CONSIDERATIONS FOR MISSION LEADERSHIP IN UNITED NATIONS PEACE OPERATIONS

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Foreword

When it comes to UN mission leadership, good is not good enough. Mission leaders are entrusted with significant responsibilities. Much can be at stake—peace, security, a country’s development—and this must be reflected in what is expected of mission leaders. Leadership ability, both individually and as a team, is broadly recognized as a critical factor determining the success or failure of a mission.

Leadership is about making performance possible—at both the individual and organizational levels—in order to carry out tasks, accomplish objectives and achieve the desired impact and results. Successful leadership makes it possible for individuals and organizations to reach their full potential and perform at the top of their ability. This is an obligation that lies at the heart of every leadership assignment, and it is among a leader’s most important commitments.

Considerations for Mission Leadership in United Nations Peace Operations is a study on the practice of mission leadership—that is, the aspects of leadership desired for peace operations. It targets senior and mid-level leaders of UN peace operations, and anyone else interested in the practice of leading a mission. The study focuses on the core functions of peace operations and it follows a consistent structure. It explains the normative and conceptual framework for effective mission leadership; identifies preconditions for success; suggests key objectives and operational outputs; proposes sequenced benchmarks and priorities; highlights responsibilities and risks; and provides a number of considerations for the Mission Leadership Team.

Considerations is a carefully chosen term for this study. It invites its readers to join a reflective discussion, and suggests a considered and systematic approach to mission leadership. The study strives to help practitioners mitigate the well-known pitfalls of missions being driven by unanticipated developments rather than a strategic plan, as well as the widespread phenomenon of risk aversion. It recognizes that missions need both ‘achievers’ and ‘transformers’. Considerations facilitates a long-term and continuous perspective on mission leadership, against the backdrop of relatively short-term mission leadership assignments.
Considerations contains accumulated experiences, insights and best practices of men and women leaders of peace operations, and is grounded in what is known to have worked and what might be expected to happen. At the same time, the study is neither prescriptive nor exhaustive.

I would like to express my appreciation to the Challenges Forum partnership and its initiative and effort—and more appropriately, its leadership—in revising and further developing Considerations. The partnership provides for an inclusive and collaborative process, ensuring that relevant and complementary leadership experiences and best practices are thoroughly discussed, purposefully selected and systematically shared. Considerations is a genuine and impressive international team effort, and an example of the kind of strategic partnerships that are needed in order to sustain and sharpen our collective contribution to UN peace operations. The study will be widely used in mission leadership training, including in the UN Senior Mission Leaders Courses.

To current and future mission leaders reading this study, I wish you the best of luck in your assignments. There are no shortcuts to successful mission leadership. Multidimensional peace operations are complex, dynamic and demanding. The host country is your figurative universe, the end results your destination. The mandate is your guidebook and the operational plan is your path. The personnel constitute your fellowship and most precious asset. The UN values are your compass and peace is your overall purpose. Lead with humility and determination. Strive at all times to create the best possible prerequisites for your colleagues, the mission and its partners to perform—and thus succeed. Leaders’ and missions’ performance are mutually reinforcing.

Many look back on their mission leadership assignments and recognize them as the most meaningful and challenging professional experiences of their lives. A mission leadership role will draw on all your competencies, and explore and expand the boundaries of your comfort zone. To lead is to serve. Embrace your assignment with this in mind, and prepare and act accordingly. In the end, however, the decisions and the responsibility are yours. Professional planning needs to be combined with dexterity. This is the nature of mission leadership, and this is what Considerations is all about.

Jean-Pierre Lacroix
Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations
United Nations

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Acknowledgements

This second edition of *Considerations for Senior Mission Leadership in UN Peace Operations* is a strong symbol of the Challenges Forum Partnership’s long-standing commitment to and belief in multilateral peace operations as an essential tool to support countries emerging from conflict on the path towards sustainable peace.

I would like to acknowledge the important work undertaken by the study’s target audience: mission leaders in peace operations. Mission leadership is a make-or-break factor in peace operations, and we hope *Considerations* will continue to serve as a contribution to this leadership.

Recognizing the significant changes facing peace operations and recalling the initial intent to make *Considerations* a living document, the Challenges Forum Partnership agreed at a workshop in Bali in 2016 hosted by the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to revise and expand the study. Participants in the 2017 Challenges Annual Forum in Istanbul, hosted by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Center for Strategic Studies—Challenges Forum Partners, colleagues from UN Headquarters and field missions, and researchers—identified the key emerging issues to be covered in the new edition. Deep thanks are owed to the partners who hosted regional meetings on project design and conceptualization, and discussed early drafts: the Centre for International Peace Operations in Berlin, May 2018; the Cairo International Centre for Conflict Resolution, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding (CCCPA) in Cairo, September 2018; and the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in Pretoria, March 2019. Their support enabled the Challenges Forum to further strengthen the relevance of *Considerations* through participatory dialogue and reflection.

This revised edition would not have been possible without the creative leadership and generous contributions by the project’s Task Force co-chairs, who developed the intentions and ideas from Istanbul into concrete guidance and content. It has been an immense pleasure to have on board Dr Alan Ryan and Lisa Sharland (Australian Civil–Military Centre); Ambassador Ashraf Swelam, Sarah Abdelgelil and Esraa Saied (CCCPA); Jonas Alberoth, Folke Bernadotte Academy; Mark Downes (Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance); Annette Leijenaar and Gustavo de Carvalho (ISS); Gen. Rafaqat Islam and Gen. Ahmed Saeed Minhas (National Defense University of Pakistan); Col. Ryan Wolfgram and Dr Karen J Finkenbinder (Peacekeeping Stability Operations Institute,
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This edition of Considerations was produced in close consultation with the
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who provided critical support during the start-up of the process, and to
Dr Andreas Andersson and Sharon Wiharta, who have provided important
leadership in guiding our Partnership during this process.

As the Challenges Forum celebrates 25 years of shaping the debate,
supporting and contributing to the discourse and practice of peace
operations, I am pleased to share the new edition of Considerations, and
hope that it continues to be an inspiring tool for mission leaders.

Dr Björn Holmberg
Director, Challenges Forum International Secretariat
March 2021
Introduction

The peace operations landscape has evolved dramatically since the first edition of *Considerations for Mission Leadership in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations* was published in 2010. Much of the doctrine articulated within the 2000 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations [the Brahimi report] has been stretched, and several new peace operations have been deployed, employing modern technologically advanced assets and troop contributors into areas where it is difficult to find a peace to keep. At the same time, a number of long-standing missions have transitioned and closed.

Keeping and sustaining a peace has, over the past decade, arguably become a more dangerous task, occurring in environments where United Nations personnel are increasingly seen as legitimate targets. This has led to a new emphasis on personnel safety and security, as well as a strengthening of the emphasis on protecting civilians and its associated UN guidance. Equally, a culture of accountability and intolerance for sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers and a concomitant focus on the associated leadership responsibilities has had to be instilled. Peacekeeping has sought to keep pace with these and other changes in conflicts. UN peace operations have been authorized with increasingly robust mandates, improved policies and guidance and responses to developments in technology and information management.

The past decade has also seen significant policy shifts which seek to address this changing environment. Examples include the Sustaining Peace Agenda, which emphasizes the whole spectrum of conflict prevention, peace operations and peacebuilding; the reaffirmation of key policies such as the protection of civilians and the Women, Peace and Security Agenda; and the emergence of new normative frameworks such as the Youth, Peace and Security Agenda. Important policy initiatives such as the 2015 report of the Independent High–level Panel

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Considerations for Mission Leadership

on Peace Operations (HIPPO) and the 2017 Improving Security of United Nations Peacekeepers report delved into the challenges and offered concrete recommendations on how to enhance the effectiveness of peacekeeping. The UN Secretary-General’s Action for Peacekeeping initiative, launched in late 2018, built on these reports and is an ongoing response to international concerns about the conditions and effectiveness of UN peacekeeping as a result of protracted conflicts, elusive political solutions, increasingly dangerous environments and rising UN peacekeeping fatalities.

The Secretary-General has also launched far-reaching structural reforms within the UN Secretariat, including the Peace and Security Pillar in which two new UN departments—the Department of Peace Operations, and the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs—are now more interconnected.

One recurring theme in these policy shifts has been the reiteration of the importance of effective, courageous and accountable leadership in UN peace operations. This subject, and its associated challenges, has been fundamental to the reviews of UN peace operations and an instrumental aspect in the ongoing UN system reforms.

New edition of Considerations

Against this background, the Challenges Forum Partnership agreed that a revised edition of Considerations was both timely and necessary. The aim of this edition is to contribute to conceptual thinking and a wider understanding of the core functions of multidimensional peace operations. It attempts to bridge strategic and tactical approaches by focusing on the operational level, where all the complex lines of activity leading to success need to be knitted together and integrated into one mission plan. While this task officially rests with the Head of Mission (HoM) and the Mission Leadership Team (MLT), they are also heavily dependent on the skills and capabilities of middle-management leadership. These two important functions are the core target groups of this study.

This revised edition of Considerations uses the definition of peace operations outlined in the HIPPO report, namely: “UN peace operations, including peacekeeping and special political missions as well as good offices and mediation initiatives”. While the study also emphasizes how

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peacekeeping relates and contributes to conflict prevention and sustaining peace, the primary focus remains on the challenges of peacekeeping. To that end, this study seeks to “operationalize” the three core functions of contemporary peace operations articulated in a 2008 document entitled “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines” [the Capstone Doctrine], namely:

a) Create a secure and stable environment while strengthening the State’s ability to provide security, with full respect for the rule of law and human rights;

b) Facilitate the political process by promoting dialogue and reconciliation and supporting the establishment of legitimate and effective institutions of governance;

c) Provide a framework for ensuring that all United Nations and other international actors pursue their activities at the country-level in a coherent and coordinated manner.4

The present study seeks to contribute to a wider understanding of the issues senior mission leadership and management face in relation to these three core functions. In essence, a multitude of tasks, or lines of activity, are needed to support a mandate designed to move an immediate post-conflict environment towards one in which there is a prospect of a sustainable peace. Contemporary, multidimensional peace operations have the political leadership of the process, but often lack the necessary authority, budget, expertise or resources to undertake all the tasks covered by their mandates.

While the Capstone Doctrine’s principles and guidelines have resonance at all levels, it primarily gives guidance at the strategic level. The bridge linking the strategic and the tactical levels is the operational level, where all the complex lines of activity leading to success need to be knitted together and integrated into a mission plan by the MLT.

The following chapters endeavour to address a wide array of considerations for the HoM and MLT as they attempt to implement complex UN Security Council mandates under the three core functions. While this study cannot be comprehensive, it focuses on and navigates between issues at the operational level and should hopefully serve as a helpful reference document for senior leaders in the field and for middle management. For a richer understanding of the issues, supplementary reading of more specialized documents may be necessary.

Scope

This revised edition of Considerations has been written at a time when global peace and security is under stress and resources are limited. While there is less appetite for large multidimensional missions, the UN continues to play a vital role in bringing impartial engagement and protection to countries emerging from conflict, through the three core functions outlined above. At the same time, the evolving relationship between peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and the importance of the (re-) establishment of the rule of law as an exit strategy for a field mission, all add to the complexity of the task of a mission’s senior leadership. This study addresses this environment, which is characterized by UN Security Council mandates calling for a multidimensional engagement to tackle the spectrum of a conflict, while applying the provisions in Chapter VII of the UN Charter which allow for the use of force at the operational and tactical level to protect civilians and those covered by the mandate. The study’s scope, therefore, essentially covers contemporary, multidimensional peace operations as they continue to evolve.

Methodology

There are dangers in stereotyping UN peacekeeping missions and their problems. Therefore, any conceptual guidance should not be a prescriptive checklist of things that must be done but more in the nature of helpful discussion, under generic headings, of the things that the MLT might like to consider as best practice. The methodology of this study has therefore been to:

• outline the preconditions for success, even though not all of them are likely to be in place at the time of deployment of a mission;
• identify the various key objectives (based on analysis of various mandates and the Capstone Doctrine) the MLT needs to tackle;
• identify generic sets of operational outputs supporting each objective;
• identify a set of operational activities that might need to be undertaken by the mission in order to achieve the desired outputs;
• attribute to the outputs a broad benchmarked framework based on short-, medium- and long-term priorities (many of which go beyond the life cycle) and mandated responsibilities and budgets of a mission;
• associate with the outputs appropriate responsibilities, resources, challenges and risks; and
• recognize the considerations or polarities which inevitably arise and need to be managed to help inform senior mission leadership thinking.
This methodology corresponds with UN best practices, including logic models suggested by the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services.

However, not all considerations respond to a treatment which attempts to group them under objectives. For this reason, the first two chapters of this revised edition of Considerations focus on leadership, management, mandate implementation, integration, coordination and mission sustainment, which together provide the normative framework for senior mission leadership.

Chapters 3–6 focus on four key objectives extracted from mandate analysis and the core functions of peacekeeping:

- Facilitating and Supporting the Political Process (Chapter 3)
- Creating a Secure and Stable Environment (Chapter 4)
- Strengthening the Rule of Law (Chapter 5)
- Supporting Peacebuilding and Development (Chapter 6)

**Political primacy**

Lasting and sustainable peace is only achieved through political solutions and not through military and technical engagements alone. Accordingly, political solutions must guide all UN peace operations. The present study attempts to reinforce the primacy of the political nature of contemporary peace operations. A field mission led by its HoM signals the political engagement of the international community. The scope of this engagement is much wider than the leadership of the mission—it extends to the complex of actors working within the mission area and the host country, as well as neighbouring states, regional and international organizations and interested UN Member States, including troop- and police-contributing countries. The study therefore stresses the importance of the MLT’s political engagement, and this informs the contents of each chapter. MLT engagement can never be a mechanistic process but is, instead, a skilled articulation of refined political judgement. Nevertheless, the study recognizes that this judgement can be better informed by knowledge of best practices and some generic considerations.
Principles of United Nations peacekeeping

The Capstone Doctrine outlines three core principles of peacekeeping as key factors for the success of a peacekeeping mission:

1. Consent. This involves a commitment to the peace process by the parties and their acceptance of the peacekeeping operation, translating into physical and political freedom of action of the mission to carry out its mandated tasks.

2. Impartiality. A peacekeeping mission must implement its mandate without favour or prejudice to any party. Impartiality, however, should not be confused with neutrality, inactivity or inaction.

3. Non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate. A nuanced principle from its original articulation for traditional peacekeeping, and which now implies that force may, and often should, be used in support of the mandate and those protected by it.

The Capstone Doctrine identifies credibility, legitimacy, and promotion of national/local ownership as additional key factors for mission success.

Taken together, these principles provide the lens through which all the activities of a mission are viewed and considered. The ways in which they interact, conflict and/or mutually support each other must be fully understood in order to provide a guidance and analysis tool for senior mission leadership. The principles underpin the analysis in the study, which also explores how they have been nuanced to reflect today’s new demanding environment.
Chapter 1.
Mission Leadership, Coordination and Integration

SUMMARY
This chapter introduces the concept of mission leadership, summarizes the leadership principles applied within the United Nations generally and in peace operations specifically, and details the composition of a Mission Leadership Team. It also discusses the implementation of a mission mandate and outlines a set of considerations for mission leaders.
1.1 The Importance of Mission Leadership

Peace operations are about facilitating and ensuring non-violent self-determination, preventing further conflict and sustaining peace. The overall task is almost overwhelming in terms of its breadth, importance and meaning—and yet this is perhaps the greatest source of inspiration for a mission’s leader. At the same time, peace operations are just one part of a larger international effort in a host country’s transformation from conflict to peace. Mission leaders are therefore assisting in changing a country’s history, in close cooperation with its people and on behalf of the United Nations. This is a responsibility that requires highly developed leadership qualities.

Effective and inclusive leadership is a critical factor in the success of peace operations. Numerous studies and reports have concluded that the demonstration of effective leadership by appointed leaders is essential to a successful peace operation, and this has frequently been reiterated by UN Member States and UN leaders, as well as policymakers, researchers and stakeholders. Nevertheless, this insight has proved difficult to operationalize and hard to legislate for in practice. Peace operations are complex, and leadership is not easy. Balancing the two has proved a challenge for the international community. Fortunately, there have been many successful and inspiring examples of mission leadership. In addition, patterns of best practice are identifiable beyond the manifold mission-specific circumstances.

With effective and inclusive leaders, UN missions can, over time, achieve most of their mandated objectives, engage the host state in sustainable state- and peacebuilding, optimize the use of scarce resources, motivate mission personnel and beneficiaries, and strengthen the credibility and reputation of the mission and of the UN. That said, it is important to recognize that mission leadership often comes with huge responsibilities, relatively little authority and limited supportive accountability. This is part of what makes it so fascinating.

1.1.1 A mission leadership focus

The word leadership is often used to refer either to a cadre of leaders (as in ‘the UN’s senior mission leadership’) or to an effective practice and inspiring quality we expect from good leaders (as in ‘she showed good leadership as a Head of Mission’). We must always be clear about what we are referring to when we talk about leadership. The considerations in this study focus on a mission’s senior leadership, as opposed to leadership in general.
In the sense of good practice, mission leadership needs to be exercised by the MLT at the country level, and by Heads of Offices and Sector Commanders at the subnational level. The aspects and contexts of good UN leadership embrace issues such as the multifaceted international character of peace operations and their political foundation; the hazardous environment; the ever-changing interests and agendas and their complexity and width; the high stakes; and the large number of dynamic and external factors.

While this study naturally includes much generic information on leadership, it strives to clarify, visualize and give advice on the kind of leadership that is specific to assignments in peace operations. In short, it aims to be as context-related, concrete and relevant as possible. Each chapter therefore includes a section entitled ‘Considerations’ that

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**The United Nations system leadership framework**

The United Nations system leadership framework outlines eight defining characteristics of UN leadership:

- **It is norm-based** — in that it is grounded in UN norms and standards, beginning with the UN Charter.
- **It is principled** — defending its norms and standards and their application without discrimination, fear, or favour even — especially — in the face of pressure and push-back from powerful actors.
- **It is inclusive** — embracing diversity as a strength, practicing cultural and gender sensitivity, and rejecting discrimination in all its forms.
- **It is accountable** — both mutually within the UN system, and to beneficiaries and the greater public.
- **It is multidimensional**, integrated and engaged across pillars and functions.
- **It is transformational** — to achieve positive change.
- **It is collaborative** — both within and beyond the UN system.
- **It is self-applied** — that is, modelled in the behaviour of UN personnel, who are expected to act in accordance with UN principles and values.

*Source: UN System Chief Executives Board for Coordination, ‘United Nations system leadership framework’, 31 January 2018.*
Outlines key issues at stake and potentially competing principles. The observations in these sections are driven by the many polarities that exist in today’s complex peacekeeping environments.

The present study also aims to identify a leader’s perspective on the different issues discussed. This means that issues are introduced and elaborated on mainly from the point of view of leaders, and not as topics as such. What is a leader’s responsibility? What does a leader need to know and understand? What kind of action does a leader need to take? What can others expect from their leaders and what should mission leaders expect from them in return? Who is accountable for what, and to whom?

Contemporary UN peace operations are complex endeavours. This requires imaginative and dedicated leadership that is grounded in integrity and competence. UN Security Council mandates are now broader and are often more demanding as the functions of peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peacebuilding become increasingly intertwined and mutually supportive. Mission leadership is also about developing a strong relationship with national counterparts, coalescing the international community’s support and efforts on the ground and, most critically, facilitating change. These trends have placed greater demands on a mission’s leaders, requiring MLTs to be better prepared, resourced and accountable for their actions. In addition, missions and their leaders need to be more professionally directed and supported by the Security Council and the UN Secretariat. Shortcomings in these areas often fall heavily on the shoulders of the MLT. This is part of the job.

Senior leaders in peace operations need to be proven and capable leaders from the outset. Exercising leadership in peace operations cannot be about on-the-job training. It is, however, to a large degree about on-the-job learning. Successful mission leaders are open-minded, curious and flexible, and facilitate an environment conducive to continuous and adaptive learning throughout the mission and the duration of its mandate.

1.1.2 The Mission Leadership Team

The MLT is made up of the senior leaders of the mission. Its makeup reflects a variety of competencies, professional backgrounds and working cultures, including politics, civil administration, the military, the police and civil society.

The MLT will inevitably reflect numerous concepts and cultures of leadership, and thus provides a resource for complementary experience...
and insight. Correctly approached and cultivated, this diversity will be an obvious strength for both the MLT and the mission as a whole. It is important to invest in developing and forging a professional, inclusive, committed, dynamic and enduring team. All peace operations generate continuous challenges, surprises and frictions for their leaders, and these need to be tackled and overcome as a team. For the MLT to work well together, its individual members must first demonstrate inter-cultural competence. Then, teambuilding should be prioritized, planned and creative. Small and recurring efforts count. The focus should not just be on formal and scheduled occasions, but also on building the team a little every day, and in every encounter within the MLT.

The exact composition of the MLT will vary depending on the specific type of mission and its requirements. Integrated and multidimensional missions are typically led by the Head of Mission (HoM) or Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG). This core team consists of the Deputy SRSG (Political); the Deputy SRSG–Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator (DSRSG–RC/HC); the Force Commander (FC), the Police Commissioner (PC); the Director or Chief of Mission Support; and the mission’s Chief of Staff. It is very often reinforced by other section heads such as Human Rights, Gender, Strategic Communications and Security.

In assembling this group, the HoM, in consultation with UN Headquarters (UNHQ), needs to find a balance between adequate representation and efficient decision making. In practice, most missions have a core group as well as a wider senior management group (see 2.1 Integrated Missions).

Whatever the chosen format, the MLT is responsible, at the operational level, for implementing the mission’s mandate through the coordinated planning and execution of the many tasks required to achieve the strategic end state—that is, the mission’s overarching vision. To achieve this vision, each MLT member must understand their individual role and responsibilities.

The individual leadership qualities of MLT members are crucially important but can only be optimized if personalities complement each other. As a prerequisite for collective decision making the MLT also needs to operate as an inclusive, coherent team in which the members are respectful of each other’s competencies, roles and assignments. This is particularly important when it comes to the overall civilian leadership of the military and police (that is, uniformed) components.
Civilian leaders provide the general and political direction and set mission-level strategic objectives. The uniformed components plan and execute their operational contributions in order to achieve those ends. At the same time, it is important for the uniformed components to be conscious of the dynamics of political priorities and considerations, and to understand that these are not always compatible with preferred operational practices and options. Uniformed leaders need to be sensitive and imaginative within their professional domains and identify ways for the military and police instruments to sustain the political process. In essence, they need to be officers with acute political and diplomatic antennae.

Developing the capacity to lead, then, is about developing the collective level and capacity to produce shared results, whereby everyone engaged must and does fill a leading role in some fashion. Given this, it may also be useful to clarify some aspects that are core to this study. The competing issues which need engagement by senior leaders are sometimes technical in nature, requiring ‘either/or’ technical solutions. More often they are ever-present tensions or polarities that require shared ‘both/and’ attention.

1.1.3 UN leadership guidance and know-how: mission leadership as a continuum

Unsurprisingly, the personnel involved in a mission and the UN Secretariat are the most immediate and important sources of knowledge for mission leaders. Open and attentive leaders will gain a lot by tapping into the accumulated experience, views and insights of those who have led and those who have been led. Mission personnel are likely to believe in much of what they have done and achieved. If that is taken as a point of departure, the MLT will likely accomplish two things: it will win the trust and respect of personnel; and it will have their support for the things it seeks to change or do differently. At the same time, maintaining the long-term trust and confidence of the host state is equally important.

The UN has a rich catalogue of written and official peace operations guidance. There are approximately 200 documents on the UN’s internal Policy and Practice Database, covering everything from conduct and discipline to overarching peacekeeping principles.¹ This guidance exists, of course, to provide support for the mission and its

¹ Many of the official guidance documents are also available on the UN Peacekeeping Resource Hub, which is available to all.
leaders, and to ensure effectiveness and the widest possible awareness of UN best practices. Missions typically also have on board a Policy and Best Practices Officer to lead knowledge management and sharing.

Guidance constitutes a formal, comprehensive and experience-based foundation for missions’ daily operations and routines. It falls into different categories and targets a range of leaders, specialists and functions throughout the mission structure. Some are mostly for a particular component. Others should be used by mission leaders more broadly. These provide a framework of standards that enable alignment, efficiency and accountability. The MLT needs to make sure that they are familiar to, understood and applied by all mission personnel. This requires a systematic approach to follow-up, control and reporting.
Reflections on leadership

Leadership in peace operations is ultimately about successfully implementing a mandate. This can occasionally be a tough, lonely and thankless task. At the same time, it has the potential to be one of the most meaningful, rewarding and developing leadership assignments of one's professional life.

One leadership consideration deserves to be highlighted above all others: you are much more likely to succeed as a leader in peace operations if you have a genuine interest in people. You will be leading and representing people, serving, taking risks, cooperating and negotiating with people, agonizing over people, getting close to people, making a difference for people and carrying the hopes of people. You will be constantly surrounded by people from all over the world, not least the people from the country with which you will develop a life-long bond and humbly refer to as the host state. Leadership is about people. Successful leadership will be determined by your ability to relate to people as a leader, as a UN representative and as a fellow human being.

The other side of the coin

That being said, it is almost impossible to satisfy everyone or meet continuously changing expectations. Mission leadership is about getting the job done. Leaders need to develop good and durable working relations in a range of areas, but they must also be prepared to stand up for their organization’s integrity, values, beliefs and mandate. This is not always easy. It takes moral courage. Be prepared to be criticized; it is an inevitable and humbling part of mission leadership. At the same time, it is important to be honest with yourself and listen beyond the choir of complaints. What can be learned? Are we on the right track? Have we really done what the organization believes is right?

All MLT members are obliged to seek mutual understanding, respect each other’s professional competencies and communicate openly in order to avoid misunderstandings and prejudice. In addition, MLT members should first and foremost keep the bigger, political picture in mind. It is all too easy to complain and build up mistrust when exposed to the everyday realities and hardships of the mission. Do not fall into this trap. Do not become a disgruntled leader; they are, unfortunately,
not uncommon in missions. Peace operations deserve better leadership than that, and your brief mission will only be successful if you function as a genuine team. If collective performance is made possible, the impossible becomes possible.

Many reasons to be proud

To be a leader in a UN mission is something that you are likely to be proud of in its own right and in your own way, both during service and when looking back at what you were part of. The same is true of your colleagues in the MLT and almost all of your personnel. Leaders have a special responsibility for making it possible for the mission to feel that well-deserved pride. Find motivation and strength in this, as well as in more challenging moments. Make yourself proud every day, in your thoughts, relations and actions. Others will undoubtedly follow. You are, after all, representing the UN and everything that it stands for in terms of peace, hope and a better future for all the suffering and innocent people caught up in armed conflict.

Prestige can often be an issue. New leaders regularly come to a mission with their own plans and ambitions, as well as formed opinions about their predecessors, little realizing that in the near future they themselves will be someone else's predecessor. Frequently, the handover process will not even allow for successive leaders to meet constructively, even if they wanted to. Mission leadership assignments are relatively short; the UN, the mission and the host state are best served when leadership transitions are seamless, and progress is attributed to the mission rather than to individual leaders. You are there to build peace, not a legacy. If you focus on achieving the first, the second will follow naturally.

Finally, you will not have the time to become much of an expert, even though you will often be treated as one. Therefore, build on previous achievements, tap into the mission’s informal and spoken knowledge, engage in-depth with the host country and ensure that your actions are informed, targeted and sustainable. This does not in any way limit your opportunities to deal with immediate issues. Best practices and agility go hand in hand.

Jonas Alberoth (insights drawn from several mission leadership assignments)
Leadership principles for UN peace operations

A 2010 study on leadership in the United Nations, based on interviews across the senior leadership of UN peace operations, generated seven cogent findings. These are paraphrased below, with added interpretation.

Individuals do not automatically become leaders by virtue of being appointed to senior positions. Leadership has to be demonstrated, and ‘followship’, which is always voluntary, has to be earned.

Leading a UN peace operation is about not being resigned to but instead overcoming the restraints, and also about creating the space for independent action. This speaks to good leadership managing to articulate a vision and give direction when a particular situation appears difficult and confusing. This can bring risk and therefore takes courage.

UN leadership is about managing and growing beyond a series of contradictions. This speaks to the ambiguity in much of the environment of a peace operation, in which many issues and stakeholders are in tension. How to make progress while retaining impartiality and personal integrity is often a challenge.

Leadership in the UN is as much about courage and risk as it is about caution. This is saying that while there must be a balance, a fear of failure will most often lead to inaction and subsequently failure. Most problems in contexts in which the UN is deployed are intractable and will not respond readily to a cautious approach. This is especially true when the use of force by the UN is needed to protect civilians. Many good UN leaders view the mandate not as a ceiling beyond which the mission or its components must not go (the cautious approach) but as a springboard for positive action, knowing what needs to be done to make progress. The willingness to succeed must transcend the fear of failure.
UN leadership is about external and internal coalition building. This recognizes that a UN leader’s power and authority, the area of control, is limited. Instead, much of the work needed to succeed in a peace operation lies outside this area of control—that is, with the external partners, both within the mission area and elsewhere. This area of influence is widespread and contains many stakeholders. Not all will be supportive. Achieving the needed support for the vision and the desired course of action requires diplomacy, communication and inspiration.

Successful UN leaders respect, care for and empower their staff. This highlights the need to earn followship. What creates and maintains followship and followers’ loyalty to the mission mandate?

UN leadership is less about individuals than it is about creating strong leadership teams. So much poor leadership is ego-driven, with a mistaken focus on the trappings of power and authority. It is prevalent in UN missions in which the UN system often seems to reinforce the culture of the revered senior leader. The antidote to this is humility, which is in itself a key trait of good leadership.

The principal task of the MLT is to interpret the mandate and develop mission plans that implement the direction given by the mandate in the specific phase of the conflict or peace process. Mandates contain many tasks and directions, which are often added to or adjusted by the UN Security Council over time. Some of these tasks and directions may well be in tension with each other. Mandates often reflect the political concerns of UN Member States as much as realistic assessments of the practicality of implementing them. The MLT must also operationalize its complex and sometimes ambiguous mandate. This requires prioritization and context-specific planning, and adaptive management and learning, for example by innovating new methods or taking performance feedback into account.

The primary nature of any strategy—whether in the context of peace operations, humanitarian relief or development cooperation—is the relationship between ends, ways and means. In peace operations:

- **ENDS** are the objectives, such as creating a secure and stable environment or implementing a peace process;
- **WAYS** are the mechanisms through which stated objectives are pursued, such as diplomatic efforts or supporting elections or reconciliation; and
- **MEANS** relate to the resources available, such as political influence, personnel, equipment and international support.

It is crucial to ensure that the relationship between the ends, ways and means is fully understood, and that this understanding is logical, practical and clearly established from the outset. This requires mission-level planning. If there is no or little planning function the relationship between ends, ways and mean becomes incoherent, and successful mandate implementation will most likely be at risk.

The MLT will have to determine the priorities of the mission and consider what can practically be achieved within certain timelines. It must then be prepared to adjust these priorities and timelines as circumstances change—which they will. The MLT will need to balance its plans against the available human and financial resources, and should clearly define strategic goals, develop coordinated work plans and prioritize activities to ensure the efficient and effective delivery of support and proper resource allocation.

Depending on the mission’s leaders, mandates can be viewed either as a limitation on action or as an opportunity for engagement and proactive thinking. Prior to deployment, the HoM should have frank discussions
with the leadership of the UN Department of Peace Operations (DPO),
the UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA), the
UN Department of Operational Support (DOS) and other relevant
departments and offices in order to arrive at a common understanding
of the mandate and its intentions.

In addition, both host–state and international engagement will be
essential. Systematic consultation will be required when developing the
mission’s key priorities. The host state should co–own these priorities
and constitute a significant and positive pull factor. The international
community will need to provide both political and financial support. All
this must be achieved while maintaining integrity in accordance with
the UN’s normative framework.

The strategic assessment and subsequent integrated planning are
critical tools for determining priorities. This analysis should take a
number of factors into consideration, such as the structural,
intermediate and immediate causes of the conflict as well as drivers of
peace, the history and characteristics of the host country, the UN’s
political prerequisites and the role of regional and international actors.
A strategic assessment is the building block that forms the basis for the
development of the UN’s shared goals, formulation of the mandate and
the Integrated Assessment and Planning Framework. The assessment
should contain an analysis of the drivers of peace and conflict, including
of the key factors and the actors and capacities on the ground, and the
resources to undertake the operation, as well as the impact of ongoing
operations to ensure they apply the “do no harm” principle. In addition,
it should assess the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats
that might trigger change or influence transition.

While a great deal of information and analysis will be available from
UNHQ and will have been used to develop the mission’s mandate,
further analysis will need to be undertaken at the mission level based on
the information obtained from host–country actors, other international
organizations, UN Member States, and external experts and academics.
Mission analysis should be a collaborative, multi–disciplinary
undertaking that addresses all the various activities that UN
components, agencies and programmes propose to undertake. The
process of mission analysis by the MLT should be dynamic and
continuous to reflect the changing environment.

As part of the mission analysis, the MLT should also consider early
peacebuilding activities that are achievable, and which might be
initiated by the mission in support of other international and regional
actors and the host country. Early opportunities to lay the foundations
for sustainable peace and development, in close collaboration with the
UN Country Team (UNCT), need to be aligned with broader national and international responses, and the ability to coordinate with national authorities and other partners. The MLT should also identify benchmarks that indicate the efficiency, effectiveness and legitimacy of national institutions and their ability to absorb competence and resources from external partners. It is important to ensure that measures of effectiveness are incorporated into any subsequent UN implementation plan in order to measure and assess the impact the mission is having and, where necessary, to identify corrective action.

Finally, the MLT will need to be aware that, in implementing a mandate, the relationship between the mission and the host government will be dynamic and change over time. The close political engagement that is required and highly sought after in the early days of a mission may become less welcome or even resented as national interests manifest themselves in different ways. What is possible at first may become harder to achieve later in the process—for example, after elections. The MLT needs to be alert to and prepared for these shifts, which could indicate the waning influence of the mission and its ability to sustain the peace process and the mandate. Close and forward-looking coordination with the UN Secretariat and the Security Council will be essential. Developments such as these, however, are natural in the life cycles of most missions and are not necessarily negative. Peace operations, after all, are about encouraging the development of self-determination, as long as it is peaceful.

How well a mission starts, or handles critical junctures, is likely to determine its future progress and credibility. The perception of a mission among the host government and population is dynamic and is often formed against the backdrop of how well it delivers on key expectations.
1.3 Leadership Considerations

In their efforts to improve integration, coordination and cooperation, MLTs may wish to consider the ways in which they can:

- Optimize the aims of functionally integrated teams and their co-location
- Take a collaborative and flexible approach
- Develop a shared understanding
- Leverage organizational and cultural diversity
- Manage change when needed
- Accept responsibility and ensure accountability
- Promote integrated planning and action
- Utilize planning and assessment tools effectively and creatively, including prioritization and sequencing

While any positive response by an MLT to the above considerations is likely to enhance the effectiveness of a leadership team, the collective impact of any action rests on the willingness and ability of the HoM or SRSG, and their respective teams, to develop a culture of unity, trust, commitment and mutual respect.

1.3.1 Ensuring the primacy of politics and sustaining peace

The civilian leadership of most field missions reflects the fundamentally political nature and profile of UN peacekeeping.¹ Today’s multidimensional peacekeeping operations are both driven by and the drivers of political processes. This central feature affects every aspect of the mission’s mandate. Accordingly, the MLT needs to positively and proactively facilitate the political process aiming at sustaining peace, while being constantly alert to the principle of national ownership.

The political process can include a range of activities, including: the negotiations on an enduring and comprehensive peace agreement between the parties to a conflict; the holding of what is hoped will be peaceful and credible elections; the strengthening of democratic processes; assistance to the host government with the extension of state authority; national reconciliation; continual attention to the avoidance of a breakdown in the peace or political process; and supporting and facilitating an inclusive political process that can successfully and sustainably move the country from a post-conflict state to a sustainable peace.

Considerations for Mission Leadership

peace (which is the overarching objective of the mission). All these activities constitute core peacekeeping business.

Depending on the mission’s mandate, seeking and maintaining support for the political process to achieve the above-mentioned goals can take up a sizable amount of the mission’s time and resources. In particular, and again depending on the mandate, the role of the HoM can be seen on three levels: first, s/he is the lead political representative of the international community through the mandated authority of the Security Council and the Secretary-General; second, s/he is the head of the UN peacekeeping operation and responsible for all of its mandated activities; and, third, of increasing importance, s/he is the coordinator of all UN activities and programmes beyond the peacekeeping and political/security tasks. All these activities are aimed at assisting a country’s transition from conflict to a sustainable peace and ensuring that the international community vigorously supports this effort.

The political process in any country is complicated by contending pressures and actors. The mission leadership will have to continually manage the expectations of the various actors involved in the process, and indeed the entire population. Accordingly, the consent of the parties for mandate implementation can never be taken for granted. The impact of spoilers should also be taken into account. Perhaps more than in any other aspect of the mission’s mandate, and owing to the centrality of the political process, the mission leadership should continually reassess and adjust every decision against the peacekeeping principles of impartiality, the non-use of force except in self-defence or defence of the mandate, legitimacy, credibility and the promotion of national and local ownership. At the same time, the mission must monitor consent at all levels—including the working and local levels—with great political sensitivity to ensure that the mandate is being properly implemented and that possible breakdowns in consent are anticipated and addressed.

1.3.2 A human rights mindset

The MLT has a responsibility to ensure that the mission promotes and protects human rights throughout its activities. The responsibility to implement a mission’s human rights mandate lies primarily with a dedicated human rights team, which reports both to the mission and to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in Geneva. However, all mission components should be familiar with established policies on human rights, which are part of the UN’s normative framework. Moreover, they should be active promoters of these fundamental principles (see 5.1 Human Rights and Protection Promoted).
The MLT should develop a comprehensive strategy on human rights issues, with outputs integrated into the mission plan, and should consult and make effective use of the Human Rights section and encourage other components to do the same. As a matter of principle, a mission should always report and take action on human rights violations. Reports should always be coordinated with OHCHR. In those situations where a direct release of information on violations by the mission might jeopardize a delicate relationship with the host country, the mission might wish to manage such a release from Geneva.

While mission mandates differ, the promotion and protection of human rights remain core goals of many peace operations, regardless of the phase of the peace process. The different phases or situations simply determine how these goals can best be achieved. In most cases, the main aim is to assist and empower national communities, institutions and authorities to take ownership of human rights issues.

**Human Rights Due Diligence Policy**

Human rights also represent an important part of the normative framework for UN action and establish the ‘rule book’ for the activities of a mission and the conduct of its staff. In this regard, the UN has put in place a Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP), which specifies that before providing support to any non–UN security force, a UN entity must conduct an assessment of the potential risks and benefits involved. This assessment must include consideration of the human rights record of the intended recipient of support and the adequacy of the measures in place to prevent human rights violations. The intent of the HRDDP is to be supportive rather than prescriptive, so that where necessary, the scope and nature of mitigating measures should be identified, agreed and put into effect.

**1.3.3 Mainstreaming the Women, Peace and Security Agenda**

Conflict and violence affect men, women, boys and girls differently. The MLT should systematically integrate and apply this understanding if the mission’s various activities are to have the intended results. Gender mainstreaming means that, in all mission planning, implementation and evaluation, the MLT should consider, and report on, how activities, processes and procedures help to ensure equality in the situations of women and men. It is also important to ensure that the approach advocated by the MLT is culturally sensitive to the wider social contexts in which the mission is operating. The MLT has clear responsibilities to
incorporate a gender-sensitive approach in all of the mission’s activities and policies, while also setting standards and encouraging actions that demonstrate and promote a gender balance and gender mainstreaming across all grades and mission components.

The MLT has an obligation to lead by example and to champion policies and strategies—both within the mission and in all its dealings with national and local authorities—that incorporate a gender perspective at both the political and the organizational levels. The MLT should establish clear goals and ensure that there are sufficient resources in mission budgets to support the deployment of gender advisers and resources to ensure that gender is mainstreamed effectively across the different functions of the mission. It should review and monitor progress on compliance with the policy on gender-responsive peacekeeping. The MLT should consult and make effective use of gender advisers and encourage other components to do the same. The mission should also ensure that female staff participate in meetings held with government officials, local community and civil society, and that women’s groups are consulted on the implementation of the mission mandate. The full participation of women in the peace process is essential in order for the process to be genuinely inclusive, legitimate and sustainable.

1.3.4 Conduct of personnel

The success or failure of a mission can rest on the performance and good conduct of its personnel. All cases of misconduct have a negative impact on the image and legitimacy of a mission, which in turn can erode consent and have concomitant security implications for mission personnel. The MLT should set the tone and exhibit the highest standards of personal conduct and behaviour at all times. It must seek to ensure that UN policy is enforced and that all complaints are investigated thoroughly. Efforts should also be made to promote the welfare of and recreation for personnel, as this will help to strengthen morale and discipline. Most missions have conduct and discipline teams that provide policy guidance and technical advice to the mission leadership on conduct and disciplinary issues and organize training for mission staff.

The MLT has a command responsibility to ensure that specific and proactive measures are taken to prevent cases of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA), and that the UN’s policy of zero tolerance in this area is enforced. Preventing SEA is about

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**Key UN Policies & Guidance**

DPO/DOS ‘Gender Responsive United Nations Peacekeeping Operations’ policy

Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse (2003)
upholding the human rights of individuals that missions serve. The MLT needs to be proactive in promoting a transparent system that sets and maintains the highest standards of discipline and conduct by all mission components. While the MLT plays a key role in this regard, close cooperation with the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) as well as troop- and police-contributing countries (TCCs/PCCs) is central to ensuring good conduct and discipline and addressing violations of relevant UN policies.
Chapter 2.
Sustaining the Mission and Its Mandate

SUMMARY

This chapter gives an overview of the main management issues that mission leaders need to be aware of in running a United Nations peace operation: integrated planning and operations based on sound peace and conflict analysis; strategic communications; crisis management; maintaining the safety and security of UN personnel; managing mission resources; and the environmental impact of a mission.
2.1 Integrated Missions

The United Nations system has the invaluable ability to employ, under a unified leadership, a mix of civilian, military and police capabilities in support of a fragile peace process. Integrated missions are designed to facilitate a coherent system-wide approach to assisting countries experiencing or emerging from conflict on their path to peace and post-conflict recovery. The UN Policy on Integrated Assessment and Planning (IAP) states that the UN system should be configured in an Integrated Mission or an Integrated Approach in all conflict and post-conflict situations in which a UNCT, a multidimensional peacekeeping operation or a Special Political Mission/Office is present.2 A UN peace operation becomes an Integrated Mission when Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC) functions are part of the peacekeeping mission. Its presence is underpinned by a shared vision of the UN’s strategic objectives that reflects a common understanding of the operating environment as well as agreement on how to maximize and measure the effectiveness, efficiency and impact of the overall UN response.

In complex environments, the MLT should meet regularly in order to agree on overarching aims, build trust, and enhance teamwork. Furthermore, the team must develop a shared understanding of the political strategy and a “theory of change” on how to achieve the expected mission objectives and implement the mandate.

Experience has shown that integration and trust develop more easily between the leaders and staffs of the various components when key elements of a mission are co-located. If component headquarters are dispersed and contact between members of the MLT is reduced, this can undermine the mission’s effectiveness, security and level of cooperation. In addition to the maintenance of open lines of communication, the MLT can improve its shared understanding and effectiveness through the establishment of a number of integrated structures, such as a Joint Operations Centre (JOC), a Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) and a Mission Support Centre. Overall, the structure of the mission should be determined by functionality rather than bureaucratic considerations. Expertise should be placed where it is most needed to improve integration and communication, which may not necessarily be within its parent component.

These two principles—a shared idea of how to implement the mission plan, and the importance of co-location—apply equally at the regional or sector levels, where it is desirable for the Civilian, Military and Police

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components to be co-located wherever possible and appropriate. Humanitarian agencies often prefer to be located in separate facilities based on the humanitarian principles of impartiality, neutrality and independence. In addition, UN police may need to position themselves adjacent to host-state police facilities.

A schematic model of an integrated UN mission is shown in Figure 2.1. It should be noted that the model is purely illustrative, since the actual structure will vary from one mission to another depending on their mandates, the resources available, the allocation of functional responsibilities to senior leaders, and the conditions on the ground. The model also illustrates the linkages between mission components, and between the mission and the wider UN system through the coordinating position of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General–Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator (DSRSG–RC/HC). Although Figure 2.1 depicts separate functional components, their operation in the field should be within integrated teams.

Figure 2.1 Generic United Nations integrated mission structure
All members of the MLT need to understand the roles and responsibilities of the various UN agencies, funds and programmes present in the country, and of the overarching IAP framework. The MLT should take the lead in promoting the best possible working relations between all the UN entities operating in the same country or conflict zone. This task is often the responsibility of the DSRSG–RC/HC, who has overall responsibility for coordination within the UN family. The HoM, together with the DSRSG–RC/HC, will need to strike a delicate balance between creating a secure and stable environment through the work of the mission and its military forces and police services, and preserving and respecting the “humanitarian space” for UN agencies and their partners on the ground. Given aligned overall objectives and continuous communication, these should not be regarded as conflicting priorities, but rather as a polarity that should be managed. Nonetheless, ensuring effective civil–military cooperation and coordination among elements of the wider UN and with international partners is one of the most difficult challenges that the MLT will face.

In addition to ensuring intra–UN integration, a mission will also need to ensure that there is an adequate level of targeted coordination with a wide range of relevant international, regional and host–country actors. This will require the MLT to maintain a high degree of sensitivity towards the respective mandates, interests and operating cultures of such actors. Results-oriented partnerships are the key to success, and the level of mutual interdependence will be high.

Integrated UN missions are often deployed alongside a variety of international, regional and UN Member State actors with their own mandates, agendas and time horizons. Developing fruitful and dynamic partnerships with all the relevant international presences is of the utmost importance; alignment of overall efforts is a strategic imperative.
2.2 Promoting Integrated Planning and Operations

The MLT should have a sound understanding of UN integrated planning and its interaction with mandate design processes, as well as relations between UNHQ and the field. At the same time, there will be different approaches to planning within any integrated mission, particularly between the military/police and civilian components. The MLT should encourage flexibility and agility in planning processes through close interaction and information sharing.

In addition, each UN field presence should have standing coordination arrangements that bring together the UN system in an effort to provide strategic direction to and planning oversight of the joint efforts of the Organization to build and consolidate peace in the host country. The configuration and composition of integrated or joint planning structures will vary from one mission to another, based on the scale and nature of the UN operation and the level of strategic and programmatic coordination required, and in line with the principle that “form follows function”. Unless planning is driven by the MLT, the unity of purpose of the mission becomes incoherent and its mission support component (its budgetary and logistical resources) struggles to provide timely support. The buy-in and active engagement of the MLT is therefore essential for a successful and coherent planning process in support of mission implementation. At the very least, the MLT must give overarching planning direction to enable a mission planning process to be cascaded down through all components. This forms the basis of a mission plan.

Regardless of its configuration, the coordination architecture should fulfil key functions at the strategic and operational levels. Strategic planners in all UN entities should have a shared understanding of their purpose and core tasks, the composition of their teams and the organization of their work. At the mission level, Joint or Integrated Planning Units help bring together expertise across all disciplines to ensure a mission-wide planning structure and plan (see Figure 2.2).

Utilize assessment and planning tools effectively and creatively

IAP is defined as any UN analytical process at the strategic, programmatic or operational level that has implications for multiple UN entities, and which therefore requires their participation. There are nine guiding principles of IAP:

1. **Inclusivity.** Planning must be undertaken with the full participation of the mission and the UNCT, and in consultation and coordination with UNHQ.
2. **Form follows function.** The structural configuration of the UN integrated presence should reflect specific requirements, circumstances and mandates and can therefore take different forms.

3. **Comparative advantage.** Tasks should be allocated to the UN entity best equipped to carry them out and resources distributed accordingly.

4. **Flexibility based on context.** The design and implementation of assessment and planning exercises should be adapted to each situation and built on a continuing analysis of the drivers of peace and conflict and related mission options.

5. **National ownership.** This is an essential precondition for the sustainability of peace.

6. **A clear UN role in relation to other actors.**

7. **Recognition of the diversity of UN mandates and principles.**

8. **Upfront analysis of risks and benefits.**

9. **Mainstreaming.** All IAP processes should take account of UN policies on human rights, gender, and child protection, among others.

Figure 2.2 United Nations planning frameworks
In order to facilitate overall UN coherence, each mission should develop an Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) that reflects a shared vision of the UN’s strategic objectives and a set of agreed results, timelines and responsibilities for achieving synergies in the delivery of tasks critical to consolidating peace. Other UN planning frameworks, such as the UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework, can serve as the ISF. The purpose of an ISF is to:

- bring together the UN system around a common set of agreed peacebuilding priorities;
- identify common priorities, and prioritize and sequence agreed activities;
- facilitate a shift in priorities and/or resources, as required; and
- allow for regular stocktaking by senior managers.

The scope of the ISF should be limited to key peace consolidation priorities that are unique to the context of each mission area. Because they involve highly political and sequenced activities by a number of UN actors, many typical mandated tasks—such as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR); security sector reform (SSR); the rule of law; the return and reintegration of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees; the restoration of state authority; and addressing human rights violations—are particularly challenging and time-consuming. An ISF provides an opportunity to create clarity in the overall approach and establish priorities and a framework for mutual accountability.

Mission planners should be aware of other assessment and planning processes, and actively seek to create substantive linkages with the ISF wherever possible (see Figure 2.2).3 Such processes may include a Humanitarian Response Plan.

**Comprehensive Performance Assessment System**

The Comprehensive Performance Assessment System (CPAS) for Peacekeeping Operations was launched in 2018 in order to give peacekeeping missions a tool with which to measure their impact. The system forms part of the Integrated Performance Assessment Framework called for in UN Security Council Resolution 2436 (2018) on peacekeeping performance.

CPAS is a context and mission-specific planning, monitoring and evaluation tool. It helps translate mission objectives into components and work plans. It enables the MLT to make decisions aimed at

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improving performance by maintaining or scaling up those activities that have a meaningful impact and adapting or ending those that do not. The system assesses mission performance by analysing its effect on the knowledge, attitudes and behaviour of the people and institutions the mission needs to influence in order to prevent violent conflict and sustain peace. It does so by analysing the relevance, extent and duration of the mission’s actions on selected outcomes, identified during the planning process.

CPAS provides the leadership team with evidence of the impact the mission is having, and an analysis of where adjustments are necessary to improve performance. This enables the leadership team to optimize the allocation of resources and direct the mission’s focus in ways that can maximize performance and continuously improve mandate implementation. The system is an iterative adaptive cycle that starts with a planning process and that ends with adjustments made to future plans and operations, based on an assessment of performance (see Figure 2.3). In large multidimensional missions the system will generate quarterly performance assessments in order to enable these missions to adapt with more agility to their fast-changing circumstances. Over time the data and analysis generated by CPAS will help inform the reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, and the Results-Based Budgeting reports of the missions to the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly.

Figure 2.3 The Comprehensive Performance Assessment System
Context analysis: The drivers of peace and conflict

In recent years, there has been an increased push for data-driven peacekeeping. Conflict systems analysis constitutes a key management tool and a central point of departure for integrated planning and operations. Such analysis helps to identify the drivers of peace and conflict, and the likely areas in which intervention will be required to achieve the mission’s strategic objectives and contribute to peace and security.

In generating the analysis, the mission may make use of existing peace and conflict analyses such as the internal UN Common Country Analysis, external research or create a lighter version. For example, a workshop with a small group of national and international experts at the start of a mission or planning cycle may help identify drivers of peace and conflict. At the other end of the scale, the analysis can also be developed as a full peace and conflict monitoring system. Regardless of its scope and depth, the analysis and its identified options for action need to be an integral part of strategic and operational management throughout the planning, implementation and follow-up processes. It is a continuous process based on intelligence information, identification of and dialogue with key stakeholders, and a constant assessment of contextual changes.

Done well, context analysis can become a key part of crafting and adapting the political strategy and mission concept. It also provides a method for identifying the possible negative impacts of the mission, and ensures that the mission applies a “Do No Harm” approach.

While there are various methodologies for undertaking a peace and conflict analysis, it should as a minimum include the following four elements:

1. **A situation, context or profile analysis.** That is, a brief snapshot of the peace and conflict context that describes the historical, political, economic, security, sociocultural and environmental context. As a key starting point, this analysis should focus on the nature of the political settlement and its legitimacy—whether it is disputed and if so, by whom and why.

2. **An analysis of the causal factors of peace and conflict.** This should identify and distinguish between structural causes, intermediate or proximate causes and immediate causes or triggers. This causal analysis should attempt to establish patterns between the various

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4 This section is based on an edited version of UN DPKO, *Integrated Planning and Assessment Handbook* (2014), p. 26; and the draft 2018 policy.
causes of conflict and peace, perhaps by using a problem tree. The result should provide a clear idea of the key drivers of peace and conflict and allow the mission to plan to address the most important of these—that is, to reduce the effects of the drivers of conflict and strengthen the drivers of peace. In essence, this will also facilitate the prioritization and sequencing of different mission outcomes and outputs.

3. **A stakeholder or actor analysis.** Focusing on those engaged in or affected by conflict, this element analyses their interests, positions, capacities and relationships. It is essential to integrate gender and youth lenses in this analysis (see 6.2 Women’s Role in Peace and Security Promoted, and 6.3 Youth Participation Supported). In particular, the stakeholder analysis must map patterns of influence among the various actors and identify the resources that will be required to enable each actor to achieve their agenda. It is essential to map the actors that use violence to achieve their goals, as well as those that use collaborative actions to contribute to peace. The mapping exercise should also include formal and informal networks (noting that women may be more engaged in informal or community networks than official ones). This will generate an understanding of the key current and potential future actors, which will be central to formulating the mission’s political strategy towards them.

4. **A peace and conflict dynamics analysis.** This element should synthesize the resulting interactions between the peace and conflict profile, the causes and the actors, and provides potential scenarios, drivers of change and contingencies for the different scenarios. The latter will be essential for contingency planning and for ensuring the preparedness of the mission for future developments.

**Prioritization and sequencing**

In the early post-conflict period, national and international efforts should focus on achieving the most urgent and important peace-building objectives. The challenge will be to identify which activities best serve these objectives in each context. Priority setting should reflect the unique conditions and needs of the country, as identified in the peace and conflict analysis, rather than be driven by what international actors can or want to supply. Several operational activities will be needed to achieve an output but it is unlikely, given the limited resources available to a peace operation, that they can all be implemented at the same time. Prioritization will ensure the optimal use of available resources.
There are clear differences between prioritization and sequencing. Prioritization is a function of the importance of an activity. This does not necessarily mean that some activities must wait until a prioritized activity has been completed before they can begin. In contrast, sequencing means that one activity should not start until another has been completed. Combining the two approaches, an output can have a high priority, but could be sequenced to a later stage when the context is more conducive to change. For example, supporting a national reconciliation process may be a high priority but reconciliation initiatives can be sequenced to begin at a time when the political conditions are more favourable and national ownership is stronger.

During the planning stage, efforts should be made to both prioritize and sequence activities. The MLT should give direction on their priorities, and the planners can then provide the sequencing options. Legitimate international and national representatives of the host country should participate in these efforts. A plan of sequenced actions is based on a notional understanding of how events might unfold. Planned sequencing will almost always be disrupted by the unpredictability of activities on the ground. Prioritization and sequencing must remain flexible in order to adapt to the changing situation. Without systematic prioritization and sequencing, however, the mission will not know where it is heading or where to put its limited resources; and the influence of external factors will be even more significant and disruptive.

**Integrating a gender perspective at every stage**

Any situational analysis, as well as the ensuing planning and action, must consider all of the population and variations in living conditions, economic and political life and needs. Accordingly, a gender perspective must be an integral part of all analysis and planning. The MLT must be conscious that a UN peace operation is likely to be a critical mechanism for progressing the essential role of women in peace and security, without which the chances of a sustainable peace are small.5

Without an active gender perspective across the work of UN peace operations, missions will only see part of the overall picture related to the drivers of peace and conflict, the threat environment, the risks to civilians and the opportunities for sustainable peace. Gender expertise within the mission is essential to ensuring that peacekeeping activities are responsive to the different needs of women and men, and that resources are allocated effectively to support the WPS Agenda within the mission.

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Integrating a gender perspective is a mission-wide commitment that has to start with the MLT. A gender-responsive analysis that incorporates the needs of women and—as well as men—and considers power dynamics in society can identify indicators that serve as early-warning signs of violence or potential threats to the mission. This is particularly important for missions that have the protection of civilians as part of their mandate, as it can enhance the mission’s ability to assess threats and respond more effectively to them. Failure to undertake analysis through a gender lens can have a detrimental and long-term impact on the whole of society that could set back peace processes and future peacebuilding efforts.

**Intelligence-based decision making**

From the outset it must be clear to the MLT that intelligence in UN peace operations refers to the non-clandestine acquisition and processing of information by a mission within a directed mission intelligence cycle to meet the requirements of decision making and inform operations related to the safe and effective implementation of the Security Council mandate. Intelligence data can also inform the peace and conflict analysis to assist with strategic and operational decision making. In this context, it is the fundamental purpose of intelligence to enable missions to take decisions on appropriate actions in order to fulfil their mandates effectively and to enhance the security of all staff.

More specifically, peacekeeping intelligence is intended to support the provision of a common and coherent operational picture; provide early warning of imminent threats through good tactical intelligence; identify risks and opportunities; and contribute to force and staff protection. At the same time, peacekeeping intelligence can provide the MLT with an enhanced understanding of shifts in the strategic and operational landscape that present risks or opportunities for mandate implementation.

The precise intelligence structure will vary between missions, depending on the mandate and the resources made available by TCCs. It is important that the MLT takes appropriate measures to safeguard the analytical integrity of the mission. This entails allowing the intelligence cycle to run its course and being wary of the all-too-common phenomenon of members of staff seeking influence by maintaining a monopoly on information.
UNMIL: Long-term strategic objectives versus competing operational tasks

There was broad consensus that the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) could have done more to support the host country in a number of vital areas, especially national reconciliation and constitutional reform. Critical issues such as decentralization of public services and land tenure reform could have been prioritized and followed consistently from the outset to ensure peace was sustained on the basis of social cohesion.

Addressing the structural drivers of conflict—the absence of a just social contract and human security had neither featured strongly enough nor been pursued vigorously in Liberia’s post-conflict interventions. As UNMIL neared its closure, these issues remained largely unresolved. This reality exposed the odd absence of a comprehensive approach to planning for peacekeeping operations.

As a result of the government’s lukewarm attitude to the recommendations of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, national reconciliation in Liberia never went beyond a set of disparate and poorly funded initiatives that failed to produce significant results. Meaningful progress on this critical issue could have been achieved by bringing a sense of “reparation” to the most war-affected areas and communities through targeted development investments.

In addition, memorialization of the victims, accompanied by a formal acknowledgement of the wrong done to them and their families, as well as a collective expression of regret and apology, could have gone a long way to bring closure to the emotional agonies experienced by thousands of Liberian families. Furthermore, adoption of critical constitutional amendments and enactment of critical draft legislation on land tenure rights and local governance could have helped address some of the deep-seated historic factors responsible for marginalization and national disharmony.

Yet, the mission’s attention and limited resources had remained thinly spread for too long across an expansive array of mandated tasks. During the transition period, the mission requested and secured a four-fold increase in its programmatic funding, which provided the badly
needed resources for implementing some of the most critical interventions through the UN Country Team, civil society and non-governmental organizations.

It is crucial for all cycles of a peacekeeping mission, but particularly in its final stage, to make use of programmatic funding for projects in support of mandate implementation. In UNMIL's case, programmatic funding was a key enabler in residual areas of mandate focus and served as a critical tool in supporting our good offices and facilitation with the government, political parties, civil society, media, and the public.

Farid Zarif, SRSG UNMIL, 2015–18
Utilizing emerging technology

New technologies—including monitoring and surveillance technologies—have been made available to missions to a varying degree. The MLT should regularly request expert opinions from advisers and subject-matter experts from all three components on areas where new technology might be used to facilitate the implementation of the mission’s mandate. The use of technology is primarily aimed at supporting decision making and enhancing security. Examples of recent technologies that have been usefully deployed include situational-awareness platforms or systems (such as SAGE and MCOPS), unmanned aerial vehicles, ground radar and closed-circuit television.

In addition to technical issues that must be carefully coordinated with the host country, such as radio frequency allocation and airspace management, monitoring and surveillance technologies requires careful political management with regard to its potential intrusiveness and the sharing of information. The MLT must ensure that the mission’s use complies at all times with the principle of impartiality and is in full accordance with international and national laws. A mission must not engage in illegal activity in order to collect information.
2.3 Mainstreaming Strategic Communications

Modern communications contexts require UN peace operations to explain their strategic intention to promote changes in the behaviour of key stakeholders rather than merely disseminate information. The goals of a successful strategic communication campaign are to inform and shape a narrative that resonates with the target audience, and to promote dialogue and influence behaviour and perceptions in line with the mission’s mandate. This shift from top-down “one-way” messaging to a dialogue-driven approach through mechanisms such as social media builds engagement and partnerships, creates conversations, and allows a number of distinct but harmonized voices to come from the mission. However, such an approach requires commitment and resources.

Strategically designed and well-executed public communications are critical to a mission’s success, central to its ability to achieve the mandate and also contribute to the security of its personnel. The mission’s strategic communication plan should therefore be a key element of its political strategy. It can alter perceptions and dispel misconceptions, deter spoilers, provide greater situational awareness, solidify support, create partnerships, promote dialogue and, critically, generate political will and buy-in to a peace process. Communications also assist with maintaining consent, legitimacy and credibility, and managing local and international expectations. It is crucial that public information outreach activities, especially radio broadcasts, are able to reach the maximum number of local people, particularly women and marginalized groups, even if this may be logistically difficult or politically sensitive (for example in cases where the host government delays or obstructs the granting of a broadcast licence).

Effective internal communication (whether with UN mission personnel or the wider UN system) is also a necessary aspect of mandate implementation that is often underutilized or ignored by the UN leadership in modern peace operations. Staff at all levels use social media and have wide influence and outreach. Therefore, ensuring that UN staff understand what they are there to do and the leadership’s vision for implementing these frequently complex tasks is as vital as outreach to external constituencies.6

The planning and ownership of public information activities and processes should be driven by the MLT and fully integrated into all stages of the deployment of a peacekeeping operation. The mission’s Chief of Strategic Communications and Public Information should be

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considered senior staff and be part of the MLT’s decision-making process, in order to advise on communication strategies and outreach mechanisms for any decisions taken. For their part, members of the MLT should be prepared to represent their components, the mission and the UN in discussions with international, national and local media. Finally, in the spirit of “One UN”, the mission’s information and overall messages need to be closely coordinated with those of the UNCT.
2.4 Crisis Management

In peacekeeping, crisis management has become an increasingly key aspect of an MLT’s role. Crises are a regular feature of mission life. It is axiomatic that prevention through good analysis and intelligence can avoid some crises, but crises do happen. Many peace operations are on a virtually permanent crisis footing, making sound crisis-management procedures part of the normative framework for good mission leadership. Accordingly, good routine management is critical to successful mission crisis management.7

It is recognized that informed and effective leaders are the critical success factor in good crisis management. These leadership skills can only be developed by training and practice drills using sufficient resources in secure environments which focus on crisis preparedness. Preparedness requires clear policies and structures, clear roles and responsibilities, and understood and practised mechanisms for the fast flow of information and direction. None of these can be assumed, and it is usually too late to discover their absence in a crisis. The MLT has a central role in anticipating and preparing for crises, and ensuring all components are familiarized and practised in the use of the mission’s crisis management structures and procedures. It is equally important that all MLT members are well versed in the mission’s crisis-management procedures.

In moments of crisis, reliable reserve capacities are a vital but unmet requirement of UN peace operations. Even the best-prepared plans are ineffective in the absence of a credible response. When a political crisis erupts or serious violence breaks out, the UN must be able to react rapidly and effectively. It is critical that the mission HQ forges a unified political approach through the Crisis Management Team. While multiple initiatives will be essential, they should be mutually reinforcing. Developing contingency plans and holding regular scenario-based exercises to increase the mission’s preparedness for handling crises is essential.8 Because of the significantly reduced margin for error, the effectiveness of crisis response depends vitally on unity of information flow and unity of command.

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8 UN DPO, ‘Improving Security of United Nations Peacekeepers: We need to change the way we are doing business’ [Santos Cruz report], 19 December 2017.
UNAMID: Negotiating undeclared national caveats during crisis

There are instances when mission leadership must weigh the credibility of the mission in delivering its mandated task to protect civilians against the security of UN personnel. A critical question for mission leadership is negotiating undeclared national caveats by troop-contributing countries (TCCs) and police-contributing countries (PCCs) that come up during an operation or crisis.

For example, at one point during the mandate of the United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), fighting between rebel groups and Sudanese security forces led to approximately 50,000 people fleeing towards the UNAMID Saraf Umra Team Site. The Team Site had a Military Company, 32 Individual Police Officers and several Military Observers and civilian staff. There was a risk that the displaced persons could force their way into the camp, and a threat of further attacks on the civilians. There was also a need for inner perimeter protection to identify the actual number of people and humanitarian needs.

During MLT deliberations on how to address the situation, several tensions arose. The MLT decided to deploy an additional Military Company to the Team Site as well as a platoon of formed police unit (FPU) personnel to assist with inner perimeter protection, and crowd management.

The FPUs had not previously deployed in such situations and when the decision was made to send a detached platoon, the PCC resisted and indicated that FPU platoons could not be detached from their unit. The political implications of potentially failing to protect civilians in Saraf Umra were significant and the mission would lose trust and any credibility with the local population it was mandated to serve.
Taking into consideration the protection needs on the ground and the memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the PCC, the MLT decided that the FPU platoon could be deployed after all for detached duties within a specific timeframe. As part of the security arrangements the FPU personnel moved together with the Military Company to provide inner perimeter protection and crowd management, while the military focused on outer perimeter protection and the gradual return of the displaced persons.

It was important for UNAMID to have considered the implications and consequences of the situation. Several questions arose, for example regarding the interpretation of detached duties of an FPU and the MOU between the UN and the PCC, while credibly implementing the mission mandate. All this was when time for MLT decision-making was short. It was therefore important for the MLT to have a deep understanding of the competing issues and in the face of such polarities to make appropriate and timely decisions.

Brig. Gen. Hester Paneras,
Police Commissioner, UNAMID,
2013–15
2.5 Maintaining the Safety and Security of UN Personnel

The host government is primarily responsible for the security of the UN staff, their dependents and the UN resources in country. However, host-state capacity is often weak and UN field missions increasingly operate in high-risk environments. This requires a system-wide, multidimensional approach to ensure acceptable levels of staff safety and security. Security must not be looked at in isolation. Decisions need to be made in collaboration between the UN as a system and the responsible host government. A major challenge (polarity) for the MLT is to strike a balance between the mission’s accessibility and programmatic activity, while ensuring the safety and security of its personnel. Furthermore, because the UN operates an organization-wide security management system (SMS) there is potential for tension between the political and security focus and aims of the mission as articulated by its mandate and the MLT and those of the UNCT, whose focus is primarily humanitarian.

The UN Security Policy Manual contains a series of security policies that guide all actors within the UN SMS, including the Under-Secretary-General of the UN Department of Safety and Security (USG UNDSS). There are four essential policies for any security decision maker in the UN system:

1. The Framework of Accountability—who is responsible for what?
2. The Applicability Policy—to whom does the SMS apply?
3. The Policy on Security Risk Management (SRM)
4. The Programme Criticality Framework

In addition to being personally responsible for the security arrangements of the mission, the HoM is often also appointed the Designated Official (DO) for all UN agencies operating in the mission area through the UN SMS. The DO chairs, and is advised by, the Security Management Team (SMT), which, in the presence of a peace operation, will contain heads of mission components (such as Military, Police and mission Support) as well as members of the UNCT. The DO is accountable to the Secretary-General, through the USG UNDSS, and is responsible for the safety and security of all designated UN personnel, premises and assets throughout the country or mission area. Nevertheless, along with other members of the MLT, the HoM should discuss with the host government and other actors in the region their respective responsibilities under international law for ensuring the safety and security of UN personnel.
The DO is advised by the Principal or Chief Security Adviser (PSA/CSA), who is the secretary to the SMT and who has authority over the UNDSS staff in the mission area. It is important for senior leaders to understand that the UN’s SMS structure works in parallel with the mission’s structure while having numerous areas of overlap. The SMT effectively analyses and responds to safety and security issues, including by providing training and advice to all components and individuals through the Chief Security Officer and Area Security Officers. It is critical that the PSA/CSA works very closely with the mission’s FC and UN Police Commissioner, as all three act as key advisors to the HoM on all security-related matters and command the mission’s Security component. Each remains accountable for the command and control of their respective entities. When joint operations are conducted, they represent a complex planning and command system that requires joint planning and coordination. This must be clearly stipulated and regulated by policies and procedures and requires specific and well-practised standard operating procedures.

The SRM process is a structured and risk-based decision-making tool. It guides the process for the identification and assessment of threats to UN personnel, assets and operations in a Designated Area. It then identifies measures and procedures to reduce the level of associated risk in order to enable programme delivery within acceptable levels of risk. The process also includes a structured decision-making model for acceptable risk, which balances security risk with programme criticality.

SRM measures should include both passive and active security, such as security risk assessments, appropriate physical protection of facilities, observance of the agreed minimum operating safety standards, an active warden system, preparatory exercises and contingency planning, as well as the provision of adequate medical facilities and personnel. SMS safety and security requirements may be in tension with the conduct of the mission’s political, operational and administrative activities, and may therefore involve difficult decisions on mission priorities.

Mission leaders need to be clear on their and their components’ responsibilities for safety and security. This is especially important when the SMS overlaps the mission’s command and control structures, such as in integrated camps where civilian staff, police and military live alongside each other in high-risk environments. Given the frequent rotation of uniformed personnel, constant crisis drills and exercises are necessary in these circumstances to ensure security procedures are well understood and function properly.
The aim of the Programme Criticality Framework is to assess programmatic priorities in changing or volatile security situations and to determine the level of acceptable security risk for programmes and mandated activities implemented by UN personnel, particularly in high-risk environments. Its application is crucial to ensure integrated security decision making in an area. The responsibility for Programme Criticality lies with the SRSG or the RC. Programme Criticality assessments are also recommended as preparatory measures in countries with unpredictable or rapidly changing security environments. Such proactive assessments can facilitate rapid decision making if the security risks are suddenly elevated.
2.6 Working with UN Headquarters

Working out how best to implement the mission mandate is an interactive process, which involves constant dialogue between the mission and UNHQ, and is informed by dialogue with key partners on the ground, in response to the evolution of the political process and the conflict. Accordingly, it is important that the MLT maintains a close relationship with relevant departments and offices in the UN Secretariat through regular consultation and sharing of information.

Following the adoption of the UN reforms in December 2017, the principal departments at UNHQ are DPO, DPPA and DOS. Other relevant entities within the UN Secretariat are UNDSS, OHCHR and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). It is important that the HoM establishes a personal relationship with both the Secretary-General and the USG DPO, as well as other senior officials in DPO and relevant departments and offices. Similarly, other members of the MLT should establish relationships with their counterparts in the UN Secretariat: for example, the FC with the Military Adviser, the Police Commissioner with the Police Adviser, and so on. However, it is essential that messages conveyed through these functional contacts are consistent with the thinking in the rest of the mission, that the appropriate chain of authority and command is not by-passed, and that the HoM is kept fully informed. A main point of entry for the MLT to UNHQ remains the recently modified Integrated Operational Team system, which is responsible for providing day-to-day support as well as integrated operational and political guidance to the mission.

Working through the DPO, the MLT will also need to remain mindful of the views and dynamics of the UN Security Council, budgetary committees, TCCs/PCCs and other concerned UN Member States. The HoM, and possibly also other members of the MLT, will be required to regularly brief and engage with the Security Council (and other intergovernmental bodies such as the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions and the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly) on mission progress, often in connection with the periodic renewal of the mission’s mandate, either in-person or by video conference from the field. Visits to UNHQ need to be well prepared as they provide an important opportunity to consult widely and systematically with UN counterparts and Member States.
2.7 Working with Partner Organizations

The mission operates in a political landscape in which partner organizations play a vital and even indispensable role. It falls on the MLT to ensure that relations with partner organizations are managed in such a way that enables constructive outcomes.

The MLT will also need to establish good and enduring working relationships with a range of important international and regional actors, such as diplomatic missions and bilateral donors, most notably the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the European Union; countries providing non-UN military and police contingents under separate arrangements; international organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross; and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The MLT should invest in these relations on a long-term basis in order to align efforts and draw on external competencies and capabilities.

There are several ways in which the MLT, and in particular the HoM, play the coordinating role of the international community at the national level. For instance, in the context of UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Frameworks the SRSG or DSRSG–RC/HC co-chairs the Joint Steering Committee with the relevant host-state minister, as well as on the thematic committees. In addition, in some cases the mission may support other ongoing political negotiations led by regional organizations.
2.8 Mission Resources

As part of the UN Secretary-General’s management reforms, the HoM has been granted greater delegation of authority (DoA). In principle, more authorities will be delegated directly from the Secretary-General to the “Head of Entity” which, in a peacekeeping operation, means the HoM/SRSG. These authorities include human resources, finance and budget, procurement, and property management (see Figure 2.4). Some can be delegated further but the HoM still retains overall authority and accountability. The HoM will clearly be advised on their delegations and the implications of these delegations, but the new system of DoA, and the accountability that goes with it, is designed to put a stronger and more transparent focus on the field and measurable results. It will have a significant impact on the business of the HoM/SRSG and the MLT.

The MLT must assess all of its proposals and plans against the human and financial resources available from the UN peacekeeping budget and other sources. While peacekeeping operations are funded through assessed contributions, programmatic aspects of the mandate, such as DDR or elections, largely depend on voluntary funding, which often falls short of the pledges made. It might be useful for the MLT to seek technical advice from World Bank representatives in priority areas where it has a clear comparative advantage.

Figure 2.4 Revised delegation of authority framework
The MLT should oversee the preparation of the mission’s budget to support successful mandate implementation. While now being given direct DoA from the Secretary General, the HoM/SRSG should understand that the mission will still have to follow the financial rules and regulations laid down by the UN General Assembly. The Director of Mission Support remains the key advisor to the MLT in this regard. Budgetary considerations need to be factored in when deciding the goals, objectives, and particularly the priorities and sequencing of competing mission activities. Plans need to consider both the assessed budget and other funds and donors that can contribute to mandate implementation.

The MLT needs to be aware that unless budgetary resources are built into the planning process and a cooperative understanding is developed for their resolution, such issues can become a major source of friction within a mission. Within the MLT, close working relations based on good coordination, cooperation, consensus and effective communication go a long way towards improving integration and ameliorating competition for limited resources.

**Staffing**

The most important resource of a mission is its personnel. Qualified, competent and dedicated personnel at all levels can make or break a mission. While the recruitment of the leadership is the responsibility of UNHQ, the MLT and in particular the HoM has authority and responsibility for the recruitment of mission staff with the required skills and integrity. Managers should ensure that vacancies are filled in a timely manner, and that staff receive the necessary training and opportunities for advancement. Maintaining high morale within the mission is also an important factor in retaining competent staff members.

Ensuring gender parity within the mission contributes to the overall effectiveness of peace operations. Ambitious targets for gender parity in missions have been set by the Secretary-General. Women in peacekeeping give missions greater scope to engage in community outreach, support more effective mandate implementation and ‘decrease incidents of sexual exploitation and abuse’. Increasing women’s participation requires a willingness within the senior leadership not only to bolster the number of women serving in key positions, but also to ensure female interlocutors in all stages of the peace process.

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2.9 Maintaining a Green Footprint

Large and complex peace operations are now deployed to some of the world’s most insecure areas. Enabling infrastructure may be severely lacking, and this can lead to serious challenges in ensuring good environmental stewardship. The short- and long-term implications of underperformance are serious, particularly in light of the vulnerability of the ecosystems and societies to which UN operations are deployed.

As noted earlier in this chapter, part of the MLT’s responsibility is to maintain the host state’s long-term trust and confidence in the mission. The way in which the mission treats the physical environment can be seen as highly symbolic of the level of respect and consideration it has for the host state. The MLT also has a responsibility to ensure that “responsible missions achieve maximum efficiency in their use of natural resources and operate at minimum risk to people, societies and ecosystems”, and thus have a positive impact on these wherever possible.10

While respecting all local laws and regulations, the waste generated by UN field missions must be managed and disposed off in a safe and proper manner in order to protect the health, safety and security of mission personnel and local populations, and to reduce the risk of accidents and environmental degradation. In the absence of host-country or local laws or regulations, field missions must comply with internationally recognized best practices and standards. There is ample support and guidance available to enable the MLT and its members to meet these standards.11

The mission should, to the greatest extent possible, procure goods and services locally in an attempt to increase the peace dividend. If, for example, water is contaminated, or firewood is not easily accessible as a consequence of mission actions, it may also have a disproportionate impact or unintended consequences on women in society. However, the mission should be aware of and pay attention to possible local political, ethnic or religious rivalries, as an imbalanced use of local resources or employment of service providers might be perceived as bias and damage the credibility or impartiality of the mission.

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10 UN DFS, ‘DFS Environment Strategy (Executive Summary)’, April 2017.
11 UN DPKO/DFS, Policy on Waste Management Policy for UN Field Missions, June 2015.
MINUJUSTH: Delegation of authority

Integrated missions are designed to facilitate a coherent system-wide approach to assisting countries in—or emerging from—conflict on their path to peace and post-conflict recovery. However, the financial rules and regulations that govern the use of assessed resources sometimes appear to be in conflict with achieving the desired level of integration. Leadership, creativity and innovation are needed to effectively achieve mandates within the regulatory framework.

The UN Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH) completed its peacekeeping mandate in October 2019. The UN Security Council mandated a follow-on special political mission, the UN Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), to “work in an advisory capacity with Haitian authorities and the UN Country Team (UNCT) to further the consolidation of the stability, security, governance, rule of law, and human rights gains achieved since 2004”. The Security Council noted that the UNCT would assume MINUJUSTH programmatic and technical assistance roles and encouraged MINUJUSTH to collaborate with the UNCT for a seamless transition.

To achieve the UNCT mandate, the World Food Programme (WFP) as lead agency in Haiti proposed establishing a “One UN” facility and requested MINUJUSTH to gift several million dollars of assets and materials to WFP in Haiti. According to the UN’s financial rules, MINUJUSTH could sell its assets to WFP at a “nominal price” if it determined that the “interests of the United Nations will be served” and if the equipment was “not required for current or future peacekeeping operations or other United Nations activities funded from assessed contributions”.

Since it was unclear that gifting the specific equipment requested would serve the interests of the UN, the ensuing discussion focused on balancing the seemingly conflicting principles of complying with the Financial Rules and facilitating UN integration in Haiti. The wrong decision could either deprive UN Member States of their appropriate financial credit or reduce the collective resources available for furthering overall UN objectives in Haiti.
The Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG) had delegated authorities for the disposal of UN property while complying with UN Financial Rules and Regulations. After considerable discussions between and among the WFP team in Haiti, MINUJUSTH, the UN Department of Operational Support, and WFP headquarters, a service-level agreement was negotiated for WFP to provide certain services to BINUH on a cost-recovery basis. It was agreed that this arrangement provided significant benefits to the UN and thus justified the gifting or sale at nominal cost of a subset of equipment originally requested by WFP.

This seemingly mundane administrative question became the catalyst for a broader discussion about responsibilities related to delegation of authorities and backstopping by UN Headquarters. It was important for the entire Mission Leadership Team to engage in discussions regarding the contrast between the mission’s obligation to recoup as much of the assessed funding provided by Member States as possible with the operational imperatives of meaningful integration. The MINUJUSTH SRSG, the Deputy SRSG (Resident Coordinator/ Humanitarian Coordinator), the Chief of Mission Support, the Chief of Staff and the Police Commissioner were all engaged in these discussions, and in lively discussions with their respective counterparts in UNHQ and the UNCT.

Stephen Liebermen,
former Special Adviser to the SRSG,
MINUJUSTH, 2019
Chapter 3.
Facilitating and Supporting the Political Process

SUMMARY
This chapter outlines the centrality of successfully facilitating and supporting political processes. It underscores the political nature of a peace operation, and the need to bring political processes and solutions to the forefront. UN peace operations should be part of a comprehensive political solution to resolve conflict. In essence the chapter discusses the need for political issues to have primacy in all mission considerations. In the absence of such political engagement at every level, including at the strategic level, the prolonged presence of a mission is likely to freeze a particular political situation. The mission, and the MLT in particular, therefore need to carefully navigate a crowded political environment which lies at the centre of gravity of a sustainable peace.

The chapter discusses a set of five operational-level outputs, each with its own set of activities, risks and benchmarks, which together contribute to the overall outcome of successfully facilitating and supporting the political process.

1. Host Country Engaged and Relations Promoted. This output highlights the need to engage with national partners to ensure that the mission meets people’s needs at the national and local level, and to help sustain consent and national/local ownership. The host government is the principal partner in this endeavour. Interaction between the mission and the host government should be strengthened with a view to restoring government control, keeping the peace process alive and managing any potential relapse into violent conflict.

2. Peace Process Supported. This output serves as a reminder that negotiating a political settlement is usually a complex and delicate process. The content of the settlement is likely to determine the challenges that will arise during the implementation phase. A peace operation can only succeed if the conflict parties are genuinely committed to resolving the conflict through a peaceful political process. It is essential that women and youth are able to meaningfully participate in the peace process.
3. **Legitimate State Authority and Institutions Strengthened.** This output serves to re-institute the social contract between the government and the population. It is critical that the reform of state institutions are sustained through the longer-term development phase to keep the country from slipping back into a situation in which public trust is eroded because of weak institutions and poor governance.

4. **National Reconciliation Promoted.** This output reflects the principle that, ultimately, political leaders and the population at large must desire reconciliation more than conflict in order to achieve a sustainable peace. Reconciliation, however, is a long-term process. The mission’s continued engagement on this front—for example by way of monitoring consent and progress, and mentoring change—will be critical. The role of the mission is to help consolidate legitimate institutions, not a particular group or party. This requires sensitivity in handling the changing relationship between the mission and the host government.

5. **Peaceful and Credible Elections Held.** This output reflects the fact that elections are often an integral part of the political settlement and constitute an important benchmark in the peace process. The holding of peaceful and credible elections and the creation of a sustainable electoral management body is thus a vital part of a political transition and the legitimacy of governance, as well as an important element in the promotion and protection of human rights.

Each of these five outputs generates a set of **considerations**, which reflect the inevitable polarities inherent in trying to advance political solutions for resolving conflicts. These point to the need to balance conflicting issues, such as:

- broadening political engagement with stakeholders beyond the host government while recognizing that this may cause sensitivities and tensions;
- weighing specificity on key provisions in peace processes likely to be contentious and vagueness that allows the process and negotiations to mature;
- working with host government counterparts to address urgent needs to provide security and basic services with the need to foster legitimate state authority;
- promoting peace or national reconciliation efforts at the expense of justice; and
- holding early elections to show progress in the political process but that may not be deemed to be free, fair nor credible by the population.
Ensuring the Political Primacy of Peace Operations

Peace operations are an essentially political undertaking. They remain, “above all, a political instrument, which works to expand political space for the implementation of peace agreements achieved by peacemakers”. They are both driven by and the drivers of a political process. Therefore, despite the increasingly complex security environment in which most UN peace operations operate, political solutions must guide all operational responses. As the 2015 High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations noted: “lasting peace is achieved through political solutions and not through military and technical engagements alone”. At times, interacting directly with actors that have leverage over spoilers in the field can be faster and more decisive than military or security responses.

UN peace operations should be part of a comprehensive political solution to resolve conflicts. In the absence of such political engagement at all levels, including at the strategic level, the prolonged presence of a mission is likely to freeze a particular political situation, which is not its purpose, and potentially jeopardizes the mission’s own legitimacy and efficacy.

Contemporary intra-state conflicts are very complex, with transnational elements and a proliferation of proxy actors, regional actors and other vested parties. The mission, and particularly the MLT, needs to carefully navigate a crowded political sphere. This requires the MLT to use its political influence and advocacy to address the structural and immediate causes of conflict and instability as well as the causes of peace. To do this the MLT, always being mindful of the principle of national ownership, must engage with the conflict parties (including those that may stay outside of the peace process) and key national partners such as civil society organizations (CSOs) and the local population in order to promote the prevention and peaceful resolution of conflicts. The HoM is the lead facilitator on the ground, communicating with interlocutors on the political front, such as the host government, the parties to the conflict, and regional partners. At the same time, all mission actors must be aware of the political context and the implications of their actions and decisions.

The political process usually comprises a range of activities: negotiation of an enduring and comprehensive peace agreement between the parties to a conflict; supporting and facilitating an inclusive political process.

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that can move the country from a post-conflict state to a sustainable peace; supporting the host government to extend legitimate state authority; the holding of peaceful and credible elections that will strengthen the democratic processes; and national reconciliation. All these activities have become core mandated tasks for most peace operations.

Given the political dimensions of these processes, the mission’s leadership must be politically attuned and ready to look beyond its everyday professional perspectives to the underlying political imperatives. For example, the political nature of providing police assistance, as well as supporting and working with national police services, requires the Police Commissioner (PC) to establish good working relations with the national political authorities as well as the Political Affairs section in a mission. The same is true for the military. This may run somewhat counter to the inclination of uniformed services, which see themselves as more apolitical, but finding the right (political) entry points for important national reform measures is critical for successfully moving the process forward. Conversely, senior uniformed leaders who are not attuned to the politics of the peace process can cause more harm than good.

**Pre-conditions for success**

- All major parties to the conflict are committed to an all-inclusive peace agreement as well as a dynamic and inclusive political process. Willingness to maintain and build the peace by those previously engaged in the conflict is fundamental but is not a given, and often needs the close attention of external actors.

- The peace agreement ending the conflict in the country addresses the concerns of significant parts of the population and tries to tackle the underlying causes of the conflict. In particular, the agreement must address the rights and concerns of hitherto disadvantaged groups; this includes giving recognition to gender-related issues.

- The mission leadership has a holistic and nuanced understanding of the factors and structural causes underlying the conflict as well as the continuing political tensions in the country in the period after the agreement. Such an understanding must emanate from a rigorous peace and conflict analysis; it should also be premised on and give precedence to national and local concerns and knowledge.
Benchmarks

Short-term

- Regional and international support mobilized.
- Political strategy developed in consultation with UNHQ based on the peace and conflict analysis is communicated to mission personnel and enjoys support of Security Council and key bilateral or regional actors.
- Key sectors of society have begun to participate in an inclusive process of national reconciliation that builds local stakeholders’ confidence in the political process. The process has taken into account the concerns of women and those previously ignored by the country’s political mainstream.

Medium-term

- The mission’s Political and Civil Affairs personnel are fully deployed and have strong links throughout society.
- Increased political leverage by the international community on parties and spoilers.
- Violence against civilian population is decreasing.
- DDR, a main enabler of the peace process, has commenced and is broadly supported by the former conflict parties, national and local leaders, communities, civil society and the international community.
- The host government is developing the necessary capacity to uphold and extend state authority and build legitimate, representative institutions that deliver needed services to the population.
- An independent civil society is developing the necessary capacity to demand accountability and legitimate representative institutions.

Long-term

- Peaceful and credible elections have been held, giving rise to a representative government.
- National/local mechanisms for peaceful settlement of conflicts established and being used, including meaningful participation of women.
- Security and justice provided to all, in line with the rule of law, irrespective of ethnic, political or gender considerations.
Outputs

In summary, the five outputs that contribute to ensuring the political primacy of the peace operation are:

1. Host Country Engaged and Relations Promoted
2. Peace Process Supported
3. Legitimate State Authority and Institutions Strengthened
4. National Reconciliation Promoted
5. Peaceful and Credible Elections Held
3.1 Host Country Engaged and Relations Promoted

Peace operations face high expectations in the host country, including among national security actors and the local population. For this reason, it is essential to engage with national partners to ensure that the mission meets people's needs at the national and local level, and to help sustain consent. The host government is the principal partner in this endeavour. Interaction between the mission and the host government should be strengthened with a view to restoring government control, keeping the peace process alive and managing any potential relapse into violent conflict. The host country’s military and police leaders play key roles in supporting the national political processes. Accordingly, the mission’s FC and Police Commissioner will need to closely engage with the leadership of the national security organizations to reinforce UN messaging and approaches to the political process at the highest level.

At the same time, direct community engagement is necessary to improve the mission’s understanding of local realities, and to help design better political and protection strategies. The mission should, in close collaboration with the UNCT, also act as a bridge between the local population and the host government, thereby facilitating a more inclusive and sustainable political process. With the support of national partners, the mission can deliver more effectively and help promote national/local ownership. At the community level, the UN military but to a larger extent the UN Police component regularly engages with cross-sections of communities, and with the national police. In doing so, it strives to strengthen those relations which are central to creating safe and secure communities, thereby enabling an environment in which political processes are more likely to succeed.

3.1.1 Operational activities

The mission’s operational activities to support this output include:

• Managing the host country’s expectations concerning the mission’s objectives and deliverables.

• Developing a political strategy to guide and inform the mission’s responses and ensure that the peace and conflict analysis, identifying drivers of peace and conflict as well as interests and power basis of key stakeholder, continually informs and shapes the political strategy. Local perspectives—particularly those of women—should be mainstreamed in the design and implementation of such political strategies.

• Providing advice and support to the host government to re-establish state authority.

• Consulting with the local population on its protection needs and
concerns to gain improved situational awareness.

- Ensuring that an appropriate mix of male and female personnel are well-placed to engage with the host government and local communities to allow the mission to interact with all stakeholders within society.
- Promoting relations between the host government and the local population through confidence-building measures.

3.1.2 Benchmarks

Short-term
- Key national partners/focal points identified.
- Direct communication channels with key national partners/focal points (government officials and local population)—including women and youth—established.
- Training and capacity-building activities to enhance national capacities initiated.

Medium-term
- Relations between the host government and the mission promoted.
- Joint programmes implemented/support to host government and local population provided in accordance with the UN HRDDP.

Long-term
- Legitimate state authority restored and/or extended, core government institutions functioning effectively.
- Trust and social contract between the local population and the host government re-established.
3.1.3 Responsibilities and coordination

The HoM is expected to maintain a channel of communication with high-level government officials in order to support the political process and reinforce the principle of consent. Mission personnel, including the UNCT, are also expected to work closely with national counterparts to facilitate the transfer of knowledge and skills. In addition, employing national staff as Community Liaison Assistants can facilitate the military and police components’ engagement with the local community. The Civil Affairs team also plays a key role in gathering data and delivering information from the field to senior leaders. Strong coordination is required on the part of the MLT to ensure unity of vision and message.

3.1.4 Resources

To perform its political functions effectively, the mission will require a strong political and civil affairs team to keep abreast of political developments in the host country, identify potential tensions, and use the mission’s good offices to engage with government counterparts, community and/or traditional leaders and civil society. Programmatic funding for quick impact projects can also be tapped to build confidence in the mission, the mandate and the peace process. Substantive and political support from DPO, DPPA and other entities in the UN are also available.

3.1.5 Challenges and risks

• The mission’s limited presence and resources make it difficult to access population in remote areas.
• Risks are heightened in a scenario where the host government is complicit in attacks against civilians and/or the host government obstructs mission operations.
• Managing the expectations of the host government and sustaining strategic consent for the mission.
3.1.6 Considerations

- Engagement should not be limited to consultations but, wherever possible, the mission should work closely with national and local partners to promote national/local ownership and the sustainability of results.

- There will often be tension between the wishes of the central government and those within local and civil society. Missions can be too focused on dealing with the host state’s government, as their principal partner, at the expense of understanding and promoting the needs of the people outside the capital.
3.2 Peace Process Supported

A peace operation can only succeed if the conflict parties are genuinely committed to resolving the conflict through a peaceful political process. A mission deployed in the absence of such a commitment runs the risk of becoming paralyzed or, worse still, being drawn into the conflict. The signing of a ceasefire or peace agreement is an important indicator of whether the parties are ready to engage in political dialogue. At times, however, agreements are signed as a result of international pressure. The true worth of an agreement lies in its level of implementation. Negotiating a political settlement is usually a complex and delicate process. The content of the settlement is likely to determine the challenges that will arise during the implementation phase. There may be immediate windows of opportunity to address transitional justice that close later. Relevant senior leaders, particularly the DSRSG, should be part of any initial transitional justice discussions between the justice and human rights sections. More broadly, in some instances there may be tensions between the need for frank reporting on human rights issues and the overall objective of advancing the peace process.

It is essential that women and youth are able to meaningfully participate in the peace process, as both victims of conflict and important drivers of recovery and development. The MLT should meet regularly and maintain dialogue with women and youth groups, local communities and civil society more broadly to establish a transparent dialogue on gender-related issues within the peace process. The MLT should also engage with the national authorities and advocate the importance of gender equality and women’s participation in national institutions and political and electoral processes. Peace will only be sustainable if women are included, feel secure and have their human rights upheld and protected. The MLT has an obligation to lead by example and to champion policies and strategies—both within the mission and in all dealings with national and local authorities—that incorporate gender and youth perspectives at the political and organizational levels. This includes leveraging political engagement at the highest political levels, particularly with the host authorities.

Contemporary conflicts are often marked by a fluid constellation of actors. In some cases, spoilers may emerge to obstruct or derail the peace process. Spoilers are actors who believe that the “peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests.” They can range from sceptics of the peace agreement or political process, to terrorist groups who use violence to undermine the implementation of

the peace agreement. Such spoilers may be found at all levels, and both inside and outside the forum of peace negotiations. It is important to understand the motives of sceptics, and even the less committed spoilers that may change their position, so as to engage them in the peace process and strengthen their incentives for supporting a peaceful resolution of the armed conflict. Spoilers that use violence are often represented as non-state armed groups (NSAGs), a subset of which are “proscribed armed groups”, often labelled as terrorist groups. It is common for national and international organizations to prohibit political engagement with such groups even though they are stakeholders in the conflict and have established viable relationships with local communities (see 4.5 Public Order Established). It is important to note that UNHQ has recently developed guidance that allows for engagement with NSAGs to enable peace operations to support the political process and carry out their protection mandates.

If or when members of the MLT are involved in negotiating settlements, a number of issues should be considered:

• The political and military strengths of the parties are often unequal.
• Those who support the political process should be supported to capitalize on the drivers for peace identified in the previous analysis.
• The structural causes of the conflict must be addressed; these tend to be pervasive and include long-standing factors and differences that have permeated the politics and culture of a society.
• Interest-based causes are likely to exacerbate a climate conducive to violent conflict or its further escalation in competition for resources.
• While the symptoms of these causes of conflict may have to be dealt with in the short term, their solutions require thorough analysis and a long-term, structured approach.
• As with structural, intermediate and immediate causes and drivers of conflict, the mission must also explore the drivers or causes for peace that exist in societies, including, for example, traditional conflict-resolution mechanisms. Actors with an interest in changing the narrative of conflict from the use of violence to the use of accepted resolution mechanisms need to be engaged at the national, regional or community level.
• Disagreements over implementation—especially with regard to sensitive processes such as SSR/DDR and power- and resource-sharing—can undermine peace processes.

16 UN DPKO and UN DFS, ‘Aide Memoire: Engaging Non-State Armed Groups (NSAGS) for Political Purposes’, 2017 [internal document].
• Unrealistic goals and timetables can complicate or undermine implementation; realistic, measurable goals that enhance accountability are preferable.

• Without host-government leadership, local politicians and leaders might conduct their affairs while disregarding the peace process. Hence, it is essential to map and understand the interests and incentives of key stakeholders.

• Political processes should include all parties with the power or ability to cause violent obstruction, as well as marginalized groups such as women and minorities who may have been victimized or excluded in the past.

• The active engagement of the civilian population through public dialogue and civil society mechanisms is a key factor in the success of any peace process.

• Any peace process must be supported by an effective strategic communication plan that helps to deliver credible and easily understood messages about the objectives of the process and is able to manage expectations about the pace and dividends of its implementation.

3.2.1 Operational activities

The operational activities of the mission to support this output include:

• Establishing confidence-building measures.

• Utilizing the instrument of peace and conflict analysis at the national (and, where applicable, local) level, to understand the drivers of peace and conflict and the interests of key stakeholders.

• Ensuring the political strategy is informed by continuous analysis to explore opportunities and manage obstructions to peace.

• Analysing the influence of neighbouring and regional activities on the political dynamics in the host country.

• Developing strategic partnerships with influencing parties who have leverage over others, in order to create and sustain space for the peace process.

• Addressing political tensions at the community level, in close cooperation with the UNCT, and supporting local conflict-resolution initiatives.

• Ensuring the inclusion of women and youth in the peace process.

• Establishing a strategic communication strategy.

• Establishing verification mechanisms to ensure compliance and deal with violations.

• Ensuring that the political process addresses social cohesion, inequalities and marginalization and contributes to a more sustainable peace.
3.2.2 Benchmarks

*Short-term*
- Ceasefire and/or peace agreements signed, and compliance mechanisms established.
- Joint confidence-building measures implemented.
- Strategic communication strategy planned.
- Marginalized groups are represented in the peace process.

*Medium-term*
- Established mechanisms for resolving disputes are being used, and violence against civilian population and institutions is decreasing.
- Factions are communicating with each other in a productive dialogue.
- The population considers that it is being included in the process, as verified by various polling and survey tools.
- The ability to provide basic policing, security and justice functions is developed.
- The number of violations is decreasing, and their severity is at such a level that they can be partly managed by the national authorities.
- The host government is able to extend its authority to large parts of the country.

*Long-term*
- The use of political violence has ceased.
- Governmental institutions are addressing grievances and implementing a transitional justice process.
- The rule of law is respected by the population and governmental institutions are abiding by it.

3.2.3 Responsibilities and coordination

The roles of the mission in and its responsibilities to the peace process need to be clearly spelled out and widely communicated. The MLT should allocate time to gain an understanding of peace and conflict dynamics and drivers, as well as the interests of the various adversaries. Within the mission, the HoM is responsible for all efforts pertaining to the political aspects of the peace process. The HoM and relevant members of the MLT should be constantly involved in the political process, in close
consultation with UNHQ and the facilitators and/or guarantors of the peace agreement. It is important that senior military and police commanders work under the SRSG’s direction when supporting the political process. Close coordination between the political, military and police components is crucial in this respect, not least when establishing and applying dispute-resolution mechanisms.

3.2.4 Resources

Sufficient resources must be allocated to support the mandated tasks, including adequate communications and key experts who can conduct sensitive negotiations and assess compliance. DPPA’s Mediation Support Unit (MSU) can be called on to enhance the mission’s capacity to conduct and support negotiations. The MSU can help support mission leaders and train their teams (including Political and Civil Affairs Officers) in negotiation and mediation techniques, and strengthen local dispute-management capacities through its own work and that of its partners. The long-term success of a political process will also depend on marshalling donors to provide the financial and material support required to keep the process on track.

3.2.5 Challenges and risks

- Lack of political will in the peace process or withdrawal of consent by one or more of the major parties.
- Parts of the population feel excluded or marginalized from the peace process.
- The expectations of the population, including those of former belligerents, are not met in a timely manner.
- The peace process does not sufficiently address the structural causes of the conflict nor does it explore the drivers of peace already existing in society.
- Lack of national ownership of the process.
- Lack of political will and/or engagement on the part of the international community, and at times having to reconcile competing regional interests with the Security Council mandate.
- Regional developments or instability spill over or have a negative impact on the peace process.
- Limited capacity within host government’s national authorities.
- Lack of understanding in the population of the role of the UN in the peace process, particularly its limitations.
3.2.6 Considerations

Peace accords lay out long-term roadmaps for sustainable peace and achieving state resilience but, beyond statements about reform, they often leave details related to the machinery of government relatively vague. Several trade-offs should be considered.

**Balancing short- and long-term needs**

The short-term need to provide security and basic services usually takes precedence over long-term development and issues of governance. Initially, engagement with the host government tends to focus on the agencies responsible for security and service delivery. To achieve long-term governmental effectiveness and sustainability, however, other functional executive agencies such as ministries of finance, planning and trade need to be included, along with legislative bodies. In addition, to put in place the building blocks for responsive and representative government, avenues for citizen participation need to be opened up sooner rather than later. The peace process needs to balance these needs, and the mission should be aware of what is being negotiated, as this will affect its concept of operations.

**Addressing urgent needs while fostering state legitimacy**

A related trade-off is between meeting urgent needs and fostering the legitimacy of state institutions. It is important to find ways to include public agencies and officials in planning, budgeting and decision making so that citizens perceive their government as responsive to their needs and those of the country. However, the government’s capacity is likely to be weak, or else high-level officials may be more interested in political power and patronage than in effectively fulfilling their service-delivery responsibilities. The mission needs to balance its urgent support for local authorities against ensuring that its partners are developing legitimate capacities and have not committed egregious human rights violations.
Weighing specificity against ambiguity

Another trade-off is between specificity on key provisions that are likely to be contentious and vagueness that allows the process and negotiations to mature. Efforts to push towards specificity may lead political actors and their supporters to entrench themselves behind firm positions, which can delay implementation of peace agreements and even reignite violence. Without political structures and procedures that enable actors to work out ambiguities and disagreements peacefully, vague and ambiguous provisions may sow the seeds of future governance problems. However, if the focus is on interests rather than political positions, specificity may not be a problem as a detailed focus may prevent later complications or disagreements.
3.3 Legitimate State Authority and Institutions Strengthened

In a post-conflict transition environment, state authority must be strengthened to re-institute the social contract between the government and the population. The trust that citizens invest in the state by participating in elections and submitting to the government should be met with institutions that are seen to be sufficiently capable, legitimate and able to assume responsibilities, maintain order and ensure public safety. It is critical that these state institutions are sustained through the longer-term development phase to keep the country from slipping back into a situation in which public trust is eroded by weak institutions and poor governance.

Extension of state authority is a core function of UN peacekeeping. Large, multidimensional missions now frequently use (or at least project) force not merely to fend off direct attacks from spoilers, but as part of deliberate strategies to expand and secure the authority of a government in contested territories. However, while security is an essential precursor to a sustainable peace, state authority includes a broader notion than just strengthened security. A range of other mission activities contribute to the extension and consolidation of state authority, including support for strengthening the rule of law and improving public administration, SSR, and human rights promotion (see Chapter 5).

3.3.1 Operational activities

The activities of the mission to support this output include:
• Contributing to improved security, including in contested areas.
• Facilitating broad dialogue on the nature of political institutions and good governance.
• Helping to build a general public consensus on the roles and constitutional/legal mandates of political institutions.
• Supporting the restoration of an accountable public administration, especially in areas dealing with natural resources, land, property rights and other potential causes of conflict.
• Helping to build the state’s capacity to tackle corruption in governmental institutions.

18 See UN DPO, "Presence, Capacity and Legitimacy: Implementing Extension of State Authority Mandates in Peacekeeping" (2017).
3.3.2 Benchmarks

**Short-term**
- Agreement on appropriate laws, accountability mechanisms and responsibilities for public institutions.
- Public information mechanisms initiated that generate transparency and build wider trust.
- Decline in violence associated with political discord, including conflict-related sexual violence.
- Extension of state authority over its territory, including contested areas.

**Medium-term**
- Peaceful democratic processes (including elections, decision making, creation and enforcement of law, and service provision) are taking root.
- Civil education campaigns implemented in formal programmes and mass media.
- A strong capacity-building strategy has been initiated to ensure durability of government structures, public administration and a competitive, professional bureaucracy.
- Proper administration of natural resources restored.
- Transparent budget process and taxation system established.
- Broad dialogue on desired political institutions facilitated.

**Long-term**
- Where they exist, arrangements are in place to allow traditional institutions to function alongside formal institutions and jurisdictions.
- The capacity of oversight bodies is enhanced and transparent.
- National and international policies and responses are better integrated with long-term development frameworks.
- Meaningful input by civil society actors established such that the judiciary and all branches of government are accountable and open to questioning.
- Strong local capacity developed, and professional bureaucracy lives beyond the term of first post-conflict administration.
- Emergence of markets in core commodities food and shelter.
- Supporting the development of a free and open political culture underpinning a strengthened state authority.
3.3.3 Responsibilities and coordination

Through its Rule of Law and Human Rights sections in particular, the mission should support the work of agencies such as the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and other international actors such as the World Bank, to help the national authorities extend their authority. Coordination functions may vary depending on sectoral expertise. The mission should add value to this process through its work in support of the political process, as well as its network of political and civil affairs staff throughout the country. The mission should also ensure that its country analysis includes the structural causes of corruption, and advocate for appropriate attention to address them.

3.3.4 Resources

Implementing activities to support the extension of legitimate state authority requires a sound understanding of the socio-political dimensions of the host country. Therefore, personnel with relevant expertise will be critical to provide effective technical advice to the mission and to host-country counterparts. Such activities can also be resource intensive. Peacekeeping operations have tapped into programmatic funding such as quick-impact projects, trust funds and increasingly, where possible, the Peacebuilding Fund, to support local or regional state capacities and deliver peace dividends. However, these are not sustainable. The MLT can play an outsize role in mobilizing long-term support and partnerships with UNDP, the World Bank and/or bilateral donors.

3.3.5 Challenges and risks

- The strength of responsible institutions may be compromised and may not be an immediate priority if humanitarian concerns are more pressing.
- Traditional and/or transitional institutions and functions at the local level may be better equipped and more trusted than the nascent state bureaucracy.
- Donor fatigue becomes a real risk over the long term. The preference of most donors is to support the most visible and politically positive phases, which occur early in the process.
3.3.6 Considerations

Respecting national ownership while promoting international standards

The strength and legitimacy of traditional structures may prove to be more reliable and adaptable than international standards. However, customary systems may not always respect international standards that the state has signed up to and/or may violate the mandates of international actors.

Balancing short-term, easily achieved goals and long-term, sustainable goals

The peacekeeping operation might run a public information campaign based on winning public support, which may require a series of easily achievable, high-profile “wins”. The hard-fought reforms and less glamorous development of a viable bureaucracy, however, are likely to prove more supportive of a durable peace.
3.4 National Reconciliation Promoted

National reconciliation is a key priority in a post-conflict setting because it is critical to attaining a lasting peace and political stability. The political process, supported by the work of the mission, must create enough opportunities and space for this to take place. Reconciliation is a long-term process. In the immediate term the mission can provide crucial political leadership that inspires the parties to a recently ended conflict. Ultimately, however, the leaders and the population must desire reconciliation more than conflict in order to achieve a sustainable peace. Domestic political institutions retaking control is an important phase as conflict gives way to development but unless this is accompanied by the long process of reconciliation, challenges can very easily resurface. The MLT’s continued engagement on this front—for example by monitoring consent and progress and mentoring change—will be critical. The role of the mission is to help consolidate legitimate institutions, not a particular group or party. This requires sensitivity in handling the changing relationship between the mission and the host government.

3.4.1 Operational activities

Operational activities by the mission to support this output include:

• Contributing to a secure environment free from violent conflict and social disorder.

• Engaging with the host government’s leadership to promote national dialogue and reconciliation over the recent past, including supporting truth and reconciliation commissions.

• Acting as a bridge between local communities and host authorities to rebuild trust and engaging the civilian population in all stages of the process through traditional social mechanisms or democratic representation.

• Ensuring that the civilian population begins to consider itself secure and able to live without fear in the new political dispensation.

• Providing training and capacity-building for key societal figures and youth who are managing the reconciliation process or are part of it, taking account of their independence and how representative they are of the different parties and actors, and the level of female representation.

• Capacity building for national/local media as they provide critical support for the reconciliation process.
3.4.2 Benchmarks

**Short-term**
- Agreements among relevant groups, such as a power-sharing agreement, peace accord or amnesty, have been signed and are credible and durable.
- Key legitimate and credible persons have been identified who will be involved in the reconciliation.
- Training programmes in legal, conflict-resolution or mediation skills have been put in place for those individuals who will manage the reconciliation.
- Advocacy and education programmes to promote and explain the reconciliation process have been put in place and are working effectively.
- Evidence of increasing perceptions of security among the local population.
- Women and youth are appropriately represented and are at the forefront of the reconciliation process.
- Inclusive discussions on the drafting of a new constitution are under way.

**Medium-term**
- Laws have been promulgated or modified to allow successful implementation of the agreed reforms.
- The process of restoring civil society activities and participation has begun.

**Long-term**
- Domestic political institutions are robust enough to manage the effects and results of the reconciliation process (e.g. reintegration of former combatants, criminal sentences for those found culpable, forgiveness and/or amnesty).
- National and international policies and responses are better integrated with long-term development frameworks.
3.4.3 Responsibilities and coordination

The mission must support the creation of national reconciliation and enable a secure environment in which it can take place. In addition, the HoM can provide a sustained political voice to underpin the process and to nudge the parties and local populace in this direction. At the same time, the HoM needs to be mindful of what constitutes a sustainable pace for the local population. The HoM is responsible for coordinating the international community’s efforts towards national reconciliation, particularly within the UN system, and the role of UNDP, OHCHR and others in bringing together different groups in reconciliation efforts. The HoM should therefore be aware of some of the programmatic tensions in this regard.

3.4.4 Resources

In coordinating the international system’s efforts, the MLT should help to convene international stakeholders, including regional and subregional actors, international financial institutions, the UNCT and relevant Member States to support the reconciliation process. The MLT should also do its utmost to generate not just donor interest but engagement in supporting the often-fragile process of national reconciliation. In this context, advocating and pinpointing concrete projects to donors would be one way of supporting the process. Another would be to show some creativity in the way key donors could be invited to support a special fund at the disposal of the HoM for initiating political support and reconciliation functions. Under such a scheme, which has been implemented in some peacekeeping operations in the past, the HoM would be accountable to those donors for how funds are allocated and for furtherance of the more political aims of the peace process.
3.4.5 Challenges and risks

- National reconciliation is a long-term endeavour and peacekeeping operations can only provide a helping hand in starting and supporting the process. There can be frequent breakdowns or reversals due to disagreements between the parties. While the time horizon of the mission is necessarily shorter and based on its time-limited mandate, it must always take a long-term view. Exit strategies are needed for the handover of its political functions and support for national reconciliation to other organizations on the departure of the mission.

- National reconciliation processes do not necessarily result in the most just political dispensation. They require constant management, and great sensitivity and judgment. Political stability sometimes has to be balanced against justice, but this requires a nuanced approach as there is no simplistic trade-off between peace and justice.

- If possible, the exact role of formal judicial bodies in the context of reconciliation should be negotiated and settled before any specific measures are taken, otherwise ongoing judicial investigations and proceedings may be compromised.

- An uncoordinated relationship with judicial entities could lead to untimely prosecutions or the undoing of a locally managed reconciliation process.

- Reconciliation risks establishing a regime of revenge and a reanimation of tensions. At the same time, general pardons can undermine the accountability of individual actors. Attempts by the parties to provide amnesties for war crimes, violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) and crimes against humanity should not be condoned by the UN.

- National reconciliation processes resulting in regimes that combine democratic and non-democratic elements can affect the political culture and challenge political stability.

- The lack of a constructive relationship between citizens and political parties, and political parties driven by narrow interests, can undermine the promotion of national reconciliation.

- Premature withdrawal of a mission in order to meet the requirements of a timely exit strategy before reconciliation has taken root would jeopardize the long-term peace process.
3.4.6 Considerations

Understanding both the national and the multi-locals of the conflict

Missions tend to focus on the national level with national partners, but it is important for the mission leadership to recognize that conflict often has multiple local manifestations and is experienced differently across national populations. It is essential to understand local conflict dynamics by regularly reaching out to engage with local populations whose views may be at variance with those at the national level.

Peace and justice

Peace and justice are fundamental to ending violence and preventing its recurrence. Building a durable peace involves addressing the underlying causes and sources of peace and violent conflict, along with sequencing justice activities. If the process is hastened, it risks igniting a short-term tension between peace and justice. Justice is not just about respecting the victims and punishing the perpetrators; it is also about re-establishing trust in institutions and reconstituting the fabric of an atomized society. The MLT may also need to consider a situation in which actors on the ground insist on addressing issues through national customs, but progress is not made over an extended period.

Promoting international advocacy while supporting national ownership

There will inevitably be tensions between those international partners and donors that urge national reconciliation on the parties and the inclination on the part of local partners to favour a slower, more gradual process of national reconciliation.
3.5 Peaceful and Credible Elections Held

Many post-conflict countries are governed by transitional political arrangements until the first elections are held. National authorities are often appointed rather than elected and are put in place through a brokered agreement by the parties to the conflict. Thus, they may not be fully representative of or recognized by the population. The holding of peaceful and credible elections and the creation of a sustainable electoral management body is thus a vital part of a political transition, as well as an important element in the promotion and protection of human rights. As such, elections are often an integral part of the political settlement and constitute an important benchmark in the peace process. As these elections often take place in a context with a history of violence, the mission and national actors (based on conflict systems analysis) need to mitigate risks and strengthen the conditions for democracy and sustainable peace. Thus, elections need to be accompanied by a range of other actions, such as the consolidation of political parties, the development of local democracy and the promotion of free media, grassroots-level empowerment and a vibrant civil society.

While the peaceful conduct of elections is a significant event in the transition to recovery and long-term stability, it is only one element in this process and should not automatically lead to the withdrawal of the peacekeeping mission. Efforts to enhance governance should seek to address legacies of deep mistrust between the government and marginalized groups, helping to repair what is often a broken relationship. The pre- and post-election periods are also likely to entail a spike in activity for the mission, as tensions may rise. Furthermore, most multidimensional operations are mandated to provide active support in a variety of ways to the preparation and conduct of the vote. In planning its support, the MLT should prioritize respecting and monitoring the compliance of stakeholders with the various political agreements that underpin the holding of national elections. Failure to abide by these agreements can undermine the conduct of elections. Alongside the political effort, a security plan that fits into the overall electoral plan should be developed, involving the mission’s military and police assets. In addition, the mission must ensure that the international community supports its electoral-assistance efforts at the political, financial and logistical levels.


3.5.1 Operational activities

The activities of the mission to support this output include:
- Advising on the type of electoral system to be implemented.
- Supporting creation of the security-related conditions to allow for peaceful and credible elections to take place, including through demining.
- Supporting the conduct of voter registration.
- Providing technical assistance, such as legal advice, training of election staff and assistance with developing dispute-resolution mechanisms.
- Conducting public information campaigns about the electoral process.
- Handling and defusing threats to the political and electoral process posed by spoilers.
- Collaborating with other UN agencies to design electoral assistance projects.
- Providing security and logistics support during the election process, including moving and securing electoral materiel.
- Planning for domestic and international observation of elections.
- Providing political and technical support to the process of government formation.
3.5.2 Benchmarks

**Short-term**

- National election commission and other relevant institutions established and functioning.
- Effective electoral dispute-resolution mechanisms in place.
- Political parties formalized and sensitized, and an environment with a free media conducive to the safe conduct of elections achieved.
- Electoral districts mapped, voter registration database created, and voter registration commenced.
- Voter education programme/campaign established to ensure participation by both men and women, and including people from minorities and marginalized segments of society.
- Plans made to provide security in vulnerable and/or key areas deemed to be threatened by spoilers.
- Finances, logistics and security support agreed for the conduct of elections.
- Donor engagement and practical support determined.

**Medium-term**

- Legislative framework that can provide for the conduct of peaceful and credible elections in place.
- Transitional mechanisms developed with UNCT to transfer election support from the mission to UNCT and, in the longer term, to national authorities to conduct elections without international support.
- Wide-ranging public information strategy geared to sensitizing voters and other electoral stakeholders implemented.
- Security support, including patrolling, guarding and securing key installations and polling places, provided.
- Transparent elections conducted in a credible manner and peaceful environment.

**Long-term**

- Arrangements for out-of-country voting (where appropriate) put in place.
- Those elected are perceived as representative by the majority of the population.
3.5.3 Responsibilities and coordination

Depending on its mandate, the mission can play an important role in assisting in the organization of elections by providing international expertise and by placing logistical and security assets at the disposal of the national authorities. However, this presents a dilemma in terms of capacity building and cost-effectiveness, since the shorter the time for preparations, the greater the pressure will be for the mission to take a lead in this area (for example, by distributing election materials). In addition, the mission should play a leading role in coordinating donor and international support for the elections and, if this is not already the case, seek to have this included as part of its Security Council mandate. This is required in order to create coherent support for the elections, which are fundamentally a complex logistical and security exercise that requires an integrated effort.

Close contact should be maintained with DPPA’s Electoral Assistance Division, which provides support to the focal point for electoral-assistance activities (currently the USG for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs). The focal point is responsible for ensuring UN system-wide coherence and consistency in the provision of electoral assistance.

Within the mission, efforts to support elections are often led by an electoral component, which should work closely with and coordinate the activities of all other relevant components. These may include the military and police components, the Political, Civil Affairs, Public Information, and Human Rights sections, as well as other relevant UN agencies. In view of the political significance of and sensitivities associated with elections, the mission leadership, especially the HoM, should be actively engaged throughout the process.

3.5.4 Resources

Peacekeeping operations, which often have significant resources at their disposal, can play an important role in supporting a national electoral management body. This includes the provision of logistical resources for the transportation and storage of electoral material. Even more importantly, with its military and police assets, the mission plays a vital role in supporting and maintaining a secure and stable environment for the conduct of elections. In all of its efforts, maximum attention should be paid to building national capacity and encouraging sustainability and cost-effectiveness.
3.5.5 Challenges and risks

- Selecting the most appropriate electoral system that is both sustainable and has national ownership.
- Security incidents and/or acts of violence destabilize the process.
- Lack of political will and/or capacity to conduct a credible process.
- Non-availability or withdrawal of financial, logistical or institutional support.
- Non-participation in or boycott of elections by a significant party, faction or group.
- Failure to deal with electoral fraud, leading to rejection of the results by national and/or international players.
- Return to office, through success at elections, of political figures who may have played a negative role in the recently ended conflict. This is particularly relevant if elections take place shortly after the end of hostilities.
- Inadvertent creation of a more disruptive, politically divisive environment in the country that harms the prospects for reconciliation.
3.5.6 Considerations

**Early or well-organized elections**

While elections may need to be held soon after the end of a conflict to demonstrate that political progress is being made, their early conduct may significantly undermine the potential for them to be peaceful and credible. Great care must be taken in deciding on the timing for holding elections.

**Balancing comprehensive participation with the selective exclusion or disqualification of spoilers**

The decision to include or exclude spoilers should also be carefully evaluated as it can have a significant impact on the overall credibility and acceptability of the electoral process as well as the long-term inclusivity of the wider political and democratic processes.

**Balancing electoral efficiency and national ownership**

There is always a need to strike a balance between providing international support to encourage the timely, efficient and peaceful holding of elections and leaving national authorities to take the lead, at the risk of timelines not being met and the technical conduct of elections being of lower quality. However, the principles of building capacity and encouraging sustainability and cost-effectiveness should be at the heart of all electoral assistance, even at the risk of the process being less smooth than it might be with greater international involvement.
Chapter 4. Creating a Secure and Stable Environment

SUMMARY

A secure and stable environment is characterized by a reasonable level of public order which allows the population to pursue its daily activities in relative safety. Furthermore, the state's monopoly on the legitimate use of force has been reasserted in order to deter both internal and external aggression upon the state, its institutions and its people. In a United Nations peace operation, the police and military components of a mission often play a key role in helping to create a secure and stable environment, until the host government is in a position to maintain its own internal and external security. This may involve the legitimate use of force by the mission, which must be carefully calibrated and linked to the desired political outcomes. Overall, the mission should project strength and credibility and not allow spoilers' use of violence to undermine a peace process. Meanwhile, the mission should also use this opportunity to partner with the host government in reforming the security sector.

This chapter discusses a set of six operational-level outputs, each with its own set of activities, risks and benchmarks, which together contribute to the overall outcome of creating a secure and stable environment.

1. **Warring Factions Separated and Violent Conflict Contained.** This output emphasises the separation of parties to a conflict in order to allow the peacekeeping force to monitor their actions through the establishment of areas of control. In the short term, this helps limit the suffering of civilians and asserts control over armed forces in support of ceasefires, thereby building confidence in a fragile peace process.

2. **Civilians Protected.** This output reflects the fact that civilians are at risk and are often targeted during armed conflict. The most vulnerable groups are women, children, refugees, IDPs, minorities and the elderly. Protecting these groups using integrated and holistic mission responses is vital to preventing suffering and strengthening confidence in the peace process in the eyes of the local population, neighbouring countries and the international community.
3. **Freedom of Movement Regained and Exercised.** This output highlights the free flow of people and goods, and the social integration of isolated communities without fear of physical harm or disruption, leading to the normalisation of daily life and economic growth. However, freedom of movement by the mission can be challenged by various factors, including hostilities, opposing factions, natural disasters or even an uncooperative host state conscious of its sovereignty. All these factors must be managed by the various mission components.

4. **Threats from Spoilers Managed.** This output highlights the challenges spoilers pose to the peace process. Spoilers come from a variety of sources but, in differing ways, they all work against the peace process and threaten the success of a UN mission. Managing threats from spoilers requires the development of discrete strategies based on a rigorous peace and conflict analysis. Spoiler management requires the integration of intelligence, law-enforcement, political, security, diplomatic and development resources. Credible local institutions must be harnessed and supported. These approaches must be based on sound and deep intelligence as well as wide sharing of information among all actors that can understand the nodal relationships among all of the spoilers.

5. **Public Order Established.** This output reflects the fact that public disorder is profoundly destabilizing and undercuts efforts to strengthen state security institutions. It is often accompanied by widespread violations of human rights. The judicial system tends to be weak and confidence in its ability to adjudicate cases is low, while prisons are often overflowing. Public order is essential if the population is to gain confidence in the public security system rather than seek security from other illegitimate entities such as militias and warlords. Supporting the host government in the re-establishment of public order is a whole-of-mission task, with the police component taking the lead at the tactical level.

6. **Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programmes Implemented.** This output emphasises the fact that integrated DDR processes may contribute to security and stability in a post-conflict environment, allowing recovery and development to sustain peace. Dealing with combatants is a first-order step in moving towards peace and reconciliation and creates confidence in the peace process. All stakeholders will have different expectations and agendas, and the peacekeeping mission will always be expected to deliver more than time and capacity will allow. The key is to balance what is possible against what the stakeholders believe should be possible within a given time.
Each of the six outputs listed above generates a set of **considerations**, which reflect the inevitable polarities inherent in an environment and society traumatized by recent conflict. These point to the need to balance conflicting issues, such as:

» the effect of the use of force on political legitimacy and impartiality;
» the mismatch between limited mission capabilities and local/national expectations;
» the host state’s burgeoning sense of sovereignty and the mission’s need to implement its mandate through the status of forces agreement (SOFA);
» the long-term need to confront impunity while continuing to secure short-term support for the peace process;
» the tensions between DDR programmes, local security, and civilian expectations; and
» the need to deal with national security forces for short-term security while initiating the needed long-term SSR.
What is a Secure and Stable Environment?

A secure and stable environment is primarily characterized by the absence of large-scale hostilities, violence, and the lingering threat posed by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), which allows the civilian population to pursue its daily activities in relative safety. In such an environment, there is a reasonable level of public order, the state holds a monopoly over the legitimate use of violence, the population enjoys physical security and freedom of movement, and the country’s borders are managed to mitigate the effects of transnational organised crime (see 4.4 Threats from Spoilers Managed), and to protect against invasion or infiltration by foreign armies or armed groups. A peace operation—and in particular its police and military components—often plays a key role in creating a secure and stable environment until the host government is in a position to maintain internal and external security. In so doing, the mission can also support the first steps towards reform (see Chapter 5).

The changing character of conflict, along with an increase in the number of regional partnerships, have made UN peace operations more complex. There may be other military forces operating in parallel to, or with a different mandate or purpose from, the UN mission. Operations may also be bilateral, as in the French interventions in Côte d’Ivoire and Mali, or the African Union Mission in Somalia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operation in Afghanistan. It is important for mission leadership to identify and map the other actors present in the country and establish relationships with each country not officially contributing troops to the UN mission. This effort will ensure parallel forces are not working at cross purposes, reduce the potential for “friendly” fire incidents, ensure accountability for violations of international law, and reduce the confusion of those citizens the mission is supposed to protect.

The use of force

When the MLT determines that other means—in particular, political dialogue—have not been effective and force must be used to fulfil its mandated tasks, the use of force must be linked to the desired political outcomes. The mission should project strength and not allow the use of violence by spoilers to undermine a peace process. This means that it has to demonstrate a credible, flexible force posture and presence which does not yield to the unlawful use of force by non-state actors.

Military commanders and their units must have a mindset that demonstrates a resolve, readiness and capacity to respond appropriately to hostile acts and threats of violence. UN military units must openly...
display professional conduct at all times. Shows of force, and of the determination and resolve to act, contribute to military credibility and may reduce the need to use force. Using agile, mobile and robust forces in an indirect approach to deter spoilers, pre-empt destabilizing actions and neutralize threats can often calm a volatile situation. It also reassures the population and provides a visible demonstration of external support that allows other elements of the peace process to be implemented.

The use of force depends on an understanding of the specific situation and the threat environment. It should be part of the political strategy of the mission; legal; consistent with the rules of engagement (ROE) for the military or the Directive on the Use of Force for the police; proportionate; critically necessary; and capable of achieving the desired outcome. When needed, force should be used to deter, pre-empt, neutralize and consolidate. Reliable intelligence is essential for the effective, proportionate and judicious use of force.

Deter

Deterrence refers to actions taken to discourage potentially hostile acts. It requires that the UN has communicated its intent of responding with the use of force under certain conditions, and that this is perceived as a credible commitment, which means that the UN is capable, effective, and able to carry out its mandate. It is reinforced if the mission has responded to earlier breaches through similar resolute actions.

Examples of deterring actions include adopting a strong deterrent posture, conducting visible patrols and establishing check points. Additional actions might include demonstrations of mobility and speed in the redeployment of troops; information networking; regular security surveys, inspections and assessments of facilities, camps and bases in the area of operation/interest; strengthening UN installation physical security; and engaging in community-based activities.

Deterrence serves to dissuade a spoiler from using violence where the mission is present, encourages confidence among the local population and supports the mission security framework. Deterrence activities need to be communicated to the adversary, through contact with potentially violent actors where possible. Dialogue with local communities and engagement with both male and female representatives of those communities is essential to achieving situational awareness. Implementing a good strategic communications plan is essential for deterrence.
Pre-empt

Pre-emption refers to active measures to contain an identified threat against civilians, UN and associated personnel or UN installations, and/or to gain advantage over a threatening group before it can carry out a hostile act.

Examples of pre-emptive actions by peacekeepers include interpositioning and shows of force or manoeuvring of forces to demonstrate resolve and defuse situations; enforcing curfews, cordon and search operations; targeted use of necessary and proportionate force against identified potential hostile acts and hostile threats; apprehension and detention operations; and tactical redeployment of troops to guard key infrastructure, terrain or targeted groups, consistent with the ROE. Again, this must be accompanied by a well-developed strategic communications plan and a “Do No Harm” approach to avoid unintended consequences for the population and general resistance against the mission.

Neutralize

Neutralizing refers to actions that involve the necessary and proportionate use of force to neutralize, isolate or render ineffective a hostile act endangering life and/or impeding implementation of mandated tasks such as the protection of civilians. Peacekeeper responses should be timely and assertive, as authorized by the mandate and the ROE. Examples of neutralizing actions include physical protection and evacuation of civilians at risk; direct confrontation; robust camp defence; search and rescue; and close air support.

Consolidate

Consolidation refers to activities to manage the situation after a hostile threat has subsided. It involves actions to deny spoilers the ability to restore their capability, and assisting the local population and host-country authorities in normalizing the situation. The MLT should act swiftly and robustly, together with the host government, to ensure that the rule of law is reinstated and upheld, and that spoilers are brought to justice. This not only supports national and local ownership, but also serves to deter future hostile actions. Examples of consolidation actions include support for DDR activities; security support to facilitate civilian-led humanitarian activities; the establishment of procedures to monitor and safeguard buffer zones and treaty compliance; threat assessment; and robust defence. Consolidation requires an active strategic communications plan.
Preconditions for success

• An agreement forms the basis of the peace process, the implementation of which leads to a sustained settlement of the conflict.
• All major parties to the conflict are committed to the peace process.
• International/regional partners support the peace process.
• TCCs/PCCs remain committed to pledges, which include training, preparation, equipment and willingness to act robustly when needed.
• National authorities develop the capacity to address security and stability issues.

Benchmarks

The following benchmarks represent a desired end state, which may take many years to achieve, and which therefore calls for perseverance and long-term engagement.

• Large-scale armed conflict has ended, a ceasefire or peace agreement is being implemented, violent spoilers are controlled and immediate impacts of mines and ERW are being addressed.
• Police institutional structures are in place and services are functioning throughout the country.
• Fair popular access to justice has improved.
• Public order prevails; laws are respected and enforced, while criminal and political violence has been reduced to a minimum; and criminal elements are pursued, arrested and tried.
• National security services operate lawfully and enjoy the support of the public, while major illegal armed groups have been identified and disarmed.
• No part of the population lives in fear of threats to physical safety; displaced people can return safely; and critical infrastructure and key historical and cultural sites are being protected.
• There is freedom of movement for all parts of society throughout the country and across its borders, which are reasonably secured against invasion or infiltration by armed groups, as well as the illegal movement of goods (especially weapons or drugs) and people across borders, which is part of the remit of the UN Police (UNPOL) on organized crime.
MINUSCA: Red lines and the use of force

A critical question for the leadership of a UN peace operation is how far a mission can go in using force, and when it is right to do so. While the grounds for the use of force are likely to be fairly well defined in the mandate (usually in terms of the need to protect civilians, probably also to protect the mission and humanitarian actors, and to defend the mandate) and reflected in the military Concept of Operations and Rules of Engagement, much will depend on the interpretation of, for example, what constitutes a threat to civilians, or when it is justifiable for a mission to defend its mandate by force.

For example, in the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), when certain ex-Seleka groups were threatening to march on Bambari (the second biggest city in the country), the mission decided that its protection of civilians (POC) mandate meant that it could set “red lines”, beyond which armed groups would face the use of force. When some rebels breached these red lines, the mission justified air strikes in terms of protecting civilians.

UN peace operation must not be a party to the conflict, and the International Committee of the Red Cross, which acts as the guardian of international humanitarian law, was clear that the airstrikes would have compromised the mission’s status were it not for the specific warnings given that this was how we would interpret our POC mandate.

It was important for MINUSCA to have thought through the implications and consequences of the airstrikes. These questions of interpretation are likely to arise during a crisis situation and a mission leader may have little time to decide what they can do. So, having a sound understanding of the limits, and indeed of how far those limits can be stretched, is essential.

Diane Corner, DSRSG, MINUSCA, 2014–17
Outputs

In summary, the six operational outputs that contribute to creating a secure and stable environment are:

1. Warring Factions Separated and Violent Conflict Contained
2. Civilians Protected
3. Freedom of Movement Regained and Exercised
4. Threats from Spoilers Managed
5. Public Order Established
6. Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programmes Implemented
4.1 Warring Factions Separated and Violent Conflict Contained

While not applicable in all situations, separating forces reduces tensions so that continued negotiations, cooperation and implementation of a peace process can proceed. The separation of warring parties involves establishing distinct areas of control that keep factions apart, and allows the peacekeeping force to monitor their actions. This helps limit civilians’ exposure to conflict and asserts control over armed forces, thereby building confidence in the peace process. The separation of combatants should be followed by observation and monitoring of a ceasefire. Establishing control and preventing large-scale fighting demonstrates the authority and forcefulness of the mission and generates credibility, which will set the tone for future actions and compliance by the parties. The role of the peacekeeping force in ensuring a secure environment is vital until the national authorities are capable of providing security.

The nature of the conflict will determine the disposition of separation, varying from buffer zones (e.g. in interstate conflicts or secessionist intra-state conflicts) to areas or zones of separation that create a neutral space or “no-man’s land” (e.g. in some internal conflicts where combatants and civilians intermingle). The boundaries and entry points of these zones should be agreed on by all parties, clearly marked, and identifiable on a map or formal record. In the final analysis, ending armed conflict and securing long-term peace require political, not military, solutions.

4.1.1 Operational activities

The key operational activities by the mission to support this output include:

- Deployment of troops and UN police to zones of separation.
- Deployment of UN police and formed police units (FPUs) in population centres.
- Establishing joint confidence- and security-building measures for monitoring compliance with a ceasefire or other military agreement, and improving coordination through liaison officers or joint commissions.
- Establishing control measures for the separation of forces, weapons and ammunition, equipment, and the movement of personnel.
4.1.2 Benchmarks

**Short-term**
- Mechanisms for implementing security arrangements are established and functioning.
- The mission’s strategic communications strategy is implemented.
- Control measures are in place.
- Monitoring is in place and functioning.
- DDR programmes have been planned and implementation has started.
- The mission supports SSR discussions among key national stakeholders and preparations are made for an initiation of a SSR process, if applicable.
- Priority mine action tasks completed, if applicable.

**Medium-term**
- Continued implementation of DDR.
- A national SSR programme is being implemented.
- All factions separated and complying with the control measures.
- All designated weapons have been cantoned in accordance with relevant agreements and the DDR programme.
- Factions are complying with the security provisions of the peace agreement.
- Incidents of violence involving former combatants are significantly reduced.

**Long-term**
- Factions have been integrated and are part of the government process.
- Factions refrain from using violence to settle grievances or gain political power.
- The security situation is conducive to the return of IDPs and refugees.
- Final phases of DDR are being implemented.
- SSR programmes consolidated and yielding long-term results with support of all key stakeholders.
4.1.3 Responsibilities and coordination

Separating warring factions requires that the HoM make significant efforts to keep all belligerents engaged in the process. The FC will have responsibility for monitoring compliance with security arrangements in accordance with the mission’s mandate. If the peace operation is taking over responsibility from another force, the MLT (in particular the SRSJ and the FC) should ensure that the transition is closely coordinated with the DPO and the DOS, as well as the authorities responsible for the previous force. Joint mechanisms should be established to coordinate with factions.

4.1.4 Resources

Timely deployment of the mission’s uniformed personnel requires adequate resources, with sufficient capacity and capability and with the appropriate directives to establish control measures. The mission should also have access to suitable technology for surveillance and monitoring compliance, either through TCCs/PCCs or through contracted services. Experts should be recruited to support the DDR and SSR processes at a time when the conditions are right.

4.1.5 Challenges and risks

• Compliance is not universal, or factions do not respect all the elements of the relevant agreements.
• Fragmented/renegade/spoiler groups continue fighting, or the peace process/agreement fails and conflict resumes.
• Conflict spreads beyond the borders of the mission area.
• Regional or other transnational actors subvert the peace process.
• The impartiality of the mission is compromised by apparent or perceived support of one party over another.
• The peacekeeping force is unable to accomplish its mandate due to operational inflexibility and restrictions, undeclared national caveats (restrictions placed by TCCs on the use of their force) or lack of capability, capacity and training.
• Lack of political ownership for the necessary reforms within the police, security and justice institutions.
4.1.6 Considerations

Mission posture

Separating warring factions may, in some circumstances, require the use of force, especially where spoilers are present and/or a culture of impunity is prevalent. While assertive action ensures credibility, excessive force might jeopardize the legitimacy of the mission and alienate certain groups or enable spoilers to rally the population against the intervention. Finding a way to balance this trade-off is essential and may involve the engagement of the police component through the deployment of FPUs that are proficient in the use of lethal and less-lethal force against non-military threats. Because peace is fragile at this stage, the impact of all actions and the risks of reigniting conflict should be carefully assessed. Understanding and exercising the principles of impartiality and consent is essential, as is the availability of a range of both lethal and non-lethal capabilities.

Area deployment or point defence

Force levels in peacekeeping operations are almost never sufficient for the scale and number of tasks. The military component is usually spread very thinly over large areas and it is hard to concentrate force. Additionally, much military capability is taken up by self-protection of the mission and its vulnerable bases. The extent to which the mission concentrates on defending points and bases or providing wide area security is a balance of judgement between spreading forces so thinly that they are ineffective or, conversely, concentrating them in a few key areas and leaving parts of the country and civilians unprotected. In practice a mission must be able to do both and have the intelligence and flexibility to recalibrate and redeploy to counter new threats. A similar dilemma is faced by UNPOL in its deployment of FPUs. A balance must be struck between their public order policing tasks and their deployment in place of the military for security duties.
4.2 Civilians Protected

The protection of civilians (POC) is included in the mandates of most contemporary peace operations. Civilians are at risk in fragile environments and are targeted during armed conflict. The most vulnerable groups are women, children, refugees, IDPs, minorities and the elderly. Protecting these groups is vital to preventing suffering and strengthening confidence in the peace process in the eyes of the local population, neighbouring countries and the international community. The mission’s protection activities need to be framed within a sound political process and go well beyond physical security. This calls for a comprehensive approach involving all mission components and external actors.21

POC refers to “all necessary action”, up to and including the use of deadly force, aimed at preventing or responding to threats of physical violence against civilians, within the capabilities and areas of operations, and without prejudice to the responsibility of the host government to protect civilians. All necessary action includes any political, developmental, humanitarian or other non-violent means that may be required to ensure civilian protection in the long term. It therefore requires an all-of-mission approach if threats are to be countered. A “threat” exists from the moment it is identified as a potential source of harm to civilians to the time it is no longer determined as such.

The three tiers of protection of civilians

Tier 1. Protection through dialogue and engagement

Tier 1 covers political or diplomatic efforts encompassing political engagement in, advocacy for and assistance with the effective implementation of a peace agreement, conflict mediation, political pressure and advocacy, community reconciliation efforts or other political measures to resolve conflict (see 3.2 Peace Process Supported, and 3.4 National Reconciliation Promoted).

Tier 2. Provision of physical protection

Tier 2 includes patrolling outposts, monitoring force deployments, area security and other actions to prevent, deter and respond to situations in which civilians are under threat of physical violence. These are normally

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duties for the military component, but FPUs from UNPOL are also armed and likely to be in the front line of physical protection (including deterrence).

**Tier 3. Establishing a protective environment**

Tier 3 encompasses efforts to enhance the safety and support the rights of civilians through promoting and monitoring legal protections and human rights, facilitating humanitarian assistance, supporting national institutions and facilitating SSR, DDR and transitional justice. It includes peacebuilding measures to further good governance, the rule of law, social well-being and economic sustainability to reduce the chances that future grievances will result in conflict that threatens civilians. The role of UNPOL’s international police officers (IPOs) should be considered.

However, the provisions on protection from physical violence are open to interpretation. In many cases, there can be very different views—including within the UN Security Council, in the mission and among TCCs—on their exact scope and nature. In addition, a mission’s resources, ability and capacity to protect all civilians do not always match the expectations of the international community and the local population. A strategic communications plan will be vital to manage these expectations.

Missions should support the three tiers of POC from an understanding of the changing vulnerabilities and levels of threat to the various sections of the civilian population. This requires a regular assessment of the operating environment, its actors and dynamics. Missions must conduct effective assessments and manage intelligence and multi-source information to guide their actions on protecting civilians.

**4.2.1 Operational activities**

The key operational activities by the mission to support this output include:

- Developing a POC strategy.
- Identifying vulnerable sections of the population, such as women, children, minorities and IDPs, and their protection needs, including sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) and conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV).
- Establishing a presence in key areas of potential volatility.
- Establishing joint protection teams consisting of Military, Police and Civilian components.
- Responding to or preventing the forced displacement of civilians.
4.2.2 Benchmarks

Short-term

- All vulnerable sectors of the population have been identified.
- Sufficient presence has been established in key areas to deter major outbreaks of violence, including CRSV.
- Mechanisms created for interaction with other actors and the local population.
- Security zones and areas established as needed.
- Effective monitoring is preventing or reducing acts of violence.
- Main roads and volatile areas are cleared of ERW (if applicable) and patrolled.
- The public information strategy has been planned and is being implemented.
- Key IDP camps are secured.
- Protection issues have been incorporated into SSR and DDR programmes.
- A comprehensive plan for mine action is in place.

Medium-term

- Incidents are being investigated and documented, and the national authorities are taking appropriate action, including on CRSV.
- The number of incidents (including of all forms of sexual violence) have decreased.
- Advocacy programmes are working and effective.
- Government policy exists on the protection of civilians, including CRSV.
- Legitimate and capable host state security forces are being developed.
- People have access to legal recourse.
- Property issues are being addressed by the national authorities.
- Information campaigns and education on human rights are under way.
- Civilians can move on key thoroughfares safely.
- Forced displacement of civilians is not occurring.
- Relief and medical treatment are being provided to vulnerable groups and survivors of sexual violence.
**Long-term**

- The host government has the will and has built the capacity and capability to protect civilians and counter CRSV, with legitimate police forces performing the main role.
- Justice, governance and reconciliation efforts are well established at the national, regional and local levels.
- An improvement in sustainable security as measured by access by the civilian population—in particular, women and girls—to food, water, shelter, education, public services and economic opportunity.

**4.2.3 Responsibilities and coordination**

Notwithstanding the host government’s primary and ultimate responsibility for protecting civilians, peace operations are often mandated to protect civilians, in part because the national authorities lack the capacity or will to protect the civilian population. Increasingly missions are judged upon their ability to protect civilians. POC requires a whole-of-mission effort; it therefore becomes the MLT’s business to ensure that POC responsibilities are clearly cascaded down throughout the mission. Protection efforts should therefore include multiple components of the peace operation, in addition to the uniformed personnel, such as Political Affairs, Human Rights, Public Information, and Civil Affairs, as well as coordination mechanisms such as the JOC and JMAC. This requires a mission-specific POC strategy and, where necessary, regional POC plans. Additionally, regular political engagement with the host government and major political parties by the HoM and the MLT is essential to preventing and bringing to a halt to attacks and violence against civilians.

No single actor has access to all of the information or expertise required to plan and conduct the wide range of protection activities that can be used to support civilians in conflict and post-conflict settings. In addition to improving cooperation between the components of the mission, the MLT must establish effective coordination and communications arrangements with other relevant UN agencies and other actors on protection issues. Developing protection strategies in consultation with humanitarian actors is crucial. Protection activities—including the mitigation of CRSV—should also be coordinated with the national authorities, civil society groups and other representatives of the civilian population. SGBV should be recognized as a responsibility of the host government. Gender discrimination and inequality lie at the heart of CRSV.
4.2.4 Resources

If the mandate of a peace operation has POC provisions, the mission should have the training, early capacity and capability to carry out the necessary tasks. Within the broad range of resource requirements, the availability of enabling assets, particularly aviation, is critical. UNPOL may deploy FPUs. In addition, the mission needs high quality information management and intelligence to be successful, as well as sufficient numbers of translators and interpreters to enable communication and understanding of cultural sensitivities.

In the likely event that a mission faces gaps in these resources, the MLT should inform UNHQ and the Security Council of its requirements and the implications of continuing shortfalls. The mission should also prioritize its requirements and the allocation of protection assets. UNPOL plays a significant and flexible role in protecting civilians. IPOs are often the main interlocutors with host-state police and therefore have both a presence and a network among host-state police officers and local communities.

The basic needs of the people should be met primarily by the government or through humanitarian operations, which should be adequately supported (see 6.1 Secure and Effective Humanitarian Relief Supported). Since long-term solutions depend on the development of local capacity and capability, international donors and UN entities such as UNDP should marshal adequate resources.
4.2.5 Challenges and risks

- The national security forces or elements therein are complicit in preying on elements of the civilian population, requiring management of the HRDDP in the interpretation of continuing support for the host government.
- Threats against civilians do not come from armed groups but from other less identifiable civilians for complex local reasons.
- The peacekeeping mission has neither the capacity nor the capability to carry out its POC mandate.
- The expectations of the local population exceed the ability and capability of the mission to protect civilians.
- The population is scattered, with groups being out of reach of the national authorities or the peacekeeping mission.
- Sustained political engagement by the Security Council may be difficult to obtain and/or UN Member States are failing to apply pressure on host governments that are not fulfilling their responsibility to protect their populations.

4.2.6 Considerations

Balancing short-term security imperatives and investments in long-term, host-state capacity building

The immediate requirement to protect civilians needs to be balanced against development of the host government’s capability, capacity and accountability to take on this responsibility. With limited resources, it may be difficult to balance short- and long-term needs. The need for immediate security may divert donor resources and attention from longer-term SSR processes. Demonstrating quick wins can build credibility but may jeopardize development of a foundation for deeper SSR reform. Personal security will probably be the most urgent issue for citizens in post-conflict societies. It is one of the elements of good governance that affects early perceptions of the legitimacy of the state and thus will almost always be one of the first and most important public tasks. Those providing security will often lay claim to leadership while also having the support of citizens who see them as the only immediate option for the protection of person and property, however undemocratic and unaccountable they may be.
Managing international, national and local expectations

The MLT will immediately be required to deal with expectations regarding the provision of security and POC. The legitimacy of and commitment to the peace process may suffer if expectations are not adequately managed. Strategic communications are crucial to ensuring that the local population has a realistic understanding of the mandate and capability of the mission.

Temporary or permanent deployment pattern

POC, as well as monitoring and observation of the warring factions, may require a composite model of deployment involving a mix of temporary locations around civilian and urban centres and deployment along conflict lines and security zones. The former can be readjusted when no longer required. The mission should balance its resources and capabilities against the actual needs on the ground in order to determine the appropriate application of resources and manpower. Temporary patterns will better support fluid operations and clearance activities; permanent patterns will better support peacebuilding activities.

Balancing the protection of the local population with the protection of UN personnel

The mission may face a dilemma when balancing its POC mandate against its responsibility to protect UN personnel (both within the mission and in the wider UN system). Expectations must be managed as resources will always be stretched.

Balancing imperative to protect civilians with the political need to ensure host-state support for the peace process

The mission may face a dilemma if host-government security forces are identified as perpetrators of violence against civilians. The mission will have to find ways to end this behaviour while maintaining consent at the operational and tactical levels across the mission area. Missions are frequently mandated to support host-government security forces, and it is imperative that the human rights principles and the HRDDP by which it is implemented are discussed with the host government. This calls for the vetting of supported units and commanders (which may include armed groups), as well as a close dialogue with the host-government authorities, which is a sensitive process requiring political finesse.
4.3 Freedom of Movement Regained and Exercised

Freedom of movement entails the free flow of people and goods without fear of physical harm or disruption. At the same time, illicit commodities and other sources of instability must have their movement disrupted. Free movement promotes the normalization of daily life and economic growth, such as access to schools and markets, as well as the social integration of isolated communities.

Freedom of movement can be challenged by various factors, including hostilities between warring factions; the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by one or more parties; natural disasters; and an uncooperative host state. Hostilities between parties are likely to prevent movement of the civilian population and can severely restrict the freedom of movement of the mission. The Military component would be considerably slowed down in areas and times where fighting is ongoing, and the movement of the mission’s civilian component or UNPOL may be curtailed. Although the risk of casualties would be low, an uncooperative host state can make movement difficult for all the mission’s components by administrative and political means, threatening the mission’s ability to fulfil its mandate.

While hostilities between parties and an uncooperative host state are subject to political solutions, maintaining freedom of movement in an environment in which explosive ordnance and IEDs constitute a threat is a military–technical issue. An aggressor may deploy IEDs to reduce or prevent the freedom of movement of the forces it is targeting. This often creates a non-permissive or semi-permissive environment in which such aggressors have freedom to operate and are able to project their power. Maintaining freedom of movement within an IED-threat environment is therefore a key focus of IED-threat mitigation via explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) activities.

Establishing rules on where to enable, limit or deny access will be a key consideration for the MLT in its dealings with the host government. Conversely, parties on the ground might test the credibility and resilience of peacekeepers by restricting their freedom of movement. As a result, it is essential that the mission’s Military component secures the operational and tactical mobility of all personnel across the mission area. Cooperation on this matter may also be an indicator of the general level of consent for and commitment to the peace process, and of overall consent for the presence of the peace operation.
4.3.1 Operational activities

The mission’s operational activities to support this output include:

- Identifying, through study, the vulnerabilities of key routes.
- Tracking the viability of all routes via the JOC.
- Establishing an EOD/IED threat-mitigation working group.
- Developing EOD capabilities, removing ERW from abandoned storage sites and promoting safe ammunition management.
- Implementing and sustaining the SOFA or status of mission agreement (SOMA).
- Exploiting IED events through technical and tactical analysis.
- Contributing to the degradation of IED networks by implementing recording and recovery of EO components.

4.3.2 Benchmarks

**Short-term**

- Routes and air heads are secure, and alternate routes are established.
- Humanitarian supplies are moving.
- Spoilers and their areas of operation have been identified.
- Mines and IEDs identified and priorities for clearing established.

**Medium-term**

- Population can move on key routes without violence.
- Key strategic resources are protected.
- Police has restored law and order in critical areas.
- Status of routes updated.

**Long-term**

- National authorities are able to ensure full freedom of movement for people and goods throughout the territory.
- Re-establishment of customs and border procedures consistent with international standards.
- Mine action continues.
4.3.3 Responsibilities and coordination

The host government is responsible for ensuring freedom of movement for its population and the peacekeeping mission. The SRSG will need to urge and remind all parties to adhere to their agreements. The mission needs to track the state of freedom of movement through the JOC and the Force HQ. Meanwhile, the FC and the Police Commissioner need to ensure compliance on the ground. Components involved in mine action (both military and civilian) will also have an important role to play with regard to freedom of movement, as will the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other relevant UN agencies dealing with the movement of refugees and IDPs. Coordination is therefore essential, as is close political engagement with the parties.

4.3.4 Resources

Mission resources and deployment timelines will determine both when and which freedom of movement activities are implemented. Early resources and speed of deployment will facilitate compliance with agreements. Donors need to provide appropriate resources for mine action so that routes and essential locations can be cleared. Technological assets will have to be available to enable this task.

4.3.5 Challenges and risks

- Host government gradually adopts a stance of non-compliance with the terms of the SOFA.
- Host government cannot ensure freedom of movement.
- Lack of credible information on mine and ERW contamination.
- Peace process falters and fighting resumes.
- Factions/spoilers restrict the movement and/or access of peace operations personnel.
- Factions/spoilers use freedom of movement to exert political leverage.
- Territorial integrity is lacking, enabling influx of external spoilers.
- Regional actors are not supportive.
4.3.6 Considerations

Balancing freedom of movement and security

Population and resource controls may initially need to be implemented to control factions and spoilers and establish security. The extent to which this is required will depend on the situation. These controls should be explained to the population in order to maintain transparency in the mission’s communications and to manage public expectations.

Balancing the required performance with the available capabilities

Counter-IED/mine intelligence requires the fusion of multiple information layers to provide a detailed understanding of spoiler-IED tactics, techniques and procedures; every unit must maintain a current and clear understanding of the status of each route. Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets will provide technical capability for the identification of IEDs and mines. Electronic counter-IED assets can be utilized as a threat-mitigation asset on vehicles or on personnel required to move from, through or to an area with an assessed radio-controlled IED threat. Force generation to obtain the necessary capabilities is a highly politicized process that requires a good tripartite relationship between the MLT, TCCs and the DPO.

Immediate or gradual movement controls

Immediate and gradual movement controls each have their pros and cons. While experience shows that the latter are more viable and pragmatic, humanitarian considerations may well determine the appropriate type of controls.

Controlling movement of national resources

In a resource-based conflict, protection and prevention of the illegitimate movement of national and strategic resources could be of great significance. Consequently, movement control efforts and other security tasks related to this issue will have to be prioritized from the inception of the mission.
Respecting host-country sovereignty while maintaining freedom of movement for the mission

As a host government maintains (or regains) control of its territory, possible interruption, restrictions or even denial of mission movement may occur. The SOFA/SOMA should be forward looking and adaptable, as the host government exerts increased sovereignty over its territories. Full freedom of movement is essential for a mission from an operational view, as restrictions can inhibit its ability to perform mandated tasks. In addition, accepting limitations imposed by the parties automatically undermines the credibility of the mission, signalling that it can be manipulated without consequences.
UNMIS: Maximizing operational effect of the military component

With increased threats in peacekeeping environments and attacks on UN bases and personnel, there has been a growing demand for more troops for force protection. An emerging dilemma for mission leadership is ensuring a balanced military deployment that secures static installations while retaining sufficient mobility to respond to developing critical situations.

The UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) had a mandated strength of approximately 10,000 troops to support the 2006 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. While South Sudan supported UNMIS operations, looking forward to the 2011 Independence Referendum, operational consent was selective in the north, especially in Darfur and Abyei. Many UNMIS troops were thus hesitant to maneuver.

Since surface mobility was confined to mine-cleared roads, cross-country movement was being conducted by daytime aviation effort. The mission had limited access to outer reaches, mostly being provided by military observer long-range patrols with limited staying power.

There was a necessity to infuse maneuver culture in the mission to sustain control of far-flung areas, which was crucial for effective monitoring of the 1956 border Trans Line redeployment of the Sudanese Armed Forces and South Sudan People’s Liberation Army.

Thus, UNMIS pioneered the concept of a temporary operating base (TOB)—a light footprint deployment for conducting need-based tasks. There was initial resistance from troop-contributing countries as well as the Director of Mission Support, as this required effort.

TOBs were provided with field scale accommodation, rations and medical support. They became additional pivots for gaining access to the entire geographical space. Initially two TOBs were deployed, one each in Upper Nile and Bahr el Ghazal. Later each sector developed the capability to deploy one TOB. TOBs can be an effective way for the mission to establish freedom of movement and dominate space economically.

4.4 Threats from Spoilers Managed

Threats to the peace process come from a variety of sources. Spoilers are agents, organizations or factions that work against the peace process and threaten the success of a UN mission. Working sometimes in tandem, but also independently, spoilers perceive the peace process as threatening their world view, power or interests (often financial) and are willing to use both violent and non-violent means to achieve their objectives.

Spoilers can be domestic or international and can include but are not limited to violent extremists and terrorists, criminals (both organized and unorganized) and warring factions. Conflict zones are politicized regions of insecurity that can be conducive to various types of spoilers (political, ideological and criminal) that may lead to armed violence.

Managing threats from these spoilers requires the development of discrete strategies to address each type based on a deep understanding of their intentions, motivations, level of commitment and interactions (see 2.2 Promoting Integrated Planning and Operations, and the subsection on context analyses). In addition to understanding the goals of spoilers, the mission must understand their political/social strategy and financial strategy, as well as the networks in which they operate, their leadership and organizational structures, the interrelationships among spoiler groups and the decision-making process. Spoilers can be categorized according to: (a) their relationship to the peace process; (b) their willingness to negotiate in the context of the peace process; and (c) their willingness to use violence.

Distinguishing between spoilers

Relationship to the peace process

Spoilers can be inside or outside of the peace process. Inside spoilers are part of the host government or a party to an agreement that has failed to abide by that agreement and places obstacles in the path of the process that prevent the UN mission from carrying out its mandate. Outside spoilers have not signed up or agreed to the peace process and can use any means to prevent that process from succeeding. Some outside spoilers are conflict entrepreneurs, whose commitments to ending conflict are subordinate to their lucrative exploitation of the conflict. All of these spoilers can be empowered by existing criminal power structures and linkages to transnational organized crime. Each presents different challenges for the MLT.
Willingness to negotiate

Another type of spoiler may have limited goals, such as power sharing, redressing grievances, security or access to resources. Such spoilers are willing to negotiate to achieve these goals in the context of a peace process. The peace process may have to be adjusted to accommodate their goals. Other spoilers may seek total power based on ideological or religious views that are non-negotiable and outside of the peace process. Conflict entrepreneurs will evaluate the costs and benefits to determine which negotiation path provides them with the most lucrative outcome or if they must seek to obtain their goals through intimidation (see 3.2 Peace Process Supported).

Willingness to use violence

Some spoilers may not be willing to negotiate, may be driven by ideological or religious goals or may have had their criminal enterprises put at risk. This type of spoiler is more likely to use force than other types—a factor which must be considered when designing operational approaches. The way in which force is used should also be considered. An ideological or religiously driven spoiler may be using force in a manner consistent with IHL while remaining unwilling to negotiate and may therefore be seen as continued armed opposition.

Alternatively, a spoiler may use force with complete disregard for IHL and with the deliberate intent of creating fear through unpredictability (e.g. in terms of targeting), which would mean an indiscriminate and disproportionate use of force. Non-state groups using force in the pursuit of ideological or religious goal, with disregard for IHL and with the deliberate intent of creating fear, are sometimes referred to as terrorists. While a UN mission is not mandated to conduct counterterrorist operations, it is increasingly recognized that UN missions can be targets of terrorist activity and need to be able to protect themselves and their staff from it.

Operational approaches

The operational approach must not only address each type of spoiler, but also embrace the context in which they operate and the connections that empower and facilitate them. It must be understood that in some areas spoilers may be networked and operate in symbiotic relationships, therefore requiring the networking of mitigation efforts. In addition to considering each type of spoiler, MLTs, through the JMAC, must look for and exploit the critical nodes where criminality, extremism and politics intersect. This requires the integration of intelligence, law-enforcement, political, diplomatic and development resources. Credible local
institutions must be harnessed and supported. These approaches must be based on sound and deep intelligence as well as the sharing of information widely among all actors that can understand the nodal relationships among all of the spoilers. All operational approaches require integration not only at the mission level, but also in the host state and among other international actors outside the mission. All approaches must devise a robust strategic communications plan that addresses the social narratives that support extremism. The basic concept is to combine proactive, reactive and consequence-management measures to undermine the incentives for violence while promoting alternatives paths.

Proactive measures

Use positive measures to engage with spoilers and address their goals; strengthen or build accountable host-state institutions; preserve political momentum; deconstruct spoiler narratives and develop supportive narratives; create or support social educational programmes; engage with religious leaders and communities; engage with civil society with a focus on women and youth; strengthen and reform economic and financial institutions to include anti-corruption efforts; run a viable SSR and DDR programme; and secure borders and gain support from external neighbours.

Reactive measures

Use the integrated assets of the mission and national structures to weaken, persuade, compel and neutralize spoilers. Consider the appropriate combination of strategic communications, and diplomatic, political, economic, legal, law-enforcement and military means.

Consequence-management measures

Such measures address the social, economic, religious and political consequences of extreme spoiler acts.

Impact of transnational organized crime mitigated

Transnational organized crime (TOC) is more than a law-enforcement problem. Structured groups that commit serious crimes in the mission area for financial or other material benefit are a threat, and risk delaying or derailing both the mission and the peace process. TOC threatens the general security environment, state legitimacy (through corruption) and the legitimacy of the government when it is perceived to be beholden to criminal groups. Actors engaged in TOC may even be part of the government the mission is seeking to reform.
Therefore, an effective response to TOC requires a comprehensive and multi-stakeholder approach, in which the mission will be an important actor. The main focus of the mission’s activity will be to build capacity in the host country to mitigate the negative impact of TOC. The MLT might be asked to coordinate the activities of many stakeholders, including the host government and its relevant agencies, as well as regional and international organizations. In the past, many mission leaders ignored TOC and by the time it was recognized, it was extremely difficult to counter its negative impact. It is therefore extremely important that the MLT considers preventive measures early on to mitigate the impact of TOC.

4.4.1 Operational activities

The mission’s operational activities to support this output include:

• Identifying the different spoilers and understanding the connections between them.
• Engaging civil society, media, religious leaders and communities with a focus on women and youth.
• Conducting strategic communications to deconstruct spoiler narratives while developing supportive narratives.
• Reaching out to spoilers who are ready for negotiation and reconciliation.
• Assisting in identifying and developing mitigation strategies on TOC (including corruption and terrorism) with the host state.
• Soliciting internal and external support and resources, such as intelligence sharing, and establishing operational planning and coordination mechanisms with external actors.
4.4.2 Benchmarks

**Short-term**
- Intelligence and warning systems are in place.
- Presence established in key areas of potential volatility.
- Prevalence of transnational organised crime, including its type, scope and nature, identified.
- Local partners (e.g. civil society, religious or ethnic groups) that can assist in reasserting control and satisfying grievances identified and approached.
- Community outreach and educational programmes on de-radicalization initiated.
- Strategic communications with positive narratives to reduce support for spoilers and enhance the legitimacy of the mission and host state in place.
- Freedom of movement established.

**Medium-term**
- Expanded space for dialogue among all factions preserved.
- Impunity for criminal acts addressed.
- Recruitment by spoilers disrupted.
- Local leaders implicated in transnational organised crime replaced.
- Irreconcilable spoilers are isolated and neutralized.
- Former spoilers successfully reintegrated.

**Long-term**
- All relevant government bodies and institutions are held accountable.
- The host government has developed the necessary capacity to deliver needed services to the population.
- The general population, factions and elites all feel that their expectations are being met.
- Spoiler groups, especially violent extremists and terrorists, are politically and socially rejected, isolated and neutralized.
- Education campaigns that reject extremism implemented in formal programmes and the mass media.
- Civil society institutions have the capacity to mobilize without fear of undue interference from any entity.
4.4.3. Responsibilities and coordination

The host government is responsible for developing its capacity and capability to address spoilers, with the support of the mission, relevant UN agencies and international stakeholders. However, until the national authorities can fully assume this responsibility and be trusted by the population to deliver, the peacekeeping mission may be expected to deal with a range of spoiler issues, in close coordination with national security institutions. The DPO Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) will be a key player in providing support to the mission in these areas. To be successful, strategic communications must be a focus of the MLT and coordinated at all levels.

Close cooperation should be promoted between the situational-awareness and analytical capabilities of the JOC, JMAC, UNPOL’s criminal intelligence cell, and military intelligence (U2) branch, and where appropriate engage in information sharing with regional partners.

4.4.4 Resources

The mission—and in particular the JMAC, Military and Police components—should have sufficient training, capacity and capability, along with the appropriate ROE, to deal with spoiler challenges. SSR and DDR are central elements and will therefore require adequate funding and support from donors. Resources may also be required to develop penal, police and judicial facilities and sites. Conducting strategic communications to deconstruct spoiler narratives while developing supportive narratives will require investment in personnel and equipment as well as a focus by the MLT. Engaging with civil society institutions to build resilience should also be a focus of mission resources, along with educational programmes and consequence-management initiatives to heal communities after violent attacks.

Where possible, the MLT should consider reaching out to neighbouring and regional countries, as well as the wider UN system (e.g. the UN Office of Counter Terrorism and the UN Office of Drugs and Crime) and external organizations such as the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) to ensure cooperation and support on intelligence, planning and operational activities. These could provide valuable yet low-cost resources (including data, analysis and coordination mechanisms) for combating TOC.
4.4.5 Challenges and risks

- Spoiler networks are too entrenched and supported by external means that cannot be addressed.
- A deeply rooted culture of corruption can affect the mission’s most senior interlocutors.
- The existence or growth of national and transnational organized crime, including black markets in a symbiotic relationship with spoiler networks.
- TOC might represent a sizeable and accepted part of the local economy that is difficult to replace.
- Security and legal systems are corrupt and politicized, while crime is institutionalized and rooted in illicit revenue sources.
- Radical narratives have a stronger appeal than counter-narratives.
- Poorly conceived actions by the peacekeeping mission, including misconduct, can increase spoiler recruitment and undermine the legitimacy of the mission.
4.4.6 Considerations

Balance counter spoiler actions with the unintended effect of driving individuals towards violent extremism

The mission must “do no harm”. Use of kinetic military operations, ISR, border control, policing and the criminal justice system has the potential to push individuals towards violent reaction and extremism. Poorly designed strategic communications based on an inadequate understanding of social dynamics could negate efforts to discredit radical ideological narratives. This might also apply to peacebuilding programmes. Addressing the consequences of spoiler actions and terrorism through well-designed DDR, SSR and rule-of-law programmes will help in this regard.

Engage with spoilers to include them in the peace process or seek justice for extremist actions

Dealing with spoilers, including terrorists and organized crime groups, may be necessary for the peace process, rehabilitation, mitigating tensions and influencing other spoilers to participate. At the same time, ignoring the continuing use of political violence or exploitation of criminal networks will preserve a culture of impunity and threaten sustainable peace. Common ground and space for negotiations should be sought that includes civil society.

Take account of the host country’s traditional mechanisms as well as international norms and standards

When supporting change to a country’s governance culture, the mission should consider existing “rules” and behaviour, as well as the patterns of operation of previous security forces, which might not be easy to change and may have been effective. Successful SSR will depend on how well it reflects an understanding of existing institutions and historical patterns. Good governance will ultimately be provided only insofar as societal actors revise their notions of what public security is and how it operates.
Perceived legitimacy or perceived credibility

The imperative to manage TOC too hard and too quickly could create tensions with the host government, particularly if the local senior political leadership is implicated in TOC. If significant segments of the population depend on TOC for their livelihoods, the legitimacy of the police may be compromised in the short to medium term if activities to counter TOC are successful. The MLT must consider the trade-off between immediate security needs and redefining the economy of the host country.
4.5 Public Order Established

Public order is characterized by the absence of high levels of criminal and political violence, such as kidnapping, murders, riots and the intimidation of targeted groups or individuals. Public disorder is profoundly destabilizing and undercuts efforts to strengthen state security institutions, and is often accompanied by widespread violations of human rights. The judicial system tends to be weak and confidence in its ability to adjudicate cases is low, while prisons are often overflowing. Public order is essential if the population is to gain confidence in the public security system rather than seek security from other entities such as militias and warlords. Maintaining public order is the domain of the police and other law-enforcement agencies, the courts, the prosecution service and prisons, all of which make up the criminal justice system (see Chapter 5).

In some cases, multidimensional UN peace operations have been deployed to support the transition to legitimate government, and even temporarily to assume the legislative and administrate functions—in part or in full—of the state. In such scenarios, maintaining public order is a key function of the peace operation. In most cases however, UNPOL through the FPU, stands ready to assist host-state police in maintaining public order.

4.5.1 Operational activities

The operational activities of a mission supporting the establishment of public order include:

• Establishing a presence in key areas of potential volatility.
• Managing civil disturbances and facilitating peaceful demonstrations.
• Supporting the capacity/capability development of local police and other law-enforcement entities and the re-establishment of the justice system.
• Protecting key governmental and UN installations, cultural sites and infrastructure.
4.5.2 Benchmarks

**Short-term**
- Assessment on the capacity and capability of security and justice providers is initiated.
- Police and Military components have established coordination mechanisms and are prepared to manage civil disturbances.
- Quick-response elements formed.

**Medium-term**
- Violence in volatile areas eliminated and if civil disturbances erupt, they are quickly contained.
- Most of the country has returned to normal patterns of daily activity.
- National police and other law-enforcement authorities are present nationwide and are held accountable.
- Population expresses confidence in public order.
- Civil disturbances are quickly contained and actions of security forces are compliant with international human rights.

**Long-term**
- Rule of law established.
- Evidence of a robust civil society.
- All relevant government bodies and institutions are held accountable.
- Normal civil and political patterns reappear.

4.5.3 Responsibilities and coordination

With the support of the mission and relevant UN agencies and international stakeholders, the host government is responsible for developing its capacity and capability to maintain public order. Until national authorities can fully assume this responsibility, however, the peace operation might be expected to deal with a host of public order issues, in close coordination with national security institutions. OROLSI at UNHQ will be a key player in providing support to the mission in these areas.

Public-order-management tasks, such as crowd and riot control, are a primary function of the host state, and UNPOL, in particular FPUs, often acting in support of the host-state police. In extreme cases when UN
military are located in remote areas and UNPOL is not available, or a public disturbance is being caused by an armed group and the level of violence exceeds the capacity of the police, UN military units may be given a public-order-management role. These units may act alone or in conjunction with the Police component or host-state police. For the Police Commissioner, it will be important to understand the command structure, including the role of the FPU coordinators but also the possibility of integrated command with military assets.

4.5.4 Resources

The mission—and in particular its Military and Police components—should have sufficient training, capacity and capability, as well as the appropriate rules of engagement, to address public-order challenges. The role and deployment of the Police component and the FPUs must be carefully managed through risk analysis as there will be numerous calls on a limited resource.

4.5.5 Challenges and risks

- Local security elements might oppose the peace process.
- Spoiler networks may be entrenched or supported by external means to subvert the rule of law and undermine public order.
- The existence or growth of national and transnational organized crime, including a black market.
- Security and legal systems are corrupt and politicized, and crime is institutionalized and rooted in illicit revenue sources undermining public order.
4.5.6 Considerations

Balancing short-term public order imperatives and investments in broader security sector reform

Perhaps the most critical trade-off faced by the mission will be choosing between an urgent need to address the security situation—possibly by lending legitimacy to less-than-democratic processes and actors, redundant layers of security provision and organizations that have reputations for corruption and lack of professionalism—and establishing legitimacy for patterns of governance and actors that support accountability, transparency and other processes critical to good governance. With limited resources, it may be difficult to balance short- and long-term requirements—for example, immediate security versus long-term SSR efforts. While quick wins might build credibility, they can undermine deeper reform of the security sector.

Promoting short-term stability while confronting impunity

Dealing with spoiler groups or individuals may be necessary to secure the engagement of certain factions or mitigate certain tensions. At the same time, ignoring the continued use of political violence or exploitation of criminal networks will preserve a culture of impunity and threaten sustainable peace.

Balancing police and military public order functions

While maintenance of public order is a responsibility of the host-state police force, situations may require UNPOL through its FPUs to act independently or in support of host-state police in order to carry out the mission’s mandate. If the level of violence exceeds that which can be addressed through the capabilities of an FPU, or in cases when such units are not available, the mission’s military component may need to take action. The transition from police to military control of a situation, or vice versa, requires efficient command and coordination procedures. These should be widely understood and frequently rehearsed.
4.6 Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programmes Implemented

DDR is a process through which members of armed forces and groups are supported to lay down their weapons and return to civilian life. The objective of an integrated DDR process is to contribute to security and stability in post-conflict environments. Equally, DDR processes can contribute to creating an environment in which peace processes, political and social reconciliation, and access to livelihoods can be enacted, thereby enabling recovery and development towards sustaining peace. Disarming and demobilizing ex-combatants is a highly visible and political process that can increase public confidence in the peace process. It can therefore be seen as integral to consolidating peace and promoting stability.

The UN defines disarmament as the collection, documentation, control and disposal of the small arms, ammunition, explosives, and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population. Disarmament also includes the development of responsible weapons management programmes.

Demobilization is defined as the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from the armed forces or other armed groups. In general, a differentiated approach which takes into account the specific needs of groups such as women, children and people living with disabilities should be adopted.

The first stage of demobilization can extend from the processing of individual combatants in temporary centres to the massing of troops in camps designated for this purpose (e.g. cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas or barracks). The second stage comprises reinsertion—a support package provided to the demobilized. Reinsertion is a form of transitional assistance to help cover the basic needs of ex-combatants and their families and can include the provision of transitional safety allowances, food, clothing, shelter, medical services, short-term education, training, employment and tools.

Reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and an income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open time frame that primarily takes place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility, but often necessitates long-term external assistance.
When it comes to DDR processes, the local population, ex-combatants and the host government all have different expectations and agendas, and the peacekeeping mission will always be expected to deliver more than time and capacity allow. The key is to balance what is possible against what the stakeholders believe should be possible within a given time. Public information and community-sensitization campaigns will ensure that affected communities and participating groups receive accurate information on DDR processes. Messages should be designed appropriately for different audiences and employ many different and locally appropriate means of communication.

DDR programmes are viable when certain preconditions exist, such as: (a) a peace agreement and/or a negotiated ceasefire that provides a framework for DDR; (b) trust in the peace process; (c) willingness of the conflict parties to engage in DDR; and (d) a minimum guarantee of security. Increasingly, these conditions are not always present; in those instances, missions can support or pave the way for a fuller DDR programme by employing a number of DDR-related tools (see Box: Tools related to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration).

4.6.1 Operational activities

The operational activities undertaken by the mission to support this output include:

- Establishing a strategic framework for UN engagement in DDR.
- Developing an operational plan, including a division of labour, in coordination with UN agencies and national actors.
- Identifying the different categories of persons such as women associated with armed forces or armed groups, children associated with armed forces or armed groups, foreign fighters, and people living with disabilities, to plan and prepare for tailored and specific support.
- Securing funding, particularly for the reintegration phase.
Tools related to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

Pre-disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

Pre-disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (pre-DDR) is a local-level transitional stabilization measure designed for those who are eligible for a DDR programme. Pre-DDR can be initiated when the implementation of a DDR programme is delayed.

Transitional weapons and ammunition management

Transitional weapons and ammunition management may include (but is not limited to) weapons collection in exchange for community development projects, and support for the safer management of weapons and ammunition by communities.

Community violence reduction

Community violence reduction is a bottom-up approach that helps to eliminate the main drivers of violence in communities by providing alternatives to recruitment into armed groups and building social cohesion. It includes a wide range of activities from labour-intensive projects to community dialogue forums.

DDR support to mediation

DDR practitioners can provide support to the drafting of DDR provisions in ceasefires and political agreements. They can also make proposals on the design and implementation of DDR programmes, provide advice on how to engage armed forces and groups on DDR issues, and contribute to the attainment of agreements.

DDR support to transitional security arrangements

DDR practitioners can provide support to the establishment of security-related confidence building measures as part of ongoing negotiations, ceasefire or peace agreements. This can include the temporary establishment of legitimate non-state security providers or of mixed patrols and units made up of both state and non-state armed forces and groups.

Source: Integrated DDR Standards
4.6.2 Benchmarks

**Short-term**

- Mechanisms established under civilian lead to maximize national ownership.
- Funding secured to enable execution of the process; technical experts available to provide support; and key sites secured and/or constructed.
- Public information and other outreach programmes conducted.
- Security guarantees coordinated with the host government to provide adequate security.
- Planning for reintegration undertaken.
- Monitoring and evaluation tools developed.

**Medium-term**

- Public order restored.
- Decrease in the number of incidents involving the use of prohibited weapons.
- Programme is supported by the majority of the key factions, communities into which ex-combatants have been reintegrated and the general public.
- Re-recruitment of ex-combatants is prevented, and first-time recruitment of at-risk youth is prevented.
- Traffic and movement of weapons and related materiel are under control.
- Border controls in place to prevent influx of new weapons and materiel.

**Long-term**

- Government has control of national security forces and their use of force.
- Weapons controls enforced in accordance with the rule of law.
- Ex-combatants are largely reintegrated.
- State stockpiles of weapons secured to prevent leakage of weapons into society.
4.6.3 Responsibilities and coordination

Political will among the national parties concerned is an absolute prerequisite for the success of DDR programmes, and the SRSG should actively foster political support for DDR among key stakeholders. The SRSG and MLT should support the programme in accordance with established working mechanisms and in collaboration with the relevant UN and external partners, including key donors. Public information efforts carried out by the mission’s strategic communications and public information department is essential.

Since many local and international implementation partners may be both delivering humanitarian assistance to civilians and provide support for DDR, coordinated planning between humanitarian and DDR programmes is important. DDR occurs in multiple and overlapping planning frameworks. Where peacebuilding and recovery involve a number of national and international stakeholders, the DDR process should be part of national and international recovery strategies. UN Country Teams, the World Bank, the IMF, bilateral donors and national authorities must all be part of the coordination process.

4.6.4 Resources

The mission’s DDR component should include staff with specialized expertise (e.g. planning, monitoring and evaluation, logistics, gender mainstreaming and child protection). Military and police liaison officers should also be seconded to the DDR component. In peacekeeping operations, the military component should be able to contribute to a DDR programme in a number of ways (e.g. through logistical support, provision of security, information gathering and provision of specialized weapons and ammunition management expertise). Full engagement by the Mission Support section in DDR programmes is also essential.

Some partners’ ability to assist may be limited by their mandate. Many humanitarian and development organizations, for instance, cannot work with combatants until they have been demobilized. Careful consideration should be given to how best to make use of such partners’ assistance while respecting their mandates or other factors that may limit their work.

In a peacekeeping context, funding from peacekeeping assessed contributions can be used to cover disarmament and demobilization (including reinsertion) operations, while voluntary contributions from donors cover reintegration activities. This diversity of funding sources has at times resulted in a gap between disarmament and demobilization—both relatively easy to fund, plan and implement—and
reintegration, which is dependent on willingness of donors and on expertise and conditions that are not always present in a timely manner in a post-conflict environment. This gap can be minimized through DDR-related programmatic activities (e.g. community violence-reduction projects), and by ensuring long-term reintegration programmes are properly planned with donors, and adequately resourced from the outset.

The inclusion of reinsertion funding as a part of demobilization allows assessed contributions to be used to provide participants with transitional assistance for a period of up to one year. The goal of ensuring that warring factions can return to civilian life may require direct assistance for demobilized combatants as well as local communities.

4.6.5 Challenges and risks

- Lack of political will and/or host government does not accept ownership of the programme.
- Lack of comprehensive peace agreement/political settlement; not all armed groups are party to the peace agreement.
- Relationship with the host government on the issue of child soldiers may need to be managed carefully, particularly if state security forces include children.
- Girls may be recruited by armed forces for combat or support roles; their gender and place in society mean they are vulnerable to consequences such as rape, sexual violence, pregnancy and stigma that may be overlooked in demobilization efforts.
- Military and police components, which may be authorized to use force, may not have clear guidance or training on what to do when engaging with child soldiers using lethal force.
- Combatants do not sign up to DDR.
- National actors/local communities have limited capacity to support reintegration.
- DDR benefits are perceived as inequitable.
- Disarmed and demobilized factions possess inadequate skills for reintegration, and there is inadequate funding for reintegration.
- Supply of arms and related materiel cannot be controlled.
- Security of demobilized belligerents and their families cannot be guaranteed, and reinsertion programmes appear to reward ex-combatants in preference to their victims.
4.6.6 Considerations

**Providing credible security guarantees at the expense of other mission mandate priorities**

The provision of credible security guarantees is essential if combatants are to give up their weapons. The peacekeeping force should have the capacity to provide security throughout all phases of DDR, not least at cantonment sites as well as the home communities of demobilized combatants, while paying close attention to the balance of power among factions. This must be balanced against the other demands on the mission’s security resources, such as POC.

International support can lend credibility to these efforts by overseeing disarmament and demobilization or participating in a national oversight commission to ensure that disarmament rates among rivals are comparable. This support should also ensure that disarmament violations are investigated and corrected.

**Complete or conditional disarmament**

Complete disarmament may not be immediately acceptable to all parties. Ideally, the extent of disarmament should have been addressed during the drafting of the relevant agreements. A broad range of short- and long-term activities should accompany this process, such as community-based weapons collection and control programmes, weapons destruction, the re-establishment of domestic legal systems to control and regulate the possession, production and supply of weapons, and securing stockpiles to prevent the leakage of arms into society.

**Balancing accountability and stability**

Coordination and sequencing of transitional justice and DDR programmes begins with an understanding of how the two processes can interact positively in the short term in ways that, at a minimum, do not hinder their respective objectives of accountability and stability.
Reintegration and local capacity

While international actors and donors often show great enthusiasm for disarmament and demobilization programmes, their commitment to the long and costly reintegration process may be less certain or too hesitant. Shortages of resources have frequently hampered reintegration efforts in the past. Successful reintegration requires the prompt and sustained commitment of financial and technical assistance over many years.

Another reintegration challenge involves preparing and convincing host communities to accept ex-combatants into their neighbourhoods. In particular, programmes should avoid displacing women who may have assumed head-of-household responsibilities during the conflict.

Inclusive or exclusive treatment

While ex-combatants may need special attention to prevent them from becoming a destabilizing factor, paying exclusive attention to them risks generating resentment in the broader population. Other groups, such as refugees, IDPs, women and children, require substantial social and economic support.

Security should be balanced with equity. As far as possible, strategies for ex-combatants should be integrated with broader strategies to address resettlement and rehabilitation for displaced populations, reconciliation efforts, the rule of law and governance issues. This will also help prevent ex-combatants being stigmatized or isolated from the rest of the community. The peacekeeping mission runs the risk of losing its impartiality if this task is not performed carefully.

Balancing rapid disarmament and a long-term approach

The long-term approach required of DDR is sometimes offset by the short-term political or security imperative to rapidly disarm combatants that pose an immediate threat to peace. If disarmament is rushed and not planned carefully, it could have serious negative consequences at a later stage, especially if reintegration is not well planned and resourced.
Demobilization and reintegration of child soldiers in the state security sector

This may be a sensitive topic with the host government. In many conflict and post-conflict contexts, children may have been forcibly recruited to serve in the national armed forces. Similarly, other armed groups are likely to rely on children. While the peacekeeping mission has a responsibility to report any grave violations, it will need to consider whether, and if so how, it engages with the state security sector where these violations are taking place.
Chapter 5.
Strengthening the Rule of Law

SUMMARY
A rule-of-law environment exists when all persons, institutions and entities (public and private), including the state, are held accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated. The mission, in close cooperation with the host government, has both a responsibility and the capacity to influence how quickly and firmly the state is able to recover and extend its authority, legitimacy and capacity to apply equitable laws in a fair manner. This requires a comprehensive understanding of the actors involved in the rule of law, including those who provide security, policing and judicial services; those who manage those services; and those who hold service providers to account. The MLT therefore plays a crucial role in crafting a comprehensive and holistic approach to strengthening the rule of law. Where there is non-state service delivery of security and justice, regardless of who provides security or justice services, they should equally be held accountable to the law and formal governance structures. All actions should be carried out in close consultation with all parties to the peace process as well as with civil society. Strategies should be needs-based and long term, and donors should be encouraged to remain engaged and stay the course.

This chapter discusses a set of seven operational-level outputs, each with its own set of activities, risks and benchmarks, which together contribute to the overall outcome of strengthening the rule of law:

1. Human Rights and Protection Promoted. This output reflects the centrality of human rights in the work of the UN system. It is essential to maintain a strong spirit of partnership on all human rights issues within the UN and with other humanitarian, development, political and related actors. The MLT should be aware, however, that the promotion of human rights may at times, from a short-term perspective, leave the mission torn between difficult questions of peace versus justice. This illustrates one of the core leadership considerations on polarities, whereby both peace and justice should be supported and neither neglected.
2. **Legal Framework Strengthened.** This output highlights the tendency of conflict to weaken legal frameworks over time, ranging most commonly from usurping or destroying institutional infrastructures to simply undermining their effectiveness through authoritarian control. A strong legal framework based on the rule of law and the principles of human rights provides a mechanism by which a state frames its laws in response to the will of the people. This forms the foundation for an effective rule of law environment.

3. **Justice Sector Strengthened.** This output emphasises the importance of a sound and well-respected judicial sector, supporting reform of the police and corrections services, to a transition to a sustainable peace. It requires, among other things, a national comprehensive security strategy recognizing the linkages between justice and security. Needs assessment and mapping will identify the many activities required to support judicial reform. As capacity building in the justice sector takes time, there may be pressure for rapid justice to meet public expectations and provide evidence of reform. A balance must be found between initiating a judicial reform process that responds to the needs assessment and the capability of the host government and population to absorb the reforms.

4. **Security Sector Strengthened.** This output stresses the need for the establishment and maintenance of effective, accountable and sustainable security services, within a framework of the rule of law and respect for human rights, in order to assure long-term security and the rule of law. This sector includes police, corrections, defence and the governance of these institutions. This is a complex and highly political process, involving contentious issues such as governance and accountability, which are often linked to the structural causes of the conflict. It will often lead to questions of national sovereignty and tensions between the mission and the host country and donors. Early on in the peace process, discussion is required with national, regional and international actors on how the mission will support SSR efforts and the most appropriate mechanisms for guiding, implementing and monitoring these activities.

5. **Police and other Law-Enforcement Sectors Strengthened.** This output underlines the importance of an adequate level of policing and other law enforcement, without which it is impossible to reinforce the rule of law or achieve sustainable peace and security. Police and other law-enforcement agencies are the most visible expression of governmental authority. Transition to police responsibility for law and order, away from the military, is an important step towards re-establishing the rule of law and signals to a population that the government is re-establishing the rule of law within a human rights framework.

6. **Corrections System Strengthened.** This output draws attention to the non-existent or weak security and poor conditions in post-conflict corrections systems, which generally result in violations of prisoners' basic human rights and a lack of coherence between the elements of the criminal justice system. A corrections system that conducts itself in a humane, fair and coherent manner gains public trust, legitimacy and international respect. The corrections system must be the partner of strengthened legislative, judicial, police and other law-enforcement agencies as evidence of a legitimate and credible rule of law.
7. **Defence Sector Professionalized.** This output points to the fact that it is of critical importance that the military re-establishes its credibility in the eyes of the public and the international community, especially if it has been implicated in conflict. The ultimate goal of professionalizing the defence sector is civilian control of the military. Professionalizing the defence sector should not simply aim at rebuilding troop levels and training military actors; it implies the holistic reconstruction and development of both the armed and non-armed elements of the defence sector, as well as its civilianized governance structures, including with regard to normative values and traditions.

Inevitably, these seven outputs, which go to the heart of a nation’s sovereignty, are deeply sensitive and often long term in nature. As such they generate numerous polarities, articulated as **considerations** which, however difficult, must be recognized and managed. For example:

» Balancing the relationship with the host state and the peace process with the need to report/denounce human rights violations, especially when perpetrated by the host government.

» Balancing international standards through external and donor support with the ownership expediency of local customs, religions and laws.

» Balancing the need for representative legislative and legal and judicial frameworks for the whole of society, including minorities, while advancing the reform process with the elite structures of governance.

» Managing the need and demand for results with the fact that reform related to the rule of law is a long-term process without a fixed end date.

» Supporting national ownership while incorporating principles of good governance, accountability and respect for human rights.

» Supporting what is effective and works while promoting what is right. In this sector this is often seen as a balance between credibility and legitimacy.
Strengthening the Rule of Law with Respect for Human Rights

A rule-of-law environment exists when all persons, institutions and entities (public and private), including the state, are held accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. The rule of law serves to uphold human rights and justice; good governance of the security sector is thus an essential pillar of the rule of law. In creating this environment, the supremacy of the law, equality before the law and accountability to the law should be demonstrated in a transparent manner, both legally and procedurally.

The mission, in close cooperation with the host government, has both a responsibility and the capacity to influence how quickly and firmly the state is able to recover and extend its authority, legitimacy and capacity to apply equitable laws in a fair manner. More specifically, the role of the MLT in strengthening the rule of law is likely to include:

- supporting political dialogue on rule of law (security and justice) needs, norms and standards;
- supporting national assessment of needs, gaps and capacity, in relation to international standards and good practice;
- supporting development of national strategies in relation to the security of the state and its people, with a focus on the effectiveness and accountability of security and justice; and
- facilitating international support.

This requires a comprehensive understanding of the actors involved in the rule of law, including those who provide security, policing and judicial services; those who manage those services; and those who hold service providers to account. The MLT therefore plays a crucial role in crafting a comprehensive and holistic approach to strengthening the rule of law. Where there is non-state service delivery of security and justice, regardless of who provides security or justice services, they should equally be held accountable to the law and formal governance structures. All actions should be carried out in close consultation with all parties to the peace process as well as with civil society. Strategies should be needs based and long term, and donors should be encouraged to remain engaged and stay the course. Capacity building on the rule of law should include the full spectrum of functions and institutions that administer justice, such as ministries, police and other law-enforcement agencies, prosecuting authorities, public defenders’ offices, courts, prisons,

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oversight bodies, law-reform agencies and legal-education institutions. SSR is inextricably linked to strengthening the rule of law. Implementing institutional reforms is a complex change-management process and is inherently political. Each function of the criminal justice system requires internal institutional capabilities that include human resources, budgeting, logistics, administration and training.

Recognition by the mission of the critical importance of local ownership at all levels of the system and all stages of the process will enable the provision of a functional and relevant rule-of-law environment. At times, however, this recognition needs to be balanced with a certain level of intrusiveness in order to help combat corruption and strengthen institutional integrity and accountability of the police and other law-enforcement agencies that would otherwise derail rule-of-law and SSR efforts.

Supporting the rule of law also depends on interactions with informal justice systems, non-state actors and the general population. In fact, non-state actors and informal institutions may offer many of the services that the state is unable or unwilling to provide. The MLT therefore needs to understand the culture, and cooperate with those systems which already exist and have credibility with the population. In order to create the conditions for success in strengthening the rule of law, prioritization of activities that yield medium- and long-term results is critical.

The MLT may wish to consider the following in determining priorities:

• Is the environment safe and secure?
• Who is providing justice and security?
• Does the country have the capability to absorb reform initiatives?
• Are there active spoilers who can destabilize the environment and how can they be managed?
• Is there a geographic area that can support the rule of law reform process without it being derailed by spoilers, and where a quick win may help build confidence in the reform?
• Is the host government stable enough to undertake reform, and is there ownership for the reforms or can it be stimulated?
• Is the rule of law responsive to the gendered perceptions of security, law and order, and other social, economic and administrative issues?
• Are the police and other law-enforcement agencies able to maintain law and order/public order within a framework of human rights?
• Are there some areas of justice and SSR that need to be addressed before reform in other areas can begin?
Ultimately, strengthening the rule of law is necessary for a sustainable peace and a smooth transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding and, while a long-term process, should be part of mission planning from the outset.

**Preconditions for success**

- All significant parties to the conflict have signed a peace agreement and have shown commitment to its implementation.
- A comprehensive needs assessment and a peace and conflict analysis constitute the basis for configuring prioritized and sequenced support.
- A sufficient level of willingness on the part of the host state to carry out justice and security reform is displayed.
- Bilateral donors have agreed to support the strengthening of the rule of law with adequate resources in a harmonized and coordinated way.

**Benchmarks**

- A strong legal framework provides guarantees on non-discrimination consistent with international human rights norms.
- The roles of women and minorities have been factored into development of a legislative framework that is also responsive to local concerns, traditions, culture, knowledge and history.
- A public administration that is rules-based and accountable, with adequate systems of appeal in place.
- A strong and independent judicial sector able to withstand external pressures from a variety of actors.
- Separation of powers is in place and checks and balances have been framed to ensure fair and equitable interpretation of laws.
- A strengthened police and other law-enforcement sector is responsive to the needs of the population, with consideration for women and minorities regardless of political actors.
- A reformed and strengthened corrections system consistent with UN human rights standards.
- Structural mechanisms and mediation processes for the peaceful resolution of conflicts have been established.
- Functioning internal and external oversight and accountability mechanisms are in place.
Outputs

In summary, the seven perational outputs that contribute to a strengthened rule of law are:

1. Human Rights and Protection Promoted
2. Legal Framework Strengthened
3. Justice Sector Strengthened
4. Security Sector Strengthened
5. Police and other Law-enforcement Sectors Strengthened
6. Corrections System Strengthened
7. Defence Sector Professionalized
5.1 Human Rights and Protection Promoted

Human rights are at the centre of the work of the United Nations. They are one of the three mutually reinforcing pillars of the UN system, alongside development, and peace and security.

Human rights principles, information and analysis should inform a UN peace operation’s strategic planning. All peace operations personnel have a responsibility to ensure that human rights are promoted, respected and protected through and within operations in the field. The HoM and the MLT are accountable for ensuring that the promotion and protection of human rights is instilled as a fundamental principle of peace operations and that all staff are aware of their human rights responsibilities (see 1.3.2: A human rights mindset). If UN personnel (whether military, police or civilian) commit human rights abuses, they must be held accountable. Alleged human rights abuses that are brought to the attention of the HoM and/or the MLT by victims, witnesses or other sources, should be shared with the Conduct and Discipline section and investigated.

The UN’s HRDDP specifies that before providing any support to a non-UN security force, the mission must first conduct an assessment of the potential risks and benefits involved. This assessment must include considerations of the human rights record of the intended recipient of support and the adequacy of the measures put in place to prevent human rights violations.

Human Rights sections in missions

The Human Rights section helps mainstream human rights across all mission activities and leads the human rights-related work of other components of the mission. It conducts monitoring, investigations, assessments, reporting, advocacy and interventions; gives human rights advice; and provides support for institutional reform and capacity building to host governments.

The Head of the Human Rights section acts as the human rights adviser to the HoM and as the representative of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in the area of operation. They are responsible for keeping the both the High Commissioner and OHCHR informed, as well as for consulting with them on key policy and operational issues and developments. As such, the Head of the Human Rights section has dual reporting obligations with regards to the HoM and the High Commissioner.

The MLT should also meet regularly with national and international human rights organizations, civil society and host-state authorities in
order to ensure transparent dialogue on the human rights situation. It is now standard operating practice for missions to issue jointly produced and regular public reports on issues of human rights concern. The MLT should also solicit feedback on the impact of the mission’s work in promoting and protecting human rights. In addition, human rights monitoring and investigations should feed into the mission’s work related to evaluation, training and assessment, and advice on the formulation of legislation.

In addition to the Human Rights section, a number of other sections can play a significant role in the promotion and protection of human rights, not least the Child Protection section, which is usually established and operated in close coordination with the SRSG for Children and Armed Conflict and the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF). Other relevant sections include Gender, and Rule of Law. Some operations also benefit from dedicated components that address specific aspects of transitional justice. It is essential to maintain a strong spirit of partnership on human rights issues within the UN and with other humanitarian, development, political and related actors. The MLT should be aware, however, that the promotion of human rights may at times, from a short-term perspective, leave the mission torn between difficult questions of peace versus justice. This illustrates one of the core leadership considerations on polarities, whereby both peace and justice should be supported and neither neglected.

Conflict and post-conflict situations typically exacerbate levels of risk to which women are exposed. Conversely, women have a distinctive and important role to play in promoting human rights and achieving sustainable peace. Although these issues are widely understood and accepted, they are not always acted on or may even be overlooked due to misconceived “gender-blind” approaches to human rights.

Conflict-related sexual violence

Sexual violence frequently occurs during armed conflict or in fragile states, particularly when ill-disciplined military or police forces or other armed groups believe they can act with impunity. CRSV consists of violent acts of a sexual nature, such as rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity against women, men, girls or boys.

CRSV is a crime against international human rights law, criminal law and refugee law. It can be centrally orchestrated as part of a deliberate campaign of terror against a specific group, and as such can be part of a genocidal effort or mass atrocity with the purpose of destroying families
and communities or supporting ethnic cleansing of an area. It may also occur in a more decentralized manner due to a general lack of discipline within units, or due to a general lack of security and stability.

The mission should solicit women’s views regarding CRSV and, if they do not already exist, it may be possible to facilitate the creation of women’s groups to provide insights on CRSV and other issues. Women’s groups, NGOs, the media and CSOs can increase awareness, generate the communal interest to eliminate CRSV, conduct local activities, implement and strengthen local norms in accordance with international standards, share information, form coalitions, and advocate to generate political pressure to eliminate CRSV. However, it should be noted that discussing or dealing with CRSV and SGBV is culturally taboo in many cultures. Working in the context of such cultures can be particularly challenging and context awareness and locally anchored approaches to prevention methods should be adopted.

Preventing and combating CRSV and SGBV are multi-dimensional activities and demand the integrated capacity of the UN system. The UN system will normally establish a sub-cluster or working group to address SGBV and CRSV in all aspects of the response. The need to deploy sufficient numbers of uniformed women in the military and police components is an essential prerequisite. UNPOL may deploy specialized teams consisting of a limited number of experts with special skills in areas such as investigations and SGBV. It is essential that the UN itself does not compound the situation by ill-discipline and predatory behaviour against the population; and here the MLT supported by the mission’s Conduct and Discipline section must be alert (see 1.3.4: Conduct of personnel).

**Child protection**

Children have particular needs as a consequence of conflict. Provisions for the protection of children are included in several peace operations mandates. Children may have been mobilized or recruited into armed forces at a young age, been the victims of sexual violence, or be parties to or the victim of killings, maiming or abduction. They may also lack access to humanitarian relief or child-sensitive DDR programmes. As a consequence, actions will need to be taken to address any abuses committed against children by armed groups, and to identify and support the needs of children affected by conflict, through humanitarian assistance, relocation, reunion with family members, reintegration programmes, education and

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**Key UN Policies & Guidance**

UN Policy: Mainstreaming the protection, rights and well-being of children affected by armed conflict within UN Peacekeeping Operations

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other forms of support. Peace operations also have a role to play in early-warning of signs of attempted recruitment and the use of child soldiers, as well as in reporting grave violations against children.

With support of child-protection advisers, the MLT must identify—jointly with UNICEF, the UNCT and national actors as appropriate—the child-protection priorities in the mission area. This may require advocacy with national actors and other partners. Peacekeeping personnel should not conduct interviews with children, take pictures of child survivors or give money. Grave violations against children should be referred to child-protection advisers and other experts to manage.

### 5.1.1 Operational activities

Key operational activities in support of this output include:

- Conducting regular monitoring of the human rights situation, which involves active collection, verification, analysis and use of information to prevent and address human rights violations.
- Conducting in-depth investigations into serious human rights violations or emblematic cases where appropriate and where possible, with reliable national actors, to document the widespread or systematic nature of such incidents.
- Monitoring and reporting any grave violations of children’s rights, such as killing and maiming, the recruitment and use of children, abduction, sexual violence, attacks against schools and hospitals, and denial of humanitarian access.
- Conducting threat and vulnerability assessments for specific groups (e.g. women, children, IDPs and minorities) to advise the mission on protection responses that could prevent further incidents.
- Incorporating human rights and protection concerns (e.g. the protection of women and children) into mission planning processes.
- Preventing human rights violations through mission-wide early-warning mechanisms.
- Establishing joint-protection teams consisting of military, police and civilian components and deploying human rights or multidisciplinary mobile teams to remote areas where necessary and possible.
- Conducting regular proactive patrols.
- Ensuring appropriate security conditions to guarantee temporary

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demilitarized zones intended to allow the safe transit of humanitarian aid into, and/or refugees out of, a crisis region.

• Undertaking advocacy and intervention actions at local, national and/or international levels to address human rights concerns, for instance through quiet diplomacy or public statements.

• In conjunction with the OHCHR, issuing public reports on human rights issues in the country; and supporting institutional reform and capacity building by working closely with and advising the host government and civil society.

• Monitoring all detentions by UN personnel and obtain unconditional access to detained persons held in UN premises at all times, as well as to all documents relating to the taking, handling and management of detained persons.

5.1.2 Benchmarks

Short-term

• Monitoring and reporting mechanisms and processes established for grave violations.

• The mission’s strategic planning and policies are informed by human rights principles, information and analysis.

• Strategic communications plan formulated and implemented.

• Main roads and volatile areas such as markets, water points, and schools are patrolled.

• Cross-cutting protection concerns incorporated into mission planning processes, and mainstreamed into mission activities, including the work of military and police components.

• Integrated coordination mechanisms on cross-cutting protection issues established within the mission.

Medium-term

• Devise and implement strategies to prevent and respond to CRSV and SGBV.

• Ensure accountability for violations, and remedies for CRSV and SGBV victims.

• Support and develop civil society’s ability to monitor the human rights situation and promote change, assist victims and develop human rights programmes.
Long-term

- Empower the host population to assert and claim its human rights.
- Enable state and other national institutions to fulfil their human rights obligations.
- Provide human rights training to state authorities, schools and teachers.
- Assist in the development and implementation of National Human Rights Action Plans.

5.1.3 Responsibilities and coordination

Within the mission, the Human Rights section is responsible for promoting and implementing the necessary human rights required by the mandate. The head of the Human Rights section must have effective direct access to the MLT and be part of the integrated senior management group and other relevant decision-making bodies, including the SMT (albeit as the OHCHR designate) and operational planning bodies.

5.1.4 Resources

The MLT should ensure that sufficient resources are available in the mission budget to facilitate human rights efforts more widely.

5.1.5 Challenges and risks

- Expectations of the local population exceed ability and capability of the mission to prevent egregious violence against civilians.
- Local consent could be jeopardized by the scope and content of the required mitigation measures.
- A lack of local capability to internalize mapping and vetting processes might lead to these processes losing credibility.
- Insufficient engagement by host-country decision makers in designing and implementing monitoring and evaluation mechanisms could hamper effective benchmarking.
- Corruption and political affiliations could hamper reforms.
5.1.6 Considerations

**Balancing host–state relations and the peace process against the obligation to report human rights violations**

There will always be a tension between the duty to speak out and the need to advance a peace process. Peace and justice are two important objectives in any mission and can represent a polarity which must be managed either by e.g. silent diplomacy or by long-term “light” advocacy for human rights.

**Balancing the need to support local security forces in assuming responsibilities against the need to advance and protect human rights standards**

Another tension may occur between the need for the local forces to represent the host government’s willingness and ability to exercise its monopoly on the legitimate use of force and the need for the mission to comply with HRDDP. There should be a balance between expediency and mapping and vetting that will reinforce the legitimacy and credibility of the process among civil society. Therefore, engagement with representatives from the local forces at all levels, as well as groups representing different sectors of the population, such as minorities and women, will have to be balanced against short-term security interests.

**Balancing the interests of and relationships between the host government and civil society groups**

The host government and civil society groups may sometimes be in conflict with each other. Maintaining a good relationship with both is essential for realizing the mission’s short-, medium- and long-term human rights benchmarks. It is therefore important to be aware of this dynamic when initiating new cooperation or activities.
5.2 Legal Framework Strengthened

Conflict can destroy institutional infrastructures or simply weaken their effectiveness. A strong legal framework based on the rule of law and principles of human rights provides a mechanism by which a state frames its laws in response to the people’s will. This is the foundation of an effective rule-of-law environment. Legal frameworks that discriminate against certain segments of a population, and/or fail to pass laws that promote rights of all citizens, can also contribute to conflict. Legal frameworks should be internally consistent while adapted to cultural norms and ensure the equitable participation of women and minorities.

5.2.1 Operational activities

The key operational activities in support of this output include:

• Assessing needs and mapping existing legislative frameworks.
• Supporting legislative reform.
• Coordinating donor support.
• Raising public awareness using strategic communications campaigns.
• Engaging with civil society, including women’s and minority groups.

5.2.2 Benchmarks

Short-term

• Needs assessment and mapping of legislative frameworks completed.
• Donors and areas of engagement identified.
• Planning with host government on needs for legislative reform carried out, and obstacles to reforms identified.

Medium-term

• Plans for legislative reform initiated by host government, including the participation of minorities and women.
• Donor support prioritized.
• Popular support for reform observed.

Long-term

• Legislative reform implemented.
• Civil society support strengthened.
• Constitutional processes initiated.
5.2.3 Responsibilities and coordination

Within the mission, MLT members are responsible for promoting the rule of law with their respective national counterparts while balancing local ownership against the goals of the mission. The host government has ultimate responsibility for devising rule-of-law frameworks that respond to the local or national environment. Coordinating efforts will be difficult and the MLT will be required to manage tensions. Continued political engagement on the part of the MLT will also be needed to support legislative reforms.

5.2.4 Resources

Sufficient expertise and resources must be allocated to support the mandated tasks. The MLT should do its utmost to generate donor interest, as well as to encourage sustained support for this sector. Long-term success also depends on continued political engagement, as well as continued donor support through the provision of the financial and material support required to sustain a successful reform process.

5.2.5 Challenges and risks

- International actors could seek to impose legal systems that are inappropriate to the local context, or local consent may be jeopardized by the pace and style of legislative reform.
- A lack of local capability to absorb legislative reforms might lead to a loss of legitimacy or credibility.
- Insufficient engagement and ownership by host-country stakeholders in designing and implementing monitoring and evaluation mechanisms could hamper effective benchmarking and long-term results.
- Tensions between the MLT and the host government might affect the implementation of plans or priorities for overarching legislative reform.
- Local laws, traditional justice as well as customary and religious systems, while having popular support, might clash with international human rights norms and standards.
- Corruption and political affiliations could distort the course of reforms.
5.2.6 Considerations

Timeframe required for legislative reform

The short-term need to meet budgetary cycles, as well as donor and local expectations of observable change, will have to be balanced against the realization that sustainable legislative reform is a long-term process. If the reform process is rushed and fails to factor in variables such as cultural norms, gender perspectives and citizen participation, the outcomes from the process will not be sustainable. If the reform represents a substantive shift from previous legislative frameworks, and the MLT is not sensitive to the time factor, spoilers may simply wait out the mission or begin to challenge its legitimacy and credibility. Finally, building the capacity of the existing legislative frameworks to adapt to or absorb change may require time.

Balancing international norms against local customs, religions and laws

In implementing legislative and judicial reforms, there may be a discord between international standards and local customary and religious systems and their formal legislation, for example regarding women’s access to voting, inheritance, land ownership, and so on. Precipitous or over-zealous encouragement of legislative reforms to conform to international norms may create negative tension between the MLT, the host government and elements of the population.

Balancing the need for representative legislative frameworks against elite structures of governance

Another trade-off may occur between the need for legislative frameworks to represent the whole of society, including minorities and women, and responding only to those who hold power. While support from those in power is imperative to drive the reform process forward, responding only to those in power is unlikely to ensure the desired outcome. There should be a balance between expediency and legislative reform that will reinforce the legitimacy and credibility of the process. Engagement with advocacy groups representing different sectors of the population, such as minorities and women, will have to be balanced against the interests of those in power.
5.3 Justice Sector Strengthened

A sound and well-respected judicial sector linked to the police and corrections departments is a vital element in a country’s transition to sustainable peace. A strengthened justice sector will support reform of the police and corrections services. Thus, a national comprehensive security strategy recognizing the linkages between justice and security is necessary. Furthermore, foreign direct investment for development and commercial growth will prefer to operate in jurisdictions where the predictability and the integrity of the justice system are not in doubt.

While the focus may be on criminal justice, issues of civil justice (e.g. family and inheritance law, land reform and commercial law, as well as constitutional and administrative law) can be critical structural factors in reducing the incidence of crime and disorder. If civil disputes are not addressed, they can escalate into unrest or even violent conflict. If, however, citizens trust that the judicial system will not try and punish them arbitrarily, but will instead apply justice evenly and fairly, this also engenders trust in the host government and the entire justice system.

The international community should assess whether, with its comprehensive support, national counterparts would be willing and able to confront systemic threats to the judicial sector and thus to the rule of law. A mismatch between the degree of threat to judicial reform and the rule of law, and the authority and resources afforded the mission, is a prescription for failure. For example, it is not unusual for police reform to outpace judicial reform. This is unwise and negatively impacts all reforms.

The MLT is only one actor among those supporting judicial reform. The mission’s role as championing and supporting the national coordination of an overarching process will help add legitimacy and credibility to both the mission and the host government. Other international actors will remain engaged in judicial sector reform long after the peacekeeping mission has ended. The MLT may therefore find it useful to engage with them early on, in order to support and help coordinate all efforts. A strengthened judicial sector is a critical part of peacebuilding.

Based on the needs assessment and mapping, the MLT team will be aware of the many activities required to support judicial reform. As capacity building takes time, there may be pressure for rapid justice to meet public expectations. The MLT will have to consider which activities will avoid destabilizing the peace process while, at the same time, providing evidence of reform. The MLT will also need to strike a balance between initiating a judicial reform process that responds to the needs assessment and the host government’s capacity to absorb the reforms.
In meeting the requirement for rapid justice, the MLT may need to consider whether this requirement can be met using interim justice mechanisms or by supporting customary law, both of which can be extremely sensitive.

The expectations of the host country and the international community are likely to create tensions that the MLT will have to manage to avoid losing the support of either the host government or donors, whose long-term engagement is critical. Quick wins that demonstrate change might result in increased patience or tolerance that will provide the leverage needed to create sustainable judicial reform. The unintended consequence may be a quick win that does not meet the requirements for sustainable judicial reform in the longer term.

### 5.3.1 Operational activities

The key operational activities of the mission in support of this output include:

- Conducting needs assessments and mapping existing judicial mechanisms, including traditional, customary and/or non-state mechanisms.
- Promoting judicial and prosecutorial independence, professionalism, accountability and transparency through improved management and oversight.
- Promoting effective enforcement of laws and equitable access to justice, including support for independent public defenders’ offices for the most excluded members of society.
- Raising public awareness through information campaigns, ensuring that civil society perspectives are included, especially with regard to women and minorities.
5.3.2 Benchmarks

**Short-term**

- Needs assessment and mapping completed.
- Judges and all state officials in sector are paid.
- Obstacles to reform identified.
- Environment for judicial reform created.
- Public information campaign planned and implemented.

**Medium-term**

- Decrease in the number of people being detained illegally without a court appearance.
- Vetting processes for prosecutors/defence lawyers, discipline and judicial appointment systems supported through secondments and international partnerships.
- Budget and staffing requirements analysed.
- Donors coordinated to minimize overlap.
- Judges, prosecutors, defence lawyers and court administrators held accountable in transparent processes.
- Increased access to, and use of, justice mechanisms, particularly for women and minorities, and increased representation of women in the judicial sector.

**Long-term**

- The judiciary is independent and free from politicization of its financial affairs and the selection, promotion and disciplining of judges.
- Judges, prosecutors and lawyers are held accountable for misconduct without any international involvement.
- The legal profession adheres to rigorous standards of conduct.
- The justice system performs essential criminal and civil law functions effectively.
- Measures to protect human rights, such as a human rights commission or ombudsman, are effective.
5.3.3 Responsibilities and coordination

The host government retains the lead role in ensuring that a strengthened judicial sector enforces the legal codes developed by the legislative body. Within the mission, the MLT is responsible for balancing local ownership of the judicial sector against the goals of the mission. In most instances, the MLT can support the strengthening of a judicial sector by providing political leadership and facilitating the coordination of long-term donor support. By championing and coordinating, the MLT can help create a political environment in which judicial reform can prevail over time.

A major factor in supporting the creation of legitimacy and credibility in the judicial sector is mitigating the risks inherent in the timeframe for achieving the mandated tasks related to judicial reform, while not jeopardizing the local ownership of and public support for judicial reform. Linking with women’s and minority groups that advocate on behalf of equitable access to justice and overall judicial reform will also be a critical area for coordination.

5.3.4 Resources

Sufficient resources and expertise should be allocated to support the strengthening of the judicial sector. Key national experts with knowledge, skills and abilities, and international expertise in the relationship between culture, context, law and balancing what is possible in the given circumstance will be important for mentoring and supporting judicial reform. Personnel will be needed within the mission with experience and expertise in political, legal and human rights mentoring and advice. The long-term nature of judicial reform requires sustained donor assistance.
5.3.5 Challenges and risks

- The potential clash between national and international norms on judicial reform.
- A shattered or non-existent formal legal system lacks sufficient actors to undertake the breadth of measures required.
- A weak civil society is unable to contribute to judicial reform, which limits judicial legitimacy and credibility.
- Organized crime and corruption with ties to political power influence reform of the judicial sector.
- The logistical and resource challenges of undertaking large-scale changes to court administration and management.
- Weak national management and/or leadership culture.
- Integration of marginalized and vulnerable groups is challenged.

5.3.6 Considerations

Balancing political stability against the accountability of judicial sector

Political and criminal influence over the judicial sector is an obstacle to the rule of law. However, tackling this may have political consequences that could destabilize the peace process. In times of conflict, a variety of interests (e.g. legal, political and economic) are often implicated in criminal activity, which can have an effect on post-conflict recovery and judicial reform. The hasty removal of judges, for example, can create a vacuum in power structures, which may have a longer-term negative impact on strengthening judicial reform.

Balancing results and time

Judicial reform is a long-term process without a fixed end date. The need for results on the part of the mission and the donor community should be balanced against the time and local skills required to build judicial reform that is responsive to culture, context and capacity.
The absence of a strong professional legal community (i.e. judges, prosecutors, defence lawyers, court managers) results in undue reliance on international experts who are not likely to be engaged in the long-term development of a judicial core that can implement the judicial reform processes. At the same time, the short-term expedient use of international expertise may help prevent detention for extended periods while local expertise is developed.

Addressing entrenched corruption while supporting judicial reform

There are often ties between organized crime and corruption, especially when the host government has not paid judges and other staff employed in the judicial sector. Corrupt practices often become the standard means through which the population gains access to justice. If this practice is generally accepted, there are likely to be fewer incentives for—and greater resistance to—reform of the judicial sector. For the host country, there is often substantial resistance to changing institutionalized corruption.

Supporting local or international norms

Strongly developed traditional forms of justice, which have met the needs of the local population, often exist in a post-conflict environment. These sometimes fail to adhere to international norms, especially with regard to women and minorities. There is likely to be a need to balance cultural norms (expediency) against international norms (standards). Customary dispute resolution, whether formal or informal, should be acknowledged and brought into the overall strategic consideration of judicial reform. Furthermore, cultural norms should not be used to entrench violations of human rights, especially with regard to women and minorities.
5.4 Security Sector Strengthened

SSR is the overarching process that helps to define the norms and standards under which the security and justice sectors will operate, the needs and gaps that exist, and the means by which these gaps will be overcome. It is a critical activity for ensuring long-term security and rule of law in any country. Only the establishment and maintenance of professional security services that respond to the security needs of the population and the state, while adhering to human rights standards, will assure long-term security and sustained peace. This section reviews the conditions for the overarching support to the process of SSR. Subsequent sections provide further details on the strengthening of the police, corrections and defence sectors (see Chapters 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7).

The mission’s role will primarily be to assist the national authorities with reforming the security sector. This is a long-term process that does not have a fixed end date and is unlikely to be completed within the timeframe of the peace operation. Therefore, a long-term approach is needed that goes beyond the activities that can be carried out within the period of a mission’s mandate. Support to SSR needs to be closely monitored by the MLT and will involve interactions between several mission components, the UNCT and a host of external actors.

SSR focuses on building effective, accountable and sustainable security sectors within a framework of the rule of law and respect for human rights. It is a complex and highly political process that is often linked to the structural causes of conflict. It may lead to questions of intrusion into national sovereignty and tensions between the mission and the host government and donors. In recognizing this, the MLT will need to consider early on in the peace process, in discussion with national, regional and international actors, how the mission will support SSR efforts and the most appropriate mechanisms for guiding, implementing and monitoring these activities.

National ownership and leadership are key elements of a successful SSR process. Weak national capacity or a lack of genuine political will on the part of national actors is likely to undermine the process. The political roots of internal conflict may continue into the post-conflict phase and are often played out in competition within and between security institutions. Therefore, external technical and financial support for this process must be complemented by active political engagement to resolve political issues.

The national SSR strategy reflects the host country’s culture, sensitivities and historical conceptions of security. It does not seek to implement a Western paradigm of the security sector, and understands that a Western
model may not be appropriate. Nonetheless, SSR planners cannot adopt a lax attitude to security practices that contribute to conflict or instability. As with the broader campaign plan, the SSR strategy will seek to resolve the underlying sources of conflict while preventing new security crises.

5.4.1 Operational activities

Providing support to SSR may entail reform of a number of sectors and actors including the police, other law-enforcement agencies, corrections, defence and intelligence services, the ministries that manage these services, parliamentary accountability mechanisms as well as assistance to institutions responsible for border management, customs and civil emergencies. In order to ensure long-term security, SSR should also include efforts to promote good governance and civilian oversight of these services.

Initial investment in the creation of an integrated approach to supporting national SSR efforts through joint assessment and analysis, planning and adoption of a shared work plan and benchmarks will pay dividends in the medium to long term. This integrated approach should take account of the close relationship between SSR and strengthening the rule of law, and should include all relevant mission components and sections (i.e. UNPOL, Justice and Corrections). Hiring and retaining high-quality personnel in these areas will be essential.

The key operational activities of the mission in support of this output include:

- Conducting multi-agency assessments of the security sector in support of the national SSR process.
- Providing political and technical support to the national dialogue aiming at a shared vision of, and a national strategy on, the security sector.
- Supporting the implementation of the security sector strategy and its related plans in the different sub-sectors.
- Helping create conditions for a more gender-equitable security sector providing equal opportunities and services for women and men.
- Establishing the principles and structures of the security sector’s accountability to civilian political leadership to ensure good governance (e.g. through parliamentary oversight bodies, ombudsman institutions and civil society).
5.4.2 Benchmarks

In addition to short-, medium- and long-term benchmarks (see below), the following indicative list contains both process- and results-oriented benchmarks, which provide a framework for the reform process of the security sector as a whole.

- **A national concept of security developed.** The host country develops a concept of security that reflects the security and justice needs of the people, underpinned by good governance and transparency and enjoys a political consensus around it.

- **All-security-sector framework or strategy established.** SSR should encompass all security sector actors. It provides a framework for structuring thinking about the diverse security challenges facing the host country and its population. The framework should ensure civilian involvement and oversight and be both coherent and coordinated.

- **Cooperation with and among civil authorities developed.** Security services must develop SSR approaches in cooperation with the public and led by the civil authorities. Effective strategies should be reflected in a comprehensive strategy that encompasses the numerous functions of the security sector.

- **Human rights norms respected.** SSR must be based on democratic norms and abide by the principles of international human rights. SSR should enhance the institutional and human capacity of security actors to function effectively, and help ensure that justice is delivered impartially and is consistent with the rule of law.

- **Monitoring systems created.** It will also be important to create and implement monitoring systems to track developments and changing needs to continually update the effectiveness and accountability of the security and justice sectors.

**Short-term**

- Assessment of the security sector completed.
- National dialogue initiated on a shared vision for the security sector and on key elements of a national security sector strategy. This includes a delineation of clear roles of the different security services (especially between the police and the military), chains of command, and governance and accountability structures.
- Mission provides political support to overarching SSR process and technical support to sub-sectors of the security sector.
• Funding and support mechanisms are agreed, national ownership and a light international footprint promoted within the UN and with other international actors, including development banks and bilateral donors.
• Mission and UNCT activities coordinated in support of DDR (see 4.6: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration).

Medium-term
• A national SSR strategy has been agreed upon by key national stakeholders, promoting the security interests of the population at large and the state.
• Oversight mechanisms in place and functioning, including both state actors and civil society.
• Sector-wide plans (including plans for each sub-sector) have been finalized and are being implemented.
• The mission and the international community support the implementation of the national SSR strategy and agree on mechanism to harmonize support to avoid overlapping/duplication of efforts.
• National and international expectations managed effectively, with a public information strategy supporting the process.

Long-term
• SSR has advanced in its implementation with continued political commitment from key national stakeholders and support from the international community.
• Public confidence in the security sector and its respective services restored.
• Oversight bodies are functioning and capable of leading, challenging, reproaching and controlling the security sector.
• National and international policies and responses are better integrated with long-term development frameworks.
• Meaningful input from civil society actors established and legitimized.
• Monitoring system established to track changes/progress and identify evolving needs.
5.4.3 Responsibilities and coordination

SSR is a far-reaching systemic endeavour and requires careful coordination on the part of the MLT. The SSR and DDR divisions or sections of the mission (which are often combined) are in the lead, supported by justice and corrections, and the police and military components. Multiple actors may provide support to the security sector concurrent with the UN’s activities. It is therefore essential to coordinate and achieve rationalization among these efforts. External assistance should not undermine host government ownership and legitimacy. National institutions, laws, and processes—however weak—should play a central role in formulating and implementing programmes and processes. External planners should be careful to respect host country sovereignty by involving the host government in planning and execution. SSR processes should be closely coordinated with DDR programmes.

5.4.4 Resources

Some SSR-related programmatic activities may be funded by the peacekeeping assessed budget, if approved in the mission’s budget. However, a fully-fledged SSR process takes time, requires strategic as well as operational resources and is likely to require donor support beyond the lifespan of the mission. For this reason, coordination with the UNCT, the World Bank and bilateral donors at an early stage is essential to ensure sustainability of effort.

5.4.5 Challenges and risks

A host-country’s level of development is an important consideration in SSR planning. Poverty and corruption will significantly challenge SSR efforts. Individual and institutional corruption typically lead to poor economic growth, inadequate or excessive government revenues, and a chronically under-resourced public sector. Additional challenges and risks may be encountered:

- National elites’ divergent political interests derail SSR process.
- Security sector services’ infrastructure is severely degraded.
- SSR reforms do not keep pace with DDR processes or political reforms.
- State revenues are low, and funding of SSR is inadequate, leaving the security sector weak and disaffected, and creating substantive hurdles for good governance and the rule of law.
5.4.6 Considerations

Effective SSR requires unity of effort and a shared vision by those contributing to the reform process to support the nationally owned process. Integrated programmes that consider relationships among organizations, sectors and actors increase the likelihood of success, minimize unforeseen developments and ensure the most effective use of resources. Four principles should be taken into account when designing and supporting SSR:

1. Support national ownership while incorporating principles of good governance and respect for human rights.
2. Balance efforts to enhance operational capacity against support to ensure effective governance.
3. Foster transparency, accountability, dialogue and trust.
4. Balance “do no harm” against “do what works” and “what is right”.

In addition to these four principles, there are a number of specific considerations for the MLT in peace operations.

National or sector focus

The decision to initiate SSR at the national or sub-national level must depend on assessed needs and security requirements. Resources may not be available to professionalize all parts of the security sector in parallel, and trade-offs relevant to geography and culture should be considered.

Balancing short-term security imperatives against investments in broader security reform

Perhaps the most critical trade-off faced by the mission will be choosing between an urgent need to address security and public order issues—possibly by lending legitimacy to less-than-democratic processes and actors, redundant layers of security provision and organizations that have reputations for corruption and lack of professionalism—and establishing legitimacy for patterns of governance and actors that support accountability, transparency and other processes critical to good governance. While quick wins might build credibility, they can undermine deeper reform of the security sector (see 4.5: Public Order Established).
5.5 Police and other Law-enforcement Sectors Strengthened

Police and other law-enforcement agencies are the most visible expression of the security sector and governmental authority. In many post-conflict societies, police agencies may lack legitimacy due to their involvement in the conflict, their perceived corruption, human rights abuses and their unresponsiveness to the security and rule of law needs of the population. In cases where the military has assumed responsibility for internal security, transition to police responsibility for law and order is an important step towards re-establishing the rule of law. There may also be high levels of organized and transnational crime, with links to corruption and political power, creating a threat to security and undermining the rule of law. Strengthening policing and other law-enforcement agencies is therefore one of the first positive signals to a population that the government is re-establishing its authority.

Without an adequate level of policing and other law enforcement, it is impossible to reinforce the rule of law or achieve sustainable peace and security. The MLT’s support to strengthening police and other law-enforcement agencies, including customs and border services, is therefore critical to a strengthened rule-of-law environment. However, as per UN Security Council resolutions 2185 and 2382, any police-related activity should be undertaken in full conformity with the Strategic Guidance Framework for International Policing (SGF), including its Guidelines on Police Command, and form part of an overarching national security plan.

The SGF defines the “what” of UN police peacekeeping (policy) and the “how” (guidelines) on the four core pillars of a UN Police Peacekeeping component outlined in the Policy:

1. Police Administration
2. Police Capacity-Building and Development
3. Police Command

Key UN Policies & Guidance

UN Strategic Guidance Framework for International Policing
UN Guidelines on Police Command

25 The terms “policing” or “police” as used in this study follow UN terminology and include all national security agencies (such as the police and the gendarmerie) that exercise police powers, especially the powers of arrest and detention.

In prioritizing support for police and other law-enforcement agencies, the MLT may wish to consider whether: (a) the proper infrastructure is in place for local actors to be responsive to reform; (b) reform will be sustainable; (c) comprehensive reform might be premature; (d) the state of security is such that police reform can be implemented; (e) resources exist so that reform will be supported with the right skills; and (f) the level of political will exists in the host government for police and other security reforms.

5.5.1 Operational activities

The key operational activities support of this output include:

- Conducting needs assessments and mapping existing police and other law-enforcement agencies.
- Supporting the police and other law-enforcement agencies’ responses to protection issues, and including the perspectives of women and minorities on, for example, SGBV.
- Supporting the increased participation of women and minorities in the police and other law-enforcement agencies.
- Providing operational support to the police and other law-enforcement agencies in accordance with the mandate.
- Supporting the management and oversight of the police and other law-enforcement agencies within the host government, including support for budgetary, regulatory and legal frameworks.

5.5.2 Benchmarks

Short-term

- Needs assessment, census and mapping of police and other law-enforcement agencies completed.
- Planning with host government on reform, restructuring and rebuilding, and plans for recruitment and training, initiated.
- Role of police and other law-enforcement agencies in providing internal security clearly delineated from that of the military.
- Clarity on national police, vision and strategy, and the roles that UNPOL personnel will play as trainers, mentors, advisors or operational support, achieved.
- Governance and accountability framework to oversee the provision of police, security and justice established.
- Donors and areas of engagement identified.
Medium term
• Vetting, selection and recruitment of police and other law-enforcement personnel undertaken.
• Accountability mechanisms reinforced.
• Management and oversight of police and other law-enforcement agencies strengthened.
• Institutional capacity of police and other law-enforcement agencies strengthened.

Long term
• Police and other law-enforcement agencies are able to respond to the needs of the population.
• Police and other law-enforcement agencies trained to operate within human rights frameworks with consideration for women’s and minorities’ needs.
• Information-sharing and operational modalities on transborder and other serious crimes institutionalized between neighbouring states, and regional and international forums.

5.5.3 Responsibilities and coordination
The leadership role within the mission rests with the Police Commissioner who is responsible for the mission’s support to this sector. The MLT may need to ensure that mission activities among the multiple actors who are engaged in different areas of strengthening the police and other law-enforcement agencies are coordinated. Since it is a broad system that includes judges, prosecutors, the courts, corrections, customs and border services, as well as court management and administration, these multiple efforts may require the attention of the MLT to avoid overlap, duplication and gaps. The political management of the police and other law-enforcement agencies (e.g. in a ministry of the interior or of justice), are important to the overall credibility and legitimacy of these agencies. Therefore, the MLT should foster support for reforms at these political levels.

5.5.4 Resources
Continued human and capital resources to support long-term reform processes are critically important. Moreover, having police and other law-enforcement mentors and advisers whose skill sets include political awareness, cultural and gender sensitivity, and integrity, adds to the legitimacy of the reform process. Increasingly, there is a demand for
technical expertise in specialized areas of policing and other law enforcement, as well as in areas related to the reform, restructuring and rebuilding of institutions. Donor and bilateral aid based on long-term commitment is critical if the police and other law-enforcement agencies are to be reformed, restructured and rebuilt. As noted above, these processes are long term in nature, and dependent on capability and capacity, as well as local perceptions of legitimacy and credibility.

5.5.5 Challenges and risks

- It must be recognized that reform is an inherently political process, especially reform in the area of policing and the security sector. All dangers, sensitivities, and intricacies are likely to surface during the process of reform, but opportunities will also present themselves.
- Lack of political will—or, conversely, undue political interference in the management and operational activities of police and other law-enforcement entities—can compromise their effectiveness and professionalism.
- Lack of infrastructure and resources in the police service and other law-enforcement agencies inhibits the capacity for reform.
- The police, other law-enforcement agencies or political management may be resistant to reform.
- Entrenched corruption is an obstacle to accountable and legitimate policing and other types of law enforcement.
- Police leaders must have knowledge of and capability for strategic planning and implementation of change management processes. The SGF plays a critical role in overcoming some of the challenges of coherence in policing approaches, which may surface in the planning process. Police leaders must also have the ability to use analytical tools to make the best use of information and intelligence to enhance decision making.
- Leaders must manage diversity and implement gender-related policies. This is challenging in any environment but more so in those that have not previously experienced gendered approaches.
5.5.6 Considerations

When balancing the points of consideration outlined below, the SGF should be front and centre.

**Providing external support while promoting self-sufficiency**

While support from the international community may be needed in the short term to strengthen the host-state police force and other law-enforcement agencies, over-reliance on international expertise, capacity and resources can result in dependency rather than self-sufficiency.

**Quality versus quantity**

An excessive focus on providing material resources, infrastructure and the recruitment, training and vetting of police and other law-enforcement agencies can result in the presumption that reform is taking root. Failure to address institutional capacity and accountability needs, the promotion of a positive organizational culture or management of the sector may result in increased local capacity quantitatively in the short term, but not qualitatively in the longer term. Building professionalized and reformed capacity among the police and other law-enforcement agencies while also ensuring effective and transparent governance of the sector will be essential if change is to be sustained and successful.

**Perceived legitimacy versus perceived credibility**

An imperative to manage security and law and order may result in putting host-state police officers on the streets too quickly and without proper vetting. The legitimacy of the police may be compromised in the long term if care is not taken to vet out undesirable elements. At the same time, if UNPOL are perceived as assuming responsibility for police services instead of the host-state police, this may affect the longer-term credibility of police and other law-enforcement agencies and their ability to respond to the population. Maintaining a “light footprint” will require the MLT to consider the trade-off between immediate security needs and building the capacity of the host-state police and other law-enforcement agencies for long-term legitimacy and credibility.
**Differentiated perceptions**

People have differing views of the rule of law and security depending on their power, position, status, location (e.g. rural versus urban), needs and roles. These factors affect how the police and other law-enforcement agencies are perceived and valued. As a result, the MLT should be sensitive to diverging views as it conducts its activities in support of the rule of law. The mission should be attentive to the views of those groups whose perceptions are generally not considered in the dialogue on the rule of law, such as women and minorities.
5.6 Corrections System Strengthened

In post-conflict contexts, rule-of-law institutions are frequently undermined, and prisons are by no means an exception. Situated at the end of the criminal justice chain, the corrections system is often forgotten, unprioritized, lacking host government political support and operating with insufficient resources. Post-conflict corrections systems are generally characterized by lack of resources, non-existent or weak security and poor conditions with significant overcrowding, many instances of arbitrary and prolonged detention, inadequate separation and classification of prisoners, and poorly trained and ill-equipped staff. These result in violations of prisoners’ basic human rights and a lack of coherence between the elements of the criminal justice system.

Support to corrections is critical, and if not adequately catered for, can jeopardize other security and rule of law efforts, have a detrimental effect on security and stability. The corrections system must be the partner of strengthened legislative, judicial, police and other law-enforcement agencies as evidence of legitimate and credible rule of law. A functioning criminal justice sector that adheres to rule-of-law principles is essential to combat impunity, extend state authority, protect civilians, and ensure law and order. A corrections system that conducts itself in a humane, fair and coherent manner gains public trust, legitimacy and international respect. Moreover, prisons can provide useful insights for the mission into the issues and concerns of a community that can endanger peace and security. While the corrections system is often the most easily overlooked element of the judicial system—and is the most difficult sub-sector for which to attract donor support—it represents the culmination of the judicial process and is no less critical to the comprehensive application of the rule of law.

5.6.1 Operational activities

The key operational activities in support of this output include:

- Supporting the host government with needs assessments and a mapping of the corrections system.
- Support the early functioning of key corrections areas.
- Increasing access to legal advice and counsel for prisoners.
- Assisting in the development of independent reporting procedures on prison conditions and practices, including abuse by prison personnel.
- Supporting the development of accountability mechanisms.
- Laying the foundations for reform by supporting effective prison management and administration, and development of budgetary, legislative and legal frameworks for the corrections system.
5.6.2 Benchmarks

Short-term

• Needs assessment and mapping of corrections system completed.
• Reliable numbers and categorization of prison population established and registered.
• Recruitment, vetting and selection processes initiated.
• Strategies to accommodate the basic needs for prisoners such as food, water, health care, sanitation facilities and access to legal representatives in place.
• Differentiation of prisoner categories (e.g. women and children separated into appropriate sections).

Medium-term

• National plan for corrections reform, including training, in place.
• Construction of new facilities or structural repairs and improvements to existing facilities.
• Clear procedures introduced to ensure that a properly authorized legal document is required before a person is detained.
• Prison system able to manage inmate population consistent with the UN’s Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.

Long-term

• Legislation governing management and administration of corrections system in place, including a clear separation between the agencies that investigate crimes and the prison authorities.
• Population trusts the corrections system.
• Independent internal and external oversight mechanisms in place.
• Prisons and detention centres operate in compliance with international human rights standards, particularly with regard to vulnerable groups such as women, children and minorities.
• Sufficient budget allocated to prison administration.
5.6.3 Responsibilities and coordination

The MLT should ensure that a focus on corrections is an integral part of the mission’s overall effort to strengthen the rule of law and human rights, and that the issue receives attention from the host government and international donors. The mission can provide mentoring and advice to corrections personnel in the host country and ensure that local criminal justice stakeholders put in place mechanisms to coordinate and collaborate. The MLT can also be supportive in gaining donor support for this sector, which is generally overlooked. As strengthening the corrections system is a long-term process not likely to be completed within the timeframe of the mission, early engagement with developmental actors that can support long-term development of the corrections system will be important.

5.6.4 Resources

Sufficient resources must be allocated to support a strengthened corrections system, including key experts with appropriate experience, skills and competence related to corrections systems. Technical advisers, as well as experts in detention and rehabilitation, are critical to successful reform of the corrections system, as well as in the initial pre-mission assessment. Long-term financial support will be needed if reforms to the correction system are to be sustainable. In order to ensure such support, specific language on corrections in the mission mandate, as well as a clear and defined budget separate from other Rule of Law sections, will be vital. Experience has shown that corrections officers in many missions are seen as belonging to the police component, which causes problems in terms of budget and logistics.
5.6.5 Challenges and risks

- The existing culture of impunity, arbitrary sentencing and detention practices affect the reform process.
- Lack of political support and insufficient budgeting for corrections reform from host government.
- Overcrowded prisons, often due to the high number of prisoners awaiting trial.
- Limited trust from the population.
- Limited or non-existent access to public counsel for the accused.
- Low capacity, numbers and insufficiently trained prison staff
- Limited international access to the corrections system, resulting in a lack of transparency.
- Limited interest of the international community in corrections reform.
5.6.6 Considerations

Maintaining popular and host government support while strengthening the corrections system

In a post-conflict setting, strengthening the corrections system may be a low priority for the host government and may also not enjoy local support. If resources are generally scarce, there may be resistance to allocating them to prisoners or prison administration. The MLT may need to balance these views against the importance of supporting a strengthened corrections system consistent with the rule of law and human rights.

Local versus international norms

Local perceptions of prisoners often lead to abrogation of their fundamental human rights. Prisoners are sometimes not regarded as being entitled to fair treatment. Given the sensitivity of their status, political prisoners may be at heightened risk of having their rights overlooked. Depending on the nature of the conflict, the MLT may have to consider the political aspects of corrections systems reform.

Ensuring donor support while managing expectations

Notwithstanding that the responsibility to ensure adequate resources are allocated to the corrections system lies with the host government; corrections systems reform is a long-term process that also requires sustained donor support. It is often not a popular sector for donor support as the results are not usually immediate and may not be substantial enough to attract long-term resources from donors. This will require active engagement on the part of the MLT.

Local capacity and needs

Even if there is political will, host governments are often unable to meet the basic needs of a corrections system in a post-conflict setting. While encouraging the host government to meet its obligations to respond to these needs, the MLT may need to consider the local capacity to do so.
5.7 Defence Sector Professionalized

As part of SSR, a peacekeeping mission may be tasked to select, train, advise, mentor, support and provide institutional development for the defence sector. This may include training in the areas of human rights, IHL, child protection and the prevention of gender-based violence. It is of critical importance that the military and police re-establish their credibility in the eyes of the public and the international community, especially if they have been implicated in the conflict (see 4.5: Public Order Established). In many cases, incidents of poor discipline, inappropriate standards, accelerated induction or strained resources will have been catalysing factors in a return to conflict.

The ultimate goal of professionalizing the defence sector is civilian control of the military. Professionalizing the defence sector should not simply aim at rebuilding troop levels and training military actors; it implies the holistic reconstruction and development of both the armed and non-armed elements of the defence sector, as well as its civilianized governance structures, including with regard to normative values and traditions. Training is a critical part of this process and should include decision makers from the entire sector.

5.7.1 Operational activities

The key operational activities of the mission in support of this output include:

- Securing agreement by the military to undertake institutional reform.
- Conducting multi-agency assessments of defence sector.
- Securing funding for restoration of facilities and infrastructure, supporting the establishment of appropriate recruitment and selection systems, and regularizing payment for the military.
- Establishing the principles and structures of defence accountability to civilian political leadership.
- Introducing a training and reorganization process to harmonize military systems with the prevailing security conditions.
5.7.2 Benchmarks

**Short-term**
- Assessment completed, training and reorganization plan accepted by host government and military authorities.
- Procurement for equipment and facilities initiative finalized.
- Trainees selected, and trainers and mentors deployed.
- Standards agreed.
- Plan coordinated in support of DDR.
- Roles and responsibilities of the police and military delineated.

**Medium-term**
- Essential equipment and facilities procured and available, and administrative and financial systems in place and functioning.
- Oversight mechanisms in place and functioning.
- Payment and human resource systems in place and functioning.
- National and international expectations managed effectively through a public information strategy supporting the process.
- Agreement within the donor community to prevent overlapping priorities and efforts.
- Military able to conduct small unit exercises.

**Long-term**
- Military reorganized and able to conduct operations in accordance with plan.
- Support structure for the military established and functioning with limited international assistance.
- Public confidence in the military restored.
- Oversight bodies are functioning and capable of leading, challenging, reproaching and controlling the military.
- National and international policies and responses are better integrated with long-term development frameworks.
- Meaningful input by civil society actors established and legitimized.
5.7.3 Responsibilities and coordination

Support to the defence sector may include many actors as a result of multiple bilateral and multilateral agreements running concurrently with the UN’s activities. Coordination and rationalization among all of these efforts is therefore essential. External assistance should not undermine the legitimacy of the host government; national institutions, laws, and processes—however weak—should play a central role in the formulation and implementation of programmes and processes. Defence sector support should be part of a national SSR process and closely coordinated with DDR programmes.

5.7.4 Resources

Resources consist of time, funds, facilities and equipment as well as trainers and advisers, who may be funded by donors and through bilateral and multilateral agreements with the host government. An integrated and synchronized plan with the host government should account for the funding, procurement, allocation and distribution of resources necessary to support and professionalize the defence sector. A long-term programme should include sustainment plans that provide for the life-cycle management of materiel systems.

5.7.5 Challenges and risks

- Military infrastructure has been severely degraded.
- Military support and professionalization is not keeping pace with development of political reforms, and/or defence reforms not keeping pace with DDR.
- Significant elements within the military are disaffected, particularly with the peace agreement, and impede reform efforts, distance themselves from the wider peace process or, at worst, resume fighting.
- Funding is inadequate, leaving the military weak and disaffected.
5.7.6 Considerations

*Balancing immediate security requirements against gradual defence sector reform*

There may be tension between the need to field forces quickly and the need to gradually develop a professionalized force. The immediate requirement to protect civilians may conflict with the need to develop the capability and capacity of the national authorities to take on this mission. With limited resources, it may be difficult to balance short- and long-term requirements. The need for immediate security may divert donor resources and energy from long-term defence sector efforts.

*National versus sector focus*

The decision to focus on defence reform from a national or regional level may depend on the assessment of the needs and security requirements. Resources may not be available to professionalize all parts of the defence sector simultaneously, and trade-offs relevant to geography and culture should be considered.
Chapter 6.
Supporting Post-Conflict Peacebuilding and Development

SUMMARY
This chapter considers the efforts needed to sustain peace by preventing the outbreak, escalation, continuation and recurrence of conflict. Peacebuilding efforts need to focus on building resilient national institutions, a task which poses both governance and developmental challenges. Moreover, an actively engaged civil society is just as important as formal government institutions. While peacebuilding reforms cannot be enforced by national and regional leaders alone, they will need to be engaged in the effort.

It is important for a mission to consider mission exit and transition from the outset of a peace operation. Efforts to sustain peace must focus on addressing the issues of marginalization and unaddressed grievances, based on updated peace and conflict analyses. This requires a different approach to such analysis, one which allows for inclusive ownership and for identifying the drivers of peace and conflict that need to be jointly addressed by the state and society. It also means that the MLT must constantly undertake peace and conflict analyses to maintain awareness of the threats and risks to the mission and its ability to implement its mandate.

Peace operations are not often in the lead in many of these efforts. The MLT sets the tone for the rest of the mission to work collaboratively with other actors on the ground, allowing them to lead in areas where they have a mandate or a comparable advantage. The SRSG and DSRSG-RC/HC must exercise leadership and create political consensus in a broader sense, ensuring coordination among UN entities, mobilizing and maintaining donor funding, and marshaling support and engagement of key international players and regional financial institutions.

This chapter discusses a set of seven operational-level outputs, each with its own set of activities, risks and benchmarks, which together contribute to the overall outcome of sustaining peace and development.
1. **Secure and Effective Humanitarian Relief Efforts Supported.** This output emphasizes the important linkages and similarities between the objectives of humanitarian relief and efforts to sustain peace and deliver the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Accordingly, many peace operations missions have been mandated to contribute to a secure environment to enable the delivery of humanitarian relief. Nonetheless, the relationship between humanitarian actors and a peace operation is a fine balancing act, driven by humanitarian principles.

2. **Women’s Role in Peace and Security Promoted.** This output speaks to the fact that women’s participation in conflict-prevention efforts, political processes and the security sector, as well as their perceptions of their own security, are essential contributors to a long-term and sustainable peace. This is particularly the case when a peace operation is preparing to drawdown and transition. Peace operations are expected to put in place mechanisms and reforms to ensure that women’s peace and security is promoted.

3. **Youth Participation Supported.** This output reflects the fact that youth perspectives are underrepresented in formal political structures, including peace processes, and are excluded from discussions and decision-making. This can risk stoking grievances, making them an accessible demographic for armed groups, and creating enmity for the future, while ignoring the need to listen to, value and provide economic opportunities for the future electorate. Missions can foster these dialogues between the host authorities and civil society.

4. **Civil Society Engaged and Supported.** This output highlights the essential role of civil society in building and sustaining peace, especially in times of transition. The mission needs to view efforts to engage with civil society as a long-term process. Peace operations can leverage civil society to improve the conditions for mandate implementation in order to prevent and mitigate local-level conflicts, provide early warning on human rights violations and abuses, devise protection strategies, facilitate local consultations and foster greater inclusiveness, particularly of women and youth.

5. **Return and Reintegration of Refugees and IDPs Supported.** This output acknowledges that return and reintegration is a highly sensitive and potentially volatile process, from the identification and registration of affected persons to their eventual and voluntary return, in safety and in dignity, and their subsequent reintegration. Although the return of refugees and IDPs is managed and led by specialized UN agencies and their implementing humanitarian partners, the mission is central to establishing safe and secure conditions, and can play an important supporting role before, during and after the return.

6. **Transition from Emergency Relief to Recovery and Development Enabled.** This output highlights that once the need for emergency assistance has subsided and early recovery is in progress, the focus should be on a smooth
transition to longer-term development activities. This will entail gradual handover of responsibilities to national authorities. Ideally, planning for transition from emergency and early recovery to long-term rehabilitation and development should begin early in the peacekeeping and peacebuilding phase. The successful transition from recovery to development and the ability of national and other institutions to take responsibility in a number of areas will be defining factors in the exit strategy of a mission.

7. **Independent Media Supported.** This output underlines the vital role of the free and responsible flow of information in supporting efforts to build and sustain peace. While peace operations do not have a lead role in establishing an independent media, they can enable the process through their political offices and capacity-building tasks, which provide an opportunity to foster legal institutions that can protect journalists in the long term and support the development of an independent media.

Each of the seven outputs listed above generates a set of **considerations**. Given the primacy of the host country, the UNCT and other development partners in the long-term process of sustaining peace, these considerations give rise to management issues for the MLT and the mission, such as:

» Balancing short-term political expediencies and gains with long-term UNCT attempts to address root causes for a sustainable peace through development.

» Balancing humanitarian imperatives and the political and force-protection requirements of peace operations. While peace operations are largely driven by political mandates, humanitarian action is driven by the principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence.

» Balancing humanitarian programmatic activity against safety and security of all UN personnel in the mission area for whom the DO as HoM is responsible.


» Engaging with a polarized civil society alongside prejudices and reluctance of government elites on whom political progress for peace depends.

» Balancing security and mission responsibilities to protect vulnerable civilians and IDPs against the government’s national ownership of the problem.

» Managing pressures for premature drawdown and early withdrawal alongside the dangers of overdependence on the peace operation and the erosion of national capacities.
Peacebuilding and the Role of Peace Operations

Efforts to help countries emerge from conflict need to consider the full spectrum of activities that support “sustaining peace” long after the UN peace operation has left the country. This means that the host government must be willing to support the post-conflict needs of the country and ensure that there is effective investment in sustaining peace and development following the departure of the UN peace operation. It also means that mission transition and exit should be planned for from the outset. Sustaining peace requires much broader engagement, beyond the host government, to foster inclusivity and dialogue throughout society with different individuals and groups, such as women’s and youth groups, civil society and the media.

An essential part of the efforts of the MLT to support post-conflict peacebuilding will be the consideration of simultaneous efforts to sustain peace by “preventing the outbreak, escalation, continuation and recurrence of conflict”. These efforts need to focus on building resilient national institutions, which poses both governance and developmental challenges. Moreover, an actively engaged civil society is just as important as formal government institutions. These reforms cannot be enforced by national and regional leaders from the top, but they will need to be engaged in the effort.

While a mission may be deployed to address particular threats to peace and security in a country, it may also face risks from other regional and global threats. Terrorism, transnational organized crime, drug trafficking and violent extremism know no borders. Marginalization, exclusion and unaddressed grievances present long-term threats to international peace and security. Efforts to sustain peace must focus on addressing these two issues. Exclusion and injustice can stoke grievances and also need to be addressed. This requires a different approach to peace and conflict analysis that allows for inclusive ownership and for identifying the drivers of peace and conflict that need to be jointly addressed by the state and society. It also means that the MLT must constantly undertake peace and conflict analyses to maintain awareness of the threats and risks to the mission and its ability to implement its mandate.

Countries emerging from conflict have typically experienced significant socio-economic ruptures. Post-conflict intervention largely aims to repair these ruptures and lay the foundations for sustainable peace. It is

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28 President of the UN General Assembly, ‘Chair’s Summary’, High-level Meeting on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace, 24–26 April 2018, p. 3.
about instilling or restoring the confidence of citizens in the state’s leadership and institutions. The immediate priorities are emergency assistance and early recovery, which will pave the way for longer-term development. From short-term emergency assistance and early recovery to longer-term development, it is fundamental to ensure that local authorities and agencies take ownership of these activities and the overall process. This requires investment and engagement at the earliest stages of the deployment of a UN peace operation.

Peace operations are not in the lead in any of these efforts. Many of these initiatives will be led by the UNCT. The mindset of the MLT should set a tone for the rest of the mission to work collaboratively with other actors on the ground, allowing them to lead in areas where they have a mandate or an advantage in doing so. Nonetheless, the presence of a peace operation should help to create a permissive environment for the improvement of essential infrastructure and incremental reform to social and economic life, all of which can lead to the creation of better employment opportunities for the local population. In addition, it can help to create the security conditions in which humanitarian assistance and a wide range of peace consolidation activities can take place. At the same time, a peace operation can offer direct support to the UN’s humanitarian and development agencies, not least through the provision of security and logistical capabilities. Furthermore, a multidimensional peacekeeping operation is expected to provide and support the framework outlined in the Capstone Doctrine, which assists all UN and other international actors in pursuing their activities in a coherent and coordinated manner. The MLT, especially the SRSG and the DSRSG-RC/HC, through good leadership should work to create the necessary political consensus, ensuring coordination among UN entities, mobilizing and maintaining donor funding, and marshalling support and engagement of key international players such as the World Bank, the IMF, the European Union and regional financial institutions.

**Preconditions for success**

- A safe and secure environment, in which the local population can exist, and humanitarian or development actors can operate without the threat of physical violence or the lingering threat of ERW.
- Freedom of movement for UN agencies, local populations and goods.
- Freedom of information and expression through a free press and an engaged civil society.
- The donor community remains engaged and is willing and able to provide adequate resources.
- National authorities and local institutions are prepared to take ownership of recovery and development efforts and are supported in
developing the requisite leadership and management skills.

- Priorities are identified and agreed with national authorities and the international community.

**Benchmarks**

Many of these benchmarks are beyond the immediate responsibility of the mission.

- Emergency assistance is delivered on a consistent basis, according to humanitarian principles, and is supported and facilitated by the host government.
- Basic services are available to the general population, provided by government agencies where possible, and address the specific needs of women and youth.
- The return of refugees and IDPs is voluntary, safe and dignified, and the host government and communities are willing and able to receive and reintegrate returnees.
- The immediate impact of mines, ERW, and small arms and light weapons is addressed, with appropriate capacity building of national authorities to deal with the threat.
- Humanitarian, recovery and development efforts are sensitive to gender, ethnic and other issues, and women, youth and minorities play an active role in implementing policies and programmes.
- A strong legislative and judicial framework based on the rule of law upholds basic economic and social rights, gender equality and human rights, including freedom of expression.
- Both the international community and general population have confidence in social, political and economic institutions.
- Independent media is engaged, with press freedom and protections for journalists.
- Youth are engaged in educational and employment programmes and included in political and civic engagement programmes.
- Disarmament and demobilization of former combatants have been completed and reintegration initiated, along with effective follow-up processes.
- Civil society groups and organizations have begun to emerge.
Outputs

In summary, the seven outputs that contribute to sustaining peace and supporting peacebuilding and development are:

1. Secure and Effective Humanitarian Relief Efforts Supported
2. Women’s Role in Peace and Security Promoted
3. Youth Participation Supported
4. Civil Society Engaged and Supported
5. Return and Reintegration of Refugees and IDPs
6. Transition from Recovery to Development Enabled
7. Independent Media Engaged
6.1 Secure and Effective Humanitarian Relief Supported

Humanitarian relief has important linkages with and shares many of the same objectives as efforts to sustain peace and deliver the SDGs. Humanitarian activities aim to save lives, alleviate suffering and protect and safeguard the human dignity of communities affected by crises, whether caused by natural disasters or conflict, often in cases where the host state or government is not in a position to provide such basic services to the population. Many peace operations missions have been mandated to contribute to the creation of a secure environment to enable the delivery of humanitarian aid. Nonetheless, maintaining and managing the relationship between humanitarian actors and a peace operation is a fine balancing act, as humanitarians are required to preserve their independence, impartiality and neutrality, as set out in humanitarian principles. The MLT has an important role to play in managing this relationship, while ensuring that the mission mandate is delivered.

Although it plays only a supporting role, a peace operation can take on crucial tasks to facilitate the unimpeded delivery of relief by humanitarian agencies. In a relatively consensual environment—but one in which spoilers may still be active—these agencies value their “humanitarian space” and prefer to operate independently of and separately from uniformed UN personnel. At the same time, peacekeeping missions can provide valuable logistical support to humanitarian operations and are often ideally situated to support the creation of mechanisms that coordinate all stages of these efforts in concert with OCHA and other coordinating bodies. Coordination between humanitarian organizations and the mission can be “indispensable” in developing unarmed strategies to protect civilians.29 Local actors, if engaged appropriately as part of “conflict-sensitive humanitarian action”, can ensure the sustainability of humanitarian action long after international actors have departed, supporting efforts to sustain peace.

In more volatile situations, humanitarian operations, for example aid convoys, may require peacekeepers to provide protection and in extreme situations international humanitarian staff may rely on the peacekeeping mission actually to deliver humanitarian assistance or assist in their evacuation. Given these sensitivities and very different requirements, it is imperative that the mission, usually with the DSRSG–RC/HC taking a lead role, closely coordinates, consults and shares information with

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humanitarian actors to bridge any differences and to coordinate plans and activities. In contexts where peace operations have an enforcement mandate, it is particularly important that a clear distinction is maintained between humanitarian actors and the mission.

The host government has primary responsibility for the provision of basic services such as shelter, the water supply, sanitation, food, basic education, emergency medical services and essential health care. Nevertheless, quite often in the short term, humanitarian actors will have to step in to provide assistance in some of these areas. In some situations, peacekeepers may find it necessary to take action in this area, as they are the only ones with access to isolated communities. A peacekeeping mission may also find that it can establish, strengthen or maintain relations with host communities by assisting, and sometimes delivering, low-cost solutions. These will often take the form of quick-impact projects, implemented for the direct benefit of local communities. Such activities should always be carried out in consultation and coordination with humanitarian and development actors already engaged in these areas, through the DSRSG–HC/RC, the cluster system and the civilian–military coordination mechanisms. Quick-impact projects are only ever a temporary measure and efforts must be made to ensure that more sustainable development initiatives are put in place in the longer term.

6.1.1 Operational activities

The key operational activities by the mission to support this output include:

- Providing a secure and stable environment to allow the unobstructed and safe delivery of humanitarian relief, including mine clearance of access routes and areas.
- Supporting UN agencies with monitoring and assessing humanitarian needs and contributing to the formulation of humanitarian appeals.
- Ensuring information sharing and joint planning between the peace operation and humanitarian agencies.
- Establishing civil–military coordination (CMCoord) centres, coordinating activities through CMCoord mechanisms with OCHA and other humanitarian agencies.
- Providing protection and security for humanitarian facilities and convoys as and when required, in keeping with humanitarian operational principles.
6.1.2 Benchmarks

**Short-term**

- Humanitarian agencies and populations in need have access to each another.
- Humanitarian agencies have conducted a needs assessment and identified priorities.
- CMCoord mechanisms are established and functioning.
- Quick impact projects are being implemented.
- Main access routes are safe and cleared of mines.
- Basic services start to reach isolated communities, including the provision of food and medical support.

**Medium-term**

- The number of attacks on humanitarian convoys has fallen and the active support of former belligerents facilitates the delivery of humanitarian assistance.
- Humanitarian and security vulnerabilities have been mapped for shared use by the peacekeeping mission, and by international security, law-enforcement and host-government entities.
- Service providers are operating effectively and upholding the responsibilities they have been assigned, with the support of the peacekeeping mission.
- Excessive speculation and price swings on basic service items have been reduced.

**Long-term**

- Local capacity and reliable mechanisms for delivery of humanitarian relief exist.
- National and international humanitarian policies and responses are better integrated with the host country and long-term development frameworks.
- Service providers operate self-sufficiently, but not necessarily without the support or mentoring of peacekeeping personnel.
- Black-market structures have been overtaken by the public sector as providers of goods and services.
- National and local institutions begin to demonstrate autonomy and self-sufficiency.
6.1.3 Responsibilities and coordination

While the main responsibility for the delivery of basic services rests with the national authorities, relevant UN agencies and other actors may need to assist the government in the short term. The mission, however, should stress the primacy of the host government, in order to avert the potential perception by the population that the peacekeepers and other external actors, rather than the national authorities, are the service providers.

The main responsibility for the coordination and delivery of humanitarian relief rests with relevant UN agencies, most notably OCHA, the World Food Programme (WFP), UNICEF and UNHCR, which have a cluster responsibility for coordinating the UN’s efforts with those of relevant NGOs. UNDP has a role in mainstreaming early recovery, thereby promoting an early transition to nationally designed and owned recovery efforts. Within the mission, the DSRSG–RC/HC, in their role as Humanitarian Coordinator, is responsible for ensuring coordination of humanitarian and development activities and maintaining close contact and cooperation with all relevant agencies. The parameters for the use of mission assets or personnel in support of any UN humanitarian activities should be based on existing guidelines and a detailed agreement between members of the MLT and the DSRSG–RC/HC, under the overall authority of the HoM.

Quick-impact projects and similar activities carried out by the peacekeeping mission should be managed under the overall authority of the HoM and coordinated with the office of the DSRSG–RC/HC. Facilitating interaction between civilian and military actors will be essential and should be coordinated through established CMCoord mechanisms.30

6.1.4 Resources

A peace operation’s mandate and resources are rarely adequate to provide basic services for the local population, even though the re-establishment of these services is essential for the consolidation of security. The resources available to a peacekeeping mission for the provision of basic services are limited to spare capacity generated from the mandated force levels, such as engineering and mine clearance, and the allocation of funds for quick impact projects, which come from assessed contributions and donors.

Since emergency assistance is a civilian undertaking, military assets should only be used in a humanitarian response when the civilian...
capability is insufficient to meet the need, and under the overall guidance of humanitarian actors. Mindful of humanitarian space and resource constraints, the MLT will need to carefully assess and decide when and how military assets should be used for humanitarian purposes.

### 6.1.5 Challenges and risks

- The delivery of humanitarian aid becomes politicized, aggravating armed groups and increasing insecurity for humanitarian workers and the recipient population.
- Peacekeepers in pursuit of “hearts and minds” objectives might, through their humanitarian activities, blur the distinction between politically driven mandates and neutral, independent and impartial humanitarian needs.
- Supporting humanitarian operations without compromising the neutrality, impartiality and independence of humanitarian actors and infringing their humanitarian space, which they need for their own protection.
- Humanitarian relief falls into the wrong hands or is showcased for political purposes.
- Support to humanitarian operations diverts the resources required for other mandated tasks.
- Lack of consultation and coordination between the peacekeeping operation and humanitarian agencies.
- Quick-impact projects and other activities by the mission could create unsustainable expectations and dependency among local communities.
- Activities aimed at providing basic services may lead to mission creep and blur the line between humanitarian and peacekeeping efforts.
- Quick-impact projects and similar activities by the peacekeeping operation are of a limited and short-term nature and may be politicized and exploited by belligerents and spoilers alike.
6.1.6 Considerations

Addressing humanitarian needs and the safety and security of UN personnel

Judgements have to be made by the MLT between the need to gain access to populations in need, and the safety of the UN personnel, for whom the HoM (as the DO for security) is ultimately responsible. Key members of the MLT are part of the SMT, alongside the heads of the principal UN humanitarian and development agencies. This responsibility creates a requirement for an understanding by the MLT of threat- and risk-analysis procedures, and the use of security-risk-mitigation measures, which often consume scarce mission resources.

Balancing humanitarian imperatives and the political requirements of peacekeeping

Peacekeeping missions are largely driven by political mandates. Humanitarian action is driven by the principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence. The MLT needs to understand the differences in the application of these principles by peacekeepers and humanitarians. For example, for the mission, impartiality refers to the even-handed execution of a political mandate rather than an impartial response to an assessed humanitarian need. This different interpretation of impartiality can lead to misunderstandings and friction. The role of the DSRSG–RC/HC, as well as joint strategic frameworks designed to assist consultation, coordination and information sharing, can alleviate some of this tension.

Balancing short-term gains and long-term benefits

The UNCT will usually be in a mission area before the deployment of a peacekeeping operation and will remain after the peacekeepers depart. There are always pressures on a peacekeeping mission to make a difference, to meet national and international expectations and to achieve some quick wins in order to demonstrate progress. These pressures must be balanced against the long-term approach of the UNCT, which is to respond to needs and tackle the root causes of conflict through development activity.
Balancing force protection and the considerations of humanitarians

Civil–military activities by the mission’s military component are ultimately designed to improve the standing of the peacekeepers among the local population. This is sometimes called “winning hearts and minds”. The MLT should be clear that this is a force-protection measure. As such, it may be seen by humanitarians to be at odds with humanitarian principles. Potential tensions can only be reduced by the engagement of the MLT to ensure coordination and mutual understanding of the validity of both activities. CMCoord mechanisms need to be in place and, broadly speaking, peacekeepers should defer to the knowledge and counsel of humanitarians before embarking on “hearts and minds” activities which, unless sustainable, can be damaging. Finally, it should be recognized that many TCCs like to see their peacekeepers involved in “hearts and minds” activities and fund them accordingly. Guidance by the MLT is required to ensure that this activity is not perceived as political, is effectively focused on the long-term benefit of the local community and does not lead to unsustainable dependency or unrealistic expectations.
6.2 Women’s Role in Peace and Security Promoted

Gender equality is a key indicator in assessing a country’s ability to emerge from conflict and sustain peace. Whether a country is well placed to sustain peace is closely related to the status of women in society. Therefore, women’s roles in peace and security, through participation in conflict-prevention efforts, political processes and the security sector, as well as their perceptions of their own security, are essential contributors to a long-term and sustainable peace. This is particularly the case in conflict-affected communities when a peace operation is preparing to drawdown and transition. Peace operations are expected to put in place mechanisms and reforms to ensure that women’s peace and security is promoted. This is grounded in the overarching goal of gender equality and the four pillars of the WPS Agenda as mandated by successive UN Security Council resolutions, beginning with Resolution 1325 in 2000.31

Broadly speaking, the four pillars of the WPS Agenda refer to (a) women’s participation at all levels of decision making in peacebuilding; (b) prevention of conflict and all forms of violence against women; (c) protection of women and girls and their rights; and (d) gender responsive relief and recovery.

Mainstreaming a gender perspective is also essential to ensuring that the mission and national authorities are responding to the needs of women in particular. Gender mainstreaming means that, in all mission planning, implementation and evaluation, the MLT should consider, and report on, how activities, processes and procedures contribute to reducing inequality between men and women. It is also important to ensure that the approach advocated by the MLT is culturally sensitive to the wider social context in which the mission operations. The MLT has a clear responsibility to incorporate a gender-sensitive approach into all mission activities and policies, and to set standards and encourage actions that demonstrate and promote gender balance and mainstreaming across all mission components (see 2.2 Promoting Integrated Planning and Operations).

The MLT should establish clear goals and ensure sufficient resources to facilitate gender mainstreaming within mission budgets. It should review and monitor progress on compliance with the policy on gender equality through regular meetings designed specifically for this purpose. The MLT should consult and make effective use of gender advisers and encourage other components to do the same.

31 In addition to UN Security Council Resolution 1325, the WPS Agenda has been further elaborated in resolutions 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2010), 2106 (2013), 2122 (2013) and 2242 (2015).
6.2.1 Operational activities

The key operational activities by the mission to support this output include:

• Undertaking gender analyses that include the gathering of data disaggregated by sex and age, and ensuring that these are integrated in the peace and conflict analysis as well as strategic and operational plans.
• Establishing monitoring and reporting systems on WPS to track progress and ensure accountability.
• Advocating with national authorities to promote equal opportunity in relation to women’s participation in electoral processes as candidates, and in registration and voting processes.
• Enabling the active, equal and meaningful participation of women in dialogues and peace processes (both formal and informal) and negotiations.

6.2.2 Benchmarks

Short-term

• Gender advisers are deployed to the mission and have regular access to MLT to discuss needs.
• Gender mapping to identify women’s representation within the community undertaken.
• Discussions held with national partners on women’s participation in political processes and national institutions.
• Women serving in military, police and civilian components, and female-engagement teams enabled, where applicable.
• The needs of the population in terms of protection, particularly from SGBV, have been assessed and a protection strategy developed and operationalized.
• Monitoring and evaluation frameworks established to track progress on UN initiatives related to women’s participation in local security forces, the judicial sector and political processes.
• Gender responsive interventions for DDR programmes that include the sustainable integration of women ex-combatants have been developed.
Medium-term

- Targets and recruitment programmes put in place for women to participate in the security sector.
- Dedicated capacities in national security structures to prevent and respond to sexual and gender-based violence established.
- Rights and well-being of women and girls in corrections institutions safeguarded.
- Women ex-combatants participate in community violence-reduction projects and other capacity-building initiatives to promote social cohesion.
- Gender-responsive electoral laws and equal opportunities for women to participate as candidates, elections officials and monitors legislated for.
- Capacity-building programmes for women running for public office and public-awareness campaigns on women’s political participation implemented.

Long-term

- Government institutions engage regularly and meaningfully with women’s civil society groups.
- Women participate fully and equally in electoral and political processes.
- Women’s rights and protections included in reform of national and local governance structures.
- Gender-sensitive national security policies by national authorities developed and budgeted for.
- Laws and policies to prosecute perpetrators of SGBV enacted.
- Women participate in, and have access to equal opportunities within, the local security sector.
6.2.3 Responsibilities and coordination

While ensuring that women’s peace and security is promoted is a shared responsibility across the mission for all personnel, the MLT has a particularly important role in setting the tone when it comes to women, peace and security. It should ensure that the mission is making every effort to follow and implement the relevant UN Security Council resolutions on WPS, which includes actions by the mission to support women’s meaningful participation and empowerment, uphold women’s rights, protect women and girls, and mainstream gender into the different lines of work of the mission.

The MLT should draw on the advice and expertise of gender advisers (both civilian and military) throughout the mission in different functional areas to advance gender equality and the WPS mandates and assist the senior leadership in monitoring progress and enhancing accountability across the mission. This should include coordination with the UNCT and UN Women as soon as drawdown and transition is envisaged, to ensure that any efforts by the mission are sustainable.

6.2.4 Resources

Efforts to sustain women’s engagement in peace and security will also require the commitment and engagement of national and local institutions, as well as civil society. The MLT should ensure that as per the 2019 policy on gender-responsive peacekeeping operations, quick-impact projects apply a gender analysis as part of project selection, monitoring and evaluation, and that at least 15 per cent of funding is for projects that support gender equality and women’s empowerment. Similar engagement should also take place with donor countries, in coordination with the national authorities and the UNCT, to ensure that a gender analysis is included in and funded for capacity-building projects.
6.2.5 Challenges and risks

- Efforts to pursue the WPS Agenda in the mission may not be viewed as a priority by all stakeholders, and there may be pressure to prioritize other issues in a budget-constrained environment.
- Women’s protection needs and gender analyses may be overlooked in crisis situations.
- Although women may have a seat at the table in peace negotiations or political processes, there is a risk that such participation may not have any substantive influence.
- Prioritizing gender equality and women’s empowerment could lead to resentment among other parts of the population, who feel that their rights are being eroded as a consequence.
- Lack of support from national authorities to increase women’s participation in security, justice, legal and corrections institutions, and to increase their representation in politics and government.
- A lack of women serving in the uniformed components deployed by TCCs/PCCs, which limits the ability of military and police contingents to engage effectively with the entire population.

6.2.6 Considerations

Reliance on gender advisers versus mission-wide responsibility

Gender advisers are an important resource for peace operations, enabling mission personnel, including the MLT, to draw on their expertise. However, there is a risk that all the work related to women, peace and security and gender mainstreaming will fall on the gender adviser, rather than being taken up as a responsibility by all mission personnel to implement as part of their areas of work. The MLT will need to ensure that there are adequate training opportunities for staff, as well as accountability mechanisms with responsibility for gender mainstreaming embedded in the different functional teams. Gender advisers may then be called on to provide expertise when needed at the operational level.
Ensuring that activities and programmes on gender equality include men

Focusing on women’s participation and empowerment, without a more comprehensive discussion with the national authorities and local communities about the importance of gender equality, could alienate some men and make them feel marginalized by the mission. It is quite often men who are in positions of leadership in post-conflict countries, which means that they need to be supporters of any initiatives by the peace operation to strengthen women’s participation in national institutions if they are to be sustainable following the departure of the mission. The MLT will have to consider their strategic communications with and approaches towards local actors on issues around women’s participation in politics and security institutions, with a strong emphasis on the importance of gender equality to a long-term, sustainable peace.

Resources provided by troop- and police-contributing countries

Force generation in peacekeeping missions is generally beyond the control of the MLT. Nevertheless, the mission leadership can use its influence to urge contingents to deploy more women to peacekeeping missions, but the operational case needs to be clearly made with both the TCC/PCC and UNHQ. In cases where a contingent has deployed very few women, the MLT should work with the military and police leadership to encourage the deployment of the available women on patrols where possible, rather than use them in camp administrative functions, in order to engage with the local population and security forces.
6.3 Youth Participation Supported

The importance of engaging with youth as part of efforts to maintain peace and security was mandated in 2015 by UN Security Council Resolution 2250 on Youth, Peace and Security (YPS). In countries affected by armed conflict, youth comprise a significant yet heterogeneous portion of the population. Young people play a wide range of different and changing roles in conflict and peacebuilding. They can be peacebuilders and community leaders, while youth groups are often a source of resilience in any community. But they also account for many of those affected by conflict, not least as refugees and IDPs. Conflict may have disrupted their access to education and economic opportunities, increasing their vulnerability. Overlooking the rights and situation of young people can risk stoking grievances and make them an accessible demographic for armed groups, particularly if offering economic opportunities to provide for their future.

Despite these factors, youth are often excluded from discussions and decision making about peace and security, and underrepresented in formal political structures, including peace processes. The narrative around young people in conflict tends to stereotype and characterize them as either victims or perpetrators, strongly reinforced by gender norms (young female victims and young male fighters), with little recognition of their agency, unique perspectives and positive contribution to peace. However, young people’s understandings of their local realities—and therefore of conflict dynamics and structural causes—can provide unique and valuable insights during the situational awareness phase of a mission, or in a conflict analysis process. Young people also often constitute an electoral majority, which means that there are demographic incentives for the host government to listen to them and to value their engagement.

Peace operations have a number of different mechanisms for engaging with young people and supporting their participation in society. Engaging young people can involve mobilizing funding support to ensure they are able to achieve agency and leadership, build networks and organize themselves. Through the work of different mission sections—including Civil Affairs, Political Affairs, Strategic Communications, and Community Policing—missions can foster dialogues with the host authorities as well as civil society.

Key UN Policies & Guidance

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32 UN Security Council Resolution 2250 defines youth as anyone aged between 18 and 29. However, there are variances at the national level, and different UN entities and regional organizations use various age definitions. Subsequent UN resolutions on YPS include UN General Assembly Resolution 70/262 (2016) and UN Security Council resolutions 2282 (2016) and 2419 (2018).
6.3.1 Operational activities

The key operational activities to support this output include:

• Ensuring a youth perspective, and young people’s participation, in peace and conflict analysis processes.
• Mainstreaming a youth perspective in programme design, implementation and evaluation, and establishing inclusive mechanisms to enable meaningful youth participation in these processes, as well as in political forums within the host country.
• Establishing structured and systematic formal mechanisms to engage with youth, bringing together the mission, the UNCT and civil society.
• Enhancing institutional capacity by appointing a youth adviser in the mission and employing a network of youth focal points.
• Include training and briefings for mission and UNCT senior leadership, as well as civilian, police and military staff.

6.3.2 Benchmarks

*Short-term*

• Mapping exercise and youth needs assessment undertaken by mission and UNCT counterparts, together with young people.
• Key actors identified to foster youth engagement in peacebuilding activities.
• DDR programmes developed to support youth-specific needs.

*Medium-term*

• YPS is included in mission mandates, budgets and reports to the UN Security Council.
• A strategic YPS Agenda roadmap is developed to facilitate coordination between mission, UNCT and other actors.
• Institutional capacity is ensured through a mission youth advisor and a youth focal-point system.
• Structured and systematic mechanisms established for consultation between the mission, UNCT and young people.
• Youth groups are involved in collaborating and partnering with the mission on peace and conflict analyses and early warning, and developing sustainable options for peace and reconciliation, in line with “do no harm” principles.
Agreement among the donor community reached to avoid overlapping priorities and actions.

**Long-term**

- National and international policies and responses are better integrated with long-term development frameworks that include youth organizations.
- Meaningful input into the political process established from a diverse range of youth actors.

### 6.3.3 Responsibilities and coordination

Engagement with youth is undertaken by a number of mission sections. However, caution and special considerations must be observed with respect to military and police components when engaging with youth. Responsibility for youth programmes is likely to rest with the host government, the UNCT and NGOs on the ground. In particular, entities such as the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), UNDP, the UN Population Fund and the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) may be involved in supporting longer-term programming on the ground. The mission can support these activities and should factor them into planning at the inception of the mission. The mission can also play a critical role in supporting the growth of—and, to a limited extent, kick-starting—the engagement of youth in post-conflict settings, through sections such as Civil Affairs, Political Affairs, Human Rights, Community Policing, Rule of Law, Gender, and Strategic Communications.

### 6.3.4 Resources

Despite its importance, youth participation is rarely planned and budgeted for in a mission’s design phase. Activities to support engagement with young people are therefore likely to require additional donor support. This is not necessarily the responsibility of the peace operation but the MLT team can play a role in engaging with other partners to support these initiatives in fulfilment of the overall objectives of the mandate and building a more sustainable peace. In addition to programming, human resources are required to ensure a peace operation’s institutional capacity to mainstream YPS, including training and staff resources such as a mission youth adviser, as well as partnerships that can be forged to support these efforts.
6.3.5 Challenges and risks

- Ill-informed assumptions stereotyping young people as victims, disengaged or perpetrators of violence and social unrest in the country.
- The common mistake of programming for but not with young people, seeing youth only as recipients of a programme rather than as partners in its design, planning, delivery and evaluation.
- The elites and political class may be reluctant to engage with youth, valuing experience in numbers of years over their rights, knowledge and unique perspectives.
- Conflict may have limited the ability of young people to receive education and training, thus also limiting their options for engagement.
- Youth are not a homogeneous group so efforts must be made to engage with a diverse range of young people, not just those in a position of privilege, and to seek their input and perspectives.
- Youth often carry the burden of social and economic insecurity, and may be excluded from employment and formal political processes due to lack of resources.
- Instrumentalization and tokenism of young people by institutions, taking advantage of a youth group to serve a political objective.
6.3.6 Considerations

Youth engagement in political processes takes many forms and some may be in tension with each other

Young people are likely to be excluded from formal political processes and mechanisms. They may, however, have established other grassroots initiatives in the community to facilitate civic engagement. The MLT will need to identify how to engage with and navigate these organizations, along with the host government. Young people’s own initiatives and organizations are often a source of community resilience. It is therefore important to consider building on, and partnering with, these initiatives, before creating new projects and programmes.

Youth, peace and security and other agendas

Although there are similarities between the YPS Agenda and the WPS Agenda, they require different approaches, as they address different power structures and forms of exclusion. Common approaches taken to women’s peace and security or gender cannot therefore simply be templated. Furthermore, youth is not synonymous with “young men” any more than “gender” is synonymous with women. Youth, peace and security intersects with a number of other agendas, including the overarching 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, as well as efforts to counter violent extremism and DDR efforts. It is important to understand how these agendas relate to one another when operationalized, to benefit from synergies rather than trade-offs in their implementation.
6.4 Civil Society Engaged and Supported

Engaging with civil society is essential to building and sustaining peace. Civil society is not a monolithic unit. It refers to a “political space” for organized peaceful collective action that is voluntary and uncoerced, and which involves a “wide spectrum of societal actors motivated by shared interests, values, or purposes to advance common ideas and objectives”.

Civil society commonly embraces a diversity of spaces, actors and institutional forms, varying in their degree of formality, autonomy and power. It can comprise individuals, human rights defenders, journalists and independent media, community leaders, trade unions, women’s groups, youth groups, faith-based organizations, advocacy groups, social movements and social media communities.

Efforts to engage with civil society need to be viewed as long-term processes. If engagement by the peace operations is ad hoc, the mission will not be viewed as a reliable partner. If the mission focuses only on consulting with formal and elite organizations, then it will marginalize and alienate parts of the population, particularly at the local level, potentially exacerbating tensions and conflict. The MLT needs to ensure that peacekeeping personnel adopt a holistic approach to engaging with civil society.

Peace operations can leverage civil society to improve the conditions for mandate implementation in order to prevent and mitigate local-level conflicts, provide early warning on human rights violations and abuses, devise protection strategies, facilitate local consultations and foster greater inclusiveness, particularly of women and youth. Such engagement can also positively enhance the perceived legitimacy of the mission. It is critical, however, that mission activities to engage with civil society take full account of the gender dimension, as well as the security risks to different groups. This might entail creating a space for the mission, UNCT and civil society leaders to consult, through mechanisms such as civil society advisory committees.

CSOs have an important role in shaping and transforming societies, but they may not always support the same objectives as the UN, particularly when it comes to a peace process. The MLT must be aware of the nature of the CSOs in their specific mission context and be careful to ensure that “the needs of all segments of society are taken into account” through an understanding of how different elements can and cannot contribute to
building a peace. The mission will therefore need to identify and map civil society actors on a regular basis in order to understand their interests and their ability to positively or negatively influence the peace process and its mandated tasks. These stakeholder analyses should inform planning processes and reflect a theory of change.

### 6.4.1 Operational activities

The key operational activities to support this output include:

- Conducting actor mapping and needs assessment of CSOs at the national and local levels.
- Establishing formal mechanisms for engaging with civil society that are structured and systematic, bringing together the mission, the UNCT and civil society, and which include specific consultation mechanisms for women and youth.
- Integrating the outcomes from peace and conflict and stakeholder analyses into relevant UN and strategic mission planning documents.
- Sharing good practices with civil society groups, producing practical tools and fostering a conducive environment for a robust civil society.
- Coordinating support by the donor community.

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6.4.2 Benchmarks

**Short-term**
- Mapping exercise and needs assessment of CSOs undertaken between mission and UNCT counterparts, linking actors to objectives, identifying levels of interest and influence, and the relationships between key actors, the host state and parties to the conflict.
- Key actors with which to engage identified.
- Segments of local communities, civil society and diasporas are informed of and consulted with about mission objectives to facilitate greater understanding of the mission mandate.

**Medium-term**
- Structured and systematic mechanisms established for consultation between the mission, the UNCT and CSOs.
- Civil society involved in collaborating with the mission through early warning and development of sustainable options for peace and reconciliation (in line with “do no harm” principles).
- Agreement reached within the donor community to avoid overlapping priorities and actions.
- Best practices applied by bilateral and multilateral partners.

**Long-term**
- Climate of cooperation exists between civil society and the government in which each holds the other to account, with appropriate and proportionate checks and balances in place.
- National and international policies and responses are better integrated with long-term development frameworks that include CSOs.
- Civil society institutions are empowered and have the capacity to mobilize without fear of undue interference or pressure from government institutions.
- Meaningful input into the political process by civil society actors established.
6.4.3 Responsibilities and coordination

The HoM will need to communicate that engagement with civil society is a priority across all mission components. It will also be important to engage the FC and Police Commissioner in discussions so that security concerns are heard and taken into account. If it is to be effective, such engagement with civil society needs to be systemic and coordinated. It should also leverage existing mechanisms, where possible, particularly those established by the UNCT. While other UN actors, such as UNDP and OHCHR, play an important role in supporting civil society, peace operations often have a very strong political mandate to work with civil society in the context of reconciliation, addressing local conflicts, promoting women’s participation and gender equality, fostering inclusiveness and reintegrating former combatants. Through sections such as Civil Affairs, Political Affairs, Public Information, Human Rights, Rule of Law, Gender, and Child Protection, a mission can play a positive role in supporting the growth of civil society in a post-conflict setting.

6.4.4 Resources

The Civil Affairs section will have a central role in engaging with civil society, given its focus on monitoring and facilitation at the local level, as well as confidence building, conflict management and reconciliation. It will also have a key role in ensuring that local voices are heard and in forging partnerships with civil society. Additional engagement will come from the human rights section (to ensure that civil society is not coming under threat or having its rights violated) and the strategic communications section (to support messaging with communities while keeping the national authorities informed about different activities), where appropriate. Bilateral partners may also be involved in supporting CSOs, depending on donor interests.
6.4.5 Challenges and risks

- Strengthening or rebuilding civil society is a long-term process. Peacekeeping operations can only, at best, provide initial support. The challenge should be approached with humility, deference to local knowledge and avoidance of international and donor hubris.

- A polarized society is likely to have a negative impact on the emergence of viable civil society structures, as intimidation, real or perceived, may discourage members of civil society from pursuing their work freely and rigorously.

- As expectations within civil society may be high when it comes to implementation of the mission mandate, messaging needs to be carefully managed.

- Similarly, as CSOs may expect support in the form of financial resources, the mission will need to manage these expectations, which may involve providing information on external funding opportunities.

- The host government may view civil society as a threat to its authority and attempt to thwart engagement efforts between the mission and civil society.
6.4.6 Considerations

Engaging locals versus elites

It is not possible for a peace operation to engage with all of civil society. It often only engages with a few elite people, normally based in the capital, who may deem themselves representative of a wider group, demographic or set of interests. This can cause friction, tensions and even conflict. The peace operation should ensure that it engages with civil society in a transparent but broad-based manner that is communicated at the national and community level. Engagement at field-office level will be essential to achieve this, but coherence of messaging will be challenging.

Navigating a polarized civil society and government caution

Civil society represents a diverse range of views and interests. This means that it is not necessarily neutral, and may be divided by the conflict, with different groups supporting different parties to the conflict. The MLT needs to be aware of this, and make assessments on engagement to ensure that the mission does not give the impression that it is inadvertently supporting one party or another. Engagement may also exacerbate tensions with the host government. Social media platforms have provided new outreach methods for stakeholders, but many countries have also witnessed a growth in attempts by governments to control civil society groups, which are competing for resources and legitimacy. A key challenge for mission management will be how to properly identify the various actors that can promote and strengthen peace, and to navigate the relationship with the host government where there are differences. Broad engagement across civil society is essential.

Supporting civil society while allowing it to stand on its own feet

A long-term view on supporting civil society argues that the most robust organizations should be free of any international support in order to maintain their local credibility.
6.5 Return and Reintegration of Refugees and IDPs Supported

The safe return of refugees and IDPs is a highly sensitive and potentially volatile process, from the identification and registration of affected persons to their eventual and voluntary return, in safety and in dignity, and their subsequent reintegration. Even after their return, a number of political and security issues (e.g. property disputes) may arise, as communities that were abandoned by their original residents may have been resettled by others, leading to tensions and renewed conflict. The status of returnees who may have been former combatants is likely to be legally and politically complex, and to require further guidance. As is the case with other humanitarian activities, the return of refugees and IDPs is managed and led by specialized UN agencies and their implementing humanitarian partners. However, the peacekeeping mission is central to establishing safe and secure conditions, and can play an important supporting role before, during and after the return.

6.5.1 Operational activities

The key operational activities by the mission to support this output include:

- Monitoring border crossings and securing return corridors.
- Providing physical protection in the form of temporary shelters, working closely with the authorities responsible for camp management and security.
- Coordinating and conducting mine clearance of routes and resettlement areas.
- Ensuring a safe and secure environment around IDP camps.
- In support of the host government, ensuring a safe and secure environment at the IDPs’/refugees’ places of origin to allow a safe return.
- Providing logistical support to humanitarian agencies, as necessary and as requested, within the means and capabilities of the mission.
- Monitoring, recording and reporting human rights violations and helping to ensure that all returns are voluntary.
- Conducting civil affairs activities aimed at addressing the tensions between returnees and receiving communities.
6.5.2 Benchmarks

**Short-term**
- Refugee and IDP camps are safe and secure and women’s security is being considered.
- Refugees and IDPs are identified and registered and are agreeing to return voluntarily.
- Border crossings and return corridors are secure and free of mines and other threats.

**Medium-term**
- Places of origin are safe and secure, and women’s security is being considered.
- Returns are taking place in an orderly and safe manner.
- Accommodation and basic services are available on return.

**Long-term**
- Reintegration of returnees is successful, and the receiving population is playing a supportive role.
- Property disputes are being addressed through well-established and impartial mechanisms.
- National and international policies and responses are better integrated with long-term development frameworks.

6.5.3 Responsibilities and coordination

The main responsibility for the voluntary return of refugees and IDPs rests with UNHCR or the International Organization for Migration, supported by WFP and UNICEF, and international and local NGOs. OCHA plays an important role in terms of coordination, policy and advocacy, but is not an operational agency directly engaged in the delivery of humanitarian programmes. The peacekeeping mission acts in a supporting role. Efforts should be closely coordinated by the DSRSG–RC/HC, in concert with the FC when the military is involved. Parameters for use of peacekeeping assets or personnel in support of the return of refugees and IDPs should be based on a detailed agreement between members of the MLT and the RC/HC, under the overall authority of the HoM.

In extreme situations, missions may be managing IDPs seeking protection from physical violence in what have been termed “POC sites” on or alongside UN bases as part of their mandate to protect civilians. This will require the direct engagement of the peacekeeping mission and the
MLT to manage the facilities and provide security, in close coordination with humanitarian actors. Broadly speaking, the same issues apply to returning and reintegrating refugees in these sites.

### 6.5.4 Resources

Providing security for protection camps can tie down scarce mission resources. If possible, local security services (in particular the police) will need to be supported, which will often require police component resources. Securing border crossings and return corridors is labour intensive and may require considerable military resources. Ensuring that returns are voluntary and that possible disputes are addressed are core functions of several civilian sections such as Political Affairs, Civil Affairs, Human Rights, and Public Information. It is therefore an integrated activity, which requires close coordination within the mission and with the UNCT, as well as adequate human and other resources.

### 6.5.5 Challenges and risks

- Information on the number, needs and types of displaced people may be lacking or inaccurate, or even manipulated.
- Refugee and IDP camps may become militarized and politicized and/or the centre of tensions and conflict, while borders become areas of direct security risk, particularly for women.
- Host governments may have an interest in maintaining the status of refugee and IDP camps to garner international attention or, alternatively, seek to have them dismantled before there is a safe and secure environment for IDPs to return to.
- Involuntary returns may create fear, tensions and instability.
- Security conditions along return corridors may still be fragile.
- Returning refugee or IDP groups may include former combatants who may seek to restart hostilities.
- Resentment between returnees and receiving communities may be a source of instability and spark renewed conflict.
- The status of refugees and IDPs could become institutionalized and entirely dependent on long-term emergency relief.
- After prolonged periods in camps, IDPs may be reluctant to move back to their areas of origin.
- Lack of coordination between the peacekeeping operation and humanitarian agencies.
6.5.6 Considerations

**Balancing security and national ownership**

Refugees and IDPs and their camps can become political pawns, and there is a danger that they will exacerbate tensions. The security of refugees, IDPs and their environment is a concern of the MLT. A balance must be struck between the mission’s responsibilities to protect vulnerable civilians and the principle of national ownership. Ideally, the security of the camps and their inhabitants should be a matter between UNHCR, the host government and the camps’ internal organizational structures. However, the MLT may have a political role in facilitating the host government’s close engagement in and resolution of the issue, as well as a responsibility, in support of the host government, to ensure that the camps exist in a secure environment. The amount of mission resources to commit to this process will be a matter of MLT judgement.

**Promoting speedy returns while ensuring that all returns are voluntary and take place in safety and dignity**

The existence and reduction in the number of dependent refugees and IDPs tend to be international measures of a peacekeeping operation’s progress and success. While UNHCR is the lead on this issue, there may be tensions between the political motivations of the peacekeeping mission which will wish to free up committed resources and UNHCR’s humanitarian criteria. This will require close coordination of activities and messages within the UN system.
6.6 Transition from Recovery to Development

Enabled

Once the need for emergency assistance has subsided and early recovery is in progress, the focus should be on a smooth transition to longer-term development activities. This will entail gradual handover of responsibilities to national authorities. The transition from peacekeeping to subsequent phases of UN engagement should be factored in from the outset of the mission planning process, in order to clearly delineate the roles and responsibilities of the various UN actors on the ground. Ideally, planning for the transition from emergency and early recovery to long-term rehabilitation and development should begin early in the peacekeeping and peacebuilding phase. It is important at the outset to help national authorities implement a holistic approach that brings together all the relevant branches of government. Only national actors are in a position to meet their country’s needs and objectives in a sustainable manner.

Clearly identified benchmarks will make it easier to plan the exit strategy of the peace operation. In other words, the successful transition from recovery to development and the ability of national and other institutions to take responsibility in a number of areas will be defining factors in the drawdown of a mission. Key elements of transition, such as socio-economic recovery, are rarely among the mandated tasks of a peacekeeping mission. This makes a holistic and integrated UN approach essential. Peace operations must also support a number of essential activities that contribute to the consolidation of peace, such as the restoration of basic services and the revitalization of the economy.

6.6.1 Operational activities

The key operational activities by the mission to support this output include:

- Completing the DDR process.
- Ensuring the ability of national armed forces, police and other law-enforcement agencies to provide security and maintain public order.
- Monitoring the restoration of state authority and the resumption of basic services.
- Overseeing the consolidation of legitimate political institutions and democratic processes.
- Benchmarking and achieving consensus on the criteria for successful transition in coordination with the UNCT.

Developing transition plans in all relevant areas in coordination with the UNCT.
UNMIL: An accelerated, yet prudent and responsible, exit

When I arrived in Liberia in July 2015, the country was already fairly advanced along the path of peace consolidation. Achieving the long-awaited UN strategic goal in Liberia—attaining a steady state of security with national institutions able to maintain security independently of a peacekeeping mission—seemed closer than ever before. The democratically elected government had been in office for nearly 10 years, and the process of institution-building in the rule of law and security sector was at an advanced stage. Yet, fragility was palpable.

The UN Security Council had been considering the drawdown and withdrawal of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) since 2007. In my pre-deployment bilateral meetings with key members of the Security Council, most made it clear to me that the closure of the mission before the October 2017 general elections was a priority, and that preparation for that eventuality constituted the core of my mandate. They expressed frustration over a “wasteful mission creep”, in terms of both mandated timeframe and expanse, leading to an “acute and chronic dependency syndrome”.

However, the common narrative in Liberia—whether in the government or civil society, cities or countryside, the mission and other UN entities, or neighbouring, subregional and regional diplomatic representations—was running in the opposite direction. They argued that while there was significant progress in the area of security, the state of stability was still vulnerable, and people remained deeply weary of a dangerous relapse, which the government might not be able to handle in the absence of peacekeepers. They pointed out that the electoral campaign, which is always accompanied by heightened levels political tension, had the potential to lead to widespread violence. As such, they argued that the mission should remain in place until Liberia was ready to stand on its own.
It was obvious that UNMIL must rapidly and fully concentrate on helping prepare the country, psychologically and operationally, for a post-UNMIL future. The task of completing the UNMIL mandate in an accelerated manner had to be implemented in tandem with the mission's further drawdown as we moved closer to its closure. Our actions included extensive dialogue and engagement with the government, political parties and civil society leaders, as well as massive outreach campaign with (and through) the media and the general public, with a view to instilling self-confidence and national pride in assuming full responsibility for their future.

In the meantime, we accelerated the transfer of residual responsibilities in human rights monitoring, rule of law, national reconciliation and security sector reform to the government institutions, civil society and the UN Country Team. Given the critical significance of ensuring that transfer of power from President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf to a new president took place through free, fair and peaceful elections, the mission successfully supported the joint appeal by the President and her Côte d’Ivoire counterpart, as well as many regional and subregional voices, for the Security Council to extend the mission’s mandate until after the elections and the inauguration of the new president.

Furthermore, the mission enhanced its assertive engagement with the three branches of government to expedite full implementation of the transition agenda and the preparation of a peacebuilding plan.

Farid Zarif, SRSG UNMIL, 2015–18
6.6.2 Benchmarks

Short-term
- Security situation stabilized.
- Host government generally considered legitimate and enjoys public support.
- Disarmament and demobilization completed, and focus shifted to reintegration of former combatants.
- Public participation in development visible.
- Public expectations for development managed.

Medium-term
- The state has a monopoly on the legitimate use of force.
- Human rights violations are decreasing.
- The demands and needs of the victims of the conflict have been largely met.
- Reconciliation and transitional justice efforts are underway.
- Legitimate institutions of government have been established.
- Capacity-building efforts, including at the local level, are underway.
- A long-term development plan is in place.

Long-term
- Disputes are settled peacefully and within well-established and functioning political institutions and mechanisms.
- The rule of law has been fully (re-)established.
- General security levels and the economic climate are both conducive to foreign investment, encouraging participation by all economic actors, including local actors.
- Secure banking and credit structures and monetary policy are established, and inflation rate is controlled.
- Individuals and enterprises have access to loans and/or investment capital.
6.6.3 Responsibilities and coordination

A host of UN and external partners play lead roles in emergency assistance, early recovery and development, but the interface and involvement of a peacekeeping mission in all these efforts require close coordination with all the relevant actors, from the initial planning stage to the final handover of responsibilities. While the entire MLT should be actively involved in this regard, the role of the DSRSG–RC/HC is particularly important. Benchmarks should be formulated in close coordination with the national authorities, donor governments, and local and international NGOs. These should be based on the development of local capabilities rather than progress with mandate implementation. Careful cooperation and coordination between the mission and UNHQ, including the PBSO, will be necessary in determining possible follow-on arrangements to the peacekeeping mission.

6.6.4 Resources

From a resource perspective, most recovery and development efforts are outside of the purview of the peacekeeping mission. However, the mission should have adequate civilian human resources throughout its deployment, including during the process of downsizing/liquidation, to be able to efficiently undertake all liaison and coordination activities with relevant partners. Since many recovery and development activities are funded from voluntary contributions, the MLT, especially the SRSG and the DSRSG–RC/HC, will play an important role in coordinating UN efforts, and mobilizing donor support and the engagement of key international players such as the World Bank, the IMF, the EU and regional financial institutions.
6.6.5 Challenges and risks

• The peace operation is withdrawn prematurely leaving the structural causes of the conflict unaddressed, with the potential to affect long-term development.
• National authorities and local institutions do not yet have the capacity to take over from the mission and/or UNCT.
• Donor fatigue leads to disengagement and under-funding of recovery programmes.
• Donor focus is diverted to other emerging international crises.
• There is a lack of funds for peace consolidation and development activities, such as for the reintegration of former combatants.
• There is a lack of coordination between peacekeeping mission and follow-on operations and/or entities.
• There is a lack of thorough analysis of or consideration given to the needs of women or perceptions of their security.
6.6.6 Considerations

**Premature withdrawal versus over-dependence on the peacekeeping mission**

Resource pressure may compel the UN Security Council and the wider international community to push for the termination or downsizing of a peacekeeping mission earlier than recommended or desired by the UN Secretariat. Pressure to withdraw may also come from the host government. On the one hand, premature withdrawal could have disastrous consequences from a political, security and financial perspective. On the other hand, the extended presence of a mission may lead to overdependence or inhibit the development of national capacities. Capacity development should start as early as possible rather than being seen only in the context of an international exit strategy.

**Maintaining external support while preparing for withdrawal**

International attention is greatest in the immediate aftermath of a conflict, generally defined as the first two years after the main conflict has ended. Transitions may be a sign of successful peace consolidation; but they are also highly sensitive periods. National authorities may have concerns that the departure of the peacekeeping mission will have unintended impacts or coincide with a huge drop in external political and financial support. The HoM and MLT should actively encourage international actors to continue their engagement after the withdrawal of the mission. The prospects for a responsible exit would be improved in each case, and overall costs reduced, by three sets of commitments by the international community: (a) enhanced economic support; (b) political oversight, perhaps through new Peacebuilding Commission country-specific mechanisms; and (c) security guarantees.
6.7 Independent Media Supported

A free press can ensure that citizens have access to diverse sources of information, enabling them to take part in society more effectively. An independent media that is engaged with citizens can support many of the same objectives as a peace operation. It can encourage dialogue and foster a range of different views, which might counter or dispel efforts to perpetuate misinformation or hate speech. Investigative journalism can shine a light on impunity, atrocities or injustices, supporting the strengthening of government institutions and accountability, as well as mandate implementation of a peace operation.

The free and responsible flow of information can be vital in supporting efforts to build and sustain peace.\(^35\) In the context of many peace operations, however, the media can also be manipulated to spread misinformation and hate speech, or journalists may be targeted, censored or arrested. A lack of independent media outlets, or a plurality of media institutions, can exacerbate tensions and conflict.

Peace operations do not have a lead role in establishing an independent media. Efforts to support the establishment of an independent media are largely beholden to the host authorities, which need to support freedom of expression. Moreover, independent regulators and funders are required in order to support the existence and work of an independent media. However, peace operations provide an enabling role, through their political offices and capacity-building tasks, which provides an opportunity to foster institutions that can protect journalists in the long term, through judicial and legal institutions, and foster the development of an independent media. The Strategic Communications and Public Information section can do much to support the training of local journalists, thereby supporting the development of an independent media.

6.7.1 Operational activities

The key operational activities by the mission to support this output include:

- Encouraging and supporting local media professionals, including through the training of journalists.
- Supporting the creation of self-regulatory mechanisms in the media and/or an independent media commission.
- Supporting the development of institutions and/or legislation that will support press freedom and address impunity.

• Building the capacity of government institutions to engage with the media, through training on both traditional and social media.
• Supporting civic education programmes with civil society and development actors that foster an understanding in the community of the role of media and reporting.

6.7.2 Benchmarks

**Short-term**
• A process to establish an independent regulatory mechanism for the media has commenced.
• Host authorities are engaged in discussions about the value and importance of an independent media, and any judicial reforms that need to be considered.
• A mission radio station and/or programmes have been established to engage with civil society and local journalists.

**Medium-term**
• There is a legal framework that guarantees freedom of speech and access to information.
• Capacity-building or training programmes have been created to professionalize journalists.

**Long-term**
• Self-regulatory mechanism created by the print and electronic media, working effectively within the limits of the law.
• Independent media regulation/commission functioning effectively.
• Government engaging effectively with the media to communicate with the population.
6.7.3 Responsibilities and coordination

Supporting an independent media is not necessarily a mandated task, and no single mission component has sole responsibility for providing such support. It is, however, an important consequence of advocating for legislative and judicial reform. In this regard, political affairs and judicial officers can have an important role to play. MLT members can act as role models for the host authorities in terms of how they and the mission engage with the media, particularly when there is criticism of actions the mission has undertaken. In support of a free and independent media, a mission may attempt to build capacity by establishing a radio station to provide free and independent news, and through the training of local journalists. This may require coordination with the Strategic Communications and Public Information section, the Civil Affairs section, development actors and bilateral donors.

6.7.4 Resources

Efforts to support an independent media are likely to require additional donor support, particularly to support efforts to establish a plurality of media organizations and the infrastructure needed to support different media platforms (including television, radio, print, Internet and social media). This is not the responsibility of the peace operation, but the MLT can play a role in engaging with other partners to support these initiatives in fulfilment of the overall mandate and objectives, and to build a more sustainable peace.
6.7.5 Challenges and risks

- Intimidation, real or perceived, may discourage members of civil society and the media from pursuing their work freely and rigorously.
- The media may pose a threat to the mission if not engaged with effectively.
- Global distrust in media organizations may result in a lack of public trust in established organizations and the news they communicate.
- Other actors may capitalize on new media platforms to spread “fake news” to promote a particular view of the conflict, or against the mission.
- If the mission fails to effectively engage with the media institutions that are established, particularly in times of crisis or criticism, this may set a bad example for the role of government in accepting a free and independent media.
- Funding media institutions can be a challenge, which means that there is a risk of undue influence if media organizations are not appropriately and sustainably funded and guided by journalistic ethics, which makes appropriate donor support essential.

6.7.6 Considerations

*Access to and reach of different media platforms*

In some countries, traditional media platforms may have more reach than new social media platforms due to limited or uneven Internet access. The MLT will need to consider the different priorities in terms of engaging in activities that might support an independent media, based on the availability and accessibility of different media platforms across the country.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CMCoord</td>
<td>Civil–military coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPAS</td>
<td>Comprehensive Performance Assessment System</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRSV</td>
<td>Conflict–related sexual violence</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSA</td>
<td>Chief Security Adviser</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil society organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>DoA</td>
<td>Delegation of authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration</td>
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<tr>
<td>DO</td>
<td>Designated Official</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOS</td>
<td>UN Department of Operational Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPO</td>
<td>UN Department of Peace Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPPA</td>
<td>UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSRSG</td>
<td>Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General</td>
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<tr>
<td>EOD</td>
<td>Explosive ordnance disposal</td>
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<tr>
<td>ERW</td>
<td>Explosive remnants of war</td>
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<tr>
<td>FC</td>
<td>Force Commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>FPU</td>
<td>Formed police unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>HC</td>
<td>Humanitarian Coordinator</td>
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<td>HIPPO</td>
<td>Independent High-level Panel on Peace Operations</td>
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<td>HRDDP</td>
<td>Human Rights Due Diligence Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>HoM</td>
<td>Head of Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAP</td>
<td>Integrated assessment and planning</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally displaced person</td>
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<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised explosive device</td>
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<td>IHL</td>
<td>International humanitarian law</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPO</td>
<td>International police officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISF</td>
<td>Integrated Strategic Framework</td>
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<td>ISR</td>
<td>Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance</td>
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<td>JMAC</td>
<td>Joint Mission Analysis Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>JOC</td>
<td>Joint Operations Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>MLT</td>
<td>Mission Leadership Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSU</td>
<td>Mediation Support Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non–governmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSAG</td>
<td>Non–state armed group</td>
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<td>OCHA</td>
<td>UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>OHCHR</td>
<td>Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>OIOS</td>
<td>UN Office of Internal Oversight Services</td>
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<td>OROLSI</td>
<td>UN DPO Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions</td>
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<tr>
<td>PBSO</td>
<td>UN Peacebuilding Support Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>Police Commissioner</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCC</td>
<td>Police-contributing country</td>
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<td>POC</td>
<td>Protection of civilians</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSA</td>
<td>Principal Security Adviser</td>
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<tr>
<td>RC</td>
<td>UN Resident Coordinator</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>Rules of engagement</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDG</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goal</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEA</td>
<td>Sexual exploitation and abuse</td>
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<tr>
<td>SGBV</td>
<td>Sexual and gender-based violence</td>
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<tr>
<td>SGF</td>
<td>Strategic Guidance Framework for International Policing</td>
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<tr>
<td>SMS</td>
<td>Security management system</td>
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<tr>
<td>SMT</td>
<td>Security Management Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOFA</td>
<td>Status of forces agreement</td>
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<td>SOMA</td>
<td>Status of mission agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRA</td>
<td>Security risk assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRM</td>
<td>Security risk management</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRSG</td>
<td>Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security sector reform</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCC</td>
<td>Troop-contributing country</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOC</td>
<td>Transnational organized crime</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNCT</td>
<td>UN Country Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>UN Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>UN High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHQ</td>
<td>UN Headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>UN Children’s Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNPOL</td>
<td>UN Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>USG</td>
<td>Under-Secretary-General</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDSS</td>
<td>UN Department of Safety and Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>WPS</td>
<td>Women, Peace and Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>YPS</td>
<td>Youth, Peace and Security</td>
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</table>
### Partner organizations

(in alphabetical order)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Organization</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Centro Argentino de Entrenamiento Conjunto para Operaciones de Paz (CAECOPAZ), in cooperation with the Ministry of Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>National Defence Research University (NDRU), in cooperation with the Ministry of Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Australian Civil–Military Centre (ACMC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Global Affairs Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>China Institute for International Strategic Studies (CIISS), in cooperation with the Peacekeeping Office, Ministry of National Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Cairo International Center for Conflict Resolution, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding (CCCPA), in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development and Ministry of Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF), in cooperation with the German Federal Foreign Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>United Services Institution of India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Institute of Diplomacy of the Jordanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates, and the Jordan Public Security Directorate and Peacekeeping Operations Training Centre</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Nigeria  National Defence College, in cooperation with the Nigerian Army, Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Norway  Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI)

Pakistan  National Defence University, in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence

Russia  Center for Euro-Atlantic Security of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in cooperation with the Center for Political and International Studies

South Africa  Institute for Security Studies

Sweden  Folke Bernadotte Academy, the Swedish Armed Forces, the National Police Board, and the National Prison and Probation Service

Switzerland  Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF) and Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP), in cooperation with the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs and the Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport

Turkey  Center for Strategic Research of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in cooperation with the Armed Forces and National Police

United Kingdom  Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO), in cooperation with the Ministry of Defence

United States  Department of State, Department of Defense and United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, in cooperation with the United States Institute of Peace

Uruguay  Ministry of Foreign Affairs

World Federation of United Nations Associations (WFUNA)
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