



Looking to the Future: Peace Operations in 2015¹

I. Introduction

1. Global peacekeeping enters its seventh decade at a moment of strategic uncertainty – with a shifting power balance between the great and emerging powers; with a poorly understood and evolving terrorism threat; and with deep political divisions that trace outwards from the war in Iraq complicating international cooperation in a range of areas, but particularly on collective security questions.

2. Until recently, peacekeeping has seemed isolated from this strategic uncertainty. Global peacekeeping is at record high levels of troop deployments, and has missions of ever-expanding scale and complexity – as well as an increasingly complex organizational structure. At the UN, peacekeeping has been the one area left largely untouched by the political divisions that have scuttled broader reform initiatives.

3. Troop numbers in the UN alone have risen 600% in the past six year. Is this rise likely to continue? Will the UN continue to be the backbone of peacekeeping, working in collaboration with other organizations such as the AU, EU and NATO; or is a more divided system emerging? Where will the demand for peacekeeping come, and from where the supply of troops?

4. This report poses these and related questions to forecast some aspects of the likely future of peacekeeping over the next five to seven years. It is necessarily speculative; and since serving as a backgrounder for discussion among a wide range of Challenges Forum Partners, intended to provoke. The paper is not normative or prescriptive – rather, it is analytical in its approach, raising developments and noting emerging issues without judging *a priori* whether these are positive or negative.

5. It suggests that the likely evolution of peacekeeping will be built around three main features: a deepening engagement in state-building functions; a growing counter-insurgency and possibly even counter-terrorism function; and the gradual emergence of a predictable multi-actor system for peacekeeping involving, primarily, the UN, NATO, the AU and EU. That is, if global

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peacekeeping systems can overcome three political and three technical challenges. The technical challenges are deepening organizational capabilities for management and oversight; maintaining and indeed increasing the availability of troops, police and civilian personnel; and improving the mechanisms for inter-institutional cooperation and coordination. The technical challenges will likely be overcome if the political ones are: maintaining host nation consent for intrusive operations, maintaining contributing nations consent for robust operations, and – perhaps most difficult of all – maintaining overall international support for peacekeeping as a robust instrument for peace maintenance, protection of civilians, counter-insurgency and even counter-terrorism functions.

II. Brief Background on the Evolution of Peace Keeping

6. Peacekeeping has a long history in the UN. While full-blown peacekeeping is generally considered to have been born in the Suez Crisis with the deployment of the UN Emergency Force (UNEF), peace operations had an important precursor in the UN Truce Supervision Operation (UNTSO) deployed to the Arab-Israeli theatre in 1948 and still deployed there today – the UN's longest running mission.

7. UN Peacekeeping During the Cold War. That the UN's first two missions were in the Middle East was illustrative of peacekeeping's role in the Cold War era. With few exceptions, Cold War era peacekeeping was used in essence as a tool to help define and stabilize ceasefires or disengagement agreements in conflicts that otherwise threatened to engender direct superpower confrontation – along the Israel/Egypt border (twice) (UNEF), along the Israel/Syria border (UNDOF), and in southern Lebanon in the context of Israeli invasion (twice) (UNIFIL). The only consequential exception to this was the UN Operation in the Congo (UNOC), a large, multi-dimensional, and exceedingly robust operation that was deployed to the Congo to halt a secessionist war – a UN air force and 20,000 soldiers in tow, along with hundreds of civil servants, school teachers and other civilians. ONUC was a precursor, largely forgotten, to the transitional administration missions that would be so important to UN peacekeeping's revival at the end of the 1990s.

8. If the Middle East was the site of most early UN peacekeeping, it was also the cause of a loss of faith in the instrument in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Perhaps the turning point can be pinpointed at the moment that a proposal contained in the Egypt/Israel/US Camp David Accords for the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force in the Sinai to secure Egyptian territory after Israeli disengagement was rejected by the UN. The US instead designed and led a force, Multinational Force and Observers Sinai (MFO Sinai), comprised of US, Canadian, Italian and other western troop contributors, to deploy into the disengaged area – the birth of multinational peace operations outside the UN context. UN peacekeeping entered its Cold War doldrums.

9. The Post Cold War Surge. Those doldrums lasted until near to the end of the Cold War. By the late 1980s, however, the decline in US-Soviet tensions, and those two powers' search for ways to disengage from several of their proxy wars, led to renewed interest in UN peacemaking and then UN peacekeeping, in Namibia (UNTAG), Cambodia (UNTAC), El Salvador (ONUSAL), Mozambique (UNOMOZ) and Guatemala (MONUGUA). The rise in UN

peacekeeping – from a Cold War average of ca. 13,000 peacekeepers (as it stood in 1988) to 78,500 by early 1993 – was the first sign of the post-Cold War revitalization of the UN.²

10. The early UN peace operations enjoyed some important successes, often forgotten in later critiques. In Guatemala, El Salvador, Mozambique and in Cambodia (during the early stages) the UN's presence appeared to help create circumstances under which previously warring parties could reach accommodation with one another and implement wide-ranging peace agreements, themselves often negotiated with UN assistance.³ And in Namibia, the UN mounted its first large-scale transitional administration operation, with substantial success.⁴ The growing range of UN capabilities and prospective activities were encoded in Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's ambitiously titled *Agenda for Peace* (1992).

11. By 1994 however, the UN was coping with the political and moral fallout of a series of disastrous failures, some of their own making, some foisted upon them. In Somalia (UNISOM), Angola (UNAVEM), Rwanda (UNAMIR) and Bosnia (UNPROFOR), literally millions of people were dying or being brutally killed on the UN's watch, sometimes under UN protection, and partially as a result of the collapse of UN-brokered and UN-guaranteed peace agreements.⁵

12. Much as the successes sparked new engagements, new policies, new tools, and even new departments (the Department of Peacekeeping Operations was born in 1992 to bring greater coherence to the military dimensions of the UN's peace operations), so the failures provoked soul searching, lessons learning, pessimism and retrenchment.⁶ The interaction between the two, combined with evolutions in international thinking about such issues as sovereign responsibility and humanitarian intervention, produced a multifaceted evolution in UN peace operations during the next half-decade.

13. UN Peace Operations from the Late 1990s: Multi-faceted Evolution. Here, perhaps we can date the turning point to SG Annan's decision in summer 1999, when the UN's peacekeeping force in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was under heavy attack from the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), to stand firm and call for reinforcements – the opposite of the UN's disastrous stance when under attack in Rwanda. Annan deployed his USG for Peacekeeping, Bernard Miyet, to travel to Freetown to stand with the troops, while Annan himself made an impassioned plea to the Security Council to reinforce the operation. This was done by out of area reinforcements being sent by primarily India, Jordan and Britain, the latter deploying 2500 Royal Marines to fight alongside the beleaguered UN force, winning a quick reversal in their position. The British then stayed on to train the Sierra Leonean army.

² Global Policy Forum. "Size of UN Peacekeeping Forces: 1947-2006," <<http://globalpolicy.igc.org/security/peacekpg/data/pcekprs1.html>> December 9, 2002.

³ William Durch (ed.), *UN Peacekeeping, American Policy and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s* (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1996): Chapters 1,3,5,7.

⁴ There had been earlier transitional administration operations, in West Papua for example, but on a far smaller scale. See Simon Chesterman, *You, The People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004): pp. 58-60.

⁵ Charles T. Call and William Stanley, "Civilian Security", in *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements*, eds. Stephen J. Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002) pp. 303-325.

⁶ Bruce D. Jones, "Rwanda", in *United Nations Interventionism, 1991-2004*, eds. Mats Berdal and Spyros Economides (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007) pp. 139-167.

14. The success of the Sierra Leonean mission re-energized the Secretariat – a good thing, since they were shortly to be assigned the most expansive UN operation ever, in East Timor (UNTAET). Shortly thereafter would follow Kosovo (UNMIK), an odd mission in that the military side was managed by NATO, the civilian side by the UN in collaboration with the EU, the OSCE and UNHCR – but a mission that would set important precedents for much of what would follow in terms of multiple actors joining together in a range of configurations to mount operations – so called ‘hybridity’, a theme to which we will return.

15. The apparent success of these two challenging operations (at least in their early days) sparked a renewed interest in UN peacekeeping, which was quickly followed by a major surge. Indeed, in the six years that followed, the UN would experience rapid growth every year, such that by 2006 the UN had experienced a 600% increase in the number of Blue Helmets and by early 2007 had surpassed the previous highs of the early 1990s. At the time of drafting, existing operations combined with authorized operations not just deployed call for a total of over 100,000 UN Blue Helmets to be deployed to 23 operations worldwide, in addition to almost 20,000 civilians.

16. The evolution of peacekeeping in this decade was not only about numbers, however. It was also characterized by a series of additional trends. First, there was an important regional variation in the UN’s peacekeeping responses. UN peacekeeping was most responsive to conflicts in Europe and Latin America, followed by Africa, and was least responsive in Asia.⁷ There were, moreover, significant variations in the scale of operations. Comparing per capita spending and per square kilometer troops levels shows that several hundred thousand troops would be required in the D.R. Congo to match the density of deployment in Kosovo.⁸

17. Second, there was over time a significant decline in the troop contributions of developed states to Blue Helmet missions, especially in Africa. This is much discussed, though reference is often made to the overall decline of Western troop contributions without any regional specification. Norway, Canada and France all continue to contribute peacekeepers to operations in the Middle East, while Australia contributes substantially in Asia and the Middle East. Eastern European states have maintained fairly consistent levels of overall contributions to UN peacekeeping, but concentrated outside Africa.⁹ The decline in the contributions of troops by developed states to Blue Helmet operations in Africa generated discussion of a ‘commitment gap’ – a misleading term, better described as an ‘Africa gap’. Conversely, there was a rapid growth in the contributions of troops by developed states to multinational forces.¹⁰ Western troop contributions made, and continue to make, substantial contributions to UN-authorized operations, and to UN-commanded operations outside of Africa.

18. Third, the late 1990s saw the broadening of the functions of peacekeeping, from the narrow military tasks of separation of forces, demobilization, and securing of territory, to so-

⁷ Michael Gilligan and Stephen J. Stedman, “Where do the Peacekeepers Go?”, *International Studies Review* 5, no. 4 (December 2003): pp. 37-54.

⁸ Stedman, Rothschild and Cousens (2002)

⁹ William Durch et al, *The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Henry Stimson Center, 2003)

¹⁰ For a full account of these statistics, see *The Military Balance (1991-2001)*, published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London.

called ‘multi-dimensional’ operations, which took on a steadily increasing set of civilian, governance, and economic functions. This trend reached its peak in the transitional authority deployed to Kosovo (UNMIK) and East Timor (UNTAET), where the UN had full executive, legal and judicial authority over all aspects of these nascent entities’ territorial administration. In these missions, the UN performed functions related to civil administration, economic reconstruction, financial management, internal security, external security, international relations and treaty making, mounting of elections, administration of justice (including police and courts), and drafting of laws and constitutions.¹¹ Many of these functions continue to characterize UN peace operations, but without full executive authority.

19. A fourth dimension of evolution was the growth in the number of institutional actors involved in implementing UN peace operations – both within the UN system itself, and in partner (or competitor) multilateral institutions. Within the UN system, a growing number of specialized agencies, funds and programs developed putative crisis management capacities, spawning a problem of coordination and coherence. Over the course of the last part of the 1990s and the onset of the new decade, this was increasingly managed through the use of integrated mission structures operating under the direction of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and a Deputy SRSG co-hatted as coordinator of the UN system. In this period, the UN also struggled to develop more consistent relationships with the international financial institutions, especially the World Bank, whose financial and institutional role in conflict recovery grew significantly through the decade.

20. A fifth dimension of evolution involved growing use of political missions of a variety of types – i.e. the deployment of UN senior political staff, or special envoys, to conflict or potential conflict zones without accompanying UN peacekeepers or MNF troops. This type of political activity is as old as the UN itself – the first UN political envoy, Count Folke Bernadotte (Sweden), was deployed to the Middle East in 1948. However, as a tool it had been in abeyance during the 1970s and 1980s, used only sporadically. In the late 1980s and 1990s, however, it has seen not only a substantial increase in frequency (with senior political envoys deployed, inter alia, to Afghanistan, Angola, the Balkans, Burma, Burundi, Colombia, Cote d’Ivoire, Cameroon-Nigeria, the Central African Republic, the Middle East, and Somalia) but also in institutional development, with the creation both of peace-building support offices (in two regions in Africa, and in the Caucasus) and regional political offices (in two regions in Africa).

21. Last, but far from least, UN peace operations (and some MNF operations) occurred within an evolving normative framework of the protection of civilians and ultimately of the Responsibility to Protect. As this is an ongoing evolution, we will return to it below in a discussion of current and future trends in peacekeeping.

III. Main Features of Contemporary Peacekeeping

22. This multi-faceted evolution has led to peacekeeping as we currently know it; an international tool with several important features. First, despite some countervailing trends in the

¹¹ Michele Griffin and Bruce Jones, “Building Peace through Transitional Authority: New Directions, Major Challenges”, *International Peacekeeping* 7, no. 4 (2000)

late 1990s, the UN has emerged as the bulwark of global peacekeeping - by early 2007, the UN had more peacekeepers in the field than all other organizations put together.¹²

23. Second, the core role of the UN notwithstanding, peacekeeping had become a multi-actor business, and the large majority of peace operations – some 40 out of a total of 54 recent missions – were operated in some form of joint, coordinated, or sequenced operation by more than one institutions – what has been referred to as ‘hybrid’ operations.

24. Third, from 2000 onwards, the large majority of new peacekeeping operations deployed through the UN had explicit elements of their mandates devoted to the protection of civilians, and in subsequent years more and more missions had the combination of rules of engagement and force structure to match. Increasingly robust peacekeeping, veering into limited peace enforcement, became the rule, not the exception.

25. Fourth, peace operations were increasingly taking on a broad range of civilian functions, from the provision of police to support to the extension of state administration. In the most elaborate cases, transitional administrations, UN operations took on full executive, judicial and legislative authority.

26. This combination of features has led to successes, and failures. Both the UN and other platforms continued to experience important weakness, alongside new strengths. Among the most important weakness at the UN were slow internal deployment mechanisms; still poor budget and personnel procedures, notwithstanding substantial improvements from the mid-1990s; and sharp limits on its ability to find and deploy civilians. The AU showed itself in its early operation in Sudan/Darfur to be a surprisingly capable institution, but hobbled by lack of financial and civilian resources. NATO experienced some similar weaknesses, except with respect to speed of deployment; and in addition experienced the problem of constraints and caveats imposed by contributors. All institutions were operating under a major structural constraint: limits on available troops and other personnel.

27. A few of these features warrant brief consideration in turn – as does the rising strategic significance of peacekeeping. The civilian dimensions of peacekeeping will be considered in Part 3 and so not addressed here.

28. Peacekeeping as a Multi-actor Business: Hybridity. Though they are but one facet of the broader evolution of peacekeeping, the phenomenon of ‘hybrid’ operations is now prevalent. While hybrid operations are usually treated as a new phenomenon, there have in fact been variants on hybrid operations throughout the 1990s. No two hybrid operations have been identical, creating a difficulty in terms of description and categorization. This immediately highlights one important lesson: that UN peacekeeping is, perhaps contrary to popular conception, quite flexible in terms of the political arrangements under which it deploys.

29. It is possible to categorize these missions in terms of the formal relationship between the sponsoring operations. However, that categorization obscures more than it reveals. The single most importantly reality of hybrid operations is that they are *sui generis* – and that UN peacekeeping proves to be highly flexible in response. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile

¹² Center on International Cooperation, *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2007): pp. 1-12.

highlighting a series of functional features of these missions – several of which may be present in given missions.

30. We can refer to *Short-Term Military Support* – several hybrid operations, for a limited time period, have provided enhanced military support to an existing or newly-deploying UN operation. These include: the UK bilateral operation in Sierra Leone that bolstered UNAMSIL when it was under threat in 2000; the EU Operation Artemis in Bunia, the D.R. Congo, which enabled the expansion of MONUC; the US-supported ECOWAS force in Liberia in 2003, which paved the way for the arrival of UNMIL.

31. A second functional distinction involves *Civilian-Military Division of Labour*. The two clear examples of this mode of operation are UNMIK and UNAMA. In the first case, the UN (along with the EU, the OSCE and UNHCR) provides the civilian and police dimensions of an operation, under single command, while NATO provides the military arm of the operation, under separate (but coordinated) command. In UNAMA, the UN provides the civilian element of the mission, while a multinational force (now NATO-commanded) provides a military dimension, alongside US-led Operation Enduring Freedom.

32. A third mode of operation is what might be referred to as *Linked Peacekeeping-Observer Operations* – where the UN and another operation provide a combination of peacekeeping and observer capacities in separate, but coordinated commands. The two clear examples of this are UNOMIG, where the UN provides an observer force alongside the CIS peacekeeping force; and UNMEE, where the AU provides an observer force alongside the UN peacekeeping force.

33. A fourth functional characterization refers to *Handover Operations* – where the UN precedes or follows a regional or multi-national force operation. Clear examples of this include the move from the OSCE's KVM in Kosovo to NATO and, in turn, to the UN; and the transfer from ECOWAS to UNOMSIL in Sierra Leone in 1998. Most recently, the Australian-led MNF Interfet filled the gap between UNAMET and UNTAET. Artemis-MONUC also involved handovers of responsibilities.

34. Finally we see instances of actual *Integrated Operations* under joint command. So far, only two truly integrated operations have been deployed: MICIVIH, the human rights operation in Haiti, which was operated jointly (and under a dual-hatted SRSG) by the UN and the OAS; and UNMIK, which had UN, OSCE, EU and UNHCR capacities all under the operational command of a single SRSG. Of course, the joint UN/AU mission for Darfur – currently authorized, not yet deployed – will be a truly integrated operation, operating under the joint command of the UN Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Commission. Quite how this operation will function in practice remains to be seen.

35. Protection of Civilians, and Robust Peacekeeping. As scholars have emphasized¹³, since 1999 most new peacekeeping operations have had protection of civilians mandates – usually conditioned by language that stipulates that the missions are mandated to protect ‘within the limits of their capacity’.

¹³ Ian Johnstone, “Dilemmas of Robust Peacekeeping”, in *2006 Annual Review of Global Peace Operations*, Center on International Cooperation (Boulder, CO:Lynne Rienner, 2007): pp. 1-18.

36. The first several missions to receive such mandates happened to be fairly robust operations – in Kosovo and in Timor Leste. The experience of Interfet and later UNTAET in tackling West Timorese militias that posed a threat to the population was an early experience of so called ‘PoC’ operations. Far more dramatic have been the operations in the D.R. Congo (MONUC, supported by Artemis and later EUFOR DRC) and in Haiti – in both cases, the missions successfully undertook seize and hold operations against rebels or gang leaders, scoring significant political victories for the peace processes or elections in both cases. There were controversies around these operations, especially in the DR Congo where the extent of civilian casualties involved in the operations was problematic, but overall both missions received political support both by the host nation, contributing nations and more broadly within the authorizing organizations.

37. However, most troop contributors lack doctrine relating to the protections of civilians, as does the UN itself.¹⁴ Further development of doctrine through the Capstone project is underway, but it is likely that further developments on the ground will require more intensive doctrinal work in the coming years.

38. It is also important to note that the adoption of the concept of ‘responsibility to protect’ at the World Summit in 2005 creates the possibility of the Security Council authorizing enforcement operations in a context of large-scale attacks on civilians – up to and including genocide. However, in doctrinal terms, these should likely be thought of as enforcement operations, if they occur, though likely to be followed by peacekeeping operations in the more narrow sense.

39. The Rising Strategic Significance of Peacekeeping. By mid 2006, peacekeeping at the UN and beyond had not only recovered from its post-Cold War doldrums, it had begun to emerge as a strategic tool in the maintenance of international peace and security. Both in the scale and scope of contemporary operations, peacekeeping had gone from being a modest aspect of international military strategy to being a central one. Not, perhaps, for the superpower and the major powers; but it is illustrative that by 2005 the UN had more troops in the field than any actor other than the US armed services – more than the UK, more than France, more than Russia, more than China. NATO, the AU and the UN had missions under way that were of strategic significance to the major powers – in Afghanistan, in Lebanon and in Sudan.

40. For NATO, Afghanistan had emerged as not only a mission of strategic significance, but a test case. NATO’s difficulties in raising adequate troop levels for its mission, particularly when confronted with a resurgent Taleban in the south; the restrictions and caveats placed on its assets’ deployment and use by several troop contributors; its complicated, multi-actor decision-making structure; and troop contributors experience of limitations in NATO’s tactical response capacity – all of these factors contributed to something of a loss of prestige for this previously unchallenged institution. More significant still was NATO’s inability to coordinate with civilian and economic institutions in such a way as would allow for the delivery of effective, coordinated ‘hearts and minds’ campaigns in such areas as Helmand province.

¹⁴ Victoria Holt, “The Responsibility to Protect: Considering the Operational Capacity for Civilian Protection”, working paper, revised January 2005 (available at http://www.stimson.org/fopo/pdf/Stimson_CivPro_pre-pubdraftFeb04.pdf).

41. For the AU, Darfur was a testing ground both politically and operationally. In political terms, the significance of the AU Peace and Security Council's decision to deploy should not be under-estimated, constituting as it did the first major operational decision undertaken by the newly-revived Council under its new Charter – a Charter that for the first time in Africa recognized internal conflict as an issue for regional attention and possible intervention. Operationally, the AU came under much criticism for its inability to mount a large-scale, adequately robust operation – but much of this criticism was unfair, given the performance of the relatively young operational command of the AU and given the extreme logistical and operational difficulties of the case.

42. Indeed, Sudan was also a very trying case for the UN, undermining in some capitals the perception of UN peacekeeping progress and undermining also the sense that important progress had been made in fall 2005 with the adoption of the 'responsibility to protect' concept. These negative perceptions were however modified by a recognition of the scale of intransigence showed by the Sudanese government (and some neighbors), as well as by the success in summer 2007 under the combined diplomatic pressures of the UN, US, and China in getting Khartoum to agree to a serious joint UN/AU force. At the time of drafting, it remains to be seen what will be the effect (politically) of the fact that it will take the UN several months – possibly as many as nine – to deploy its full force to this most remote of terrains.

43. But perhaps even more significant for the UN was the operation in Lebanon, deployed in summer 2006 after the month-long Israel/Hezbollah war. Here we saw the return of robust UN peacekeeping to the Middle East for the first time since the Camp David Accords – and consequently the deployment of a major, robust and well-mandated UN force in an area of the highest strategic significance. The rapid deployment of forces under UN command (though not through the UN's own logistical mechanisms) dispelled or at least challenged notions of the UN as a slow and cumbersome tool; and the return of Europe to Blue Helmet operations marked a potentially significant turning point for UN peacekeeping.¹⁵ Every bit as important as Europe's re-engagement was a significant expansion in Chinese participation in the force. At the strategic level, the importance of the operation to Washington, and quite positive perceptions within parts of the Administration of the UN's performance, was leading to a broadening of interest in UN peacekeeping in that sometimes skeptical capital.

44. Successes, Failures of Peacekeeping; and Constraints. All of which has produced – what? To some analysts, the close correspondence between the rise of peacekeeping as an instruments of conflict management from the early 1990s onwards, and the decline in the level of war in the world during the same period, is indicative of a causal relationship between the two: i.e. that peacekeeping, particularly UN peacekeeping, has helped reduce the number of wars in the world.

45. Arguably, the story line is slightly more complicated. First, it is mediation that brings wars to an end; peacekeeping by and large is used to keep them ended – of late, at somewhere between a 50% and 66% rate of success. In other words, between half and a third of wars that are ended and to which peacekeepers are deployed see a renewal of warfare. The glass half empty

¹⁵ Ironically, having lobbied for the return of Europe to Blue Helmets, the UN quickly discovered in Lebanon – as NATO has done in Afghanistan – that European troops come with significant caveats and constraints; and the new UNIFIL found itself dependent on Indian and Pakistani contingents to undertake more assertive deployment and patrolling in southern Lebanon.

version of this notes that the deployment of a UN peacekeeping or peacebuilding operation appears to have little bearing on whether or not the country in questions relapse into conflict, suggesting some serious remaining flaws in peacebuilding and state-building approaches. The glass half full version suggests that the half to two-thirds of countries that do not relapsed are helped in not doing so by the presence of peacekeeping and peacebuilding capacities. The preponderance of evidence is swinging towards the glass half full version of the story line, as longer duration missions appear to correlate with declining levels of war in Africa and elsewhere.

46. An issue which has as yet not been directly tackled is: what kind of states emerge from peacekeeping? Certainly, the ambition of peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations is to establish or re-establish legitimate, democratic or at least participatory states; with a rule of law based system of governance; and reasonably free markets. To date, no serious comparative study has been undertaken on whether or not these features characterize the states that emerge from peacekeeping – an issue surely warranting further study.¹⁶

IV. Prospects for the Evolution of Peacekeeping

47. Looking outwards from 2007 towards the future evolution of peacekeeping, two very considerable unknowns must be acknowledged. The first is about the political trajectory of the Middle East. Whereas we have seen a decline in conflict in every other region, we are witnessing a rise in conflict in the Middle East; if that rise is sustained or accelerated, the implications for peacekeeping will be significant. Second, is the question of the strategic relationship between the US, the Russian Federation and China on questions of multilateral security. Should these remain in the reasonably positive space that they have been in, we can expect to see growing use of multilateral security instruments – including peacekeeping – as a tool not only for conflict management, but for crisis avoidance.

48. These two strategic factors will be discussed briefly below, as will the implication of these and other likely trends/factors on the form and function of peacekeeping – on its mandates and functions; on its likely locations; on institutional arrangements; and on its ability to overcome significant challenges ahead.

49. Location of Peacekeeping – Africa and the Middle East. How peacekeeping will function and what mandates it will undertake will invariably be shaped by the question of where peacekeepers are deployed. Forecasting conflict trends is an inexact science, to say the least, but some broad current patterns can be noted that, if continued, will have a significant impact on the form and function of peacekeeping.

50. The most important current trends, reported in the Human Security Report 2006 update, are two reversals: a decline, for the first time since the end of the Cold War, in the number of conflicts on the African continent; and a rise in the Middle East.

51. The decline in the number of conflict in Africa, if it holds, will not herald an immediate decline in peacekeeping levels there. Quite the contrary: it is the end of wars, not the wars

¹⁶ A study being undertaken by Louise Andersen, Danish Institute for International Affairs, is starting to fill this gap.

themselves, that generates peacekeeping. With some important exceptions, peacekeepers are deployed only once a peace settlement or at least cessation of hostilities has been achieved. So if political and economic or other conditions are creating circumstances by which more of Africa's wars are brought to an end, this should suggest roughly sustained levels of peacekeepers in Africa over the next five to ten years, with space freed up by the close of missions (Sierra Leone, Burundi) being filled by new ones (Darfur, Chad, Central African Republic).

52. In the Middle East, the patterns are less established, but there has been a point of continuity between the Cold War and the present, namely the deployment of peacekeepers along borders to stabilize cessation of hostilities arrangements – latest in Lebanon in 2006. Whether the pattern will hold will depend on whether we witness inter-state wars (Israel-Syria, perhaps; Israel-Iran, perhaps; regional intervention in Iraq) and if so of what type (air wars, proxy insurgency, land battles?) The bigger drive for peacekeeping will come if we see internal wars in the fertile crescent.

53. In two other regions, the prospects for peacekeeping seem remote, but can't be ruled out. In Latin America, reversals in democratic governance and social tensions have at various points over the last five years hinted at the possibility of internal struggles. On the other hand, Latin America has for the most part developed economically to the point where in comparative terms it should be at low risk of social tensions turning into armed conflict. In Southern Asia, with the major exception of Timor Leste and the earlier exception of Cambodia, the pattern has not been to respond to internal struggle through third-party mediation and peacekeeping. New demands for peacekeeping could arise in the near term in the Phillipines if there are reversals there, and in Laos, perhaps – but neither likely in large numbers. The only near-term potential source of major new peacekeeping operations lies in potential further autonomy movements in Indonesia. Given troop contributing patterns and regional politics, it seems unlikely that any deterioration of conditions in South Asia would be met by international peacekeeping. Africa and the Middle East, then, seem likely to remain as they are at present the two primary regions receiving peacekeepers.

54. Form of Peacekeeping – Beyond Hybridity. If hybridity in its various forms has already emerged as the dominant mode of peacekeeping, a critical policy question looking forward is whether we can envisage a political and organizational process that moves us from hybridity to partnership and beyond – to a global system of inter-locking capacities operating.

55. There are three critical dimensions to such a system. The first is the question of whether NATO can in a sustained way be used as the robust arm of peace keeping and peace enforcement under a UN umbrella; or whether an alternative, but equally robust mechanism can be envisaged – whether, in short, the international community will have available to it a predictable *capacity to protect*. The second is the articulation of a more effective system of clear responsibilities and fluid support mechanisms between regional architecture and the UN. The third – the most speculative – is the spread of well-organized regional operational capabilities beyond the two regions where those currently exist: Africa and Europe.

56. The question must be shaped by the regional discussion above. In Africa, we are already seeing the emergence of a dual system based on the AU and the UN, with the EU and NATO playing supporting roles. In the greater Middle East, a far less predictable set of arrangements is

unfolding, with the UN, EU and NATO, all playing operational roles in different parts of the region.

57. In Africa, the political consolidation of the AU has not yet been matched by operational consolidation, but the process getting underway of AU-UN-EU-NATO capacity building could, over time, help to develop a more robust AU operational presence. The missing ingredient is serious capacity building of the AU strategic capacity – a role the UN can and should play (see below on organizational stability).

58. In the Middle East, the first question will be: who will deploy? Israel's borders are instructive: in the north, a robust UN-commanded mission is deployed. In the north east, a traditional UN inter-positional mission watches the disengaged zone between Israel and Syria. In the south, an EU border monitoring mission works the Gaza side of the Rafah crossing while a US-led Multinational force watches the Egyptian side; and in Jerusalem, the UN has a political mission of its own, which also supports the functioning of the diplomatic Quartet.

59. In a similar forecasting report written in 2003 for DPKO, I argued that we were unlikely to see a significant expansion of UN peacekeeping in the Middle East; I was partially wrong. The deployment of the new, robust UNIFIL to southern Lebanon reflects the changed political circumstances that arose from the Iraq war and the deep unpopularity of US policy, and thus of NATO (the alternative for a robust deployment), in the region. However, the fact is that that operation was acceptable to major partners including Israel, France and the United States only once it bypassed the existing DPKO bureaucratic capacities and systems, relying far more heavily than more UN operations on contributors own capabilities and drawing in their own management assets. Still controversial is the question of whether this model – a different kind of hybrid, between UN-commanded and multi-national operations – is likely to be replicated or whether this constitutes a one-off aberration.

60. A second question in the region is whether or not a UN or regional framework can be found to draw substantially greater numbers of regional troops into peacekeeping in the region, if the demand rises. This proposition will likely be tested in the first instance in Iraq, as the US moves towards gradual withdrawal. There are many uncertainties here, including whether sectarian divisions would too greatly complicate the prospects for within-region deployments.

61. Mandates of Peacekeeping – Beyond Peace Implementation. If location and form are critical determinants of the scale of demand on various aspects of the peacekeeping system, then the crucial determinant of both its likely success and of whether it will be able to sustain political support is the core question of the purposes for which it is used – the question of mandates.

62. During the Cold War, the essential purpose and the core mandate of peacekeeping was stabilization of ceasefires. As peacekeeping began in the post-Cold War era to respond to internal wars, it did so alongside the tremendous expansion of mediation – a fundamental change in conflict management that resulted in more wars being ended by mediation in the past 15 years than the previous 200. The core purpose and mandate of peacekeeping during the post-Cold War era has been the implementation of peace agreements. As peace agreements have become more elaborate, so too have peace operations, especially in terms of the civilian dimensions. But implementation has remained at the core of mandates; protection of civilians, as discussed has been a growing element, but even this is related to peace implementation in that protection of

civilians, quite apart from its humanitarian purposes, is designed to ensure sustained political support for the operation.

63. However, two developments auger a potential change in the way that the core functions of peacekeeping are conceptualized – two related, but very different developments. The first, the less controversial, has to do quite simply with the extension of operational support to administrative functions of the state.

64. Extension of State Authority. As with many evolutions at the UN, the way in which peace operations provide support to, or in some cases temporarily supplant, state functions has developed in a dialectical fashion, two steps forward requiring one and a half back. For example, the adoption of full-blown executive authority in East Timor and Kosovo produced a backlash against this tremendous extension of mandate and purpose, notably in the Brahimi Report's call for a 'light footprint'. But the light footprint has found its own challenge in Afghanistan, in reversals in Timor Leste, and in the unresolved problem of Kosovo's status.

65. As noted above, most UN operations currently deployed to post-conflict settings have substantial civilian functions. Whether or not they hold formal powers, these operations become major features of 'state' authority in their mandate territories. Both the scope of these functions, and the length of their duration, has been steadily expanding.

66. In the UN, this reality is taking institutional expression in the form of follow-on missions, focused on peacebuilding support – notably in Sierra Leone and Timor Leste. At this stage, these are comparatively small operations, comprising roughly two to three hundred international civilian staff. And in theory they are designed to stay only for a fairly brief period after the main operation.

67. Many of these operations, however, are being deployed to contexts where a combination of ruptured politics, ethnic/sectarian division, and sharply limited state capacity mean that the challenge of restoring state authority is taking years, even decades. Ten years into the Bosnia operation it remains true that critical political and civilian functions remain in the hands of the international community – and Bosnia is perhaps the site of the *greatest* level of human and social capital of any contemporary peace operation. In Haiti, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, the capability of the state to sustain administrative and security control over the territory is dramatically lower.

68. All of this would not matter were the international community willing to see ungoverned territories stay ungoverned. But increasingly, it is not – as evidenced perhaps most dramatically by the decision of the Security Council and the African Union to re-enter Somalia after ten years of no formal or operational presence beyond limited humanitarian operations and off-shore mediation.

69. The logic for this is connected to the second theme – the increasing role of multinational military assets in counter-terrorism operations – to which we will turn in a moment.

70. The consequence of the logic is that peace operations will have increasingly to be mandated and resourced to provide sustained support to the process of extending state authority and deepening state capacity – support not over a three-to-five year time-frame, but likely over a fifteen-to-twenty year horizon. This will require, inter alia, the development of robust new

institutional arrangements at headquarters for the rapid identification and mobilization of civilian personnel, a function that so far has eluded both the UN and the EU, to say nothing of the AU and NATO (see ahead ‘Challenges’).

71. Counter-Terrorism. But perhaps the most significant development in recent peacekeeping, in terms of what it augers for the medium-term future of peacekeeping, is the gradual incorporation of counter-terrorism objectives into the mandates – or at the very least the concept of operations – of peacekeeping missions.

72. Of course, terrorism has existed alongside peacekeeping from its earliest days. Count Folke Bernadotte, the UN’s very first special envoy and mediator, and the head of its first operational deployment, was assassinated by the Jewish terror group Irgun. Its second operation, along the India-Pakistan line of separation, has repeatedly witnessed incursions across this line of groups considered by one side at least to be terrorists. When the UN deployed into the Congo to deal with separatists, at least some of those they confronted would likely be considered terrorists by today’s definitions – or at least to have engaged in terrorist acts.

73. ‘By today’s definitions’ – yes, but these are of course hotly debated, and a universal definition has eluded the UN, complicating this discussion. To illustrate: Hezbollah, an organization with a political arm and political ambition, but that has deliberately targeted civilians in Israel and abroad for attack, is widely recognized as a terrorist organization; whereas the *Janjaweed*, which has no political arm and uses wide-spread, deliberate attacks against civilians, is not thought of or listed as a terrorist organization. Such lack of consistency in application of the concept of terrorism complicates this discussion, and more importantly complicates international efforts to counter the phenomenon of terrorism.

74. Nevertheless, it is evident that in at least three contexts peace operations have been deployed in ways and with mandates that engage them in specific operations against terrorist organizations. In Afghanistan, most directly, NATO’s ISAF is directly involved in containment and offensive operations against the Taleban, while the UN directly supports the Aghan government which has defeat of the Taleban as a core strategic goal. In the Phillipines, a mission is deployed to help stabilize the situation after a counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism campaign against the Moro Liberation Front was brought to a conclusion by a negotiated settlement. And in Lebanon, the revived and revitalized UNIFIL is deployed with both the mandate and the force capacity to both resist Hezbollah and to assist the Government of Lebanon in disarming the organization.

75. Of course, the question has been raised about Afghanistan in particular: is ISAF a peacekeeping or a peace-enforcement operation? The question is more confused than it would have been five years ago, because of the trend towards robust protection of civilians dimensions to most peacekeeping operations. The line between robust peacekeeping and peace enforcement is blurry. However, Ian Johnstone has set out a compelling case for the following distinction: if the overall purpose of the operation is in support of a political agreement, robust action against spoilers, opponents to the agreement, or those who attack civilians should be considered robust peacekeeping, not enforcement; if the overall mission objective is to deal militarily with one or more parties to conflict in the absence of a political settlement, that quite clearly is enforcement. By that standard, the Afghanistan and Lebanon missions are robust peacekeeping, not peace enforcement.

76. The more speculative question is whether it is conceivable that we would see the deployment of enforcement operations with explicit counter-terrorism objectives? We have already seen the deployment of NATO in limited counter-terrorism missions, such as in counter-terrorism defense during the Athens Olympics.

77. Here, the question depends in substantial part on forecasts about terrorism trends – an even more inexact science than conflict forecasting. Suffice it to say that current developments in Iraq and the surrounding region do seem to auger for an increase, rather than a decrease, in terrorist activity in the near term. Whether it additionally augers new contexts where terrorist organizations actually control territory is at this juncture very difficult to tell. It is also difficult to predict the precise contours of international political arrangements related to the counter-terrorism aspect of peacekeeping and potential enforcement – an issue we will turn to shortly. Based on current patterns, attitudes, and reasonable forecasts, I would conclude that there is a fair likelihood of NATO and possibly the UN being asked at some point over the next five to ten years an operation that has counter-terrorism objectives at its core.

V. Conclusion: Challenges Ahead

78. If these are likely, or at least possible, features of peacekeeping's near-term future, then peacekeeping will face several intersecting challenges: maintaining stable organizational frameworks for the management of operations; generating adequate force levels; and maintaining political consent for operations – both in terms of on-the-ground consent of critical actors, and of overall political consent for the authorization and financing of increasingly ambitious operations.

79. Organizational Stability. As peacekeeping has mushroomed over the past seven years, peacekeeping institutions have faced a series of organizational challenges in the management of operations. These issues are likely to remain on the agenda over the next three to five years as the necessary political and bureaucratic processes are worked through.

80. The issues of organizational stability differ from institution to institution. In the UN, peacekeeping will in the next three to five years struggle to deal simultaneously with the massive organizational demands of managing 21 missions comprising almost 130,000 troops in the field (if currently mandated missions are all fully deployed.) By 2008, the UN's military field presence could be larger than the US military presence in Iraq. Here, the HQ-field ratios for organizational support are startling. The US ratio of HQ staff to military personnel in the field is roughly 3:1; the NATO ratio is 1:4; the UN ratio is 1:100 – *after* the addition of new posts through the creation of the Department of Field Services. But scale will not be the only challenge. The splitting of DPKO into two Departments, and the restructuring of DPKO itself around three pillars (operations, military, rule of law) will have a substantial effect on organizational culture and practice, and will take time to settle. As will the as yet untested relationship between the Under-Secretary-General for Field Services, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, and the Deputy-Secretary-General, newly provided with delegated authority for oversight of the field support function – but in no way staffed to execute that authority.

81. The African Union is starting at a far lower level of organizational capacity for planning, management and oversight of operations. Governments nominally adopted a 10-year

commitment to accelerated capacity building with the African Union in the World Summit outcome document in September 2005, but to date there is little to suggest that that commitment will be made real. If not, capability building in the AU might be put back substantially. On the other hand, if the pattern of AU/ECOWAS and UN joint or sequential action on the continent (Liberia, Somalia, Darfur) continues, an alternative presents itself – namely some process by which DPKO Africa Division capabilities are made available in a sustained way to AU decision-makers. One option here would be creating a regional office of DPKO in Addis.

82. In Europe, primarily two issues will require continued attention: the development of peacekeeping-specific (versus general military planning) expertise within NATO; and the relationship between NATO and EU military and civilian capacities. On the later, the question of whether it proves possible to overcome the complications that have bedeviled EU/NATO interactions over the past few years depends on many aspects, and including a prior political question about France's relationship to NATO. Here, recent statements from the new French leadership suggest the possibility of change. We could see in NATO/EU the emergence of a multi-disciplinary peacekeeping capability, able to combine the full range of high-order military capabilities (including enforcement, intelligence, and tactical capability) with extensive civilian and economic capabilities. However, it should be noted that several EU Member States are not Members of NATO, and vice versa, which indicates that there is likely to be two distinct organizations with different identities, possibilities and constraints for some time also in the foreseeable future.

83. Finally, each of these four organizations will have to develop specialized capabilities around the issue of coordination with each other.

84. Force Levels. A quite different challenge will be in maintaining troop levels [Should be complemented by civilian personnel levels, including the police]. Several factors will drive the availability of troops for peacekeeping deployments:

- *Defense transformation in Europe* – at present, only a small fraction of Europe's 1,500,000 troops are able to be sustained overseas at any one time. Transformation of even a fraction of Europe's armed forces could significantly increase available troops for peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations.
- *Chinese and other Asian participation* – if the sizeable Chinese and Indonesian troop contributions to the new UNIFIL auger the start of a trend line in contributions from East Asian countries, this could have significant positive effect on available supply.
- *South Asia* – As two of the four major troop contributors from the region develop economically, the question becomes whether they will sustain their troop contribution levels. If not, this could offset any increase from East Asia.
- *Arab states* – to date, Jordan has been the only consistent large-scale troop contributor from Arab states. Renewed Egyptian interest in peacekeeping and peacebuilding including in AU contexts could signal a shift in trends in that region, depending heavily on overall security dynamics in the region.
- *SouthNorth American states* – with new experience of peacekeeping in Haiti, we may see renewed engagement of South American contributors to peacekeeping. From Canada, a

continuing popular attachment to UN peacekeeping, not at all reflect in Canada's contribution, could drive renewed contributions especially if popular sentiment forces a drawdown of the country's force in Afghanistan. As to the United States, the shift of 20,000 US troops from Operation Enduring Freedom to NATO in Afghanistan constitutes an important return to multi-lateral peacekeeping, more likely to take place under NATO than UN auspices.

- *African states* – just 12 African states provide over 85% of the African troops contributed to UN and AU peacekeeping, and they are facing serious strains. On the other hand, G8-based initiatives and NATO activities in capacity-building could amplify African capacity over the next several years.

85. Maintaining Political Consent. All of the above will require maintaining political consent – of host nations, and of contributing nations. The challenge has three dimensions.

86. Responsibility to protect operations face a particular challenge in *maintain contributing nations consent*. Faced with the inevitable fact of casualties emerging from robust peacekeeping, contributing nations have had a difficult time convincing their publics that peacekeeping missions are worth sacrificing soldiers' lives for. These operations have been explained to publics not in national security terms or threat terms, but in humanitarian terms – terms which generate support for spending, support even for deployments, but not so far, for casualties. Efforts to make the case to populations that success in robust peacekeeping in contexts like Afghanistan contributes to overall international and national security relies on a risk analysis and chain of events logic that translates poorly into public messaging. This challenge is less severe in non-democratic contributors, but even there far from irrelevant. Consent of host nations can largely be assumed – after all, in most such contexts the post-war government is the lead beneficiary of the settlement being protected – though excess civilian casualties can erode host nation support.

87. The state support function of operations is likely to find broad support politically among troop contributing nations and more widely among authorizing nations – but will have to work hard to maintain consent of host nations over time. This may sound surprising – that the political and governance function of peace operations may prove more controversial than the security function – but in many contexts where peacekeeping is deployed, host nations do not have a strong tradition of civilian control over the military or the military and police providing protection to citizens, hence – assuming effective management and avoiding civilian casualties – the basic security function provided by peacekeeping has been proving by and large uncontroversial – there have been, as evidence, several recent instances of countries appealing to the Security Council to maintain troop levels – most recently in Timor Leste. However, political governance functions of peace operations very quickly run into sensitivities about sovereignty, and of course directly touch the interests of and political space available too state elites. Developing appropriate cultural and behavioural norms, as well as deepening doctrine about the appropriate balance between state authority and support thereto, will be critical to maintaining host nation consent for this function.

88. With respect to counter-terrorism aspects of operations, one would anticipate that both troop-contributing nations and host nations would readily support such missions – the former because they will be able to explain the mission in more clear national security terms, the later because the government will be direct beneficiaries of the operation.

89. But there is a broader question: will peacekeeping institutions be able to maintain the broader support of their memberships if peacekeeping increasingly contains counter-terrorism dimensions, or even robust counter-insurgency dimensions? The deep controversies around terrorism in the UN and other international fora suggest that this may not be so. It is worth noting that polling data finds consistently that large majorities of populations in the West and in the Arab world share an abhorrence of terrorism and a commitment to seeing it effectively tackled.¹⁷ However, those same polls show a major divide between many western nations and many Arab nations in particular as to whether terrorism is a subject for rule of law and police action, or military engagement. If peacekeeping becomes associated with a military approach to terrorism, it will likely run into substantial political headwinds – as it has, for example, in the Somalia operation. If on the other hand, authorizing institutions can devise new forms of operations that provide advanced police, rule of law, and tactical military support to counter-terrorism operations, that may be a very different story indeed.

¹⁷ See for example recent Pew Global Attitudes Project Polling on this subject. Available at <http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=248>