

BACKGROUND PAPER

# SAMIM in Cabo Delgado: what lessons for political and strategic coherence?

## ABOUT THE EVENT

The Challenges Annual Forum 2023 (#CAF23Addis) will gather partners and key stakeholders to explore ways to strengthen global-regional peace and security partnerships, with a focus on Africa. The in-person event, co-hosted by the Training for Peace (TfP) programme, will take place in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia from 26 – 27 October.

**Challenges Forum** is a global partnership that uses its convening power to generate innovative ideas and promote results for more effective peace operations.

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**In the wake of escalating violence in Cabo Delgado province, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) initiated the deployment of a Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM). A decision that gained support from the African Union’s Peace and Security Council the following year. This paper analyses the degree of collaboration and highlights gaps in strategic coherence, operational coordination, and conflict prevention efforts in Cabo Delgado. It also offers some recommendations and guiding questions to stimulate discussion.**

In June 2021, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) approved the deployment of the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) to assist the Government tackling the insurgency threat of violent extremists in the province of Cabo Delgado. SAMIM comprises troops deployment from eight Personnel Contributing Countries namely, Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, South Africa, United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia, working in collaboration with the Mozambique Defence Forces and other troops deployed to Cabo Delgado to combat acts of terrorism and violent extremism.<sup>1</sup>

The African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) endorsed the deployment of the Mission in January 2022. SADC authorised SAMIM as a military operation under the African Standby Force Policy Framework (Scenario 6). Following an improvement of the security situation on the ground, SADC amended the mandate to a multidimensional mission of the Framework (Scenario 5), in July 2022. SAMIM operates under the SADC political leadership, with the endorsement of the AU PSC. As SADC was invited by Mozambique, no United Nations (UN) Security Council authorisation was required. The economic cost of the Mission is covered by contributing countries, with additional financial support by the European Union (EU) and logistical support from the AU, through the Continental Logistical Base in Douala, as well as with equipment donated by China to AU.

SAMIM’s deployment has contributed to improving the overall security situation in Cabo Delgado.<sup>2</sup> However, it has proven difficult to sustain the gains due to insufficient operational and tactical coordination, and a lack of strategic coherence among the different operating security actors (SAMIM, Rwanda and Mozambique government).

Additionally, in line with the transition under the African Standby Force Policy Framework, SAMIM needs to develop a multidimensional comprehensive strategy addressing the drivers of violent extremism in the region, in close coordination and alignment with Humanitarian, Development and Peace nexus actors in Cabo Delgado.

### **Strategic coherence**

There is currently an insufficient operational coordination between SAMIM and the forces of the Government of Mozambique and Rwanda, that operate alongside each other in Cabo Delgado. Despite some military gains by the three forces, operational and intelligence gaps due to insufficient coordination have undermined their ability to consolidate prolonged security gains. On their part, the insurgents have adapted, changed their tactics, and increased their attacks on the civilian population.<sup>3</sup> With neither a shared strategic vision nor the operational plans and coordination mechanisms needed to implement such plans, SAMIM has thus far not been able to undertake effective joint operations with Rwanda. The Mission has further not the capacity to

1 <https://www.sadc.int/latest-news/sadc-mission-mozambique-samim-brief>

2 This background paper is based on research by Moffat, C., Dzinesa, G.A & Saraiva, R. presented in EPON Study: Effectiveness of the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) [forthcoming 2024]

sustain support for the Government of Mozambique, and it cannot secure and backstop the humanitarian and reconstruction efforts in the province.

Although the AU PSC has endorsed SAMIM's deployment and provided logistical support to the Mission, the strategic coherence between the AU Commission (AUC) and the Mission remains poor.<sup>4</sup> There is still no effective coordination mechanism in place, and SAMIM is not systematically sharing information with the AUC.<sup>5</sup>

Strategic coherence between EU and the Mission could also be improved. The European support to SAMIM includes the provision of funding through the European Peace Facility targeted to cover non-military aspects of the Mission's mandate. Additionally, the EU is supporting SAMIM's Peace Building Support Programme, funded by the African Peace Facility's Early Response Mechanism.<sup>6</sup> EU is also financially supporting the Government's reconstruction efforts and providing training to the Mozambique armed forces. However, it remains unclear to which extent EU is leveraging its support to these various actors, to achieve greater cross-sectoral strategic coherence.

### **Joint multidimensional prevention**

In line with the mandate, SAMIM has been partly successful in fulfilling its responsibilities, especially related to restoring security and stability in the region. The transition from a military operation to a multidimensional peace mission shows flexibility and adaptability.<sup>7</sup> The amendment of the mandate also demonstrated that SADC understood the importance of adopting a multidimensional approach of the Mission, with the ability to better address root causes of violent extremism in the region.<sup>8</sup>

As part of the transition, SADC adopted the Framework for Support to the Government of Mozambique in Addressing Terrorism as well as a Peacebuilding Support Programme. Both are aimed at complementing Mozambique's Reconstruction Plan for Cabo Delgado (PRCD), which is supported by the World Bank, UN agencies and bilateral donors.<sup>9</sup> SAMIM aims to align its peace support efforts with Mozambique's PRCD, especially in the area of capacity building for police and correctional services.<sup>10</sup> However, better coordination is needed among SAMIM and the other security and Humanitarian, Development and Peace nexus actors in Cabo Delgado to ensure that their efforts are coherent with Mozambique's national priorities and address the socio-economic needs on the ground.

*“The transition from a military operation to a multidimensional peace mission shows flexibility and adaptability”*

In general, the Mozambican government, security forces and international actors as well as NGO's operating in Cabo Delgado lack a shared vision for preventing and countering violent extremism. More investments are needed in developing a shared understanding of the issues, and a joint approach to strengthening the resilience and adaptive capacity of the affected communities. SAMIM could play an important role, in supporting the Government of Mozambique, to take a lead in such a process.

3 Moffat, C, Dzinesa, G.A & Saraiva, R. EPON Study: Effectiveness of the SADC: Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) [Report in preparation]

4 African Union. Communiqué of the 1062nd meeting of the PSC. <http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/communique-of-the-1062nd-meeting-of-the-psc-held-on-31-january-2022-on-the-deployment-of-the-southern-african-development-community-mission-in-mozambique-samim>

5 Amani Africa. Ministerial meeting on the situation in Mozambique and Operations of SAMIM.

<https://amaniafrica-et.org/ministerial-meeting-on-the-situation-in-mozambique-and-operations-of-samim/>

6 Moffat, C, Dzinesa, G.A & Saraiva, R. EPON Study: Effectiveness of the SADC: Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) [Report in preparation]

7 Dzinesa, G.A (2023) The Southern African Development Community's Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM): Policymaking and Effectiveness

8 Ibid.

9 Dzinesa, G.A (2023) The Southern African Development Community's Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM): Policymaking and Effectiveness

10 Ibid.

## Recommendations

### a. Joint vision

SAMIM, Rwanda and the Mozambique Government need to develop a joint vision to strengthen their strategic coherence, in order to achieve and sustain long-term peace in Cabo Delgado. This is done through putting in place operational plans with tactical coordination mechanisms to support mandate implementation.<sup>11</sup>

### b. Multidimensional mission

SAMIM needs to develop a strategic plan, in order to operationalise its transition to a multidimensional mission. Such a plan should be aligned with the Government's and international partners' priorities, to ensure that the security support SAMIM is providing is coherent with and complements the humanitarian, development and reconstruction efforts.

### c. Information sharing and planning

Strategic coherence and operational coordination among all actors across the Human Development Partner nexus can be improved by sharing information, resources and best practices. As well as developing joint and comprehensive strategies for preventing the spread of violent extremism. These joint strategies should include peacebuilding, development assistance and community-embedded prevention.<sup>12</sup>

### d. Roles and responsibilities

Under the principle of subsidiarity, AU and SADC could better define the specific roles and obligations of the two organisations, to enhance the strategic coherence.<sup>13</sup> AU and SADC could further developing a joint framework on the type and frequency of information that needs to be shared.<sup>14</sup>

### e. Coordination and training

The Government of Mozambique, the AUC and SAMIM can explore how the EU Training Mission to Mozambique can be coordinated with the efforts of Rwanda and SAMIM in Cabo Delgado. This would strengthen the interoperability as some of the military and police officers trained by EU could potentially serve as liaison officers or as counterparts.<sup>15</sup>

### Guiding questions for working group discussions

- What lessons could be learned from missions like SAMIM for future peace operations, mandated and deployed by Regional Economic Commissions?
- How could Regional Economic Commissions, like SADC or ECOWAS, rethink their relationship with AU for more strategic coherence and effectiveness?
- How could Regional Economic Commissions improve their mandating process for peace operations, in close coordination with AU? Does this include clarifying specific roles and obligations and the principle of subsidiarity?
- Is there a role for UN, in a situation where a Security Council mandate is not a legal requirement, in these kinds of missions? If so, could the Council endorsement add additional legitimacy and credibility?
- How could a strengthened UN-AU partnership assist in supporting Regional Economic Commissions' peace operations. Could the UN support SAMIM via the AUC? If so, how could strategic coherence between UN, AU, SAMIM and the Government of Mozambique be sustained?

11 Institute for Security Studies (ISS). SADC and Rwanda shouldn't go alone in Mozambique. <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/sadc-and-rwanda-shouldnt-go-it-alone-in-mozambique>

12 Ibid.

13 A Regional Economic Commission within the African Standby Force Framework and with the endorsement of the AU PSC

14 International Crisis Group (2023) Making the most out of the EU's integrated approach in Mozambique. Accessed: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/east-and-southern-africa/mozambique/making-most-eus-integrated-approach-mozambique>

15 International Crisis Group (2023) Making the most out of the EU's integrated approach in Mozambique. Accessed: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/east-and-southern-africa/mozambique/making-most-eus-integrated-approach-mozambique>

16 International Crisis Group (2023) Making the most out of the EU's integrated approach in Mozambique. Accessed: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/east-and-southern-africa/mozambique/making-most-eus-integrated-approach-mozambique>

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