
Challenges Forum Research Workshop,
Berlin, 15–16 October 2012

Workshop Report

The world of peace operations has changed tremendously in recent decades and will surely continue to do so in the future. That’s not exactly news. But how will it change? What will be the drivers and key factors, what will be the landscape for change? What kinds of conflict will we face and what concepts, instruments and resources will we have to face them? In other words: How could the peace operations world look in the year 2025?

Building on the contributions of an outstanding group of experts, practitioners but also non-insiders to peace operations, ZIF has applied modern scenario methodology to shed some light on these questions and “create” four scenarios upcoming discussions can built on.

The first Challenges Forum Research Workshop, held in Berlin on 15–16 October 2012, provided a space to discuss these scenarios and to identify implications for peace-operations-related work today. In this report, the key recommendations of the working groups are presented in more detail.

Four Possible Futures

The scenarios are based on combinations of projections for twelve so-called key factors and two given factors, and are briefly summarized below.¹

Key Factors

- National Interest versus Global Interdependence
- State of the Global Economy
- Economic and Political Power Shifts
- Norms and Values
- Evolution of International Organizations
- State Fragility
- Organized Crime
- Resource Scarcity
- Migration, Refugees, Diasporas
- New Technologies
- New Media
- Private Security Companies

Given Factors

- Demographics
- Climate Change

Erratic Progress

In this scenario, things are kind of so-so in a familiar way. The stuttering engine of multilateralism is limping along through under-resourced initiatives towards poorly defined or unrealistic goals. New and powerful actors that could make a difference are still trying to find their place in the international system and have not yet translated their economic clout into decisive political action. A partial consensus on key norms and values is reflected in informal and minilateralist “club governance” structures. However, the UN remains the centrepiece of multilateralism. Peace operations are muddling through with occasional successes and frequent setbacks. After various shifts in strategy have failed to produce better results, there is not much appetite for investing in the stabilization of failed states. Uneven economic growth has done nothing to reduce global income inequalities. This continues to fuel conflict while keeping the resources for international crisis management efforts scarce. The overall outlook is not hopeless but somewhat messy.

National Interests

As the global economy is hard hit by the worst recession since the 1930s, an international climate of growing isolationism and unilateralism leads to the end of multilateral peace operations as we know them. Objectively, there is a strong demand for peace operations as many of the more fragile states relapse into violent state failure. Conflicts are also fanned by fierce competition for natural resources and the unchecked spread of organized
crime, which in some cases has resulted in state capture by criminal networks. However, nations focus on economic survival and internal security at the expense of their international footprint. In addition, the rising powers fail to rally around shared values and agreed goals. A permanently blocked Security Council is yet another symptom of a growing divergence on basic norms and values and the prevalence of national interests. As a consequence, few operations are deployed and blue helmets are largely a phenomenon of the past. Where states do intervene in a crisis, ad-hoc and narrow coalitions of the willing prevail—usually not deploying their own boots but those of private security companies.

Regional Diversity

Regional organizations are clearly in charge, including of peace operations. Transnational challenges—from climate change to resource scarcity, organized crime, state fragility and violent conflicts—are increasing the need for functioning global governance structures. However, after the “rise of the rest” and the “decline of the West,” existing multilateral structures failed to accommodate the new powers, who in turn found ways to accommodate themselves—largely through a network of regional organizations. As a consequence, the UN has lost its role as the major multilateral player in the area of peace operations and the Security Council is no longer the primary legitimizing body for such operations. While the regionalization of peace operations could have led to “regional solutions for regional problems,” key actors alternate between cooperation, competition or mere co-existence without much consideration for each other. For peace operations, this to and fro is frequently getting in the way of sustainable successes. Fragile states remain a major challenge but state fragility fatigue limits reliable support and stabilization initiatives.

Global Cooperation

The golden age of global cooperation has finally arrived and the framework for peace operations is one of well-endowed multilateralism. This is underpinned by a broad global economic boom benefiting established and rising powers and even the least developed nations. With new actors on the stage, multilaterals have realized reform plans in order to better reflect the new realities. International and regional organizations across the board not only enjoy an adequate financial base but are also backed by a broad consensus on values and norms developed under the growing influence of advocacy groups, civil society organizations, mega-foundations and social media. Peace operations have changed considerably but the main driver of change is innovation rather than resignation. As the number of conflicts and fragile states decrease, so too does the demand for peace operations. While fewer peace operations are deployed, those that are in the field are better resourced, benefit from advanced technology and, crucially, take a longer perspective on conflict resolution.
Working with the individual scenarios

Participants were asked to discuss the scenarios in small groups in greater detail and spell out the implications of each particular future for today’s work in terms of structures, capacities and strategies. They compiled a list of recommendations relevant for today’s work and commented on the other groups’ working results before prioritizing all recommendations. The main strands of discussion are summarized below, bearing in mind the overall guiding question: “How could and how should we act now to be better prepared for the future?”

Scenario 1: Erratic Progress

Workshop participants pointed out that of the four scenarios, Erratic Progress was closest to the current situation and thus perhaps the most likely in the absence of any game-changing events. As the type and number of conflicts would remain relatively unchanged and no additional resources for operations would be forthcoming, several participants suggested that a “strategic muddling through” approach would be both a likely and acceptable approach. This approach would aim to create robust but flexible capacities to deal with a number of emerging challenges to peace operations and involve adaptive decision-making.

Participants noted that, under these conditions, the UN would remain the core institution of the international peace operations system. The UN was also described as the ideal platform to tackle one of the key developments of the coming years: the integration of new powers into the peace operations system. Participants felt the UN should create a number of mechanisms for their involvement and coordination. These mechanisms would aim, firstly, to develop a consensus on minimum objectives for peace operations and, secondly, to agree on a division of labour. One such mechanism would specifically target the improvement of the coordination among regional organizations as well as between them and the UN. Non-state actors also play an important role in this scenario. Another mechanism would aim at developing synergies between the UN and global NGOs and mega-foundations. A final critical component would be a framework to engage actors of growing relevance to peace operations such as civil society organizations, mega-foundations and private corporations. The goal should be to both encourage their participation and at the same time coordinate their efforts with those of international or regional peace operations.

Workshop participants also held that the UN was the only institution with the necessary credibility to define and operationalize norms for peace operations in the form of

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2 This was the central theme of the Challenges Annual Forum 2012, held that year in Geneva. For more on inter-institutional cooperation, see Challenges Forum Report 2012, http://www.challengesforum.org/cms/Annual_Reports.do?pageId=203
minimum standards or codes of conducts. As a first step, those areas where norm consensus is particularly critical for operational success or currently particularly shaky will need to be identified in order to focus future efforts. Subsequently, a norm consensus will have to be established through inclusive mechanisms in order to accommodate the concerns of the new actors.

Participants identified several issue areas of increasing relevance to peace operations. Many felt, for example, that the international community would in the future have to focus on transnational organized crime in post-conflict areas as this phenomenon not only threatens the sustainability of peacebuilding efforts in the host country, but also the security of neighbouring states of the host country and the developed world. However, simply including the fight against organized crime in mission mandates will not be sufficient. At the strategic level, there is a need to have a broad agreement on how to combat transnational organized crime. This could be supported by raising awareness for this issue—for example through open discussions in the UN Security Council. At the operational level, an assessment of the risks posed by organized crime in the mission area will have to be made and integrated into the mission planning process in order to successfully address transnational organized crime. Additionally, the relevant skills and structures for combating transnational organized crime will need to be identified and incorporated into peace operations. Finally, some participants proposed enhancing international cooperation on this issue, by creating structures allowing the sharing of information between international organizations and Interpol and other law enforcement agencies.

A further issue that participants identified as of particular concern was the role of private security companies (PSCs) in international peace operations. They acknowledged that PSCs are currently an element of many missions and their role is unlikely to diminish under this scenario. However, they also noted that many actors, particularly in the Global South, have strong misgivings about their deeper involvement including potential use of force. In this regard, several participants voiced concerns about the current lack of accountability and regulation of PSC activities. Others, however, pointed out that PSCs possess capacities vital for the success of peace operations, such as logistical support, specialized training and crisis management advice, or protection of personnel, bases and convoys. In order to resolve this dilemma, international organizations should urgently develop both a strategic framework and a clear code of conduct for the future use of PSCs in peace operations.

New Media (Twitter, blogs, social networks, SMS/mobile phones) clearly have the potential to influence the conduct of peace operations. Accordingly, workshop participants agreed that the relevant international and regional organizations needed to develop strategies for the utilization of New Media. This must be based, firstly, on understanding New Media’s impact on the local and international public and, secondly, on creating capacities at headquarters and in field missions for their proactive use.
Ideally, such a strategy would not only serve to improve the missions’ situational awareness of developments within the mission area but also to enhance the legitimacy of peace operations both locally and globally.

Finally, participants discussed the dilemma of how to create the capacities needed to tackle the various new threats and new tasks in the absence of a major influx of additional resources under the “Erratic Progress” scenario. Several argued that the international community would have to prioritize more rigorously, as funds, personnel and equipment would remain limited in the future. Questions that need to be answered include: Which conflicts need to be addressed most urgently? Where are the chances of success most promising? What is vital for a speedy stabilization and recovery? Others suggested that international and regional organizations should focus on strengthening their core capabilities and at the same time develop their mutual cooperation in emerging fields such as combating organized crime, maritime safety, cyber security and intelligence gathering. This would need to be preceded by a stakeholder mapping of comparative advantages and the development of an understanding on a division of labor.

Scenario 2: National Interests

National Interests is clearly the least desirable of the four scenarios. In this possible future, large, multi-dimensional, long-term peace operations would largely disappear. In discussing possible approaches to this scenario, participants suggested two distinct but connected strategies. On the one hand, the peace operations community will need to strive to make this outcome less likely. On the other hand, the relevant actors need to develop a vision of how a minimally effective, “bare bones” peace operations system might look.

As a first step, workshop participants proposed to strengthen advocacy for peace operations in order to demonstrate the alignment of national with global interests within these operations. One element of this strategy is the credible validation of the positive impact of peace operations and the distribution of the findings to national decision-makers and the broader public in the countries that contribute to peace operations. In addition, it was suggested that the peace operations community should in the future engage in more outspoken lobbying, advocacy of international involvement in crisis areas through an appeal to the self-interest of developed countries. For example, communicating that a drug shipment seized by the Guinea-Bissau Coast Guard as a result of international efforts of capacity building will not reach the European market.

Participants also advocated the development of smart, lean forms of operations with efficient capacities that make maximum use of limited resources by creating synergies between different actors whenever possible. Stopping the doubling of efforts among different actors or even working at cross-purposes is clearly imperative. One aspect of this task is a better-defined division of responsibility between the military, police and civilian components of a mission. Another is the enhancement of hybrid capacities between international and regional organizations with the goal to profit from their
comparative advantages and thus fill capacity gaps. Finally, several participants emphasized the specific advantages of political missions: Small and entirely civilian, they require little funding and equipment, yet can be highly effective given the right circumstances, as recent examples in West Africa have demonstrated.

In order to make political missions—and other light and cheap forms of international engagement such as preventive diplomacy—truly effective, additional efforts by the international community are necessary. As they work best in the initial stages of a conflict, international and regional capacities for early warning and intelligence gathering, sharing and management must be improved, and the financial advantages of such early action must be strenuously lobbied to political decision-makers. However, participants were aware that these efforts would not go unopposed. A number of member states are suspicious of the UN and regional organizations developing in-house intelligence capacities both at headquarters and in missions. In addition, most national armed forces and intelligence communities are currently unwilling to share their information with multilateral organizations.

Additionally, the participants also urged international and regional organizations to focus on the achievability of mandates and on clearly defined and realistic transition strategies. This concentration on minimum essential requirements and shorter time frames rather than on most desirable outcomes in a distant future was seen as imperative to preserve peace operations as a viable instrument in a period of austerity and of a crisis of legitimacy (as provided by the scenario). Some participants even argued that such a focus on essentials might be desirable in its own right and possibly create higher quality results at lower cost to the international community. Others, however, maintained that the multidimensional character of many modern peace operations constituted one of their key strengths and should be preserved regardless of cost.³

As the role of private security companies (PSCs) in international peace operations is likely to grow in this scenario, participants strongly supported the development of a framework for transparency and accountability for PSCs. This would define the role of and set rules for the future employment of PSCs in such a way as to benefit from their capabilities, and at the same limit the potential harm to the legitimacy of peace operations by abuses committed by private contractors.

Finally, participants demanded the creation of mechanisms for engaging private actors in peace operations. Their aim would be to use the resources of corporations and mega-foundations to bridge the funding gaps imminent under the “National Interests” scenario. Participants also identified the challenge of structuring these partnerships in such a way

³ The UN Security Council in January 2013 adopted Resolution 2086 which endorsed the importance of the ‘multidimensional’ approach of UN peace operations. Full text of the resolution is available at https://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/sc10888.doc.htm
that they would align with the interests of the private actors without compromising the long-term consolidation goals of peace operations.

**Scenario 3: Regional Diversity**

The **regional diversity** scenario clearly is of an ambiguous nature. Within the basic premise that regional organizations play an even more prominent role in the area of peace operations than today, different outcomes are possible: regional cooperation is one option, but so are competition or mere co-existence. The backdrop of stronger regional organization is the failure of multilateral forums, first and foremost, the United Nations to accommodate the interests of the rising new powers.

While some participants argued that this scenario with a further evolution of regional organizations was plausible, others were more sceptical. They underlined that in some regions there still does not exist a common notion of security, let alone functional conflict management mechanisms that would be conducive to the emergence of strong regional blocs. Some countries might also have a strong preference to work through multilateral arrangements, particularly the UN. Given this qualification, participants discussed how to ensure best outcomes and avoid negative ones that relate to this scenario.

To counter a possible fragmentation on the global level, participants underlined the importance of **enhancing the UN’s ability to cooperate with regional organizations**. This could be achieved through more openness and cooperation among regional organizations, but also between the UN and regional organizations, necessitating strengthened capacities for dialogue, cooperation, and interaction between relevant actors. However, this would mean that **current UN structures need to be adjusted**—or even “re-invented”—to reflect the ongoing shifts in economic and political power and promote more inclusiveness. There are various ways of tackling this issue: a stronger regional participation in the UN’s strategic decision-making on peace and security is clearly one of them. However, there is a need for discussion of what can be achieved in times when Security Council reform remains unlikely.

Given the diversity of regional approaches, **crisis management structures in certain regional organizations need to be further developed**. A preceding assessment of available regional capacities could be initiated and led by the UN. Participants emphasized the value of regional crisis management and regionally-led peace operations where effective structures are in place. Regional actors naturally have a better understanding of the local cultures, power dynamics and other factors that influence particular conflicts. Operational regional mechanisms therefore address the issue of local ownership and can bolster the effectiveness of peace operations in general. In this context, participants also pleaded for the development of regional strategies to combat trans-border crime or even regional threats to peace and security. Capacity gaps might be closed by soliciting or even enforcing corporate support for peace operations, especially when business interests form
part of the conflict dynamics (e.g., through the introduction of a “stability surcharge” for mining concessions).

While some existing regional structures only need to be strengthened, some regions do not yet have appropriate arrangements. The Arab League, for example, does not have a crisis management mechanism per se. Participants therefore advocated the development of regional structures where they do not exist. The international community should encourage the UN, donors and other relevant international actors to consciously work through regional organizations. This in itself would strengthen them and underscore their relevance. In general, participants preferred multilateral action to bilateral arrangements. This would also fuel a spirit of cooperation in other areas besides peace and security, for example in international trade.

Looking for the positive potential of this scenario, participants expressed their desire for an effective modus operandi between regional organization and an UN system that still remains highly relevant. In this sense, they called for a sustained effort to promote international standards, guidelines and norms, which dovetail regional organizations with the UN. Possible areas for these standards are manifold and suggestions reached from the advancement of international criminal law and its implementation through regional criminal court structures, the promotion of international principles of the rule of law, to capacity-building programs in all regions. Again, the importance of the UN as coordinating authority becomes obvious. Assuring an effective interaction will avoid harmful overlaps in mandates and programs at the regional level.

Participants stressed the need to establish interoperable national, regional, global conflict management structures once these international standards and guidelines are established. This would mean embedding strategic assessment, planning and implementation, as well as finance and communication, in regional mechanisms. Whenever there are missions by several regional organizations, coherence in political leadership is indispensable. On the operational level, interoperability also encompasses the availability of common capacities, such as the pooling of high-tech assets and other scarce resources. Participants also identified the need to accentuate information sharing and early warning. Finally, where operations by different regional organizations are to be deployed in the same or adjacent areas, their mandates must be harmonized to a much higher decree than is currently sometimes the case.

**Scenario 4 - Global Cooperation**

This golden age of global cooperation is almost too good to be true. Yet, one has to bear in mind that even in this scenario the world is not devoid of conflicts. However, international organizations are in a much better position to meet the challenges they are facing. Participants were thus able to put forward a range of optimistic measures. Some voiced an important qualification: this golden age of cooperation cannot be taken for granted. Therefore careful thought must be given to its sustainability. This also holds true
for the present, in the sense that the UN could and should improve the communication of its successes, possibly through a UN “marketing strategy” using first and foremost social media tools, while also including other relevant actors. The main theme in discussing this scenario was how to improve the cooperation between the UN – whose leading role in conflict prevention and intervention was widely acknowledged – regional organizations and other players. This golden age in particular could provide the background for a properly resourced pro-active engagement.

Participants advocated the development of an overarching policy document, tying together the UN family and regional organizations. This approach is meant to develop broad political coherence between all relevant actors on fundamental objectives of peace operations, to promote a more an inclusive approach towards their conduct, include new emerging actors, enhance cooperation, and foster long-term strategies. Various proposals were put forward: a “Peace 2025—Deliver As One” policy paper or even a process that resembles the efforts that eventually led to the Millennium Development Goals. The major aim of such an endeavour would be to identify commonalities among international and regional organizations, to maximize on shared objectives and to minimize overlap and redundancy. Participants stressed that strategies derived from this new policy guidance should fully recognize the importance of local ownership and long-term development needs that go well beyond traditional peacekeeping objectives.

To further disseminate this political coherence and ensure its workability, participants proposed to strengthen existing or create new UN peace operations structures (e.g., a “Peacekeeping Council”). The prime objective would be the ability to work closely with regional organizations, and to harmonize strategic goals and planning.

A golden age of cooperation could be facilitated through an integrated global peace operations personnel system that assures mobility of staff across the UN, regional organizations and national systems. An exchange of international staff between organizations would enhance the interoperability between organizations. This would entail continuous training and evaluation (e.g. through certified mandatory educational modules), as well as training measures for permanent mission staff, and more incentives for personnel to rotate between field missions and headquarters, and between inter-organizational missions. These measures should also be supplemented by the promotion of a cultural change in national governments to value international civil service.

Participants also hoped that under this scenario critical capacity gaps that today hamper the effectiveness of international peace operations could be closed. Given a favorable financial background and a broadly reduced level of conflict worldwide, participants hoped that member states would show more willingness to make national assets available to international organizations to a much higher degree than today. The “wish list” included UN and regional police rule of law and corrections stand-by capacities, as well as a pool of civilian experts covering critical peacebuilding areas.
Yet another building bloc of smooth cooperation and interoperability would be *shared mission assessments* that foster a better understanding of drivers and dynamics of conflicts. Participants recommended using state-of-the-art technological and software capacities for shared situational awareness and *information management* between the UN, regional organizations, missions and headquarters. Some also called for enhanced strategic intelligence capacities for the United Nations.

Finally, participants called for a “greening” of peace operations. Clear environmental standards for contingent owned equipment and mission infrastructure should be developed and integrated into procurement processes. With a view to local ownership, there is also a clear demand for building host country capacities for these environmental standards.

**Summary and Outlook**

What can be learned from these discussions? Single scenarios and conclusions drawn from them only add up to a bigger picture when they are seen as a whole, since individually they can be seen as mere inventions of plausible futures. As a package they help to identify areas that are of importance to the field of peace operations independent from the exact path of the future. So while discussion will continue some critical commonalities can be identified at this point.

On the strategic level, it became clear that there is a need for political coherence on fundamental objectives of peace operations. And this coherence needs to be established across a multitude of actors, especially considering emerging powers and engaging regional organizations. There is of course a broad continuum ranging from the rather minimalist aim of mapping out what it takes to design achievable mandates to the maximalist position of establishing a system-wide “deliver as one” approach. The question of how to facilitate this strategic debate and what should be aimed for is still to be answered.

Equally challenging are the thoughts evolving around the UN peace architecture. Although there have been a lot of ideas evolving around the C-34, the Peacebuilding Commission, even the General Assembly; it remains an open question what is politically feasible and whether it is realistic to accept institutional reforms in time of an outstanding reform of the UN Security Council.

A breakthrough in terms of political coherence would surely ease the development of interoperable global capacities, as well as shared risks assessments and information management. When it comes to improved civilian support to conflict-affected regions, a
lot of valuable ideas and ongoing initiatives are currently under way in the framework of the so-called CivCap Review\(^4\) and should be continued.

A very specific topic of great interest and concern was the role of private security providers. There was consensus on addressing the issue. Nonetheless, here again the point of departure can be a rather minimalist position of establishing codes of conduct, up to introducing an operational concept and strategic framework.

While this report and its preceding discussions cover a broad range of issues and put forward various suggestions for further inquiry, some recommendations are highlighted here.

\(^4\) For fuller details of the UN civilian capacity initiative, see [http://www.civcapreview.org/](http://www.civcapreview.org/)
**Recommendations**

1. Include new actors and promote political coherence.
   a. Devise a new overarching policy document, which spells out a consensus on a minimum of objectives of peace operations and peacebuilding activities of the UN family.
   b. Foster the UN’s ability to cooperate with regional organizations and strengthen regional capacities by promoting international standards, guidelines and norms, and aim to harmonize strategies, goals and planning processes.

2. Prepare for emerging threats (e.g. Organized Crime, risks for maritime and cyber security).
   a. Identify vulnerabilities of peace operations and prioritize areas that could and should be dealt with by peace operations.
   b. Conduct a stakeholder mapping of actors involved in these issue areas to identify comparative advantages and to develop an understanding of a possible division of labour and linkages between different instruments.

3. Build a broad agreement on how to combat organized crime. Identify relevant skills and structures to fight organized crime and incorporate these into peace operations.

4. Develop strategies for the adoption of new tools and technologies in peace operations.
   a. Promote international and regional capacities for early warning and information gathering, sharing and management.
   b. Understand the role of New Media and Big Data in conflict and conflict prevention, understand its impact and create capacities to use it proactively.
5. Regulate the role of private actors in peace and security.
   a. Clarify the roles and risks of integrating Private Security Companies (PSCs) into peace operations and devise rules for their engagement.
   b. Think about new approaches to mobilize resources of private corporations and mega-foundations as additional funding for peace operations.

6. Strengthen the advocacy for peace operations and promote their successes, internationally and nationally to policy-makers and their constituencies.

7. Promote an integrated global peace operations personnel system that assures mobility of staff across the UN, regional organizations and national systems.

8. Establish global stand-by capacities in the following areas: police, Rule of Law, corrections as well as a pool of civilian experts covering critical peacebuilding areas.

9. Green the Blue Helmets and develop clear environmental standards for contingent owned equipment and infrastructure.
Programme

**Sunday, 14 October**

19:00–21:00  Informal Welcoming Dinner

**Monday, 15 October**

09:00–09:30  Welcoming Remarks
09:30–10:30  Session 1 | Scenarios – What They Are and What They Are Not
  - Clarify the purpose of scenarios;
  - Introduce the applied methodology which was used in deriving ZIF’s scenarios for peace operations in 2025;
  - Set out the purpose and expected outcome of this Challenges Forum Research Workshop.
10:30–11:00  Coffee Break
11:00–12:30  Session 2 | Getting To Know the Scenarios
  - Introduce the broad themes of the four different scenarios.
13:00–14:00  Official Launch & Reception of the Scenarios at the Federal Foreign Office
14:30–16:30  Session 3 | Group Work
  - After familiarizing participants with the group work of the following sessions we will:
  - Each group will discuss one scenario in detail;
  - Spell out the consequences of this possible future for today’s work in three different categories: structures, capacities, and strategies;
  - Compile a list of recommendations which are relevant for our work today.
16:30–17:00  Coffee Break
17:00–18:00  Session 4 | Group Work Continued
19:30  Official Dinner
Tuesday, October 16

09:00–09:15 Introduction of Today’s Workshop Agenda

09:15–10:30 Session 5 | Presentation of Working Group Results

This session will:
– Give an overview of the various recommendations by the working groups of day 1.

10:30–11:00 Coffee Break

11:00–13:00 Session 6 | Walking Groups

Participants will:
– Review and discuss the recommendations by the other groups;
– Add further recommendations and thoughts.

13:00–15:00 Lunch

15:00–16:00 Session 7 | Group Work — Consolidating the Recommendations

This session will:
Consolidate and prioritize the recommendations made by the walking groups.

16:00–16:30 Coffee Break

16:30–18:00 Session 8 | Some Critical Thoughts & Wrap-Up

This session will:
– Provide a comment on the scenarios and work in the previous sessions;
– Discuss challenges of partner organizations and institutions in implementing future-oriented activities in their current work;
– Discuss ideas of how to make best use of the scenarios for further work in the various Challenges Thematic Working Groups

19:30 Official Dinner
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