was reinforced by commentary and review by over 20 senior peacekeeping practitioners and mission leaders. In his Foreword to the Study, the then Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Mr Alan Le Roy, said: “I am grateful for the intention of the Challenges Partners to make Considerations a living document, which will be reviewed and updated on regular intervals in the coming years, so that it may continue to serve as a valuable tool to mission leaders and all other staff serving in peacekeeping operations around the world” (Author’s italics). One year later, it is timely for the Partners to review its implementation and impact, with a view to identifying further needed work.

The New Environment

Since the inception of the Considerations project, following the publication of the UN Principles and Guidelines in 2008, the global context for peacekeeping has changed significantly. Foremost is the impact of the global financial crisis, which has put a resource pressure on peacekeeping like never before. The days of carrying on as normal, but with an increasingly bigger budget, have gone. The principal financing member states for UN peacekeeping are those most affected by the financial crisis, which has imposed constraints upon all public spending. Peacekeeping will not be an exception to this. The UN is now required to do more with less. Efficiency, cost effectiveness and rigor in driving down costs are all now essential requirements for mission leadership. This is unfamiliar territory for many of them.

47 For simplicity, from now on the full name of the Study will be reduced to Considerations”.
48 Also known as the Capstone Doctrine. Challenges Partners, under Challenges’ auspices, were instrumental in hosting and managing seven of the eight international workshops in 2006–2007, used by DPKO to help develop and seek international involvement, contribution and buy-in for the Principles and Guidelines document.
At the same time the consensus for peacekeeping looks uncertain. At the level of grand strategy, the partnership between the finance contributing countries and troop contributing countries is fragile. Efforts to get better value in peacekeeping from a stronger focus on quality rather than quantity are bumping against the issue of reimbursement costs and their needed review. In this atmosphere, initiatives to drive a more robust and capable peacekeeping posture are constrained. Political divisions within the Security Council have compounded these difficulties. The challenges of Côte d’Ivoire, Libya, Syria and Palestine have been too much for the unity of the Council, and the UN’s peace and security structures look fractured and irresolute. Meanwhile, at the operational level, it is evident in a number of missions that the host nation’s consent for the presence of the peacekeeping mission is eroding. Mission leadership has to deal with this issue and the transition to something other than peacekeeping that is required. But there is little appetite amongst donors to write blank cheques for development without measurable progress in governance and the rule of law, and so difficult decisions have to be made at the operational level in an area where the UN still lacks expertise and capacity.

In addition to these significant pressures on senior mission leadership, it is arguable that the very paradigm of conflict is changing and that the UN’s peace and security apparatus has yet to catch up. Just as the nature of conflict, which involved the UN, changed in the 1990s from inter-state to intra-state conflict (requiring a major conceptual and operational re-think of peacekeeping leading to multi-dimensional peacekeeping) so there is evidence that it is changing again. Much of present day conflict, in areas where international peace operations are deployed, is driven by criminal not political activity. From Afghanistan to Somalia, through the DRC, Darfur and South Sudan, to parts of West Africa, and Haiti, the driver for conflict and instability is most often organized criminal violence in pursuit of and in competition for economic rents. This violence and conflict thrives in an environment where there are weak institutions, poor governance and the absence of the rule of law. UN peacekeeping is struggling to manage this new paradigm of violence with conceptual and physical mechanisms still trying to make the change from traditional to multi-dimensional peacekeeping.

All this serves to show that the context for UN peacekeeping has moved on, and that the pressure on mission leadership has increased. Considerations was an attempt by the Challenges Partnership to ease some of this pressure by identifying, in a structured way, the variety of challenges faced by senior leadership

49 UN troop reimbursement costs were reviewed in 1992, with an ad hoc increase in 2002, and then again in 2011. Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping 2011.
50 See UN Peacekeeping Principles and Guidelines 2008: Chapter 2
51 See World Bank’s World Development Report (WDR) 2011
within a mission, using the framework of the core functions of peacekeeping. The Partnership recognized that contemporary peacekeeping existed in an uncertain, complex, ambiguous and dynamic world and that any assistance they could give to the Mission Leadership team in dealing with this world would be beneficial. Clearly, the need for good leadership has not changed. Indeed it is the one constant in a changing context for peacekeeping. But is the mere calling for good leadership enough, or do we need to do more to help develop it?

Mission Leadership

It was observed by an Under-Secretary-General\textsuperscript{52} that the UN still tended to throw its leaders into the deep end of the pool without really knowing whether they could swim or not. This both recognizes the difficulties of ‘swimming’ in contemporary missions and the risks inherent in the selection and deployment of senior leaders from Member States to meet its objectives of fairness, universality and legitimacy. The UN must recruit its senior leaders (political, developmental, and security) from the spectrum of its contributing member states. Some leaders are a known quantity and have learned their trade on earlier missions. Many are new to the UN, and while being recommended as senior leaders by their own member states, they have not necessarily conceptualized or experienced the step change in complexity between senior leadership in a national context and senior leadership within UN peacekeeping. So they learn to swim on the job; some manage, some do not.

To help support the recruitment and selection of appropriate senior mission leaders (and by this term it is meant members of the Mission Leadership Team (MLT))\textsuperscript{53}, a small team was formed in DFS (called the Senior Leadership Appointments Section (SLAS\textsuperscript{54})) to provide support to succession planning, leadership requirements and vacancy management for senior field appointments, as well as to support the identification and targeted search for potential senior leaders up to their selection for post by the Secretary-General. In this way they act as quasi headhunters for the organization in creating candidate lists for potential consideration. But they also perform a valuable, if necessarily limited, candidate management service in guiding and counseling the candidate senior leader through the UN selection procedures. However, SLAS has no mentoring or coaching function, and while being clear on the requirements for mission

\textsuperscript{52} DPKO’s Senior Leaders’ Programme 2011.
\textsuperscript{53} The core members in an integrated mission are the SRSG, Principal DSRSG, DSRSG RC/HC, Force Commander, Police Commissioner, Director of Field Support and Chief of Staff.
\textsuperscript{54} Headed at the P5 level and staffed by only an additional 2 professionals.
senior leadership they have as yet no capacity or mandate to test, exercise or develop it.

Much of this is being addressed following recommendations in the UN’s Civilian Capacity Advisory Group Report of 2011,\textsuperscript{55} which has some strong sections on leadership and accountability. The Secretary-General’s subsequent Report to the General Assembly and Security Council on this undertakes “to strengthen the capacity and accountability of senior United Nations leaders … to build on existing initiatives to select leaders based on competence, to examine ways to conduct a more rigorous review of the track record of potential leaders, including on gender mainstreaming, … to use innovative and appropriate methods of assessment… and in terms of improving the capacity of senior leaders to manage the United Nations response to conflict, …to explore ways in which training for leaders can be improved within existing resources”\textsuperscript{56}. What has been written for civilian capacity must of course equally apply to military and police senior capacity. Moreover, the growth and development of staff within the UN system itself requires additional focus and resources. Currently there is no attempt in the Secretariat to stream, train and develop the UN’s international peacekeeping staff as future senior leaders.\textsuperscript{57} But at least there is now a clear agenda and needed focus on senior leadership within peacekeeping, with a strong emphasis that any selection process should be based primarily on competence. It remains to be seen, however, in the context of the current financial constraints, whether sufficient resources will be made available for this training and development.\textsuperscript{58}

Currently the only UN-owned mechanism for the education and training of senior leaders is the Senior Mission Leaders’ (SML) course. Run bi-annually, and lasting two weeks, the SML course is a mentored activity which puts about 24 senior leaders from all peacekeeping disciplines through an overview of the complexity of multi-dimensional peacekeeping, with a focus on the responsibilities of the MLT. Course participation is drawn from recommendations forwarded by member states as well as candidates from within the wider UN family. Competition for places on the course is now tight and DPKO/DFS run a selection panel for course participants run by middle managers of the various peacekeeping pillars within the Secretariat, including from SLAS. There is no formal assessment or evaluation of participants on the course, but by their attendance they become known to the UN system and usually, during the course, have the opportunity of a session with a representative from SLAS.

\textsuperscript{56} Secretary General’s Report: Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict, 19 August 2011
\textsuperscript{57} This is in contrast to best practice within most national public sector staff development programmes, such as military or police staff colleges and civilian public service training colleges.
\textsuperscript{58} In 2010 DPKO’s training budget was cut by 40\%.
None of this represents an evaluation and selection process, despite the participants having been put under a certain amount of exercise pressure and being given the opportunity to show how they work in teams and in a multi-national, multi-cultural and multi-disciplinary environment. Clearly, there are a number of factors that go into the selection of a senior leader, many of them are political. The common denominator however, must be senior leadership competence. Currently there is no established mechanism for properly assessing or developing this. Indeed, only a limited proportion of newly appointed senior leaders have actually gone through the SML course process.

There is much anecdotal evidence from the past of senior leaders being thrown into their roles with no training or induction for their responsibilities. A common theme from the Reviewers of Considerations was that they wished they had had something like an SML course or the Considerations Study to help them before they took up their positions. Even now, senior mission leaders comment that their preparation for their role involves a frantic tour around the various offices of the Secretariat in New York before being dispatched to the mission. This is often compounded by there being no one in position to hand-over to them, as gaps in senior leadership positions, while fewer, are still common.

The Senior Leaders’ Programme (SLP) is an attempt to improve this situation. Like the SML, it is run by a very small staff of the Integrated Training Service within DPET/DPKO. It is a five-day programme for appointed senior mission leaders, many of whom have been in mission for some time. As such, it provides a useful and necessary update to new senior leaders on the current thinking and developments concerning peacekeeping within the UN Secretariat. It does not (and cannot as currently configured) provide any personal development or guidance into the leadership challenges likely to be encountered by new leaders within the missions. Separately, the Office of Military Affairs in DPKO is currently developing a 5–8 day mission-specific induction training programme for heads of military components. It is hoped that, once implemented, this might become a model for the training and preparation of other senior leaders.

Overall, up until now, those involved in senior leadership training in the UN have shared a concern that the Organization, caught up in the crises and con-

59 By the end of an SML course the mentors, (all very senior and seasoned peacekeeping practitioners) generally have a good idea of who will make a good mission senior leader and who will not; or to extend the USG’s metaphor, who will swim, who will float and who might sink. While subjective, no formal use is currently made of this knowledge.

60 See Annex 3 of Considerations for Mission Leadership in UN Peacekeeping Operations for a list of these Reviewers.

61 Interviews with Senior Leaders’ Programme 2011.

62 A team of two headed by a P4.
straints of the present, have not invested the deserved focus, resources, and senior level engagement on the critical subject of senior mission leadership. The changing environment and the resource pressures on missions might have changed this and given an urgent but welcome focus on leadership. Initiatives such as the Civilian Capacity Report and the Secretary-General’s recent commitment to its recommendations, hopefully, have created a new climate of practical engagement on the issue of senior leadership and its selection, training and preparation.

The Impact of “Considerations”

Given that commitments to improve UN selection procedures for senior leadership have now been made at the highest level, Challenges Partners may want to focus on the preparation and training of this leadership. The aim of the Considerations Study was to contribute to conceptual thinking and a wider understanding of the core functions of multidimensional peace operations in order to assist the development of operational level guidance material for DPKO’s peacekeeping practitioners in the field. In pursuit of this aim, the Challenges Secretariat has been active in having the Study translated by the Challenges Partners into the six official languages of the UN. At the same time Partners are encouraged to publish and use the Study for the preparation of their own peacekeepers. In this way the Study has become one of the guidance texts available for member states alongside other training texts (such as the UN Principles and Guidelines) and instruction programmes (such as Peacekeeping Operations Training Institute\textsuperscript{63}). The Challenges Partners are forwarding information to the Challenges Secretariat about ways in which they have been making use of the Considerations Study within their national and regional training environments, the sum of which will be presented in a separate Challenges Paper.

For the UN, the Study is now a pre- and through-course reading text for the SML\textsuperscript{64}. It is also used by the African Union’s equivalent SML on the ground of its similar relevance to AU peacekeeping. In addition, it has been distributed by the Challenges Secretariat to a number of regional senior leadership training courses (such as have been held this year in Nairobi and Addis Ababa). Finally, it is also now being used by UN DPKO’s SLP and by UN DFS’ Senior Mission Administrative Resource Training Programme (SMART)\textsuperscript{65}. In all these pro-

\textsuperscript{63} POTI specializes in offering a wide spectrum of distance e-learning courses, free to African member states. Its course “Principles and Guidelines for UN Peacekeeping Operations’, based on the ‘Capstone doctrine’ and therefore a valuable text for designate senior leaders, is free to all.

\textsuperscript{64} Used in Amman Nov 10, Pretoria May 11 and Madrid Nov 11.

\textsuperscript{65} SMART is an annual training programme, split into three one-week modules, for potential senior Field Support personnel. Its focus is field support but Considerations provides a useful planning context for its studies.
grammes, the feedback about the utility and helpfulness of Considerations has been very positive. Its structure, using an OIOS-logic model, assists an understanding of the senior leaders’ responsibilities for giving planning guidance. Its identification of key activities, and their benchmarks, priorities, risks, challenges and considerations are what senior leaders need to assist their decision-making, without being too prescriptive. In other words it has become a valuable textbook and guide for senior leader training.

In terms of assisting the development of operational guidance, the original intent was to contribute to a new articulation of the Peacekeeping Handbook. This publication was looking dated when the UN Principles and Guidelines was being written. Its replacement is still an aspiration and no doubt Considerations will play a part in providing some of the guidance material needed. More directly, work in the past year has been going on in areas such as the nexus between peacekeeping and peacebuilding an area linked to the Challenges’ Considerations work. The recently published DPKO/DFS Early Peacebuilding Strategy guidance document has had a close and co-dependent evolution with Considerations, in the helpful way anticipated by the Challenges Partnership when the Considerations project was first conceived.

Next Steps

From this it would seem that Considerations is being used “as a valuable tool to mission leaders and all other staff”. Nevertheless, its use would be enhanced if every potential mission leader was given a reading pack including Considerations and also if it was included in the body of guidance material available on DPKO’s Best Practice intranet web site. To this extent it probably suffers from being a Partners’ publication rather than an official publication of the UN Secretariat. Accordingly its use within missions by senior leaders remains informal rather than institutionalized. Those senior leaders keen to learn more about their profession and their responsibilities will find access to it. But the responsibility is personal. This is consistent with all senior leadership training and career development within the UN to date. The UN Secretariat still does not really “own” and manage its staff (and their training) in a systematic way which treats them as a precious resource upon which the success or failure of a mission and future peacekeeping depends. Rather they are expected to fend for themselves in an extreme articulation of free market forces. They are “thrown into the pool”. Their personal training is therefore their business.

68 USG DPKO Foreword to Considerations.
change this culture will take time and some significant management reforms. The Secretariat is aware of this but advocacy amongst the member states must be pursued and battles won in the 5th Committee. It follows that there remains useful work to be done by the Challenges Partnership in championing and helping the preparation and training of senior leadership.

One area of useful development would be exploring the concept of close mentoring of new senior leaders. Effectively this is the temporary provision of a practiced “swimming partner“ during those early days of immersion. This would be particularly beneficial during any customized training/induction programme. New senior leaders do not know what questions to ask and what is important. Someone to advise and guide them through this process is needed. Mentors would be experienced but retired practitioners (such as the Reviewers of Considerations) who understand the challenges of peacekeeping and can help guide the senior mission leader during his/her preparation, in the early days of deployment and thereafter whenever requested. There is no such system yet institutionalized within the UN, although it is best practice in other similar complex organizations.69

A further clear direction for Partners was the proposal discussed by the Partners in New York in February 2011: “Considerations for Mission Leadership in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations – Experiences in the Field and Best Practices for the Future.”70 This recommends looking at specific missions as companion case studies to the more generic Considerations Study from which to draw lessons and best practice. The case studies would cover the spectrum of field missions so that senior leaders, having absorbed Considerations, could pick from them those most appropriate to their requirement and guidance needs. This theme will be picked up at the next Partners meeting in Cairo.

At a more general level the Partners need to keep a close focus on the whole issue of senior leadership and the selection, training and preparation of senior leaders. This will require a culture change, both within the Secretariat and the providing member states, as well as a richer dialogue between the two concerning who and what is needed. Member states tend to underestimate the challenges and responsibilities that their nominees will face in the field and could do more to ensure that their less experienced nationals are properly trained and qualified for the complex environment of contemporary missions. Ultimately, unless member states have confidence in the senior leadership of peacekeeping missions they will continue to be reluctant to commit their resources and their people to support them.

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69 NATO has such a mentoring programme for its new senior field commanders.
70 See Challenges Discussion Note on Project Proposal 1 February 2011
In conclusion, the peacekeeping environment has become more challenging since Considerations was first mooted. The onus of delivery is increasingly being put upon strong and effective senior leadership. Recommendations on senior leadership and accountability have been made to the Secretary-General, to which he has committed. Now appropriate attention needs to be paid to the training and preparation of suitably qualified senior leadership within the Secretariat. Member states have an important role in this, both in championing progress and in better understanding the senior leadership requirement. Considerations has gone some way to providing a training and guidance resource for senior leadership. The Partnership will wish to explore what more can be done.
Challenges Forum Strategic Seminar in Egypt

Opening and Welcome

H.E. Ms Soad Shalaby, Director, Cairo Regional Center for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa, Egypt

Excellencies, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, it is a great honour for me personally and for CCCPA to welcome you all to Egypt and to Sharm El-Sheikh, the City of Peace. I feel proud and happy that after a lot of planning and hard work we have more than 80 experts and high level participants here for this Challenges Forum Strategic Partners’ Meeting and Seminar. The theme and Seminar program were designed and planned a long time ago, and although the dates and venues have changed, due the circumstances beyond our control, yet the theme of the meeting: ‘Peace Operations Beyond the Horizon; Enabling Contributing Countries for the Future’, continues to be crucial, timely and need of our focus and attention.

It is indeed a source of pleasure for the Cairo Regional Centre for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa to co-host this meeting with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Egypt, and the Challenges Forum in this particular time of history, while Egypt is celebrating the first anniversary of the January 25th revolution.

Egyptians rose up several times in modern history. However, three main characteristics distinguish the January 25th revolution. The most distinct feature was the incredibly large number of protesters who participated throughout the eighteen days of the revolution.

The January revolution was also unique for its predominantly peaceful nature that involved Egyptian men and women, young and old. The revolution engendered an extraordinary aura of tolerance, acceptance and pluralism. Ordinary people and intellectuals who came from different ideological backgrounds, religions, political orientations, and geographical areas were determined to have a better future for Egypt. They were tolerant and accepting each other and transcending their differences.
If three lessons learned from the January revolution are: enabling more people to contribute, adopting peaceful means of change and nourishing socio-political tolerance, what else do we need to promote peace and security worldwide? In that sense, Egyptians consider their revolution a message to the international community to make peace happen through peaceful activities and cultural pluralism. Egyptians will overcome their difficulties and will realize in the next couple of years the new Democratic Egyptian Republic.

The latest progress report of the New Horizon Initiative has rightly indicated that the United Nations’ global reach and broad participation are an essential source of its fundamental legitimacy; however, such a multinational nature also leaves the UN subject to political challenges, resource pressures and competing demands.

Enabling as well as empowering the UN member states for better contribution to peace operations is an inevitable need of the international community. It entails three aspects: enabling countries to contribute more, contribute better and contribute adequately. Let me say a few words on these aspects.

Almost six decades ago, the UN had only two peace operations with less than a thousand personnel deployed in both missions. In 2011, the total number of personnel serving in 16 UN-led peace operations is over 121,000. Along with the growing number of missions and personnel, the peacekeeping operations budget has increased to almost 8 billion US dollars annually and 114 countries have contributed uniformed troops in the last month.

Such steady increase in all aspects of peace operations has been a natural response to an urgent international need. As an example we have seen lately in all the news of the Middle East region, discussions about a possible deployment of a peacekeeping mission in Syria. So the growing demand for more peace operations is creating challenging gaps that the international community needs to bridge. Enabling current and potential contributing countries will enhance the UN’s capacity to deliver.

Peace operations have evolved from traditional military observing missions to multidimensional integrated operations with military, police and civilian components. Thus, effective coordination, visionary leadership and strategic guidance have become the essential keys for successful peace operations whether international or regional. That is why we are gathered here to discuss these important issues and make our voices reach the policy makers in New York.

I would like to seize this opportunity to thank those who have made this event possible. First we would like to thank Her Excellency Ambassador Malin Kärre,
Ambassador of Sweden to Egypt, for her continued support since last year and for hosting a very warm reception at the overture of the event last night. From the Challenges Forum and Folke Bernadotte Academy we would like to thank Ms Annika Hilding Norberg for her dedication to the success of the Egyptian partnership, and to the Challenges team for their tireless hard work in realizing this event. We must also thank Ambassador Stig Elvemar, who introduced Egypt to the Challenges Forum.

We would like to thank the Japanese government and the people of Japan who in spite of their difficult times continue to be committed to supporting the capacity building of peacekeeping in Africa and have provided the Cairo Regional Center with consistent and sustained support for several years.

I would also like to welcome the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations delegation, Ms Nakamitsu and General Gaye in particular. I know that the discussion will be greatly enriched by the participation of such high-level UN delegates. A note of thanks also to the African Union. We are particularly glad to have with us today Ambassador Lamamra, the AU High Commissioner for Peace and Security. Your Excellency, your contribution is greatly appreciated.

I want to thank CCCPA staff for their diligent work and dedication. Needless to mention, the support of the government of Egypt, particularly the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of the Interior has been essential. The Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior have offered us consistent support and have also provided high-level experts in all our training as participants and facilitators in our courses, and we appreciate their contribution to the Challenges Forum. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is highly represented as a joint organizer and host of this event, and we are most fortunate that Ambassador Ahmed Fathallah, with his long multilateral diplomacy experience will enrich our seminar.

Finally I would like to thank you all for accepting our invitation and we wish you a very happy and pleasant stay in Sharm El-Sheikh. Now, it gives me a great pleasure to introduce the key note speaker, His Excellency Ambassador Ahmed Fathallah, the First Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Egypt, who is going to present his remarks on behalf of His Excellency Mohamed Kamel Amr, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt.
Statement of H.E. Mr Mohamed Kamel Amr, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt delivered by H.E. Mr Ahmed Fathallah, First Under-Secretary, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Egypt

H.E. Ambassador Lamambra, African Commissioner for Peace and Security, General Babacar Gaye, Military Adviser, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, H.E. Ambassador Soad Shalaby, Director of the Cairo Regional Center for Training of Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa, Distinguished Partners and Guests, it gives me the great pleasure to welcome you to this important gathering of senior officials and experts convened to address the challenges of contemporary peacekeeping operations. I would like to express our support to the Challenges Partnership and to welcome the convening of this Seminar in Sharm El-Sheikh, in cooperation with the Cairo Regional Center for Training of Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa and the Folke Bernadotte Academy. Allow me, first to underscore, on behalf of Egypt and the Non-Aligned Movement, the great importance that we attach to the development of peacekeeping, both conceptually and operationally. The current scale and complexity of peacekeeping requires that we reinvigorate our partnership, to review where we stand and to identify the way forward. The various initiatives launched in this regard reflect our collective awareness and the need to address jointly the most urgent challenges in this regard.

Whether in a phase of growth or consolidation, peacekeeping remains dynamic in nature and continues to develop incrementally as a key instrument to maintain international peace and security. Further, peacekeeping remains a cost-efficient means to avert conflicts and represents a genuine expression of the principle of collective security. Its global reach and broad participation are a source of its fundamental legitimacy. Thus, peacekeeping, as the flagship activity of the United Nations, needs to continue developing as a partnership and burden sharing between North and South. Therefore, we look at this Seminar as an opportunity to enrich the ongoing dialogue and partnership between all relevant actors, in order to strengthen peacekeeping operations, either implemented by the United Nations, or the relevant regional organizations.

A much broader sharing and contribution by all Member States and relevant stakeholders would ensure the unity of vision that we need to reach our common goal of peace and security. In this context, full involvement of Troop Contributing Countries in all aspects and stages of United Nations peacekeeping operations is required. Concerns of peacekeepers and the difficulties that they meet on the ground in executing their mandates need to be conveyed to the Security Council, while it considers the establishment – or renewal – of a given mandate. Progress has been made over the past two years in this regard, and
needs to be sustained and improved, with a view to a common future vision for United Nations peacekeeping operations.

While addressing the challenges of peace operations, the question of the resource gap remains a central challenge for the management of existing multidimensional peacekeeping missions and the planning of future operations. Peacekeeping cannot continue to do more with less funds and resources. Scarcity of enablers and lack of troops has become a structural problem that hampers the ability of the United Nations and regional organizations to operate effectively in increasingly challenging environments and complex mandates. Enabling contributing countries and emerging contributors with resources and capabilities remains a key issue for tackling peacekeeping overstretching.

Today, all organizations engaged in peacekeeping are suffering from overstretch because of the dramatic expansion of worldwide peace operations during the last decade. It is no longer sustainable for peacekeeping. Serious measures are required from the international community to address this long-standing issue. Thus, peacekeeping should not be used as a substitute for addressing the root causes of conflicts, which should be addressed in a coherent, well planned and comprehensive manner, with relevant political, social, economic and developmental instruments.

Furthermore, peacekeeping should be provided from the outset with the needed political support, sufficient human, financial and logistical resources, as well as clearly defined and achievable mandates and exit strategies. Considerable progress has been made during the last two years in clarifying key concepts and reaching consensus on fundamental policy positions. The New Horizon initiative launched by the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support has helped identifying key perspectives in issues related to policy development, capability development, field support, planning and oversight, including protection of civilians under imminent threat. We look forward for further interaction in this regard within the upcoming session of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations in New York next week.

We understand that peacekeeping alone cannot bring sustainable peace in complex and post conflict situations, unless accompanied by peacebuilding efforts aimed at preventing the recurrence of violence and achieving developmental targets as an end goal. The needs in the immediate aftermath of conflicts are great while capacities and capabilities are limited.

It is thus critical that the early peacebuilding efforts in peacekeeping operations are based on a coherent strategy and clear priorities that maximize resources and respond to the real needs of the concerned country. United Nations peace-
keeping operations, with its political leverage and legitimacy, can provide a catalytic support to carry out critical peacebuilding tasks, including providing advice for institutional reform and coordinating international donors and other actors behind a national strategy. However such support has to be coordinated with all United Nations relevant actors, including the Peacebuilding Commission “PBC” and the Peacebuilding Support Office “PBSO”.

With the development of armed conflicts in Africa, United Nations peacekeeping operations have evolved to address a new nature of conflicts and to include new mandated tasks, such as strengthening State authority, natural resources, administration of justice, security sector reform, post conflict peacebuilding and protection of civilians. In this regard, new mechanisms, based on the principles of partnership with Africa and national ownership, need to be expanded and reinforced.

An effective partnership between the United Nations and the African Union would contribute towards addressing common peace and security challenges, including conflict prevention, mediation support, peacekeeping and post conflict reconstruction. This issue will be one of Egypt’s priorities during its terms in the African Peace and Security Council for the period 2012–2014. These are common efforts to provide effective support for African peacekeeping missions undertaken in accordance to chapter VIII, but yet still more are required to enhance African Union capacities and architectures through predictable, sustainable, coherent and flexible financing, particularly for peacekeeping operations undertaken under a United Nations mandate like AMISOM and the African Standby Force.

I am sure that our will and determination are equally strong and will contribute to find innovative ideas to face peacekeeping challenges and overstretching. I am also confident that your work will strive to find an inclusive middle ground, that brings us all together for the interest of better planning and implementation of peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities, having peace, security and development as the main objectives and benchmarks. I wish you all the success, and I thank you.

Gen. Babacar Gaye, Military Adviser, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations

Excellences, Ladies and Gentlemen. I feel privileged to speak on behalf of Mr Hervé Ladsous, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, who unfortunately cannot be with us today due to a situation that arouse and which required his presence in New York. On behalf of the Under-Secretary-
General, I would like to take this opportunity to thank the Government of Egypt, represented here by Ambassador Ahmed Fathallah for his generous hosting of the Challenges Forum Strategic Seminar and Partners Meeting. I would also like to thank the co-host, the Cairo Regional Center for Training of Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa, represented by Ambassador Soad Shalaby, the Challenges Forum and its Secretariat for putting together an insightful and timely agenda for us here today.

It is particularly appropriate that we are gathered in Egypt to address the issue of Enabling Contributing Countries for the Future of Peacekeeping. Egypt itself has been a significant partner for the United Nations Peacekeeping during the growth of peacekeeping, not least over the last two decades, and it is showing a growing commitment to building its contribution even as we face new and complex challenges in the field.

If we look back twenty years ago, Egypt provided 20 military personnel to two missions. Ten years ago it increased to 260 personnel, made up of troops, military observers and civilian police across eight missions. Today, over 4000 Egyptian uniformed personnel serve across nine of our peacekeeping missions.

This build-up of support has provided important resources to many of our most difficult missions. It has also been characterized by its multi-faceted nature, providing always military, troops, police assets and civilians, reflecting the many and varied needs of the wide range of missions and the peacekeeping environment that exists. These needs can only be expected to continuously evolve in the future. Therefore, an integrated, multi-dimensional and close functional peacekeeping support is likely to be a key requirement also in the future.

Our focus today on discussing ways in which to enable such support will help us frame our thinking on these issues, hopefully provide some new insight on how we can sustain and build contributions for the future. I very much look forward to hearing from you and interacting with you today, and would again like to thank our kind host for the invitation. Merci Madame.

H.E. Mr Ramtane Lamamra, Commissioner for Peace and Security, African Union

Your Excellencies, Ambassador Ahmed Fathallah, First Under-Secretary of the Ministry of the Arab Republic of Egypt, Ambassador Soad Shalaby, Director of the Cairo Regional Centre for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa, Distinguished Ambassadors of the co-sponsoring countries and Representatives of the Challenges Forum, Ambassadors and Senior Officers,
Ladies and Gentlemen, in the Tripoli Declaration issued on 31 August 2009 at the end of the special session of the African Union on conflicts in Africa, the Heads of State and Government made the following commitments:

“We are determined to deal once and for all with the scourge of conflict and violence on our continent, acknowledging our shortcomings and errors committing our resources and best people and no opportunity to push forward the agenda of conflict prevention, peace-making and peacekeeping as well as post-conflict reconstruction. We, as leaders, simply cannot bequeath the burden of conflicts to next generation of Africans”.

The important problems and prospects for the preparation and capacity building of troop contributing countries in future must be dealt with in the light of this statement of faith which embodies commitment, particularly that of mobilising all the means and human resources and to seize all opportunities to promote the agenda of peace and security in Africa.

No effort will, therefore, be too much for the attainment of the major objective of a continent rid of the scourge of conflicts. In this regard, the Challenges Seminar which has brought us together, today, is an additional building block to the building of peace which the African Union is endeavouring to erect with determination and perseverance. Naturally, I cannot keep silent about the role played by Egypt, which has just been entrusted with a new mandate on the Peace and Security Council of the African Union and I wish to commend the Cairo Regional Centre for Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping for the initiative taken to organise this Seminar and more importantly for its qualitative contributions and expertise in the development of the doctrine and the promotion of the action of Africa in this area.

As reflected by its title, this Seminar is an opportunity to exchange views on capacity building of the troop contributing countries against the background of the future of peace operations. I would like to stress here the relevance of the brainstorming to which we have been invited more especially as it takes place in the context marked by important changes which will fundamentally affect the future of peace operations on the continent. May I focus my observations on only three aspects of the ongoing developments in order to situate the conceptual and institutional framework as well as the political environment in which the theme of our seminar is placed.

The first one relates to the process for making the African Peace and Security Architecture fully operational, whose objective is to provide the AU and the Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, with the necessary doctrine, instruments and programmes to be able to effec-
tively take up the challenge of peace and security on the continent. Over the past years, important progress has been made in the operational establishment of this Architecture whose vertebral column is the African Standby Force. We should stress here that the mandate of this Force covers all the areas of crisis management ranging from conflict prevention to peace building through their resolution. Doctrinal and legal reference documents have been worked out and their enrichment is constantly envisaged and considered, including the mandate, the employment and logistics concept, the strategic mobility and so on. At this juncture, I want to stress that the ongoing capacity building of Africa will necessarily induce a substantive redefinition of the cooperation modalities between the African Union and the United Nations.

This redefinition will be necessary more especially as the establishment of the African Peace and Security Architecture is the emanation from a strong will to intervene on the ground despite the huge challenges linked to these operations in a wide spectrum of situations ranging from preventive deployment to emergency action in possible cases of genocide or massive violations of human rights. The AU-led mission in Darfur between 2004 and 2007, before the takeover by the AU/UN Hybrid Operation and the ongoing operation in Somalia, AMISOM, bear witness to this political will and determination. In one case or the other, the AU did not wait for peace to be restored before deploying troops on the ground. Our operations were designed as tools capable precisely of helping to trigger a dynamism conducive to the emergence of a peace process whose consolidation requires patience and perseverance: these are “peace support operations” with all the exigencies and ambitions but also dangers that are inherent in such a denomination and vocation.

In my second point, I want to echo the words of my friend, Hervé Ladsous and to share with you my perception of the conditions for UN intervention. As indicated by their name, the UN Operations are designed as “Peacekeeping Operations”. The result is that their deployment is often subject to the existence of peace to be kept. Now, the realities on the ground are often more ambiguous, in a situation of “neither war nor peace”. Consequently, the international community often finds itself facing delicate choices: either wait for peace restoration to be effected on the ground, while knowing that the situations are rare in which an armed conflict totally stops at a fixed date or to take the necessary risk of enhancing a fragile dynamism, support the peace forces and isolate the trouble makers, if there is no possibility of bringing them to a logic of dialogue and search for compromise. The experience of many African countries shows that often there are circumstances which make multipronged mandates indispensable with varying powers representing the capacity for flexibility and adaptation as well consistent means.
It is the challenge of peace support, under uncertain and risky circumstances, that the AU took up in Burundi, after the signing of the 2002 Arusha Agreements while the most important armed movement of the time had not associated itself with the Agreements. A pioneer in different respects, the AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB) greatly contributed to the stabilisation and, through its presence, facilitated the subsequent deployment of a UN Operation. It is also the same challenge that the AU has taken up in Somalia. The situation on the ground is indisputably difficult but we hope, despite everything, to be able to repeat the success obtained in Burundi. Already positive results can be credited to AMISOM. The liberation of the Comorian Island of Anjouan in 2008 from an illegal and secessionist regime was achieved at the initiative of the AU, under remarkable conditions, through a military action led by two contingents provided by the Sudan and Tanzania.

The third aspect relates to the political environment in which peacekeeping operations are carried out. For complex reasons, often linked to their domestic policy and/or their history, some countries maybe reticent to the deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation. The case of Darfur in the Sudan is a glaring example. There is no need to refer here to the conditions under which AMIS was transformed into UNAMID, as the international community, including the Security Council, was induced to accept the stubborn realities on the ground by accepting finally the deployment of a hybrid operation in place of a traditional UN Operation. I know that the “Purists” of peacekeeping took a lot of time to agree that this political response to a given situation reflected a mature political intelligence where the orthodox approach had been inhibitive. The authors of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations could not, obviously, foresee such a role for “Regional arrangements” and still less for Africa.

Nobody better than the UN Secretary-General, Mr Ban Ki-Moon, has rightly appreciated and clearly expressed this new approach in the relation between the world organisation and regional organisations. When he writes in Paragraph 41 of his “Special Report on Somalia”, bearing Reference S/2012/74, dated 31 January 2012, relating to the preparation of the Joint AU and UN team for a Strategic Concept for AMISOM, that “this initiative, which has been taken jointly by the UN and the African Union, under the leadership of the latter, is a remarkable example of cooperation between the two organisations”.

In the light of the foregoing, it appears clearly that the AU and the Regional Mechanisms as well as the Member States will have an increasingly important role to play, given that their action is carried out on behalf of the international community and often with the support of the Security Council, which has the main responsibility for international peacekeeping and security. Now the difficulty faced by Africa is not that much related to the lack of human resources,
training and expertise but rather to the lack of adequate equipment and sustainable, predictable and flexible financing to carry out successfully peace support operations on ad hoc basis as is the case, at present, and as it will be the case in the future with the African Standby Force (ASF) and its Regional brigades.

It is, therefore, urgent for the United Nations, as urged by the African Union, to establish financing mechanisms for peacekeeping operations led by the AU or under its authority. The Prodi Report made interesting recommendations on this matter, although they are below what Africa had requested. We note with concern that these recommendations have not yet been taken fully into account by the UN Security Council and that the debate on the financing of operations carried out by Africa has not decisively progressed. Hence, the need to redouble efforts to solve, in a lasting manner, this issue by basing it on the support modules established by the UN for AMIS and the substantial logistic support given at present to AMISOM.

Our partners in the international community, who rightly insist on the need for capacity building of the African countries, individually and collectively, should understand that without sustainable and predictable financing the capacities that would be built would be of no great use. Capacity building should go hand in hand with the financing of operations. Indeed, nothing would be more detrimental to the credibility of the entire mechanism in the situation where the installed and mobilised capacities would be condemned to inactivity due to lack of adequate funding.

Another consequence of the ongoing development relates to the hybrid operation phenomenon. In particular political situations, this type of operation, in spite of the complex nature of its strategic leadership, could cease to be an exception. We should, both in the AU and in the UN, prepare ourselves for this possibility as this will imply a thorough change of mentality on both sides as well as an aptitude for creativity to deal with what is necessary rather than to be happy with the routine of tested patterns.

I am convinced that we will benefit in future by considerably strengthening the consultation mechanisms between the African Union and the African States concerned and the United Nations. In so doing, it will establish a political environment, more conducive to the success of peacekeeping operations, building the necessary confidence and better anticipating difficulties that can emerge. Obviously a better linkage between the world level, represented by the UN Security Council and the continental and national levels will enhance the legitimacy of peacekeeping operations and give the assurance that they are capable of contributing value added to the positive development on the ground which should be duly recognised and sustained.
In general, today more than ever before, it is imperative, as the Prodi Report stresses, to work out a common strategic vision to enable the UN and the AU get most out of their respective comparative advantages: particularly, for the African Union, its aptitude to provide rapid response with the unequalled knowledge of the realities on the ground and other local factors and, for the United Nations, their unique experience in this field and their capacity to support, in a sustainable and effective manner, the operations. Such a vision will also make it possible to avoid duplication and prevent the risk of taking actions that run counter to each other. New methods of operation must be designed and implemented without quarrels of competence and competition but in a spirit of complementarity and mutual assistance so as to raise the cooperation between the AU and the UN to a level of effective strategic partnership.

I would like to stop here, convinced that the Challenges Forum, which has brought together decision makers, practitioners and scholars, whose presence I would like to hail here, will make it possible to reflect thoroughly on these and other issues, including the often avoided question of the reaction and attitude of the local population to the operations deployed on the ground. In other words, we should detach ourselves from an approach that is entirely focused on “Peacekeepers” and show interest also in “Peace-kept” and to their dynamic and complex interaction with the external actors. It is clear that the ownership of the objectives of peace operation by the host country and its population constitutes a decisive condition for success.

African countries, within the continent as across the world, are ready to join in the mobilisation of the international community in the service of peace, represented by the different types of operation and mission. They already distinguish themselves by the number and strength of their contingents and by the quality of their performance and particularly by the admirable spirit of sacrifice that motivate them.

This seminar in Sharm El-Sheikh, on the Egyptian territory, with a history which is particularly relevant for our meeting, is a new demonstration of the will of Africa to be an actor and a beneficiary of the changes in the international relations. This seminar must be able to help with the liberation of the prospects and horizons of our countries and peoples as well as those of peacekeeping operations from the many constraints and challenges they face. I wish you every success in your deliberations and I thank you for your kind attention.
H.E. Mr Norihiro Okuda, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Egypt, Japan

Madame Chairman, distinguished Delegates, Ladies and Gentlemen, I would like to offer my heartfelt congratulations to the Cairo Regional Center for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Arab Republic of Egypt for hosting the “Challenges Forum Strategic Seminar and Partner’s Meeting” in Sharm El-Sheikh. In particular, I would like to pay tribute to Ambassador Shalaby, Director of CCCPA and her staff for their effort to make this Forum happen. I commend the CCCPA’s contribution in promoting the capacity of African countries and peacekeeping activities in Africa, as the CCCPA plays a significant role as a peacekeeping training center in Africa in conducting various training courses for participants from African countries. It was mentioned that the CCCPA has been keeping on carrying out its activities and responsibilities in very difficult circumstances prevailing in this country, in a transitional Egypt, over the past one year. I will not dwell on the situation here in Egypt but I very much hope, and wish, that this current transitional period will lead to a full-fledged democratic Egypt in which people will be able to live in peace and prosperity and is open to cooperation with the international community including the United Nations particularly in the field of peacekeeping operations, as well as other fields.

UN peacekeeping today faces challenging circumstances. The international environment surrounding peacekeeping operations calls for more complex mandates, such as protection of civilians (POC) and nation-building in post-conflict countries. It has become necessary to tackle the highly demanding task of doing more with limited resources. In this regard, the focus of filling the capacity gap should shift from a conventional “quantity-based approach” to a “capacity-driven approach”, where the role of peacekeeping training centers is catered to increase the “capacity” of peacekeeping operations. In addition, it is urgent for the international community to engage in peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities in a comprehensive manner so as to consolidate peace.

Now, I would like to share with you Japan’s experiences and efforts for peacekeeping and peacebuilding, so that those experiences will become fruitful thoughts during this seminar. Our effort in this regard centres on four major pillars.

The first pillar is the increase of the troop contributions of Japan to UN peacekeeping operations. Japan has deployed the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) transport units in Golan Heights since February 1996 to carry out transportation of basic needs, restoration of roads, and other activities. In addition,
Japan has deployed the JSDF engineering units in Haiti since February 2010 following the massive earthquake in January 2010 to support the recovery and restructuring of the country in an integrated manner. Currently, approximately 320 personnel are engaged in various activities, including the removal of rubble, ground levelling, road repairs, and construction of small facilities. Moreover, the most recent contribution is the dispatch of a JSDF engineering unit to South Sudan that is responsible for improving infrastructure, including maintenance and repair of roads. Despite the devastating damage caused by the Great East Japan Earthquake last year, Japan, as a country committed to international peace and security, continues to deploy our enabling units to UNDOF and MINUSTAH and decided to dispatch another unit to UNMISS.

The second pillar of Japan’s contribution is human resource development. There are three areas which we have emphasized in our efforts toward capacity building. First, we emphasize the importance of training PKO personnel both by the participating countries and the international community, as well as the capacity building of civilian experts to provide specialized knowledge, experience and effective communication skills. We cannot overlook the fact that the number of capable personnel still falls short despite the increasing call for personnel contributions in today’s peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations worldwide.

In this regard, Japan has been active in the capacity building of African countries, thereby supporting the peacekeeping training centers here as it is important for us to help African countries resolve the conflicts with a spirit of ownership. Towards this end, Japan has dispatched 8 SDF personnel and 13 civilian experts as lecturers to peacekeeping training centers in Africa since 2008. To date, more than 1,800 military, police and civilian personnel have been trained through this assistance. Japan has also provided assistance to peacekeeping training centers in Africa amounting to a total of 23.7 million US dollars. Regarding CCCPA, Japan has delivered financial contribution amounting to 3.5 million USD to CCCPA for assisting its training programme as well as developing facilities of the Center.

Further, Japan has been active in the capacity building in the Asia-Pacific region. For instance, Japan and the United States co-hosted the GPOI-SML (Global Peace Operations Initiative – Senior Mission Leaders Course) courses in 2009 and 2011 in Japan to train potential candidates in Asia and Pacific countries for senior mission leadership in integrated peacekeeping operations.

Second, Japan has positively contributed to enhancing the civilian capacity, in particular in the Asia-Pacific region. Since 2007, Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been conducting “the Program for Human Resource Development in Asia for
Peacebuilding” in cooperation with the UN Volunteers Programme. In this context, Japan welcomes the report of the Secretary-General on Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict.

Third, the international community must respect the ownership and capacity-building efforts of post-conflict countries. Towards this end, it is essential to protect and empower individuals, including women and the vulnerable, from the viewpoint of human security. We need to generate conditions that are conducive to making peace irreversible through promoting co-existence and reconciliation, including through creating employment for the youth. Japan has been making contributions for the peacebuilding and the capacity-building through overseas development assistance and multilateral assistance.

The third pillar of Japan’s contribution is the promotion of international dialogue for peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Japan initiated the dialogue as the Chair of the Security Council Peacekeeping Operations Working Group from 2005 to 2006 as well as from 2009 to 2010. Moreover, the G8 Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding Experts Group Meeting, launched under Japan’s G8 presidency in 2008, provides the venue for coordinating activities of the G8 members regarding capacity building. In addition, Japan is an active member of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C34) Bureau to align our efforts to others.

The final pillar of Japan’s assistance is the financial contribution. Japan is the second largest contributor to the UN PKO budget, where all member states of the UN are obliged to disburse their respective share of contribution under the UN Charter. Voluntary contributions in peacebuilding such as funding for meetings of this kind are also important. It is essential to make the best possible use of funds available for the immediate aftermath of a conflict, such as the UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), to which Japan is the 5th largest contributor.

Concluding, based on our experience, I would like to stress the importance of promoting ownership and capacity-building of post-conflict countries, as well as strengthening civil-military cooperation to tackle a highly demanding task. I would like to once again express Japan’s commitment to promoting peace and stability in Africa and the world through actively engaging in peacekeeping and peacebuilding. I hope that the international community also continues its strong engagement to that end.

Allow me to pay respect to the CCCPA and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Arab Republic of Egypt for their excellent leadership in holding this meeting. I trust that the outcome of this meeting will greatly contribute to the future com-
mitment of the international community towards peace. Thank you for your attention.

Mr Johan Frisell, Director, Security Policy Department, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Sweden

Ladies and Gentlemen, I would like to express my appreciation to the Government of Egypt and the Cairo Regional Centre for Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA) for coordinating this Challenges Seminar. On behalf of my government, I also welcome Egypt as a member of the Challenges Forum.

Egypt is an important regional actor and plays an active role on the international arena. It is one of the greatest contributors to UN peacekeeping operations, with a particular focus on Africa. We also recognize the important role of Egypt in the Arab League and the African Union, as well as the current task of coordinating the Non-Aligned Movement. The democratic change that your country undergoes will further strengthen your international standing.

A few months ago, we marked the 50th anniversary of the tragic death of United Nations Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld. In an address to the Security Council in 1956 he said: “The principles of the Charter of the United Nations are, by far, greater than the Organization in which they are embodied, and the aims which they are to safeguard are holier than the policies of any single nation or people”.

The developments in North Africa and Middle East and the challenges they pose provide an illustration to this vision. That is why the venue of Sharm El-Sheikh is particularly well chosen. It is clear from the last year’s experiences in this region that there is no long-term peace without democratization and respect for human rights. We have realized that the international community sometimes needs to act with military means to protect civilians. The active work of the League of Arab States in the case of Syria is a good example of what an important role the regional groups can play for the promotion of peace and security. It also points at the potential for far-reaching cooperation between such regional groups and the United Nations. The changes of this last year only reinforce the need for effective preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping operations and peace building as essential elements in our common effort to seek to address conflict and crisis when and where they occur.

To the west and to the south of Egypt, the United Nations have launched two large missions in 2011 – in Libya and South Sudan. They represent in their own
individual ways a new way of setting up and operating peacekeeping and related operations. The generation of contributions from the UN member states remains a challenge, not only of military troops but even more police, corrections staff and other civilian personnel. When we today study these two missions, I hope that we will see how the United Nations have learnt from the New Horizon process as well as from findings from the Challenges Partnership.

The International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations has existed for more than 15 years. The Forum has been growing incrementally and in an inclusive way. It keeps a careful balance with an equal number of participants from the North and the South; military, police, civilians and not least a valuable mix of academics, practitioners and officials. The Challenges process has proved efficient in generating true cooperation amongst us all. Sweden is proud to have given financial and political support to Challenges over these years.

Challenges is about to move into a new phase. The fundamental common burden-sharing of the Challenges amongst the Partners, makes the collaborative effort particularly important. Following the request by Partners at the last Partners’ Meeting held in New York one year ago, Sweden is pleased to announce an additional financial support at the medium-term for a reinforcement strategy for the coordination of the Forum and the strengthening of the capacity of the Secretariat. This makes it possible for the Partnership to develop, to broaden its funding base and to pursue the important objectives and results they have envisioned. It will allow the Partnership to stay at the strategic, policy and doctrinal level and at the same time pursue operational field work that can validate and further feed into the strategic and future oriented concepts.

After today’s seminar and tomorrow’s Partners’ meeting, we look forward to the briefing of the findings of this meeting that will be held next week in New York. We hope that they will inspire and encourage the C34 community, to consider new and inclusive solutions to critical challenges. Thank you.

Ms Annika Hilding Norberg, Director, Challenges Forum Secretariat, Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden

Minister, Excellencies, Partners, Ladies and Gentlemen, Friends, how appropriate to meet here in Sharm El Sheikh – the City of Peace. Thank you Minister Fatallah, Ambassador Shalaby, Mr El Sherbini, Dr Abdalaziz and the whole Egyptian team and ministries for making both this and peace happen! On behalf of the Challenges Partnership, I would like to thank the Cairo Regional Centre for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa
(CCCPA) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Egypt for your resolve to make a difference for the world of peacekeeping; civilian, military and police, all of whom are gathered here today and tomorrow.

With over 65 representatives from the Partner Organizations here for the formal Partners Meeting tomorrow – I think this will be the largest Partners’ Meeting to date. Nigeria is Chair of the United Nations Special Committee for Peacekeeping and is here with the largest delegation of senior peacekeepers. Egypt is the Chair and Coordinator of the Non Aligned Movement, making our deliberations especially relevant.

The purpose of the overall Challenges Forum is to contribute to the global dialogue on the analysis, preparation, implementation and evaluation of multidimensional peace operations, to raise awareness and generate practical recommendations and encourage action for their effective implementation.

As the Foreign Minister conveyed through Ambassador Fatallah, the importance of the Challenges Forum rests not least in our common effort to seek to broaden and strengthen the international network of actors, from the South and from the North, involved in multidimensional peace operations. The Challenges Forum is a working Partnership intended to provide the international community with a strategic, broad-based, and dynamic platform for deliberations on peace operations among leading policy makers, practitioners and academics. Building on the achievements of the Challenges of Peacekeeping: Into the 21st Century Project initiated in 1996 and the Challenges unique network of Partner Organizations, the International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations, or the Challenges Forum, was established in 2006.

United Nations is our common denominator. However the Challenges Partnership has also welcomed the cooperation with and contributions made, by the African Union, the European Union and the NATO and other major organizations. There are also emerging organizations at the regional and sub-regional level that are increasingly focused on peace operations related matters, including the Collective Security Treaty Organizations and the League of Arab States. For example, we held several meetings with the League of Arab States in December and now earlier this week. We appreciate their expressed interest in cooperating with the Challenges Partnership and are pleased to forward a message from the Assistant Secretary-General for Peace and Security of the Arab League wishing the Partners and Colleagues great success in the important deliberations in Sharm El-Sheik. ASG for Peace and Security had hoped to participate in the seminar as the theme of the seminar was indeed timely. He regretted not to be able to take part due to other commitments, but looked forward to learning the outcome of the work, and to explore cooperation with
the Challenges Forum Partnership on issues of common interest and concerns. We are also pleased to have participation here from the Multinational Forces and Observers.

So what have we done – what do we do? Some 30 Challenges reports on particular and critical issues of peace operations based on the outcomes of major forums, seminars and workshops have been produced, including two concluding reports presented at the United Nations Headquarters to the United Nations Secretary-General. The Annual Forums generates a rich diversity of recommendations for the improvement of multidimensional peace operations. Ideas and recommendations have been picked up and turned into concrete policy development in the Secretary General’s Report on Peacekeeping, resolutions in the UN Security Council, and the reports of UN Special Committee for Peacekeeping Operations, as for example, supported by our Turkish, Australian, and Japanese Partners.

Peace Operations Beyond the Horizon – Enabling Contributing Countries for the Future. The theme of our seminar is as timely and as critical as can be. We are meeting here in Egypt for this Challenges Forum milestone event – the Sharm El Sheikh Challenges Forum Strategic Seminar and Partner Meeting. Egypt is a major personnel contributing country. Egypt is also a major global and regional political actor in peacekeeping, acting as Chair and Coordinator of the Non Aligned Movement. Cairo is the location of the Arab League Headquarters. The Cairo Regional Centre for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA) was Co-Chair of the Challenges Considerations for Mission Leadership in UN Peacekeeping Study and provided translation of it into Arabic. Finally, the CCCPA is Chair of the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres (IAPTC) Civilian Committee and will Host the IAPTC Annual Conference in 2013.

Over the last year, developments in Africa, not least, but not only, in North Africa and the broader Middle East, have shaped much of the international and local agendas. Given all these transformations and conflicts: what will be required from the countries and actors that are or will contribute with peacekeepers and peacebuilding actors to these missions or possibly the peace mission or political mission models of the future?

We look forward to exploring how we all in our different ways and with our various comparative advantages can support and enable effective and inclusive multidimensional missions – what is required for the international community to develop a true unity of purpose, effort, operations and achievements. We look forward to assessing and developing concrete ideas how we can better enable our military, civilian and police and corrections contributors, to build
on achievements already made and assessing additional steps that needs to be taken to make substantive progress. The key findings and messages of this seminar will be briefed to members of the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations in New York next week. Results of our seminar here will also be published in the Challenges Forum Report 2011.

Allow us to pay tribute to one of the main sponsors of this seminar, our Challenges Partners in Japan, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Using the Japanese hosting of the Challenges International Seminar held in Tokyo in 2001 as an example, I will indicate some of the outcomes possible from a Challenges Seminar Meeting like the one we are participating in today. The generated findings in Tokyo was presented to the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, included in a subsequent UN Secretary-General Report, and was made into a Resolution in the UN Security Council. Our Japanese Partners have also used findings in the Security Council Working Group of Peacekeeping. Japan was instrumental in establishing a framework of active cooperation between UN DPKO and Challenges.

We are now in our third and more long term phase of cooperation. How did Challenges start? Challenges was initiated in the mid 1990’s when the seminars on peacekeeping were primarily a North American and European affair. The aim of the first seminar was to engage peacekeepers that were counted on to contribute with troops and personnel, but not often listened to. Rather than pointing fingers at one another criticizing each other for shortfalls, the idea was to sit down at the same side of the table and put our brains together to try to find the best possible solutions to the challenges that all peacekeepers face in mission areas.

The Challenges initiative was launched in 1996 as a project to hold a round table discussion involving primarily peacekeeping organizations in Sweden, the Russian Federation and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Challenges has today developed into a global partnership for peace operations co-owned and co-financed by Partners from 19 countries, incl. the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, major troop, police, corrections, civilian, and financial contributing countries.

Partners have also been involved in parallel cooperative projects. In 2006, the Challenges Partnership was invited by the UN DPKO to support the launch of the UN DPKO led process to develop the Principles and Guidelines for UN peacekeeping operations. The UN DPKO was in the lead of that process, but the Partners were pleased to convene workshops to assist in that Member State consultation process.
Encouraged by the United Nations, the Challenges Partnership then set about operationalizing the Principles and Guidelines into Considerations for Mission Leadership in United Nations Peacekeeping. With input and comments from the broader UN System, and some twenty current and former senior mission leaders: SRSGs, Force Commanders and Police Commissioners, the study involved mandate analysis of all mandates over the last 15 years. The study identified the main objectives, outputs, activities, considerations related to prioritization, sequencing, and an identification of required resources. The Considerations is now translated into the six official languages of the United Nations. The final draft of the into Chinese translated edition of the Considerations Study came smoking hot from our Partners in Beijing only two days ago. The Considerations study is already a core element of the course material for UN Senior Mission Leadership courses, the African Union senior mission leadership courses and it is part of the development of an European Union equivalent. A special thanks to the CCCPA of Egypt, CAECOPAZ of Argentina, the Peacekeeping Office of the Ministry of National Defence of China, the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre of Canada, and for the Russian translation, East West Services. Partners are using the Study in their training and exercises around the world as we speak.

The Challenges Forum is based on the recognition of the importance of creating a sustained momentum for deeper cooperation and concrete results – linking theory, policy, and practice with training and implementation and in tune with international developments. By shaping a critical mass of common results and progress, each sector or undertaking feeds into and nurture other parts of the partnership initiative as it continues to evolve. We seek to adapt to international developments – sometimes Challenges is in support and sometimes in the lead, sometimes we focus internationally and sometimes regionally – whatever is necessary for the international community – as a whole – to contribute in the most inclusive, effective, and efficient way. We very much look forward to today’s and tomorrow’s important dialogue and work, when we expect much to be developed.

Beyond the horizon of this seminar, allow me to mention the next meeting, the Challenges Annual Forum 2012 on the theme: Cooperation and Coordination in Peace Operations – United Nations and Regional Perspectives. It will be hosted by our Swiss Partners, the Geneva Centre for Security Policy in cooperation with the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs and the Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sports of Switzerland 8–11 May 2012 in Geneva. We also look forward to the coming contribution by our most recent Partner – ZIF – the Centre for International Peace Operations in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Germany, to our
Challenges Forum effort – the exact format of which will be discussed and deliberated upon by Partners tomorrow, at the Strategic Partners Meeting.

The Strategic Partners Meeting tomorrow is envisioned to take the Challenges Partnership to the next level – to strengthen and intensify both our cooperation and our common output and relevance. We welcome and look forward to your contribution of insightful ideas, relevant experiences and not least – by together – looking intensely and jointly into the future.

We recognize and deeply appreciate the broad support for our common effort over the years, without which we would not be able to make our collective, representative and practitioners oriented contribution to the larger international peace operations effort. Thank you – I look forward to our discussions today and tomorrow.
Excellencies, dear Partners and Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, it is a great pleasure and honour for me to chair this first session in this seminar on Peace Operations Beyond the Horizon – Enabling Contributing Countries for the Future. I would like to welcome Ms Izumi Nakamitsu, Director, Division for Policy, Evaluation and Training, United Nations and Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Mr Kenichi Kobayashi, Director, United Nations Policy Division, Japan.

Presentation by United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, Mr Hervé Ladsous, delivered by Ms Izumi Nakamitsu, Director, Division for Policy, Evaluation and Training, United Nations

Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, today I am speaking to you on behalf of Under Secretary-General Ladsous, who unfortunately could not be with us due to developments in the Middle East, which have required him to remain in New York.

The issue of ‘enabling contributions for the future of peacekeeping’ is a critical priority for us all. We continue to face new and complex challenges in the field, across all of our missions, requiring us to respond rapidly, effectively, and with efficiency in order to deliver on diverse mandates. We are sure that this will continue.

Indeed, the responsibilities of our missions today require a tremendous amount of organisational flexibility and operational agility of our peacekeepers. This holds true whether we are considering the start-up of new missions such as the one in South Sudan; effective response to ongoing threats to civilians such as in Darfur and the Democratic Republic of the Congo; or support to stabilization and recovery such as in post-earthquake Haiti. These realities also demand that we all respond in a cooperative and coherent manner, befitting the scope, scale, criticality and diverse range of the challenges faced.
History has shown that peacekeeping is a uniquely flexible and multi-faceted instrument. Our operations today are more varied than ever before, bringing together different configurations of civilians, troops, and police under a unified political leadership in order to implement complex mandates and assist countries in the difficult transition from conflict to sustainable peace. From our successes and from our failures we have learned that peacekeeping is most successful when supported by a unified political strategy and by the sustained support of the Security Council, contributing countries, the host state, and regional partners. It requires support and engagement from all of these actors, as well as effective management of operations by the UN Secretariat.

Today’s meeting will look at strategies for enabling the military, civilian, and police capacities required for successful peacekeeping. This is crucial if we consider the wide range of functions peacekeepers must fulfil in today’s missions. Beyond the “traditional” roles of monitoring ceasefires and deterring the eruption of violence, peacekeepers today provide direct support to peace processes in the aftermath of conflict, including but not limited to assistance to reform of rule of law, justice and corrections institutions; support to elections processes; promotion of human rights and women’s empowerment; HIV and AIDS awareness-raising and civil-military coordination; protection of children and other vulnerable populations; and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of former combatants.

As we look to the future, I believe we can expect the diversity and complexity in our missions to continue, perhaps even to expand. This creates a pressing requirement for a responsive, nimble and sustainable commitment from the international community, a need that is only likely to intensify as we react to ever evolving threats to international peace.

Generating a coherent collective response, particularly within the current global financial climate, requires innovative thinking by all members of the peacekeeping partnership. The Security Council, Member States including the TCC’s and PCC’s, and the Secretariat, must all strive to identify not just how we can continue to support our current obligations, but also how we can best prepare for the future challenges we will face.

Whilst we are unable to predict exactly what peacekeeping will look like in the coming decades, we can anticipate that contributing countries will be asked to continue sharing the burden of providing resources and capacities. This year’s focus of the Challenges Forum on Peace Operations Beyond the Horizon and on enabling all types of contributors for the future is timely. In this regard, I would like to outline some of the key initiatives that we are taking, together with partners, to assist in this enabling process.
A Comprehensive Approach

We are taking a comprehensive approach in this regard, creating building blocks to support our partners, trying to better frame our understanding of the motivations for, and obstacles to, contribution by Member States, and also increasing our outreach and engagement with those who can and may provide the resources needed. Success will require support and dialogue across a broad spectrum of operational, policy and resourcing issues in order to best enable the right contributions, at the right time. Much of this effort are directed by ongoing reform initiatives encapsulated in the New Horizon document released in 2009 and in its annual Progress Reports, the most recent of which was distributed in support of this meeting.

The reform agenda’s vision of a more capability-driven approach to peacekeeping outlined a range of activities designed to support the generation and sustainment of critical resources for our operations, both now and in the future. We are also continuing to identify additional areas of work to help current and prospective contributors deliver on their commitments and to ensure the highest possible levels of performance in the field.

At the same time, we are engaging in efforts to strengthen the identification of and access to critical civilian capacities by operationalizing the system-wide Civilian Capacities Initiative.

Building Blocks to Enable

One of the basic building blocks of this comprehensive effort is to develop capability standards for different components within UN peacekeeping missions. These efforts, focused initially during the piloting phase on developing manuals and training for infantry battalions, military medical support and staff officers, will provide our current and potential troop contributors with key guidance to best enable them to prepare for, and operate in, UN peacekeeping missions.

As a result of extensive practical development and exchange with Member States, the materials are nearing completion. It is anticipated that they will provide a critical tool for those who prepare and contribute troops, and the Secretariat itself, for the first time generating a common understanding of the tasks, methods and capabilities desired of some of our most critical units. This effort builds on similar initiatives with respect to standardizing and setting guidance for police components in peacekeeping, including through development of a Strategic Guidance Framework and underpinning operational guidelines and training.
It is conceived that this work will facilitate both increased coherence and options for improved interoperability between contingents who are deployed. It is also seen as mechanism for preparation prior to deployments. This will link with related work on developing a more comprehensive approach to enhancing the operational readiness of deploying uniformed contingents.

In parallel to identifying a common baseline standard, we are also seeking to enhance our communication with Member States on the requirements for our peacekeeping missions, both with respect to uniformed and civilian capacities. This involves strengthening the effectiveness of the current capability gap list process which outlines the military and select civilian units, contingents and enabling assets we are seeking for our missions. We aim to make the gap lists a timely, accessible and dynamic tool. This includes better articulating the real impact that a lack of the identified units has on the ability of the mission to deliver on its mandated tasks. It is anticipated that this process will also enable improved trend analysis of likely future gaps, thereby helping Member States to be more forward-looking in their planning for contributions.

We are also committed to finding ways to help Member States help each other to generate the needed resources for our missions. We recognise that not all countries are able to provide units with the required capabilities. However, other Member States do have the ability to train, build and, in some cases, equip potential contingents, building their capacity to the point where they can actively and fully participate in UN peacekeeping operations. We are working now to find ways to better identify options for such partnerships, matching need with resources wherever possible. Of course, we rely on our Member State partners to improve the coordination and coherence of such efforts.

Building Consensus to Enable

To ensure peacekeeping remains an effective tool in support of peace, we also recognise the need to find ways to better understand the differing perspectives of all members of the peacekeeping partnership and to work toward a common vision. In reality, we do not always agree what missions need in order to succeed and, as a result, where reforms are most urgently required.

In order to cement and build an effective partnership, we must realise that listening as part of an open, transparent and two-way dialogue is vital to understanding the perspectives, requirements and expectations of all members of the peacekeeping partnership. This is the responsibility of all stakeholders, including the Security Council, the peacekeeping contributors, the Secretariat, and the many partners that support our operations.
For the Secretariat, this means recognizing that ‘who we ask’ and ‘how we ask’ are perhaps even more important than ‘what we ask for’ in many cases. To help us in this process, we are looking to increase our awareness of the issues faced by current and potential future contributors by seeking views from across the peacekeeping partnership. In particular, we are working to develop a more accurate and comprehensive understanding of the national and regional perspectives on UN peacekeeping, what motivations and expectations exist for Member States to provide contributions, what administrative, operational and political obstacles may need to be considered, and what incentives may be created to encourage a full realisation of the concept of burden-sharing across Member States.

The reality we face in terms of capability gaps in our missions has shown that the status quo is not sustainable. In other words, we cannot remain static in our endeavour, doing the same thing over and over again, with the same limited results, yet expecting change. We must recognise that the world evolves and that the political, financial and operational environments in which the Member States exist also change. This will impact their abilities, inclinations and commitments to support United Nations peacekeeping.

Supporting to Enable

We have seen this in action with the development of such initiatives as the Global Field Support Strategy, a multi-year approach that seeks not only to increase the efficiency of our field support processes, but also to better engage with Member States on meeting their needs. Modularisation, development of service packages, creation of Global and Regional Service Centres – each of these are designed to best deliver support to our partners and to reduce the frictions and difficulties they face in working in often harsh conditions. The focus is on making it as easy as possible for States to contribute and sustain a contribution over time by making the systems, processes and procedures much simpler, predictable and effective. It is operationalizing a client-focused approach.

The Civilian Capacities Initiative, for its part, has put a premium on identifying new and innovative opportunities for partnership, including through South-South and triangular cooperation and more effective mechanisms for matching demand and supply.

Similarly, we are hoping that the Senior Advisory Group, formed by the Secretary-General to look at the issues of reimbursement for troop-contributing countries and related issues, will provide additional guidance on how Member
States can be enabled and incentivized to contribute. This body, which commenced its meetings earlier this year, is charged with seeking common ground on a range of issues which have sometimes been the subject of a difficult and contentious dialogue in recent years, but which are also central to enabling a sustainable group of contributing countries.

**Outreach to Enable**

Such wide-ranging approaches must however be matched with clear and coherent steps by the Secretariat to reach out, engage and adjust the dialogue with the Member States in order to create the best opportunities for contributions. We need to focus actively on developing and implementing supportive and cooperative dialogue processes which seek a full realization of the principle of a collective response to threats to international peace and security, as outlined in Article One of the United Nations Charter.

Unfortunately, this principle has yet to be realized fully. This is evidenced by the fact that most uniformed contributions to our missions are being provided by a relatively small number of major contributors, mostly in the Global South. In fact, the current number of contributors sees only 58% of Member States providing personnel and contingents to UN peacekeeping operations. Obviously, we are not doing enough to encourage and enable full participation.

Whilst we recognize that the concept of burden-sharing may be characterized in ways other than the physical provision of personnel and equipment, the requirement to sustainably access high-capacity peacekeeping capabilities remains a critical priority. Complex missions covering vast geographical areas and responding to a growing range of multi-dimensional needs require a sustainable and capable peacekeeping force able to meet mandate obligations.

As you know, this is a particularly acute challenge when it comes to key enabling capacities such as helicopters, engineers and medical assets and specialized civilian needs such as police mentors and trainers and corrections experts. As such, our efforts must look both at accessing sufficient quantity of contributions, while also focusing on mobilizing the key capabilities required to complement and multiply the reach and effectiveness of peacekeepers.

In order to best frame our long-term approach to seeking such resources, we are strengthening our dialogue processes, including through taking advantage of international fora such as this one and other partner-sponsored workshops that bring together representatives of the military and civilian community. Such processes are and will remain critical in enabling frank and open exchanges on
the key aspects of ‘being a peacekeeper’ and provide venues for sharing of lessons and experiences, as well as opportunities for bilateral coordination on capacity and capability development initiatives.

Strategic engagement presents a vital opportunity for open and direct discourse between key Member State representatives within ministries, militaries and police forces, dealing with critical aspects of the contribution process with decision makers and those with the power to change on each side of the table. This outreach must be complemented by increasing direct and focused exchange between the Secretariat and legislative bodies such as the Security Council. In this context, it is important to recall the special responsibility of the Security Council as the mandating body to support outreach and force generation and to ensure alignment of mandates and resources. Starting with the 2000 Brahimi Report, the Secretariat has repeatedly underlined the role of a two-stage mandating process in ensuring that appropriate capabilities to meet mandate requirements are in place. Unfortunately, to date, this effort has not been embraced by the Member States.

Conclusion

Each of these steps, from creation of building blocks, through to improved understanding of our partners and development of a complementary strategic engagement process, must work towards meeting the long-term needs of peacekeeping. They must best enable the identification, generation and support of critical resources, and they must do so flexibly, responsively, and with an ability to adapt to ongoing change in the political, economic and operational environments. We look forward to the contributions of this year’s Challenges Forum to this dialogue and to helping set a path towards a comprehensive approach that will enable contributing partners while enhancing our collective ability to meet our global obligations. I look forward to hearing your views on this.

Mr Kenichi Kobayashi, Director, United Nations Policy Division, Japan

First of all I would like to express my appreciation to the Cairo Regional Centre for Conflict Resolution and Training in Africa (CCCPA) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Egypt for hosting this seminar of the Challenges Forum in the wonderful setting of Sharm El-Sheikh. I would also like to pay tribute to my previous speaker, Ms Izumi Nakamitsu, for her valuable detailed presentation today, as well as her organisation’s various initiatives in the past years to make peace operations better, ranging from the New Horizon initiative, to the Global

One of the biggest challenges that face the international community from the viewpoint of a country contributing both in financing and with human resources to peace operations will be the discrepancy between the sustained, if not increasing demand, for peace operations worldwide on the one hand and possibly more limited availability of resources, particularly financial resources, on the other. Due to the economic difficulties in many parts of the world, it is now becoming harder to secure understanding of people in meeting the demand of what sometimes seem to be a never ending business of conducting peacebuilding and peacekeeping around the world. The challenges cannot be addressed improperly by just ignoring it, by trying to do business as usual, or by cutting the resources blindly and unilaterally. In my view, this must be addressed by endeavouring to make peace operations more effective and efficient, more accountable to the contributors and the people on the ground, and more tailored to bring in reserves in respective situations in tangible and timely manners.

I would like to highlight the importance of a couple of elements which Japan has emphasized as the Chair of the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations in 2005/2006 and 2009/2010, when Japan was a member, as well as an active participant in the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations of the General Assembly.

First, the importance of an inclusive dialogue among stakeholders especially in the establishment and modification of mandates of peace operations cannot be overestimated. The stakeholders include the Security Council, the Secretariat and the Contributing Countries that provide the troops, police and the finance. Such early dialogue is essential to ensure the formulation of realistic achievable mandates, which is the key for successful operations. Once the mandate is established in such a manner, it is likely to be implemented on a more solid footing based on a consensual commitment by the contributors.

Second, a clear vision of transition and an exit strategy is crucial. The key words here are “partnership and ownership”. The international community should extend the necessary cooperation to countries in conflict, in the spirit of partnership, that will enhance the sense of ownership among the countries and avoid a sense of dependency. Peacekeeping and peacebuilding should be integrated in both planning and implementation of peace operations.

In fact, one might think that these two words, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, should not remain two words as two separate concepts, but instead should
merge somehow as one word like “peace enabling”, to use the important title of the seminar.

Last year Japan experienced catastrophic earthquakes. We are now in the process of recovery and reconstruction. This process is long and puts extra financial burden on the government and on the economy, which has already been under substantial strain. In such a situation, it is not easy to look beyond your own difficulties in order to care for other peoples difficulties. But in the aftermath of the earthquake, the Japanese people were surprised to find incredible amount of support and sympathy extended to them from all over the world day by day. From the poorest countries and its people, precious gifts and money were sent to Japan to help and show solidarity. They said they did so, as a way to return what they have received from the Japanese people through peacebuilding and nation building in the past decades. This is not something we can forget, and led to a continued commitment from Japan to continue contributing to the cooperative multilateral approach to address peace and stability over the world. We believe in the capability and readiness of the United Nations system and member countries to meet the challenges ahead. I trust our discussions and change of views today and tomorrow, will enhance such capability and readiness. Thank you very much for your attention.

Interactive discussion with the floor

A first question was raised suggesting that the main challenge today is the increasing demand for peace operations versus the limited resources available. It was suggested that much more attention should be given to taking preventive measures before a situation breaks out into conflict. Many of the conflicts now are intrastate conflicts, which complicates the issues even further.

Ms Izumi Nakamitsu responded that the issue of prevention was very important. Prevention was in fact one of the priorities of the Secretary-General for his next five years, in his second turn. Thus, the UN was now particularly focused on putting together our thoughts and thinking on how to make effective preventive measures a reality. Peacekeeping missions were suggested to in themselves be a preventive measure: “Peacekeeping works as prevention of recurrence of conflict. It has been found by numerous academic research materials, that where there have been peacekeeping operations deployed, the number of conflicts that erupted again has decreased. Peacekeeping has thus been found to be a very effective and useful instrument for prevention itself.” At the same time, Ms Nakamitsu agreed that prevention before the conflict happens is important and there have to be different kinds of preventions, all the way from development cooperation assistance to the use of more structured
prevention to address the causes of a conflict, to political interventions, preventive diplomacy etc. This was indeed one of the Secretary-General’s top priorities, for his second term.

A seminar participant asked the panellists; given the current international dynamics, the developments in the New York environment, looking towards the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping starting its session shortly – if there were one or two issues that the panellists thought were “ripe” for being able to move forward on, what would those issues or areas be?

Ms Izumi responded that they were very much looking forward to the C-34 opening early in the following week. As they had explained to the Member States, this year was a year of moving from reforms to impact on the ground. The UN Secretariat wanted the reform measures initiated, also those of last year and the year before, to be fully agreed and implemented. Looking at Protection of Civilians, there had been a substantive and collective move forward. Much had been achieved together with the Member States, and now emphasis was on making impact visible. They were delivering mandate implementation in a better way. Mandate implementation was one priority, so the comprehensive agenda that the UN Secretariat had put forward was being brought to the field.

There were a few issues within the reform initiative itself that still needed a consensus view within the Member State membership. General Gaye was better placed to discuss the challenges related to the operational readiness of contingents to actually deliver on the ground. There were a few areas where a better common understanding amongst the Member States was necessary. How to achieve a consensus and common understanding on troop reimbursements and the financial aspect of peacekeeping was a major issue. There was an important body; the Senior Advisory Group on Troop Costs and Related Issues, that had begun work on this topic. It is not an issue for the C-34, but in the coming year or so, the subject was going to be an important priority.

Ms Nakamitsu continued and focussed on conduct and discipline. How could the peacekeepers on the ground, uniformed as well as civilian, conduct and discipline be ensured? There needed to be better ways to address the issue of conduct of peacekeepers on the ground. Unfortunately there had been some rather unfortunate cases in the recent months. Several Member States had raised that it was necessary to get a better grip on the conduct and disciplines issues.

Another priority was the civilian and police components. Ms Nakamitsu explored that the UN Secretariat had been seen to be emphasizing the capability of military units so far, and especially in the last year or so. The focus had to be on what were the required capabilities? How could better civilians be delivered?
One of the unique advantages of UN peacekeeping was its integrated approach, where civilians and police components were working alongside the military deployment. More focus was needed on how to improve the delivery of those civilian components and police components.

Mr Kenichi Kobayashi responded that his presentation had been a preview of what Japan would focus on in the coming weeks’ deliberations in New York. For example, the importance of reducing the capability gaps and how to better utilize the capability gaps list now being prepared. An enhanced strengthened dialogue amongst stakeholders: troop contributing countries, police and financing, and the Security Council and the Secretariat, was also a priority.

A seminar participant followed up the issue of transitions and invited comments from the speakers on how the UN was working with local levels. Integration between military, police and civilian elements inside the mission was as important as the UN working well together with other UN agencies on local levels. He suggested that the presence that the UN have, in countries like South Sudan for example, was impressive, both in breadth and depth. In South Sudan they were now increasing from around 100 civilian affairs officers to 160. In addition, another 40 or so peacebuilding officers would arrive. This would give the UN a great tool, or potential tool, to start the process of early peacebuilding.

Ms Izumi Nakamitsu responded that because of the state of global contemporary peacekeeping, the issue of transition was a very important subject in the UN Secretariat. They were conducting a couple of reviews on peacekeeping operations. In essence, during the past year, the UN Secretariat had focused on developing a transition strategy. Not just for peacekeeping, but at the system wide level. There was a body called Integration Steering Committee, which had been created by the Secretary-General Policy Committee. It was chaired by the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations and attended at the senior level by all the agencies, fund and programmes and relevant departments. That body had agreed that there needed to be a UN system wide strategy, to identify common areas, fully recognizing that transition is context specific. There was no one size fits all, but there are common areas that could be discerned and taken into account while sharpening the strategy of the UN at the system wide level. The fact that there were different entities within the UN system that could contribute to a wide spectrum UN peacebuilding effort was a very important advantage of the UN system and that strength needed to be maximised and optimized.

Ms Nakamitsu continued stating there were still areas requiring further clarification, for example, the comparative advantage and the strength of each entity within the UN system. Peacekeeping and peacebuilding were not a sequential
process. Peacekeepers were in fact important early peacebuilders, and as such, there was a need to sharpen the edges of peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping missions, including the civilians, police and military, were suggested to provide the space for peacebuilding to take place in the best way. This was one aspect, which Ms Nakamitsu expected the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping to look into. Last year, the Protection of Civilians was in focus and much was achieved. The present year, the focus could possibly be on how the UN system could address peacebuilding and transition in a coherent way. The themes had been briefed to the Committee by DKPO/DFS, with contributions also by colleagues from the UNDP and the Peacebuilding Commission.

A senior military officer from a major TCC proposed that lack of resources and the financial implications thereof for peace operations is one major difficulty for the future. On the other hand, there are arms deals and arms productions in abundance. If a business brings hundreds of billions of dollars and this business gives people profits, the revenue should be channelled into peace operations. This would help eliminating arms deals, which provoked wars and it would offer financial resources for peace operations and for conflict resolution. The United Nations should discuss a proposal with relevant countries that the countries be paid a percentage of the profits that companies, who have arms deals would be required to be put in a trust fund. It was suggested this would not be easy, but these producers of arms are those assisting in provoking wars, so they should have to contribute to peace operations.

Ms Izumi Nakamitsu responded to what she called an interesting and new idea. The presence of arms was one of the key factors in spreading a conflict. For example, the implications of the existence of thousands of arms in Libya were spreading in the region, which was of very great source of concern, including to colleagues working in the field of DDR and mine action. On the financial side and at the very senior level, both USG’s statements to the Fourth Committee opening session of the General Assembly, referred to the challenges posed by the financial climate. At the same time, it was emphasized that UN peacekeeping is probably the most cost effective peace and security instrument at the disposal of the international community. It has been repeatedly verified by academic research as well as the United States Government Accounting Office, for example, that UN Peacekeeping remains a very cost effective and cost efficient instrument. Therefore, UN peacekeeping remained as important as ever, but at the same time, the UN needed to do more. There was a catch phrase currently in the UN Secretariat that “we need to do more, with less, better”. These were the three principles guiding much of what the UN Secretariat was seeking to do at the moment.
Mr Amr El Sherbini, Director, United Nations Division, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Egypt

I would like to thank Ms Nakamitsu and Mr Kobayashi for their presentations. Three very important words “more, less and better” were mentioned. With the new financial and political environment facing us, definitely this will have an implication on the way in which peacekeeping operations develops. I do not know if we are heading towards a new kind or a new type of peace operation, but this will no doubt have an implication and it will be part of the debate in New York in the United Nations Special Committee on Peacekeeping and in other fora. Thank you.
Developments in Africa 2011: 
What will be Required from the Peacekeeping Contributing Countries and Peacebuilding Actors?

Ms Aracelly Santana, Former Deputy SRSG UNMIN, Senior Adviser, Challenges Forum, El Salvador

This session will focus on the developments in Africa 2011 and what will be required from the peacekeeping contributing countries and peacebuilding actors? We have a very experienced panel. I will introduce the speakers and outline a framework within which we can hold the discussion.

Key issues came to the foreground this morning. I would like to share with you the experiences we had conducting the integrated key assessment process in Libya. I was the deputy to Ian Martin, who was at that point the head of the process, a process which took place as the conflict was evolving in 2011. The assessment process benefited from lessons learned from both political and peacekeeping missions. Integrated planning, as mentioned this morning, was central to the effort. The main assessment began very early, right after the United Nations and the Department of Political Affairs in particular, were given the task of examining what the risks would be as the conflict evolved. What challenges those risks presented, and in that context, what should the priorities be, once the conflict ended in Libya.

We had very little knowledge at the UN about Libya. The integrated process, which included UN officers, the entire UN system, the UN country teams, consultations with bilateral and multilateral partners and the national and local authorities, was an evolving process in Libya itself. In defining what the risks were and what the priorities should be, identifying the root causes of the conflict was very much in the background of these discussion. Instead, it was the experience of the international community in recent conflicts, such as the conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan, and how those two conflicts have been addressed, that shaped the assessment process.

Regarding complementarity, the UN should not take on all the tasks. There are bilateral organisations that sometimes can do some of these tasks much better
than the UN itself. For instance, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the International Office for Migration were part of the discussions, which also had implications for the international financial institutions. Questions concerning future financing of the challenges that Libya had to address was part of the assessment process.

Focusing on national ownership was a central part of the process underlining the close connection with authorities in Libya. At the same time, it was a very conflicting situation because Libya was still represented in the General Assembly and had its credentials. It was a very conflicting situation for the UN, to be dealing with authorities that did not yet have all the support nationally or even internationally. There was much debate within regional organisations and in the larger international community about the process and requirements in Libya. It was therefore particularly important that there were on-going discussions with authorities, stressing the effort of promoting national ownership. It is also a question of national sensitivity.

To wrap up my brief introduction, I recall what was said this morning regarding how to look at a situation from a UN point of view, not in the business as usual, but to really try and respond to the specific needs of the population that we are supposed to be serving.

The integrated mission planning process resulted in a report to the Secretary-General and it framed the mission now in place. In the most recent report of the Secretary-General on Libya, which will be issued in the next period, the Secretary-General refers to all of these lessons that were important in defining the process in Libya and which are still very much part of the mission as it is evolving in its phased deployment approach.

Dr Yasser Sabra, Challenges Forum Research Adviser, Former Head of Office of the United Nations SRSG in Cyprus

I have prepared the background paper for this session [see Challenges Forum Study in Chapter 1], which I will briefly summarize here.

There has been an increased pressure on the UN to play a bigger role in peace-building, and especially to help build sustainable institutions. Why is this so? There have been changes in the nature of conflicts, which in turn has demanded the UN to change its approach.

The changes in the nature of conflict are forcing us to change our approach. What countries emerging from conflict need nowadays, beyond monitoring
cease fire, providing basic security, overseeing peace agreements and organizing elections, they need sustainable and legitimate institutions that are working. Libya and South Sudan provide good examples in this regard. The mandate of both missions is centred broadly around peacebuilding. It is more evident in the case of South Sudan, where the UNMISS mandate places peacebuilding at centre stage. This is quite new. When one looks at all the mandates of the missions, this is something that for the first time is so explicitly mentioned in a resolution. The resolution of UNMISS includes the helping of the government for them to govern effectively and democratically. It is not any more about constitution design, it is really beyond that, how can the institutions be made to work? There is a lot of demand on the UN. The challenges of the UN are highlighted in the New Horizon Report, and those include the design and implementation of peacebuilding strategies. We have made progress in helping stabilize and contain conflict, but we were not really able to help in the area of peacebuilding. We are more like fire fighters, rather than doctors, who addresses the root causes of conflict.

In terms of peacebuilding, the UN has accumulated significant experience. More in the immediate aftermath of conflict and less on the long term state building. We have accumulated experience, we do it well in terms of transitional government, organizing elections and constitution making. But we have more mixed records when it comes to building effective institutions.

Yet, on peacebuilding, we have learnt some lessons for peacebuilding. The first lesson is that the prescriptive approach adopted for example in the Balkans, where the UN played the role as administrator, does not work. This may also be the case in East Timor. National ownership is fundamental. Second, the UN has a comparative advantage preparing the ground for state building, by relying on the support of partners and coordinating their efforts – essentially, working with partners. Third, long-term peacebuilding must start immediately after the end of the conflict. These three lessons have been factored into the mandate and in the way that the mandate has been implemented so far in both Libya and Southern Sudan.

There is now a lot of focus on national ownership with planning starting earlier with the national authorities. In the case of South Sudan, peacebuilding will be done with the national authorities, and in both Libya and Southern Sudan it will start immediately. A series of questions emerge from his. How effective can the UN be at preparing the ground for state building? What does it mean? We have learnt that we need to prepare the ground. What does it mean? If we cannot do the state building in the long term, but we can lay the ground for that, how can this happen? How effective can the UN support to a locally driven peacebuilding strategy be, if the host government does not have the capacity to
deliver or the government is not ready to cooperate with the UN on all aspects of their mandate?

An interesting feature of both Libya and Southern Sudan is that we are dealing with governments that are more legitimate than governments that we used to deal with until now. Libya and Southern Sudan went through struggles, different scenarios, but similar in the sense that they were more legitimate scenarios, and where the government does not suffer from a legitimacy deficit and does not need the UN really to enhance its legitimacy. Not all, but most of the governments we have been dealing with, like in the case of the DRC and Burundi, these were governments that were actually formed after a peace agreement, that was negotiated under the aegis and auspices of the United Nations and in a sense the UN had much more leverage on these governments than in the case of Libya and Southern Sudan. So how can we help countries that are less dependent on the UN, cooperate on all aspect of the mandate, especially an ambitious mandate that involves human rights, governments etc.

Finally, how effective can the UN be in coordinating the work of donors, who have their own priority and their own expectations for speedy delivery? We need to reconcile this with national ownership. How can this be done while the mission has multiple mandates? The key mandate for Southern Sudan deals with peacebuilding, but it has protection of civilians as an important component. How can this be done? And finally, when funds for peacebuilding are limited, how can the peacebuilding mandate be fulfilled? Thank you.

Gen. Babacar Gaye, Military Adviser, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations

I will focus on what will be required from the peacekeeping contributing countries and peacebuilding and discuss this in six points.

First, I would like to highlight that six of our eight peacekeeping missions have a protection of civilians mandate. This is a demonstration of the evolution of peacekeeping. The POC mandate requires responsive military components, capable of rapid mobility under force, which can concentrate efforts at critical junctures of time and space.

Second, and also related to the POC, a contingent may be required to engage in combat operation, so it is necessary to ensure the mission can implement its mandate. We need two things to be capable of successfully engage the use of force. First, a good situational awareness is required. The capability to react is
a matter of flexibility and mobility, as is the political will to act. It is this will that give the force the moral ascendancy to the possible spoilers.

Third, we will never obtain this agility, in order to properly implement the mandate, if the Member States, the troop contributing countries do not minimize the restrictions that they may put upon their contingents. What we call national caveats actually does not exist in the UN, because the Member State revert the operational control to the AG, but despite that we may face some national restrictions.

Fourth, training must be based not only on military capability standards, but we need to have mission specific training standards. The training must be one fitting with reality of the mission where the member states are going to be deployed.

Fifth, regarding inter-mission cooperation. Great effort has been made to obtain the support from one mission that is in a very critical phase by an enabling mission. This was done thanks to several governments, such as Ukraine, Pakistan and Bangladesh between Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire and recently between DRC, MONUSCO and UNMISS in South Sudan. All the lessons from the inter-mission cooperation have been fully documented. It is something that we are going to improve, because it provides us with an in-depth strategy as we do not have a reserve in peacekeeping.

Sixth, in relation to the gaps, clearly the issue of helicopters is one of our main concerns. That particular gap in ensuring the vision of full mission capable contingents deployed in support of the UN mandate is critical. What needs to be eliminated is that lack of adequate helicopter assets which provide strategic mobility, fire power and support functions. These constraints require the UN and its Member States to find solutions for this critical capability.

Last but not least, one of the projects that my office is providing should result in policy or guidance material on operational readiness. This project is linked to oversight. However, it will serve not only the UN system, but the individual TCCs. If it is implemented as we envisage, and with the full support of Member States, I expect us to be better prepared to meet the difficult challenges in the future. In summary, I have presented what is our expectations, vis à vis the Member States. It calls for efficiency and better delivery on the field. Thank you.
All the challenges and the very important issues that have been raised since this morning can be sensitized by looking very thoroughly at the Somalia situation. Somalia was a forgotten country, forgotten people, and I am afraid sometimes AMISOM also appears to be a forgotten peace operation. The focus is on other missions, which is well covered by the media and makes headlines in the media. There were three international peace operations deployed in Somalia in the 1990s. There were two UN operations and a US led coalition of the willing. All of them failed and had to be withdrawn, sometimes with some quite humiliating circumstances.

In the early 2007, the AU decided to take a chance and to go to Somalia without much experience, without equipment, and without resources. Basically, the African Union deployed three battalions only, from Uganda and Burundi. At that time, there was an Ethiopian contingent operating in Mogadishu in the bilateral arrangement with the then Government of Somalia. Local authorities did not extend beyond a few blocks around the President’s Office in the capital city of Mogadishu. The insurgence was all over the place, inside the country, but also inside the capital. For various political reasons, Ethiopia had to withdraw its contingent at the end of 2009. One of the issues was whether AU would be able to continue by itself to try to restore some peace and security in the country or whether like preceding operations in the 1990s, we had also to withdraw.

When I look at the theme for this session “Developments in Africa 2011: what will be required from the peacekeeping contributing countries”, I think the first answer will be political resolve and determination, the spirit of sacrifice, accepting to show responsibility for the common good. The governments of Uganda and Burundi did accept to live up to their historic responsibilities on behalf of Africa. They decided to stay, and it seems a miracle is being made, since, today, there is light at the end of the tunnel.

An international summit was convened by the British Prime Minister on the 23 of February. The report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations clearly recommends that the Security Council grant the requirements, which the African Union has put in its strategic concept for AMISOM. This would entail increasing AMISOM to 17,731 personnel, to provide AMISOM with much needed force enablers and multipliers, and to imply the Somali security forces to gradually take charge of the security and public safety in their own country.
We are already familiar with the responsibility to protect, and we know that there are three cases in which this principle is supposed to apply: governments, which are not capable to protect its population; governments, which is not willing to protect its population; and governments, which is itself a perpetrator of violation of its population. In the case of Somalia there was no government what so ever for twenty years, so I believe the international community has to shoulder these responsibilities in Somalia.

Therefore whatever investment is called for, in this case it is the responsibility of the world community, to show in the name of humanity, in the name of common destiny and in the name of the objective principles of the United Nations, that we have to make a difference in Somalia and we have to put forward whatever means and resources are required. To look at it through the angle of the shortcomings and the gaps, the gaps are inherent in the very nature of AMISOM.

First of all, our soldiers, our peacekeepers, were given a USD 500 allowance in a very risky theatre of operation. The UN peacekeepers are getting twice as much. We do not have the resources to regularly pay those allowances. We are grateful to the European Union, which makes available the amount of money required within the so called “Africa Peace Facility” of the European Union. The figure has improved since the beginning, but we have had for quite some time to pay our peacekeepers USD 500.

Further, there is obviously no peace to keep. This is a peace-enforcing mission, which did not have any tools or equipment for it to live up to its requirements and responsibilities. The threats in front of it: it has to cope with religious extremism, terrorism, banditry, and especially that embodied by the warlords; were already in the place. It has to cope with piracy, in addition to the consequences of growth in famine, requiring the supply of humanitarian assistance to the needing populations.

Regarding gaps, troop protection, equipment and requirements: Darfur is an often mentioned example of a very difficult environment. Our peacekeepers have been subjected to a number of aggressors there. In five years in Mogadishu, eight to nine times the number of peacekeepers killed in Darfur over seven years, have been killed in Mogadishu. So in Somalia eight to ten times more peacekeepers are killed and injured, than in Darfur, which has a reputation of being a very dangerous place for peacekeepers.

Why is it so? Because the elements, the means and the equipment for troop protection are not available for AMISOM. There is no mobility what so ever, no intelligence and a number of key factors are missing. You can mention the
extreme ambition of the mandate and relate it to the means made available for it. The uniqueness of AMISOM has at last succeeded to attract the attention of key players within the international community.

A unique scheme is now being developed between the African Union and the United Nations. The decisions have been made to provide the African Union, AMISOM, with very significant logistical support paid for by assessed contributions in the UN peacekeeping operation budget. I believe this is one of very few times, if not the first time, that this is happening in the magnitude and in this way.

The steps that are taken now to align the resources with the mandate of AMISOM are significant of a willingness and political resolve to make the mission a success for the benefit of not only the people involved, but also for the very credibility of both the United Nations and the African Union. Despite the shortcomings and the weaknesses of AMISOM, AMISOM have been engaged in the international effort relieving people, the civilian population from desperate famine.

Mr Ihab Awad Moustafa, Senior Officer, Peacebuilding Commission Support Branch, Peacebuilding Support Office, United Nations

My task has been widely facilitated by the study by Dr Yasser Sabra, which is an excellent paper providing a very clear framework for the discussion that we have currently at the United Nations about the linkage between peacekeeping and peacebuilding, but more generally on the peacebuilding framework that should be governing the United Nations engagement in post-conflict situations and possibly in transition situations as well.

The very purpose of the decision at the World Summit of 2005, to establish a new United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture, was actually to try to find answers to many, if not all, of the questions that Dr Sabra raised at the end of his presentation. It might be a bit frustrating that five or six years down the road Dr Yasser Sabra is still here and he is posing very important and still very relevant questions today. However, the positive side of that debate today is that peacebuilding has now been recognized throughout the work of the United Nations as an important mind-set. I would not even call it a tool or an instrument, as it is important to recognize that peacebuilding is a mind-set.

A positive sign of development since 2005 up until today is when we see the mandate of the United Nations mission in South Sudan, as Dr Sabra highlighted. For the first time, it was very clearly articulated there was a need for the mis-
sion to assist the adjacent South Sudan state in drawing up a peace mission plan and to assist in peacebuilding. The mandate involves the mission in South Sudan to support the South Sudanese government in the traditional areas of early peacebuilding tasks, including Security Sector Reform, Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration, and Rule of Law, as well as de-mining.

Peacebuilding goes beyond those immediate and very important tasks in South Sudan, and especially as a newly created state. Peacebuilding will involve to assist the government in South Sudan to build sustainable institutions. The question remains however, how would the United Nations respond to this particular mandate?

The Results Based Budget framework (RBB) that UNMISS submitted to the fifth committee for budgeting purposes indicates that the mission will respond to this particular mandate through drawing up a so called South Sudan peacebuilding plan. The mission has already circulated a questionnaire to the other members of the United Nations country team in the field. It is important that the mission itself, the military and police capability, will not necessarily be or have the necessary skills sets and tools to draw up a peacebuilding plan that has longer-term institutional implications for an adjacent state.

All members of the United Nations country team, the comparative advantage within the United Nations itself, is key to support a peacebuilding priority plan or even to assist a government or the national authorities to prioritise and agree on a rational sequence of activities given its limited capacity, limited absorption, and the limited resources available.

The United Nations on its own will have a major role to play in South Sudan, not only to contribute technically to the state building requirement of peacebuilding, but also to pull together and attempt to coordinate an overwhelming donor response. South Sudan was definitely a very attractive situation for the international community. Donor enthusiasm sky rocketed around the time of independence and secession was declared in July. That is something that the South Sudanese government, while showing appreciation, is also an overwhelming situation for a government and a state that hardly has the capacity to coordinate that much enthusiasm. The role of the United Nations in South Sudan will be to try to provide a platform for the coordination among donors in order to avoid duplication and to manage also the absorption capacity of an adjacent government institution in South Sudan.

Libya will be a very different situation. Despite that it might not necessarily be too different in terms of the requirements, but in term of the political and socio-economic environment, it is quite different. The response of the United Nations
is also different. Despite that peacebuilding has been at the core of the United Nations approach to the situation in Libya, there is little information on how much exactly the mission have or will have a major military component, a sizeable police and corrections component, which in itself may put a emphasis on certain areas. However, the most important aspect is the insistence of the new government in Libya that it would like to be in the lead in prioritization and in deciding where the United Nations could be helpful. In the meantime, it will be very important for the United Nations to continue with the excellent work that has been started by Mr Ian Martin during the pre-assessment period, identifying where the United Nations comparative advantages will be vis à vis other partners from outside the United Nations.

Finally, regarding an area bringing peacekeeping and peacebuilding together and that is the transition period. The Peacebuilding Support Office, the Peacebuilding Fund, and the Peacebuilding Commission has had a particular experience in the case of Liberia. Liberia has had one of the most sizeable United Nations multidimensional peacekeeping operations. It is currently in the process of drawing down. The Peacebuilding Commission has been engaged with Liberia now since September 2010 with a focus on capacity development, whatever residual capacity issues that Liberia had over the past seven years. In the draw-down of the peacekeeping operation, the focus has been on certain capacities that will enable the Liberian government to survive and sustain the path to sustainable peace. An example is the quite innovative linking of the benchmarks of the drawdown of UNMIL peacekeeping operation to the building of the capacity of the police and justice system. The initiative of creating regional security and justice hubs, where serious provision of both police and justice are made available to the Liberian local population outside of Monrovia, strengthens the capacity of the state, the presence of the state and also as a sign of the capacity of the state to deliver key services. This was one example how to link peacekeeping and peacebuilding by a direct contribution at early stages of a peacekeeping deployment to the transition phase and onwards. Thank you.

Interactive discussion with the floor

A diplomat expressed appreciation of Dr Sabra’s point that the UN can play a very effective role in coordinating state building, but it does not actually have much capacity to conduct state building in itself. The seminar participant added that he thought that the international community did not necessarily want to see state building taking place during peacekeeping that is in early stages. There was however an opportunity when peacekeeping missions deploy to set the framework or the tone of what must follow in terms of state building. He asked what more could the UN do to ensure that the thinking of the longer terms
aspects took place at an early stage at a time when missions were thought of prior to mandating or when they were beginning to undergo a change from simply securing the situation to looking at the longer term support to peace?

Dr Yasser Sabra responded elaborating that the role of the UN was indeed to lay the ground, paving the way. But what it meant exactly was not really known, other than for example the example of Southern Sudan, where the mission was supposed to prepare longer term plan with the Sudanese on what peacebuilding could be done. The UN had a coordinating role, but it had not worked so far. In Southern Sudan, the UN was supposed to help the SPLA convert into a national army. This was a huge peacebuilding role and explicit in the mandate. How could this be done when it was known that the UN experience in the Congo had not worked at all. Further, the UN was not really in the lead. Donor countries were trying to involve themselves and the EU at the highest level to try to create all sorts of integrated brigades etc. which did not work. The UN had more of a coordinating role, but the coordinating role did not really work, which required more reflection. The question was timely because new countries like Libya and Southern Sudan would have similar requirements, many countries being beyond the election phase, beyond the transition phase. They were now seen as post-second election phase.

A scholar asked about the example of using regional hubs of security. Should such regional hubs of security not necessarily be connected to the regional security organizations like ECOWAS, the African Union or SADC, or should such hubs of security be something different, something more prepared UN rapid reaction contingents which were concentrated, trained and located at such hubs of security?

Mr Ihab Awad Moustafa responded that the term regional security hubs have been used for domestic reasons in for example Liberia. It has nothing with the regional security arrangements beyond the borders of Liberia. It is a regional security hub because it serves various counties and it service to various villages and towns spreading across these counties. It is a very internal arrangement. A former UN Force Commander suggested that the international community was still fighting yesterday’s war. It was conceptually and in terms of doctrinal guidance still trying to deal with multidimensional peacekeeping and yet the paradigm had moved on again. The paradigm now was all about peacebuilding, transition and yet there was no conceptual or doctrinal background to help in the process. There was the odd paper, the odd strategy coming up, but there was nothing like the Capstone Doctrine to try and pull the international community together in order to avoid incoherence between the donors, between states who were trying to deal with the issues of national ownership and the international community written as the United Nations. He suggested that until
the international community started to talk from the same sheet of music on the transitional business, it was going to have incoherence as identified by Yasser, and this needed to be thought about. How could the Challenges Partners in this business try to produce a savoury draft of the Capstone Doctrine, but looking at these transitional issues, which needed to be broadly accepted by the international community, otherwise there would be incoherence.

H.E. Mr Ramtane Lamamra responded by saying as far as peacebuilding was concerned, the Peacebuilding Commission of the UN had on its agenda only four African countries originally: Guinea Bissau, Sierra Leone, Liberia and the Central African Republic. Obviously, the circumstances of those four countries were completely different from the two Sudans, and far from the circumstances of the North African countries, which were experiencing revolutions and the aftermaths of revolutions. In the case of the original countries, these were really least developed countries. Everything had to be done to assist them in capacity building and so on and so forth. In the case of the two countries of Sudan, North and South, there were potentials for very strong economies; oil producing countries, agriculture for example. From the African perspective, there was a belief that the efforts of the international community should focus on both Sudans, because the agreements provided for two viable states living peacefully side by side. If the international community failed to achieve that, there would be a high potential for conflict to prolong.

As far as North Africa; Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, was concerned, Mr Lamamra thought that it would be appropriate to seek capacity building. These were countries which have developed their human resources and financial resources were available, especially in the case of Libya. There was now a necessity to develop a peacebuilding doctrine, by looking at second or even third generation of peacebuilding endeavours. Then, in some cases to focus on peacebuilding in some cases on economic development, but in some cases political development. It was now necessary to engage in building democratic structures, democratic institutions and from that perspective, the African Union was now opening an office in Libya to assist in making the transitional period successful.

Concluding, Ms Aracelly Santana, recalled that much had been explored and noted that there had been one issue that had not really been discussed but mentioned by panellists, which was the hybrid mission model. Also, the challenges related to development in peacebuilding had not been addressed. Libya was possibly one example, but maybe not the most representative at that point. Libya was quite a well functioning state that could be a resource for development and a democratic process if the people of Libya wanted and worked on that. Finally, the issue of leadership and strategic vision was something that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations had been working on, particularly in
relation to training. When it came to missions, whether they were political or peacekeeping missions, the kind of strategic vision and leadership that could be mobilized would be very important for the implementation of the mandate and the specific work that had to be done with authorities and with civil society in the countries where the missions served. Thank you.
Parallel Working Groups

There were four parallel working groups addressing: “Enabling Leadership through Effective Participation in Decision Making – What are the Next Steps”, “Enabling Military Contributions”, “Enabling Civilian Contributions” and finally, “Enabling Police and Corrections Contributions”. The plenary introductory and reporting back sessions were chaired by Ms Izumi Nakamitsu, Director, Division for Policy, Evaluation and Training, United Nations.

Working Group 1:
Enabling Leadership through Effective Participation in Decision Making – What are the Next Steps?

Chair: Dr Matthew Rowland, Head, Peacekeeping Team, Conflict Group, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, United Kingdom

The Chair observed that there had been many improvements in more inclusive, participatory decision making over the last few years. The UNSC was consulting TCCs on a more regular basis before mandate renewals and through the Working Group on peacekeeping. Some Council members had made a point of inviting force commanders to brief the Council. The context for peacekeeping continued to be dynamic, however, posing challenges both to the nature of the decisions that needed to be taken as well as the range of stakeholders in those decisions. Three areas were particularly challenging:

- The nature of conflict has changed. The system was adapting to this. As significantly, however, the nature of what constitutes peace was also changing, and differences amongst the international community over what constitutes peace, and the role of peacekeepers in that peace poses a challenge to decision making.
- Secondly, the international order is evolving. As an example, regional organisations were exercising a growing influence over decision making on matters of peace and security and, in varying degrees of directness, on decisions relating to peacekeeping.
- Thirdly, the economic environment is different. There was increased pressure on the key financial contributors to peacekeeping to demonstrate that their money was being used efficiently. While economics were never a factor in determining whether a new mission should deploy, financial considerations were a factor to be taken into account.
when renewing mandates. Similarly, in the changing economic environment, many traditional TCCs faced rising costs in preparing and deploying troops, influencing the decisions that they must take.

In their opening remarks, all panel members agreed that improvements in participatory decision making had been made in the last few years. Between them, they highlighted the following as areas for further improvement:

- Greater involvement of key financial contributors beyond those on the UNSC;
- Continued strengthening of the engagement with TCCs, including understanding the national caveats they placed on their troops;
- A greater focus within the Working Group on Peacekeeping on cross-cutting issues and clearer links between the Working Group and the C34;
- Greater clarity on transitions between peacekeeping and peacebuilding and the role of military peacekeepers in the latter;
- Strengthening the military expertise in the Office for Military Affairs;
- Continued clarification of the concept of robust peacekeeping;
- Greater transparency from the Secretariat in terms of sharing operational documents, such as the Rules of Engagement, with member states, as a means to strengthen the shared understanding of mandates;
- The establishment of a UNSC Working Group on the financial aspects of peacekeeping;
- More focus on complementary solutions, for example over the horizon forces;
- More focus on well-trained, well-selected and well-prepared leaders for key roles in missions (perhaps there were lessons to be learned from UNDP’s approach?).

The following additional points were made during the discussion:

- The Partners should give greater consideration to multinational operations, and in particular how and why they appeared to depart from their authorised mandate, because publics failed to distinguish between these and blue-helmeted missions;
- The Council should be able to adjust mandates, provide strategic direction more rapidly – annual or even six monthly reviews were too slow;
- The Secretariat needed to engage with regional organisations beyond Africa – the Organisation for the Collective Security Treaty, for example;
- DPKO still faced a lack of planning capacity – could the Military Staff Committee complement DPKO’s efforts?
In addition to drawing on certain of the points above, the Working Group agreed recommendations should be reported to the plenary as follows:

1. There needed to be more focus on senior leaders:
   - Targeting them early and ensuring they had clear guidance to which they could refer
   - Identifying what it is we expect of senior leaders
   - Giving greater attention to the selection of leaders – no amount of training could make a good leader if the individual lacked the basic aptitude.

2. There also needed to be more focus on integration, in particular during the transition between peacekeeping and peacebuilding:
   - Improving at the operational level, the co-ordination between members of the UN family, and the donor community more broadly;
   - Preparing members of the senior leadership team to perform the co-ordination function;
   - Analysing cases of effective co-ordination (Mozambique, Haiti and Liberia were all cited), including the role of the Resident Co-ordinator;
   - Developing a shared understanding and lexicon of the concepts associated with transitional environments, perhaps with a view to producing an annex to the Capstone Doctrine.

**Working Group 2:**
**Enabling Military Contributions**

*Chair: Brig. Gen. Dennis Gyllensporre, Director, Armed Forces, Sweden*

Recommendations generated by Working Group 2:

1. Attract potential TCNs and improve commitment of existing TCNs
   - Create a system of bilateral sponsorship
   - Establish robust medical support standards
   - Consider inter-institutional cooperation in planning
   - Develop C2 based on best practices
   - Contract logistics support in preparation of a mission

2. Enhance reimbursement
   - Introduce incentives for critical capabilities
   - Speedy payment process
• Simplify compensation procedures
• Review reimbursement to reflect Lifecycle costs (LCC)

3. Develop efficiency
• Intensify dialogue to ensure realistic mandates (MSC, TCN, etc)
• Develop doctrine and Lessons Learned
• Improve training (quality, shared responsibilities, ADL, standards)
• Institutionalize gaming
• Adopt flexible CONOPS to allow reserves and agility for PoC
• Strengthening of information management (intelligence, maps)

Background Paper on Enabling Military Contributions

Professor William Flavin, Director, Doctrine, Concept, Training and Education, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, United States

Introduction

As you all know the UN has instituted reforms over the last two years to help it adapt to the fivefold increase in peacekeeping over the last decade. And it is no surprise to this audience that the complexity of those operations has also increased placing a demand of the quality and ability of the leaders and the Troop Contributing forces. This evolving nature of peace operations that includes volatile operating environments with vast deployment areas that places increased demand on mobility, situational awareness, interoperability and sustainability means that the military force must be capable, flexible, and adaptable.

For the past 15 years the US Army has had to adapt to similar challenging environments and here are some of the approaches that have proved successful and may be considered.

Developing a trained and effective force, based on appropriate and relevant doctrine and standards that provides the capability needed to achieve the goals mandated by the international community. This means understanding what those needed capabilities are:

a. Pre-mission training baseline (Mission Essential Task List) that determining what Tasks are needed.
b. R+90 preparation cycle (induction training) including Leader Seminars, Doctrine Seminars, combined readiness exercises, Right and left seat ride with the commanders and staffs in the operational area, and main-
taining a connection to the operational area for situational awareness during preparation.

c. Continuing to refine during mission training.

Ensuring flexibility and adaptability to meet the dynamic environment

a. Special approaches to lessons learned to streaming the process.

Using gaming, modeling and simulation to refine or anticipate

a. Gaming is used as part of normal planning process.

b. Gaming and simulation and scenarios are used to prepare for branches and sequels.

Baseline

To start with, the US Army needed to develop a trained and effective force, based on appropriate and relevant doctrine and standards that provided the capability needed to achieve the goals mandated by the international community.

This means understanding what those needed capabilities are. Through a review and assessment of the operating environment the Army established a mission essential task list and a structure that could ensure that the force would be able to accomplish any task that it would be required to accomplish. This baseline would be modified and focused to meet the current operating environment that the unit was to be deployed into.

Pre-Deployment

Both the US and British Armies have taken a similar approach to ensuring mission readiness. We take the baseline and upon identification of a specific mission we focus on those tasks the will enhance mission accomplishment. This training and preparation focuses on the conditions present and tasks required for the contingency the unit is earmarked against.

While the deploying leaders are responsible to train their units and soldiers, there is a shared responsibility with various institutions. It is interesting to note that responsibility to conduct or provide the training is shared between previously or currently deployed units, training schools, and the training centers at Fort Polk LA, Fort Irwin CA and Hohenfels GE, which are the critical element of our training strategy.

All preparation is based on an accurate description of the operating environment that includes identifying not only the drivers of conflict but also resilience
in the population and the country and opportunities to mitigate and support peace processes.

This Operating Environment provides a list of requirements ranging from language proficiency, cultural awareness, scope of the mission mandate, to information on all participating organizations and is generally conducted by a training center for the unit. The middle category, the collective task training is the most resource intensive portion. The required tasks are developed by studying the mission, mandate, and unit capabilities then developing a comprehensive list of tasks the unit must master to succeed in its mission. This list is developed by the employing HQ, in coordination with the deploying unit and the institutional army. Getting this list right is critical. The task list will, along with a shared understanding of the OE, guide the training center to develop a highly resourced, mission rehearsal exercise specifically tailored for the unfolding mission. This rehearsal is one of the keys toward success.

This training program, with shared responsibilities, occurs over roughly a 9 month period. In the early months, we train our soldiers on the individual and contextual tasks they’ll need to successfully complete the collective tasks trained at the end of the cycle. We also invest significant resources into Leader training. Educational topics are intended to prepare leaders to conduct better training of their subordinates and to inform Leaders of critical issues surrounding their mission ranging from Historical underpinnings to Mission Command structures. Context is provided via visits to theater, cultural training, educational seminars, and by an elaborate virtual visit program including the deploying unit observing via VTC daily command events held by the deployed unit. Entering their Operational Center Virtually as a spectator. Additionally, depending on circumstances and the leadership the incoming unit can work on a problem in parallel with the deployed unit and compare their solutions. Both the deploying unit and training center personnel observe these events to ensure they all share an understanding of the environment the deploying unit will inherit. The training centers are responsible to create the appropriate training environment and problem sets within the culminating collective training event, or MRE, to replicate the conditions the deploying unit will face in the theater.

These highly resourced MREs include all types of units, ranging from PRTs to Logistics units to Brigade Combat teams. There are ample opportunities for Multinational Forces to participate in these exercises with US units. There are also multiple training centers throughout the world capable of hosting a similar event. In the US, each of our 3 centers offers divergent environments. At Fort Irwin CA the terrain is representative of a high desert or mountainous region. At Fort Polk LA a jungle like environment is prevalent while in Hohenfels GE a forested environment exists. Urban areas are modeled, both physically and
culturally around the deployed conditions. It would be possible, even desirable, for the peacekeeping community to forge an agreement where one PK Training center might build an African Environment, another a Middle East Environment, another an Asian Environment, another a South/Central American Environment, and another a European Environment. Using this methodology, an appropriate environment would always be available and individual nations could be responsible for maintaining a single, super environment then work out agreements to send their units to the appropriate center for the identified mission.

Our methodology is focused on preparing units as effectively and efficiently as possible, leveraging all of the Army’s resources to support deploying units, and ensuring the Army at large understands the scope of these missions to facilitate updates to doctrine, policies, and materiel solutions. Over the past 9 years we’ve learned the criticality of the contextual aspects of our training, and the importance of continuously monitoring these missions for changes in the environment. Our units adapt very quickly while deployed and our institutional trainers must adapt just as quickly to remain relevant to our deploying forces. We’ve learned important lessons about the criticality of training as a coalition to ensure we all understand one another’s limitations and capabilities. Foremost, we’ve learned that relationships are critical to mission success and if we can establish relationships with each other during training prior to deployments, we can focus our initial relationship building efforts once deployed on the local populace. Let’s look at what we have done to facilitate identifying and rectifying problems.

Lesson learned

The ISAF commander Gen Petraeus was not satisfied that issues in the operational area were being addressed rapidly by the supporting institutions. An OEF LL Forum was established a year ago (Feb 2011) to leverage a network of organizations/capabilities to quickly push life-saving observations and information throughout the operational and generating forces.

The forum was established to:

a. Rapidly address OEF’s emerging needs/issues.

b. Ensure relevant information is integrated into DOTMLPF adjustments.

c. Quickly work new techniques and changes into the operational environment for forces in Theater, as well as back into the training base & generating force.

• Identify the key players no matter where they were: The OEF LL Forum has consisted of reps from the HQ in Theater, Army HQ,
Army Centers of Excellence/ proponencies, training centers, Training & Doctrine Command, Forces Command, Lessons Learned organizations, USMC, and numerous others.

- **Establish priorities:** Essentially the OEF LL Forum takes action to address the immediate needs of the operational force and also works on enduring solutions to fix problems/issues. This Forum is about working on issues and delivering solutions as fast as possible – while staying connected to deployed forces.
  - The Forum captures topics or issues as they bubble up, quick turning/solving Level 1 issues (those that “Save Lives”), and framing/discussing Level 2 issues (those that “Save Forces and Mission”), then developing appropriate actions on Level 2 issues, with the involvement of senior leaders/General Officers.
  - Level I issues do not wait or slow down; they are about savings lives. For example, Counter-IED issues or vehicle rollover issues. Information/assistance is pushed back to deployed forces in 72 to 96 hours.
  - Level II issues are the focus of the OEF LL Forum collaborative/virtual sessions—aimed at “saving/aiding the forces and the mission” and looking for DOTMLPF changes/effects that need to be made throughout the Army. For example, issues related to operating with HN forces, or issues related to unity of effort among Army & USG agencies: Corruption.

- **Established a process outside of normal processes:** The Forum accepts inputs from Forum members/organizations, from ISAF units, LNOs, leader Interviews, and links throughout the lessons learned community. (Also, CALL’s technical system network collects directly from Soldiers, NCOs, officers, and senior staffs.) Once the OEF LL Forum receives an issue from any of those sources, it gets Theater to review and validate the issue, and then it works the issue through numerous organizations throughout the Army (with a designated lead agent and several assisting organizations) – to develop actions/solutions.

The schedule used by the OEF LL Forum to raise, discuss, and back brief issues is:
- Monthly action officer sessions to raise new issues, discuss progress of working issues, and develop agenda items.
- Monthly Council of Colonels sessions to monitor progress and to determine what information and issue resolution actions should be presented to senior leaders for decisions.
- Monthly senior leader/General Officer steering committee sessions to make decisions on issues/actions.
- Quarterly back briefs to senior leadership in Theater.

Throughout the process, there is continuous sharing of time-sensitive critical information.

Throughout the process, Lessons Learned information/actions/solutions are delivered to deployed forces, training centers, and generating forces as rapidly as possible.

Getting the Level 1 and Level 2 lessons quickly into the system – for training, doctrine, etc. – has markedly contributed to success of units in the field – tactically and operationally.

Their success has often been a function of the preparatory training that Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, National Guardsmen, and Reservists received prior to deploying to Afghanistan. That training at home stations and at training centers – such as NTC, JRTC, 29 Palms, etc. – has been continuously shaped/influenced by the OEF Lessons Learned process.

In summary, the purpose of the OEF LL Forum has been to get emerging issues from Theater back into an Army Forum which will quickly develop solutions/actions – both immediate solutions and also solutions that affect the Army across DOTMLPF at large.

Gaming and Modeling

“Gaming” can be interpreted in two contexts, and both are important for training and preparation. The first context is the use of simulations to train mission, component, and unit staffs. Most of these are computer-based, and many of those that are currently available may be adaptable for use by UN missions and TCCs.

The second context is the conduct of “wargames” as part of a planning process. These do not require computerized simulations but are more analogous to “tabletop exercises” in which the relevant leaders and staffs conduct structured discussions about potential situations. TTXs can be low-resource by high-payoff events that can be conducted before and during peacekeeping missions. They can address overall mission plans, specific operations, contingency situations, or planning for upcoming events such as elections or transitions. In addition to producing useful plans, they can help staffs refine their planning
processes and forge the relationships that are critical for effective peacekeeping. Because of the low overhead required, they can be conducted with a small number of trainers who can conceivably travel to the organization’s location, whether it be in their own country or at the actual mission headquarters. Additionally, since any organization has its own effective procedures, these TTXs can be a valuable source of lessons learned and best practices that can be consolidated and passed on to other staffs.

Recommendations:

The International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres Annual meeting this year identified the following:

- A need for better feedback from the operational area so that training and preparation can be improved.
- Need for more integrated training and preparation events before deploying.
- Need to leverage technology to conduct table top gaming and staff preparation.

Needs are out there. I think it is time to consider some radical solutions.

Working Group 3: Enabling Civilian Contributions

Chair: Dr Jim Rolfe, Acting Director, Australian Civil-Military Centre, Australia

The working group on Enabling Civilian Contributions held its discussion in the light of the implications of the Secretary-General’s Report: Civilian Capacities in the Aftermath of Conflict. The group sought to develop a better understanding of the current issues and requirements that need to be addressed in order to enhance the civilian contributions.

Civilian capacities have both quantitative and qualitative dimensions to it, and we tend to move between the quantitative and the qualitative. On the quantitative side, there was a “C-34 problem” or rather a “Catch-34” issue. The UN has a critical civilian capacity need that cannot draw on Member States to fill that need, which is one of the essential problems that the United Nations face. However, when we are talking of the subject of civilian capacities, there is a range of issues, including but not limited to, the complexity of operations. Mis-
sions are complex and part of the complexity is the complexity that we bring ourselves, because we do not necessarily define what it is that we are talking about. So there are complexities relating to the perspectives that we bring to the topic, and there are complexities related to the concept themselves.

In terms of the perspective held by the United Nations, and that is not just one perspective, I suspect but half a dozen. There are perspectives held by the regional organisations, there are perspectives held by the Member States themselves and indeed there is a whole range of non-government civilian capacity providers, each of which brings its own perspective to the issues. When we are talking of the civilian capacity, we tend to conflate these at the expense, perhaps, of proper understanding of what it is that we are talking about. The main concept is civilian capacity, but there are at least two kinds of civilian capacity. They are addressed in the Secretary-Generals report. There is civilian capacity that the mission might need for its own purposes and there is civilian capacity that the failed or failing state, the host nation, needs to ensure that it develops into a sustainable, successful and stable state.

The other issues that we traversed were around supply, demand, recruitment, and training. What are they and how do we fix them? Problem definition is always much easier than solution finding. However, there are ranges of solutions that emerged eventually. There is a set of solutions around definitions of what it is that we are talking about, about thinking about the issues and about clear analysis, about putting down assumptions for any specific issue.

There are solutions around the development of partnership, a concept centred on in the Secretary-Generals report. The partnerships are not easily developed. There are partnerships at all levels of the problems, but partnerships have to be worked on. They have to be worked on long before they are needed. We need to develop the partnerships today, if we are to use them effectively in five or ten years. There is no point in saying that we have a mission tomorrow, let us build up partnership to make that mission work, because the partnership at large will not work. So prior preparation for partnerships, prior preparation for training, and that training has to be properly focused, it has to fill the needs of the specific mission. There are undoubtedly some level of training that are universally applicable, but there will be training needs that are specific to mission. In the context of training, a number of us are attracted to the idea of distance training, to cover some of the problems or the limitations of face to face training, and this is especially the case in Africa, my African colleagues tell us. Further, in terms of prior preparations and developing surge capabilities, some civilian capacities that we need do not lend themselves to surge capabilities. For example senior mission leadership is not something you can surge, you need to have built it over time. Mentors and the ability to mentor is a skill that is developed
over a long period of time. On the other hand, the point was made, that elec-
toral monitors perhaps can be trained relatively quickly and surged.

There is a question of matchmaking and developing skills in the case from
South-South but also in the Global South-North partnerships. The UN was sug-
gested to have a role acting as a match-maker for want of a better term, binding
the supply and demand sides together. The how of that is left a little bit more
open, but the group was generally attracted to the idea.

Background paper on Enabling Civilian Contributions

*Dr Istifanus S. Zabadi, Dean, African Centre for Strategic Research and Stud-
ies, National Defence College, Nigeria*

**Introduction**

Peace Support Operations are mechanisms designed to manage and mitigate
conflicts around the world. This is done principally by the United Nations (UN)
through provisions of chapters six and seven of its charter, and regional organ-
izations (through chapter 8 of UN charter). The new dimensions of conflict
which the world has experienced since 1990, require more than the traditional
peacekeeping to address them.

The response has been to mount peace support operations which are multi-
dimensional, multifunctional and multidisciplinary in nature. Consequently,
complex, multifunctional, multicultural and multi-dimensional peace support
operations normally take place in difficult political, security, economic and
humanitarian situations and therefore require military, police and civilian
expertise. As a result, a varied range of skills and expertise are required in the
mission field, in addition to ‘boots on the ground’. The needs which have to be
met include security, law and order, governance, human rights protection and
other humanitarian issues. All these tasks are therefore categorized as in the
domain of military, police and civilian expertise.

Since 1992, the United Nations (UN) through the *Agenda for Peace* has recog-
nized the important role civilian professionals and experts play in conflict pre-
vention, management and resolution. To this end, the UN called on its member
states to train and provide civilian experts for peace missions. Although there
has been a sharp rise in the number of civilian tasks mandated in UN Security
Council Resolutions and in the number of civilian missions undertaken by
regional organizations in recent years, there still remains a critical shortage of
civilian personnel in global peace support operations. For instance, civilians constitute only 20 percent of UN peacekeeping. Such critical shortage also exists in peace support operations mounted by regional bodies such as the African Union (AU). This global shortage is a product of gross undersupply of civilians to peace support operations at national levels. Consequently, it has brought about the demand for increasing the involvement of civilians in peace support operations at the national level. In this light, I would like to raise three issues on how to enable civilian contribution to peace support operations.

Training

There is international consensus that all those who serve in peace operations now and in the future must be adequately prepared for their roles. The primary means to do this is through training. Whereas the military and police personnel receive the training they need to effectively carry out their peacekeeping duties, their civilian counterparts do not get the same attention. This is particularly the case in Africa despite the growing emphasis on the need to train civilians by various stakeholders such as the United Nations, the European Union, the African Union and the regional economic communities/regional mechanism.

Proper training of those civilians who will work to deliver peace support activities in difficult political, security, economic and humanitarian environments is a fundamental requirement for enabling civilian contribution to multidimensional peace support operations. Such training should be structured within the accepted UN training framework and modules to ensure standardization, and robust enough to reflect various peculiar environment and challenges of the operations to be carried out. In Africa, training of civilians is not receiving the kind of attention which should produce the needed capacities and numbers for the various peacekeeping missions. This situation will continue unless the challenges being encountered in the efforts to provide the right civilians for the appropriate roles are addressed. The challenges include:

a. Who is providing the training and for whom? In Africa, there are many institutions and outfits, governmental and non-governmental involved in ‘training’, especially civilians. The proliferation of training outfits, particularly the non-governmental type, has been greatly assisted by institutions from the global north which also offers training. The practice of partnering with some of these African institutions outside of any framework (continental and regional), has not helped the cause of coordination and cooperation in this area. In this partnership, it is “northern” institutions which possess the resources to fund this training, and many African institutions are willing to scramble for it. This
has created some confusion which can be cleared only by establishing which institutions are engaged in training, the kind of training being offered, and for whom.

b. A related challenge to the one above is that of standards. The quality of the trainer, the content (material) of the training as well as the environment in which it is given should be of standard acceptable to the organizations mounting peacekeeping operations. These have already developed such standards but they have to be implemented in the African setting through appropriate organs. This is the gap which the African Peace Support Trainers Association (APSTA) was set up to fill.

One of the cardinal objectives of APSTA is the harmonization and standardization of peacekeeping training in the continent and to that effect, the 5th AGM in Accra provided the association with a platform to undertake some major decisions towards achieving this objective. In pursuit of the implementation of the decisions reached at the 5th AGM, the Association in collaboration with the AU PSOD, held the ASF Training and Coordination Workshop in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia from 24 to 26 April 2007 with the following objectives:

- Coordination and harmonization of ASF capacity building initiatives
- Providing support to the AU in the development of policies and structures for ASF
- Evaluations of African peacekeeping missions;
- Sharing research and lessons learnt

The Training and Coordination led to the following recommendations:

- Development of a legal framework (MoU) for engagement between the two organisations.
- Introduction of APSTA to RECS/Planning Elements and Regional Brigades to gain recognition.
- The review of APSTA’s Articles of Association to include the collaboration with AU, expansion of membership and mobilisation of resources and funding.
- AU (PSOD) to provide APSTA with access to appropriate ASF related training materials.
- The development of a database of competencies with emphasis on accreditation and recognition of ASF related courses.
- Establishment, in collaboration with AU and RECs, of a database of trained Civilian, Military and Police personnel.

Members agreed during the 6th AGM in Abuja after signing the MOU with PSOD for a need to commence an accreditation process all APSTA Institutions with the following criteria:
• An office space  
• A verifiable course curriculum  
• All Course curricula meeting the UN/AU training standards (should be multidimensional, with an acceptable multidisciplinary balance)  
• Delivery capacity (Methodology reflecting use of audio-visuals, syndicate exercises, availability of relevant learner-friendly reading materials, training to include simulation and role playing exercises)  
• A diverse pool of Resource Persons with a mix between academics and practitioners.

So far, most of the training activities in the 3 ECOWAS designated Training Centres of Excellence (TCEs) conform to the training standards of the AU and UN. Some of the recommendations made by APSTA during the training coordination meeting as well as some of the decisions taken have already been implemented or are in the process of being implemented by the TCEs.

APSTA has tried to develop common training standards with respect to civilians by engaging with the European Group on Training, in 2009. At a meeting in Accra, APSTA members agreed to design and develop a course to target middle level civilian management in peacekeeping. It was observed that while the Senior Mission Leaders Course addresses the needs of the Senior Leadership Team of the mission, civilian personnel at lower levels are often not prepared for the tasks they are to undertake. [IPSTC, Kenya was to lead in this effort]. Another effort at standardization was undertaken in September 2010 at the Austrian Study Centre in Peace and Conflict Resolution (ASPR). A number of APSTA member-institutions met and developed a course curriculum on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflicts for use in Africa. A pilot Course was hosted by the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC), with participants coming from member-institutions. A third effort in this direction was another meeting convened in Dar es Salaam in April 2011 to standardize the POC course. The African Union Peace Support Operations Division (AUP-SOD) also participated in the meeting and gave the needed guidance in line with the issues on the ground.

Evaluation of Courses

Course evaluations are carried out within the TCEs in order to improve the course modules and the methods of delivery. This can be achieved through questionnaires handed to participants at the end of a particular course or through monitoring of courses and interviews to measure the effectiveness of courses, training and processes.
Facilitators and resources persons are also evaluated to ensure that the right level of facilitators is used for the subject matter involved. The general aim of evaluation is to enhance the learning process, identify grey areas and fill the gaps. The role of German International Cooperation (GIZ) is highly commendable in this regard. The GIZ has been at the fore partnering with the TCEs to coordinate the evaluation of courses, enhancement of training coordination and convening of training needs assessment.

On the whole with regards to training, the Senior Advisory Group made a recommendation that should be implemented by all stakeholders. In their recommendation 10, the Group urged all concerned to “improve training resources for the global pool of capacity providers”. This recommendation was broken down into four components which are very practical and achievable, and they include:

- Define where training is needed
- Define standards for training, trainers and trainees
- Create a certification mechanism; and
- Create access to training.

Rostering

The maintenance of adequate roster for civilians trained for deployment is vitally important in facilitating civilian contribution to, and participation in, peace support operations. In this regard, for example, Africa faces another challenge in that training of civilians is not linked to rostering, recruitment and deployment. There are rosters on the continent and mostly in the global north containing the names of African trained by the institutions referred to above. However, there do not exist as at now, rosters maintained and operated by individual national systems, Regional Economic Communities (RECs)/Regional Mechanisms (RMs) and the African Union (AU), that can be used for recruitment and deployment of civilians for peacekeeping. The AU is working on its own with technical assistance by GIZ. This explains to a large extent why there is a dearth of the requisite African Civilian capacities to be deployed to peacekeeping missions. For this to change, African countries, RECs/RMs and the AU, need to coordinate their efforts to get civilians trained, rostered, recruited and deployed to peacekeeping missions the same way military and police contingents are deployed. Another benefit of this coordination is the need to avoid the high cost of operating multiple rosters, something individual countries may not be able to afford. However, African governments are yet to buy into enabling civilian contributions to peacekeeping. For the most part African ministries of Foreign Affairs have not created the framework for training and deploying their civilians to peacekeeping. In West Africa, only Republic of Benin and Burkina Faso
are said to have departments of peacekeeping. This situation has to change such that African countries can through their national systems find and deploy the right people to fill the gaps in missions.

Cooperation and Coordination among Regional Training Institutions

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was the first REC to designate 3 institutions in member-states as Training Centers of Excellence (TCEs) in 2002. Although the number may be expanded by at least 10 more to cater for various specialist skills in peacekeeping, the cooperation and coordination among the 3 TCEs, merits attention. The 3 TCEs, National Defence College (Strategic Level), Kofi Annan Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC), and Ecole de Mantien de la paix Alionne Blondin Beye (EMPABB) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with ECOWAS as the main service providers in training. The TCEs have worked with ECOWAS to agree Training Requirements annually, to run the courses agreed on and to participate in all the training exercises conducted to operationalise the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF). The civilian component in the ESF exercise (JIGUI I–III) comprised mainly personnel from the National Defence College. Cooperation goes on between the TCEs at the level of the staff in the conduct of courses and research. The biannual meetings at the levels of the staff and commandants with the leadership of the Department of Political Affairs Peace and Security ensure effective coordination among the TCEs.

To enhance the contributions of the Civilian component to PSO, it is also important that cooperation should not be limited to training institutions within regions; it needs to explore the benefits of North-South partnerships. In this regard, for instance, the African Centre for Strategic Research and Studies of the National Defence College is collaborating with external partners that are already running courses that improve the skills and capacity of civilians for deployment in peace missions. Such collaboration include the participation of our staff in a Core Course on Peace Operations for the training of civilians personnel for deployment in international peace operations organized by the ZIF in collaboration with GTZ, Germany. Our staff were also trained by the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, Canada, in curriculum design and development. To this end also, the ACSRS has developed some middle level leadership and function specific courses in peace support operations. These include a civilian core course in peace support operations, election monitoring and observation, human rights, rule of law, security sector reform and train the trainers’ courses for ECOWAS sub-region. The proposal to run these courses has been submitted to the ECOWAS Commission.
Working Group 4: Enabling Police and Corrections Contributions

Chair: Dr. Ann Livingstone, Vice President, Pearson Centre, Canada

Given the changing nature of conflicts today [political violence, organized crime, lack of consistent access to justice, continuing violation of Human Rights issues] and the consequent impact on institutions in post conflict states, this working group focused on looking at enabling factors for strengthening the rule of law by peace operations with a focus on seconded police and corrections officers.

In doing so, the following recommendations were made by the group:

1. Make rule of law assistance with focus on all three components of the judicial sector (police, judiciary and corrections) a permanent item on the Challenges agenda. Incorporate police and corrections issues routinely as an integral part of all aspects of the work of the Challenges Forum in terms of “uniformed personnel” and emphasize the necessity to include the judiciary in related discussion (although it belongs to the civilian components);

2. Promote more specified mandates as regards the corrections components and make adequate assessments on the required numbers and functions of corrections officers;

3. Improve training by reinforcing the use of CPTM:s and STM:s as provided by DPKO and ITS in all pre-deployment trainings and ensure that the completion of such training is then considered as a selection criteria for deployment with the objective that those who are trained are deployed and those who are deployed are trained;

4. Promote gender sensitive practices in corrections and police components and consider what partners can do to encourage an increased numbers of qualified women officers serving as peacekeepers, bearing in mind different national aspects which currently may limit such participation;

5. Further the work currently undertaken by DPKO seeking to fill police and corrections seconded positions with qualified experts and promote that seconded staff members nominated for a particular assignment based on their specific expertise are not arbitrarily placed in completely
different capacities where their expertise is underutilized. Review critically the current selection practices using competency-based interviews and underline the responsibility of contributing states to nominate qualified personnel for secondment.

6. Promote making use of lessons learned from the field in the context of training and recruitment and ensure that Member States treat peacekeeping experiences of their nationals as a positive asset in their career development.

Background paper on Enabling the Police and Corrections Contributions

Mr Mohammad Azim Arshad, Team Leader, Standing Police Capacity, Police Division, Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations

Excellencies, Distinguished guests and colleagues, Ladies and gentlemen.

I would like to express my gratitude to our Chair, Dr. Livingstone, for her impressive introduction to this session, and I would like to thank all of you for your great interest in this important topic, enabling police and corrections contributions in peace operations. My name is Azim Arshad, and I am Team Leader at the UNDPKO Standing Police Capacity. Our role is to provide start-up capacity for police components of new peace operations as well as to provide advice, expertise, and assistance to the police components of existing peace operations in the field of institutional law enforcement capacity building, tasks which make us quite well aware of the challenges faced by peace operations globally.

UN Police have, like the UN itself, changed over the past decades. The discussions today are very different to those of decades ago. Mandated policing and corrections tasks – and I stress the word mandated – have become increasingly complex, from serving as observers to being tasked to assist in the rebuilding and restructuring of law enforcement institutions and provide operational support to host State police. This increasing complexity means that the issue of identifying and recruiting – in a timely manner – the police officers with relevant skills to implement the mandate become ever more important. It also means that we must ensure that we, as the peace operation, focus on our comparative advantage.
What is this comparative advantage? As the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Hervé Ladsous, stated to the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly in the fall of 2011, “The single greatest comparative advantage of peacekeeping is that it offers a unique, common platform to blend political, rule of law, human rights and other expertise with military, police, and logistics operational capabilities” and that it “brings to this platform a universal legitimacy that no other organization does.”

It is with this comparative advantage in mind that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Services developed the Early Peacebuilding Strategy. In line with this strategy, as peacekeepers we should ensure in our prioritization and sequencing that our actions (1) advance the political objectives of the mission – our mandated tasks as given by the Security Council – and (2) that those actions either advance security and safety – or – lay the groundwork for longer-term institution building, or both.

Clearly, UN Police contribute to basic security in the aftermath of conflict, from improving the public perception of security, providing security support in locations such as IDP camps, during public disorder incidents, or in the context of protection of civilians. They also support provision of security in electoral processes, for example by training host-state police. These activities, where mandated, are clearly priorities.

However, UN Police also undertake a number of activities that lay the groundwork for longer-term institution building, but if the appropriate, required specialized policing capacities are not made available by the Member States in a timely manner the results are less than optimal. These skills include not only expertise in the topic area, but also the ability to function and deliver in a dynamic mission setting, as well as knowledge transfer skills, ability to develop policing and law enforcement administrative structures, and ideally, a solid understanding of the local context.

Reform in policing, like in rule of law more broadly, is not an overnight task. However, if UN Police can both improve security and lay groundwork for longer term institution building, our missions will be better able to successfully coordinate and transition to those with comparative advantages in development, including UN agencies, funds, and programmes – such as UNDP and UNODC – along with the World Bank and regional organizations, such as the African Union and European Union, and other international organizations. This integrated approach and coordination would assist in addressing another obstacle faced by UNPOL – lack of funds to initiate significant police infrastructure or equipping programs, both of which can be undertaken by many other partners inside and outside the UN.
As we look at identifying the appropriate officers for deployment, we have to recall that the mission setting is unlike that which most police officers, even senior officers with years of experience, have encountered in the course of their duties at home. It includes not only the need for expertise in the topic area, but also in an understanding of critical processes, planning, project design and implementation, monitoring and evaluation, and equally, the ability to transmit ideas across cultural bounds to the host-state counterparts.

But if we demand more skills, and increasingly specialized skills, those officers considering service with the UN should not see time with the UN as a detriment, but a benefit. As our Police Adviser, Ann-Marie Orler, said at this same conference last year, “we have to work with Member States to make UN service a natural part of a police officer’s career”. We have to make international service both interesting and rewarding in order to motivate more of the highly qualified or specialized personnel to deploy, and concurrently, to encourage Member States to ensure there are career incentives to being seconded to a UN mission. Indeed, the Guidelines for UN Police Officers on Assignment with Peacekeeping Operations, whose target audience is as much police contributing countries as the police they second, states that “All emoluments and other entitlements from Member States should continue to be paid and/or provided to United Nations Police Officers as if they were serving in their home country.” I submit that based on this, Member States should in the least ensure that officers who serve as UNPOL do not find their careers penalized upon return. To the contrary, Member States should encourage such deployments.

Another area where Member States could play a stronger role in enabling police contributions to peace operations is pre-deployment training. Unfortunately, it is still the case that most seconded police officers arrive in the field without adequate predeployment training. In response, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations – with significant donor support – developed core predeployment training materials for UN individual police officers and organized a series of train-the-trainers course for Member States.

Similarly, the development of standardized predeployment training for formed police units, initially rolled out with train-the-trainers courses held in India in November and December 2011, should increase the caliber of these units before their arrival in the field.

At the same time, we face the challenge of competing demands for police peacekeepers, from the African Union, the European Union, and even development entities. Regional and bilateral efforts to help build national capacity to manage peacekeeping requirements will be increasingly important. Ensuring standardized predeployment training for not only the UN but regional organizations as
well would assist in meeting this challenge, and could help in the creation of specialized regional or Member State capacities that could be drawn from for deployment to UN or Chapter VIII missions.

Another challenge that we are surmounting, if too slowly, is gender balance in the UNPOL. As of today, just over 10% of all UNPOL are women. Although this is an improvement, it is not yet close to our goal of 20% by 2014. This Global Effort recognizes that policing is most effective when it is reflective of the society it serves, and experience across missions has demonstrated that the value of having female UNPOL – both as individual officers and in Formed Police Units – is significant. The challenge, though, remains, as many Member States themselves have problems with the number of female officers within their own structures.

We should also note concurrent developments to enable police contributions in gender mainstreaming. Firstly, the toolkit of gender-related materials for UNPOL was completed, providing significant guidance to police components and individual officers in this important area. Secondly, the training curriculum on sexual and gender based violence was finalized, and has already been piloted in five regional Training of Trainers courses globally. These are clearly not sufficient in and of themselves, but demonstrate the commitment of the UN to gender mainstreaming even while struggling to recruit additional females for deployment as UNPOL.

Concurrently, the Police Division is developing a strategic guidance framework as a basis for further guidance development. The framework will promote a more consistent, harmonized approach to the provision of public safety, police reform, and support to host State police services.

Serious and organized crime, particularly transnational crime, has become an ever greater threat to the rule of law and stability in many states. Thriving where institutions are weakened by conflict or where the rule of law is absent, it becomes a formidable spoiler in peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Like reform and restructuring of police, specialized experts are needed to effectively combat this plague. Expertise in crime scene management, curriculum development, border management, maritime policing, financial crimes, and the like are urgently needed by our missions. When the Member States provide such expertise, the UN can, when partnered effectively, make a difference. The West Coast Africa Initiative provides one example. Taking advantage of four peace operations in West Africa, UN Police worked with the Department of Political Affairs through its Office for West Africa, UNODC, and INTERPOL to support ECOWAS in implementing its Regional Action Plan to combat transnational organized crime. In view of the situation in North Africa, the possible extension
of such activities to the Southern Mediterranean Coast may be worth considering.

More straightforward challenges, but with visible impact, include a shortage of Francophone UNPOL. Given that many of the current operations are in Francophone countries, this is a serious impediment, one that I would plead with our Francophone Member States to remember when considering whether to increase their participation.

Another challenge is the restriction placed by some host-states on the nationalities allowed to serve as UNPOL. This has been a particularly difficult issue in some recent missions in Africa, and has in fact severely limited our ability to implement our policing mandates.

Although I have been focusing on police, it is important to recall that the Police Division is an integral part of the Office on Rule of Law and Security Institutions, which in turn is an integral part of DPKO and the wider UN system. The Office, as you know, brought together previously separate entities that must work together in support of holistic rule of law and security-related reform. Nonetheless, the statement of our Assistant Secretary General Titov to this forum last year remains true: “We still lack all necessary capacities and capabilities to do our job effectively as peacekeepers and early peacebuilders.”

In relation to this integrated approach, I would like to mention, with all modesty, the Standing Police Capacity: We are moving to improve rapid deployment and support to the field in cooperation and integration with the Justice and Corrections Standing Capacity. This cooperation is already happening, not only in Brindisi where we are both based, but also through reinforced support to each others’ mission deployments, as is currently the case in South Sudan, where members of the two capacities are jointly working with the Government to address, among other things, arbitrary and prolonged detentions, an issue with implications for police, justice, and corrections.

In closing, I would urge Member States to help the Organization by enabling qualified officers to serve the UN, by building the capacity of their seconded officers through training, encouraging increased numbers of female police to apply for deployments, and to remind us all that only through our joint work can we overcome the obstacles to bring peace to the conflict ridden areas of the globe.

Ms Izumi Nakamitsu chaired the ensuing discussion and began by supporting points made by the previous speaker. She underlined that the DPKO agreed that the three components within the rule of law should be addressed in a sort of
continuum, as it was currently being in the Civilian Capacity Review. It was the UNs aim to take a decision in the springtime about which entity should lead the effort as it moved forward. They were now engaged in an intense discussion on the issues.

Note was taken of the criticism made, as recruitment was not the UN strength. If the SRSG:s were asked, if there were three extremely competent staff and thirty average to incompetent staff, she was sure that 100 per cent of the SRSG:s would take three competent staff. She agreed that it should not be so much focus on the numbers, but much more on the quality and the profile of individuals.

A participant in working group on the civilian capacities raised the issue of harmonization of certification. It was noted that there were now some standards established. The European Group on Training (EGT) and APSTA had signed up to them, so they were important. When the UN was doing the same they should take those into consideration and consult. Second, the online platform that was being developed that it should be developed in close consultation with training and rostering organisations, who were the ones who should plug in to the online platform. Third, because this was about linking up training and recruitment, there was a certain urgency around when you had the high number of civilian vacancies in missions, there could be an opportunity for the C-34 to discuss, realizing that there is a different context today than when the GA resolution on gratis personnel was passed in 1999. There are many more rosters in the South. Rosters in the North have members from the South in their rosters, so it would be useful to consider what are the criteria for using gratis personnel within todays new reality. Fourth, realising that the UN could not provide, and was not providing, all the capacity in post-conflict settings, it should be encouraged to look at examples like the IGAD initiative in South Sudan, where neighbouring countries were providing executive capacity in twinning arrangements with ministries.

A working group participant commented on the findings of the military group. He had a question regarding how to enhance the efficiency of the employment of UN peacekeeping operations. He believed it was very important to keep the quality of the strength of the neighbouring units, such as transportation, medical and engineering units. They needed to maintain the quality of their expertise and technical capability. Some countries had a unique organisation and equipment so they go out to defend countries itself. Formalistic standardisation through the Department of Field Support was hampering potential TCCs from dispatching their enabling unit to the mission. So he requested the DPKO and the DFS to improve the reimbursement system.
Brig. Gen. Dennis Gyllensporre responded that they had discussed training standards in the working group and he could only agree with what was brought up and the need for quality in terms of training standards. Lessons learnt and the need for their immediate implementation was one of the things that was elaborated in our discussions, the need to turn around lessons to implement them in a couple of days or so. The example was counter ID measures, which needed to be an integral part of the standards not just for the longer term training, but also for training in missions.

Ms Izumi Nakamitsu concluded the session by saying the discussions had been very comprehensive and that some issues were already being addressed by the UN, others would merit further discussion. It would also be useful input to the partners discussion the following day. What were the kinds of issues that could be taken up by the Challenges Forum Partner discussion? What were the issues that the Secretariat could address or were addressing already and what were the issues that needed to be further pushed in the context of the Civilian Capacity Review Process? She would not attempt at summarising the discussions of the day, but thanked everyone and looked forward to the discussions that would take place the following day in Sharm El-Sheikh and then the following week in the margins of the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping in New York.
Concluding Session

H.E. Ms Soad Shalaby, Director, Cairo Regional Center for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa, Egypt

Good afternoon, dear Partners, Ladies and Gentlemen. We are most thrilled that so much has been achieved here today. The plenary sessions were rich and fruitful. The working groups gave us all a chance to explore ideas and generate recommendations, which is what the seminar is all about. Now in the concluding session, we look forward to the concluding remarks, and I am pleased to first give the floor to His Excellency Ambassador, Mr Ahmed Fathallah, First Under-Secretary, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Egypt.

Concluding Remarks

H.E. Mr Ahmed Fathallah, First Under-Secretary, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Egypt

Ambassador Soad Shalaby, distinguished Partners and Guests. I want to thank you on behalf of the Host Country and the Egyptian Ministry for Foreign Affairs for your participation and valuable contributions to this seminar.

Our deliberations today reflected a common sharing of peacekeeping as an important political tool that we need to strengthen for the future. The seminar discussed a wide range of issues relevant to peacekeeping and peacebuilding, on policy and implementations level including enabling contributing countries, enabling peacekeeping in Africa, enabling leadership as well as military and civilian contributions. A better understanding of the peacekeeping requirements is at the heart and core of our debates, including the peacekeeping – peacebuilding nexus. We are looking forward to the upcoming discussions to follow up this seminar with the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operation, C-34, in New York next week.

I can retain a number of key principles, terminology or words, as a result of the four working groups. Inter alia, I will not refer to all these key words, but I will mention a few. Rule of law, partnership, gender, quality and not numbers, knowledge, harmonization – which could be used as a guiding concept in our
future deliberations. Furthermore, we are looking forward to the briefing hosted in New York by the Challenges Forum, to brief about the outcome of this seminar in the margins of the opening of the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations.

Let me welcome you once again in Sharm El-Sheikh, and wish you all a safe return and thank the Challenges Forum and the Cairo Regional Centre for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa, for pushing the dialogue on peacekeeping and better implementation for its implementation on the ground. We look forward to continue our dialogue with you in the future, and I thank you very much.

Concluding Remarks and Looking to the Future

Ms Annika Hilding Norberg, Director, Challenges Forum, Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden

Dear Partners, dear Hosts, distinguished Participants and Friends. What an illuminating and rich day it has been! As you will have noted, for various reasons, we have sought to follow the most quoted principle of the day here: "to do more, with less and better". "To do more" – by way of the rich and insightful presentations and deliberations in plenary and in the working groups, “with less” – in one day, this is a record, and “better” – absolutely!

I will not try to capture everything or even all the key issues addressed today, as we have had excellent rapporteurs working very hard throughout the whole day, a whole team, that will assist CCCPA and ourselves in preparing for both next week’s important meeting and briefing in New York, and for the full Challenges Annual Report, that is coming later.

As mentioned by the First Under-Secretary Ambassador Fathallah and in the statement by the UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping; effective peacekeeping requires effective partnerships. If we do not have an effective and mutually supporting peace operations partnership, we will for sure, per definition, not deliver effective peace operations. Mr Ihab reminded us of the importance of what mind set we choose to start from or inhabit. From a Challenges Partnership perspective, I believe this seminar is a real show of confidence and support as our Partners have come in great numbers to Egypt to meet, to discuss and to further strengthen our cooperation amongst existing as well as new partners.
The importance of focusing on and harnessing the true comparative advantages of all Partners is key. The world of contributors is much more sophisticated than two opposite groups. Those that finance and decide the mandates, or those that contribute with troops and personnel. As an example, regarding United Nations Peacekeeping, the so called “Western countries” has largely not contributed to UN peacekeeping for the last 15 years. The real operational experience rests with the troop- and police contributing countries, not with the West.

At the same time, the resolve and the ability, to ensure that the experience and expertise developed transfers into the institutional memory and the next battalion going to a mission, is still not systematic, but it is within the authority, responsibility and the capacity of the TCCs and PCCs themselves, not with the “Western countries”. All of ours’ sincere cooperation, for all sorts of reasons, is essential. The permanent members of the Security Council are the permanent members of the Security Council, but otherwise much political power in relation to UN Peacekeeping Operations today rest with partner countries like India, South Africa, Egypt, Pakistan, Nigeria and others. Alexandra Novoseloff said in our working group, which I very much enjoyed ”the need to reduce the gap between different key stakeholders is something that we have focused on today which is critical for us all to make progress”.

Our Egyptian Hosts have brought us closer to the concerns and priorities of Egypt as a major contributing country. I would like to think, and I do think, that they have also managed to bring us all closer together – enabling us to foster closer connections and cooperation, with all partners, while enabling new relations to be established with the new partners and colleagues.

This does not mean that there have not been some tough discussions in the working groups. Difficult discussions are often fruitful if they are held in a partnership environment. We are here because at the end of the day, we all wish to do better in our effort to assist men, women and children in need. Ambassador Lamamra reminded us of the hard facts of our work, highlighting the stark statistics of the number of peacekeepers killed in action while serving in Somalia.

We would not be able to do anything without the Challenges Partners investments in our common endeavour. With your brains, expertise, your experiences and your continued political commitment, year in and year out for the betterment of peacekeeping operations.

On behalf of the Partnership allow me again to thank our committed and generous Hosts, the Cairo Regional Center for Training on Conflict Resolution in Africa in cooperating with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Egypt: First Under-Secretary Fatallah, Ambassador Shalaby, Mr El Sherbini, Dr Alaa Abdal
Aziz, Ms Iman Keira, Ms Hazel Haddon and the whole team here in Egypt, which of course is much greater, including senior and operational level representatives of the cooperating ministries.

I would also like to thank the speakers and partners for your ideas, for your vital human and financial contributions, as you have decided to participate in this milestone seminar in Sharm El-Sheikh. Our Hosts and we as Coordinators look forward to sharing the issues raised and findings generated, next week in New York. All Partners are of course warmly welcome and we would equally welcome you to inform your Permanent Missions about the event planned for next Tuesday lunch time.

To be fair I should thank each and every one of you, however that would be quite lengthy, so I hope you will allow me to take this opportunity to thank the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, here represented by Mr Johan Frisell, for their belief in and unfading support for our Challenges effort over the many years. I would also like to pay tribute to our Partners and co-funders from the Swedish Armed Forces, National Police and National Prison and Probation Service, who contribute with their insightful and useful perspectives to our coordinating effort. For example, with a specific police perspective, last February, we were pleased, the Partnership could co-host a Challenges Police Forum which brought together all the then currently serving Police Commissioner and Advisers in the field. The Challenges Police Forum was held jointly with the UN Police Division. I would also like to thank the Ambassador for the dinner last night, Ambassador Malin Kärre, and Ambassador Stig Elvemar, who has been part of the effort from the very beginning in various capacities, and my colleagues from the Folke Bernadotte Academy. Our Acting Director-General, Mr Jonas Alberoth, is always giving priority to the end state of an effort, Ms Ann Bernes, Ms Andrea Rabus, Ms Johanna Ström, and Challenges former Desk Officer, Ms Anna Wiktorsson, who is on leave from an EU Monitoring mission, to contribute to our seminar here.

We cannot wait for the Strategic Partner Meeting tomorrow, when we will address how best to move the peacekeeping and peacebuilding agenda forward in the next three years. Ms Izumi Nakamitsu will share with us a perspective from New York. Further on, we look forward to the next Challenges meeting, which will be hosted by our Swiss Partners, the Geneva Centre for Security Policy in cooperation with the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs and the Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport. Dr Tardy will inform us of the Challenges Annual Forum 2012 shortly. Thank you very much for today and see you early in the morning.
Dr Thierry Tardy, Head of Research, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Switzerland

Let me first thank very warmly our Egyptian Host, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Shalaby and the CCCPA, but also the Folke Bernadotte Academy, Mr Jonas Alberoth and of course Annika for having invited all of us, but also the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, to this meeting and the wonderful city of Sharm El-Sheikh.

The Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP), together with the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs and the Federal Department of Defence is much honoured to be officially a Partner to the Challenges Forum as of last year, 2011.

The GCSP training centre was created in 1995 and the objective was and still is to train officials, diplomats, military officers from all over the world in international security issues. We have about 30 different courses every year that cover international security broadly understood. Last week we had a course in Cairo in cooperation with the CCCPA for the first time, and this is a cooperation that we look forward to developing further with CCCPA.

As a new Partner of the Challenges Forum, the GCSP in coordination with the Swiss MFA and Swiss MOD, will organise and host, the Challenges Annual Forum 2012 in Geneva in May. The theme will be Cooperation and Coordination in Peace Operations – United Nations and Regional Perspectives. We will look at internal coordination, within the United Nations in the field of peace operations, but we will also look at inter-institutional cooperation between the United Nations and regional organisations; the European Union, NATO, the African Union, the Arab League, but also inter-institutional cooperation between the UN and other actors, such as the humanitarian actors. They are all well represented in Geneva. We count on all of your presence and we look forward to seeing you in May in Geneva.
Part II – Challenges Forum Seminar in New York
The Challenges of Sexual Violence in Conflict

Ms Margot Wallström, Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, United Nations

Excellencies, distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, I would like to start by thanking all of you who contribute with soldiers, police and civilians to all our peace operations (POs) around the world. Without your crucial contributions, we would not even have something called United Nations (UN) POs.

I would like to make two points and one offer: First of all, most people – also people on the inside – when they hear about sexual violence in conflict (SVC), think of gender-based violence, domestic violence, sexual exploitation (which often is translated into peacekeepers going to prostitutes), or even think of female genital mutilation. This is why I believe it is important to specify what my mandate is. It is about conflict-related sexual violence, which is a very specific one. And my intention is not to broaden it, as we – unfortunately – have more than enough on our plate as it is. I do, however, include situations of post-conflict in my interpretation of this mandate, such as Liberia for instance, where rape still is the number one reported crime years after the conflict ended. I also strongly believe it is important to look into situations where there is a security vacuum, as on the border between the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Angola, which I just visited and from where we know of sexual violence.

Although it is true that as mostly women and girls are victims of sexual violence conflict-related sexual violence can be seen as a women’s issue, or as a human rights (HR) issue (conflict-related sexual violence is the only HR violation routinely dismissed as inevitable); it must also be understood as a peace and security issue. Sexual violence is unfortunately too often part of warfare and has a deep and lasting impact on entire communities. I want to stay relevant to the UN Security Council, as it is the Council which has given me my mandate.

Second, the nature of conflict has changed dramatically over the last century; not the least in terms of who is mostly affected by the hostilities. For example it has been said that more civilians tend to die from war than soldiers in battle. And women have ended up on the front-line not as soldiers but as victims. This has in turn led to a changed focus for POs, where modern mandates tend to have as their foremost objective the protection of civilians. At the same time;
and as we have learned from the Challenges Forum Report 2009, the tendency of the mandates is to add more detailed tasks to our responsibilities.

I think we are all painfully aware that as the UN, or acting under a UN mandate, we are often criticised for our shortcomings and mistakes. Rather than trying to present excuses we need to look at explanations and at what we can improve. I also think it is important that we start looking at what we already do well and how these actions can be further strengthened. In response to the changing dynamics of conflict outlined above and in light of lessons learned, we have to be better at protecting civilians. The UN peacekeeping troops have gathered best practices on how to do this in An Analytical Inventory of Best Peacekeeping Practice, developed by the UN Action Network and which I helped launch last year.

Can I now please ask you to imagine the following scenario: You are a soldier from a troop-contributing country, be it Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, or South Africa for example, participating in a PO mandated by the UN Security Council; and you arrived in the theatre of operations about a month ago. When you are out on a routine patrol with your squad or platoon, all of a sudden a half-naked woman comes running and screaming on the road. She is clearly been victimised in some way and she is screaming very loudly. One problem, though, is that you – the individual soldier – do not understand what she is saying (or screaming) because you do not have a language in common. Another problem is that somewhere in the back of your head something still lingers from the pre-deployment training you vaguely remember; something about rules of conduct and discipline but you are not entirely sure what a situation like the described requires. So what do you do? If you take her up on your truck to give her transport somewhere where she can be given assistance and where you could perhaps find an interpreter to find out what has happened to her, you might be accused or at least suspected for being the perpetrator of whatever horrible thing has been done to her. Then again, on the other hand, to not help her, does not seem right either. In short, you do not know what to do.

The scenario I just described is not a made-up example. It is very real and as we speak it (or something very similar to it) is being turned into a film clip which will be used in scenario-based training for peacekeepers, soon to be rolled out all over the world with an initial priority given to larger troop-contributing countries (TCCs). And I am particularly happy that the need for scenario-based

training has been recognised in the Challenges Forum Report 2010;73 according to which this is needed ‘to ensure personnel really understand how they might respond to a particular issue.’

This brings me to my offer to you. I am not here to criticise, but to make an offer to help your very capable people be able to do their job even better. What I and my Office can offer is our Travelling Presentation (or Training) Team. This is a very knowledgeable small group of individuals who, under the leadership of Maj. Gen. Patrick Cammaert, have developed a training package specifically on sexual violence in conflict. We will start rolling this out in early April, but already now we have a stand-by capacity to send a small team out at almost any time. So please do not hesitate to make use of this.

Women have no rights if those who violate their rights go unpunished. Ever since I took office in April last year; I have repeated that the UN can do no less than bring all of its accountability tools to bear. This must apply equally whether the victim is an 8-year old girl or an 80-year old grandmother. Thanks to the very recently adopted Security Council Resolution 1960,74 we are now beyond business as usual. We will make this system a reality through the establishment of a comprehensive monitoring and accountability architecture. It will help ensure that mass rape is never again met with mass impunity. Instead of serving as a cheap and silent tactic of war, sexual violence will be a liability for armed groups. It will expose their superiors to increased international scrutiny, seal off the corridors of power and close all exits to those who commit, command or condone such acts. And this will reinforce the line between a commander and a criminal.

Far from being a niche issue, sexual violence is part of a larger pattern. Rule by sexual violence is used by political and military leaders to achieve political, military and economic ends. These crimes present a security crisis that demands a security response. To me, Security Council Resolution 196075 and the Analytical Inventory of Best Peacekeeping Practice76 represent the start – not the end – of a process to prevent and combat conflict-related sexual violence and improve women’s security. Much more must yet be done to promote actions that have real impact, as we move from recognition to action and from best intentions to

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75 Ibid.
best practice. The journey has only begun and you are key partners on this jour-
ney.

Excellencies, distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, thank you very much for inviting me to the International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations. I would like to thank all the Forum organizers and the co-hosts of this Forum; Australia, Pakistan and Sweden.

Opening and Welcome

Co-Chair: H.E. Ms Joy Ogwu, Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the United Nations and Chair of the United Nations Special Committee for Peacekeeping Operations, Nigeria.

Excellencies, distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen. Allow me to express my deep appreciation to the International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations, for organising this important event. This seminar aims to lay a solid foundation for continuous dialogue and exchange of views on issues of global concern in peacekeeping operations. Due to their thematic importance, these issues coincide with the preoccupations of the United Nations Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34) Special Session, which is due to commence next week.

As the seminar will also draw immensely from the varied experiences of both academics and practitioners in the field of peacekeeping, including diplomats and Field Commanders, we expect to be enriched through in-depth analysis, expert knowledge and profound ideas. The diversity of opinions emanating from these backgrounds will undoubtedly reflect the challenges of an increasingly complex and multidisciplinary modern peacekeeping. It is, therefore, my great pleasure to extend a cordial welcome to all participants who; in my judgment, are the primary beneficiaries of this seminar.

When I was requested to deliver one of the opening addresses of this seminar I contemplated on two key concepts: challenges and partnership/internationalism. These two concepts, which I shall briefly dwell on, are not only implicit in the name of the organisers of this seminar; they also constitute the bedrock of ideas animating the major concerns of modern peacekeeping. Whether or not we like them, those concepts are not going to be readily wished away in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping. They are essential ingredients in our peacekeeping efforts and indeed, determine the degree of success in modern peacekeeping.
The global economic and financial melt-down of the past few years, which impacted negatively on several UN Member States, is in reality, translating to a gradual halt in the seven-fold astronomical rise in the number of UN peacekeepers. Simultaneously, it is imposing severe constraints on the freedom of actions of financial contributing countries. This scenario brings to the fore the concept of challenge in maintaining international peace and security in the face of dwindling human and material resources. The major task facing the UN is therefore how to assist its Member States encourage a new value orientation; through capacity building of peacekeepers so as to ensure result attainment at the least cost. Indeed, transforming peacekeepers into resource-keepers and resource-builders is a serious challenge confronting the international community.

The UN was built on the concept that it is only by working in concert among nations that true and genuine peace can be realised. This partnership or internationalism is indeed the pivot around which the unity in the diversity of our common humanity revolves. Individually, we can do little. That the UN system has survived over a period of six decades is; in part, as a result of partnership. Indeed, only concerted international efforts can help mitigate the increasing transnational threats such as terrorism, proliferation of arms and light weapons, drug trafficking and money laundering among others. It is often said that where ‘there is a will, there is a way’. But in committed partnership there are several ways.

Three valuable studies will support our deliberations and collegial dialogue in the course of this seminar namely:

1. A New Horizon for Peace Operations Partnerships: What are the Next Steps?\textsuperscript{77}
2. Challenges of Protecting Civilians in Multidimensional Peace Operations.\textsuperscript{78}
3. Considerations for Mission Leadership in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations.\textsuperscript{79}

In concluding, I am confident that our discussions will be rewarding and fruitful in terms of the valued contributions they will make to enhance UN peacekeeping operations. Once again, I congratulate the organisers on their accomplishment and wish every participant a most successful meeting.

It is now my pleasure to handover to my co-chairing colleague Ambassador Mårten Grunditz, Permanent Representative of Sweden to the UN whose Mission has coordinated the Challenges’ effort ever since its inception. I thank you.

Co-Chair: H.E. Mr Mårten Grunditz, Permanent Representative of Sweden to the United Nations, Sweden

Excellencies, distinguished Colleagues, Ladies and Gentlemen, good morning. On behalf of the Challenges Forum Partnership it is my great privilege to welcome all of you to the international forum for the challenges of peace and to this seminar in New York. I am very pleased to co-chair this opening session together with the Permanent Representative from Nigeria, Ambassador Joy Ogwu. She is as you know the Chairwoman of the United Nations Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and as she mentioned the committee will convene the 2011 session early next week. Nigeria is also a longstanding partner within the Challenges Forum. I am equally pleased to be co-hosting this Challenges Forum seminar together with the Permanent Representative of Australia, Ambassador Quinlan; and the acting Permanent Representative of Pakistan, Mr Amjad Sial. They both represent countries with a major involvement in and contribution to United Nations (UN) peacekeeping and to international peace operations around the world. We are looking forward to being hosted by our Egyptian Challenges partners at the Challenges Forum taking place in Cairo later on this year; that I mentioned already yesterday at the reception.

We are meeting this week against a backdrop of several challenging events of direct relevance to our business. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is never far from the world’s headlines. Over the last six months the focus has been on the protection of civilian issues driven not least by the systemic use of sexual violence and abuse as a weapon of war. Margot Wallström spoke eloquently on that very subject yesterday evening at the reception. Meanwhile Cote d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast) tested the resolve of the international community and its various regional and international organisations to support and uphold the results of elections and good governance. As for Haiti, she has struggled to emerge from the aftermath of an appalling natural disaster; facing at the same time the need to renew the political leadership and rebuild institutions of government, as well as facing daunting tasks in terms of health, humanitarian needs, recovery and development.

Following the successful referendum recently; Sudan is moving into a new phase where important challenges exist in terms of both peacekeeping and peace-building. The leadership of the UN multi-dimensional mission that we may expect to be established to assist in South Sudan will have a crucial role. South
Sudan will in my opinion offer a new and very important opportunity for the UN to show resolve, leadership and an ability to bring the international community into a really well coordinated delivery in the field.

Thus events show that the issues that Challenges and its partnership are trying to address have probably never been so topical. All these events serve to hold us to our business and remind us of its applicability. Sweden is therefore pleased to cooperate with its distinguished Challenges partnership and coordinate the overall effort. The study on Considerations for Mission Leadership in UN Peacekeeping Operations\(^80\) and the two annual reports presented here today are concrete testimonies to the belief in the importance of building long term and equal partnerships as well as a belief in the importance and possibilities of peacekeeping.

Mr Henrik Landerholm, Director-General of the Folke Bernadotte Academy; the coordinating organisation of Challenges, will following the presentation of the acting Permanent Representative of Pakistan further elaborate on the partnership and our program today and tomorrow. But before that and in order not to steal any thunder from my fellow co-hosts I will first hand over the word to Ambassador Gary Quinlan who will give his opening remarks and welcome you all from a Australian perspective. Thank you.

H.E. Mr Gary Quinlan, Permanent Representative of Australia to the United Nations, Australia

Good morning, in a sense Mårten has overstated what my task is because the real task; and I do not wish to detract from my fellow panellists, is really to get underway with the substantial discussions in the panels themselves since they are going to contain the quality and more in depth analysis of what the forum is all about. I look forward to welcoming you all here today to what will, we know that from past experience, obviously be a very productive discussion. I also very much thank our co-hosts Sweden and Pakistan and look forward very much to continuing our partnership with Egypt this year.

Last time I spoke at the Challenges Forum was last year to invite people to visit Australia for the Forum in Queanbeyan outside Canberra. A very large number in fact managed to make that journey. It was the first time we had a major forum in Australia with Challenges since our initial involvement with the seminar back in 2002 in Melbourne on the ROL in peace operations. There has been a sort of seamless approach to the area that Australia itself has chosen to
focus on in particular of trying to bring some extra quality thinking and coordination in the forum’s and partnership’s work specifically regarding the ROL and protection of civilians (POC). The forum in Queanbeyan was very enriching and the report is hereby launched and titled: The Challenges of Protecting Civilians in Multidimensional Peace Operations.\(^1\)

We are fortunate to have the Executive Director of Australia’s Asia Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence; retired Major General Mike Smith, here to go into detail on the report and the sorts of discussions that were raised in Queanbeyan. The discussions continue to have a lot of resonance out in the field with the issues on the minds of so many commanders in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) which has been mentioned this morning and even Côte d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast) and the recent peacekeeping referendum in Sudan have all brought to the fore again the importance and centrality of POC in particular and the way in which the world; our global markers, are in fact continually focussed on that themselves. Many of the gaps that were identified at the forum still exist and there needs to be further discussion about those in a practical sense about what more can be done to fill those gaps. Training and guidance are one particular area and we will continue to work with Member States through the C.34 to see what can be done more in that area. Not just to the training and guidance required but also as to providing the capacities and capabilities required. One little reminder to ourselves is that we have to deal with all the situations; particularly the difficult ones and not only the easy ones that are convenient, which sometimes is the tendency when looking at these kinds of things.

Australia was pleased to host another one in a series so far of three seminars here in New York open to groups like yourselves and beyond the United Nations (UN) missions on POC in December. The particular focus in last December’s forum co-hosted with Uruguay each year was on the strategic framework which is just being released; and the framework as you know will guide senior mission leadership in the development of mission specific strategies. We must continue of course the focus of the fact that mission leadership has the most decisive impact at every level of the leadership of a mission as it is structured; those sorts of issues will be discussed a lot more in detail over today and tomorrow as well.

That means that the other study which I have just been asked to bring to your attention in case you have not already seen it; Considerations for Mission Leadership in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations study\(^2\) which will also be

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launched today will also be very instructive for focus and discussion. Australia was one of the co-chairs and we were pleased to assist in that as well. Alain Le Roy I think will be saying some comments about that. He says in his introduction of the Considerations for Mission Leadership study how very instructive and practical; and how needed that study has already started to prove with commanders on the ground. It reflects of course what we were talking about last night at the reception concerning the wisdom of practitioners and that is where the input is most valuable. It is very much the sort of true reflection of what the partnership and the work does and the thinking it generates produces of utility to the UN and what makes the UN activities that much more effective and stronger in providing that seamless kind of partnerships. ‘Partnerships’ is the word most recurrently used when we talk about what the forum does and people do not use it just as a mantra; it does actually mean something, it enables different partners to bring the strengths that they have and comparative advantages to the table and that is what we want to continue to canalise if we are going to continue to be able to continue to have more effective peacekeeping globally.

We will on Australia’s part continue to have a very active role in supporting the forum in all these sorts of activities as we go forward into the future. If anything, we intend that our involvement with the forum will increase and not stay static. So we look forward to that continuing indefinitely into the future and making this an even more powerful input into a seamless approach with the UN into all these activities; bringing that practitioner; always the practitioners, test and input to what the forum is doing.

So nothing original there, all very predictable; but it might help you to just ease into the next panel and the more substantial discussion which will begin shortly on POC, so welcome again and thank you.

H.E. Mr Amjad H. B. Sial, Acting Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations, Pakistan

Chairpersons, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, The ‘International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations’ has since 1997 performed an important service for the international community by providing a forum for policy discussions amongst the main stakeholders of the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping and experts in this field. The recommendations generated through the meetings

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83 Ibid.
of the Forum provide useful insights into the ways and means for dealing with the challenges confronting peacekeeping today.

The 2009 Challenges Forum, co-hosted by Pakistan and Sweden in New York; provided an opportunity for discussing the recommendations of the UN New Horizon initiative. It helped in developing a better understanding of some of the challenges facing the international community.

Ladies and Gentlemen, peacekeeping is today the UN biggest enterprise; bringing security, solace and hope to millions of peoples afflicted by conflict around the globe. However, the rising demands on peacekeeping; particularly in response to complex crises, have also presented exceptional challenges in all phases – from planning to design of mandates, force generation, deployment, management, to draw-down and withdrawal of missions.

Addressing these challenges is crucial for continued success of UN peacekeeping. It is the collective responsibility of the Member States to enable the UN to respond speedily and effectively in mounting and sustaining peacekeeping operations. This collective effort by Member States must cut across a range of key issues that include the following:

- First, is the respect for the basic tenets of peacekeeping i.e. impartiality, consent of the parties and non-use of force except in self-defence. Any deviation from the guiding principles and the UN Charter would jeopardise the success of the UN peacekeeping.
- Second, is the obvious need to adapt peacekeeping to the changing requirements and to strengthen the capacity both in the field and at headquarters (HQ). We expect that the changes resulting from the Global Field Support Strategy\(^ {84} \) will result in greater efficiency and effectiveness in the implementation of mission mandates.
- Third; and particularly in the context of complex crises, much more needs to be done to fully operationalise a truly comprehensive approach, addressing in particular the root causes of conflicts and preventing relapse. We believe that a real interface of peacekeeping and peace-building through the integrated missions and the Peace-building Commission is essential for formulating the right exit strategies and laying down the foundations for sustainable peace and development in these situations.
- Fourth, the missions must be provided with resources that are commensurate with their complex and demanding mandates. Mandates should

be clear, realistic and achievable. Formulation of mandates should be
guided by an objective and comprehensive analysis of the ground
realities. If based on political expediencies or cost considerations, man-
dates could set up missions for failure and erode the credibility of the
UN. Availability of adequate resources; from the outset and at each
subsequent stage of the mission, is also essential to ensure safety and
security of personnel. As compared to missions that are overstretched,
well resourced missions are also better placed to ensure proper conduct
and discipline. In the context of resources, we should also reach agree-
ment on a credible and feasible rapid deployment capacity.

• Fifth, is the need to promote a genuine and meaningful partnership
between the UN Security Council, the troop-contributing countries and
the Secretariat. The UN relies mainly on the Member States for its
peacekeeping operations. The nature and quality of cooperation and
engagement with the troop contributing countries (TCCs) is therefore
crucial for informed decision-making and policy formulation at the
HQ. It is equally crucial for operational effectiveness and success in the
missions. Partnership with TCCs must also encompass their proper
representation in the operational as well as top managerial positions
both in the field and the UN HQ, taking into account their contribu-
tion to UN peacekeeping.

• Sixth, and perhaps the most crucial, is the political support and com-
mitment of Member States, on which the success or failure of peace-
keeping ultimately depends. We believe that such support and
commitment can be maximised where peacekeeping actions are agreed
and undertaken collectively and in full respect of the Charter. Contro-
versial actions lose such support.

These are the fundamental issues, which should be at the core of our work relat-
ed to peacekeeping. In this seminar you would be covering many of these
themes and I wish you all the success in your discussions.

Peacekeeping is a collective enterprise which we all have to support. We owe
this to those millions of people afflicted by conflict and looking up to the UN
for help. We owe this as well to our men and women in the field, the boots on
ground, who work day and night; in the most testing and dangerous conditions,
to translate our mandates into tangible results. We have utmost respect and
appreciation for the hundreds of thousands of peacekeepers who have served
under the UN flag. We pay homage in particular to all the brave souls who have
made the ultimate sacrifice by laying down their lives for this noble mission in
the service of humanity. I thank you.
Mr Henrik Landerholm, Director-General, Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden

Excellencies, Challenges Forum Partners, Ladies and Gentlemen. It is a great pleasure to be back in New York once again on the occasion of the Challenges Forum. On behalf of the coordinating organisation of the Forum, it is an even greater pleasure to be able to welcome you all to this event.

Many of you have come from different corners of our world; some of you have come from just around the corner; but to all of you, thank you for coming and making a contribution to this Seminar. The Challenges Partnership stands or falls by the commitment of its Partners and their preparedness to engage and contribute to the effort. I do not underestimate the sacrifices, in time and resources that this commitment often entails. And so I double my welcome and my appreciation of you; and all that you do in support of peace operations (POs), worldwide.

Additional to your own expertise, we have assembled a most prestigious array of speakers and panellists, whose qualifications to speak on and discuss our agenda issues are impeccable. We are particularly looking forward to – mentioning just a few – the contributions to be made by the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Alain Le Roy and the Under-Secretary-General for Field Support, Susana Malcorra. Reflections by the Challenges Forum Patron, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, will as always be a beacon of insight. Well – to all of you – I extend my warmest welcome and thanks for giving us your time.

The last time we met here in New York was in November 2009 at the second Challenges Forum, hosted by our Pakistani Partners in cooperation with Sweden. We gathered in the wake of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Department of Field Support’s (DFS) New Horizon\textsuperscript{85} initiative. Our overarching theme for that 2009 Forum was how the international community of peacekeeping practitioners might best support the New Horizon effort. And, being here in the Roosevelt Hotel, I wish that we by now had been able to offer international peacekeeping a ‘New Deal’; progress has been made but much remains to be done.

Yesterday, we held a fruitful Partners Meeting at the Permanent Mission of Pakistan. We are equally grateful to Australia for co-hosting the Reception at the Millennium Plaza Hotel and the important update from the Secretary-Generals Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict and the event here

\textsuperscript{85} United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, \textit{A New Partnership Agenda – Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping} (New York, July 2009) 56.
today. I would also like to extend our appreciation to the cooperation with the DPKO Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) and the Police Division in the hosting of the Challenges Blue Forum tomorrow. And who knows – a model that may be followed by future forums of different colours. And, finally on Thursday the Partnership will meet up again at the Swedish Mission to conclude our planning for the future.

Turning to the business in hand at this Seminar; we are building on the work of our earlier Forums and to a great extent preparing ourselves for our next Annual Forum. Today, we will start with a session on the complexities related to, the protection of civilians (POC). It is really good to see our host of the Forum of 2010; General Mike Smith, here with us. He will soon be reporting on some of the key issues arrived at and generated by last year’s Forum in Queanbeyan. All captured in the comprehensive Challenges Forum Report 2010 presented today – the yellow report. There; and in the report, – we covered many of the issues surrounding that bedrock requirement for legitimate and credible POs. Much work on the POC has been done by the international community to build on the various seminars and papers developed during 2010, including at our own Forum.

The session today is designed to bring us up to date with the results and direction of this work both from the United Nations (UN) perspective and also from that of various concerned and engaged Member States. It is intended to act as a springboard for further discussions at the upcoming Forum later this year. The two Under-Secretary-Generals will share their perspectives on Peacekeeping Partnerships: its progress and prospects. The relationship between the Challenges Partnership and the UN Secretariat is a vital one, which is reinforced by seminars like this and manifested by the active participation of the heads of peacekeeping and field support and several of their key staff members. Accordingly, we propose to continue to hold such seminars periodically in New York, in addition to and alongside the annual Forums hosted by our Partners.

After this we will focus on the project that the Partnership has been undertaking during the past two years, called – Considerations for Mission Leadership in UN Peacekeeping Operations. This has been a considerable piece of work and I am delighted to say that it is now published, also available on the Challenges website, in hard and CD copy. The Study is being translated into the six official languages of the UN. The feedback we have had already has been most helpful and overwhelmingly positive. We will later discuss its utility and how

we can optimise its potential. I would also like to take this opportunity to thank all of those involved, especially forum senior adviser on the Considerations Study; General Robert Gordon, in the development of this excellent work. It has been a considerable team effort of the Partnership; and is a fine example of the best that we can achieve by working together.

This afternoon we will also be picking up from the work of our 2009 Forum here in New York, concerned with the delivery of the New Horizon recommendations with a particular focus on highlighting issues of relevance for the deliberations of the forthcoming United Nations Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34). The timing of this Seminar has been expressly designed to complement, as appropriate, the Special Committee’s sessions. Again, we believe that this is where the Challenges Partnership, with its knowledge and interest in POs can add substantive value by furthering informed debate.

Let me also mention how pleased I am to see General Muhammed Farooq, President of the ‘National Defence University’, our Partners in Islamabad, here today. The theme of the 2009 Forum was *A New Horizon for Peacekeeping Partnerships – What are the Next Steps?* The specific focuses included command and control arrangements in UN peacekeeping, mandate making and mandate implementation, including implications of peacebuilding and state building in UN mandates, broadening the resources base and enhancing effective consultations with contributing countries and peacekeeping as possible platforms for fighting organised crime. Some key findings of the report will be raised by General Farooq during the final session today.

The Cairo Regional Centre for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa in Cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, intends to host the Challenges Partnership and peacekeeping colleagues from around the world in Cairo later this year. We will then focus on issues relevant to the planning and conduct of peacekeeping from major troop contributing country’s perspectives.

The two reports from the earlier forums have now been published. The work that has gone into this process has been impressive and is a testament to the Partnership in action. Hopefully you will already have had a chance to look

88 Ibid.
89 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, *A New Partnership Agenda – Charting a New Horizon for Un Peacekeeping*.
at them. Reading through the Reports, I have been struck by the detail and rigour of the many presentations and the richness of the following discussions amongst central actors involved in modern POs. I do believe that the Reports are self-standing and reward a good read; however experienced the practitioner.

Tomorrow we have coloured the morning blue; police blue, not just the regular UN blue. Under the overall theme of support to the ROL, we will be looking at issues concerning UN policing. The United Nations police (UNPOL) commissioners and advisers from the various UN missions, who are presently here in New York for their annual meeting, will join us in this session. They have even been kind enough to align their programme with ours. This will be a good opportunity to hear and discuss some of their issues first hand, in a dynamic field of peacekeeping endeavour that is still developing and is highly relevant to the themes of our recent; and no doubt future, Forums.

We are all here amongst friends and so of course; in the margins of these sessions there will be plenty of scope for those invaluable bi-lateral discussions; which are the very stuff of such events. Meanwhile, I and my team, including International Coordinator, Annika Hilding Norberg, do look forward to the activities of the next two days and meeting as many of you as possible both here and at our next Challenges forum. Ladies and Gentlemen, warmly welcome.
Chapter 8

Protection of Civilians

Purpose of Session: to discuss proposals that could enhance the way in which the international community can better protect civilians caught up in violent conflict, building on Challenges’ findings and in the light of ongoing UN developments.

Lt. Gen. Randhir Kumar Mehta, Member, Board of Management, United Service Institution of India, Former Military Adviser, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, India

Good morning Excellencies, distinguished Colleagues, Ladies and Gentlemen. It is truly an honour to be invited to chair this session on Protection of Civilians (POC) along with three very experienced and accomplished panellists. I recognise the presence of a number of my former colleagues from my United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) days in the audience with great affection and regard. It is with much pleasure that I recognised the presence of Mr Jean-Marie Guéhenno former Under-Secretary-General, the DPKO. I admire him greatly for his vision, strong leadership and amazing calmness while taking tough decisions. He recognised the importance for total synergy between all the civilian staff, police and military elements which greatly helped us in our work. I also wish to thank Mr Henrik Landerholm, Ms Annika Hilding Norberg and Ms Anna Wiktorsson for keeping us updated on the preparations for this meeting and the administrative support. It is also my pleasant duty to thank the co-hosts for the seminar; Australia, Egypt, Pakistan and Sweden for their support.

In this next session, we aim to present and discuss proposals that could enhance the way in which the international community can better protect civilians caught up in violent conflict, building upon Challenges findings in the light of ongoing UN deployments. Looking back at my career in the army; I was first exposed to the ideas of managing safety and security of civilians as a gentleman cadet in the Indian army academy in 1966. We were given tasks on the Geneva conventions, aid to civil authorities, POC in combat areas, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), refugees, rules of engagement and operating with police and civil authorities. Civilians always figured in all our planning in peace and war as a ‘constant factor’. The basic tenets of protection of safety and security of civilians have not undergone any significant changes ever since then. However
in a complex, multi-dimensional environment as obtains in peace operations (POs), POC needs greater attention.

The Challenges Forum Report 2010 focuses on the challenges of protecting civilians in multidimensional PO. It is with much interest I read the very well compiled report with some very effective presentations covering the different dimensions of the subject. In the Chapter on Global State of Peace Operations (PO); while discussing key issues for effective POC in Armed Conflict, Maj. Gen. Tim Ford re-iterated the view, “the issue is no longer whether to protect, but how to protect”. Since 2000, ten missions have been authorised under Chapter VII to take all necessary measures to fulfil the POC mandate. Referring to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)/DPKO study of 2009 on protecting civilians in the context of PO; it was noted that no mission had a clear definition of POC. Shortfalls such as lack of capacity, information gathering and analysis, mobility, pre-deployment training etc; have been highlighted. Questions to be asked:

1. Are peacekeepers under equipped or under resourced?
2. How does a re-hatted mission look at this?
3. How do the newly rotated contingents look at the tasks at hand?
4. Is there a distinction between POC and Responsibility to Protect?
5. The relevance of political support of the host nation and its fundamental obligation to protect people in the conditions obtaining in some missions?
6. What when the state’s institutions for security are weak and unable to function?
7. How do we implement a multi-dimensional and transitional approach to POC?
8. Does a mission wait for all its resources to build-up and then concentrate on POC tasks. In what details are the Troop contributing countries (TCC)/Police contributing countries (PCC) guidelines required at the operational and tactical levels without curbing initiative and innovation?
9. How about military and police ethos of training in conjunction with the other peacekeepers and locals!
10. And lastly the role of the Parties to the conflict in POC.

93 Ibid.
What are the specific areas of pre-deployment training required in addition to that contained in Standardised Generic Training Modules (SGTMs) and Core Pre-deployment Training Materials (CPTMs)? How do we synergise United Nations (UN) military – police efforts together with the host Government security elements and existing civil set-up? By ‘military’ I am also referring to military aviation, boat units, United Nations military observer’s (UNMO’s), staff and Integrated Mission Training Cells. Likewise for United Nations police; the necessary effective linkages between mission leadership team (MLT), entities such as Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC), Joint Operations Centre (JOC), Joint Logistics Operations Centre (JLOC), Sectors, Host Government set up at different levels, Social Structures; and Inter-mission Co-ordination are important. The recent migration of people from United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) and the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) is a case in point. Importance of mission posture and the application of the ‘One up – two down’ principle for armed UN Peacekeepers are relevant.

The Challenges Forum Report 2010 also included some very cogent and candid presentations by Ambassador Mahiga, Mr Amr. Aljowaily and Dr William Durch, all very effectively guided and steered by H.R.H. Prince Zeid. Dr Durch in particular has covered cross cutting issues in POC covering human rights, humanitarian issues, gender, mine action service, security sector reform, safety and security, mission management considerations, conduct and discipline and resources. The report also addressed ‘Regional Approaches’ covering the European Union (EU) and African Union (AU) approaches, a field perspective and POC in the South Pacific; there are some very useful points there for follow-up.

Maj. Gen. (retd.) Michael G. Smith, Executive Director, Asia Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence, Host of Challenges Forum 2010 on Challenges of Protecting Civilians in Multidimensional Peace Operations, Australia

Distinguished Guests, Friends and Colleagues. It is good to be back in New York amongst those committed to enhancing the effectiveness of the United Nations (UN) in peace making, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. My thanks to our Chair, Lt. Gen. Mehta, for his excellent summary of the contents of the Challenges Forum 2010 proceedings on the Protection of Civilians (POC), the report which is launched here today. It was a privilege for my Centre to host this event in Australia last year.

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The success of the Forum last year was due to a number of factors. In addition to the hard work of my own staff and the Challenges Secretariat; we managed to attract excellent speakers and to generate focussed discussion in both plenary and the break-out sessions. The positive outcomes from the Forum were largely due to the excellent background paper98 and recommendations prepared by Dr William Durch and Alison Giffen from the Stimson Centre; and by the exceptional work of our Rapporteur, Haidi Willmot (now with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations).

Over the past couple of years much has happened; and is happening, in the peacekeeping protection space. This is particularly pleasing; and I would like to congratulate the Council, the Secretariat, the C34 and the hard working mission staff for the significant progress that has been achieved to enhance the POC in UN missions. These achievements have been aided by the commitment and focus of the African Union (AU) to mainstream POC for the African Standby Force, working in close collaboration with the UN.

This session is designed to discuss proposals that could enhance POC; and is intended to be forward thinking. I will, therefore, summarise the progress made to date on POC and highlight a few forthcoming initiatives that Australia has underway in its continuing contribution to realise protection. I have been involved with POC in both the military and humanitarian dimensions for more than a decade. On Monday this week I had the privilege of sitting-in on the DPKO’s dialogue with Member States on the Framework for Drafting Comprehensive POC Strategies in UN Peacekeeping Operations. Such a positive discussion would not have been possible just two years ago. This progress is palatable and pleasing but we still have a long way to go.

The necessity to enhance POC has demanded both a top-down and a bottom-up approach: top-down from the UN Security Council; and bottom-up from the various UN and UN/AU hybrid missions that have been mandated to undertake POC. This approach has been characterised by better knowledge management of protection issues; and a commitment for improved integration and understanding between the various civil-military protection actors. POC is truly a cross-cutting issue.

While some disagreement or uncertainty between the various protection actors persists in relation to specific protection responsibilities; and on the resources, doctrine and training required for effective implementation of POC mandates; there is a predominant and unifying commitment for peace missions to provide

better protection outcomes at field level. The practical challenges to strengthening the POC in peacekeeping operations are well known. The last twelve months has seen an escalation in efforts and real progress made in providing strategic and operational skills and resources to meet those challenges.

Since the release in 2009 of the ground breaking study commissioned by the DPKO and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA); *Protecting Civilians in the Context of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*\(^99\) and the April 2010 Challenges Forum\(^100\) in Australia which helped to progress key issues, we have seen a number of positive developments:

1. New Horizon Initiative: Progress Report No. One (October 2010)\(^101\), which focuses on developing policy on the POC as a reform priority.
2. Eighth Report of the Secretary-General on the POC (November 2010)\(^102\), which outlined some of the positive developments, including advances at the normative level.
3. An updated Aide Memoire\(^103\) on the POC, which was adopted by the Security Council in November 2010.

At the strategic level considerable progress has been made on POC. The DPKO/Department of Field Support (DFS) Lessons Learned Note\(^104\), *Concept Note on Robust Peacekeeping*\(^105\) and *Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians*\(^106\) released early last year addressed significant gaps in guidance at the strategic level. In parallel to these activities, the African Union Peace and Security Commission last year developed the *Proposed Guidelines for the Protection of Civilians in African Union Peace Support Operations*. Australia was pleased to assist the Commission in this endeavour; and The Peace and Security Council welcomed the Guidelines in October 2010 and has directed that they will be mainstreamed into the activities of the AU Mission in Somalia.

105 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, ‘Concept Note on Robust Peacekeeping’, (New York: General Assembly’s Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 2009).
More recently, the DPKO’s Framework for Drafting Comprehensive POC Strategies in UN Peacekeeping Operations, is an important addition to this growing body of doctrine and guidelines.

1. The Framework was released in January 2011 and largely addresses the findings and recommendations of the Challenges Forum Report 2010 relating to applying protection in UN Missions.

2. The Framework is a positive development and addresses a number of key POC issues, including clarifying the POC roles and functions of each of the mission components.

3. The Framework requires that an analysis of mission resources and capacities be undertaken to identify gaps and confirm if additional resources are needed to effectively implement the protection mandate.

While the DPKO Framework is a positive development at the strategic level, further work is needed at the operational level. As we all know, a mission-wide POC strategy is critical for effective implementation in the field; and its inception begins with the Technical Assessment Mission that largely shapes the Secretary-General’s advice to the Council on the requirements for the mission. I am particularly pleased that the recent Challenges booklet on Considerations for Mission Leadership in UN Peacekeeping Operations has recognised the importance of POC as a cross-cutting leadership issue.

A mission-wide strategy in the form of a United Nations Secretary-General’s Special Representative directive gives operational meaning to POC, breaking it down into clear tasks and objectives. It clarifies the roles and responsibilities of mission components and the Mission’s relationship with other protection actors, including the UN Country Team. This enables the heads of mission components; including force commanders and police commissioners, to clearly specify POC responsibilities in their directives; and it provides a mechanism to better coordinate the activities of all protection actors.

The military component of a peacekeeping operation plays a critical role in protecting civilians by preventing, deterring and responding to attacks against civilians. Mobility, posture and presence are key requirements if POC operations are to be pre-emptive, preventative and effective. And this must be based on good situational awareness and cultural understanding through shared information management systems. In essence, better early warning systems and a willingness to act decisively.

Protecting civilians is core business for the police. More work is required to determine the operational requirements for police in implementing POC tasks; and to distinguish between the roles of Formed Police Units, community police and mentoring and training teams in capacity-building of host country police forces.

Thus far, my comments have focussed on POC in peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions but it is important that we think beyond such missions. Ultimately of more importance will be the legacy of these missions in contributing to the establishment of sustainable POC mechanisms by the host country; at both the government and at the community levels.

I will conclude by mentioning a few forthcoming initiatives that Australia is taking to continue its contribution to POC development. Building on our partnership with Uruguay here in NY to convene POC roundtables; and our ongoing commitment to assist the AU Peace and Security Commission, the following activities are planned:

1. Work has commenced to develop POC doctrine for the Australian Defence Force and the Australian Federal police. We will be very happy to share this work as it develops; and to learn from similar initiatives that might be underway by other countries.

2. On 25th–26th May we will be holding a senior level Civil-Military Affairs Conference in Australia on Enhancing the POC in Peace Operations: From Policy to Practice. This conference will take stock of recent developments at the strategic/political and operational levels, highlight linkages between POC and relevant issues of women and children, consider POC training initiatives and identify next steps. Presentations will be short, followed by active plenary discussion conducted under the Chatham House Rule.

3. As a lead-up to this POC conference in Australia in May, we plan to facilitate a two day workshop here in NY (NY) on 12th–13th April at the Australian Mission, to examine opportunities for integrating the Women, ‘Peace and Security’ and ‘Children and Armed Conflict’ agendas into the POC agenda.

4. We have agreed with the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) to assist in the development of a POC documentary film that will be useful for training purposes.

There are many positive activities now occurring in the POC space; and it would be good to share information in this area. On training, a number of UN agencies are involved in protection training: the DPKO, the UNITAR, the United Nations Women (through the Analytical Inventory) and the humanitarian protection agencies – the OCHA, the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). All have their place and meet necessary requirements. It would be good to ensure complementarity between these courses; and consistency in messaging between regional peacekeeping training centres.

In conclusion, the last twelve months has been a very important period of development in the POC agenda. There have been very positive developments and progress made at all levels. What is now required is consolidation of these positive developments:

1. There should be greater focus on the operational level and the development of military and policing strategies that support mission-wide POC strategies.
2. Training for all levels of the mission will be critical.

POC has now reached a level of maturity and gained considerable momentum. The challenge will be to maintain this momentum and build civil-military capabilities at field level. Thank you very much.

Ms Izumi Nakamitsu, Director, Policy, Evaluation and Training, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations

I would like to thank the Hosts of the Challenges Forum for the opportunity to participate in this discussion on the challenges facing United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions in the implementation of mandates to protect civilians. The level of participation at this meeting demonstrates the continued interest in UN peacekeeping by Member States.

As the previous speakers have highlighted, the protection of civilians (POC) is an important priority for UN peacekeeping operations; but one that continues to pose considerable strategic, operational and tactical challenges. Today we have greater policy consensus on POC as compared with two years ago; yet there remain some differences among Member States. At the operational level the lack of resources and capabilities remains a concern to both troop-contributing countries (TCCs) and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). Expectation management is a real challenge; we cannot protect all civilians, yet we cannot avoid the fact that on the ground people expect peacekeeping missions to protect them and; indeed our missions must do and be seen to be doing, their utmost in this regard.

These challenges are; more than ever, at the forefront of Member States’ agendas for the development of policy and guidance for peacekeeping operations. Earlier this week we briefed the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Oper-
ations (C-34) on the status of POC work streams. Member states showed a keen interest in the development of a strategic framework for the elaboration of POC strategies. They also expressed their eager anticipation for the finalisation of a resources and capacities matrix for all the DPKO field activities that relate to POC; which will inform a discussion on resource and capability gaps in peacekeeping missions. I will discuss both of these matters at greater length in a moment. The Member States are resolute that the host state must remain primarily responsible for the POC within its borders and we agree with that. They remain engaged on the difficult challenges that continue to be faced by peacekeeping missions; including the engagement of non-state armed groups, protection challenges emanating from the elements of the host state itself; and the importance of locally gathered situational information in informing well tailored protection strategies.

Most of the initiatives we are currently working on were undertaken by the DPKO on the request of the C-34 itself. In May 2010, the C-34 requested the Secretary-General to take forward a number of initiatives designed to improve POC implementation in the field. These included the creation of training modules for peacekeeping personnel; an assessment of the Department of Field Support (DFS) resource and capability requirements for the POC; an analysis of Concepts of Operations; and the development of a strategic framework for mission level POC strategies. Let me just briefly touch on each of these. As you know, over the course of 2010, much of our work at the POC has been focused on completing these tasks.

The Integrated Training Service of my division is currently developing training modules that target military, police and civilian personnel in peacekeeping missions. These modules will provide trainees with a foundational understanding of POC and scenario based exercises on the application of these concepts. It is my hope that we will be able to share drafts of these training modules in the next few weeks; on the understanding that they are still in draft and we are incorporating comments from the field. We have also partnered with the United Nations Women under the auspices of UN Action Against Sexual Violence to develop trainings that deal specifically with sexual violence, as Ms Wallström elaborated last night.

We are also working to develop a POC resource and capability matrix that will provide a basis for all stakeholders to be on the same page when considering the DPKO’s current capacity levels. Once complete, the matrix will assist us to identify capacity and resource gaps that hamper the efforts of peacekeeping missions to protect civilians. It will help to ensure missions; and those who staff them, are fully capable and resourced for the task.
We conducted an analysis of the concepts of operations for each of the DPKO’s field missions with POC mandates so as to assess the missions’ operational preparedness for the POC. The exercise found a significant degree of variance amongst missions; which demonstrates the need for a more systematic treatment of POC planning by the DPKO and the DFS in the future.

The analysis took place as part of an initiative to examine the POC planning process as a whole and as a means of identifying ways in which it can be better integrated into wider DPKO/DFS planning. Recommendations for the revision of pre-deployment and in-mission planning processes are being applied in order to assist mission leadership to be more adequately prepared for POC operations. A draft paper on the integration of POC planning into the DPKO/DFS planning processes has been prepared and consultations with field missions are currently on-going.

This work goes hand in hand with our efforts to elaborate a Strategic Framework to guide the drafting of comprehensive POC strategies at the mission level. The strategy; which was recently completed and shared with stakeholders, was the product of extensive consultations with mission leadership and key stakeholders, including a workshop for civilian, military and police officials from six peacekeeping missions with protection mandates. The document reflects lessons learned by peacekeeping missions over the years and incorporates advice from external partners, notably other members of the UN family with experience in POC. It responds to a call from mission leaders themselves for clearer guidance on the preparation of POC strategies. By providing a template for these strategies, the Strategic Framework establishes a common approach for senior mission leaders to draw together the full range of a mission’s capabilities to protect civilians.

While the strategic framework lays out an approach for the elaboration of POC strategies, it should be noted that the contents of these strategies and the means for implementing them will remain the remit of mission leadership. It is vital that peacekeeping missions retain the flexibility necessary to respond to the unique conditions on the ground.

These are the work that has been done to date, which I believe represents a considerable stride towards improving our capacity to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence. However, a great deal remains to be done and we are looking ahead to a busy schedule in 2011 on the POC agenda. Much of our work this year will focus on the dissemination and implementation of our guidance on POC; and to start supporting Member States in their training efforts in POC. We will shortly begin rolling out training modules on the POC and receiving feedback on their effectiveness. The Strategic Framework will be
communicated to relevant missions and follow up work will be done to ensure that each of the seven missions with POC mandates have a POC strategy that is in line with the framework.

We will also aim to turn conceptual work on POC into tangible guidance for field missions. As the conceptual architecture surrounding POC becomes increasingly solid, we will begin to develop much anticipated operational guidance for military and police components of peacekeeping missions. This was one of the recommendations from the military police advisers’ Community (MPAC) visit to the UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) last autumn. As well, we plan to develop clear, practical guidance on POC-oriented reporting for all mission components. This latter element is in response to a request from the UN Security Council outlined in Resolution 1894109.

We are striving to enhance our role in the coordination of POC activities in the DPKO. In particular, we are seeking to ensure that different thematic areas of POC, notably child protection and sexual and gender based violence, are progressing along the same lines and in accordance with a shared conceptual foundation. We continue to seek support for the establishment of a small POC coordination unit in the DPKO and hope to receive formal approval for this initiative in the coming months.

We are also reaching out to external stakeholders, especially the African Union (AU), to enhance our role in the global dialogue on the POC in armed conflict and to share operational lessons and best practices. As we share many TCCs; our partnership with the AU is particularly important in order to ensure a common approach to the role of the military component in protecting civilians.

In conclusion, I would like to emphasise that you have guided us and supported us – particularly through cross cutting policy discussions in the C34 – in the complex and quite comprehensive work on POC, which I have outlined. We believe that 2011 must be the year of C34’s cross cutting policy work and the overall peacekeeping reform efforts making a visible difference on the ground in our key missions. We will continue to work with the UN Security Council to assist in clarifying POC language and supporting strong, clear policy on POC. We hope to continue to work with Member States, UN Country Team members and other stakeholders in these important efforts to make peacekeeping operations more effective in the maintenance of international peace and the security; and to protect civilians. Thank you for your attention.

Mr Hansjoerg Strohmeyer, Chief, Policy Development and Studies Branch, Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, United Nations

I would like to thank the important contribution of the Challenges Forum to advancing the agenda on protection of civilians (POC) in peacekeeping contexts. The report of the Challenges meeting last April very much provides us with a road map of what we need to do. Let me at the outset make two introductory comments:

First, beyond the technical discussions that we are having today, we must remember that the POC is a shared responsibility of the Council, peacekeeping operations and humanitarian actors. It remains a hot and important topic as we have seen from recent events in South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Côte d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast).

Secondly, while peacekeeping missions are an important factor for protecting civilians; most notably by providing physical protection through the use of force, we need to ensure a comprehensive approach to the POC, which is very much an umbrella concept that includes human rights, humanitarian action and the rule of law. Significant progress has been made on the issue since the publication of the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)/United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) study in late 2000; which I might add was a principal reason for us to bring together the different actors into a common strategy. However, significant challenges still remain and the five core findings of the OCHA/DPKO study remain relevant today.

Leadership
The Challenges Forum has recognised in its publication Considerations for Mission Leadership in UN Peacekeeping Operations the crucial role of leadership, not least in relation to POC. Leadership includes not only the United Nations Secretary-General’s Special Representative, the Force Commander, etc. but also the United Nations Deputy Secretary-General’s Special Representative who is often the Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC) and therefore makes the vital bridge to the humanitarian community. Leadership is particularly important for managing expectations.

Strategies
The development of comprehensive POC strategies by peacekeeping operations is particularly important and must be underpinned by good risk and threat
analysis. We worked extensively with the DPKO on the development of its Strategic Framework that has just been presented to the C34, including jointly organising a field-based workshop in Addis Ababa in June last year. Because of the implications the Strategic Framework has for coordination with humanitarian actors, we will make sure that our humanitarian colleagues in the field are briefed on its content.

If we are really going to enhance protection of the civilian population it is vital that we have a genuine integrated strategy encompassing both those of the mission and humanitarian actors. This is essential for ensuring a common understanding of the protection priorities of all actors. While it might not be possible to have a comprehensive strategy all the time; it is important that we at least have a common understanding of the priorities.

**Coordination**

Coordination on POC is important both within the mission between the military, policy and civilian components; but also with external protection partners, not least humanitarian actors. Within the humanitarian community it is the Protection Cluster led by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) that is the forum in which coordination takes place; and peacekeeping missions are usually a member of these groups. Working with the UNHCR we are going to be undertaking a review this year of Protection Clusters in the field, which should include how they collaborate with peacekeeping missions. There should be a ‘Responsibility to Consult’ to ensure proper coordination between peacekeeping missions and humanitarian actors; at least to have a common understanding of the thematic and geographical priorities in a country.

**Fragmentation at the field level**

While we have made significant progress at the normative and strategic levels in a number of ways, we still need to make sure that these are translating into practical changes at the field level. This was one of the key messages of the last Secretary-General’s report on the POC published in November 2010. What we must avoid is a fragmentation of our approach to the POC. Significant progress has been made on the POC, children and armed conflict; and sexual violence issues on the Council’s agenda. However; at the field level we need to ensure a coherent approach and not a ‘stove-piping’ of our actions.

**Benchmarking**

Protection benchmarks for peacekeeping missions and indicators to measure progress are crucial; as was recognised in Resolution 1894\(^\text{111}\). I am convinced that there are a lot of success stories out there about peacekeeping and POC but these are not always told. These might be small stories but small stories become
big stories and we need to be better at communicating this progress. However; the monitoring of progress on protection should not be restricted to peacekeeping missions and the contexts in which they operate. That is why, following the recommendation of the last Secretary-General (SG) report on POC, the Emergency Relief Coordinator is going to launch a process of developing a set of indicators for measuring progress on POC in all contexts and involving all actors.

UN Security Council informal Expert Group on the POC
I would like to mention the important role that the UN Security Council informal Expert Group on the POC plays. This forum is important not only in relation to the renewal of the mandates of peacekeeping missions; but also to ensure a coherent and consistent approach by the Council across contexts; and as a tool to monitor progress in addressing protection concerns. UN Security Council members have for a long time raised concern about the lack of detailed and timely information on POC, which is necessary for them to take action. That is why we are developing with the DPKO and other UN colleagues draft guidelines for improving the reporting on POC in the SG’s country reports, which was requested in Resolution 1894.112

Conclusion
I would just like to say that we fully support the strategies of peacekeeping operations in relation to the POC; and will continue to work with them on these. There are though two challenges that I feel we need to be aware of: First, monitoring progress on the POC is particularly important in the context of mission drawdown as we have seen in the case of the UN mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) in Chad. Second, other situations of violence other than armed conflict, such as political violence, criminality and gang violence, are critically important to POC.

Discussion
The first question focused on the issue of guidelines and that they had been contentious among Member States in New York. It was suggested it was a compromise solution the previous year, producing a strategic framework to guide the development of a comprehensive protection of civilians (POC) strategy. Was the debate at its foundation a difference in perspectives on what guidelines really are? Some would view them as being rules which were binding and in some respects legally bind peacekeepers on the ground. Whereas from a strategic perspective; guidelines represent capturing fundamentals and principles on which

111 United Nations Security Council (64th Year : 2009), 'Security Council Resolution 1894 – on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict'.
112 Ibid.
commanders shape how to formulate their plan. With reference to the doctrine comment by General Smith with respect to litigation that is imposed by guidelines; it was asked whether guidelines should be produced or not.

A second participant asked the panellists to explore the issue of managing expectations in the context of POC and how it conflicts with the mandate of POC. A third participant raised the issue of critical capacity gaps and how the missions can actually meet the POC requirements in the mandates, given the lack of helicopters and other critical capacities required.

Maj. Gen. (retd) Michael Smith responded noting that the question on guidelines and doctrine was a particularly good one; when does a document become doctrine and not? He suggested that the fundamental issue really was that if missions; i.e. the military contributing countries and police contributing countries going to missions are told to do POC, there is a requirement for something to explain what that means and what skills are required in order to be able to conduct themselves on the ground. Certainly in Australia’s case at that moment they did not have that; so they were wrestling with the situation. They were confident that by the end of the year, they would have developed what they call a doctrine for the Australian defence and police forces when conducting POC. This did not mean that all doctrine must be slavishly followed, there was always the licence for commanders to adapt it on the ground according to the necessity of the situation. So Gen Smith would not want it to be considered that the doctrine would tie the hands of peacekeepers unnecessarily: “At the moment if you say POC to a policeman or a soldier, they really do not understand what you mean. They might think they know but they do not really; and it gets all confused with maintaining a secure environment.” So there was a lot of work that still needed be done on.

In terms of managing expectations, the big issue in all the United Nations (UN) and African Union (AU) missions was where they are told to do POC; was that they cannot protect every single person 100% of the time. And indeed there were missions that did not have POC, but the people still expect the UN will protect them and that was what they were there for. So one of the things that was missing at the moment in missions was the ability to be able to communicate with the community and through the host government about what could be done and could not be done and what that level of protection actually meant. It was impossible to expect every single person to be protected 24/7 from every possible thing that might happen to them; it just could not be done. It could not be done in countries that do not even have conflict.

Regarding the question on critical capacity gaps, such as the lack of helicopters and how that impacted the ability to protect civilians. Gen Smith continued:
“How can we ensure protection if we do not have the necessary mobility assets to be enable to really get to the places we need? I agree and this is where the POC is such a powerful tool; because if the UN Security Council is going to mandate missions to do POC, the technical assessment missions that are putting together the advice for the Secretary-General have to say these are the resources that are required to enable you to undertake the task. It is a mobility task; and not necessarily just helicopters because often the best protection that can be done is not the asset or piece of equipment; but it is the people on the ground walking. The best way to protect civilians is to have people on the ground communicating with the local community – but you still need to get there to do it. People who stay in vehicles all the time have mobility, but may not necessarily be the most effective protection as a patrol. But you need nevertheless the means to get to the situations quickly and more importantly than that, the potential perpetrators need to know that the UN will get there and be able to do that and is able to maintain a very active patrolling regime to ensure it.”

Ms Izumi Nakamitsu responded to both issues; managing expectations and the capability gaps. Expectations management had a few different aspects; one was that at the international level, we could not be expected to protect everyone, everywhere and all the time, it was just simply not possible; especially given the capability gaps, especially when helicopters were not made available; the mobility assets, that were already authorised, but not given to the UN: “The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is the size of Western Europe; if we cannot move around that would definitely hamper our ability to protect civilians. This being said; obviously we need to do our utmost and we also need to be able to say very confidently that we think within limitations we are absolutely doing our best to protect as many civilians as possible. Expectations management also has a local dimension and if we are able to actually communicate to the local populations our limitations that we have in terms of mobility etc. we feel it would also increase our ability to be more proactive”. Ms Nakamitsu drew attention to the UN operational concept for POC which covers not just the reactive intervention by military forces, but also the wide spectrum, all the way from prevention mitigation to the establishment and capacitive building of protective capacities at the local level. If the required assets were missing, the lack of mobility would limit the UN’s ability to be reactive to the maximum level then the UN would need to do better on the prevention side. It was suggested this require the local population to really understand the UN’s capacity and capabilities and limitations, so that they could also be part of the UN strategy for prevention. The local population could approach the UN with what they believe needs to be done at the early stage of protecting civilians: “Protection expectations management has slightly different dimensions to it, but is part of a very important strategic framework that needs to be kept in mind”.
Ms Nakamitsu continued commenting on the question of the capability gap. The UN had been trying to deal with the gap in capabilities more systematically, which is why the UN developed the capability gap list. What was required now was to think through together with the Member States as to how the gap list could be used more effectively. Further, how could the capabilities required to implement mandates, such as the POC, be mobilized more effectively? One example was the preparation of a resourcing capability matrix for POC mandate implementation. Much work had been done already, consultations with the field missions were on going, and Ms Nakamitsu hoped that they would be able to share the matrix with the Member States very soon.

Mr Hansjoerg Strohmeyer responded on the issue of expectation management. It was not just an issue of political correctness or a communications exercise. He underlined that in the first instance, expectation management needed to be a conscious exercise of a mission or the community as a whole to say ‘what is it that we can realistically do?’ He suggested the UN needed to be self-aware of what could be done before the UN raises expectations. The UN had an effect when being deployed, when being visible, when driving around in certain vehicles. These all had an effect on the population and it was not something that was easily managed on the ground.

Mr Strohmeyer highlighted an example. If in parts of Darfur there were populations in small hamlets or villages that live under the threat of recurrent attacks, at some point they may just leave and go to the next internally displaced person (IDP) camp, which then populates the IDP camp. It was very difficult to tell them with any type of communications exercise; ‘please do not do this, we do not have the capacities to protect you in the camp’. What was required was through leaders and others say ‘we cannot protect you, but we could within our capabilities, for example every two weeks, send a patrol, or a helicopter overflight, or a certain display of visits to the communities even by humanitarian workers, a certain display that the international community cares and shows some measure of presence’. Mr Strohmeyer stressed that this was precisely why there was a need for a strategy. A strategy was number one, not only to identify the priorities; that maybe the easier part of it. There needed to be an understanding as to who can do what, who can engage better with local communities, who can display some presence, who can talk to leaders or has contacts to leaders to say ‘you can help us prevent your communities escaping every time something is happening in the neighbourhood, because the situation out there may be even worse’.

Regarding doctrine, Mr Strohmeyer commented that it was not the humanitarian community’s business, so he would not comment on the protection guidance as such. However, at the receiving end in a country context of
humanitarian organisation and others, what was not possible was to leave the people on the ground; be they peacekeepers, be they military, be they police, be they humanitarian workers or human rights workers, to figure it out on their own. What often happened, was that people come to the military and say: “can you help us with fire wood patrols? Can you help us with IDP returns? Can you help us with patrols around certain camps? And then what. Is it a favour that we ask of the military? Then they say in these two weeks their capabilities are a little better and they will assist, two weeks later they do not do it? Or is it responsibility that they need to assist?” Mr Strohmeyer underlined that this was precisely the point. What was needed was predictability. If it was clear that the military could not support, then that needed to be clear. If it was clear that it is part of their responsibility then it needed to be sure that it happened.

Concluding, Lt. Gen. Randhir Kumar Mehta stated that he had some further eight to ten major points to make, which he would raise in the following sessions as and when appropriate. He thanked organisers for the opportunity to chair the session as well as the panellists for making very succinct points throughout their presentations. Ladies and Gentlemen, Thank you very much.
Chapter 9

The Peacekeeping Partnership: Progress and Prospects

Mr David Harland, Director, Civilian Capacities Review, Peacebuilding Support Office, United Nations

Ladies and Gentlemen, thank you and welcome very much to this executive session. We are very lucky to have both Under-Secretary-Generals here; Mr Alain Le Roy and Ms Susana Malcorra from the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Field Support (DFS). Alain will speak first on some of our strategic challenges to give us a sense of the context within which these considerations are being made. Alain will be followed by Susana, before we open the floor to an interactive discussion.

Mr Alain Le Roy, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations

Before I address the issues of partnership specifically, I would like to make a brief observation on where we stand today with regards to peacekeeping as a whole, building on my previous participation in the Challenges Forum. Last year in this forum I noted that it appeared that peacekeeping was entering a phase of consolidation, with a number of missions drawing down or transitioning; and that United Nations (UN) peacekeeping must be prepared for this eventuality.

Whilst this statement remains true with respect to overall numbers of personnel, it likely does not do full justice to the complexity of remaining missions; and in some cases the increasing challenges that we face in our operations, particularly within the current fiscal climate. The response required to situations such as those occurring in Sudan, in Haiti and in Côte d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast); all require an enormous amount of organisational flexibility and operational agility. They also demand the Organisation respond in a manner befitting the scope, scale, criticality and diverse range of the challenges faced. Each of these evolutions in the field has taught us that we must constantly be prepared; and able to rise to meet new challenges; including many that we may not have foreseen, even in environments we consider to be well known. In each of these circumstances the subject of this session also remains a key reminder.
Peacekeeping is indeed a partnership. It specifically requires not just the work of the departments of ‘Peacekeeping Operations’ and ‘Field Support’; and our colleagues serving in our missions in the field; but also that of our partners elsewhere in the Secretariat, within the agencies, funds, programmes and specifically the Member States. This includes troop and police contributors, members of the UN Security Council and other inter-governmental bodies within the UN, various regional organisations and of course the host nations of our missions in the field. Without strong and systematic coordination, cooperation and a real sense of partnership, the effective and efficient delivery of peacekeeping operations would not be possible. The Challenges Forum offers an important venue to help solidify these partnerships.

New Horizon
Guiding us in how we build and maintain these partnerships has been the New Horizon Initiative113, which has set the tone for our work over the past 19 months. This initiative has built on the Brahimi recommendations114 of over 10 years ago and the subsequent reforms implemented in the field and at headquarters; each of which has enabled a clearer and more effective delivery of our mandates and responsibilities.

Much has been achieved since the launch of New Horizon115 in July 2009. The systematic advances made were highlighted by the Progress Report116 issued in October last year; however significant challenges remain. In order to address these challenges we have identified four priority areas for action, many of which are also subjects of the Considerations Study117 presented at this seminar. These are:

1. Achieving greater coherence around crucial policy issues, including the peacekeeping-peacebuilding nexus, protection of civilians (POC); and robust and effective deterrence of threats;
2. Identifying and sustaining the required capabilities for multi-dimensional peacekeeping;

113 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, A New Partnership Agenda – Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping.
3. Making the field support machinery more efficient and cost-effective through the *Global Field Support Strategy*\textsuperscript{118}; which will be addressed in detail by Susanna Malcorra;

4. Strengthening planning, management and oversight of missions.

Responding to each of these is a multi-year, comprehensive endeavour that depends greatly on the support of all of our partners, including many of you in the audience here today. Much progress has been made, but much work remains to advance implementation and build on actions taken thus far. Today Susanna and I will attempt to highlight both this progress and future prospects.

**Policy Development**

As you have already heard this morning, we have made significant headway on the issue of POC; and have developed a mission-wide framework to assist in drafting strategies to achieve this. We are also progressing with our work on the development of POC training modules including scenario-based training exercises for missions and mapping of capability and resource requirements for implementation of protection mandates.

Progress has also been made in another area of focus noted within the Considerations Study\textsuperscript{119}; and which in particular relies on our partnerships outside of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the United Nations Department of Field Support (DFS). This is with regard to clarifying the peacekeeping-peacebuilding nexus, where we are looking at how peacekeeping plays a critical role in helping countries manage transition from conflict to peace. To better elaborate this challenge, we have developed a concept paper that outlines the roles of peacekeepers and their contribution to overall peacebuilding activities in three key ways:

1. Articulation of peacebuilding priorities with national counterparts and the broader international community.
2. Enabling national and international actors to implement peacebuilding tasks; by providing a security umbrella and space for action.
3. Implementing early peacebuilding tasks themselves; including through early capacity building in collaboration with other partners.

We are also continuing the development of strategies and guidance for peacekeepers on executing early peacebuilding functions on the ground, where we work in close collaboration with particularly our colleagues in the Agencies, Funds and Programmes of the UN. We are also continuing our consultations


with Member States on identifying the means for enabling an effective and robust response to threats, including those against civilians.

**Capability development**

In terms of capability development, we have also refined our efforts to see us focus on three key areas:

1. Developing guidance and capability standards,
2. Generating and sustaining critical resources,

Each of these areas requires a strengthened and cooperative relationship between the UN and those nations and bodies that train, equip and deploy police and military capacities into the field, as well as with those that provide civilian capacities. Development of capability standards for specific peacekeeping components (infantry battalions, staff officers and military medical support) is underway, which will provide a baseline for training and other capacity-building support; and for evaluation and assessment.

We are also increasing dialogue with Member States to push for broader participation in peacekeeping and expanding the base of countries which provide peacekeeping forces. For our missions to be both effective and legitimate, our troop and police contributors must reflect as much as possible the global membership of the UN.

We are looking to increase our capacity-building coordination role by identifying and disseminating mission capability gaps and seeking more effective ways to fill them. We are working closely with the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) on the soon to be released Review of Civilian Capacities as we see the civilian role in peacekeeping as a critical element of its effectiveness and efficiency.

**Planning and oversight**

With the aim to strengthen planning and oversight, a more comprehensive and systematic consultative process between troop and police contributing countries, the UN Security Council and the Secretariat has also been developed. This includes briefing Council members and troop/police contributing countries (T/PCCs) before and after Technical Assessment Missions to the field; and the provision of Secretariat support to regular ‘triangular consultations’ between troop and police contributing countries, the Council and the Secretariat.

We have also reviewed reporting practices to improve how we inform Member States of developments in a timely manner, while a review of command and control structures in peacekeeping is also underway.
Peacekeeping in consolidation
As I mentioned during the opening of my remarks, peacekeeping is entering what appears to be a period of consolidation. This does not however mean that the challenges we are facing are diminishing. The scale and complexity of deployments remains significant, while the diversity of our missions is likely to continue to grow, as are expectations in terms of what UN peacekeeping should deliver. In this sense, we must strive to prevent creating expectations that cannot be met; and must improve how we manage constant challenges and the public perception of peacekeeping’s role and impact on the ground.

It should not be forgotten that all of these tasks are also being delivered in an extremely difficult financial environment that calls on us all to do more with less resources, to increase our flexibility while reducing size; and to look to raise performance levels in all aspects of peacekeeping. This is particularly important when we consider the multifaceted needs created by missions in transition; and the specific requirements for planning and resources to meet changing mission roles in areas such as policing, rule of law and institution-building.

We must also not forget to look to the future missions that we will likely be called upon to deliver. To best respond we must maximise our preparedness by learning from past experiences in order to ensure we can deliver on new challenges we have yet to face, whilst also meeting our current commitments. We can be sure that each of these challenges and complexities will call for even more cooperation and indeed strengthened partnership with all of those working to deliver peace and security with us in mission areas.

With these broader issues in mind, I will now hand over to Susanna to reflect on the progress achieved and challenges remaining with respect to the effective, efficient and timely delivery of support to our missions in the field. This remains a cornerstone of our work to improve our performance in the field and our partnerships inside and outside of the Organisation.

Ms Susana Malcorra, Under-Secretary-General for Field Support, Department of Field Support, United Nations

Introduction
As noted by Mr Alain Le Roy, peacekeeping is indeed reliant on the principle of partnership. This is particularly so when we consider the issues facing us in our efforts to actually deliver and support efficient and cost effective operations in the field within current and future missions. Such support requires cooperation and coordination amongst an enormously diverse group of people, organ-
isations and processes; and across a wide range of complex and challenging environments.

It must also be noted that smooth and effective support is even more critical within periods of financial constriction such as those we are facing today, requiring us to be ever more flexible, agile and responsive to the need to deliver more with less, often in the most difficult places to operate. As just one example, we are asking missions to look for some 90 million United States dollars (USD) in savings from current personnel costs to fund new human resource conditions passed by the General Assembly. These new conditions are welcomed, but funding them through savings is a clear example of today’s fiscal realities.

Global Field Support Strategy
Beyond such financial measures, a key element of achieving improved delivery; and being best prepared for meeting our future obligations, is the implementation of the Global Field Support Strategy\(^{120}\) (GFSS). The GFSS represents a comprehensive response to the key logistical and administrative challenges faced by the UN and is aimed at enabling more timely mission start-up, improved provision of physical support to field missions and increased accountability and transparency in the efficient use of the resources entrusted to the Organisation by Member States.

Developed as a five year process; the GFSS is based on four key principles for improvement of service delivery to the field almost all of which rely on the key tenet of partnership both within the UN and with key Member States. These principles include:

1. Broad consultation with Member States calling for support to the field to be considered in light of several (at times competing) objectives including increased efficiency in the use of resources and faster and improved support to field missions.
2. Optimising service delivery within existing resources and budgets; something of critical importance within the context of the global financial crisis.
3. Increased transparency and accountability.
4. A strong call for engagement of civilian, military and police mission components in developing and implementing the strategy.

Each of these principles relies not only on the work of the Secretariat and the missions in the field for its achievement; but also on a strong partnership particularly with our troop and police contributing countries and the major providers of funds for peacekeeping operations. Within the field environment itself;

it requires partnership with host nations and local populations to ensure we adopt a holistic approach to implementation in order to mitigate the pressures created by long supply chains and limited local markets. With these key principles in mind, several core objectives have also guided the development of the GFSS. These include:

1. Expedite and improve support for peacekeeping, including critical early peace-building.
2. Expedite and improve support for peacemaking, electoral assistance, mediation support and conflict prevention.
3. Strengthen resource stewardship and accountability while achieving greater efficiencies and economies of scale.
4. Improve the safety and living conditions of personnel, including contributed troops and police.
5. Fully utilise local and regional investment and capacity.
6. Reduce the in-country environmental impact of peacekeeping and field-based special political missions.

Key changes to support delivery
Progress achieved against each of the above objectives has been further refined, allowing us to focus on four distinct but integrated pillars:

1. The creation of global and regional service centres, including the re-profiling of the UN logistics base at Brindisi, Italy as the Global Service Centre; and the existing Support Base in Entebbe, Uganda, as a shared Regional Service Centre for missions in the region.
2. The establishment of deployment modules to include enabling capacities in order to improve the speed and predictability of the deployment of the military, police and civilian components of field missions, particularly in start-up or surge operations.
3. Increased financial flexibility for the Secretary-General, with the due review and concurrence of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions to expedite the timely deployment of material and human resources to missions.
4. The reinforcement of response capacities; a deliberate approach to securing external and building internal civilian capacities including: stand-by arrangements with contractors; military support capacities; short-term consultants and individual contractors; rapidly deployable standing and stand-by capacities, including senior-level positions and highly specialised functions; and rosters of capable and rapidly deployable capacities.
Current situation after the General Assembly approval of the GFSS on 1st July 2010

The implementation of each of these objectives is a considerable challenge for the Organisation. However, since its approval by the General Assembly in 2010 we have made significant progress. This includes the development of the first service package; a module for a 200-person camp, which is being defined in consultation with Member States and field missions. Five specific functions have also been identified to be transferred to the Global Service Centre located in Brindisi after consideration by Member States. The Regional Service Centre has also been established in Entebbe, Uganda.

The Global Field Support Strategy Steering Committee has also been made fully functional, while development of a human resources framework is advancing in close coordination with the Office of Human Resources Management. In addition, proposals for a standardised funding model for the first year of operations will be presented for the consideration of the GA in early 2011. Significant work has also been undertaken to strengthen workforce planning to ensure that field missions have the critical civilian staff needed to implement their mandates.

Each of these steps has been taken using a core approach of extensive consultations with Member States, including through briefings to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations on progress made and also the conduct of informal workshops (on Modularisation). In addition, these steps have been designed to ensure that we are developing deployment processes, activities and modules with the priorities of the Member States in mind, whilst also focusing on providing flexible and agile solutions to the challenges of today; and critically, of future missions.

As we look to the immediate future, there does however remain considerable work to be done on implementation of the Global Field Support Strategy. To help guide us in measuring progress in reaching these goals, the following milestones have been outlined for achievement over 2011 and 2012:

1. Implementation teams will have further predefined modules of equipment available to improve the speed, predictability and efficiencies of their deployment. These will provide critical enabling capacities and the pre-approved standard funding model for the first year of field missions previously mentioned, which will enable the rapid dispatch of critical components to allow establishment of facilities and infrastructure.

2. The installation of the first service centre in Entebbe will enable improvements in service delivery to regional missions while decreasing mission footprints. Particularly the Transport and Movement Integrated Control Centre (TMICC) will assist with more effective and
efficient arrangements with regard to deployments, repatriations and leave rotations for those troop contributing countries (TCCs)/police contributing countries (PCCs) based in missions in the Great Lakes area. Both the military and police components can also benefit from the Regional Training Centre and Conference Centre.

3. The implementation of the integrated human rights management framework will also continue in order to maintain support to the recruitment and retention of highly qualified human resources, including through the launch of the talent management system in the field and conditions of service and workforce planning and outreach processes.

Each of these steps will continue to require close consultation with Member States as well as with field missions and other implementing departments across the Organisation. Through this effort we want to reinforce the vision that this process is a partnership between all of us as we work towards improved delivery and performance in peacekeeping. We are committed to achieving this and making the GFSS a success that will generate an efficient and effective approach to ensuring the most appropriate delivery of support to our missions in the field, recognising that this is not only for those operating currently, but also those that we may be asked to deploy in the future.

Discussion

The International Coordinator of the Challenges Forum thanked the Under-Secretary-Generals for their insightful and illuminating presentations. She invited them to share their perspectives on what they thought could be expected to be the best case scenarios in terms of outcomes from the forthcoming UN Special Committee of Peacekeeping Session? What would they consider to be the three most important issues that they would like Member State’s support for in the next UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations Session (C34)?

Mr Alain Le Roy responded that they had many outcomes to choose from the C34, but in terms of policy development; it would be great to get full support for the policy on ‘protection of civilian strategic framework’, because more than seven of the UN missions had the protection of civilians (POC) mandate and that was what the UN was judged on. When the UN was criticised, there are great expectations on the UN ability to protect civilians, so full support from the C34 would be one of the most important achievements.

Secondly, and more difficult, was a consensus which was not there the previous year, but that the UN Secretariat was working on, for robust peacekeeping or
what some Member States preferred to speak of as ‘operational effectiveness’. It was very clear that now in the UN missions with chapter seven mandates; in Sudan, in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), or in the Ivory Coast, was a question of having a robust posture, a deterrent posture was absolutely key. Mr Le Roy stated that they knew there was still no consensus in the C34, but they were working to have a partnership on this issue. A seminar had been held in Abuja with a main African troop and police contributor, a seminar in Argentina with most of the Latin American TCCs and PCCs, and a final seminar was planned for Indonesia with both the Asian and Indian Subcontinent TCCs to try to converge a consensus. The first seminar was held at Wilton Park three years ago. He stressed that the UN wanted to progress on the issue, because clearly there was still no consensus within the Member States community on the issue.

Thirdly, it would be useful to have more clarity on what the UN Security Council debated last Friday, the peacekeeping – peacebuilding nexus. The DPKO/DFS proposed that the UN peacekeeping missions should be involved in peacebuilding activities: first, there is a need for articulation of peacebuilding priorities with national counterparts and the broader international community. Second, national and international actors need to be enabled to implement the peacebuilding tasks by the UN providing a security umbrella and space for action. Third, the UN needs to implement early peacebuilding tasks themselves, including through early capacity building in cooperation with all partners. There is almost a consensus, but there need to be better clarity and detail on the right division of labour between the various actors and the civilian capabilities, the cluster proposal being one way to progress in that area. The C34 will probably discuss this further, but this is one of the fields which the UN wish to discuss with Member States.

Ms Susana Malcorra responded that from the Department for Field Support perspective, they wanted to continue the discussion on the goal of the support strategy. In particular, they needed to be able to convey the message of how much had already been advanced, but also how many new opportunities was opening up as the processed moved forward. This would be central in the DFS conversation with the Member States. A couple of chapters in the Global Field Support Strategy would require a special review; including the global service centre. Ms Malcorra underlined that they needed the audience engagement and support for the process. The overall situation of financial constraint was something that would be with everyone during the course of the discussion. The financial aspects would fall more on the fifth committee, than the fourth committee and the C34, so it was hoped that the members of the C34 would really encourage the UN to think broadly on what is required. This would allow for
a good dialogue in the fifth committee on the budgets and results based on the decisions and endorsements by C34 could be crystallized.

A diplomat from the South raised the issue concerning the challenges related to having the two Under-Secretary-Generals (USGs). He suggested that the sense of partnership that was initiated by the two USG when they started had come down to the level of the missions and improved the environment in New York (NY) regarding the very sensitive discussions on peacekeeping. The diplomat raised the example of the discussion on POC and commented that apart from the importance that POC has in itself, it provided the international community with a very critical and sensitive subject to gather around together to find a solution. He suggested that it was time that the international community needed to find something else for the next one, two, three years, that the international community could gather around together again and find ways to strengthen peacekeeping on the ground, and including, the role of the UN on peacekeeping matters.

He was convinced that the ‘capability gap’ could be the next subject, because it was very connected to the realities on the ground. He suggested that the UN session on ‘Contingent-Owned Equipment’ (COE) was a missed opportunity and the international community needed to look forward and be more constructive. The diplomat mentioned that his country in the upcoming UN Special Committee for Peacekeeping Operations was going to propose that it was necessary to start to build-in an operative perspective; not only the financial one, that needed to be a link between the complexity that was experienced on the ground and the risk the peacekeepers were taking with the need to improve the situation. The issue depended on many factors in what the TCCs could provide to the UN, in the incentives that the UN could give to the TCCs, it depended also on the triangular cooperation with developed countries that have these assets and put them into the service of developing countries. But it was important to stop missing opportunities. There was an opportunity the following week in the C34, to start building this link for one, two, three years. The comment made was not only for the Under-Secretary-Generals, but also for his diplomat colleagues in New York present at the forum.

Mr Alain Le Roy commented that it was not a question but a comment that he subscribed to. Mr Le Roy reminded everyone that the speaker came from a country that was the top contributors pro ratio its’ population to UN peacekeeping.

Mr Alain Le Roy further commented on the Contingent Owned Equipment (COE) working group, which had been a missed opportunity since the group had not been able to reach a consensus on the troop reimbursement levels. COE
had played a major part of the New Horizon agenda, i.e. to have a more capability driven approach. The capability driven approach involved incentives for some kind of capabilities that was difficult to get. Another area, which did not enjoy a consensus, was concerned mitigation of peacekeeper risk. One of the options to achieve this was to improve capabilities, including what some call intelligence capacity; which is essentially information gathering capacity, to protect the peacekeeper on the ground. It was recognized that there was sensitivity around this issue amongst some Member States, but clearly progress had to be made on the subject.

Ms Susana Malcorra responded that there was a need to think of a different architecture to tackle these issues. The question of discussing COE reimbursement was a very difficult and big one. To think that the intergovernmental process would be able to begin and finish the discussion in two weeks with something that was very, very substantive was not really realistic. It was a controversial issue, but it was also threatening. It was threatening to open a Pandora’s box not knowing how much money you were talking about. So every single element that was discussed had to go through the number crunching online and produce results that sometimes could not be digested. It was also threatening because when one move towards a more of an incentive based approach, the ones who were on the receiving end of the reimbursement wondered what that would imply for their people on the ground. So it was clear to Ms Malcorra, this being the first time for her to go through a COE process, that there needed to be a conversation held on how to handle the question from then on. It was commented by Ms Malcorra that it was the only intergovernmental discussion, that was started with a blank piece of paper and with proposals coming from Member States themselves and from the Secretariat without a pre-digestion. This was something for Member States to decide, but there needed to be something set up that could lead discussion throughout time, and at least some of the critical issues, could be pre-discussed and shared with capitals. She suggested to establish a forum that not only is a one year effort for people in NY, but also has some kind of linkage to capitals through the use of internet and cyberspace for an ongoing assessment and deliberations of the critical issues.

Ms Susanna Malcorra concluded by underlining she would be very open to discuss this with the Member States and to offer options for their considerations as she thought they could not let this opportunity go by again without introducing changes. It would be necessary to be prepared to finalize the process with something that is around 80% agreed to and then the formal process could focus on discussing the remaining 20% instead of trying to build a 100% consensus. In short, the bottom line was that she agreed and thought this was some-
thing to discuss further, but of course, it was up to the Member States who had
the lead on the issue as it was an intergovernmental process. Thank you.

Mr David Harland thanked the Under-Secretary-Generals and said that he was
reminded that one of the most inspiring moments of his life in the UN was last
year in Haiti, when Ms Susana Malcorra spoke to the survivors of the earth-
quake with such a fantastic address in which she said; ‘Listen, now is the
moment of accountability and what we are accountable for are the results to
the people of Haiti; everything follows that line, everything can be explained to
our Member States, but nothing can be explained, if we are not doing the most
with our resources for those people’. The UN Secretary-General had lent his
weight with a very powerful letter and Mr Harland commented that it had been
an incredibly long year since then. He suggested to offer everyones thanks and
applause for the speakers.
Considerations for Mission Leadership in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in Managing Consent and Bridging the Peacekeeping–Peacebuilding Nexus

Purpose of Session: to present the Challenges Study on *Considerations for Mission Leadership in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations* and suggest how the Study can be of relevance to and used by mission leadership teams as they consider their alternatives translating the United Nations Security Council mandates into effective implementation plans in the field.

*Ms Annika Hilding Norberg, International Coordinator, Challenges Forum / Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden*

Excellencies, Challenges Partners, Under-Secretaries-General, Ladies and Gentlemen, Peacekeeping Friends and Colleagues, it is a true pleasure to see you all here. With all of you present, this will certainly be a very fruitful seminar. As the two Under-Secretaries-General just mentioned, despite being in a consolidation phase, the challenges remain tremendous.

On behalf of the Challenges Forum Partner Organisations, it is my privilege and I am excited to be able to present to you today a brand new copy of the study *Considerations for Mission Leadership in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*. It has been more than two years under way. Except for a few bumps on the road, the process has been a prime example of collaboration, transparency and good will. In addition, the drafting of the Study has brought together the combined experience and knowledge of many peacekeeping practitioners and other experts involved in stabilisation, recovery and peacebuilding efforts worldwide. The Study is very much a product of a partnership representative of international peacekeeping. In addition to the input and commentary, the Study has also benefitted from recent developments and papers, directives and reports that are coming out of the international peacekeeping community generally; and the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) specifically. To the extent possible; the Study is thus as current as it can be. How-

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122 Ibid.
ever, we are aware that the debate about peacekeeping is very dynamic; and the Partners are therefore committed to revisiting the Study and building on the existing project.

We think that the final product is a comprehensive and up-to-date document that will hopefully serve as a useful tool for peacekeeping personnel at all levels and in different contexts. Since peacekeeping is a fluid business; it is the intention to make the Study a living document as highlighted in its foreword, kindly written by Under-Secretary-General Le Roy. Therefore, the Partners have already considered a possible follow-up project to the Considerations study, which will focus on refined best practices through the use of case studies. The areas of particular complexities just mentioned by the Under-Secretaries-General, Sudan, Haiti, Côte d’Ivoire and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) are amongst the possible case studies; which the Partners considered yesterday at the Partners Meeting hosted by the Permanent Mission of Pakistan. Discussions are continuing; and we look forward to being cooperating; once again, with many of you on this project.

Rather than saying more about the Study, I will give the floor to two experienced peacekeepers, who will talk about the development, substance and utility of the Study. Major General (retd) Robert Gordon is Challenges Senior Adviser on concepts and doctrine development since 2006. Gen. Gordon has been Force Commander in the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) and in more recent years, he has led academic work on peacekeeping operations. Notably; he played a central role during the drafting of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines document (Capstone doctrine), which is now a fundamental text in UN peacekeeping. We are very happy that he was able to devote considerable time to the Considerations Study. Robert was unable to join us in person here today as he is involved in a Senior Mission Leadership training course for the African Union. Andreas Sugar, our excellent Considerations Study Project Coordinator; with a decade working in the DPKO and including serving in the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), will be reading Roberts prepared remarks, telling us about the process and overarching substance of the Study.

The first presentation will be followed by that of another veteran peacekeeper. General Martin Luther Agwai is also a long time friend of the ‘Challenges Partnership’ and has been involved in peacekeeping in a number of important; and very different, capacities: As Force Commander in Darfur (both the African

Union Mission in Sudan and the AU/UN hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID)), as Chief of Defence Staff in Nigeria (a major troop contributing country), as Deputy Military Adviser at United Nations Headquarters and; before that, Deputy Force Commander in the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). Martin will look at some of the core themes covered in the Considerations Study125.

Maj. Gen. (retd.) Robert Gordon, Senior Adviser, Consideration Study, Challenges Forum, Former Force Commander, UNMEE, United Kingdom

Presentation read by Mr Andreas Sugar, Project Coordination Officer, Challenges Forum, Denmark

My presentation will focus on the process that went into the development of the Considerations for Mission Leadership in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations126, as well as the overarching substance of the Study.

The Considerations study is the latest articulation of the work of the Challenges Partnership in support of best practice in peacekeeping. Following the publication of the Capstone doctrine127 in 2008, the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) indicated that it would be helpful if the Challenges Partners could look at the next layer, which entailed an articulation of the three ‘core functions’ of peacekeeping:

- Creating a secure and stable environment, while strengthening the State’s ability to provide security with full respect for the rule of law (ROL) and human rights (HR).
- Facilitating the political process by promoting dialogue and reconciliation and supporting the establishment of legitimate and effective institutions of governance.
- Providing a framework for ensuring that all the UN and other international actors pursue their activities at the country level in a coherent and coordinated manner.

What was asked of Challenges was to try and develop some concepts and principles in order to operationalise those three core functions. The focus of the Study therefore is at the operational level – the level that links the Capstone doctrine and the strategies articulated at the United Nations Headquarters with

126 ibid.
the tactical level for which there is a burgeoning amount of doctrine and guidance developed within the DPKO. It is in this linking area – at the operational level – that all the various activities that need to be undertaken in the field are knitted together by the leadership team to produce a mission plan.

The methodology we undertook was to look at this in terms of identifying the things that need to be done; almost in a planning sense, by the mission leadership team (MLT). In order to do that we first had to identify the key objectives that are generic and constant for most multidimensional contemporary peacekeeping missions. We did a thorough analysis of all the mandates of recent missions and came up with some fairly generic objectives. We then identified various outputs; things that need to be achieved to support the objectives and the activities which support those outputs. We then tried to benchmark all the activities against the outputs, in terms of prioritisation and associate with those outputs the responsibilities, resources, challenges, risks and trade-offs. Of course, this can only be used as guidance for the things that are likely to be undertaken.

The key objectives we identified are generic to almost every single mandate that missions undertake; and they are a natural extension of the ‘core functions’ articulated in the Capstone. These are:

- Facilitating the political process – we believed this was at the heart of mission leadership responsibilities.
- Creating a secure and stable environment.
- Strengthening ROL with full respect for HR.
- Promoting socio/economic recovery and development – while these issues are not necessarily the missions’ immediate responsibility; they provide the environment within which a peacekeeping mission and leadership team have to work.

These four objectives are covered in a chapter each. They are preceded by two chapters that cover a number of considerations regarding leadership, coordination and integration, as well as cross-cutting issues which are essential to understand the responsibilities at the mission leadership level.

There were several milestones that got us to where we are today. The process started at the International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations’ in Paris, in October 2008, where the Partners agreed that this body of work was something that they wished to take on. Some ten meetings and workshops around the world followed, during which the Study was developed, drafted, consolidated, revised, commented on; and revised some more. In this connection, I would like to mention the important work undertaken by the Co-chairs of the three Working Groups that spearheaded the process. Working Group
One was co-chaired by the National Defence University of Pakistan and the United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, which focused on security and stabilisation. Working Group Two was co-chaired by the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre in Canada, the United Service Institution of India and the Cairo Regional Centre for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa. The working group focused on facilitation and the political process. Working Group Three, co-chaired by the Institute of Security Studies in Pretoria and the Asia Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence, addressed coherence and the coordinating framework for all in-country activity.

It was not until January 2010 that all the material of the Working Groups was first put together into one document. Following three further iterations of the Study, with continued inputs from Partners, as well as colleagues from the DPKO and other UN departments and entities, it was shared with; and received very useful comments from some 20 senior peacekeeping practitioners, including former and serving United Nations Secretary-General’s Special Representatives (SRSGs), force commanders, police commissioners; and not least, from the Challenges Patron, Jean-Marie Guéhenno. On this basis, a fairly decent draft was produced for the Challenges Forum 2010128, held in Australia in April. Observations and suggestions made at the Forum have since been incorporated, not least with regard to the sections dealing with protection of civilians – the main theme of the 2010 Forum. Following final editing and receipt of the foreword written by Under-Secretary-General Le Roy, the Study was finally ready for print at the beginning of this year.

In conclusion, we believe that the Study can serve multiple purposes. It can be used as an introduction to those who are new to peacekeeping or as an instruction for those who need to know more. It may serve as a useful reference document for more experienced peacekeepers; and we certainly believe it will have huge value in senior mission leadership training. It has already been used and proved invaluable in the most recent UN Senior Mission Leadership course held in Amman last November. And today, we are using it at the International Peace Support Training Centre in Kenya to help our instruction with the AU Regional Senior Mission Leaders (SML) course, which we are currently running. Meanwhile, Partners themselves have expressed the utility of the Study for the training of their people, at a national level, in multidimensional peacekeeping. Finally, while the Study is primarily intended as a document for the MLT, it could be useful for staff at all levels who wish to gain better understanding of the multitude of issues and challenges facing a mission as a whole. With today’s

peacekeeping being both complex and multidimensional, there is a real need for all involved to know what others are doing, as well as to understand the overall objectives and challenges of the entire mission.

I will conclude here, leaving it to Martin Agwai to highlight some of the issues covered in the Considerations study. I wish all of you an enjoyable and productive Seminar. Thank you.

Gen. (retd.) Martin L. Agwai, Former Force Commander, UNAMID, Former Deputy Force Commander, UNAMSIL, Former Deputy Military Adviser, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations and Former Chief of Defence Staff, Armed Forces of Nigeria, Nigeria

Thank you, Annika, for your kind words of introduction; and Robert for summarising the process and giving us an idea about the overarching substance of the Considerations study. I will instead try to highlight some of the many issues, considerations and challenges covered by the Study that I find particularly important or useful.

Let me begin with a general note. Going through the pages of the report again, it strikes me what a complex and multifaceted enterprise peacekeeping has become. Mission leaders have to be as comfortable with high-level negotiations as grassroots confidence-building; and they need to know and make decisions about issues in countless spheres, ranging from corrections facilities to disarmament, border security and how to deal with victims of sexual violence. I think it is difficult to find managerial positions in the United Nations (UN) system (or anywhere!) that require such versatility, flexibility, stamina, patience and empathy.

Therefore, the first point I would like to make is a general one; and it is really more of a plea or reminder to all of us; not least those who are responsible for selecting and deploying senior mission leaders to peacekeeping operations. The point is also highlighted in Chapter one of the Study: the success or failure of missions may in large part depend on the quality, dedication and preparedness of their leaders. So therefore, when Member States are requested by the Secretariat to nominate people to senior positions in the field, they should make sure to nominate the best of the best! For its part, the Secretariat should always strive to select leaders based on their merits, rather than allow political and other considerations to determine the selection.

130 Ibid.
131 Ibid.
Cooperation, integration and information-sharing
The Study also highlights another important point in the context of leadership; namely, that while the individual qualities of each member of the mission leadership team (MLT) are crucial, so is their ability to complement each other. In order to be successful mission leaders must operate compatibly as an inclusive, coherent team in which the members are respectful of each other’s competencies and mandates. In this regard, the Study covers a number of essential considerations that may guide the MLT in their efforts to improve integration, both within the mission, as well as with the UN Country Team and the wider range of national and international actors. These considerations include thoughts and ideas with regard to optimising collocation, accepting responsibility and ensuring accountability, promoting integrated planning and action; and leveraging cultural and organisational diversity.

Finally, the Study underlines the close relationship between the concept of integration and the concept of shared understanding. Shared understanding begins with developing a common situational awareness (including knowledge of the environment, history and personalities of the conflict). But maintaining a shared understanding is an on-going process which, first and foremost, requires inter-operable information-gathering capabilities. This in turn requires that everybody is committed to sharing information, using common language (avoiding jargon and contested terminology) and strengthening a culture of collaboration.

Of course, information-sharing goes beyond the mission and includes communication with external partners, locally as well as globally. Effective communication and outreach is vital to ensure the cooperation of local actors, manage expectations, thereby enhancing the mission’s ability to achieve its mandate and contribute to the security of its personnel.

Political primacy
The primacy of the political nature of contemporary peacekeeping is stressed throughout the Considerations study. Since today’s operations are deployed in support of political processes, they are both driven by and the drivers of those processes. Thus, almost all activities of and engagement by a peacekeeping mission have political implications and require political judgement and skill. Not only by the civilian Head of Mission/ the United Nations Secretary-General’s Special Representative; but by all members of the MLT.

Political processes in post-conflict settings are; per definition, bound to be complicated and driven by contending pressures and actors. In such environments, consent can never be taken for granted and the presence and impact of possible spoilers should always be taken into account. As noted by the Study, the mis-
sion leadership should constantly gauge and re-adjust every single decision on the basis of the peacekeeping principles of impartiality, the non-use of force (except for self-defence and defence of the mandate), legitimacy, credibility and promotion of national and local ownership.

At the same time, the success of a political process rests upon a number of factors beyond the mandated activities of the peacekeeping operation. It depends on the nature and inclusiveness of the agreement(s), the commitment of the parties and the availability of resources. Also crucial is of course the engagement and support of the international community throughout the process, from the initial negotiations to end a conflict; to the final stages of peace consolidation. As we all know, international commitment is, by no means, guaranteed. Important international players may have special interests or biases in certain conflict scenarios. Further; even in the best of cases, it is difficult to maintain international support once relative peace has been established on the ground. It is therefore often up to mission leaders – as well as other senior UN officials in the field and at United Nations Headquarters – to rally the support of the international community, generate resources and mobilise political pressure when required.

Smooth transition from peacekeeping
The last area of the Study that I would like to talk about concerns the all-important question that is much debated in these years: when and where does the role of peacekeeping come to an end? There appears to be growing consensus that peacekeeping and peacebuilding, rather than being separate processes, are reinforcing and need to go hand in hand from the outset of UN engagement. And throughout this engagement, the overall aim should be to enable and strengthen the capacity of local actors so that they can take ownership of the process.

Post-conflict recovery should include measures aimed at building capacity and confidence in social, political and economic institutions and reducing the risk of a return to conflict. Host governments must demonstrate the ability to provide and control security by enforcing the rule of law and delivering social services in a transparent and consistent manner. Peacekeeping operations are rarely in the lead on these efforts; but their presence and access should help create an environment that allows the improvement of essential infrastructure and social and economic reform. Also, a multidimensional peacekeeping mission is expected to support and contribute to the framework that helps all UN and other international actors pursue their activities in a coherent and coordinated manner.
Finally, peacekeepers also help create security conditions in which humanitarian assistance and peace consolidation activities can take place. Chapter six of the Considerations study outlines four areas of activity in this regard:

a. Support for secure and effective humanitarian relief efforts.
b. Re-establishment of basic services.
c. Support for the return and reintegration of refugees and Internally displaced persons (IDPs).
d. Enabling transition from recovery to development.

Focusing on the return and reintegration of refugees and IDPs, the Study\textsuperscript{132} highlights the direct role of a peacekeeping mission in establishing safe and secure conditions, as well as its important supporting role, both before, during and after the return. Operational activities include monitoring border crossings and secure return corridors; providing physical protection of temporary shelters; mine clearance; logistics support to humanitarian agencies; monitoring and reporting human rights violations; and addressing tensions between returnees and receiving communities.

Particularly useful is the study’s\textsuperscript{133} list of challenges and risks related to return and reintegration, for example the fact that camps may become militarised, politicised and the centre of tension and conflict. Or the fact that IDPs may be reluctant to move back to their areas of origin after prolonged periods in camps.

\textbf{Conclusion}

The Considerations study\textsuperscript{134} covers a lot of ground; and I have merely picked a few issues that I found particularly relevant in order to demonstrate the versatility of the document. In addition to the substance of the Study, I find it well structured and easy to read and follow. I would have been happy to have had such a study before going to Sierra Leone and a revision of it before deploying to Darfur. I hope that it will serve as a useful companion for peacekeeping leaders around the world. In view of the challenges they are facing, they need all the support and help they can get. Thank you.

\textsuperscript{133} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{134} Ibid.
Mr Chair, distinguished Colleagues, Ladies and Gentlemen, I am very grateful for the opportunity to discuss with you today; the challenges we face in implementing the United Nations (UN) Security Council mandate of the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). I will focus particularly on the challenges in the political, security, rule of law and humanitarian spheres, challenges that are highlighted in chapters three through six of the Challenges study: Considerations for Mission Leadership in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. I intend to provide you with a candid assessment.

Let me first provide the Challenges Forum with a short summary on MINUSTAH. The Mission was established by UN Security Council resolution 1542 in April 2004. It took over from the Multinational Interim Force that quickly deployed following the departure of former President Aristide on 29th February 2004. Mandated under Chapter VII of the Charter, MINUSTAH originally had a force strength of 1,622 United Nations police (UNPOL) and 6,700 military troops. From the outset the Mission was integrated with the United Nations (UN) Country Team, which was put under the overall authority and coordination of the Special Representative under whom served a tripled-hatted Deputy Special Representative/Humanitarian Coordinator/Resident Coordinator. The Mission is also multidimensional in the sense that, in addition to its core security and political mandates, it is responsible for supporting the Haitian State in the field of rule of law (ROL), good governance and extension of State authority; and the promotion and monitoring of human rights.

Over the years, the mandate of the Mission evolved to provide support to Haitian authorities in other key areas as well. For example, corrections experts were deployed, a military maritime component was added, more emphasis was put on border management and a Community Violence Reduction concept replaced the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) approach initially envisaged. After the catastrophic earthquake of 12th January 2010, the UN Security Council mandated MINUSTAH to support the immediate humanitarian and recovery efforts; and authorised a temporary surge of up to 4,391 police and 8,940 troops.

Political challenges

Peacekeeping operations are generally established after a violent conflict to assist parties in the implementation of a peace or cease-fire agreement. This supposes the existence of a minimal consensus on the way forward; and some kind of roadmap and benchmarks against which parties can be held accountable and progress can be measured. In Haiti, there was no war in 2004; but the country was heading towards one; and hence no peace or political agreement to implement. What we had was a situation of chronic political instability caused by an unsuccessful democratic transition; and a rebellion that emerged from the political crisis created by the contested elections of 2000. To some extent, a UN peacekeeping operation was deployed in Haiti because the international community had no better tool at its disposal to prevent the country from failing. MINUSTAH was deployed to prevent a potential civil war and break the cycle of chronic political instability of the last decades; and support the State in its most fundamental functions, including the maintenance of public security and the ROL.

As I just mentioned, MINUSTAH operates in a deeply polarised country in which there is no socio-political consensus. Since 1986, Haitian leaders have not been able to agree on the way forward for their country. This is what explains the military coup d’État of 1991 to 1994 and the abrupt resignation of Aristide in 2004. This situation creates challenges for a peacekeeping mission mandated to support a constitutional and political process and national dialogue and reconciliation.

Some observers had hoped that the earthquake might have been the catalyst for change which could bring together Haitian leaders around a reconstruction project. Unfortunately, a year later, one has to admit that the tragedy has increased the polarisation of the society. For MINUSTAH to eventually withdraw, Haiti will need a political compact between the main segments of the society; and a truly democratic engagement of its political class. The next Government will have to lead that process with the support of MINUSTAH.

This leads me to another key factor for the implementation of MINUSTAH’s mandate; which is government leadership. As a peacekeeping operation mandated to support the government, we will never be more successful than the government we are assisting. Peacekeeping operations are part of a process that is nationally-owned. There is no alternative to it. While we do have UN policies and principles, our advice and support must be underpinned by a government vision and in support of its priorities.

In practice however, leadership is often lacking because of the weakness of Haitian national institutions. For example, MINUSTAH undertook considerable
efforts in support of the vetting process of the Haitian National Police. Two years ago, a significant number of vetting cases were completed but the Government has yet to take action as part of the certification process of police officers. To some extent, Haiti’s complex political system, which was largely designed to prevent the resurgence of a new dictator, is complicating decision-making and priority setting processes. This situation has been exacerbated by the earthquake, which has killed many Haitian civil servants and destroyed the infrastructure of the government.

Since MINUSTAH is mandated to support the Government in fulfilling its responsibilities; through a so-called non-executive mandate, its long-term success is largely contingent upon the quality of its relationship with the Government. Trust between Haitian’s officials and MINUSTAH personnel; at all levels, is very important. Sometimes, progress has been hampered because of a lack of trust between Haitian and MINUSTAH counterparts. As peacekeepers we operate in a foreign country for a few years; but for our national interlocutors it is home. We have to be mindful of that reality. Our Haitian partners too have the responsibility to take full advantage of the presence of MINUSTAH and work constructively and openly with us. The question of trust is compounded by the fact that national and international actors may work at a different pace. Even if we work in Haiti in support of Haitians, we, the members of the international community, are largely controlled by timetables and schedules conceived in foreign capitals.

**Security and ROL challenges**

The support of MINUSTAH to the Haitian National Police (HNP) is at the core of our mandate. There are currently 9,272 HNP officers in service and 900 in training. The Government’s plan was to reach a force of 14,000 officers by the end of 2011. It is increasingly obvious that we will not reach that target; and the next Government will have to address the issue. Since 2004, the HNP has made significant progress and has increasingly gained the trust of the local population. However, the police force still requires much support of MINUSTAH, especially during period of social tensions. Since our mandate is non-executive in nature, we cannot impose ourselves. We have to convince the HNP leadership of the advantages of collaborating with our UNPOL officers. This has been a challenge and we are working at improving information sharing between the HNP and MINUSTAH.

To some extent, the operational partnership between UNPOL and the HNP is also complicated by the fact that the HNP is a very centralised organisation, in which middle managers, such as the commissaire, do not have much decision-making power. Often, we have to intervene at a very senior level to ensure that simple tasks such as joint patrolling are carried out.
The large number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) living in improvised camps creates a particular security challenge related to the protection mandate of MINUSTAH. IDP camps are an environment particularly conducive to gang activities and where women and children are particularly vulnerable. To respond to that particular challenge, MINUSTAH has conducted an integrated security assessment and developed an integrated approach involving the military component and a UNPOL IDP unit.

The earthquake also had indirect impacts by diverting the government’s attention from important activities. A draft integrated border management strategy was prepared in 2009 and was awaiting the Prime Minister’s approval. However, it was never pursued by the Government following 12th January 2010. This situation creates challenges for the implementation of our border management mandate, which is already confronted to operational challenges, such as the lack of capacities and infrastructures of the Coast Guard.

The absence of ROL has undermined the confidence of the people in their government, allowed corruption to flourish and is also a major contributing factor to the political instability in Haiti. The rule of law; of course, is police, prisons and justice. But ROL is also a land registry, a birth registry, construction and building codes, commercial laws. It is the capacity of the State to collect taxes, to guarantee a level of legal security to promote entrepreneurship, investments, job creation, to facilitate economic development.

One may legitimately wonder why, after several international missions; and billions of USD being allocated into governance projects, the ROL has remained for two decades so weak in Haiti. At least three clear principal reasons can be identified:

1. First, interventions in support of the ROL have largely been donor-driven. But for the ROL to take root, it must be pushed by domestic constituencies. The ROL, which is at the very heart of the functioning of the State, must be implemented by national actors, both from the top – through the promulgation of legislation and the establishment of systems to implement the law – and from the bottom, through an awareness of citizens’ rights and the demand from the population for accountability from the State.

2. Second, the effectiveness of donors’ efforts has been undermined by persistent bilateralism. Externally funded projects may have been successful individually and temporarily; but their net impact has been less than the sum of their parts.

3. Third, it would be wrong to assume that weak or absent ROL can be addressed simply by building up capacities to administer the law. The reality is much more complex. Alternative modes of adjudication and
dispute resolution replace the juridical order established by the State. In Haiti, informal, client-patron networks provide a viable and often more efficient alternative to the slow-moving State apparatus. The problem with this alternative order is that it privileges a small stratum of society and excludes the great majority of the population, whom do not have the access to such networks. Without recognising and addressing these informal alternative networks of governance, efforts to build the ROL specifically in terms of fiscal efficiency and the collection and redistribution of taxes, will be in vain.

MINUSTAH’s ROL mandate is complicated by the fact that Haiti is a significant transhipment platform for narcotic trafficking from producing countries to North-American markets. We all know the erosive effect of drug money on State institutions, even in richer and better established democracies. Its detrimental effect on the already weak Haitian institutions should not be underestimated. The revenues from this trafficking corrupt all levels of the State. Narco-trafficking and its related corruption will have to be addressed. However, while MINUSTAH can assist Haitian authorities in counter-narcotics efforts, the main responsibility falls to other partners.

Humanitarian/Recovery challenges

The humanitarian and recovery effort post-earthquake continues to be confronted by a number of challenges linked to Haiti’s underlying institutional and structural weaknesses. The main challenge for MINUSTAH, the UN agencies and other humanitarian partners lies in the fact that this is essentially not a ‘rebuilding effort’; but a transformation, building something new that cannot be addressed in merely one year of humanitarian response. Nevertheless, progress has been made. The initial humanitarian response showed a number of successes in shelter, water and sanitation, health, nutrition, child protection and other fields. Today, an estimated 800,000 IDPs remain in camps, down from the approximately 1.5 million in July 2010.

The strategy on post-earthquake response and recovery is firmly centred on creating conditions for return and relocation of camp populations while assuring minimum conditions for those still remaining in camps. Thus the humanitarian response is in significant part conditioned by the pace and extent of the recovery response. Whilst the pace of recovery has to some extent been slow, current donor commitments in the context of the Haiti Interim Reconstruction Commission shows that 1.3 billion United States dollars (USD) have been disbursed, 1.5 billion USD earmarked or allocated, i.e. all of 2010 promises have been disbursed or allocated; and now 700–800 million USD of 2011 commitments have been already earmarked. At this time of political transition, it is crit-
ical to ensure continuity, forward motion and maintenance of donor confidence.

Mr Chair, distinguished Colleagues, Ladies and Gentlemen, I thank you for your time today. It was my pleasure to expose some of the challenges we are facing in Haiti, while implementing our UN Security Council mandate; and look forward to answering any of your questions. I thank you, merci, muchas gracias.

Ms Ameerah Haq, Special Representative of the Secretary-General, UNMIT, United Nations

It is a pleasure for me to participate in the dialogue with so many old and new friends; and particularly in this session which is devoted to a very important topic: bridging the peacekeeping/peacebuilding nexus. So, given the current situation in Timor-Leste and the status of the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT), it is a topic that has been uppermost in my thoughts since I first took up the post of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General a year ago in January 2010. The Challenges study has been very valuable, because it has provided some useful frameworks and inputs into thinking about this issue; and I will certainly make reference to that here. I will speak specifically about how implementation plans resulting from our United Nations (UN) Security Council mandates are hopefully laying the groundwork for the transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding. However, I also want to speak more generally about the leadership necessary to guide and manage this transition.

So let me first, set the stage. In 2006; Timor-Leste suffered what Timorese calls ‘the crisis’; the approximate cause of which was a division in the national military that spread throughout the capital; leading to the collapse of the command of the national police, a general breakdown in law and order and over 100,000 internally displaced persons. It was a time that was marked by serious divisions and suspicion amongst the political leadership of the country. This led to the establishment of the UN mission in Timor, an integrated mission with a large police component.

In contrast; the Timor-Leste of today is very different from that of 2006 and 2007. It is even very different from 2009. Credible and fair elections were conducted in 2007. Dili is a bustling city. The national police have gradually resumed more and more responsibility. National elections are scheduled for early 2012; and all things remaining the same, I am optimistic that they will go well, allowing for the exit of the peacekeeping mission.
The leader of a peacekeeping mission confronts a somewhat different set of demands from those faced by leaders of corporations, governments and other institutions whose goals may be increased profits, expansion, maintaining power and continued existence through better practices and policies. On the contrary, the greatest success of a mission is to achieve its own obsolescence. Our supreme accomplishment will be reaching the moment when we are no longer needed. This is one of the main challenges in bridging the peacekeeping/peacebuilding gap, one that in my view is more difficult than those faced by leaders of other kinds of institutions.

Not that there are no lessons to be learned from other leaders; Steve Jobs, the co-founder of Apple, said, ‘Innovation distinguishes between a leader and a follower.’ A mission leader must be an innovator. I realise that mission leaders have restrictions upon them in the form of UN Security Council mandates, organisational policies and bureaucracy at headquarters and in field; however, we cannot see this as a kind of cage restricting our movement. They must be interpreted in the context of on-the-ground realities; and the key factors for a peacekeeping mission success listed in the Challenges study136 as: credibility, legitimacy and national and local ownership.

Our ultimate responsibility is to the cause of peace, stability and democracy in the countries in which we work. I am currently managing a transition process which I think is innovative but will be judged by others; and which I am optimistic can serve as part of the experience that other missions can capitalise on making the transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding. I have been guided by several considerations in moving the process forward. The most important of these is the need for national ownership, which also helps insure the legitimacy of the process.

The second is a need to define as specifically as possible what success means in terms of the transition. And the third is to ensure that the eventual withdrawal of the UNMIT is as smooth as possible, contributes to continuing peacebuilding efforts; and that there is a unity of effort amongst all actors involved in the transition. President Jose Ramos-Horta, the Prime Minister Kay Rala Xanana Gusmao and I have established a high level committee on transition, which has met three times since September 2010. The committee is currently drafting a transition plan which will be informed by seven joint technical working groups.

These groups are:
1. Democratic governance.
2. The police and security sector.

3. The rule of law (ROL), justice and human rights (HR).
4. Socioeconomic development.
5. Mission support and logistics.
6. Training for the national UN staff.
7. The impact of the missions’ departure on the local economy.

I will quickly note here that these areas closely reflect the chapters of the Challenges study; and let me make a pitch here for the investment that we are requesting in training our Timore staff that we are making in this year’s budget. We are upgrading the skills of our Timore’s professional staff, of language assistance, of administrative staff and trades people so that after the transition, they can contribute to Timor-Leste’s development either in government with bilateral institutions or in the private sector; and hopefully many of them will become entrepreneurs.

The government’s commitment to this process is demonstrated not only by the Prime Minister’s involvement but by the level of the government focal points for the working groups that I mentioned. For example, the minister of justice, Lucia Lobato, is the focal point for the working group on ROL, justice and HR. Other actors, such as civil society, political parties and the wider international community are also being consulted in this process. The government has committed to devoting a session to transition at the next Timor-Leste development partners meeting in July; and I have already discussed it in my regular meetings with political parties, civil society and diplomatic representatives.

The high level committee on transition is guided by some basic questions about UNMIT’s activities. What activities will be required after 2012? Of these activities, which can be taken up by state institutions or civil societies? Which are best continued by the UN Country Team? Which are best addressed by other international actors? And how can UNMIT support the transfer of these activities to other institutions? The answers to these questions will guide UNMIT’s activities through the end of the mission.

This process brings many benefits. The Challenges study refers to the danger that national leadership may become more disengaged with the mission as time goes on. However, this mechanism has actually reinvigorated the relationship between the UN and the national leaders. It is a joint effort and an entirely new dynamic.

Reflecting the integrated nature of the mission, the UN Country Team is fully engaged with this transition process. It is facilitating integrated planning and action, prioritisation and sequencing; and a shared understanding of what the continued needs of Timor-Leste are. It provides the UN Country Team with a
kind of interaction with national leaders that they may not have in the absence of a peacekeeping mission. This can only help in bridging the peacekeeping/peacebuilding nexus.

Sir Winston Churchill once said: ‘Courage is what it takes to stand up and speak; courage is also what it takes to sit down and listen.’ The transition process is predicated on this concept of courage. I can; and as Edmund Mulet has just said, we must all in our roles stand up and speak. Sometimes we have to deliver strong messages to national leaders which they do not want to hear. I will not go into the details but recently the government made some decisions which we felt would have a long-term impact on the integrity of the national police. We had to strongly state our objections; but this is the job as a leader of a peacekeeping mission. I must uphold the values and principles of the UN as well as its commitment to the people of Timor-Leste; and failing to do this, failing to maintain these values and principles, would result in little point to any of our activities. However, we also must listen. The senior management of UNMIT also listens; this is the only way to truly develop the shared vision to which the transition process is devoted.

Why does listening take courage? Partly because sometimes we, as UN leaders, may not hear things that are pleasant to hear from others within the mission, from the international community and from national leaders. We may hear things that call into question the value of some of our activities. However, if we are to truly exhibit leadership, to truly guide processes in support of a shared vision, then we must engage in these dialogues in an honest way.

In the transition process, for example, we may hear from national authorities that they would like marked changes to some of our activities. Let me cite one example, just because it springs to mind; but certainly I think all of you have experienced other similar issues. Government officials in various forums have indicated that they do not agree with some aspects of the UNMIT mandate in the security sector. It is probably the sector that most touches on sensitive issues of national sovereignty. Our support in this area tends to be formalistic, providing support to drafting of legislation, regulations, policies and training.

However, the sector again more than other sectors, is shaped by dynamics that are based on informal personal relationships in a way difficult for the UN to engage with. That is the truth that we must deal with. This resistance requires hard thinking on our part. It requires courage. We cannot simply sweep aside the concerns of our national interlocutors. We have to realistically examine what our points of entry are. We have to look to the future of the sector. After

137 Sir Winston Churchill. A conference in Washington DC, British Politician (1874–1965)
all, the peacekeeping mission will not be around indefinitely to monitor and report on the developments in the sector. It is the civilian institutions of Timor-Leste that must bear this responsibility.

Strengthening of civilian oversight institutions, parliaments, ministries, onward persons and civil society is perhaps the greatest contribution we can make to the sector. Those institutions would welcome such support. Again, this requires an integrated approach, drawing on the comparative advantages of units dedicated to security sector reform, other units such as HR and the UN Country Team.

Be innovative, be courageous, speak and listen. All of these are necessary qualities in a leader looking to develop truly shared visions, looking to work with national counterparts in a joint manner; and looking to ensure the credibility of our efforts. I have many more thoughts on these issues and I could go on but let me end by quoting Franklin D. Roosevelt, who said, ‘Be sincere. Be brief. Be seated.’ And so with that, I will take my seat. Thank you.

Ms Aracelly Santana, Former Deputy Head of Mission, UNMIN, Ecuador (Could not attend the Seminar but forwarded presentation afterward)

The themes that I would discuss are focused on three main areas related to the work of the United Nations (UN), notably peacekeeping, political, and electoral; taking into account that – as it is widely acknowledged – all missions are essentially political. In that context, peacekeeping, electoral processes are the building blocks that support a political process, which can be lengthy (or short) depending on the particular circumstances of the country under review.

The document: Considerations for Mission Leadership in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations is extremely valuable, because it is the result of broad consultations and debate among key actors in a field mission. As a guide to effective action, Considerations is rooted in their practice and their evaluation, each one having worked in or examined different and complex operations.

I believe that a document like this would have been helpful for me when, as a Senior Political Affairs Officer, without any experience in the field except my academic and Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) background and work at UN Headquarters, I was deployed for the first time to a field mission in a

position of authority and leadership. I consider it appropriate that Considerations is being seen as a work in progress that will be enriched by further experiences. Within the three areas outlined above, the following elements would be important:

The need for integration. The long-term effectiveness of a mission is predicated upon a confluence of factors, including analysis, common approach and synergy of resources. This process can take place even if a mission is not established as an 'integrated' one, i.e. the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) that was a political mission. For integration to be effective the process must begin as early as when respective offices at the UN focus particular attention on a country exhibiting signs of conflict. The UN has made much progress since the 1990s and it is nowadays more likely than not to develop early concrete political analyses with risk scenarios and entry points for the Organisation’s involvement if requested. This task involves wide-ranging consultations across the UN and its offices, agencies as well as with the Government, Parliament, political parties, civil society, NGOs, etc. in addition to interested Member States, regional bodies and the International Financial Institutions (IFIs). It should be noted though that Member States are not always keen on such issues as conflict analyses and prevention, because some can perceive those initiatives of the Organisation – which are framed within its overall mandate – as ‘interference in their domestic affairs’. In that respect, Considerations underlines the need not only for analysis, but also for a knowledgeable, diplomatically skilled and competent mission leadership, who can ensure the implementation of the mandate entrusted to the Organisation. For me, being the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was a very instructive experience as it was not the easiest task to ensure coordination among the four pillars of that mission, two of which were within the UN domain and the other two were each a different international structure.

The need for coordination. This is a complex subject in discussions of how the UN missions (or other international missions) in general work. In a peacekeeping mission coordination is essential as it largely pertains to the manner in which its components work, i.e. the joint operation of the military, police and civilian components in addition to other relevant actors in a conflict situation. While the UN has made advances, coordination faces hitches due to the many and varied mandates of the different UN offices and agencies. More importantly, the core of the mandate of a mission is the protection of civilians in conflict, including but not limited to girls, women, children and youth. Therein lies some of the difficulty given that the mandate of a mission is generally the result of a

political compromise among Member States and, as such, often reflects the lowest common denominator for international action. Peace agreements and cease-fires are by definition compromises and full of ambiguities that only add to the complexity of coordination.

This area could be the subject of an entire seminar given current developments in peacekeeping operations and the complicated mandates, which can land the UN in controversial situations, notably being unable to fulfil effectively a mission mandate. The electoral field comes to mind since unfortunately much of the international community seems to consider electoral processes the equivalent of what is usually termed 'democracy'. In a sense, electoral processes are now the 'exit strategy' in the same way that 'comprehensive peace agreements' have become static principles rather than being the basis for political processes that must involve the society at large – not just the 'victors' who signed the agreement – and must evolve in accordance with the conditions of the country in conflict. In that regard, I witnessed the difficulties of the Organisation in the implementation of its mandate during my postings in the Balkans in the 1990s and in more recent missions. The Considerations study again underlines and elaborates on the importance of the political process in the evolution of a mission.

The need for comprehensive evaluation of the activities of missions. Evaluation is an essential element that can work against complacency, mediocrity and 'business as usual'. An important aspect of it is continuity, in the sense that the Organisation – as it changes – must evaluate the past and make reforms accordingly. It has been of interest to me that in all field missions I have been involved – always in a senior position – I have found little record of what the previous leadership did, i.e. what was the tenor of discussions with the Governments, the parties to the conflict? The UN Country Team? NGOs? etc. Too often it is said that cables to UN Headquarters should not dwell in 'specifics'. It is in the context of that interaction between headquarters and the field that strategic decisions with long-term impact on the country as well as on the Organisation are made. The Considerations study underscores such issues throughout pointing to the importance of responsibility and accountability.

And finally, an overarching issue is leadership. In my experience both at headquarters and the field, I have learned that the qualities required of leaders and managers are not usually found in the same person; or very rarely are. Moreover, among many qualities, a good leader must be knowledgeable about the issues at stake, project a vision to accomplish the mission mandate; and be com-

mitted to professional and ethical standards. A leader delegates accordingly because it trusts the professional cadre – not a clique – and plans the end of the task. A leader knows from the start that the ultimate objective of the mission is to make itself redundant; that is, no longer necessary. This type of leader can inspire staff.

Ch. Supt. (retd.) David Beer, International Policing Adviser, Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, Former Police Commissioner, MINUSTAH, Canada

We are clearly in agreement that the Considerations for Mission Leadership in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations is an important report of the pressing challenges for mission leadership teams (MLTs). It will serve to inform and guide leaders facing the ever increasing complexity of peace operations; and the ‘integrated’ mission model as the necessary strategic response.

We will also agree I think that where the complexity of operations is characterised by the changed nature of conflict and the ever expanding victimisation of civilians, there is a prominent role for policing, supporting security and the protection of the vulnerable, the rule of law (ROL); and building capacity in support of sustainable justice sector development. From that perspective; and from lessons of the police role in integrated mission, we are able to offer ideas and insight relevant to MLTs in translating United Nations (UN) Security Council mandates into comprehensive plans and effective operations.

Elements for consideration by an MLT: Consistent with the realities of complex missions and the integrated management model, points of discussion related to policing are not unique to questions of security and justice, but are relevant across the core functions of multidimensional peacekeeping as elaborated in the Capstone doctrine. Here the issues of human resources, operations (elections, information analysis) and leadership are our focus.

Human Resources in mission. With the human resources considered a missions’ most valued resources, having sufficient resources with the appropriate experience and expertise and deployed in a timely fashion will be a constant preoccupation of the MLT. This reality though is that where it concerns the police component this must be particularly considered. Why is that?

The police component is likely to be contributing to the mission mandate in a number of different ways (security, establishing ROL, developing capacity in the justice sector or supporting host state police operations). At the same time the United Nations police (UNPOL) are often the most visible elements of a mission, exposed daily before the public and the media. Shortfalls in numbers, experience, expertise, or language capacity are common and cannot be disguised and will not go unnoticed. Where special skills or mission critical experience is required; the problem of shortfalls is compounded. At stake is the credibility of the mission, the capacity to attend to priorities and necessary operational timing and sequencing.

Unfortunately the shortage of expert resources is a norm. An MLT facing issues like protection of vulnerable persons, organised crime, kidnapping or corruption, will not be well served without a full understanding and effective analysis of the issues; and guidance in the appropriate minimum strategies in response.

Mission Operations. Elections, peaceful and credible; and the establishment of electoral organisations are vital parts of political transition; and a benchmark of mission progress. In addition of the political effort an electoral plan includes security contributions by the military and police components; and usually results in spikes in mission activity. Any MLT might consider then the following:

- For a host government an election very often garners so much attention all other priorities are effectively ignored. This preoccupation can take place over protracted periods, including run-up periods, the elections themselves, post-election and during governmental transition. All mission projects of development or capacity building are negatively impacted where the host ‘partner’ is diverted and not actively engaged.

- An alternative for the MLT in partnership with the host country is to consider election planning proactively, early in a mission; and as a specific development opportunity. This is particularly relevant to UNPOL components working in support of local counterparts. The logic here is elections are predictable, security will be an issue with local forces in lead roles; but the technical planning, organisational skills, knowledge and capacity developed are sustainable and widely transferable. Early attention to predictable future election security needs can extend to the acquisition of equipment and training of field personnel; and has the potential to peak interest among international donors where support to election preparation is more attractive than specific policing/security

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support. (i.e.: radio or transport equipment needed for ‘elections’ remains in place and used as local assets.)

- By being proactive the MLT can help develop sustainable ‘national capacity,’ from planning complex security operations to the use of basic equipment; and perhaps organise international donors on the same path.

**Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC).** The *Considerations for Mission Leadership* study recognised the JMAC among the ‘joint institutions’ of the integrated mission (along with the Joint Operations Centre (JOC) and Joint Logistics Operations Centre (JLOC)) that support the MLT; and contribute to shared understanding and collective effectiveness. This explanation though perhaps understates the value of an effective and efficient JMAC to support the MLT in all facets of the mission. The contribution of a JMAC, properly staffed with skilled and trained personnel, is limited only to the imagination of the United Nations Secretary-General’s Special Representative and the MLT. Mission security, risk management, trends and patterns of behaviour, situational monitoring, public opinion and media reporting are but examples where the JMAC will contribute insight and professional analysis critical for mission management.

The police component, widely deployed, working at operational and developmental levels, engaged in matters of security, organised crime and public order; is in a unique position among mission components to see, hear and report. An information-led police mission will contribute significantly to the JMAC, inputting data and profiting from JMAC outputs.

**Mission Leadership and building professional relationships.** Finally, the UN mission brings to any peacekeeping or post conflict situation what a mere collection of bilateral contributors generally cannot; independence, a critical mass of human resources, authority, legitimacy, a stabilising presence and leadership. Among those attributes leadership may be the most important, measured by the ability to influence the ‘host’ and international partners. This of course is the responsibility of the United Nations Secretary-General’s Special Representative and her or his MLT; but where leadership may demand a certain level of intrusiveness the importance of having created professional relationships, established credibility and built trust seems self-evident. However nothing can be taken for granted in this respect.

146 Ibid. p. 19.
147 Ibid. p. 15–18.
The status of mission management relationships needs to be examined, monitored and critically assessed on a routine basis. Where there are failures, that is to say relationships with ‘counterparts’ are strained or simply not working properly, MLT intervention and corrective action will be required. A risk management strategy should include routine discussion, assessment, maintenance and if necessary corrective action.

Of course relationship building is critical everywhere the mission engages with local and international counterparts; and where ‘mentor and adviser’ programs are part of service delivery. This is particularly so for the police and ROL missions dealing with highly sensitive issues as corruption, vetting of public officials, transparency of process and systems of accountability. The MLT should expect to see a professional relationship and leadership monitoring plan as part of any police mission risk management strategy; and replicate such a plan across the wider mission.

Conclusions. There are likely no real conclusions to be drawn from this analysis. It is worthwhile though to reflect a final time on the ‘modern’ mission, the dynamic environment, the complexity of objectives, the need of integrated responses; and the role of the MLT team and how it might be better supported. If human resources are the UN greatest asset, then perhaps the leadership potential those resources represent is the missions’ most important role.

Discussion

A senior UN official in the audience commented on the ‘nexus’ issue that she had been asked many times by many people and no doubt others had been asked as well: what was that ‘nexus’ that everyone kept referring to? Concretely; what was the ‘nexus’ between peacekeeping and peacebuilding really? She raised the example of Liberia which recently had come onto the agenda of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). It was for her the perfect example, noting that not all would turn out perfectly, but for the time being, the model seemed so good that if that did not work, one should get really worried.

She further elaborated that Liberia was a country with a mission; United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL); and long before the winding down of UNMIL, the country’s leadership as well as the leadership of the United Nations Secretary-General’s Special Representative, Ellen Margrethe Løj, approached the Peacebuilding office and PBC for Liberia to be put on the agenda of the PBC. The reason was that it would have been devastating for UNMIL to leave without a proper security and justice system in place. Further, it was suggested that like in so many other post conflict countries, once one leaves the capital city, one really could not find much in terms of security nor justice
except for traditional justice which was another matter altogether. After many brainstorming missions, they came up with the idea of justice and security hubs that would be in four or five places throughout the country far away from the capital city so that one could almost ‘fast track’ the availability and delivery of justice and security services to the hinterland. This was identified by the government; by the president herself, who had embarked on a big decentralisation program moving away from the capital city, moving services including security and justice to the hinterland; and this was her dream of how one could kick start the decentralisation program.

Finally the senior UN official stated that there were three key words related the discussed issues: first, unfinished business – there was still unfinished business related to the peacekeeping mission. Second, national ownership – this was something that the government and the president herself had been dreaming of for years now to bring these services to the hinterland. Third, is the word catalytic; everything had started and the PBF made funds available in a very short term, three million USD in order to start construction of one of the hubs. The chair of the PBC; Prince Zeid had gathered a steering group of like-minded interested Member States, interested in Liberia’s future, to gather them around in order to force their support for how Liberia wanted to move forward in security and justice areas and other peacebuilding areas. Hopefully, that process would also be able to raise funds and mobilise resources for the very challenging tasks ahead. This was what the senior UN official thought was the ‘nexus’. Peacekeepers had so much on their plate, so more preoccupation with security and other activities that to expect them to also go into this phase of resource mobilisation, sensitisng and playing the advocate to the whole world about what a particular country needed in security and justice would be unrealistic and that was the reason for the division of labour; or the seamless transition to the peacebuilding apparatus. She tought it was an important story to share, because there was so much confusion and lack of clarity as to what the ‘nexus’ actually consisted of or if in fact, it was just duplication. Thank you.

Another UN official in the audience working in the Europe and Latin America Department of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). He was working on Haiti and trying as best to support Mr Mulet in his efforts as Secretary-General’s Special Representative. “National ownership” was identified as one of the key principles guiding how we conduct a multidimensional peacekeeping operation. He went on to explore that this was something that was discussed and identified in the context of developing the United Nations DPKO Capstone doctrine\textsuperscript{148}; something of an innovative notion at the

\textsuperscript{148} United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, \textit{United Nations Peacekeeping Operations – Principles and Guidelines (Capstone Doctrine)}. 
time. Clearly the importance of fostering and sustaining national ownership had been illustrated through the lessons and practice over recent years. One of the other challenges that had emerged was how difficult it is sometimes to strike a balance between national ownership and the need to implement a mandate that requires a fundamental shift in mind-set. There is a particular challenge when implementing the mandate means trying to push through reforms that key stakeholders on the ground do not have an interest in seeing move forward. He welcomed any insight as to how one could square the circle in which the debate seems to oscillate between full national ownership and seeking more of an intrusive or executive mandate in certain areas in order to achieve mandated objectives.

Mr Edmund Mulet elaborated on national ownership and how a mandate was implemented; on the case of Haiti, the situation at the time was beneficial to too many people; political sectors, private sector, civil society. It was very difficult to convince them to change when the current situation was very convenient for them. The average time a judge and magistrate spend in the office per day in Haiti was 52 minutes. Some of them were very responsible and they work two or three hours a day, but some never showed up to their office, so the average time per day was 52 minutes. He went on further to say: “when you talk to the association of the magistrates or to the minister of justice or all the people involved in the legal system in Haiti regarding the need to change that statistic; their reaction is a negative one. Why should they change that? It is so convenient to be paid and go to the office for 52 minutes a day, so why should they change?”.

Mr Mulet told the forum participants about a friend in Haiti, which he had tried to convince about the rule of law (ROL) and the need to have a proper justice system etc. His friend very condescendingly said ‘oh of course, thank you very much, but you know it is not going to work here in Haiti, and I am going to give you an example’. He said ‘My son had a traffic accident two weeks ago and there was a victim; it was a very sad situation, but that night of that day my son was in his bedroom in his bed and slept at home. In your system; the one the UN is proposing, my son would probably still be in jail after two weeks, I would have had to hire a lawyer and we would have had to go to court and face the family of the victim and go through all the process and the whole thing. In our system my son slept at home that night. Of course the family was duly compensated, a very sad situation, but we helped them, the two police men that came to the traffic accident site were very happy, the judge is very satisfied too, so we are all happy.’ Mr Mulet commented: “When you talk to someone like him, the leadership of the country, and say ‘change’, he says ‘why change?’ Of course he is one of the few who has access to the networks, to the connections and money to resolve his own personal problems. In contrast, you have 92% of
the other ones in jail and pre-trial detention, who have never seen a judge, have no accusation, nothing; but of course they lack the resources, the money or networks that can resolve their problems.”

Mr Mulet continued saying that in Haiti at the political level, politicians, political leaders, private sector, civil society, the justice, everywhere, the situation was very convenient for them, but they were not looking to the overall interests of the country. So how could a peacekeeping mission that has a mandate to support the government to advance the issue of ROL convince the people that there was a need to change? That was why they had to come up with the concept; which was not new, but for Haiti it would be, the ‘compact’ for the ROL between the new government, a new leadership in the country, civil society and the international community to advance the issues.

Another example of a type of challenge facing Haiti and raised by Mr Mulet was that in Haiti, in most places, there was no birth registry. A baby was born and there was no place to register the birth of the baby. Or when grandma died and there is no place to go and register the death of the grandma. Basic institutions like that were absent. There was no land registry, only 5% of properties in Haiti were registered. Everything else was up for grabs, or was very irregular, so those fundamental questions also needed to be addressed in order to create these institutions. It would take much time.

Finally, the problem also in Haiti was that the population and the relatives and friends of those 92% in jail without having seen a judge ever; they do not know about their rights, they do not know they have rights. Mr Mulet stressed the importance of having a communication and information campaign in order for the population to know that they have to ask; to demand from their government, from their state. This is where the start was and it was the only way forward.

A former Force Commander for the mission in Haiti reiterated what Mr Mulet had said that there had not been any change in the country for a long time; such as the example of the 90% of inmates without regular process. He explained that he had had the opportunity to serve in Haiti and had reflected upon that nobody knew how much money was going into the country. There was no control, whether one asked the United Nations (UN), United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) or the government – no one knew. Information regarding the flow of money, the total amount of money, the costs of projects, was very scarce. Only 30% of the international organisations submitted reports every year. He suggested it was time to change the model, not only in Haiti, but in many countries considered fragile states and which had not reached any mil-
lennium development goal. He suggested it was time to discuss changing the model of international support and even the police correlation, because it is now state building that is required.

Mr Edmund Mulet responded that the former Force Commander was Mr Mulets Force Commander in 2007 when they conducted all the security operations in Haiti, Port-au-Prince, in Gonaïves and many other places in a very successful way. They had been able to arrest most of the gang leaders and gang members, all of whom were back on the streets at the time of speaking. Mr Mulet thought that the international community were co-responsible for the weakness of the Haitian state and the weakness of Haitian institutions. There were more than 10 thousand NGOs working in Haiti. As the general had mentioned; very few were aligned with the vision of the government or with any development plans. Nobody knew where their monies came from or where or how they spent the money. Very few presented their reports to the government on what they were doing. The international community: “because we did not like the ideology of one government, or we did not like another president, or because there was corruption, we always found excuses not to work with the Haitian state. And now we are paying the price. Haitian institutions are extremely weak, if existent at all.” The UN had proposed since the earthquake that it was important for all to change and to work with Haitian institutions and through the Haitian state. It would take more time and be more complicated, but that was the only way for Haiti to build their own capacities.

Regarding the post-earthquake phase, Mr Mulet recalled that when the interim for Haiti had been established, it had taken several months before it had been really operational as there had been two concepts. Washington DC and company had wanted a big interim commission; 600–700 people, experts with technical support doing everything, preparing the projects, implementing them, putting in place all the different programs etc. The other vision was a very small interim reconstruction commission for Haiti; 40–50 people working with Haitian institutions, Haitian ministries and Haitian ‘Direction Générale’ (Directorate-General) etc. and local authorities. In the end, the second model had prevailed and it had been more complicated, it continued to be more complicated, taking more time, but finally, the Haitians were involved in the preparation of their own plans, programs and implementation. It would take time, but Mr Mulet thought it a better way in dealing with the situation than continuing with the parallel structure, that had been established in Haiti for such a long time.

Ch. Supt. (retd.) David Beer added a comment to what the senior UN official had said earlier with respect to the nexus between peacekeeping and peacebuilding. The description of the situation in Liberia had contrasted with the situation that Mr Mulet was faced with in Haiti. It was clearly an articulation
of example in political will that existed in Liberia, but did not exist and had never existed in Haiti. This was key. The Mission Leadership Team needed to seize the moment between peacekeeping and peacebuilding; the fact that they could push ahead in the Liberian example where there was a president who was prepared to make difficult decisions and take difficult choices despite the fact that she was not necessarily fully supported by the government underneath her. Proposals and projects addressing women in non-traditional roles, sex and gender based violence, the justice program away from the capital; those were enormously positive and forward thinking ideas that were there for the UN and the international community to profit from. The same experience just did not exist in Haiti, but it went back to the situation that the MLT is set with, and must make decisions around.

Mr David Harland concluded the session with noting that it was a great thought to end on and it was also his life experience in all this that the result of state building or other intervention cannot be better than the local politics. In Bosnia 20 billion USD worth of international development later; the country was still a mess, yet Mozambique was roaring on its way on a much smaller investment, so it is a great contrast. A great panel, and he thanked everybody present.
A New Horizon for Enabling Peacekeeping Capabilities for the Future

Purpose: given the challenges of contemporary peace operations, the session will discuss which capacities and capabilities are required and how they can be effectively enabled, drawing on Challenges’ findings and other developments and raising issues of relevance for the United Nations Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations as well as the ‘International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations’ 2011.

H.E. Mr Gilles Rivard, Deputy Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations, Chair of the United Nations Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations Working Group, Canada

Good afternoon, and welcome back after a session with very good presentations, including by Mr Beer and Mr Mulet chaired by Mr Harland, all of whom I know quite well, as I was the Canadian Ambassador in Haiti, before coming to New York. I am now here as the Canadian Ambassador, Deputy Permanent Representative (DPR) at our Canadian Mission and one of my responsibilities as the new DPR is to chair the United Nations Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34) working group. I have a lot of interest in the discussion that we have today. The C-34 will start next Tuesday and it will mark the beginning of the C-34 session. It is with pleasure that I am with you here today to officially kick-off my first United Nations (UN) peacekeeping mission in New York, even though I have some experience like Haiti and other places before, but from the field.

The last few months has seen an extraordinary amount of new thinking regarding the challenges confronting the UN peacekeeping agenda. By approving the global field support strategy and endorsing many ideas presented in the Secretariats’ New Horizon149 initiative, the General Assembly has contributed significantly to pushing forward the UN peacekeeping agenda. However a lot still needs to be done; the increasing demands on peacekeeping missions and on Member States to provide the necessary resources have caused significant strain on the UN and the international community as a whole. Increasingly complex mandates have placed strain not only on mission leaders tasked with integrating

149 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, A New Partnership Agenda – Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping.
disparate elements; but also on rank and file peacekeepers whose training has not yet fully caught up with normative changes in mission mandates. Civilian experts who are chronically in short supply are in high demand given the now common place inclusion of ‘peacebuilding task’.

During the last year, the UN Secretariat has regularly advocated the need for a capability driven approach and I am sure that today’s discussion will contribute to enlightening both the Secretariat and the Member States on what capability and capacity today’s UN peace operations require. To lead that discussion around the new horizon for peacekeeping capabilities for developing the future, we have four guests. The first to speak is Lt. Gen. Muhammad Umer Farooq, who is President of the National Defence University of Pakistan. He will be followed by Lt. Gen. Babacar Gaye; Military Adviser for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, who is well known here in New York. Another well-known member of this panel is Mr Jean-Marie Guéhenno; Patron of the Challenges Forum, and Former Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations. Finally the last but not least; is Ms Victoria K. Holt; Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of International Organisation Affairs, Department of State, United States.

Lt. Gen. Muhammad Umer Farooq, President, National Defence University of Pakistan, Co-Host of Challenges Forum 2009 on A New Horizon for Peacekeeping Partnerships: What are the Next Steps?, Pakistan

Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen. It is indeed an honour for me to speak to this august gathering on A New Horizon for Enabling Peacekeeping Capabilities for the Future. I would like to express my gratitude to all those who remained associated with the preparation of Challenges Forum 2009 report\textsuperscript{150}. My special thanks also to our co-hosts in 2009, His Excellency Mr Martin Grunditz, the Ambassador of Sweden, Mr Henrik Landerholm, Director-General, Folke Bernadotte Academy and Ms Annika Hilding Norberg, International Coordinator, Challenges Forum, for their whole hearted support in making the report a reality. I would also like to thank all the co-hosts of this meetings too, the honourable Ambassadors of Australia, Sweden and Pakistan.

Ladies and Gentlemen, it is now truly upon us to carry forward the valuable experiences shared in a number of Challenges Forums conducted thus far. I would like to begin with the Forum report of 2009, which turned out to be a comprehensive document spanning existing and future challenges. The report

\textsuperscript{150} International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations, Challenges Forum Report 2009, a New Horizon for Peace Operations Partnerships – What Are the Next Steps?
ranges from technical and operational, to politico-diplomatic and economic fields across a broad range of areas of multidimensional peace operations (POs), mandate making and implementation; command and control; and partnerships and many related issues.

The achievements of the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping system are undoubtedly par excellence. However the POs today are in a state of critical transition. It is critical because the dynamics of already complex conflict and post conflict environments are in a flux which in turn are impacting the way POs are being conducted as well as their future course of planning and capacity development.

There is a need to develop sound partnerships to conceptualise and operationalise the right capabilities needed to support multifaceted tasks. The challenges reflected in the report are well articulated; and I understand there might be a repetition of some ideas; but I intend to establish their linkages with the required capacities and capabilities to enhance the effectiveness of multidimensional POs through institutional reform. I wish to tackle the subject in generally four areas of POs i.e. peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peacebuilding.

In my reckoning, peacemaking is a process that spans conflict prevention, conflict management and conflict resolution. Peacemaking and conflict prevention essentially relies on pacific settlement of disputes. However, till such time the aims are desired to be achieved through means short of using kinetic force, the role and place of politico-economic and diplomatic tools shall remain in dominance. Besides early warning based on informal or formal fact finding missions; conflict prevention may also involve preventive deployments and in some situations establishing demilitarised zones.

If history is an example, the military shall continue to lend credibility to the diplomatic initiatives, as was experienced in the Balkans. Such a credibility to materialise needs deterrence which, in material capability terms, translates into assured availability of a force that the UN system can call upon on relatively short notice. The best arrangement would be a small readily deployable force under operational conduct of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), which can buy the required time to allow mobilisation of additional resources. This is not to say that the legal and procedural matters shall be compromised, but that they will be expedited. Fortunately, that deterrent does exist in the form of a concept of readily deployable forces, but since one size never fits all, one force configured to deliver in a set of environments in one area may not necessarily have the capability or capacity to deliver in another environment. I understand some efforts in this regard were made, but
indeed it is a tall order as finances and the standing military component is never easy to manage. The alternative is to have prior contractual arrangements with regional organisations that might be ready to step in on behalf of the UN, should the need arise.

The next two areas i.e. peacekeeping and peace enforcement are hard core subjects requiring direct role of the military. I think the experience and capabilities that the UN has acquired in these two fields is indeed praise worthy.

The premise for peacekeeping, mandated under Chapter VI, is that the situation will be relatively benign and there is ‘peace to keep.’ When we talk of enabling peacekeeping capabilities for the future, one of the key issues raised in the 2009 Forum was the gap which exists between mandates and tasks vis-à-vis available capacities and capabilities of the missions, military and civilians alike. More complex modes of operations and larger sizes are essential to implement such comprehensive tasks as integration of government and rebel armies, logistical support for elections and assist civil administration. Unfortunately some of the mandates have been too weak, thus peacekeeping missions are held hostage by their mandates and become largely ineffective. We have also seen that well mandated missions and their ambitious tasks have often fallen short of operational and logistical resources. This requires an early consultation with partners, with the Troop and Police Contributing Countries (T/PCCs) and major financers. Although significant strides have been made in this regard; I feel a clear and prior communication between the DPKO and Troop and Police Contributing Countries about the role, task, concept of operations and specific capabilities required can help overcome many of the well-known problems, which crop up subsequently.

The way I see it, the possibility of future UN involvement in inter-state conflict is minimal, but in intra-state conflicts and against organised crime, the possibility is maximised. Hence, the capabilities and capacities to address sub-conventional challenges need special focus. This includes developing society, administrative mechanisms, education, skills development, restoration of services, enabling local justice, law and order and enforcing agencies. In other words, a lead role of the social service development agencies, with an efficient civil-military cooperation framework.

In peace enforcement circumstances when the peaceful means fail, the response to enforcement related challenges ought to begin at the strategic level which demands greater clarity of political objectives, such as deterrence against perpetrators, while reducing risks for the compliant parties. At times, strikes against the vulnerabilities of spoilers or denial of victory to armed groups, in itself sets the tone for shaping the environment for sustainable peace.
Another possible need of peace enforcement may also be partial or complete economic sanctions, interruption of means of communication, and peace enforcement by military action. Coupled with this are the challenges to prevent arms smuggling. Now these are all the actions that require significant military capabilities such as air and naval assets, coordination with regional players, naval and river line patrolling capability and boarding rights for inspection of vessels, air surveillance platforms and means to force land suspicious aircrafts, joint manning of Air Traffic Controls (ATCs), UN oversight over border crossing points, intelligence and telecoms tracking systems to hunt down the spoilers and Non-State Actors, engineer units for creation and maintenance of communication infrastructure and demining operations as well as logistic units to ensure uninterrupted provisioning and management of combat and administrative echelons. It is also important that these capabilities are planned and acquired through a single comprehensive and synergised conception rather than as a consequence of a mission creep that transits from an under resourced peacekeeping mission to ambitious peace enforcement mission. Acquisition of a capability must not be confused with the capacity of the force to deliver, that is because each mission environment demands a minimum critical mass, failing which, the dilution in space will result in compromising the credibility of the UN effort, rather than adding to its goodwill and sincerity.

In a civil war situation, the notion of neutrality too needs a flexible interpretation. In peace enforcement, acts of aggression need to be identified and sanctioned to reverse them. In the event of recurrent violence, the principles of neutrality have to be superseded by international humanitarian laws and norms. UN forces must be able to use the minimal force without becoming partisans. It is important that such Rules of Engagements (ROEs) must be flexible and the initiative must not be ceded away. Here the demands of capability transit from small arms to heavier calibre platforms with capabilities to fire Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs), such as attack helicopters and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs).

The multi-national character of peace operations is also quite a challenge, especially with differences in doctrine, plans and understanding of issues between various national contingents. An increase in number of participating civil agencies too has aggravated this problem. Normally, it is experienced that various segments keep working in parallel with respective interests and the efforts get dissipated. Since the military is usually the first to deploy, access deep areas and develop infrastructure, the lack of coordination results into accessibility and security problems.

There are a myriad of difficulties related to inter-operability too; starting with language, procedural differences, to organisational and doctrinal, to absence of
homogeneity of equipment, integrated communications, intelligence systems and consequently an entirely different logistic support framework. In my view the gravity of such Command, Control and Interoperability challenges can be mitigated through:

- Firstly, instead of having an amalgam of multi-national forces within each region of the affected country; the multinational character of the force can be maintained at the national level by distributing areas of responsibility, region wise or in certain cases activity wise.
- Secondly it is also recommended that each contingent must come as a composite force, i.e. self-sustainable capabilities of combat troops, heavy lift and combat aviation, engineers, logistics and intelligence.
- Thirdly, just like I mentioned the unity of conception, there is a need to have a unity of command specifying clear chains of command and definition of a comprehensive framework of responsibilities not just for the military, but for all the agencies of the UN, as well as for Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs).

Here I would also recommend the DPKO to reconsider its six months rotation period, for such a system not only sets in negative attitudes of marking time, but also sets back the efforts to improve inter-operability within contingents. There is also inadequate doctrinal guidance and lack of capability driven approach with regards to peace enforcement. The complex environment in which robust military operations are undertaken, require formulation of a new framework of a modular operational doctrine and corresponding changes in the training modules of the UN military forces. I call the doctrine to be modular for it to be appropriately modified according to dictates of varying regional environments.

Regarding ‘robust operations’: the tactics mostly used by the armed groups are typically that of sub-conventional warfare, which I would term as a part of 4th generation warfare. The military response thus falls within the realm of ‘military operations other than war’ (MOOTW). To successfully deter spoilers with robust posturing requires capability enhancement in helicopters, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, night vision resources and ability to collect, share and disseminate timely intelligence within missions and other capabilities that I alluded to earlier. The present system of intelligence gathering and its integration needs critical reappraisal. Military forces of not all troop-contributing countries (TCCs) have adequate experience and training for such operations except those that are actively engaged in similar situations in their own countries and are therefore more suited for missions where use of force is often required to enforce mandates. The need for robust peacekeeping (RPKO) not withstanding I must emphasise here on three areas:
Firstly; RPKOs must not be misconstrued with possession of hi-tech weaponry/equipment only. Such missions must have robust mandates and flexible ROEs. Missions must also be well equipped with peace and security building capacities.

Secondly; RPKOs must not be allowed to become vehicles of choice for perceived subjugation by a select few countries, where other countries’ role is divorced due to supposed lack of capacity. Such a practice would undoubtedly undermine the credibility of the entire mission. The difficulty here is that neither the advanced countries would be able to provide the required mass of forces for sustained periods nor would the hitherto traditional contributors feel obliged to provide the same services. The answer therefore lies in dovetailing the provision of such force multipliers, with the existing pool of the UN forces to retain and improve the capacities of the traditional TCCs while retaining the bipartisan nature and legitimacy of UN Operations.

Thirdly; and I believe equally important, is the fact that there is a need for reform in the Human Resource management of the system; wherein whether robust or traditional missions, there is a need for greater representation of major TCCs even at the senior command, staff, management and decision making levels. Such a step will undoubtedly contribute to better synergy between civil and military and between planners and executioners.

As for post conflict peacebuilding; it is an established fact that not addressing the root causes of conflicts, is a key reason for absence of lasting peace. Peacebuilding is again a component wherein the military must learn to adopt the support role to the politico-diplomatic and economic tools. For peace operations to be truly successful, the need is for comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures that consolidate peace and advance the well-being of people. This will require agreements and joint capability building between military and civilians, including police, to end civil strife by disarming warring parties, destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security personnel, advancing efforts to protect human rights and reforming institutions. Protection of civilians remains a major pre-occupation of PKOs; however, only physical security mechanisms are not considered adequate. The overall environment and behaviour would have to be shaped thus to build a ‘security environment’. Such an effort must include conflict resolution/management strategies as well as constructive engagements of communities, as the principal tools.

Ladies and Gentlemen, Pakistan believes in the principles of good international citizenship; and I assure all our worthy partners that we shall continue to lend our whole hearted support to the UN peacekeeping initiatives.
In the end, I would like to once again congratulate all those who remained involved in the preparation and launching of Challenges Forum reports of 2009, 2010 and the Considerations study and a number of other ongoing projects that are in the pipeline. Thank you very much.

*Lt. Gen. Babacar Gaye, Military Adviser, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations*

Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, I feel privileged to have the opportunity to highlight before this distinguished audience some of the Office of Military Affairs (OMA) priorities in the area of capability development. The New Horizon initiative identified the need to improve our capabilities in the field and my office, which works on a broad range of issues that attempts to improve the capabilities of peacekeeping mission military components. Needless to say our initiatives and work are well coordinated with the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the United Nations Department of Field Support (DFS). I would also like to reflect discussions in the C34 and our continuous liaison with the missions, which informs us of the global capability gap as well as specific gaps of particular missions.

Raising the capability requires a joint approach that takes into account military, political and financial aspects. That said, I commend all deployed in the field that invariably make the very best of the equipment that they had. Military capability requirements vary from mission to mission depending on the mandate composition and variable factors such as the host nation support and infrastructure. Although every mission is unique there are some basic capabilities and requirements such as mobility, situational awareness, interoperability or flexibility which are common to all missions.

Let me at this point give you an insight into some of the initiatives that we are undertaking to address capability improvements. Together with the DFS we are focussed on optimising the usage of military helicopters and related generation and operational issues. We are developing the generic force headquarters and standard operating procedures (SOPs) as well as attempting to establish individual and collective training standards and enhancements. We have expanded peacekeeping to include operations and we are also developing a maritime policy to guide planning and the conduct of maritime operations. As highlighted in

152 Ibid.
the last Challenges Forum; the protection of civilians is an important commitment which calls for specific capabilities for missions to be able to accomplish all aspects of protection in less permissive environments; OMA is a key partner in this regard. We are also looking at intermittent cooperation to support a neighbouring mission at short notice in a time of need. Cooperation between missions enhances flexibility and promotes an original approach to peacekeeping and enforces a quick response that cannot be achieved by means of a standard generation process. I give the recent example; an excellent example of the support provided by our military in Liberia to our mission in Cote d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast), where trained infantry companies and two helicopters moved at 48 hours-notice to support the election process.

Finally, we are actively engaging troop-contributing countries (TCCs) in order to gain consensus on deterrents, the use of force and operational readiness issues. We are confident that these important issues have the support of TCCs and then they will work with us to prepare peacekeepers accordingly. One of the projects I would like to highlight and that connects to the overall capability enhancement is the identification of gaps in the supporting documentation for the field mission. This is one of my priorities and it is a joint effort by the OMA and force commanders in partnership with the division of policy, evaluation and training.

Concerning capability development; the OMA is part of a joint secretary initiative looking at three pilots in support of troop contributing countries and Member States: staff officers, medical support and the development of capabilities for a generic infantry battalion. The capability of an infantry battalion is a combination of a variety of factors including training, equipment and structure. It is our intent to link the work of these pilot projects to identification of best practices and lessons. We can then learn and adapt for future operation and identify the basis for future interaction with TCCs in particular and Member States in general.

Let me end by underling the need for a comprehensive and inclusive approach in this endeavour. The OMA is one of the key partners in the United Nations Headquarters and we will continue to work closely with the missions and the TCCs. Thank you.

Mr Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Patron, Challenges Forum, Former Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations, France

Dear Friends, it is a great pleasure to be with you again; and it is a particular pleasure to be on the panel with Ambassador Rivard and with General Gaye. I
am proud that I allured him into peacekeeping, I think peacekeeping can only be better for it. And for Lieutenant General Farooq; I only have great memories from my visit to the National Defence University, where we had a very pleasant conference, when I was there.

This afternoon I thought I would focus my remarks on the civilian capacities. The Secretary-General of the United Nations a few months ago asked me to chair a Senior Advisory Group and produce a report on the civilian capacities needed in countries emerging from conflict. That advisory group has very distinguished members and I am glad that Ms Ameerah Haq; whom you heard earlier today, contributed with wisdom and experience to the group. I will focus on civilian capacities, not with any suggestions that the military and the police capacities do not play a critical role; but because they have been very well and analysed by the two previous speakers, so I will focus on the other side, the civilian side.

The civilian side will not deliver if we do not get the politics right. It will not deliver if the security; the basic security that the military and the police can provide, is not there. It is important not to get into the debate the wrong way thinking it is the one or the other; they have to complement each other. Anyone of us, who have the experience from the field, can see that necessity.

Why reflect on civilian capacities today? The kind of mandate that the United Nations (UN) is called upon to implement, requires a broad range of expertise. The conflicts are much more complicated and the mandates much more ambitious, that we do have to reflect whether we have the right systems in place. Frankly, I think we do have to admit that often we do not. We struggle to get the right people in the right place at the right time. What looks like a simple proposition is an incredible difficult undertaking. Trying to think how to make the system better is indeed topical, because if we do not get the right people on the civilian side or the good efforts of the military, of the police, it might just go to waste. The window that the troops and police can create with a good political process underpins the whole effort; otherwise that window will not be well exploited. It is really fundamental to address the civilian issue.

How should we do it? The view of the members of the group that produced the report, which is now with the Secretary-General’s office and should be out in the coming weeks, the collective view is that we need to find the right relationships; and in a way, a parallel discussions like that we have had with the military. We need to have the right relationship between the UN, the Secretariat of the UN and its Member States. It is on the civilian side, the military side and the police side. We will succeed only if we are in it together. If the Secretariat is seen as a distant planet that operates on its own; with distant support from its Mem-
ber States, it will not work, because the Secretariat is nothing but its Member States. If the Secretariat looks at its Member States with a kind of suspicion as if they were the enemy, it will not work either.

We came to the idea; it is the ‘partnership’, that makes the difference, and it is as important on the civilian side as it is for the military and the police side.

The range of civilian capacities that is needed has been considerably broadened. There is a core group of capacities that will be needed in most missions. The number of support personnel, logisticians, administrative officers etc. that you need in every situation. There are some key functions that will be needed in all situations. Then there is a range of capacities that need to be tailor chosen, handpicked, for specific situations. There may for example be a place you need to help reorganise the harbour; you need a good team to do that. There are whole customs operations that need to be restructured. There can be a situation that you need to build up a ministry that can deal with such situations as contracts for natural resources for example. There is a range of situations which vary from one country to the other. Can the UN as a Secretariat provide all those capacities on its own? No. It can provide some of its’ capacities; but it should be able to rely on its Member States.

There need to be true partnership, true memorandum of understanding, that will allow the provision of such specialised capacities. Partnerships that should be able to be relied upon. That is why we use the word ‘partnership’ and that is why there is a parallel between what is done on the military and police side; and what is done on the civilian side.

How should one know which capacities are needed? We have spoken a lot today about national ownership; but frankly we are not always very good at supporting that nation leadership. We are better at substituting national partners that we want to help. So we have to really re-think the kind of capacities that we provide. We need to focus on some areas, for instance how do we help a government to prioritise, do we really provide those capacities? A cabinet process, so that the government knows the interlocutors, so that the priorities are not only the priorities of the donor capacities. It should be provided based on a national plan that is the plan of the country you want to help. We can contribute to that national prioritisation by providing the kind of quality contribution in key places that is badly needed. This is why the first point of the report is about ownership, national ownership.

Another aspect of national ownership is that we should not undermine the national capacities that we need to beef up; but sometimes we do. The way in which we recruit local staff sometimes means that people who have quite signi-
ficant expertise will be used as our drivers, because we provide better salaries in the mission than they would get in the ministries, where they could do something very useful. This needs to be thought through too.

Where will we find those capacities? The way we develop partnerships between the UN and its Members States is possible today in a way that it would not have been, some years ago. Why? Because today, the range of national capacities available to the UN: from the whole world, from the North as well as from the South, is much broader than it was some years ago. We were struck during our work preparing the Report, to see how we can find from India to South Africa to Brazil and many others, capacities that are willing to be deployed as support to the UN. When you combine those capacities from the Global South, with the capacities from the North, building also the kind of triangular cooperation, then you have a quite formidable support of a country that need our assistance. The discussion on the relationship between the UN and its Members States requires a new dimension. It is not about a group of countries, it is about the whole Membership coming to support countries in need. That is the spirit of the Report.

Regarding future capacities for peace operations and as we are at a real crossroad, we see that the UN is the central player in those issues and it should remain a central player. It has a legitimacy that no other organisation can have. Legitimacy when it comes to building reconciliation, which is an essential element when being perceived as impartial. If the UN wants to keep that central role, it needs to adjust to the challenges. I do not say to abandon the good practices and all the experiences; but to adjust and to broaden its scope and to bring in its Member States in a stronger way in a new relationship. That is what will help the UN remain the central player. I am confident that on the civilian side; if we all come together and also all train together, the UN should be able to do as well as it has done with its troop contributors and the police contributors. Sometimes the civilians have to learn from the military and sometimes the military has to learn from the civilians. We have to be one team. I think then we will really be in a position to help the countries in a way they deserve to be helped.

Ms Victoria K. Holt, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Organisation Affairs, Department of State, United States

Thank you very much and it is quite a pleasure to be here today and to be with such an impressive panel. From the perspective of someone in Government; that what I appreciate about Challenges work over the last decade plus is that as all those that serve in Government know; once you begin work in the morning you
are probably making decisions about what is happening right now. So the ability to look out and see trends, anticipate them, have longer term views of what the challenges are and pull us together and ask us to concentrate for a whole day or more is incredibly valuable; and so for that I am very thankful and grateful.

This is also important because some of the challenges we face are quite critical. What we are really trying to talk about and maybe what I will touch on right now is looking forward. What are some of the challenges and not just what the Challenges Forum can take on; but what each of us will be grappling with from the countries from which we come or the institutions from which we come. You can quickly look at the landscape and say; frequently we will have things we face in peacekeeping that are fundamentally unanticipated, such as an earthquake in Haiti; and we saw with extraordinary heroism how quickly the mission pulled itself together and the world community got behind trying to move the situation forward there. There are other times when we should probably be better prepared. For example, in an election, where today we watch in Cote d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast) the continued challenge to have the rightful president take power. At the same time, the peacekeeping mission has managed to keep the place going on a political course and that is impressive. Yet perhaps, it is something we could have thought through a bit better. Then there are the ones that you cannot really plan, but are hopeful when they come out, such as the referendum in Sudan, which has put us into the hopeful category. At the same time, it is also ushering in a project to with which we will have to put huge resources and energy; many of which have already been described today on this discussion panel.

So where are we going? I would add that the discussion of a year and half ago was the increase and drama of more peacekeeping missions. I think what is striking today is not the increase but how many missions are still with us and how they have been changing in real-time to some extent. Also of note is the level of sustainability required to keep up with the pace and depth of what these mission require. But then also to add to that; very conscious conversation about finances and the political environment that we face with scrutiny of international institutions and of ourselves as government people spending our tax payers USD; and what will that mean for the missions where we want to expand or have to take a harder look at what their core ideas are all about. So a couple of things on behalf of the United States; we are strong and deep supporters of peacekeeping missions, it may not be a big fancy initiative that you hear from us but on a daily basis it is something that many of us dedicate ourselves to. Our assessments to the United Nations (UN) are over two billion a year now just for the UN peacekeeping operations alone. Our global peace operations initiative which is often through the General Assembly channel and working with part-
ners to deploy, support and train as well as work with regional peacekeeping missions, has now gone on since 2003 roughly 100 million a year for us and we will continue that through 2014. We are proud to say that over 110 thousand peacekeepers have deployed to 19 missions through that program. When the Secretary of State came up to the UN Security Council this fall she announced a new effort to focus on something we have been describing here which is police and Formed Police Units (FPUs) and how we can move forward with that. So we will be looking at a new effort to do training for those new units as part of an overall effort to work here with the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) on police.

So what is my shortlist for Challenges? They would include some that have already been discussed at great length here so perhaps I am just an added voice. First off would be the police and rule of law (ROL) and the connection there to peacebuilding and the civilian side which has just been very articulacy laid out. We know the facts and figures pretty well, the security council has increasingly asked for police, particularly FPUs but also the experts of mixed capacity that individuals bring and repeatedly; and I think this will be the discussion tomorrow, that the supply of those skills and those capacities on short notice or even over a long term are often not available in the way that we need them. Our government certainly learned this in Haiti when we quickly recognised the need for additional police in Haiti and people wanted to see active FPUs. Well there are a lot of countries to provide. It is something that really gets to the core part of what peacekeeping needs to do. Once there is a level of security how do you sustain that peace? How do you help a government take hold and move forward? And the role of police and the role of law to include of course the list we all know; with courts and justice systems and the overall ability of institutions to function, is basically irreplaceable and I think that is always what is seen as being needed to move forward; but how do we get that right and prioritise it?

This leads us to something in which the police at home are often seen as taking a primary role; and that is the second challenge of the protection of civilians (POC). We all know the UN Security Council mandates for peacekeeping missions have had POC in many many forms; but particularly POC whom were in imminent threat during the last decade. I very much appreciate the panel that already got in to depth with this earlier today looking at it from both a peacekeeping role as well from the humanitarian perspective. But this is important too just as ROL is because it provides important credibility and legitimacy for both peacekeeping and of the organisation. If a peacekeeping mission is seen not to try to protect the civilians in its area of operation; just as much as it is actually the government’s responsibility, that lack of effort is often what will be broadcast back to the world. On our side we take quite seriously to not simply just talk about this issue but instead we actually help missions achieve it and we
very much applaud the work of the DPKO to lay out the strategic framework
guidance project. Beyond this is the need to reach out to all of you and other
Member States and say: ‘How do we then help the civilians the police and the
military; that we will send from our governments to participate in this mission,
to understand it before they arrive in the field?’. That they have a concept of
what this means; and that not just the military but the police and the civilians
understand how if the mission is trying to create a mission wide strategy; what
their role in that may be. How the mission can better understand civilian
insecurity not just when they deploy but over the life of the mission and how
the resources needed to anticipate and hopefully prevent violence and if neces-
sary to respond to it can actually be organised in a more strategic way. It is
something that we are certainly interested in fully supporting with the tools that
the field in particular needs.

This now brings us to the subject of what the field needs. An area that has also
been discussed at length here at the forum is capacity gaps; and I think many of
us have become familiar with what we call the gaps list both on the military and
civilian side. We are certainly familiar with the dilemma that if you have the
best team in the world but they cannot get around their mission area you are
going to have a hard time; and a number of people have raised this issue here.
I do not have an easy answer to the mobility challenge and specifically the heli-
copter issue. I can though give credit I think; we have seen a total of 43 nations
that were asked to fill the void in the Darfur mission alone; and I can tell you
many of our countries ourselves have looked to see what the capacity is. So I
think we need to open up this conversation deeply and broadly. I do not know
if the main problem is within the debates over the contingent of equipment and
reimbursements? If there is insurance? If there are technical rules? If it is supply?
If it is incentives? Or if it is the operating environment? But this is an area where
I think we need to help the UN succeed and we can do it as Member States. I
would also add into this other chronic challenges that are on the logistics side
such as medical units which are elements that we have become familiar with by
looking at the gaps list.

Leading into my forth and perhaps major final point would be a combination
of what a peacekeeping mission in the end really needs to succeed. If we set out
the hierarchy as follows: It goes in to provide security and help a political pro-
cess move forward and then takes hold with ROL; it is that political process
that we have to remain mindful of. No peacekeeping missions can succeed if it
becomes disassociated from an ongoing political discussion with the political
leadership in the area with which it is operating. But that also means for all of
us as Member States whether we serve on the UN Security Council, or as a
Troop or Police Contributing Country, or as an engaged member through the
GA, we each have a role to play in the countries in which the peacekeepers are
sent and that can be as simple as marrying bilateral dialogue with a country and our multilateral approach.

A political strategy will be core to also setting what the priorities are that the mission can do and how that supports what its mandate called it to do. This contributes to success, in which the mission works itself out of a job. So those are just a few thoughts, I think all of us remain very engaged with these set of issues and I look forward to the discussions. Thank you.

Discussion

H.E. Mr Gilles Rivard commented that the four very different presentations had many common denominators. In particular the presentations had focused on how the international community needed to fill identified gaps, address the challenges of protecting civilians (POC), enhance adaptability, effectively take national and local perspectives into account, and finally, there was a need to address the requirements of capacity building.

A seminar participant raised a question concerning the need for better situational awareness, force protection, and risk management. It was suggested that if the international community wanted more than to just respond to abuses against civilians, it needed to be able to be proactive, preventive and pre-emptive. There was a critical capability gap in terms of intelligence or information analysis: where was the UN going? Or where could the UN go to obtain this enabler? Member States could provide it, but there would still need to be a professional Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC). The participant also asked if the concept allowed for the right people turning up in a mission, so that an effective JMAC could be created. Was there a need for the UN Secretariat itself to develop the capability to understand how to create an effective JMAC and perform these functions? In essence, how could this capability gap in terms of intelligence be filled?

Mr Jean-Marie Guéhenno responded by stressing the importance of the JMAC working well. It was a concept that to his knowledge was still work in progress. It concerned breaking the silos in a mission, so that members of a mission with different professional backgrounds, could really work together. That could come through training and good preparation, but it did not come naturally. Regarding the personnel sent to missions, this was a much broader issue. Did personnel really interact with the country that they were deployed in? Some did – others did not. It was a question of preparing personnel for the interaction, the engagement, to become sponges, who absorb their environment. It was also a question of having the right specialties, in order for the missions to absorb
information. If the person deployed in a mission could bring the required expertise to a situation that the host country need, it allows for a two way street of communication. The higher the quality of the individuals that the UN recruit, the stronger the interaction will be with the local communities and the better the information and understanding of the country will be. This in turn could create a virtual circle, where the missions are well plugged in, because they are seen to bring real added value to the people they interact with. Being well plugged in, the missions could be more proactive, because they could see things coming, rather than be surprised by it. Mr Guéhenno concluded by commenting on the practical issues of language. The more a mission could rely not only on interpreters, but personnel that speak and understand the language of the local people, the better.

Ms Victoria K. Holt explored the question underlining that the important word is not intelligence, but that the UN had eyes and ears, which is the responsibility of the missions civil affairs personnel, the military observers, the police, all of whom are out amongst the population and who should have an appreciation for what is going on in the communities they are engaged in. Analysis was required of who would threaten either civilians or the peacekeeping mission itself and why. Ms Holt continued commenting that there was a real difference between a drunken soldier falling out of a bar with his gun at night, as opposed to an organised political entity that wished to organise itself and attack people on purpose for ends that are substantive in their view. The extent to which a mission can have a map of what the situation looks like could often touch civilian expertise. There were many actors in many of the countries that were the citizens themselves, the political actors, the humanitarian community; it was essentially about bringing expertise and functions together, in an analytical way, in order to set up the mission for success. She concluded that she believed the troop and police contributing countries did this every day, because they were out and about and understood the need for it.

A former senior UN official commented on the question of requirement of reserves. The issue of reserves had been debated at the UN level since 2003. A brigade group had been considered, but it was dropped off the agenda. It was rechristened ‘Enhanced Rapid Deployment Capacity’. The question was still alive though. A conscious decision had to be taken, what was needed? A company group? A battalion group? A brigade group would be too much. What were the costs? What was the state of readiness that was required and able to be maintained? What were the political considerations that a country would make when a formal request was made to deploy the reserves? It was believed that they should be self-sustaining for seven to ten days. Another imperative was that the reserves were regularly exercised and that a military adviser in con-
sultation with the political side was kept operational. These were some import-
ant factors that had to be borne in mind.

The former senior UN official continued with a second point regarding capa-
bilities and capacities. It was suggested that when a battalion, medical com-
pany, engineer company, transport company came into the service of peace-
keeping, it was best provided for by the UN; in terms of organisation structure,
equipment etc. Regarding the discussions on the need to ‘hit the ground run-
ning’ and ‘civilians in imminent danger’. The former senior UN official stressed
there needed to be clear cut mandates from the Security Council and an inten-
sive dialogue between TCCs, the General Assembly and the UN Security Coun-
cil etc. At the same time, he was puzzled to look at a recent example from 2009
to 2010, the 23rd and 24th contingent coming in from the same TCC to the same
location for the same task; why was there a total drop in standards? Was it a
command failure? Was there a sense of inner sheer? How could that inner sheer
be gotten rid of? The issue of capabilities and capacities was a serious issue that
needed to be further pursued.

Further, regarding situational awareness; it was proposed that there was
nothing which was not available in the mission. So what was the problem? The
former senior UN official commented that when assessing the JMACs during
2009 to 2010, he had been told by the missions that: ‘we have never been tasked
by a Secretary-General’s Special Representative’, ‘we have never been tasked by
the United Nations Deputy Secretary-General’s Special Representative’. ‘We do
not have any collection plan’. ‘No, we do not receive patrol reports’. ‘Had the
force commander tasked the sector commanders?’. ‘Had the sector command-
ers issued a patrolling policy?’. And so on and so forth. Invariably they had
gotten blank stares in response. The same problem existed concerning an engi-
eer plan, a communication plan, and so on. The former senior UN official con-
tinued stressing that a United Nations military observer (UNMO) was a mission
resource, a police mentor was a mission resource, every combatant was a mis-
sion resource, all the civilian capacities that were available were also meant to
contribute to the situational awareness issue. All these inputs had to go up the
chain to so called JMAC. A JMAC was not only supposed to create informa-
tion, it also had to task ‘sources’. The word used was ‘sources’; all the sources
in a mission, including the civilians of the host country, depending on how you
cultivated them. Situational awareness was not a magical thing, very elemen-
tary examples included; that the Joint Operations Centre (JOC) were supposed
to receive the situation report (SITREP) at 6 am, but could only process it over
eight hours, as they had to question the Headquarters (HQ) that had given the
SITREP. In essence, there was a mismatch, a need to talk regularly to the JMAC
with substantive tasking and routine tasking. Unless this was done, the entities
were not delivering with the potential that they had.
Lt. Gen. Muhammad Umer Farooq responded by agreeing with the realistic insights and important points to ponder. He commented in particular on that the culture and nature of the international peacekeeping force would always present varying standards, and that it would probably be asking too much expecting each contingent to be able to come up to a standard. While this was good thinking and there was nothing wrong to expect it, the problem was that there would be a gap between what was expected and what was available. When he looked through the various missions in history; one mission which was not spoken about these days provided useful lessons. The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in the early 1990’s, which faced problems in the beginning, but turned out successful in the end, is one example useful to analyse. The leadership of Mr Akashi, the United Nations Secretary-General’s Special Representative, and Lt. Gen. Sanderson, the force commander, not only pulled up the contingents to the level required, but at the time, they addressed all local actors who got on board with them and enhanced the POC by participatory and constructive engagement. They not only ran the mission, they also essentially ran the government, which was not their mandate, but in the end, it became a success. Lt. Gen. Farooq agreed that capacities needed to be enhanced and that capabilities needed to be developed. For this, a comprehensive approach was available and also had to be considered.

As regards to the aftermath of the Capstone doctrine\textsuperscript{155} and the Brahimi’s report\textsuperscript{156} and what will develop over the next few years. Lt. Gen. Farooq elaborated that the size required of a UN force could be debatable. He believed a brigade would be a good size. There was consideration for companies by each contingent, which was also good thinking, but eventually the UN still had to decide whether it wanted to develop a standing force capacity, or if it should requisite forces as required. He suggested that a UN without a force capacity was toothless. Finally, regarding intelligence and fact-finding; a pioneer force could help in fact finding. The UN did not have resources for intelligence gathering as a formation commander might have in a standing army. At the same time, statecraft and other skills available could be used to acquire the pulse of the public opinion in the street. The focus should be on violence; noisy people guiding opinion and guiding the rules.

A seminar participant linked issues raised by Mr Jean-Marie Guéhenno and Ms Victoria Holt regarding gaps and state-building. Did the UN need to do more in the area of national security architecture? The UN was much better now at talking not about ‘peacekeeping’ and ‘peacebuilding’ but joining them together

\textsuperscript{155} United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, \textit{United Nations Peacekeeping Operations – Principles and Guidelines (Capstone Doctrine)}.

at the hip. The international community was thinking more intensively about how to ensure that the 3C’s of ‘Courts, Cops and Corrections’, restoration or management and creation of defence forces, goes ahead. But often this seemed to occur in silos. It was suggested that one of the reasons this occurred was because there was not enough attention given to a fundamental Department of Political Affairs (DPA) function, the political aspects of achieving sustainable peace long term. The national security architecture at the top remained blurred. In the seminar participants case, who had been a force commander for the UN Mission in East Timor, he suggested that this had meant that they had not really taken issues far enough; and it had not really gone the way he had intended. There had been a national security office established, but it did not really go into the next mission, it sort of stopped. In the case of Timor, there was a situation where the UN was building a police force and countries like Portugal and Australia building a defence force; but there was nothing at the top to steer how all this would work and what would be the legislative requirements. The former force commander continued stressing that the mission required very skilled people, mainly diplomats, but also people in general, who understood the nuances of the situation, not telling the state how to do it, but to work with the hosting government to try to create it; all in a contested environment, as the political fallout from these conflicts had not yet been determined.

Speaking about the nexus of peacekeeping and peacebuilding, the seminar participant drew attention to a need to focus on the nexus between peacekeeping, peacebuilding and peacemaking. The peacemaking leg was the part that would create the sustainable peace. He commended an article by Ian Martin, who had written a piece recently that had hinged on this aspect. One mega UN department was not the solution; but the linkages needed to be there as well as people who understood that and worked on it.

Mr Jean-Marie Guéhenno: I think you raise a key issue, which has several layers there are sort of bureaucratic organisational layers; the UN has some experience in reforming the police sector, it has much less in terms of the military. That is looking at it from a purely technical standpoint but that there are political issues because of course when it comes in particular to the military that is something that often Member States would rather do on a bilateral basis. So then the question comes: can we have a comprehensive view of the whole security sector? What share of the natural resources will be devoted to that? What will be the relationship between what the police does, what the military does, what the balance will be? There is an economic aspect to this issue. You will have the World Bank saying rightly that you do not want to drag down the country by creating an unsustainable security sector; although it is the easiest way to do Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR). So there are trade-offs; often a successful DDR program will entail a somewhat temporary over-
sized security sector, which is the best way we know how to reintegrate people. We are not that good at moving former combatants to a non-combatant role. So there is that dimension and then there is a key political dimension of who controls the guns? Guns control the power at the end of the day. The reform is in a way as we saw it in Timor Leste with the crisis. The question there is highly political and I think the combination of the desire of Member States to have their own bilateral influence through the reform of the armed forces and the lack of political attention of the UN to the political implications of a process that is much more than technical. Thirdly the resistance of the host country to enter that discussion and in a way the interest of the host country in keeping the international community fragmented on that issue. All that combined means that very often we have a hap hazard approach to it.

For me the answer in a way touches upon something that was discussed when Ms Ameerah Haq said: ‘Courage is what it takes to stand up and speak; courage is also what it takes to sit down and listen’.\textsuperscript{157} In a way that is the key issue for a mission, how much is it in a listening mode? What is the balance between trying to shape things, at the same time trying to respect the interlocutors and their emerging sovereignty? It is easier to discuss here than to manage on the ground. What is true is that you will not be able to manage it in a constructive way if there is no solid support of the Member States. Because; and we have seen it in a place like the Democratic Republic of the Congo, very often there are divisions among Member States on how to proceed. Divisions are at worst and competition at best. A coherent framework is very hard to develop. I think in the coming years it will be important between the secretariat and UN Member States to have that discussion on the necessary political coherence of a security sector reform; otherwise a purely technical approach to security sector reform will not work. In a way it is an issue that you can also see in places like Afghanistan.

Jake Sherman, Centre of international cooperation: This panel obviously has its own capabilities and I think we have heard both about the importance of having the right equipment and the right training for missions to succeed; but I would be interested in hearing the panel’s views on another capability and that is leadership. Specifically how to actually inculcate or develop leadership at the field level both at a strategic level and also for example among national contingents so that you actually see an ability to take the right decision when snap decisions are needed and to essentially effectively implement a mandate.

Lt. Gen. Muhammad Umer Farooq: Thank you for the question, I will add to the question and then also try to answer it. Leadership is statesmanship and in

my own analysis these two things will decide the destiny of the mission. Leadership as I and other panellists have mentioned is vital. Whether it is a Secretary-General’s Special Representative, Force Commander or any of the civilian component leaders; it is leadership in the offing that delivers. Certainly in my opinion it is not only a force multiplier; it is a decider. I can give you four missions from recent past in which there were some very critical times in which it was only the leadership that enabled the mission to be sustained. So in certain areas and certain situations, even when POC was at a critical stage the leadership not only defused it but also ensured better protection and involvement. I agree with you that leadership will remain vital.

Mr Jean-Marie Guéhenno: I think the success of leadership is really much dependent on the capacity to orchestrate a range of very different resources; from the military, to the police to the civilians. The first condition is to understand what those capacities can deliver. I think in many situations you have leaders who only have a very partial understanding of the resources that are under their authority. I think that could be addressed by better training; for instance on the whole development governance side of an integrated mission you have a sometimes leaders who are very adept at the political aspects but who have little understanding of what those aspects entail. It is not quite enough to have a United Nations Deputy Secretary-General’s Special Representative who knows about it, if you want to have an intelligent dialogue with the Deputy Secretary-General’s Special Representative you need to be able to understand what his or her business is. Likewise with the military; I was struck what Lt. Gen. Randhir Kumar Mehta said on the lack of directives sometimes for the JMAC, any structure is as good as the directives it gets. If it is left abandoned on its own it will not work.

As a civilian who had to interact with the military for eight years I felt; and due respect for all the military in the room, it is a challenge because you do not want to pretend to be a general at the same time you do not want to accept for granted what the generals tell you and so to get the right balance between having searching questions and at the same time not pretending to manage something that is not your role is something that requires I think some training. There are more and more exercises and unfortunately we have had our share of crises. I think one needs to build more and more case studies on the basis of those crises where military and civilian interacted together at different levels; from the Strategic Headquarters in New York (NY) to the mission HQ to the possible tactical HQ, to see how things could work. You can be prepared for those situations and the military have been used to doing exercises for many years but the civilians do not have as much habit of that but now that we understand really success is so dependent on the good interaction between civilian and military we should have much more of that.
Ms Victoria K. Holt: Just to add in here; good leaders at some point were not leaders yet, they were young and how do we find people who are early or mid career who could then be brought along and identified early and supported early so they can move up. Right now it seems that leaders are fabulous or exist or their government called and said who do you have. I do not know how we can develop a better system? I know there is a more technical effort with the senior leadership training course thinking about how to use that successfully to train people who are prepared and available for future missions. Maybe my third point goes to something discussed earlier that falls on the last remark; and that is how do we get better at seeing where a crisis may come and asking mission to think about them in advance, not because anyone wants this to happen but to better have the leadership on the team prepared to respond. What I mean by that is not that they are not individually excellent but they may not know the others presumptions about how to respond in a crisis. Obviously a military, civilian and police personnel may think of different tools or ways to respond to something. To the earlier comment about the ‘early rapid deployable capacity’; as I understand that had that exact kind of early analysis tool that tried to go out to the missions and say ‘what are you worried about?’, ‘tell us about what is on your list of things of what you might not want to see happen’. How do we use that analysis to use some tools some countries use when they deploy their forces for other reasons to prepare them to think through those scenarios. That might be one of things we might look into to better missions down the road.

A former Secretary-General’s Special Representative for several UN missions highlighted the case of Côte d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast). He mentioned that a colleague sitting next to him had asked: ‘What is going on there? How can someone flaunt the authority of the international community? What is the UN and the security council’s mandate? What is the end state of this?’ The former SRSG continued there may be negotiations going on; but he found it extremely embarrassing that: “we are very self-congratulatory yet here we have a challenge which basically demonstrates the impotence in the face of evil and all we do is kind of watch it to see what happens or how it will play out”.

Mr Jean-Marie Guéhenno responded to the former SRSG’s question noting it was a fundamental one. Mr Guéhenno recalled his Pakistani colleague’s comments on the key importance of having the full political backing of the UN Security Council. At the end of the day the troops on the ground; they are the UN Security Council. If there is a sense that they are expendable or that in a way if they are humiliated it is not the UN Security Council that is humiliated; then there is a big problem. That is why it is so important if we have an ambitious mandate that there is not a shadow of a distance between the UN Security Council and the troops. I think there; and you have heard me say it before, the fact the burden of the toughest missions is not evenly shared is at the end of the
day a serious political issue. It creates an inevitable distance in spite of all the
good support that members of the UN Security Council which do not partici-
pate in peacekeeping operations provide in other ways. But the flag on the
shoulder that you have matters and I think it is a problem for the ambitious
peacekeeping that we have now that the burden is not more widely shared
because it reinforces that sense that the authority of the UN; of the institution
of the UN is not challenged when a platoon somewhere in the middle of the
juggle or in Côte d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast) is challenged. What is challenged is the
authority of the UN Security Council, the authority of the whole institution and
if that perception is eroded we are in real trouble.

Ms Victoria K. Holt commented on the case of Côte d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast). She
reflected on that it was a mission that for five years did not have elections, that
was not being directly confronted, that in a space of a few days shifted dra-
matically at the direction of the UN Security Council in live time to stand up for
what would become the certified president, who went to a hotel and was, as she
spoke, still surrounded by peacekeepers. They were challenged and there were
difficulties, but the country had not gone back to war, and the debate continued
in the political space. This was the intent of peacekeeping – to have a political
resolution to a challenge with the security elements needed. Everything was not
perfect, but the Security Council had been very tuned to and forward leaning
towards Côte d’Ivoire. It had been coherent working with partners in the
region, so she disagreed with some of the criticism raised concerning Côte
d’Ivoire.

H.E. Mr Gilles Rivard concluded the session by thanking the organiser for invit-
ing me and my colleagues to attend this very interesting session. I still look back
at the title of this session A New Horizon for Enabling Peacekeeping Capabil-
ities for the Future; there are a lot of words and a lot of expectation in a title
like that. There is no doubt that the agenda of peacekeeping will not be exhaust-
ed soon; so I think there is still a lot of room and time to debate these issues.
Being as I said in charge of this C34 working group; it is going to be another
occasion where some of the comments made here today will be discussed and
maybe validated, we will see what happens. In the mean time I would like to
thank you all for taking the time being here this afternoon.
Chapter 12

Concluding Remarks Day I

H.E. Mr Mårten Grunditz, Permanent Representative of Sweden to the United Nations, Sweden

Ladies and Gentlemen, we may not have exhausted the entire peacekeeping agenda, but we have had an interesting day so far. We have heard perspectives from the field, from headquarters, from partner countries and from missions in New York. We have covered the complexity of protection of civilians, we have covered a part of the peacekeeping-peacebuilding nexus and now in the last session, we went into the capabilities development issues. Of particular importance was to hear the two Under-Secretaries-General, the two most concerned, laying out some of the progress and priorities in regard to the New Horizon process and the global field support strategy. In order to summarise a day like this you need two candidates for impossible missions and we have managed to convince two: Mr Jean-Marie Guéhenno and Ms Annika Hilding Norberg. They will offer us what they perceive to have been the common threads and the key points from the sessions today.

Mr Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Patron, Challenges Forum, Former Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations, France

When I think of the extremely rich discussion and conversations that we had here today, I recall it certainly starting with the evolution of conflict and the evolution of peacekeeping missions. There is a recognition that peace operations (POs) are now often called upon not only when a country broken by civil conflict has a transitional government but also after the election phase when there is already a government which has the legitimacy of an election; but which nevertheless does not have full control of the state apparatus.

We enter into an area which is politically quite delicate. The United Nations (UN) is an organisation of states which works for the people; and it has to always balance those two considerations. Its legitimacy and the service of the people; I would say its ethical legitimacy and its institutional legitimacy is very much based on the service of the states. Sometimes the two are not quite identical and that can be a problem. I say that because this phase; where you have a government that has emerged from elections having all the elements of formal legitimacy, sometimes it needs to build more legitimacy. It needs to build more
legitimacy by reaching out to some components in the country that do not quite feel represented or reassured by that state. That is a question of perception that may be also a question of reality because the security forces have not been modernised or transformed in a way that builds trusts. There may be many reasons for that.

For the peacekeeping operations, what should they do? Earlier today we heard Alain Le Roy, refer to the difficult discussion you have had in the UN on the question of rough forces; and whether force can be used against such rough forces – there is a practical issue and there is a political issue. The practical issue is: can you really take on forces that are part of the government structure? That is a big issue which needs to be addressed on a case by case basis and one where solid political consent is needed among Member States.

Then there is the political issue. There is a trade-off between where you are not protecting the people you are meant to protect; and using your institutional legitimacy because you are challenging the state. It refers to the whole question of consent. In my point of view you need a strategic consent of the state; if you do not have it you have a serious problem. But that strategic consent may not translate into the consent of a particular platoon; who is really under loose control from the top authority; and so how do you manage that tactical situation. It is a challenge we would not have discussed twenty years ago; but it is very much here today. I think in this forum, in the Challenges Forum, having that discussion is quite important.

The next point is linked to the first on the protection of civilians. The point made earlier today, that indeed it is much more than physical protection, it is an environment that creates the conditions for the civilians to feel secure. It is certainly impossible and it would set up peacekeepers for failure if they were expected to protect the civilians throughout their vast territories where they are deployed.

The word ‘protection’; I remember discussing it when we were in Australia last year. I have one reservation with the word ‘protection’ and that is that it puts us against them. The outsiders, who are going to offer our protection and those who are protected. The key challenge is to empower the civilians, so that you rebuild the fabric of society. So that there is trust among the people, that is the real response and that in a way is linked to the question that was discussed on communication and management of expectations.

Management of expectations can be understood as just communicating to the people that ‘we can only do so much for you’. I think we can, that is not the point. The point is broader than that. It is through communication, making the
people of the country you have come to help more aware of what you can do but also of what they can do. I think it is as important to communicate to the people about what they can do, through their own local organisations and local committees; they can begin to be empowered and contribute to their security.

Communication should not be defensive; it should be a much more ambitious exercise. I often said that the communication component of a mission; if it is well or true, is worth several battalions, because it is really about creating that perception throughout the country that you have come to help and that another future is possible. When people begin to believe this they actually have gone half the way. It really changes the whole dynamic. It is the fragmentation of societies, the feeling of powerlessness that contributes to powerlessness. When that feeling begins to disappear, the transformation is at hand. I think it is very true in a peacekeeping operation. It relates to what we discussed this afternoon, the relationship between the peacekeeping operation, the PO and the host country; the bridges and the communication that does or does not exist. How a mission does not isolate itself from the country and is population – is at the very heart of a successful mission.

Ms Annika Hilding Norberg, International Coordinator, Challenges Forum, Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden

Excellencies, Partners, Ladies and Gentlemen. We have indeed had a very rich day. Our Patron has reflected on the substantive deliberations of our Forum. I believe we have had discussions from which we can draw a wealth of ideas in order to try to improve the ways in which we think about, plan and implement our peacekeeping and peace operations (POs) around the world.

In the last session before lunch, Mr Le Roy and Ms Malcorra both discussed the many situations in which the UN is currently facing a number of tests. So we thought that we should add one, to test, – how many of us had the stamina to stay focused throughout a very dense day in order to engage on the findings of our three reports, discuss current issues pressing the missions, the secretariat and Member States. In short, thank you for sharing your time with us and engaging in a dialogue on issues that the broader Challenges Partnership believe is important and often consumes us. Thank you.

On behalf of the Challenges Partnership, I would like to thank the co-hosts for this first day of the Challenges Forum Seminar 2011: Pakistan, Australia, and Sweden, who have made considerable, thoughtful and very determined contributions to our common Challenges endeavour.
I would also like to express our thanks to our Egyptian Partners, who were intimately involved in the planning and development of the agenda for this meeting. Our Egyptian Partners have translated our Considerations study into Arabic and have just sent us a thoughtful and excellent discussion note on parameters to take into account in the further development of the Challenges Partnership. We are indeed looking forward to the Challenges Forum in Cairo and will be sure to inform you as soon as plans and dates have been finalised.

We know there are some of you that wish to have put forward questions and comments, but that time did not allow for it. We would encourage you to send us your thoughts, recommendations, questions and we will take them into account, to the extent possible, in the development of our future work.

I will say a few words about the Challenges Forum Seminar discussion here in the light of the idea and purpose of the Challenges Forum as a whole. Ambassador Ogwu opened our seminar this morning, highlighting the words ‘challenges’, ‘partnership’ and ‘internationalism’ – implicit in the name of the seminar – and suggested that these are also concepts that are criteria for successful UN Peacekeeping. Another speaker underlined that, where there is a will, there is always a way. And this – this is what the Challenges Partnership is all about. The Partners have a will to engage, to share, to learn and to think ahead, to develop stronger, more effective and more inclusive approaches to building our national and international capacities for the future. We do it by developing our capabilities in various ways, including by turning some of our peacekeepers into resource builders, as was mentioned by a speaker this morning.

The need to manage expectations was raised. This is indeed a critical issue and one that cannot be overestimated. However, if we turn the question around and ask ourselves what are our expectations of ourselves? I think in general, nothing less, than that we all do, our absolute best. That we do not end up passing the buck, as General Mehta witnessed that our Challenges Forum Patron would never do. So we should not do that either.

So how do we step up to the plate? Well, today we have presented some of our common major work; and today has given at least me, a number of ideas that I think would be worthwhile to explore further, to pursue, in order to be able to move forward together. I am sure you have picked up many more. In short, we need to develop our thinking, mobilise our resolve, and commit our human, financial and intellectual resources, to make at least the most important, improvements happen.

We will continue our work tomorrow in a slightly different setting; in our ‘Police Peacekeeping Forum’, which will be co-hosted with the UN Police Division. We will have 17 currently serving police commissioners and advisers, serving in missions from Darfur to Afghanistan, from Timor Leste to Sudan. We will have a unique opportunity to focus all our attention towards a group of our most important individuals – the men and women police peacekeeping leaders. They will discuss with us the most critical gaps currently facing them in the field, allowing us to elaborate on ways in which these can hopefully be overcome. We will also have an important and timely session on the broader theme of current challenges of rule of law (ROL) and security issues with the responsible leadership in the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the United Nations DPKO Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

The question was raised regarding the *Challenges Forum Report 2010*[^159] – do we look at the sum of all issues or do we look at a selection or each in turn. From a Challenges perspective, we seek to do both. Initiated in 1996, some 15 years ago, we seek to foster a global community of civilian, military and police peacekeeping colleagues. Not to be nice, or because it is nice. No, but because we believe it is a fundamental criterion to take an inclusive and collegial approach to tackling the challenges of modern peacekeeping and peace operations. It is indeed a precondition, if we wish to be able to assist people in need around the world, from the Cite’ Soleil in Haiti; where General Carlos dos Santos Cruz were operating with such distinction, to Rutshuru in Eastern Congo; where Anna-Linn Persson, our Challenges Desk Officer on leave, will be back in only a few days working with the local population to protect the civilians in the area.

Building on Mr Guéhenno’s remark just now about protection of civilians and that it risks pitching ‘us’ against ‘them’. We need also to protect our own men and women peacekeepers by ensuring that they get the political, financial; and in short, effective, support that they need and deserve. I cannot wait until tomorrow, when we will look even further into how we can all best assist our men and women, and not least, police peacekeepers in the field. Thank you!

Part III –
Challenges Police Forum
in New York
Challenges Police Forum

What are the Most Critical Police Peacekeeping Challenges for the Future?

Purpose: in the broader rule of law and security institutions context, to discuss current and emerging critical challenges and opportunities of policing in peace operations – what are the priorities and the possible solutions?

Commissioner Ann-Marie Orler, Police Adviser, Director of the Police Division, Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations

Excellencies, distinguished Guests and Colleagues, Ladies and Gentlemen, I am delighted to welcome you all here to New York and to the Challenges Police Forum, where we will consider the most critical challenges for police peacekeeping. This is the first time in the history of the International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations that a special session has been devoted to discussing the specific challenges faced by police in peace operations (POs) with all the police commissioners and advisers in the field. This follows yesterday’s discussions on the considerations for mission leadership as contained in the very useful study on the theme as presented by the Challenges partners yesterday.

Currently, the UN is authorised to deploy 17,300 police officers in 16 POs; 11 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) led (peacekeeping operations) and five Department of Political Affairs (DPA) led (political missions). This is the highest number of UNPOL ever in the history of the organisation. As of this morning, we had 14,377 officers on active duty. With 1,351 female officers, women make up about 9.8% of the police deployed in United Nations POs.

Today’s session presents an important opportunity to discuss some of the most difficult issues that we face in bringing together police officers from 88 of the 192 UN Member States to undertake the full spectrum of policing tasks in post-conflict societies; ranging from the provision of basic security, professional training and mentoring to assisting the host-state with the reform and rebuilding of its police and other law enforcement institutions.
The Police Division is in the process of developing a strategic doctrinal framework for international police peacekeeping. This will ultimately allow us to establish clearer and harmonised standards for UN policing, to identify the required capabilities and to develop the necessary training. But other issues remain. As I am here to start off the discussion, let me focus on just five points:

**The demand for numbers:** Today, the demand for international police peacekeepers – not just from the UN, but also from our partners: the African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU), other regional and sub-regional organisations, multi-national coalitions and bilateral programmes – is soaring. The drawdown’s and consolidations, which are impacting other areas of the peacekeeping family do not hold true when it comes to the demand for international police peacekeepers or police Sans Frontières. This trend looks to endure for the present and foreseeable future. The first question I ask all of you is; can our countries collectively sustain the current supply of police peacekeepers and not only maintain their quality, but look to improve upon it too?

**The complexity of tasks:** UN police mandates and tasks have significantly grown in scope and complexity since the creation of the first deployment of the UN police in the Congo in the 1960s. Today’s police peacekeepers can be expected to be deployed under at least one of the following three types of mandate:

- **Interim Policing with Executive Powers** – where UN police temporarily replace the host-state police and take full responsibility for the maintenance of law and order, as well as the prevention and investigation of crimes; as it did in Kosovo and Timor-Leste;
- **Operational Policing Support** – providing dynamic operational assistance to young police services or those seriously weakened by conflict in order that the ‘thin blue line’ of policing does not break and the rule of law is respected and maintained; and
- **Reform, Restructuring and Re-building of Police Institutions** – here our focus ranges from the professional development and appropriate training of individual police officers of the host-state to transforming its ‘police force’ into a ‘police service’ to sometimes literally rebuilding policing as an institution that serves the general public.

My second question to you is: police reform is always a complex and contentious issue – there are very few police reform stories that are universally hailed as being successful, so how can we successfully engender police reform in a peacekeeping context?

**Professional police peacekeepers:** Given the increased and constantly evolving complexity of police peacekeeping tasks, there is a growing need for more spe-
cialised policing capacities, which means that the way we are recruiting is changing. For example, the establishment of a dedicated capacity for Selection and Recruitment within the Police Division has allowed us to have a better dialogue with Member States, to develop better job descriptions and to communicate our needs more clearly to potential contributing countries. We have recognised the need to be more expedient in recruitment and rotation processes; but there is also a critical need for personnel with the right experience, understanding, knowledge and expertise. This is quite simply about getting the right people and to get them within a reasonable period of time. In the end, we need to be able to deliver on the ground. While we bear some of that burden, we need the cooperation of Member States, for example, when it comes to meeting the standards that we set for the quality of police officers and the skills we need in a mission.

At the request of Member States, together with our colleagues in the Integrated Training Service, we have launched several initiatives in the area of training and curriculum development. We have been working very closely with the police contributing countries on the pre-deployment training for individual police officers and are close to finalising the standardised pre-deployment curriculum for Formed Police Units as well as a specifically designed course to assist police peacekeepers in preventing and investigating sexual and gender-based crimes.

An issue that is close to my heart is that we have to work with Member States to make UN service a natural part of a police officer’s career. It is my goal to make international service as interesting and rewarding as possible for police officers and to motivate more highly qualified or specialised personnel to deploy on an international mission. At the same time, we want to encourage Member States to raise awareness of international deployments in their police services and to ensure that there are career incentives to being seconded to a UN mission. My third question: how do we make peacekeeping assignments more attractive professionally to police officers as well as their respective police services? And my forth question is how do we ensure that the next generation of police peacekeeping command staff are appropriately prepared to effectively deliver on mandated tasks?

Gender-balanced policing: We know from each of our domestic experiences that policing is most effective when it is reflective of the society it serves. So, I would like to take the opportunity to mention a particular dimension of recruitment, which is our global effort to increase the share of female police officers to 20% by 2014. Again, this requires partnership with you and your countries. I continuously urge Member States to increase efforts to nominate more women for deployment to international peacekeeping missions. But also to review the recruitment requirements and procedures for international deployment to
ensure that female candidates are not unduly restricted from applying. My fifth question is: how can the UN police reflect gender parity when women are still dramatically under-represented in the majority of domestic police services?

The enemies of peace: Serious and organised crime is prevalent in many conflict areas; and is an emerging challenge for the UN. Organised crime is a complex phenomenon that requires engagement from all components of UN peacekeeping operations. Many of you may be familiar with our West African Coast Initiative (WACI). It was triggered by the recognition that countries and police services in the region would have to work together to deal with the major destabilising influence of transnational organised crime. This led to a partnership between INTERPOL and the UN family of the DPKO, DPA and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC); and a regional approach through the UN Office for West Africa, where we are assisting the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to implement their Regional Action Plan on transnational organised crimes and drug trafficking where we have POs.

The first Transnational Organised Crime Unit (TCU) has been established in Sierra Leone and work is currently underway to support the creation of a TCU in Liberia. The first phase of WACI will be complete when TCUs are operating in each of the four pilot countries of Ivory Coast, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone. My sixth question is: how can the United Nations police (UNPOL) components effectively integrate criminal information analysis capabilities in order to enhance their assistance to host-state police and other law enforcement agencies to counter transnational organised crime?

In closing, the purpose of this morning’s Challenges Police Forum is to contribute to the global dialogue on the preparation, implementation and evaluation of the police role in POs, to generate practical recommendations and to encourage action for their effective implementation through open and engaged discussion. My colleagues and I would like to hear from you about your views on good practices, obstacles and challenges, as well as recommendations for how we can help each other to reach our shared goals.

I am pleased to inform you that we are joined by the 14 heads of the UN police components, who are in NY for our annual meeting. To open this panel, I have asked Mr Gautam Sawang, the Police Commissioner from the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL); and Mr Rudi Landeros, the Senior Police Adviser from the United Nations Integrated Peace-Building Office in Sierra Leone (UNI-PSIL), to each make a short presentation, so that you can hear the ‘ground truth’ from the field. Dr William Durch from the Stimson Centre; who is well-known to many of you, has agreed to act as the Moderator. I have asked the entire group of Police Commanders to participate in the questions and answers
Mr Gautam Sawang, Police Commissioner, UNMIL, United Nations

Excellences, Madame Police Adviser Commissioner Ann-Marie Orlé, distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen. Let me thank the Police Adviser for the introduction to this session. My name is Gautam Sawang, serving as the Head of the Police Component as Police Commissioner in the United Nation Mission in Liberia. I am an Inspector General of Police in the Indian Police Service. I will now proceed by first addressing issues related to the United Nations Police (UNPOL) in Liberia and the challenges faced in implementing the mandate on the ground.

The UNPOL component in the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) is currently comprised of an authorised strength of 1375, including 498 UNPOL advisers and seven Formed Police Units (FPUs). The mission is in phase three of the drawdown with a military presence of 8,000. When the mission started it had a strength of 15,000 military ranks; during the second phase of the drawdown it was scaled down to ten; today it is 8,000.

The UNPOL officers are deployed strategically throughout Liberia, as well as strong co-locations elements at the Liberian National Police Headquarters, at the National Police Training Academy and at the Liberian Bureau of Immigration Headquarters. In terms of security, Liberia remains relatively calm, but with a fragility that can, without notice, turn tranquillity in to chaos.

Liberia’s borders remain porous; and the sub region has yet to shed its reputation for instability; with a case in point the current situation in Côte d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast). In this backdrop, the Liberian National Police have a current strength of about 4,000 officers; which is per the set benchmark; and the bureau of immigration has about 1,700 officers. Both the national police and the immigration services are critically challenged in terms of infrastructure, logistics and budget. Due to a lack of basic foundational systems of command, control, administration and basic legal operations; both services remain institutionally weak as they strive towards gaining credibility and legitimacy in their new settings.

In terms of composition, the national police are a young force with roughly two thirds of the force having less than five years of active police service. The Immigration Bureau, on the other hand, is comprised almost fully of officers whom...
have been in service or that have entered into service either pre-conflict or during the conflict and remain without formal immigration training. The UNPOL’s mandate in Liberia is very broad when compared to the conventional mandates of the years past during which monitoring, assisting and providing security comprised the bulk of the UNPOL activity.

The FPUs carry the bulk of operations, supporting Liberian National Police. The UNPOL advisers and trainers are responsible for the training, reform, restructuring, rebuilding and development of the national police; in a sense, capacity building. UNPOL has increasing responsibilities for assisting the Liberian Bureau of Immigration and Naturalisation in the reform and development processes.

The role of the UNPOL has progressively evolved as Liberia has evolved. Early on, the mission focus was on development of basic training and setting in place the foundations upon which police reform and development can proceed. Concurrently, the FPUs were very active responding to law and order issues and crisis situations. This was followed by a period of consolidation as the training process was formalised and expanded; and the areas in need of immediate development prioritised, including support to restore a national police presence throughout Liberia through a sustainment of national police officers deployed in the county at all levels.

Today, the mission and the government of Liberia have embarked on transition planning, the process of which is providing significant insight into many operational and development gaps facing the national police and immigration services. While this sounds very straightforward, it is not. The demands and expectations placed upon the UNPOL often exceed not only the ground realities. The complexities, processes and strategies for delivery on capacity building and development often exceed the individual capacity of the UNPOL officers in the mission.

UNPOL may be quite proficient at transferring basic skills to officers. We are struggling though to enable institutional changes and development of the national police and the immigration services; therefore I would return to the basics. The UNPOL is a diverse collection of officers with varying skill sets and experiences gathered from many countries; and in our case it is 39 countries. While the majority have eight years of specialisation and can work quite proficiently in their own systems; they falter and are often frustrated, when placed in dynamic mission settings.

UNPOL are expected to ‘drop in and deliver.’ They are expected to not only impart knowledge of their own experiences; but there is a need for the officers
to have the ability to transpose their knowledge and experience into functional systems in the context and realities of the host national police service. In Liberia, the approach of delivery for capacity building to the national police and immigration service goes beyond the familiar co-location and into the realm of program and project development and implementation. This strategic approach is sound; but not without challenges. There is an expectation that UNPOL have the requisite experience, knowledge and understanding to adequately advise and lead their counterparts in their strategic development process.

We are finding that this experience is rare within the UNPOL; but for those who have this experience, the impact can be substantial. The Liberian National Police and the Liberian Bureau of Immigration both have strategic developmental plans. Without question, they have formalised their strategies, which have served to entice the dormant communities into taking a closer look; and in many cases coming forward with funding support. But within this context; I believe, there are also missed opportunities as critical gaps are inadvertently overlooked; the UNPOL is limited in its capacities to adequately assess and advise on areas in need of assistance.

As I would again impress: while the majority of the UNPOL deployed in the mission have requisite technical proficiencies, they lack fundamental capacities for an understanding of critical processes, including planning, project design, project implementation, monitoring and evaluation, cost and resource analysis. Further, it is often assumed that a UNPOL officer brings to mission a capacity for not only identifying institutional shortcomings; but also, in designing a solution, such as thorough policy, procedural development; and the introduction of system and processes management. This is a tall order for a generalist UNPOL officer; and it is providing a tall order for even senior long-experienced police officers.

Let me now state what we believe are pressing challenges, not only as we implement our mandate in Liberia; but also the challenges that other missions now and in the future may have to grapple with:

- Ground realities, demands and expectations, exceed not only the individual capacities of the UNPOL to assist an institutional level capacity building and system development and integration. Often the demands are based on experiences that cannot be uniformly adapted from one mission to another, or that are based upon only an understanding of the situation in one’s own environment.
- Recruitment. We believe that at the heart of the matter is that of recruitment, combined with innovative means to draw in competencies that support the overall delivery of police reform and development in line with intentions of the mandate and in a manner that assures sus-
tainability of a post mission. Finding and recruiting the right UNPOL, or those whom have the right skills and experience to quickly adapt to the mission demands must be priority one for the mission, such as the UNMIL and for all missions in the future. This may require development of officers for future deployments. It may require drawing upon other components within the mission to supplement police components; and it may also require recruitments of ‘business savvy civilians’ with expertise in the areas of development, such as administration, finance, change management, institutional systems and processes.

- Mission settings are fluid and often politically charged. The nature of work, the complexity of the issues, the external forces and ever-changing circumstances and dynamics often served to incapacitate a force, or lend to midstream changes in course. Regardless of the best laid plans or intentions, shifting or diverging political considerations and agendas often critically impact upon police reform and development. While the process cannot isolate itself from such considerations, the UNPOL are not trained to negotiate or successfully meander through such scenarios and situations.

- Institution building is at the root of effective and sustainable police reform and development in post conflict settings. This is a hard sell, as there remains a fundamental, narrow understanding that rebuilding a post-conflict police service is simply a matter of training and equipping; and to a lesser extent providing some infrastructure; and that training is an assurance of integrity within the police.

- Prevailing negative perceptions of the police, including the UNPOL, are often based upon prior personal experience or lack of understanding of police as professionals. From many corners of the peacekeeping community as well as among national and international partners, the police are not always perceived in a positive light; as there is limitation in the understanding of the context; the critical role that the police play in providing security; establishing a rule of law (ROL) and laying the foundation for a sustainable development in post-conflict theatres.

- Local or national ownership must be balanced and not just based on the outcomes; but all the processes. At the same time, one has to be guarded that the ownership may not be at the expense of the UN core principles and standards upon which UN supportive reform or development must embrace. Often, pressures to achieve this ‘buy-in’ result in a degradation of the desired outcome of the reform processes. This is further compounded when there are competing agendas and multiple actors engaged or driving the initiatives. It therefore calls for an understanding of the local settings and mind-sets, traditions and cultures, other nuances which influences and governs the nature of engagement and the conservations.
Multidimensional missions and integrated missions offer unique benefits and opportunities but also challenges at the same time. Sharing work, joint programs and mutual support are among the benefits. However, the diversity and approach and perspective are among the challenges. For example in the UNPOL perspective and approach we view things from a very time bound perspective. We have to achieve our aim of an operationally effective and sustainable Liberia National Police (LNP) by the end of our mission. This aim differs from an agency that would view the LNP as something to be supported long beyond the life of the mission; hence there are differing views on, for example, prioritisation or if funding is involved; there may also be competing interests. Hence, in this environment, the UNPOL struggles to maintain its specific and distinct component identity as the lead entity when it comes to other than operational police matters.

Taking note of the challenges faced, I would like you to consider these in the context of peacekeeping and peacebuilding in Liberia today. The strategy goal of UNMIL is: ‘To assist the government of Liberia to consolidate peace; and achieve a steady state of security with national institutions that are able to maintain security and stability, independently of the mission of peacekeeping.’ In September 2010; while extending the mandate of the UN mission in Liberia, the UN Security Council resolution on Liberia recognised that: ‘Lasting stability in Liberia and the sub region, requires well-functioning and sustainable government institutions, including security and ROL. The Council also recognised the significant challenges that remain across all sectors including continuing problems with violent crime.’

Before closing I will now briefly describe the situation in Liberia; and place it within the context of the challenges facing the UNPOL and also in the context of the challenges recognised in our mandate. As for the security sector reform strategy; the armed forces of Liberia is 2,000 strong, comprised of two operational units and one support element, now, with the specific responsibility of providing security and protection against external aggression with no responsibilities of internal security, whatsoever. The background of this decision has, I presume, taken into consideration the role of the military in the instability of the country in the region. Therefore providing security in Liberia rests purely on the LNP and to a certain extent, the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalisation. The threat to security in Liberia as well as the possible potential threat to the instability of the country leads from internal rather than external sources.

As for the benchmarks; the LNP stands at 4,000, which consists of 3,500 LNP officers and 500 Emergency Response Unit (ERU). Having reached the benchmark; now the question is whether the LNP is in a position to provide security
in Liberia? As for the presence of the LNP on the ground; we have 168 locations of LNPs, of which as many as 24 locations are not manned because of scarcity of manpower. Out of the remaining LNP we have about 95 or 96 locations which have a strength of less than six (unarmed) on the ground. The only armed component of the LNP is the ERU which stands today at 333, which is confined to Monrovia only. Therefore, while we are planning the drawdown and transition, we need to take into consideration the fact that security today in Liberia has been provided purely by the UN security agencies. The UN forces consist primarily of UN military armed forces based in 32 locations across the country; complemented by four FPUs.

If we visualise a scenario of rapid UNMIL military drawdown beginning soon after the election; say early 2012, the question is: would the LNP be in a position to provide security? With this in mind, are the aims described today adequate to achieve this? Principally, will the planned development of the LNPs and the end of 2011 target to generate a 1,000 strong police support unit be enough to fill in the locations left by withdrawn UNMIL? Is 1,000 LNP adequate to take over from 8,000 UN military, plus about 875 FPUs of the UN, UNMIL?

To draw a parallel with Sierra Leone; the area of Liberia is about 110,000 square km, with a population of 3.5 million. Sierra Leone has an area of 70,000 square km with a population of 5.6 million. The police force in Liberia is 4,000, whereas in Sierra Leone it is more than 10,000 and they are looking at a figure of 12,000 by 2012. Sierra Leone, in addition, has a military force of around 8,500, scaled down from 15,000 military with express responsibilities of providing security and support for internal security and support, which is not the case in Liberia which has only 2,000 armed forces. So, while planning the transition, we are now facing challenges as to how the process has to be undertaken. We choose to be optimistic, because it is a visible and very apparent quest for peace in Liberia, which is all-prevailing and this reassures all the stakeholders. Thank you.

Mr Rudolfo Landeros, Senior Police Adviser, UNIPSIL, United Nations

Good morning, I am from the State of Texas and the senior police adviser for the mission in Sierra Leone. First, my colleagues and I would like to say that we are honoured and thank each one of you for being here as we know that many of you are movers and shakers, who can make a positive change for our missions.
Our two main priority tasks in the United Nations Integrated Peace-Building Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) are, first, to prepare the Sierra Leone police for the 2012 elections; and second, to enhance the capacity of the Government to fight against organised crime and trafficking of illicit narcotics; basically cocaine. Make no mistake about it, there is a major problem in West Africa with the shipment of illicit drugs.

Let me give you a quick sample of my team. It is composed of 12 officers and five of them are focussed on drug and addiction, assisting the government of Sierra Leone to fight organised crime and narcotics. In 2008 at the request of the office of the national security, the UNIPSIL team was asked to help to come up with something to stop the flow of cocaine coming to Sierra Leone. We the United Nations police (UNPOL) team began work on this in February 2008 by bringing in a lot of government stake holders. About a year and hundreds of meetings later, we had developed the Drug and Addiction Taskforce. It was a fancy name to get these agencies to work together and trust each other. In the later part of 2010, the Joint Drug and Addiction Taskforce became the Transnational Organised Crime Unit (TCU). The TCU consists of these agencies (reference slide). We were able to bring together all the different agencies to sit at the same table, work together and share information. What is very interesting is that on 12th July the taskforce became partially operational and on the 13th July the taskforce seized 703.5 kg of Cocaine, a twin engine craft, five AK-47s. Within 24 hours the taskforce had arrested the main culprits involved in the criminal operation. They arrested about 56 people, but the ones we were mainly concerned about were four Columbians, two Venezuelans, an American and a Cuban. The small twin engine aircraft had been modified for mid-flight refuelling and it flew from Venezuela to Sierra Leone.

The TCU is tasked to investigate these types of cases. With the help of the UNPOL in Sierra Leone we have assisted the government of Sierra Leone to establish some really close relationships with the Venezuelan National Anti-Drug Office (ONA), the Spanish Organised Crime and Drug Organisation, the United States Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and British Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA). The information the TCU are getting from friends such as the Spanish Organised Crime and Drug Organisation and ONA, includes for instance that the aircraft mentioned had landed in Sierra Leone on three different occasions. Our friends found and tracked this aircraft in Brazil. We also received information from our friends that on six different occasions, six different ships trafficking cocaine were bound for Sierra Leone. For instance, in 2009, there was a ship bound for Sierra Leone with about a tonne of cocaine; fortunately for us there was a United States (US) coast guard ship performing training for Sierra Leone and included members of the TCU. The ‘bad guys’ probably found this out and they rerouted their ship to a different location.
Information we received from our friends also indicated that there was one ship trafficking cocaine found in Sierra Leone. Another ship was found that had left from Sierra Leone trafficking cocaine destined for Spain. When it was stopped, they were found to be involved in human trafficking and were smuggling about 89 diamonds. The cocaine was not found and it was speculated that the cocaine had been dropped off at another location.

In September, the ‘Joint Transnational Taskforce’; just before they became the TCU; arrested a main suspect, who was involved in the 2008 case, but had fled the country. The TCU arrested the suspect with information on his person that indicated he had returned to Sierra Leone to organise another big shipment of cocaine into the country. The US DEA in May/June arrested several suspects who were trying to smuggle 4,000kg of cocaine into Liberia and Ghana. What is very interesting about this case is that the suspect; ‘TK’, was also the main suspect in our case of 2008, but had escaped. The rest of the persons arrested in 2009 coincided with the time ‘TK’ was starting up his operation in Liberia.

You are probably asking why I am giving you all this information? This is to show you that there is a major problem with organised crime and smuggling narcotics into the country.

One of the main problems that we are seeing right now is that it is very difficult to find UNPOL officers with the right specific skill sets. This is a problem throughout all the missions; but when you are dealing with investigating and tackling the organised crime issues you better have some advisers that have the experience and the expertise in handling and investigating these types of cases. Our officers will be training, teaching, instructing and educating the country on how to tackle these problems and how to investigate the cases. This is what I am trying to express to you today that it is important that you send our units and our missions people with the skills that we need; that the country needs. Some of the skills that we need regard for instance financial crimes, we need experts in investigating organised crime and narcotics, we need experts in dynamic entry. I am hoping that some of you will carry this message back to your respective countries, because this is a critical issue especially as the problem of narcotics is growing in leaps and bounds. As you probably already know; the average price in Europe is 60,000 United States dollars (USD) per kg. We need the best specialists and officers, as they are going to train the host country to combat this.

One of the main problems is that the contributing countries have got to understand that when the UNPOL ask for officers with specific skill sets that it is critical that we get those types of officers. I know it is very difficult to release some of your best, but we have taken a stand in West Africa to hopefully keep what is occurring in Mexico from occurring in West Africa and stopping some
of those drugs heading into your countries. We need and contributing countries have got to understand, that when we ask for these types of officers, if you can, send them to us.

The bottom line is send us your best, send us the people with the required skill sets and the expertise. Regarding funding, the West Africa Coast Initiative (WACI) requires funding. The WACI is a pilot of project that includes Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau and Côte d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast). There is a basket fund, which distributes funding to the pilot projects. Thank you.

Maj. Gen. Jean-Marie Bourry, Police Commissioner, UNOCI
Mr Luis Carrilho, Police Commissioner, UNMIT,
Mr Moussa Coulibaly, Senior Police Adviser, UNPOS
Ch. Supt John Farrelly, Senior Police Adviser, UNFICYP
Mr Nelson Werlang Garcia, Senior Police Adviser, UNIOGBIS
Supt. Ann-Kristin Kvilekval, Senior Police Adviser, UNAMA
Ms Agathe Florence Lele, Senior Police Adviser, BINUB
Dir.Gen. James Oppong-Boanuh, Police Commissioner, UNAMID
Mr Marc Tardif, Acting Police Commissioner, MINUSTAH
Mr Mustafa Resat Tekinbas, Senior Police Adviser, UNMIK
Mr Klaus-Dieter Tietz, Acting Police Commissioner, UNMIS
Gen. Abdallah Wafy, Police Commissioner, MONUSCO

Facilitator and Discussant: Dr William Durch, Senior Research Fellow, Stimson Centre, United States

Thank you. You get the idea, the depth and breadth of the experience sitting here on this panel. Commissioner Orler asked me to make a few provocative remarks before we go to question and answer.

The first issue is concerned with why context matters. Drawing on the first two presentations of the Challenges Police Forum, unlike military peacekeeping, police peacekeeping draws on a pool of labour not normally orientated or as readily re-orientated to peacekeeping needs. They are much more closely involved in cultural change; both in the host nation police and the host nation public and as it regards the police. This takes time even if you have all the money you need, which you do not.
Second, Sierra Leone shows us that the issues that police components face in helping to build the host nation police are not just local, not just a matter of retraining for public security in the mission area, but enabling the police to deal with regional issues that come across pores post conflicts that may have global origins and connections.

Why quality matters: if every officer now serving in United Nations (UN) operations were the right fit for the assigned task and a top performing professional I would assert the UN might be able to accomplish the same tasks it has now with half as many people. Properly motivated and compensated, financially and professionally, especially in terms of their future careers having served in a UN operation.

Why leadership matters: without effective expression of commissioners intent by an experienced head of component who interprets policing elements of the mission mandate and formulates wise directions to his or her officers, the police component is just a bunch of people who sort of dress alike.

Why women matter in the police components: most of the damage in most of the conflicts in the world has been inflicted by men and a lot of it on women. Half the populations of post conflict countries are female. Women police can better relate to, better communicate with, take statements from and build confidence in these women and men in conflict affected areas. I would deploy all of them with arms if you want civilian protection. How better to get it?

Why criminal information systems, analysis and networks matter: who in this room would knowingly step into an unmapped mine field? If you would not do that why would you step in to a criminal rich, order poor environment without as much knowledge as you can get about the criminals and other sources of disorder? How can you even advise credibly, if you do not know what is going on?

Finally, what does it take to achieve police reform in post-conflict environments? The collective experience on this desk right now is as great an assemblage on the subject as you will find in the world. So maybe we should ask them? And maybe the answer is not just one big thing? Maybe it is a lot of small things? I would like to segue now to the discussion and to your questions for the commissioners and I would invite responses to each question from as many of the commissioners who care to respond.
Interactive discussion with the floor

A seminar participant asked about a fundamental challenge that seemed to come out of the presentations given which was the availability in number and skill level of police in missions. Given that these skills often were scarce commodities in peacekeeping contributing countries; what could be done to make more police officers available for UN peacekeeping operations?

Maj. Gen. Jean-Marie Bourry responded that recruitment of qualified police officers could be improved through better promotion and marketing of peacekeeping within contributing nations. The new United Nations Police (UNPOL) logo as shown in the room was a good example of how to better market the area. In addition, there was a need for representatives within contributing nations to speak about and promote the police component requirement in peacekeeping operations. Once both elements were in place, there would be a fertile ground for recruitment and they would be better prepared to face the challenges.

Mr Nelson Werlang Garcia commented that focus should be on their efforts to try to make their officers be project managers as well. They had experienced many situations in which the trend of the future might be to increase the reform in the police. In that sense it was important that the officers have the knowledge/skill sets necessary to elaborating projects or implementing them in the missions. This would provide greater impact on the efforts delivered by the UNPOL and provide greater changes.

Mr Moussa Coulibaly suggested that one practical solution would be to pull the resources of separate contributing countries together by establishing for example regional training centres for officers that could equip the UNPOL with the necessary mission skill sets. Returning police officers from missions could then replicate their skills and transfer their experiences at the centres and help create a pool of more officers to serve in missions.

Commissioner Ann-Marie Orler said that the linkage between national and international police mission operations held a good potential to make UN peacekeeping mission commitments more attractive for contributing nations. The West Africa Coast Initiative (WACI) for example was an excellent project through which it could be shown where police officers from for example European countries go to West Africa to tackle preventive issues and prevent drugs reaching their home nations.

Mr Gautam Sawang elaborated on that there was definitely a need to engage with the police contributing countries (PCC) as well as the United Nations...
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the mission in a discerning manner to identify the needs in particular mission contexts. Every mission went through various phases. In the initial inception they may need only numbers, then as the mission grew there was a greater need for quality. The police division had a separate recruitment cell primarily to look at these areas of engaging better with the PCCs and trying to understand the needs of a particular mission. He suggested it was very difficult for contributing nations to provide the necessary quality or specialists due to these services also being required at home as well. Perhaps the answer was to have a balance; for example if 20 officers were required then ten could be generalists and five with specific skill sets needed for the particular mission etc. There was a need to look at the issue in a very discerning manner instead of the current general tendency of PCCs to simply send batches of officers.

Ch. Supt John Farrelly responded that in some contributing countries including his own, there was a perception that officers volunteering to missions somehow were abandoning their home police force. These officers then returned from the mission and were not credited for the mission experience. In order to get some of the better police officers into the missions, there needed to be much more pride within the contributing police forces for them to give their best; and the officer needs to be credited for the commitment when they came back; even acting as a step towards promotion on return. It needed to be viewed as a privilege to serve with the UN and not as walking away or even to be considered as ‘going on holiday for a year’. If this change in perception occurred then this would address the problems outlined in a significant way.

Mr Luis Carrilho, Police Commissioner, suggested that usually international police missions only test the police officers arriving in a mission on basic language, driving and shooting skills. Contributing nations were relied upon to assess police officers for more specialised skills required by missions. This was where the relationship between the contributing countries and missions needs required fine-tuning to ensure that the best people were active in missions. Ultimately, it was important that the mission police officers came with the proper attitude and motivation to better serve the country and the UN mission.

Supt. Ann-Kristin Kvilekval speaking on behalf of a female perspective, agreed with many of her colleagues. She had discussed the issue of recruitment with female colleagues who wanted to apply. She proposed that it was necessary to think outside the box and think in new ways. It was still a fact that females were the ones delivering babies to this world and many female colleagues felt that a one year contract away from family was too long. Maybe it was time to think of new ways; granting it was problematic from a logistical point of view, but why not six or eight months; as 12 months seemed a very long time.
A seminar participant raised a question about policing being part of the criminal justice system, what were some of the functions beyond policing that most support the work of the police, if it was done early in a peacekeeping mission? In other words; in the prosecutable, judicial or corrections areas: what were some of the functions that perhaps do not get the early attention that they need in order to support the policing function?

Mr Luis Carrilho responded that this was indeed a critical issue for the police side. The other actors in the justice system were essential and would be reflected in the actions of the police. In the case of Timor-Leste, they had an executive mandate for the police, but the police according to the sovereign law of Timor-Leste serve the prosecutor, who directs the criminal investigation. If there was no strong criminal justice system, this failure would be reflected in the actions of the police and consequently the population would not see justice being made. This was especially relevant in a state where ‘traditional justice’ was in opposition to ‘formal justice’. It was therefore important in the beginning of a mission, that not only was it needed to pay attention to the police, but also to make sure there were proper systems of accountability within the justice system.

Mr Klaus-Dieter Tietz elaborated that many police serve on the African continent, where traditional justice plays a very important role. For example in Southern Sudan, where he was serving, it was fixed in the constitution that traditional justice was part of the whole system. This made it difficult for the UN police to handle the situation, because the village elders were responsible for cases. On the other hand, he agreed that in Sudan there was a situation where the international community was greatly supporting the police and the correction system, but in the middle area of state prosecutors and judges etc. there was a real gap. This created human rights violation problems in police stations, where detainees were held for weeks without seeing any prosecutors or judges. He felt it was very important that the international community took action in this field by helping to fill the gap between the prison service and police.

Mr Rudolfo Landeros referred to the example he gave earlier about a male arrested entering a country in 2008; that case went to court, which he re-sat a total of 36 times. The reason for this large number was that the prosecutor did not go to the court case and attend the proceedings. Another example of problems in the judiciary involved one suspect who had been arrested with 1.5 kg of cocaine in his stomach. The judge that heard the case fined him less than one thousand USD. Under a Sierra Leone law passed in 2008 this crime should have received a life prison sentence. The answer to the question was to have a representative from the United States State Department who was very knowledgeable in criminal law; be embedded within or mentor the judiciary on a day to day basis with eyes on to help prevent some of these types of examples given.
Mr Nelson Werlang Garcia proposed that it was crucial to understand that actions taken by the police were not isolated, but instead in the context of a holistic security sector reform (SSR), was seen as a process to be taken within the country. To illustrate the challenges that they faced; when there was a country where more or less one half of the population was illiterate; and a huge proportion of that half were women; it was easy to understand why there are great problems when traditional justice prevails. Police and justice reform had to be combined with a number of peacebuilding programs along with a UN agency country team on the ground and with the efforts of bilateral and multinational entities. Nothing could be seen or done in isolation; instead the approach had to be holistic and performed in an integrated manner.

Mr Marc Tardif raised an example from Haiti, out of the correction, justice and police institutions, the police were the only institution considered to be working properly. The problem had been that after police officers were trained and they performed their job on the street by arresting suspects, the result was often that no charges followed, because the justice system was not in sync. They had a situation where some Haiti judges were working for only 50 minutes a day; a situation which gave a feeling of no light at the end of the tunnel. There was lots of pressure to bring the justice institutions up to speed in order to make a change, but everything took time. The main problem was that different ministers with different portfolios did not want to work at the same speed or towards a common agenda.

A seminar participant raised the issue of international policing as a recognised concept. He said that out of his 20 years of police service, 10 have been spent within international policing. Yet the term ‘international policing’ still did not officially exist. Three out of these years was spent in Brussels, where he saw the same dilemma in a European Union (EU) context of not recognising the UNPOL component of peacekeeping. It was not reflected in either the Headquarters (HQ) or documents that UN policing was related to the civil society, early peacebuilding, the police service function and the rule of law (ROL) as a whole. Listening to the presentations of the Challenges Police Forum, he was struck by the need for ‘Criminal Intelligence Capability’; another expression that was forbidden. Not even ‘Police peacekeeping’ was allowed in the UN context. He would be interested to learn more about the WACI initiative, where various police specifics in terms of mandate, cooperation with the host nation, in terms of tasks related to the police work and how that could be dealt with in the other missions. The mandates would guide what the police officers on the ground would do; but it was time to raise police adviser concerns of the demand in growth of having representative numbers and ability to perform police tasks. What kind of situations was the international community subjecting seconded officers to when they were deployed without even having some kind of intelli-
gence or analysis of a local situation; forcing the police instead to utilise military sources that did not provide criminal intelligence? Could this be changed? Directed specifically at the United Nations HQ: what was needed to respond to the questions raised here because the Member States seemed ready and willing to support?

Another seminar participant inquired that eighteen months ago, the UN entered into an agreement with Interpol as a first step to operationalize UNPOL peacekeeping operations. What progress if any had been made in relation to that agreement?

Commissioner Ann-Marie Orler responded beginning with the last question regarding the Interpol and the DPKO police division agreement. What had been done since then was to undertake a joint visit to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) with the aim to see in practical terms how Interpol could support both the mission and the host state. Out of this, they were also working on the action plan as had been mentioned, with the next step being to get it into the C34 (Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations) within the UN system and to secure the required political will from the UN Member States. An Interpol service member from the trip had also worked with the UN Police Division for a two week study visit looking to see what else could be done through cooperation. On the question concerning ‘intelligence’; historically it had been forbidden to use the word ‘intelligence’ but this restriction was not as bad at the time of the Challenges Police Forum. The UN Police Division’s budget included a police analyst, whom was now under recruitment to start build the system to address how all the information could be used. Every day there were thousands of reports being drawn up in missions, but they currently did not use the information. It was moving slowly, but it was moving in the right direction. Commissioner Orler concluded by saying that they would have a position at HQ to start building the analysis system and enhance the capacity within all the missions.

Mr Mustafa Resat Tekinbas also responded with regard to Interpol. Before the new WACI agreement was signed, the United Nations Kosovo mission signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) in 2004 to run an Interpol office. It was unique among UN missions to have the executive power in Kosovo and to run an Interpol office together with local authorities. With regards to Intelligence Led Policing (ILP), he very much appreciated the Swedish support to ILP projects in Kosovo. The term ‘intelligence’ within ILP was misunderstood, it did not mean wiretapping and surveillance, instead it started with foot patrolling. This was not collection of information from the local society, but instead information for the purposes of understanding the society and sharing the information with relevant units, including civilian partners. ILP was also related to
analysis for example of identifying what were the priorities in peacekeeping policing issues. The intelligence from different sources helped them to analyse the security and other policing issues for better planning for the future.

Mr Nelson Werlang Garcia illustrated the difference and how sensitive it could be in dealing with critical/sensitive information, because this also related to the security of officers on the ground. The WACI initiative as a partnership between Interpol and the DPKO would enhance the capacity of operational investigative units, but needed to be coordinated amongst the internal security services and at sub regional level. The four missions identified to host the establishment of these new units were doing their utmost to speed up the process to establish the units in the quickest time possible. This was in line with reinforcing the capabilities of Interpol offices within the host countries; because it was obvious intelligence would need to come from somewhere and as the Interpol office received support they would also be able to better operate, share information and assist in the process. None of these efforts could be disconnected from a holistic SSR process that was ongoing in the country. It had to be coordinated and connected with that process. Otherwise the effort itself would not produce the impact sought. As with regards to the need to reform the criminal justice system; the Guinea-Bissau mission SSR section had a four pillar structure of defence reform; judicial reform; ‘disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration’ (DDR) and police reform. Other missions would have similar structures and with the same focus. In addition there were programs ongoing within the different UN family agencies presented on the ground coordinating their efforts to achieve the results sought.

Maj. Gen. Jean-Marie Bourry underscored the UNPOL need for high quality intelligence. A good example was the Ivory Coast where through mentoring and monitoring with a large program of patrol amongst the population, they had been able to build a network of relationships. All of this knowledge was especially useful if the situation changed in a critical way as they would have connections to a lot of people who could be shared with, and be provided by, intelligence. The whole of the mission benefited from this specific UNPOL approach.

Dir. Gen. James Oppong-Boanuh elaborated on what do with the officers they were given in missions. There were two classes of UNPOL officers; the regular and the Formed Police Unit (FPU) which was a form of armed paramilitary police officers, who provided public order management protection to society. In certain specific areas like Darfur, where there was conflict fluidity, these FPU officers protected the individual deployed UNPOL officers working towards implementing the various mission mandates. In Darfur, the FPUs would for example protect the UNPOL officers performing mandated duties of capacity
building the police. Protection of civilians was generally a core mission mandate and therefore the FPUs would also protect civilians. This was illustrated in Darfur where women and children were escorted to farms and brought back home by FPUs. In Darfur, they also engaged in community patrols to give the communities confidence in the system. In addition, a core function was to give society confidence in their local police. In Darfur due to the conflict history, the police were not permitted to enter some societies and therefore one of the functions of the UNPOL was to bring together the local communities and society. A good example of achieving this was a local police organised football match against internally displaced persons (IDPs) inside the IDP camp. After the football match the situation improved and the local police were allowed to routinely enter the IDP camp.

Mr Rudolfo Landeros suggested that the WACI program was innovative as it looked holistically at the whole issue of organised crime and narcotics in West Africa. It was a very expensive program, but for example in Sierra Leone, the program also provided training assistance to not only the police or the transnational organised crime unit, but to the judiciary, customs, immigration, the military maritime wing and the police maritime wing. So it looked at the issue as a whole and not just the law enforcement part. It was indeed a very expensive venture; to launch the project in each country it had cost about five million United States dollars (USD) a piece, totalling approximately 50 million USD for the entire program. Sierra Leone had received a tremendous amount of funding from the United States equalling roughly around two million USD, 1.4 million USD from the Dutch and assistance from the Irish, Italians and Germans. A stand was taken in West Africa; because if a stand was taken there, to stop it there, they could reduce the flow of cocaine heading into Europe.

Mr Moussa Coulibaly added in relation to collaboration and cooperation with Interpol that generally the UNPOL was intervening in fragile or just emerging states; which meant that the UNPOL was focussing generally on community level policing. An example from Somalia illustrated that there were almost no police, so they had to focus on training the police to stabilise the community and only in the very last stage did they then intervene by training the specialised units. Since he said that UNPOL did not intervene in intelligence, they tried to make a link between the specialised units and Interpol or International police intervening in very specialised crime. It was very important to emphasise that they were not intervening in Intelligence; but they could facilitate and train specialised units to have links to specialised international police.

A seminar participant asked about how goals in partnerships with others could be achieved. In New York there was a discussion on the peacekeeping-peacebuilding nexus; and many missions were mandated to build police capacity on
the national and local level, an issue discussed by the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) Commissioner. The police was therefore early peacebuilders and not only peacekeepers. How was practical cooperation conducted in the field with other UN agencies; such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) had done with the justice sector, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and others. Were there any examples that could be mentioned? He also appreciated the briefing on the Sierra Leone experience and asked the UNPOL adviser how could that experience of Sierra Leone be transferred to other operations and how could these be implemented more strongly in future police peacekeeping strategies.

Mr Luis Carrilho responded commenting on the mission mandate in Timor-Leste. In the beginning it had a more operational role of executive policing, but was subsequently developing capacity by strengthening police intuitions. In addition, they were starting the transition in which bi-lateral partners; especially those situated close to the host state, played a key role because of their bi-lateral programs with the host state.

The UN Country Team; the UNDP, the UNICEF, the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP), the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), all played a critical role in the area of peacekeeping and peacebuilding. As the peacekeeping mission downsized and decreased the levels on the ground, it was important that their work was followed with continuity by their bi-lateral partners, so that there was no gap. For example, in UNICEF’s vulnerable persons unit, it was important that some assistance would be given by the police. Regarding the justice sector that was mentioned in the area of the UNDP; the police prosecution relationship should be strengthened and empowered. There were trans-strategic plans developed for that area and it was essential that their bilateral or multilateral partners remained on the ground to help ensure the mission area did not degenerate and that they did not have to return to the same mission area in the future.

Supt. Ann-Kristin Kvilekval elaborated on the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), where there was a huge challenge related to the numbers on the ground. There were a total of only four UNPOL officers on the ground in Afghanistan, while the number of international actors in Afghanistan was enormous; with the Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A)/NATO Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM-A) playing a primary training role on the ground. All the stake holders met through the International Police Coordination Board established politically to include the Afghan Ministry of Interior. The board agreed to meet for cooperation and tried to coordinate; but it was not easy. The four strong UNAMA police component would liked to be assisted by the UN family more. Every week requests
were received from the UNDP; who had major democratic policing programs in Afghanistan, along with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the European Union Police Mission (EUPOL) which contacted Ms Kvilekval in Kabul where she was stationed alone. In addition, gender advisers and humanitarian advisers contact her, but it was not easy to coordinate and assist them all due to the large number of stakeholders. Ms Kvilekval asked Member States participating in the Challenges Police Forum to support the United Nations HQ by giving police officers to assist us on the ground with numbers, so that the police on the ground could do a better job, when contacted by other UN agencies. This was very positive, because she did not see this level of interaction happening in all missions; in UNAMA it did happen.

Mr Klaus-Dieter Tietz raised the example from South Sudan. Before the election in April 2010, they had formed a donor group dealing with all issues of election security. They quickly found that it was very important for all the donors including the UN family to come together and coordinate all their efforts. Before this everyone had been doing a lot of good things, but it had been uncoordinated. After successfully finishing the election, they made a decision to keep the group as a referendum group and they worked together towards the referendum in South Sudan. The referendum went well, which he believed was an important outcome of the close cooperation of all donating nations and the involvement of the UN family. Further, Mr Tietz commented that UNPOL were located all over Sudan and therefore had the highest outreach in the region, so they could also claim the lead for the international community. What had been important as a success factor for the elections was that it was done by the international community after which the South Sudan Police Service (SSPS) recognised that it was important for them to take the lead and initiative. Starting after the election, the deputy inspector director general of the SSPS was in charge and leading the board. This had been much better and much more efficient, because they could really support the SSPS for the needs they had and had also been able to work on strategic planning.

Mr Gautam Sawang responded to the specific reference to Liberia. The mission in Liberia was an integrated mission that was also an example of delivering as one whole UN family. They had the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF); within which framework they worked in line with the national strategy called the poverty reduction strategy. The UNDAF and all the UN family was structured thematically as five pillars of: Peace and Security, ROL, Recovery and Governance, Development and so on. They worked in close tandem with the UN family of agencies. Regarding peacekeeping and peacebuilding, this was a long debate that was on going. These were not mutually exclusive terms. The first day of peacekeeping, is also when the mission start with peacebuilding itself, so the process is on-going from day one.
Closing Remarks:

Commissioner Ann-Marie Orler, Police Adviser, Director of the Police Division, Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations

It is not very often we see the group of police commissioners and senior police advisers in the United Nations peacekeeping context all at the same time, so I am very proud of having all my heads of police components sitting with me on the podium today. The mind set was mentioned; and the need for a changing culture; I believe we need to start internally. The peacekeeping concept from the beginning is a military concept, which we try to fit our police competencies into. Thinking outside the box has also been mentioned today; we need to keep the military ideas in the back somewhere and then try to move forward with more civilian capacities, including police. We need to start to look more openly and frankly at how we want peacekeeping to be in the future.

To respond to the question on the West Africa Coast Initiative (WACI) and how we can transform this into other missions: the WACI is a pilot project. We selected four of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) countries to be the starting point and test if this method was the right concept. Our aim is to have all the fifteen members of ECOWAS included in this project and other missions. One has to be clear though that in UN peacekeeping we do not fight organised crime. We do not have the mandate, but we do build capacity, and this is where I see how best to make use of the 14,377 United Nations police (UNPOL) officers on active duty to build the capacity in all those states. What we are trying to do to make these concepts happen and work effectively is to build our own investigative capacity in the UN through skill sets and the need for more expertise. This is exactly why we need these capacities to be able to build the capacity in the host state police services.

You never hear me say ‘police force’, I always say ‘police service’. The reason for this is that it is about a mind-set and about changing the culture. It makes a big difference if you wake up in the morning and you are going to work for your ‘police force’ or if you are going to spend a day with the ‘police service’. Under normal circumstances the work of a police officer requires 5% use of ‘force’ to solve your task, but 95% is spent delivering ‘service’. This is one of the things that is really important. I have forbidden the term ‘police force’ in my police division and would like to send the message to you: do not use ‘police force’, use ‘police service’.

This session has also focused on that we need more qualified police officers. When I was appointed police adviser one year ago, I formed a vision for my
term as police adviser. The vision is very much about professionalism, including doctrine, recruitment, giving strategic advice and partnership. We have been given the global lead within the UN system on policing and that is what we are trying to make use of; bringing all the partners together. Interpol has been mentioned today; that is one of the partners we are working closely with.

I want something concrete to come out of activities. The global effort started off with talks about a ‘campaign’. I did not want a campaign, because it may look nice, but then what? I wanted to actually change things, make a difference and achieve something concrete, not least out of this session. For those who are working in the UN system, we are moving towards the C34 discussions; which is the formal forum where peacekeeping is debated. I would like you to keep the spirit that we have laid the foundation for in this Challenges Police Forum session, keep the image of all these police commissioners, when you are going to debate, make sure you have police on the agenda and discuss the future role for UN policing. Thank you very much for coming here today and I am very proud for the UN Police Division of having had this opportunity to engage with you all.
Establishing security is a precondition for achieving lasting peace. Establishing trust is key in that process. In the absence of trust, you look for security elsewhere and not in the state that is supposed to provide that security. That is why in the first phase of any country emerging from conflict the role of the police in establishing that security is critical; that is the first circle I would say of the rule of law (ROL). Within this first circle is where we need to be able to deploy teams quickly that can help not only train the police, but build from the bottom up a ministry of interior security system that will have the confidence of the people.

Building confidence requires a range of resources because when we talk about training the police you all have uniforms that are part of the authority of a police officer; but we know all too well that many conflict affected countries the local police barely have uniforms; and I take the example of the uniforms which is the visible part of something much broader like having no communication systems, no police stations, no vehicles, no nothing.

So how do you build your authority if you are just with a T-shirt and a sort of ‘rag tag’ police force? One needs, if the credibility of the police is to be achieved, to have not just the training but a whole structure; a whole system that supports the police in a way that inspires pride among the police force and respect among the citizenry. So that effort requires really a comprehensive strategy that includes uniformed personnel, civilians and high level advisers to help the country shape its response. That is the first circle but we recognised there are other circles.

When I was in the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) I was proud to push for the creation of the office of ROL and security institutions, because it was a recognition that it is fine to have police, but if the justice system; and the criminal system in particular, is completely broken, if there is no way to try a criminal that is arrested, if there is no decent jail to put that criminal under control; then the work of the police has no staying power.
Now, it is well recognised that these three pillars of police, judiciary and corrections, go hand in hand.

There are several phases to the peacekeepers engagement. First, there is the emergency phase, where quickly build that reassurance and build the three pillars that will create that reassurance. Then there is the longer term effort, the structural effort that goes actually beyond the criminal law that is so important also for investments. ROL also means confidence in the future by investors so that there is a legal system in place where land rights for example will not be challenged if they decide to build a hotel or a plant in the particular place where the contest on land rights will not fuel further strife.

There is an even longer term dimension, which is the reflection of fundamental political choices in the country. Even in parts of the world that are relatively homogenous like in Europe, we have different judiciary systems based on different historical traditions. Those differences become immense if one takes the broader world, so for this an even longer term effort is required, and I am therefore glad Mr Jordan Ryan is here to stress that point.

We have two speakers who reflect these different phases in the effort that we all need to make together. I think the fact that here today we have representatives from the DPKO, representatives from the field and we have the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) with us shows that on this immensely difficult challenge of the ROL we really need to put all the resources of the United Nations together if we want to succeed. We heard it yesterday from Mr Edmund Mulet, who described the challenges of Haiti. Thank you and now it is over to you Dmitry.

Mr Dmitry Titov, Assistant Secretary-General, Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations

Ladies and Gentleman, Colleagues, this is my third engagement with the International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations, a body that I have followed since it was launched in 2006 and one that I am pleased to be associated with. Indeed, the development of our Office – the Office of Rule and Law and Security Institutions in the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) – has been guided in many respects by the impressive work of this Forum.

Our gratitude in particular goes out to Annika Hilding Norberg and the Challenges Forum team. Equally important to note is the support provided by the Governments of Sweden, Australia, Egypt, in particular Pakistan for this Chal-
Challenges Forum Seminar in New York; and other Member States that have supported past events.

My Office has followed closely your discussions so far; and the emerging focus that is being placed on identifying solutions to the challenges of effective peace operations (POs). In this regard, we are very impressed with the latest study – Considerations for Mission Leadership in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations 160. The focus on support to rule of law (ROL) and security institutions is most welcome, as is the approach to providing guidance on what should be done immediately and what can or should be done at later stages. It is strategic and also adaptable to local conditions on the ground; which is key.

I am also glad that police challenges were discussed with our Police Adviser, Commissioner Ann-Marie Orler. The Police Division is a core component of our Office and Commissioner Orler and we are determined to work together to face the issues in international police peacekeeping; be it the need for police women, law enforcement specialists, rapid deployment capacities or more robust policing techniques, or the need to work as a team with our corrections and justice officers in order to create lasting foundations of good governance, protection of human rights (HR) and democratic development.

I have been asked to provide remarks on the challenges of supporting the ROL and security institutions, focusing in particular on the most critical issues that need the support and engagement of Member States and the overall peacekeeping community. One point that I always stress is that the scale and complexity of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping means that ROL aspects remain critical and urgent. UN Security Council mandates increasingly include clear and concrete tasks in the areas of police, justice, corrections, security sector reform (SSR), mine action and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants. In 2010, the UN Security Council mandates that were renewed for operations in Haiti, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Afghanistan, Liberia, Sudan, Timor-Leste and others all included specific tasks to support the ROL and security institutions.

Even while the international community works in the cost-cutting climate affected by the global financial constraints and at a time when the UN is consolidating its operations, we must still strive to strengthen UN peacekeeping and make it a more focused, effective and efficient tool. For the foreseeable future, the DPKO and the United Nations Department of Field Support (DFS) will still be expected to maintain a very high operational tempo and be ready to

respond to new and even still unforeseen developments. Recent developments in Sudan, Ivory Coast or in Northern Africa clearly show this should be the case. Yet, in the present uneasy context, we can take some comfort in the fact that Member States are becoming increasingly clear about the main challenges to peacekeeping and other UN operations.

First, coordination and cooperation within and outside the UN system has been improved further; but much more needs to be done. Let us be clear: sometimes we still face competing philosophies, different priorities and distinct business models and practices. In many post-conflict environments, many different actors still launch their programmes without full coordination and prioritisation, despite the pronouncement to deliver as one.

The United Nations ROL Resource and Coordination Group are addressing many aspects of this challenge; but more remains to be done. Having this in mind, the Secretary-General has initiated a review on the impact of UN ROL assistance, with input from the Coordination Group and interested Member States. We hope that the review’s recommendations will help reduce parallel or duplicative interventions and structures; and allow each actor to play to its comparative strength in the ROL area.

Second, let us admit that despite considerable progress, we still lack all necessary capacities and capabilities to do our job effectively as peacekeepers and early peace builders. Building up the ROL and strengthening security institutions is a complex and time-consuming endeavour. It requires specific and dedicated recruitment, deployment, policy, training and other tools and mechanisms. ROL and security challenges in post-conflict settings are now at the forefront of our understanding of what the DPKO must focus on and deliver in the years to come. But the UN capacities and resources remain underdeveloped to support peacekeeping and foster peacebuilding anywhere near the degree we would like. In this regard, we welcome the work of Mr Guéhenno and the Senior Advisory Group for the ‘Review of International Civilian Capacities’ and look forward to implementing the recommendations they have just produced. Let me stress that the DPKO and the United Nations DPKO Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) in particular share many of their strategic proposals.

Finally, the lack of buy-in or even basic understanding by national authorities of our work can adversely affect the design and implementation of reforms. We all agree that local ownership and national capacity-building are the key elements of sustainable reform. Yet, as researchers at the Folke Bernadotte Academy have noted, determining what local ownership means and how it can be
implemented is both a philosophy and practice that peace operations still have
to master.

As the Secretary-General recently stated at Oxford University in his speech on
human protection in the twenty-first century: ‘we must ask ourselves: have our
strategies and our operational practice on the ground kept pace with the ever-
increasing demand for human protection? We must concede that our words are
ahead of our deeds.’

In our Office we have a saying with regard to the linkages between police, jus-
tice and corrections – ‘police are the most visible, justice is the most complex
and corrections is the most neglected’. Ensuring that these three areas in parti-
cular receive the attention and resources they deserve – and that the right bal-
ance is struck between them in tandem – is a core objective of our Office.

The same approach to prioritising and balancing our efforts holds true for the
other important components of our Office that cover SSR, DDR and mine
action. Indeed, thanks to the vision and support of Ambassador Brahimi, Mr
Guéhenno and others, our Office was created as an integral component of the
DPKO and also the wider UN system. The underlying logic and strength of the
Office is that the previously separate and stand-alone entities need to work
together as a cohesive team in order to forge joint activities in support of holist-
ic ROL and security-related reform; and this is not purely technical work. All
of them contribute to good governance, protection of civilians, HR and move-
ments toward democracy.

The five components in our Office support 17 peace and political operations.
This includes support to some 14,000 police officers, 280 corrections officers
and 175 judicial affairs officers. We also have 440 DDR officers in the field who
deal with a caseload of over 500,000 ex-combatants. Our Mine Action Service
manages nearly 70 million United States dollars (USD) in voluntary contribu-
tions through a dedicated Trust Fund. When requested, we also provide exper-
tise and assistance to our UN partners beyond the context of peacekeeping in
support of conflict prevention and longer-term development.

From the day of our creation in mid-2007, our Office has worked to address
our challenges in the way that those we serve; people in post-conflict societies,
would hopefully benefit the most. Admittedly, we have not done as much or as
well as we have hoped; but some tangible impact has been made; and the direc-
tion forward – at least for us – is clear. Let me describe some of our main efforts
for you, since it is in these areas that our Office needs additional support and
engagement from Member States and partners.
We are trying to create a relatively compact, but very professional body of Headquarter staff: specialists dealing with various aspects of policing, justice, corrections, disarmament, ordnance and mine disposal and management of the security sector. Simultaneously, our Office is trying to upgrade the professional qualities of our field personnel. Among other initiatives, we are striving to enhance the strategic planning skills of our personnel, their ability to mentor and train national counterparts which is a special skill that often eludes us and one that even the most dedicated personnel are not necessarily good at.

Building very much on the work started by Mr Guéhenno and previous DPKO police advisers, we are riding the success of our standing police capacity by adding justice and corrections elements. In these areas, speed combined with special skills is of the essence. Furthermore, we have created a rapidly deployable mechanism in mine action and a special roster of DDR and SSR experts which has already been used by Member States for assistance in the development of national security strategies and other activities. Without a doubt, standing capacities and special rosters have helped us ensure at least a limited but reliable ability to deploy rapidly with ROL specialists.

At the same time, the Office is expediting the production of essential policy guidance to our personnel, with the support of many Member States. This includes guidance on detentions in peacekeeping operations; a special ROL indicator developed jointly with the Office of the High Commissioner for HR; the new ‘Strategic Doctrinal Framework for International Police Peacekeeping’, which our Police Adviser and her team are leading, with support from the Government of Norway; a whole package of SSR doctrine produced together with our UN partners, guidance on second generation DDR and many others.

With assistance from the United Kingdom and others, we are also in the final stages of producing an early peacebuilding strategy for the DPKO. Drawn from the knowledge and experience of deploying and managing peacekeeping operations over many years, it will help steer peace-support activities to high-impact priority areas and to their logical sequencing. As a result, the strategy will guide our staff in establishing priorities for implementing complex mandates and sequencing critical political and security stabilisation tasks. The strategy is very much in line with the capability-driven approach to peacekeeping outlined in the DPKO/DFS New Horizon Initiative. It builds on the recommendations of the United Nation Panel on Peace Operations.

In terms of partnership and integration, our Office continues to work closely in the field with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in the areas of justice, corrections and policing; and I wish to thank Mr Ryan in particular for working with us; as both organisations should build upon the many coun-
try-specific joint ROL programmes established; for example, in Southern Sudan and Eastern Congo.

As you have heard this morning, our cooperation is developing well with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and Interpol on the fight against organised crime and corruption, including in peacekeeping settings and in particular in West Africa. Indeed, these new security threats directly impact peacekeeping operations and I hope that Member States will continue to support and expand on this new endeavour. As was stated by the Secretary-General during the recent UN Security Council debate on security and development: ‘the next generation of security challenges will require added emphasis on crisis management, disaster risk reduction strategies, stronger civilian components in Peace Operations and on the strengthening the rule of law.’

Finally, the Peacebuilding Commission and the Peacebuilding Support Office have become our valuable partners. For example; recently we have been working together to support the creation of regional ROL hubs in Liberia in order to extend security and governance beyond Monrovia to all citizens and vulnerable groups.

In closing, I wish to address an issue that; in my opinion, requires a serious discussion and future support from Member States in the context of peacekeeping and early peacebuilding: that is institution-building. On 21st January, the UN Security Council debated the issue of institution-building as a critical component of peacebuilding. The debate revealed a great deal of support among Member States to engage in institution-building, especially in post-conflict situations. This is also the DPKO’s conviction. It is a strategic and operational imperative. From our perspective, we believe that the DPKO should actively support this important area of activity; by concentrating on limited aspects directly related to early peacebuilding.

As noted in the same UN Security Council presidential statement, building effective and legitimate institutions is critical for sustaining peace and reducing the risk of relapse into violence. Building legitimate and effective institutions that respect and promote HR therefore must be a central element of the overall peacebuilding effort. The DPKO’s access to reliable, early and flexible funding is also required to advance this goal as well as to create police academies, buy uniforms and basic equipment, set up courts and prisons and train magistrates and corrections officers. Finally, institution-building should start early and be sustained by the national authorities and UN partners not only for years; but decades. Peacekeepers, development and humanitarian actors all have an important role to play at various stages.
Mr Jordan Ryan, Assistant Secretary-General, Assistant Administrator of United Nations Development Programme, Director for the Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Conflict Prevention, United Nations Development Programme, United Nations

My name is Jordan Ryan and I am with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), earlier having served as the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General to Liberia. Hence, it is with great pleasure that I am here with serving United Nations men and women; should be more women in the police, but that is what we are working on in the United Nations (UN). I feel like I am back at one of the graduation ceremonies, or a medal ceremony. It is as Mr Titov mentioned: the hard work, the dedication, the incredible commitment of those who serve in peacekeeping missions is something that all UN Member States should take pride in. It is an incredible sacrifice that people make, both personally and professionally; and I certainly applaud the team that is represented here and behind them the hard working men and women in the field.

I very much welcome the opportunity to speak on some of the challenges of rule and law and security issues and following on both with Mr Guéhenno’s and Mr Titov’s statements. Clearly, security and rule of law (ROL) are fundamental for development. The world development report will be released by the World Bank later this year. According to some of the briefings that they have given to UN Member States already, its findings highlighted that violence, both political and criminal violence, has risen in our world, with more than 1.5 billion people affected. Obviously, one of the answers to the problem is the strengthening of national institutions so that states can provide citizens with security and justice. It is fundamental for prosperity, it is fundamental for development, it is fundamental to even begin to achieve the millennium development goals.

The UNDP has programs in over 166 countries. We have a large portfolio of governance in all of our countries and especially those countries that are affected by conflict. We have developed a global program that works in collaboration with other partners to focus on ROL in challenging settings, whether it is Timor-Leste, Liberia or Sudan; clearly, the work is fundamental. The work that we do begins with the perspective of development. The perspective of development urges greater inclusion. It is not just mouthing the words ‘national own-
ership’, it is building the capacity of national actors to both take part in decisions that affect their lives and more importantly, lead those decisions, so that the broader communities feel vested in peace. It is the only way to true sustainable security. It is the only way to build on the hard work of peacekeepers, so that there is lasting peace.

We very much believe in peacekeeping missions. Having participated in one, I know that Jean-Marie Guéhenno likes to say that peacekeeping is the last protection before hell; I like to see it as the first door step to being closer to heaven. In countries where multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations have a mandate to operate in the area of ROL, it is an imperative that the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the UNDP and other UN system actors work even better together. We recognise in chapter five of the Considerations study\(^{161}\) that focuses on strengthening of ROL that you highlight two tasks for mission leadership. I very much agree with the two tasks. One is facilitation of a political engagement and both the United Nations Secretary-General’s Special Representative and the United Nations Deputy Secretary-General’s Special Representatives have unique opportunities to work with those leaders in countries to basically foster an engagement and foster a dialogue, that supports that host country in overcoming obstacles to strengthening the ROL.

The second issue highlighted in the Considerations study is the support to capacity building. We very much believe both is needed. Clearly, the initial response aimed at stabilisation requires two complimentary elements to be successful. First is a consistent capacity development approach, aimed at insuring that national actors; and yes, local actors are truly involved and prepared to assume all responsibilities. Second, it is a capacity to design and implement programs; whether it is infrastructure developments, training institutions, or support to the provision of judicial or justice services. This is where a development agency like UNDP is uniquely suited to help.

But capacity development has two important dimensions. First, the technical areas, whether that is training or logistics, are areas where we work very closely together with the DPKO. The second element of capacity development from a developmental perspective is that of accompaniment, mentoring and partnership. I worked in Vietnam, and long ago the Vietnamese authorities said they made a distinction between the World Bank and the UNDP and I asked, ‘What is that distinction?’ And they said ‘Oh, the World Bank, they write about us. The UNDP works with us.’ And as a development actor, clearly the capacity

development approach we take, since we are there often before the crisis, during the crisis and after the crisis, is truly to work with and for those people in that country.

You need people on the ground for a longer term engagement. It cannot just be a one off training session; you need a team that works. In addition, what we found is if you are not engaged for that longer term, you will never have the true transformation that leads to peace. As Mr Guéhenno said, it is in a sense making sure that those actors on the ground are seen not as a threat, but as a reassurance that those actors on the ground change the way they engage with the population. It does not mean that everything short term is done by the mission and we wait for the long term for the UNDP. Both approaches require that they begin at the early onset. Now, some would call it early peacebuilding. I personally, think that is not a very good concept, because there is a lot of work that goes on, even needs to go on even before a peacekeeping mission goes to build the peace.

The UNDP and the DPKO’s complementary response approach and our capacity development approach need to be maximised. Now, we believe that there are, truly, some innovations underway already that need to be maximised. The joint programs that Mr Titov mentioned in the area of ROL do try to capture our respective, comparative advantages. We work together as equal partners, not as one implementing partner and one brain. It is the UN together that works, through flexible arrangements, based on the context and reality on the ground. It has to be tailored for the local situation, not cooked up by divisions of labour in Washington and Geneva and Brussels and New York. It needs to respond to the reality on the ground.

I agree with Mr Titov that one of the biggest challenges we face is that of financial resources. Resource mobilisation for joint programming should be a shared effort and for the benefit of the UN system at large. Timor-Leste is a very good example of a multi-year justice program, adopting a comprehensive approach, supports the strengthening of all elements of the legal chain. We have helped the government of Timor-Leste to articulate its own vision – not our vision – its vision, for reform and a better justice system. This has led to the development of a national justice sector strategy that charts the way forward. We support the implementation of that strategy and build the capacity of the Timorese officials and authorities to assume greater responsibility for their own justice sector.

The DPKO leads on many of the politically sensitive issues; the mission monitors human rights, provides high quality technical advice on key pieces of sensitive legislation and we are hard at work on capacity development. Clearly, Haiti offers another example where we have together supported the Ministry of
Justice and Public Security to design and implement a joint program on ROL justice and security; and in the Democratic Republic of Congo; again, a joint justice program has been developed.

Some final observations. Development actors from the UN are present during and after a crisis. It is the critical role of development actors that needs to be taken into consideration, when the mandate and areas of intervention of peacekeeping operations are being defined by Member States. That would help ensure greater synergy. It would build on our comparative and respective advantages; and these efforts need to be adequately resourced. The delay that we often face in acting – and I know well having been a resident representative – I cannot spend a penny until the penny is in the bank; sometimes that bank is the World Bank. If only we had their resources.

Peacekeeping operations do have a shorter time frame. It is critical that the process of drawdown and withdrawal be considered from the beginning, so that as mandated missions prepare to leave, it is well planned out from advance. I would, again plea that the issue of adequate resources needs to be stepped up even in the thinking of the planning for the mission. It is not a simple idea that we hand off to the UNDP. Clearly, it is handing off to a government with support from the development actors; but to be effective the issue of resources needs to be taken on.

As Mr Guéhenno and Mr Titov have both said, it is time for all of the resources of the UN to come together to play that very important role that the UN has at its heart of supporting countries to achieve and consolidate peace. To build security and to make sure that people, especially those affected by conflict, have a chance to develop and flourish in peace. There are more gaps than overlaps; and indeed, there is plenty of work, for all of us to do together. But we need your continued support. Thank you very much.
Concluding Remarks and Looking to the Future

Mr Håkan Wall, Deputy Head, Special Operations Division, National Criminal Police, Sweden

Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, I would like to thank the organisers for this very first ‘Challenges Blue Forum’ or Challenges Police Forum. I would also like to thank the chairs and the panellists; and especially the police commissioners, for this opportunity to discuss the most critical ideas facing international police peacekeeping.

The Swedish police has been engaged in UN policing since 1964 in Cyprus. Throughout the years we have witnessed the dramatic growth in demand for United Nations police (UNPOL) as well as the increased complexity of tasks for police peacekeepers. The complexity of recent mandates requires defining what police peacekeeping is. There is a need for a strategic framework for international police peacekeeping.

There is also a need for increased capacity for Intelligence Led Policing (ILP). ILP is the basis of policing in most of our countries. Domestically, we do not work without adequate analysed information. Therefore, criminal information analysis must also be a natural component when we are building capacity abroad together with local counterparts. Not the least because criminal information analysis is necessary for combating the enemy of peace that is organised crime. For these reasons, we welcome the UN-Interpol Action Plan and look forward to its development and future implementation.

To increase operational effectiveness we need to recruit more police officers that are women. More officers that are women are also needed for UNPOL to better reflect the communities they serve. In the end, policing is about serving communities and protecting civilians. These are fundamental tasks of policing.

We all know that police are a critical part of UN peacekeeping; but perhaps less recognised is the role of the police in peacebuilding. As early peace builders, the police are the bridge between peacekeeping and peacebuilding. As is clear from today’s discussions; we need to continue to focus on the issues of international police peacekeeping. Police issues must be a natural part in deliberations on peacekeeping and peacebuilding. We therefore hope that the Challenges Forum
can continue to be a platform for discussing the increasingly important field of UN policing. Thank you.

**Annika Hilding Norberg, International Coordinator, Challenges Forum**

Excellencies, Assistant-Secretaries-General, Police Commissioners and Advisers, Challenges Forum Patron and Partners, Ladies and Gentlemen, What a productive day! We have had the extraordinary privilege to be able to focus on the challenges of police peacekeeping in dialogue with the responsible Heads of Police Components at the helm of the United Nations police peacekeeping operations deployed across the world as we speak.

The five points or challenges raised by Commissioner Orler calls for Member States to fully engage and provide effective and sustained support for our policemen and women in the field. The purpose of today’s meeting was to address the most critical challenges faced by the practitioners in the field with a view to strengthen the international community’s support of their effort to implement the mandates decided upon by the Security Council.

The Panel of Police Commissioners and Advisers draw our attention to a number of specific needs and gaps that need to be filled. One thing is very clear, we need to quickly move forward towards implementation on the actions and solutions that already have been agreed upon, but which have not yet materialized on the ground. At the same time, and as Commissioner Ann-Kristin Kvilekval, UNAMA Police Adviser in Kabul, proposed; we need to try to think outside the box, to find new solutions to emerging situations and novel complexities. Today’s discussion allowed for a range of ideas and recommendations to be put forward, emerging from lessons being learned in Liberia, Sierra Leone and elsewhere. Now we need to mobilize the political and financial will, to make it happen!

I hope that the meeting today is a beginning of a deeper and more systematic engagement with our police peacekeeping colleagues in the field and in partner countries. We need to think long-term and build on this meeting. We look forward to exploring ways in which we can also support “sister services” to the police, such as corrections and other vital components. We warmly invite all of you to engage and join us in this effort. We hope that police colleagues in your missions, our Challenges Partners and their police colleagues in their respective capitals, and not least the Permanent Missions here in New York will contribute. An effective broader Rule of Law perspective is critical for the overall success of peacekeeping. The Assistant-Secretaries Generals high-lighted progress that have been made, while also illustrating the outstanding challenges
that the international community of peacekeepers still have to find better ways to grapple with. The frank and thought provocative engagement in our deliberations by senior UN officials like ASG Titov and ASG Ryan makes all the difference to the quality and relevance of the outcome of our work, and for which we are most grateful.

On behalf of the Challenges Forum Partnership, I would like to close this meeting by extending our most sincere thanks to everyone, in particular, to our distinguished Chairs, Speakers, and Panelists. Our Patron, Mr Jean-Marie Guéhenno, has once again shared his deep and unique expertise with us, shedding more light on the issues and complexities presented before us.

Our Partner Organizations, from major civilian, military and police contributing countries, the five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council, major financial contributors and other major partners, provides the direct relevance for our proceedings.

Further, I would like to thank the co-hosts of this event; the respective Permanent Representatives of Australia, Pakistan and Sweden to the United Nations. We appreciate the contributions made by them and their friendly and efficient staffs. We also appreciate Egypt’s contribution to the planning of this event and our Egyptian Partners future hosting of the Challenges Partnership in Cairo. They were not able to participate here now due to the unfolding situation in Egypt, but were nevertheless able to send a paper to our Partners Meeting for the consideration of the broader Partnership.

A special thanks go to the UN Police Division and the UN Police Adviser to the Secretary-General for the effective and efficient cooperation on the planning of the Challenges Police Forum and to colleagues at the Permanent Mission of Sweden for their assistance in making this particular event and dialogue possible.

We have achieved much during our deliberations here in New York. At the same time, much remains to be done. As the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping will convene early next week, I do hope that the rich exchange of analysis, ideas and recommendations over the last two days, may have given each and every one us, an impetus for change, a sparkle of an idea and an urge for its implementation - for the betterment of peacekeeping and for the realization of peace on the ground. Thank you and I look forward to seeing you soon in Cairo.
Annex 1:

Acronyms

ACABQ Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions
AFP Australian Federal Police
AMIS African Union Mission in Sudan
AMISOM African Union Mission in Somalia
AMU Arab Maghreb Union (AMU)/Union du Maghreb Arabe (UMA)
AOR Area of Responsibility
APCMCOE Asia Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence
ASF African Standby Force
AU African Union
AUPSA African Union Peace and Security Architecture
BINUB United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi
C-34 United Nations Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations
CAECOPAZ Argentine Peace Support Training Centre
CAR Central African Republic
CCCPA Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa
CIC Centre on International Cooperation
CIMIC Civil-Military Cooperation
COE Contingent-Owned Equipment
CPTM Core Pre-deployment Training Material
CSTC-A Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan
DDR Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DEA United States Drug Enforcement Agency
DFS United Nations Department of Field Support
DPA Department of Political Affairs
DPET United Nations DPKO Policy, Evaluation and Training Division
DPKO United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DPR Deputy Permanent Representative
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo
DSRSG United Nations Deputy Secretary-General’s Special Representative
EAC East African Community
ECCAS Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
ERC Emergency Relief Coordinator
ERU Emergency Response Unit
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC</td>
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<td>MOOTW</td>
<td>Military Operations Other Than War</td>
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<td>MOU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>MPAC</td>
<td>Military Police Advisers’ Community</td>
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<td>NAM</td>
<td>Non-Aligned Movement</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>NTM-A</td>
<td>NATO Training Mission Afghanistan</td>
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<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
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<td>OCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>OHCHR</td>
<td>United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights</td>
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<td>OMA</td>
<td>Office of Military Affairs</td>
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<td>ONA</td>
<td>Venezuelan National Anti-Drug Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>OROLSI</td>
<td>United Nations DPKO Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions</td>
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<tr>
<td>P-5</td>
<td>Five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council</td>
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<td>PBC</td>
<td>Peacebuilding Commission</td>
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<td>PBF</td>
<td>Peacebuilding Fund</td>
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<td>PBSO</td>
<td>Peacebuilding Support Office</td>
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<td>PCC</td>
<td>Police-contributing country</td>
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<td>PGM</td>
<td>Precision Guided Munition</td>
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<td>PIF</td>
<td>Pacific Islands Forum</td>
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<td>PKSOI</td>
<td>US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute</td>
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<td>PNTL</td>
<td>Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste/National Police of East Timor</td>
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<td>PO</td>
<td>Peace Operation</td>
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<td>POC</td>
<td>Protection of civilians</td>
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<td>PPC</td>
<td>Pearson Peacekeeping Centre</td>
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<td>PSA</td>
<td>African Union Peace and Security Council</td>
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<td>R2P</td>
<td>Responsibility to Protect</td>
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<td>RAMSI</td>
<td>Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands</td>
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<td>RC</td>
<td>Resident Coordinator</td>
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<td>ROC</td>
<td>African Standby Force Rapid Deployment Capacity</td>
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<td>RoE</td>
<td>Rules of Engagement</td>
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<td>RoL</td>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
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<td>RPKO</td>
<td>Robust Peacekeeping</td>
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<td>RUF</td>
<td>Revolutionary United Front (Sierra Leone)</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<td>SC</td>
<td>Security Council</td>
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SG Secretary-General
SGTM Standardised Generic Training Module
SIOC Security Information and Operations Centre
SITREP Situation Report
SLA Sudan Liberation Army
SML Senior Mission Leaders
SOCA Serious Organised Crime Agency (British)
SOP Standard Operating Procedure
SRSG United Nations Secretary-General’s Special Representative
SSPS South Sudan Police Service
SSR Security sector reform
SVC Sexual Violence in Conflict
TAM Technical Assessment Mission
TCC Troop-contributing country
TCU Transnational Crime Unit
TFG Transitional Federal Government in Somalia
TMICC Transport and Movement Integrated Control Centre
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UMA Union du Maghreb Arabe (UMA)/Arab Maghreb Union (AMU)

UN United Nations
UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNAMID AU/UN Hybrid operation in Darfur
UNAMSIL United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNCT United Nations Country Team
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDAF United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNFICYP United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNHQ United Nations Headquarters
UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund
UNIFEM United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNIFIL United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNIOGBIS United Nations Integrated Peace-Building Office in Guinea-Bissau
UNIPSIL United Nations Integrated Peace-Building Office in Sierra Leone
UNITAR United Nations Institute for Training and Research
UNMEE United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNMIK United Nations Mission in Kosovo
UNMIL United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMIN United Nations Mission in Nepal
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<tr>
<td>UNMIS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sudan</td>
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<td>UNMIT</td>
<td>United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste</td>
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<td>UNMO</td>
<td>United Nations Military Observer</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOCI</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNODC</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNPOL</td>
<td>United Nations Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNPOS</td>
<td>United Nations Political Office for Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTAET</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTSO</td>
<td>United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>USD</td>
<td>United States dollars</td>
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<tr>
<td>USG</td>
<td>Under-Secretary-General</td>
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<tr>
<td>WACI</td>
<td>West Africa Coast Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>United Nations World Food Programme</td>
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Challenges Forum Partner Organizations

(in alphabetical order)

- Argentina: Argentine Armed Forces Joint Staff and CAECOPAZ in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Australia: Australia Civil-Military Centre
- Canada: Pearson Centre
- China: China Institute for International Strategic Studies in cooperation with the Ministry of National Defence
- Egypt: Cairo Regional Center for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence
- France: Ministry of Foreign European Affairs (United Nations and International Organizations Department) and Ministry of Defence (Policy and Strategic Affairs Department)
- Germany: Center for International Peace Operations in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- India: United Service Institution of India
- Japan: Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Jordan: Institute of Diplomacy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Nigeria: National Defence College in cooperation with the Nigerian Army, Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Norway: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
- Pakistan: National Defence University in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence
- Russian Federation: The Center for Euro-Atlantic Security of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation in cooperation with the Center for Political and International Studies
- South Africa: Institute for Security Studies
- Sweden: Folke Bernadotte Academy, coordinators, and in cooperation with the Armed Forces, National Police Board, Swedish Prison and Probation Service and National Defence College
- Switzerland: Geneva Centre for Security Policy in cooperation with the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs and the Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sports
- Turkey: Center for Strategic Research of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in cooperation with the National Police Force, Armed Forces and the University of Bilkent
• United Kingdom: Foreign and Commonwealth Office in cooperation with the Ministry of Defence and the Department for International Development
• United States: United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute in cooperation with the United States Department of State, Bureau of International Organizations and the United States Institute of Peace
Annex 3:

International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations

Partnership Framework

Background

1. The establishment of the International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations (Challenges Forum) was discussed and a framework agreed at the Partners’ Meeting held in Saltsjöbaden on the 29 September, 2006. The Saltsjöbaden framework, as discussed and hereby revised as agreed by Partners in Sharm El-Sheikh on 17 February, 2012, outlines and details further key principles, which have guided the Challenges Partnership in its cooperation since its inception in 1996.

Objective

2. The aim of the Challenges Forum is to contribute to the global dialogue on the analysis, preparation, implementation and evaluation of multidimensional peace operations, to raise awareness and generate practical recommendations and to encourage action for their effective implementation. The Challenges Forum also seeks to broaden and strengthen the international network of actors involved in multidimensional peace operations.

3. The Challenges Forum is a working Partnership intended to provide the international community with a strategic, broad-based, and dynamic platform for deliberations on peace operations among leading policy makers, practitioners and academics. To this effect, the Challenges Forum is committed to holding an Annual Forum, as well as undertaking various cooperative undertakings, such as concept and doctrine development, and to produce an Annual Report.

162 The Challenges Partnership decided in 2001, for its focus and activities, to use the term Peace Operations as defined in the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, the Brahimi Report in August 2000, which includes conflict prevention and peacemaking; peacekeeping; and peace-building. The Partnership also deliberates on challenges related to robust peacekeeping, peace enforcement, crisis management and other peace operations related efforts undertaken by UN and regional organizations and arrangements.
Expected Outcomes

4. The expected outcomes of the Challenges Forum are:
   a. an established, effective, regular and inclusive sharing of best practices among relevant actors in the international and national peace operations community;
   b. the provision of practical recommendations and the encouragement for their effective implementation by relevant actors in the international and national peace operations community; and
   c. an enhanced and widened international network of cooperating and emerging actors involved in peace operations.

Themes and Issues

5. The Challenges Forum shall address important new developments, trends and challenges arising from the analysis, planning, conduct and evaluation of multinational and multidimensional peace operations, including:
   a. issues of interest to the Challenges Forum Partnership;
   b. issues raised in sessions of the UN Special Committee for Peacekeeping Operations;
   c. issues raised as areas of concern or need of attention by the UN Secretariat; and
   d. issues of concern to Regional Organizations and other major international actors.

Challenges Forum Organizational Structure

6. The structure of the Challenges Forum is outlined in the diagram below.
a. This involves, but is not limited to, ongoing communication with Partners and the coordination of partnership issues as well as the Partners’ website and knowledge network.
b. Principally, the Annual Challenges Forum hosted by a Partner and the Annual New York International Seminar.
c. This includes Reports, Studies and Translations by Partners emerging from Challenges Forum work.

Partner Organizations and the Partners’ Meeting

7. Building on the achievements of the Challenges of Peacekeeping: Into the 21st Century Projects Phase I and Phase II,¹⁶³ and the Challenges unique network of Partner Organizations, the International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations was established on 20 January 2006. The Partners’ Meeting represents the Steering Committee of the Challenges Forum, consists of the Partner Organizations and forms the overarching governing body of the Challenges Forum. The Challenges Partnership is a balanced and inclusive group of members that reflects a global and representative background and spectrum of expertise, all focused on peace operations. The Partners’ Meetings are chaired by the Folke Bernadotte Academy, Host of the International Secretariat.

8. Decisions of the Partners’ Meeting are taken through consensus. The door to new Partners should remain open, normally to allow for one new Partner per year to qualify for Partnership. There will be a natural size limit beyond which Partners may feel the organization should not grow in order to retain its effectiveness. To qualify for membership a new Partner should either host an Annual Forum or contribute with the equivalent amount of funding to a Challenges Forum concept and doctrine development or other undertaking.

Partner Organizations Advisory Committee

9. Given the evolving number of Partners involved in the Challenges Forum, in order to ensure the organization’s effectiveness, inclusiveness and transparency, an Advisory Committee of the Partner Organizations shall consist of five members, including four Partners representing different regional and professional cultures, and the Director of the International Secretariat, who will lead the work. The purpose of the Advisory Committee, which shall be a rotating responsibility for two years, will be to contribute to the quality, relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of the Challenges Forum. The responsibility of the

Advisory Committee would be to advise and contribute to the development and preparation of proposals to be presented for discussion and decision by the Partner’s Meeting.

**International Secretariat / Coordination**

10. On behalf of the Partners’ Meeting, a central International Secretariat is provided by the Folke Bernadotte Academy and located in Sweden. The Secretariat is headed by a Director, who plans, prepares and coordinates the work of the Partnership on a daily basis. Partners are invited to contribute to the work of the Secretariat in Stockholm, either by attaching personnel to the Secretariat or by working with the Secretariat electronically.

11. Part of the Partnership Coordination function of the Secretariat is to raise international and national awareness of the Partnership and its contribution to effective peace operations. In support of this, an effective and user-friendly website and knowledge network will be provided for the Partnership and its business. Its purpose is to encourage and facilitate a rapid and effective sharing of experience and expertise amongst Partners and between the Partners and the broader international community.

**Challenges Annual Forum**

12. Central to the Challenges Forum founding concept is the hosting of an annual international forum. Known as the Challenges Annual Forum, this major international event is intended to serve as a launching platform for forward-looking research, concepts, and policy initiatives in the area of peace operations. Partners are encouraged to raise themes and issues of interest and concern for this event. The Challenges Annual Forum is a brand and central activity of the Partnership and wherever hosted, this brand should be prominent and take precedence.

13. Commissioned background papers reflecting different perspectives shall provide the framework for discussion at the Challenges Annual Forum. These should be sent to the Secretariat in the timeframe specified by the Secretariat. The Challenges Annual Forum will involve a mixture of traditional presentations, such as key interventions by senior officials, practitioners and academics, with innovative ways of engaging participants on the issues. Structured working groups will elaborate further on the issues to be addressed. Effort should be made to actively engage in the program as many leading experts as possible from the Partnership countries, with up to 20% of the speakers/chairs reserved.
for the Host country. The program will be developed cooperatively and agreed to by both the Secretariat and the Hosting Partner.

14. The hosting of the Challenges Annual Forum will be a shared responsibility amongst the existing Partners or as a qualifying introduction for new Partners. In principle, the hosting of the Challenges Annual Forum should alternate between the “Global South” and the “Global North”.

15. The Challenges Annual Forum shall be open to some 250 interested and relevant actors from different professional, organizational, geographical and thematic categories in the field of peace operations and peace building. The principles of invitation are that all Partners shall be invited, as well as relevant officials and experts from the international, regional and national peace operations and peace-building communities. In addition, an invitation to send a national expert to the Forum should be extended to the members of the United Nations Special Committee on Peacekeeping. In particular Hosts of peace operations or peace-building missions should be encouraged to participate. The invitation format and list should be agreed between the Secretariat and the Hosting Partner, but the Hosting Partner should send out the invitations. In principle, plenary sessions should be open to the media whose representatives may be invited to share their perspectives on themes related to peace operations. However, the Hosting Partner and Secretariat may choose to apply Chatham House rules to certain closed sessions.

16. To optimize the benefit of the event, every effort should be made by the Hosting Partner to run the Challenges Annual Forum in an environment that allows meetings and networking to take place outside the programmed activities. The Hosting Partner will be responsible for funding the Challenges Annual Forum costs and meals (including two official dinners), and to cover the participation expenses, including international travel and accommodation, for speakers and a limited number of participants who may require assistance. Participants who are not programmed speakers will be sponsored for meals and the Annual Forum attendance costs by the Hosting Partner, but will cover their own international and local travel and accommodation.

17. In principle, the Challenges Annual Forum shall be held in October and be disengaged from any major UN HQ activities. The main programme shall include at least two days of Challenges Annual Forum activities as well as a minimum of one day for the Partners’ Meeting and project work. More meeting time for Partners’ business, as identified by the Secretariat, should be made available when necessary.
18. An Executive Summary of the Challenges Annual Forum shall be ready for distribution two weeks following the event. Its production and distribution is the responsibility of the Hosting Partner advised by the Secretariat.

19. Separate to the Challenges Annual Forum, an annual Challenges International Seminar will be arranged in New York prior to the commencement of the United Nations Special Committee for Peacekeeping. The focus, format and attendance at this event will depend on variable factors, including funding.

Concepts and Doctrine Development

20. The Partnership has since its inception been involved with efforts to improve and develop the concepts and inform policy development that underpin the preparation for and delivery of effective peace operations. The Partnership is committed to continue this process and engagement. To this end, projects, seminars, workshops and fieldwork will be undertaken, as required and when funding permits, in support of external partners such as the UN and regional organizations. This work may well generate stand-alone published reports, several of which will be translated into the official languages of the UN.

21. The results of the work of the Challenges Forum will be presented in the Challenges Annual Report. This report will provide the international community with analyses, policy options and possibly recommendations on a selection of current challenges and issues concerning peace operations. The Challenges Annual Report will be ready for presentation and distribution prior to the commencement of the subsequent United Nations Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. The production and associated costs of the Challenges Annual Report are the responsibilities of the Secretariat.

Funding

22. Separate to the specific hosting costs of the Challenges Annual Forum (see Paragraph 16) for the Hosting Partner, the costs of membership and participation in the work and activities of the Challenges Forum will be the responsibility of the Partnership Organizations. This will be on the basis of costs lying where they fall. On certain occasions a Partner may sponsor activities, participation or events on an ad hoc basis or when assistance is needed. More strategically, running costs of the Challenges Forum to sustain the level of activity and engagement identified in this Partnership Framework will require further external funding sources. The costs of the International Secretariat and its basic coordinating function are met by Sweden.
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<td>Abdal Aziz</td>
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<td>Cairo Regional Center for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa</td>
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<td>H.E. Mr.</td>
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<td>Mohamed</td>
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**United Kingdom**
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- Ms Johnson
- Mr Kardan
- Mr Kobayashi
- Col. Khedr
- Col. Kikir
- Ms Lamamra
- Mr Lafi-Mbaye
- Mr Lamuney

**United Nations**
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- Col. Kikir
- Ms Maskor
- Mr Meidan
- Ms Meier
- Mr Meier

**Armed Forces**
- Ms Maskor
- Mr Meidan
- Ms Meier
- Mr Meier

**Egypt**
- Ms Maskor
- Mr Meidan
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**Germany**
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<td>Mr Leggat Robert</td>
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**Embassies**

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**Other Organizations**

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### List of Participants Challenges Forum Seminar in New York 2011

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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Gen. (retd.)</td>
<td>Agwai</td>
<td>Martin L.</td>
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<td>Al Kulaib</td>
<td>Mesaid</td>
<td>First Secretary</td>
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<td>Ms</td>
<td>Al Rifai</td>
<td>Tamara</td>
<td>Delegate, Spokesperson</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<td>Brig.Gen.</td>
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<td>Jean</td>
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<td>Mr</td>
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Ms Wallström Margot Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict
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<td>Brig. Zia Kamran</td>
<td>Director, Centre of Excellence for Peace Studies</td>
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The International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations (henceforth Challenges Forum) is an international network of Partner Organizations from all continents, including major troop, police and civilian contributing countries and the five Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council. The purpose of the Forum is to contribute to better planning and conduct of multidimensional peace operations. Initiated in 1996, the Challenges network aims to generate practical recommendations and encourage their effective implementation at the international, regional and national levels. It also seeks to widen and strengthen the international network of actors involved in peace operations.

In 2011, the Cairo Regional Center for Training on Conflict Resolution & Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA) in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Egypt invited the Challenges Partnership to a Challenges Strategic Seminar and Partners Meeting in Sharm El-Sheikh to address Peace Operations Beyond the Horizon – Enabling Contributing Countries for the Future. Taking into account recent developments in Africa, the present report includes the deliberations and findings generated in Egypt. The International Community and Challenges Partners also met in New York to focus on the police dimension at the Challenges Police Forum hosted in cooperation with the UN Police Division. The Peacekeeping Partnership: Progress and Prospects; Considerations for Mission Leadership in UN Peacekeeping Operations; Rule of Law and Security Issues, Protection of Civilians, and the Challenges of Sexual Violence in Conflict, were other subjects addressed in New York and reported on in this volume.

**Partner Organizations (in alphabetical order):**

- **ARGENTINA**: The Argentine Armed Forces Joint Staff and CAECOPAZ (in coop. w. the Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
- **AUSTRALIA**: Asia Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence
- **CANADA**: Pearson Peacekeeping Centre
- **CHINA**: China Institute for International Strategic Studies (in coop. w. the Ministry of National Defence)
- **EGYPT**: Cairo Regional Center for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (in coop. w. the Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
- **FRANCE**: Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs (United Nations and International Organizations Department) and Ministry of Defence (Policy and Strategic Affairs Department)
- **GERMANY**: Center for International Peace Operations (in coop. w. the German Federal Office)
- **INDIA**: United Service Institution of India
- **JAPAN**: Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- **JORDAN**: Institute of Diplomacy
- **NIGERIA**: National Defence College (in coop. w. the Nigerian Army, Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
- **NORWAY**: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (in coop. w. the Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
- **PAKISTAN**: National Defence University (in coop. w. the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence)
- **RUSSIAN FEDERATION**: Center for Euro-Atlantic Security of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- **SOUTH AFRICA**: Institute for Security Studies
- **SWEDEN**: Folke Bernadotte Academy (coordinators and in coop. w. the Armed Forces, National Police Board, Swedish Prison and Probation Service and National Defence College)
- **SWITZERLAND**: Geneva Centre for Security Policy (in coop. w. the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs and the Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sports.)
- **TURKEY**: Center for Strategic Research of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (in coop. w. the National Police Force, Armed Forces and the University of Bilkent)
- **UNITED KINGDOM**: Foreign and Commonwealth Office (in coop. w. the Ministry of Defence and Department for International Development)
- **UNITED STATES**: United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (in coop w the United States Department of State and the United States Institute of Peace).